OSCE

400529 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Women’s engagement in conflict prevention and resolution, negotiating and maintaining peace, and addressing humanitarian challenges was the focus of a train-the-trainer course organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe on 19 October 2018 in Dushanbe. The event marked the 18th anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

The course brought together 40 participants, including men and women from seven registered political parties as well as gender experts and gender champions active in promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment in Tajikistan.

“Conflicts exist in households, communities, and societies. Domestic violence is one of the first early warning signs, often times ignored. Women along with men must be equally and meaningfully represented in law enforcement and security,” said Vesna Ivanovikj-Castarede, the Gender and Anti-Trafficking Officer of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

During the event, emphasis was placed on the role of men and youth in supporting the effective and efficient implementation of the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, as well as on the importance of this resolution for the promotion of women’s engagement in conflict prevention.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 19 and 20 October, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 20 and 21 October, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in a location between Zolote-4/Rodina and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. It observed damage to civilian infrastructure in Novoluhanske and to a tent caused by bullets near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk. It recorded ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Novoazovsk, Lebedynske and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka as well as Izvaryne, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station and to a water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna. In Lviv, it monitored a peaceful gathering in front of the Prosecutor’s office.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 215 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 300 explosions). Between the evenings of 20 and 21 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 115 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 19 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 12 undetermined explosions and about 80 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east and from east to west), all 0.2-3km at southerly directions. The following evening, the camera recorded about 60 undetermined explosions and about 40 projectiles (mostly from west to east), all 1-4km at southerly directions.

On the evening of 19 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 13 undetermined explosions and about 190 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north), all 2-5km at easterly directions.

Between the evenings of 19 and 21 October, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard at different time intervals about 105 explosions (four explosions as caused by artillery rounds and the remainder undetermined) and about 525 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-8km at southerly and westerly directions.

On the evening and night of 20-21 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions 2-6km at easterly and southerly directions. During the day on 21 October, while in the same location, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 2-6km at easterly and southerly directions.

During the day on 21 October, positioned about 1.5km east of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk) for about 2.5 hours, the SMM heard 15 explosions (13 assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, one as an airburst and one undetermined) 1.5-4km east and north-east.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (13 explosions). Between the evenings of 20 and 21 October, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

During the day on 21 October, positioned in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions and 26 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-2km south-south-east.

During the day on 21 October, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-2km south-south-east. On the same day, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 60 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-10km north-east.

The SMM followed up on reports that a woman and a man (both in their forties) had died in a location between Zolote-4/Rodina and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. On 19 October, the SMM conducted a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight in the area and spotted two bodies. [The Mission was unable to reach the location, which is about 130m east of the closest position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and about 500m west of the closest position of the armed formations, by road or foot due to safety concerns regarding the possible presence of mines.] On 21 October, in Zolote-5/Mykhailivika, the brother (aged 40-50) of the deceased man told the SMM that he had asked for the bodies to be recovered and moved to a non-government-controlled area. As of the morning of 22 October, no agreement had been reached on a recovery operation despite dialogue facilitation efforts undertaken by the Mission since the explosion was reported.

The SMM observed fresh damage to the Bakhmut Agrarian Union Pig Farm in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2018). On 20 October, accompanied by Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and de-miners, the SMM saw at least 20 scattered fragmentation holes in the east- and north-facing parts of a metal container, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a northerly direction. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that shelling took place at 21:00 on the evening of 15 October. The SMM saw a well-maintained trench about 10m south of the metal container. On 15 October, at the same location, the SMM had seen burn marks and a hole in the middle part of the south-facing section of the roof of one of the farm’s buildings. The SMM noted that repairs were ongoing and was unable to assess what weapon caused the damage. Approximately 25m north of the building, the Mission saw an impact on the road, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the area on 28 September and 13 October.

