OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. It followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Marinka. An explosion occurred 100m from an SMM patrol, assessed as inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The Mission also recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Bezimenne, Kozatske and Novolaspa.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit and Nyzhnoteple. In Kyiv and Dnipro, the SMM monitored public gatherings against rising gas costs.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 140 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions).

On the evening of 23 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 35 undetermined explosions 3-12km at directions ranging from east to west-south-west and about 160 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-7km at directions ranging from south-east to west-south-west.

On the evening and night of 23-24 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 13 explosions (one assessed as an airburst and the remainder undetermined) and 34 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-east to south-west and from west to east), all 0.5-4km at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 23-24 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded four undetermined explosions and about 55 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), all 2-4km at directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east.

During the day on 24 October, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and about 290 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small arms fire, all 1-4km at southerly and westerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 45 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion).

On the afternoon of 24 October, positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 42 explosions assessed as artillery rounds and uncountable bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun, automatic grenade launcher and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) cannon fire, all 3-8km south-east.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). On 22 October, at the Marinka District Hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk), accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the SMM saw a man (aged 40) with a bandage on his right thigh. He told the SMM that during the day on 21 October, while repairing the roof of his house at 28 Matrosova Street in Marinka, he had heard a burst of small-arms fire and then felt pain in his right thigh. On 24 October, medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that the man had been admitted to the hospital on the evening of 21 October with a wound in his right thigh caused by a bullet.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 23-24 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 4-5km south-south-east and 34 shots of small-arms fire 3-5km south-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. In the morning of 24 October, positioned about 300m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard an explosion approximately 100m west, assessed as probably caused by a mine or unexploded ordnance (UXO) inside the disengagement area.

On the morning of 24 October, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske for about 60 minutes, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-6km south and two bursts of small-arms fire 2-3km south, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 23 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 23 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air-missile systems (9K35) in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 23 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six tanks (T-72) near Siversk (99km north of Donetsk), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Vyimka (93km north of Donetsk), 19 tanks (T-64), three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and two self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Verkhnokamianka (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun [3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 23 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted eight IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), and four IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-70 or BTR-80) near Novoluhanske. On 23 October, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk). On 24 October, the SMM saw two APCs (BTR-80) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 23 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five APC (MT-LB) in Pervomaisk and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Sanzharivka (67km north-east of Donetsk). On 24 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk). 

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water wells near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk), to water pipelines and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit and in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM monitored two public gatherings in Kyiv and one in Dnipro against rising gas costs. In Kyiv, the SMM saw about 500 people (mostly aged 60-80; 70 per cent women and 30 per cent men) near the building of the Presidential Administration at 11 Bankova Street. Participants were holding dozens of flags of a political movement and banners with messages critical of the increase of gas prices. In front of the building of the Cabinet of Ministers at 12/2 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street, the SMM saw about 100 people (aged 40-60, 60 per cent men and 40 per cent women), many of whom were holding flags of a political movement and similar banners. In Dnipro, the SMM observed about 450 people (mixed genders and ages) gathered in front of the building of the Regional State Administration at 1 Oleksandra Polia Avenue, some of them carrying national Ukrainian flags and flags of a political movement. Some participants held speeches critical of the Government’s decision to increase the cost of gas from 1 November. All three protests ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 22 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing kinetic events”.
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to road E58.
• At a checkpoint in Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from superiors”.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “the security risk for the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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400997 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Delegations from Tajikistan and Afghanistan led, respectively, by the Commander of the Border Troops of Tajikistan, Colonel-General Rajabali Rahmonali, and the Head of the Afghan Border Police of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Brigadier General Abdullah Stanakzai, paid a visit to Tokyo, Japan, from 22 to 30 September 2018. The visit was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

The purpose of the visit was to foster cross-border and regional co-operation among the OSCE participating States and the Asian Partners for Co-operation and strengthen their security dialogue.

During the visit, Ambassador Tuula Yrjölä, the then Head of the Programme Office in Dushanbe, introduced the work of the Office, emphasizing OSCE-Japan co-operation. The Tajik and Afghan commanders briefed their Japanese hosts on the achievements in their respective border agencies, as well as present and future prospects for co-operation with Japan on border security and management.

The delegations met with Hideki Uyama, Deputy Assistant Minister, Deputy Director-General from European Affairs Bureau; Rear Admiral Hiroshi Ito, Deputy Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretariat, National Security Secretariat from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan;  Hideharu Maruyama, Director, Entry and Status Division of the Immigration Bureau of Japan; and Hideo Tsuda, Director of the Customs Branch of Haneda International Airport.

VIENNA, 25 October 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed his alarm and strong condemnation after an explosive device was sent to CNN’s offices in New York, in the United States of America.

“I am deeply outraged by this attempted attack targeting the media in the United States. This latest incident highlights an alarming trend of threats and attacks targeting the media," said Désir. 