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to an inflatable tent used by civilians to keep warm approximately 70m north of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) on the eastern side of road T0513. The SMM saw two patched holes in the exterior wall of the tent (one in the south-facing wall and one in the north-facing wall) and two holes in the interior walls of the same tent (one in the south-facing wall and one in the north-facing wall), assessed as consistent with the characteristics of a through-and-through trajectory caused by bullets fired either from an east-south-easterly direction or from a west-north-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 20 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 6-8km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 20 October, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard six explosions assessed as caused by mortar rounds (82mm) 5km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening of 21 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion and eight projectiles in flight (five from north-east to south-west, two from south-west to north-east and one in vertical flight), all 2-4km south-east and assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 20 October, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-3km west-north-west, four undetermined explosions 4-6km west and about 100 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 19 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 tanks (T-64) in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) (for similar observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 20 October 2018). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Kasianivka (81km south of Donetsk) and two antitank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk). On 20 October, the SMM saw four tanks (T-64) loaded on trucks near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk). On 21 October, the SMM saw three tanks (T-72) near Druzhne (39km north of Mariupol) and a tank (T-64) near Lysychansk.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In such storage sites, beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, on 20 October, the SMM saw eight towed howitzers (two D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and six 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be missing.

In such storage sites, beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, on 21 October, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10), eight MLRS (BM-21) and eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and noted that two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), 23 MLRS (BM-21), 22 self-propelled howitzers (11 2S1 and 11 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and six towed howitzers (D-20, 152 mm) continued to be missing, as well as that four MLRS (BM-21) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing for the first time.

On 20 October, the SMM revisited two heavy weapons permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 18 tanks (eight T-64 and ten T-72) remained missing.

On 20 October, the SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in an area of Luhansk region outside government control and noted that a tank (T-64) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft guns[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 19 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Sartana (91km south of Donetsk) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) near Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol). On 21 October, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) in Prymorske (13km east of Mariupol), an APC (BTR variant) in Shchastia, an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR-80) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 19 October, the SMM saw two APCs (BTR variant) near Donetsk city. On 20 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted ten APCs (two BTR-80 and eight MT-LB) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). On 21 October, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) in Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

On 20 October, the SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). On 21 October, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). On both days, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM visited five border areas not under government control. On 20 October, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 60 minutes, the SMM saw eight cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine, and ten cars (nine with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates), two mini-vans (one with Russian Federation licence plates, the other with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about five minutes, the SMM observed no traffic or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

On 21 October, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw a pedestrian (man, aged 30-40) entering Ukraine and a man (aged 50-60) on a bicycle exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a car (with Russian Federation licence plates) and 15 pedestrians (seven men and eight women, all aged 35-55) exiting Ukraine, and a car (with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus (plates not visible) and six pedestrians (four men, two women, aged 35-45) entering Ukraine. After ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point in Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw five pedestrians (two men, three women, aged 25-60) exiting Ukraine and three pedestrians (two men, one woman, aged 50-55) entering Ukraine.

In Lviv, the SMM monitored a gathering in favour of the creation by the regional government of an independent commission composed of representatives of non-governmental organizations and civil services. In front of the Prosecutor’s office at 19 Shevchenka Street, it saw 200 people (70 per cent men and 30 per cent women, all ages), about half of them wearing jackets with insignia of the Right Sector movement and carrying flags of the same movement. Approximately 80 police officers were present. The gathering ended without any incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 20 October, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”.
• On 20 October, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through, citing “orders from superiors not to allow the SMM into Novoazovsk”.
• On 20 October, at a mobile checkpoint about 2km east of Novoazovsk, two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from passing through, citing “orders from their commander not to allow the SMM to travel eastward to Siedove” (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk).
• On 20 October, at a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “demining and engineering works ongoing in the area”.
• On 20 October, at a checkpoint south of Lebedynske, two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM passage eastward, citing an “exchange of fire in the area”. After the patrol mentioned it would travel southward, the two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied it access again.
• On 21 October, at a checkpoint near Lebedynske, three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM passage further east, citing “an ongoing exchange of fire in the area”. The SMM observed five cars passing through the checkpoint in both directions while it was at the location.
• On 21 October, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 20 and 21 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[4]
• On 20 and 21 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times. [4]
• On 20 and 21 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 19 October, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming[5], near Kashtanove (non-government-controlled, 13km north of Donetsk), Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk).
• On 21 October, at a checkpoint in Horlivka, a member of the armed formations indicated to a patrol’s lead vehicle that it could proceed through the checkpoint. The patrol’s remaining three vehicles were then stopped and told by the same member of the armed formations that he had the authority to shoot at the lead vehicle because it did not stop. The three vehicles were allowed through the checkpoint after approximately five minutes.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

read more

400562 Edita Buçaj Ivana Milatovic, OSCE Mission to Serbia

The fourth OSCE Dialogue Academy for Young Women, which brought together 24 participants from Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština, concluded on 21 October 2018 in Stadtschlaining, Austria.