On 24 October, at around 10:00am local time, CNN staff were evacuated after a homemade explosive device was found at their offices in New York. 

The Representative welcomed the swift response and condemnation by the authorities and that an investigation is underway.

“It is imperative that journalists are protected and able to work in a safe environment, and that those responsible for this act of terror are brought to justice,” he said.

“I urgently call on all political officials to do their utmost to support the media at this difficult time, to strongly condemn these incidents, and to defend the media as an indispensable and vital cornerstone of democracy,” concluded Désir.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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YEREVAN, 25 October 2018 – Concluding a two-day visit to Yerevan yesterday, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed the commitment of the Acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to strengthen freedom of the media, and encouraged the authorities to undertake additional initiatives.

During his visit to Yerevan, in addition to meeting the Acting Prime Minister, Désir met with Acting Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, and Acting Justice Minister Artak Zeynalyan to discuss challenges to, and the promotion of, media freedom and other areas where the OSCE Representative may offer legal expertise and assistance.

“I welcome the commitment expressed by the authorities to strengthen media freedom as a cornerstone of democracy. This is especially important in the context of the country’s current political developments,” said Désir. “I encourage the government to vigorously promote a safe and enabling environment for journalists, and to consider steps to strengthen media pluralism, independence of the public broadcaster, transparency of media ownership and access to information.”  

The Representative called on the authorities to prioritize the safety of journalists and to act against any threats and intimidation media workers may face. He underlined the importance of measures to further facilitate public access to information. In the meetings, Désir discussed the need for reforms that would guarantee the independence and accountability of public service media and of the National Commission on Television and Radio. He further stressed the necessity of ensuring that the transition from analogue to digital broadcasting will contribute to media pluralism.

The Representative also discussed the challenge of "fake news" and freedom of the media with the Acting Prime Minister.

“Armenia is a very important partner in the promotion of media freedom in the OSCE region. After the elections it will be important to see strong political will from the future government to protect and advance media freedom in the country,” said Désir. “My Office stands ready to work with all stakeholders and contribute with expert advice and recommendations in line with OSCE media freedom commitments and international standards.”

Désir also met with representatives of media and civil society organizations, including the Yerevan Press Club, the Media Initiatives Centre, the Committee to Protect Freedom of Expression, the Freedom of Information Center, the Public Journalism Club, the Armenian Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the MediaMax News Agency, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation, the Regional Studies Center, EVN Report, CivilNet and Hetq. These meetings offered the Representative the opportunity to hear a diversity of professional viewpoints on the media freedom situation in the country. In separate meetings, the Representative also met with the Deputy Human Rights Defender, Artyom Sedrakyan and the Director of Public TV of Armenia, Margarita Grigoryan. 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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KYIV, 25 October 2018 – Alexander Hug, the Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), will hold a news briefing on Friday via video link from eastern Ukraine.

Hug will talk about the Mission’s recent activities and the general security situation throughout Ukraine.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 26 October, at 14:00 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng

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400940 Andrii Dziubenko SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

A series of workshops on project management aimed at improving the access of the non-governmental sector to state and local government funding concluded on 24 October 2018. Three hundred and fifty government officials and 250 representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) took part in the two-day workshops held across Ukraine. They were organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU) in partnership with the country’s Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Youth and Sports.

The participants enhanced their knowledge of opportunities offered by co-operation and partnership between the authorities and CSOs, as well as of principles and procedures of transparent distribution of public funds to finance CSO projects. For non-governmental actors, the improved understanding of tools for project planning, management and implementation tools, including monitoring and evaluation, will enable them to better fulfill their missions and be engaged in state policy implementation. For officials, the knowledge gained will help them to make sure that expenditures are in line with the national legal framework and international best practices.

Special focus was paid to gender mainstreaming of projects, so that state-funded efforts of civil society are equally beneficial for men and women.

The importance of organizing calls for proposals by authorities in a transparent and efficient manner was among the topics covered in depth. Participants received copies of the guidebook (in Ukrainian) Manual for Conducting Competitive Selection of CSO Projects for State Funding (Ukrainian and International Experience), developed by the CSO expert and Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine with the support of PCU.   

Communication and Media Relations Section

A two-day national workshop organized by the OSCE on transit procedures with a view to furthering implementation of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement was held for more than 30 representatives of the public authorities of Kazakhstan and the country’s business associations on 23 and 24 October 2018 in Astana.

Organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) and supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the workshop was designed to respond to the needs identified by the authorities of Kazakhstan in the Draft Plan of Action on the Implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. The workshop covered trade facilitation and paperless trade, best practices in the transit of goods, and the importance of comprehensive guarantees for efficient and secure transit. There was a specific focus on the Convention on Common Transit and its implementation.

Representatives of the Ministry of National Economy, the State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry for Investments and Development, the Ministry of Justice, Kazakhstan Railways, the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs Atameken, the Association of National Freight Forwarders and other business representatives enhanced their competencies in applying international standards in transit and discussed potential solutions for customs and private stakeholders. They discussed the facilitation of transit by implementing simplified procedures and institutionalizing communication channels between state and business stakeholders.

“I am satisfied that the seminar has been a platform for constructive discussions that can help the Republic of Kazakhstan to decide on the necessary measures for the fulfilment of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement,” said Gulnur Smagul, Deputy Director of the Department of Foreign Trade Activity at the Ministry of National Economy of Kazakhstan.

Jonas Grätz, OCEEA Economic Adviser, welcomed the interest in Kazakhstan to improve its transit procedures in order to reap the full potential of its geographic position and infrastructure. “It is encouraging that the workshop concluded with a summary document that can be considered during the further development of the Draft Plan of Action on the Implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement,” he said.

The workshop was facilitated by accredited experts of the World Customs Organization as well as by experts from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union of the European Union.

This activity is part of an OSCE extra-budgetary project on promoting connectivity in the OSCE region. It is funded by Germany, Switzerland and Austria. Kazakhstan is one of the beneficiary countries alongside Moldova and Belarus.  

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM facilitated and monitored the recovery of the bodies of a man and a woman from a location near the neighbourhood of Vilnyi, between Zolote-4/Rodina and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka in Luhansk region. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as again near Zaichenko, Novoazovsk, Lebedynske and Alchevsk.* The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Miusynsk. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit and Nyzhnoteple. The SMM followed up on reports of a fire at a café in Odessa.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions).

On the evening and night of 22-23 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 115 undetermined explosions and about 950 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at distances ranging 2-6km at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 22-23 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions and a projectile in flight from north-west to south-east, all 1-4km south-south-west.

During the day on 23 October, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw four undetermined explosions and heard two undetermined explosions and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-4km at southerly directions.

Positioned in Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 2km north-north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (one explosion), compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions).

The SMM facilitated and monitored the recovery of the bodies of a man and a woman (both in their forties) from a location near the neighbourhood of Vilnyi, between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled 59km west of Luhansk) and the forward positions of the armed formations in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). Reportedly, they died as a result of the explosion of a device on 18 October at the aforementioned location. On 23 October, the SMM saw three vehicles belonging to the armed formations, one of which had a demining sign on it, as well as two vehicles of an international organization, arriving at Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. A member of the armed formations, who disembarked from one of the vehicles, told the SMM that a demining team of the armed formations would recover the two bodies. Meanwhile, in Zolote-4/Rodina, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that a Ukrainian Armed Forces demining team was present and ready to intervene if necessary. After about two hours, the SMM saw all vehicles depart Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and head towards Vilnyi. SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which were flying over the area at that time, spotted a group of about five to ten people with demining equipment recover a body, assessed as the body of the woman. About one hour and a half later, the SMM saw that all vehicles had returned to Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. Subsequently, a representative of the international organization and members of the armed formations told the SMM that both bodies had been recovered and would be brought to a morgue in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

During its presence near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1km north-north-west (see below). In the past weeks, SMM UAVs spotted recently dug trenches, firing positions and anti-tank mines near and within residential areas of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (see SMM Daily Report 10 October 2018 and SMM Daily Report 11 October 2018) as well as near Zolote-4/Rodina (see SMM Daily Report 26 September 2018). In the same area, in some points, the distance between the known forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations is about 500m.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1km north-north-west (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 17 October, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined) in a training area about 6km south-east of the centre of Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 30 May 2018).[3]

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 23 October, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) on flatbed trailers heading south on road E-40, near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 17 October, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 12 pieces of towed artillery or mortar in a training area about 6km south-east of Miusynsk.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that 11 tanks (seven T-72 and four T-64) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[4] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk) and three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-2 and one BMP-1) in Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 23 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined), 11 IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) as well as water pipelines near Zalizne. While monitoring the ceasefire for these repair works from a position on the north-west outskirts of Horlivka, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion about 2-3km north-west. The SMM also facilitated and monitored repair works to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the Aidar water pumping station near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), water wells in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and power lines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. The SMM continued to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

In Odessa, the SMM followed up on reports of a fire at a café at 36A Henuezka Street. At the site, the SMM observed that the interior of the one-floor building had entirely burnt down. A man (aged 50), who introduced himself as an Israeli citizen and the co-owner of the café, told the SMM that the fire had happened on 22 October around 05:00. He added that, at that time, a woman, an employee of the café, had been on the premises, when she had heard the sound of a breaking window and seen that a device which had exploded had been thrown into the café. An officer from the Prymorksyi Fire Department in Odessa told the SMM that they had responded to the fire and that they were investigating whether the fire was caused by arson.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 22 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from a superior”. The SMM observed civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint at the same time.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city, citing an “ongoing operation”. The SMM observed civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint at the same time.
• At a checkpoint on road M14 south of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer again prevented the SMM from proceeding east, citing the presence of risks to the security of the SMM. (The SMM was later allowed to proceed through the same checkpoint.)
• In Alchevsk (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a compound, citing lack of prior authorization from senior members of the armed formations. Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed. Other impediments: 
• On two occasions, an SMM mid-range UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference while flying over an area near Lebedynske.[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] In SMM Daily Report 20 October 2018, the report incorrectly referenced a weapon seen in violation of agreed withdrawal lines near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) as a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), however the weapon seen was a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm).