Over ten days, the participants had the opportunity to build up their personal contacts, exchange views on the issue of women empowerment in decision-making, learn about the challenges that members of each community face, and address issues of common concern.

The programme included intensive team-building exercises, lectures on the topics “Dialogue, Mediation and Reconciliation” and “Women in Politics” delivered by international experts, and an exchange of views on dialogue with six prominent women from Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština - members of the Follow Us Initiative.

To become acquainted with the OSCE’s work, the participants heard Ambassador Melanne Verveer, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Gender and first US Ambassador for Global Women’s Issues, share her views and respond to their questions. In addition, the participants attended a session of the OSCE Permanent Council and met with representatives of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

“The OSCE Dialogue Academy for Young Women reaffirmed to us that politics is going to serve women only when women are involved in it,” said Kaltrina Ahmeti, a participant from Prishtinë/Priština.

Isidora Šmigić from Belgrade said: “The OSCE Dialogue Academy taught us that women need to stand together and be united in fighting for our rights, crossing the ethnic, religious and political divides. That is the only way we can achieve change in our societies.”

As a follow-up, participants of the fourth Dialogue Academy will have the opportunity to meet in November in Belgrade for an alumni exchange visit. There they will further develop their project ideas for 2019 that are designed to enhance their collaboration and promote cultural exchanges.

The Academy is organized annually under the auspices of the Follow Us Initiative, supported by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE Mission to Serbia, as part of their work to enhance women's participation in dialogue, conflict resolution and decision-making processes.

The Initiative, which gathers prominent women from Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština, was launched in 2012, and has been facilitated since then by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE Mission to Serbia.

COPENHAGEN, 22 October 2018 – Leading members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s election observation mission to the 28 October presidential election in Georgia are arriving this week in Tbilisi for final preparations of the mission. 

Kristian Vigenin from Bulgaria was appointed by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office as Special Co-ordinator to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission and will deliver the preliminary post-election statement at a press conference in Tbilisi on 29 October. The OSCE PA’s observation mission for the election is headed by Margareta Cederfelt from Sweden and includes 50 parliamentarians and staff from 17 OSCE countries. 

“Clearly, this election is important both to Georgians and to the international community, and represents another test for the development of democracy in Georgia,” Vigenin said today. “As observers, we will bring a critical eye to this process, assessing it for compliance with the election-related commitments to which all OSCE countries have agreed, and will ensure that our assessment is fair, balanced, and based on the broadest information possible.” 

“Our presence in Georgia demonstrates our solidarity and support of the Georgian people, who we hope will turn out to vote in high numbers,” Cederfelt said. “We hope for a competitive and calm election, mindful that this election marks the conclusion of the shift from a presidential system initiated eight years ago.” 

The observation mission is a common endeavour involving OSCE parliamentarians, observers deployed by the OSCE/ODIHR, and election observers from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. In total, the OSCE expects to have more than 350 observers active on election day throughout Georgia. 

This is the 12th time that the OSCE PA has sent election observation missions to Georgia, including for the presidential election in 2013 and for both rounds of the parliamentary elections in 2016. The OSCE PA’s observation activity in Georgia dates back to 1995. 

Media contact: Iryna Sabashuk, +45 60 10 81 73, iryna@oscepa.dk

read more

400565 Communication and Media Relations Section Giovanni Davoli

The likely challenges that the law enforcement agencies will face in the years to come and strategies for future policing were the focus of the OSCE’s 2018 Annual Police Experts Meeting, held in Vienna on 22 and 23 October 2018.