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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400877 Željka Šulc

There is still no effective system of judicial protection for those who face discrimination in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the country’s Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination is inconsistently applied, concludes an analysis presented by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on 24 October 2018 at the Annual Conference of Civil Law Judges in Jahorina.

The Analysis of Judicial Responses to the Challenge of Discrimination in BiH was presented to more than 500 judges and legal professionals from across BiH, who had gathered for the conference.

Other key shortcomings identified by the analysis are a lack of knowledge among judicial staff of the legal notion of discrimination, and the length of proceedings in such cases.

“Although the BiH Law on Prohibition of Discrimination is in line with European standards, the Law is still not fully implemented,” said Fermin Cordoba, Head of the Human Dimension Department at the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. “This type of analysis that is based on specific, identifiable, and recent cases is critical for all institutions involved in the fight against discrimination. The analysis is important for tailoring capacity-building efforts to address specific problems faced by the judiciary.”

The analysis is based on 148 discrimination cases completed between July 2009 and July 2017 before the courts in BiH. It contains detailed statistical data on the prevalence of discrimination, areas of life where it occurs, the forms it takes, as well as the outcomes of court decisions.

This is the first analysis of this kind, said Goran Nezirovic, Judge of the Federation of BiH (FBiH) Supreme Court. “This document contains a qualitative analysis of judgments in anti-discrimination cases and points to trends in jurisprudence when it comes to application of the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination. To improve current practice there is a need to remove the inconsistencies of case law, improve understanding of specific institutes and prevent the violation of the principle of urgency in anti-discrimination proceedings,” he said.

Arben Murtezic, Director of the FBiH Centre for Education of Judges and Prosecutors, said that discrimination is a threat to every society and BiH is not an exception. “The processing of discrimination cases is a challenge for the judiciary in BiH. The analysis is an excellent tool for further education of judges, prosecutors and other legal professionals on the adequate implementation of the Law and it will be useful source material for future training courses.”

VIENNA, 24 October 2018 – How the rights and duties of military, paramilitary and security forces’ personnel, including their human rights and fundamental freedoms, are reflected in policy development, training and education programmes, was explored at today’s meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation in Vienna, held under the Forum’s Swedish Chairmanship.

The discussion was the second Security Dialogue organized by Sweden’s Chairmanship on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, a key OSCE document that provides guidance on how to regulate the role of armed forces in democratic societies. Next year marks the Code’s 25th anniversary. A Security Dialogue on the Code, organized by the Swedish Chair last month, focused on the democratic control of armed forces.

“Military and security forces personnel, under the control and oversight of our democratic institutions, are representatives of the people,” said Chairperson of the Forum and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the OSCE Ambassador Ulrika Funered as she opened today’s meeting. “They must not only show great character, but also always remember their responsibilities.”

Ambassador Funered went on to ask: “So, what is this great character, and what responsibilities do military and security forces personnel have towards others and within their own ranks?”

Chris Whitecross, Commandant of the NATO Defense College and Lieutenant General of the Royal Canadian Airforce, providing answers to these questions from NATO’s perspective, said that the alliance’s Building Integrity Programme provides practical tools to help participating countries strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in the defence and security sector. The NATO Defense College, she said, is a unique civilian/military institute that also builds the capacities of senior leaders from NATO and partner countries in this area.

Referring to the Canadian Armed Forces, she highlighted Operation HONOUR, which is designed to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour in the Canadian military.

“Operation HONOUR is based on the principles that every man and woman who serves their country deserves to be treated with dignity and respect – anything less is simply unacceptable,” said Lieutenant General Whitecross. “Any attitudes or behaviours which undermine the camaraderie, cohesion and confidence of serving members, threatens the Canadian Armed Forces’ long-term operational success.”

A significant part of the discussions focused on women’s participation within the military and security forces.

Major General Elena G. Knyazeva, Deputy Head of the Military University of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, described the historical tradition of women in the military in her country. She said that there are 18 universities in Russia providing military educational programmes for women, with the Military University of the Ministry of Defence commemorating its 100th anniversary next year.

“There are some 3,000 female officers in the Russian Armed Forces, and more than twenty of them are at the grade of colonel,” said Major General Knyazeva. “The majority of women are specialists in the medical and finance branches, signal corps, some of them are leaders of certain units. Together with men they accomplish combat missions and many of them have been awarded state decorations.”

Major General Klas Eksell, Director of Human Resources at the Swedish Armed Forces, talked about how “creating a moral compass” guides the work of his country’s military. This was particularly important when Sweden reintroduced compulsory military service based on a gender-neutral approach, he said.

“The Swedish Armed Forces’ leadership policy is called ‘developing leadership’. All officers and civil servants in leadership positions are committed and educated to this model,” said Major General Eksell. “Lead by example, based on values, consider individuals, inspire and motivate… Our core values are based on openness, results and responsibility. Trust between leaders and troops based on competence and values delivers, in our perspective, the most efficient units.”

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COPENHAGEN, 24 October 2018 – The multi-pronged and multi-level responses to migration challenges in Denmark and Sweden have been in focus during a two-day field visit by members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Migration, led by Chair Nahima Lanjri (MP, Belgium).

The OSCE PA delegation noted that authorities on the national and local levels, working with non-governmental organizations, have responded effectively to the refugee and migrant crisis that took hold in late 2015, but that there is room for improvement in clarifying legal rights of asylum seekers, and in particular ensuring that unaccompanied minors are fully protected. Ad Hoc Committee members welcomed positive achievements in employment rates for refugees in both countries but observed that a long-term strategy was needed in both countries to create more inclusive societies.

Lanjri and several other members of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Migration started their visit in Malmo, Sweden, on Monday, and wrapped up in Copenhagen on Tuesday. They met with representatives from the Swedish and Danish migration authorities, local officials, border police, school administrators, the international community, civil society, and migrants and refugees to assess current developments.

The delegation included Ad Hoc Committee Vice-Chair Isabel Santos (MP, Portugal) and members Haydar Akar (MP, Turkey), Jan Bauer (MP, Czech Republic), Margareta Cederfelt (MP, Sweden), Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (MP, Cyprus), Mehmet Sait Kirazoglu (MP, Turkey), and Georgios Varemenos (MP, Greece), as well as Head of the Danish Delegation to the OSCE PA Peter Juel Jensen and OSCE PA member Soeren Soendergaard (MP, Denmark).

The OSCE parliamentarians noted the extraordinary efforts made by governments in processing the large number of asylum claims made in 2015/6, as well as the continued challenges to provide housing, quality schooling, and, in the case of recognized refugees, access to the labour market. Committee members recognized the difficult task to implement the growing number of return decisions. All OSCE countries should ensure that international humanitarian obligations are fully upheld for asylum seekers and rejected asylum seekers alike, Ad Hoc Committee members said.

“On one hand, the challenges faced by Denmark and Sweden are unique, but in other ways they are not unlike the challenges faced by countries throughout Europe,” said Lanjri. “Other OSCE countries can learn from their experiences, including integration initiatives to provide language training to refugees and by giving them opportunities in the labour market. Sweden is also encouraging private entrepreneurship through a pilot project in Malmo, a city with an incredible potential due to its young population and great diversity, where more than 180 nationalities are represented.”

She added that consideration should be given to reevaluating the restrictions on family reunification for asylum seekers who have received temporary protection status in Denmark. Greater attention should also be paid to the unique needs of unaccompanied minors and effective strategies must be developed to address the issue of missing minors and young people and to prevent this problem, which can be seen throughout Europe.

Cederfelt, who serves as OSCE PA Vice-President and Deputy Head of the Swedish Delegation, stressed the need for developing long-term and comprehensive strategies that consider the need to provide integration opportunities for migrants and support for the municipal governments that shoulder so much of the burden in providing essential services.

“All countries in Europe, whether they are points of entry, transit countries or countries of destination for migrants, must work together to ensure that these challenges are addressed in a fair and equitable way,” Cederfelt said. “We will never have an effective response to migration unless we work together on the international, national and subnational levels, involving civil society and providing necessary resources to local governments.”

During the visit, topics of discussion included developments in improving the legislative framework and the need for responsibilities to be shared fairly between countries as well as between municipalities within countries. Delegation members observed living facilities for asylum seekers in Denmark, both those beginning their asylum application procedures and rejected asylum seekers.

Members also commended the work of humanitarian and NGOs working with migrants and refugees and urged greater support for voluntary return and integration schemes such as those offered by the International Organization for Migration.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Migration was established following a unanimous decision taken by the Standing Committee on 25 February 2016 in Vienna. For more information on the OSCE PA’s work on the migration issue, please click here.

Photos of the Sweden-Denmark visit are available on Flickr.

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400805 Kunduz Rysbek

Kyrgyzstan’ Prime Minister Muhammedkaliy Abylgaziev presented a two-year national action plan (NAP) that aims to increase the accountability of the Government’s work in Bishkek on 23 October 2018. The NAP was developed jointly by the Government and civil society within the framework of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

With adoption of the National Action Plan  Kyrgyzstan undertakes 18 ambitious commitments to strengthen the government’s reform accountability and combat corruption.

The OSCE Programme Office supported the government’s efforts by helping to establish the OGP Secretariat in Kyrgyzstan, which functions under the OGP National Forum and works in close collaboration with the Office of the Prime Minister. The OGP National Forum consists of an equal number of representatives of the government and civil society (38 in total), who jointly developed the OGP commitments and the NAP.

The NAP aims to strengthen the involvement of civil society in policy development and decision making, and improve the quality of public services. The Plan also envisages the introduction of new technologies to increase government transparency and public access to information. It covers thematic areas such as health, education, local self-government, media, international aid, and election reform.

Stressing that  openness of government structures is a pre-requisite of any democratic society, Prime Minister Abylgaziev said: “We will not stay in government forever. Today I am the Prime Minister of this country, but who knows, tomorrow I might join your ranks and become a civil activist and one of you might become a member of the Government or the new Prime Minister. Therefore, it is important  that we listen to each other because we have a common goal - to develop our country.”

Deputy Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, Valeriu Chiveri, said: “Activists and civil society organizations are important allies of the government, and fulfilling the OGP commitments means strengthening the foundation for partnership between the people and the government, open access to ideas and increased support from all sides.” He added that "the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek is honoured to accompany this very important process and remains a reliable partner for bringing it forward."

The Open Government Partnership was established on 20 September 2011, when eight founding governments (Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States) adopted the Open Government Declaration. Last year Kyrgyzstan became the first country in Central Asia to join the Open Government Partnership. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. It recorded ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Bezimenne, Novoazovsk, Lebedynske, Alchevsk and Bohdanivka.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske and Aidar water pumping stations, a gas pipeline near Yasynuvata and the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station, as well as to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit and Nyzhnoteple.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 115 explosions).

On the evening and night of 21-22 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 45 explosions (two assessed as incoming and one as outgoing, one as an airburst and the remainder undetermined), 46 projectiles in flight (the majority from south-easterly to north-westerly directions) and 13 muzzle flashes, all 0.5-3km at southerly directions.

On the evening of 21 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about 445 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire (mostly 2-3km east), all 2-6km east and south-east. During the day on 22 October, while in the same location, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 120 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire (mostly 2-3km east), all 2-7km east and south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 40 explosions).

Positioned about 800m east of Svitle (non-government-controlled, 11km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions (ten assessed as outgoing and the remainder undetermined) as well as eight bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-7km south-south-west. 

The SMM continued to follow up on reports that a woman and a man (both in their forties) had died in a location between Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled 59km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). As of the morning of 23 October, no agreement had been reached on a recovery operation despite dialogue facilitation efforts undertaken by the Mission since the explosion was reported on 18 October. (See SMM Daily Report 22 October 2018.)

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 22 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard 11 shots and bursts of small-arms fire 2km south-south-west, assessed as outside of the disengagement area.

On the evening of 21 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded seven projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, all 2-4km south-east and assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske and also in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation in the Petrivske disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three towed howitzers (probable D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Dyliivka (49km north of Donetsk), three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in firing positions near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk).

In violation of respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk), four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk) and eight MLRS (BM-21) about 2km west of Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) about 3.5km north of Bila Hora. On 22 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (S-300) and two towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) on trucks near Nikolske (formerly Volodarske, 97km south of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM observed two towed howitzers (D-20) on the western outskirts of Urzuf (40km south-west of Mariupol).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 11 tanks (T-64) in a training area near Miusynsk; nine tanks (type undetermined), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and three towed howitzers (D-30) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk); and 45 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Manuilivka. The same long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Zhytenko (70km east of Donetsk), which was turned on and operating, north-west of a non-government-controlled area near the border with the Russian Federation where the SMM had previously observed convoys entering and exiting Ukraine (for most recent observations see SMM Daily Report 18 October 2018).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft guns[3] and other signs of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Yurivka (35km north of Donetsk), three ACVs near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk), an infantry fighting vehicle  (BMP-1) near Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk) and an APC (type undetermined) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk). On 22 October, the SMM saw two APCs (BTR-70) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable ACV (type undetermined) near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk). The same long-range UAV spotted two sets of trenches seen for the first time about 2km north-west of Stavky (30km north of Donetsk). Also on 21 October, an SMM mid-range UAV for the first time spotted about 300m of trenches, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (not visible in imagery from 15 August 2018), on the western outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and three houses destroyed by recent shelling (probable artillery) (not visible on imagery from 8 October 2018) about 500m north of the trenches. On 22 October, the SMM observed two APCs (MT-LB) mounted with anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the Aidar water pumping station near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), a gas pipeline near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM did not observe traffic traveling in either direction and noted that the border crossing point on the Ukrainian side continued to not be staffed.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven vehicles (three with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) as well as three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM observed five vehicles (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) and a bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 22 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from a superior”.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from traveling west on road M14. The SMM saw a civilian vehicle cross through the checkpoint from west to east.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), one armed member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city, citing an “ongoing operation”.
• At a checkpoint on road M14 south of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer again prevented the SMM from proceeding east, citing the security of the SMM. (The SMM was later allowed to proceed through the same checkpoint.)
• While following up on allegations of the presence of heavy weapons at a compound of the armed formations on the south-eastern edge of Alchevsk (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from accessing the site.
• While following up on allegations of the presence of heavy weapons at a compound of the armed formations on the southern edge of Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), two armed men denied the SMM access to the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines remained present on the road leading north to the bridge and that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km NW of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

VIENNA, 23 October 2018 – A conference entitled “Human trafficking and human rights – access to justice for victims of human trafficking” will be held in the OSCE conference centre, Vienna Hofburg, on the occasion of EU Anti-Trafficking Day on Monday, 29 October 2018.

The conference is organized by the Austrian Task Force on Combating Human Trafficking in co-operation with the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the Office of the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, the Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Co-operation (VIDC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).

Following opening remarks by Ambassador Petra Schneebauer, Austrian National Co-ordinator for Combating Human Trafficking, the conference will be opened by Karoline Edtstadler, State Secretary of the Austrian Interior Ministry and Alessandro Azzoni, Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE.

In two panel discussions, international experts and representatives of international organizations will speak about access to justice for human trafficking victims, from national and international as well as the gender perspective.  

Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, UN Special Rapporteur for Combating Human Trafficking in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Myria Vassiliadou, EU-Co-ordinator for Combating Human Trafficking, among others, will provide insights into existing issues and challenges.

The entire event, taking place in the Hofburg Conference Centre’s Neuer Saal on 29 October 2018 from 9:00 to 16:30, is open to the media.  

Interested media representatives are requested to register by sending an e-mail by Friday, 26 October at 17:00 to press@osce.org.

Media accreditation will take place at the entrance to the Hofburg Conference Centre (Heldenplatz). Journalists will be required to present a valid press badge or a recent accreditation from their media outlet. In view of possible delays at the entrance, please arrive by 08:30 at the latest.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO) and one first-responder[1]. The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly decreased from 10,689 to 10,312 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[2].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 46 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased to 36 (compared to 31 last week); 20 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 16 into Ukraine (72 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, nine families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and eight were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when eight families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and five into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (387 compared to 426 observed during the previous week). There were 202 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 185 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Luhansk-Kharkiv; Luhansk-Simferopol; and Stakhanov- Kharkiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 806 to 853 (278 at the Gukovo BCP and 575 at the Donetsk BCP); 445 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 408 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 66 (compared to 72 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 63 to 88: of the total number of trucks scanned, 63 trucks (73 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 25 trucks (28 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[3] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 163 to 148 vehicles; 76 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 72 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 22 occasions, compared to 13 last week; the OTs assessed that 13 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Georgian, German and Polish licence plates and with “DPR” plates.

On 17 October at 14:27, the OT observed an ambulance entering the Gukovo BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle parked behind the main building and drove back in the same direction at 14:44. Due to its unfavourable position, the OT could not observe if any assistance was provided during its stay inside the BCP area.

On 17 October at 14:55, the OT observed a green MI-8 type helicopter which flew over the Donetsk BCP. The aircraft came from the north and continued flying in  a south-easterly direction.

In addition, on 18 October, two different helicopters were observed flying over the Gukovo BCP coming from the north-east before heading away in a southerly direction. The first white and green helicopter was recorded at 12:17. A second military helicopter was observed at 14:03 . All these mentioned helicopters remained inside Russian Federation airspace during the whole time they were visible by the OTs.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 18 September to 16 October 2018, please see the attachment here. 

[1] First responders are OSCE staff or mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time.

[2] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[3] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The last in a series of three OSCE-supported roundtable discussions on the prospects of agricultural development in Kazakhstan with a focus on recently adopted national standards of organic production and certification concluded on 23 October 2018 in Astana.

Some 35 parliamentarians, officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and representatives of civil society and the business community discussed  key challenges and proposed a set of recommendations to the Parliament to promote organic production in Kazakhstan. Experts from Germany presented organic production practices in the European Union and highlighted the government’s role in developing incentives for effective organic farming.

The event was organized in partnership with the Coalition for Green Economy, G-Global Development, and the German-Kazakh Agricultural Policy Dialogue. It is a follow-up to a training-of-trainers series on international organic farming standards held in the Almaty and Kostanay regions.

The seminar is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-term efforts to assist the host country in promoting sustainable development and green growth policies.

THE HAGUE, 23 October 2018 – OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Lamberto Zannier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Stef Blok will present the Max van der Stoel Award to a group of high school students from the municipality of Jajce, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The award ceremony will take place in The Hague, the Netherlands, on Friday, 9 November.

The high school students from Jajce were selected as the 2018 winners of the award for their year-long battle against a cantonal decision to set up a new segregated school, which would have further divided students along ethnic lines. Learn more about the winners here.

On the margins of the ceremony, a photo exhibition will be launched to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the HCNM. From 12 November to 1 December, the photo exhibition will be viewable by the public at the Atrium, The Hague City Hall, Spui 70, 2511 BT Den Haag. Entrance is free-of-charge.

The OSCE Secretary General, Thomas Greminger, the First Vice-President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, the General Director of the Carnegie Foundation - Peace Palace, Erik de Baedts, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bruce Berton, and the Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Netherlands, Mirsada Čolaković, will address the event. The full event programme is available here.

The event is by invitation only. Media representatives should register by Friday, 26 October, midnight, by sending their name, contact details and the name of the media they represent to Anastasia Rybachenko, Communications Assistant at HCNM, anastasia.rybachenko@osce.org.

For more information about the Max van der Stoel Award and the winners, visit: osce.org/mvdsaward2018.

Follow the discussion on Twitter using the hashtag #mvdsAWARD.

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Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

A delegation of members of Albania’s Parliamentary Committee on Productive Activities, Trade and Environment, consisting of representatives of both the ruling majority and opposition parties, participated in a study visit to Lake Constance from 19 to 23 October 2018 to learn about cross-border co-operation with regards to managing the lake. The visit was organized by the OSCE Presence in Albania as part of a custom-tailored programme highlighting multilateral co-operation between parliaments and parliamentary oversight mechanisms.

The delegation attended the International Lake Constance Conference at the invitation of the Lake Constance Parliamentary Commission.

“Participating in the International Lake Constance Conference was an extremely worthwhile experience,” said Eduard Shalsi, who headed the delegation. “Lake Constance is jointly managed in a successful way by Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Albania and its neighbours can borrow from this experience with the aim of applying it to the Lakes Scutari, Ohrid and Prespa. I am thankful to the OSCE Presence in Albania for supporting this visit.”

The delegation learned about the obligations shared by the involved parties, who co-operate on a regular basis, and success stories and challenges. The discussions focused on the cross-border management of lakes, sustainable use of natural resources, rehabilitation of water bodies, and the involvement of different levels of policymakers in these processes.

The delegation visited several lake maintenance facilities, including waste water treatment plants, and received information on the procedures, management, and financial and human resources needed to operate them. They also participated in the Third Special Lake Conference organized by the Ministry for Environment, Climate and Energy of the German State of Baden Württemberg, on the sustainable use and rehabilitation of lakes, and met representatives of the Integrated Commission for the Transboundary Management of Lake Constance.

The activity was organized as part of the inception phase of the OSCE Presence’s extra-budgetary project on supporting the parliament and civic education in Albania. The project will begin in November 2018 and will be funded by the Swiss Government.

ROME, 23 October 2018 – Government officials and representatives of civil society and religious communities discussed good practices for addressing racism, xenophobia and other forms of discrimination, including on the basis of gender, and for countering anti-Semitism and intolerance against Muslims, Christians and members of other religions at an OSCE conference in Rome yesterday.

Organized by the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the "Conference on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination, with a Focus on Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Towards a Comprehensive Response in the OSCE Region" also provided an opportunity to focus on ways to make future efforts more effective.

“Fighting intolerance has been among the priorities of Italy’s OSCE Chairmanship. We firmly believe that freedom of religion or belief, individual or collective, is indivisible: each offense to a religion is an offense to all,” said Guglielmo Picchi, Italian Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation. “We think that the OSCE’s human dimension of security provides a positive agenda for fighting intolerance and discrimination. For Italy, this agenda has a particularly Mediterranean meaning.”

In her remarks at the conference opening, Gísladóttir stressed that the discrimination and intolerance that continue to confront different groups today have to be a matter of vital concern to all.

“Despite extensive, long-standing and well-meaning commitments, intolerance and discrimination remain a reality for many members of different religious or belief communities, ethnic or other minority groups in the OSCE region,” the ODIHR Director said. “We need to counter polarization, which in light of history, carries a tremendous risk to peace and security, to the detriment of all. Once the principle of tolerance has been eroded and we start down the slippery slope of allowing intolerance and discrimination to thrive, no group – and I repeat, no group – can assume that they are immune.”

Following morning plenary sessions devoted to challenges faced in addressing racism, xenophobia and discrimination based on religion or belief the afternoon sessions were devoted to panel discussions examining, among other issues, the role of media in addressing intolerance and discrimination, good practices to promote religious pluralism, and the role of educational programmes in addressing negative stereotypes.

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400559 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE-supported Women’s Resource Centres (WRCs) in Tajikistan together with local authorities celebrated the International Day of the Girl under the theme “Empowering Girls” in rural regions of Tajikistan on 11 October 2018. The campaign was organized around various thematic activities, which included painting contests, fashion design competitions, conferences and sessions bringing together different rural communities. It aimed at raising awareness of girls’ and boys’ equal rights to opportunities in society.

The International Day of the Girl is also an occasion to highlight the importance of school attendance among girls, as well as the issue of forced marriage, which affects particularly rural girls. More than 300 people participated in the activities, including 170 young women and 20 young people with disabilities.

Since 2012, 11 October has been marked as the International Day of the Girl. It was declared by the UN General Assembly to protect girls around the world from discrimination and violence and ensure their right to education and security.