The meeting brought together 130 law enforcement experts from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation as well as representatives of international and regional organizations and academia. They discussed recent developments and trends, and prospects for the future. International experts presented innovative approaches to addressing the new and changing operational environment. There was also a particular focus on ways to enhance efforts to seize, confiscate, manage and re-use criminal assets. 

“The challenges that today’s law enforcement is facing have become more demanding, complex and multi-dimensional,” said Ambassador Luca Fratini, Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE, in his opening remarks. “The criminal world is truly transnational in nature and making full use of globalization and new technologies. So must our policies, strategies and operations.”

Participants noted that while already existing transnational crimes – like trafficking in illicit drugs and human beings, the smuggling of weapons and terrorism – are expected to become even more difficult to combat, cybercrimes including ransomware, online fraud, hacking and data theft will  become central issues for law enforcement agencies to deal with. The expansion of online payment methods, cryptocurrencies and anonymous websites further contribute to the changing nature of crime.

Guy Vinet, Head of the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, said: “Traditional policing methods alone cannot effectively contain these new types of crime and we have to look to new methods. This does not mean that traditional policing has failed. No, it means that there is a need to expand it and to supplement it with new strategies, including by making use of modern means such as the social media, analysis software and crime predictive techniques.”

400352 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A series of training courses organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe to enable police officers to work more effectively with victims of domestic violence and with aggressors and perpetrators of violence concluded on 18 October 2018.  

A total of 65 police officers attended three separate training courses, which commenced on 3 October and were held in Garm, Khujand and Dushanbe. Two Tajik experts and one international expert from Moldova delivered the courses. The participants learned about the national and international practices of dealing with domestic violence cases as well as how to work with victims and perpetrators of violence. The training sessions were organized in co-operation with the Interior Ministry of Tajikistan.

“The police are the first responders to cases of domestic violence. They must be free of gender stereotypes when dealing with cases of violence in the family. The training courses put special emphasis on gender inequality roles and gender issues as one of the contributing factors to this type of violence,” said Vesna Ivanovikj-Castarede, the Gender and Anti-Trafficking Officer at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Vladimir Kazakov, expert from Moldova, said: “The main goal of these training courses for police officers was to increase the participants’ knowledge with regard to counteracting family violence. During the training the participants learned how to co-operate with other governmental and non-governmental organizations to prevent domestic violence.”

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

A five-day training course aimed at further strengthening the capacity of Kazakhstan to counter terrorist financing was organized in Burabay, Kazakhstan from 16 to 20 October 2018. The training seminar was delivered to Kazakh participants from the capital and from the country’s Akmola, Aktobe and Karagandy regions.

The course was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Global Programme against Money Laundering, the Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies under the Prosecutor General’s Office of Kazakhstan, and in partnership with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism.

The training course was conducted to strengthen Kazakhstan’s compliance with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments. It was led by international experts together with six local government officials who were previously trained by the OSCE, UNODC and the EAG   in a train-the-trainer setting.

The course emphasized the key role of inter-agency co-operation in disrupting terrorist financing.  Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, it included sessions on national, regional and transnational threats, sources of information, money flows, tackling financial intelligence and strategic analysis. More than half of the course was devoted to practical work on exercises highlighting specific instruments and techniques that play an important role in countering the financing of terrorism.

Experts and practitioners from the Committee for Financial Monitoring, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Counter Terrorism Center, the Academy of the National Security Committee, the Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies under the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the State Revenues Committee participated in the training course.

The course was organized with the financial support of Germany, United States of America and the Russian Federation, as part of a comprehensive multiannual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.

KYIV, 22 October 2018 – The Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Alexander Hug, is traveling to eastern Ukraine from 22 to 27 October to assess the security situation in the area and its impact on civilians.

He will visit the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, meet OSCE SMM teams there as well as interact with civilians on both sides of the contact line. He will also encourage all concerned to work towards normalization of the situation. Hug will also visit the city of Dnipro in the beginning of the week.

Hug will hold press briefings, the exact time and location of which will be communicated via social media (@OSCE_SMM, www.facebook.com/oscesmm).

Journalists interested in covering the visit should contact: Tetiana Tesliuchenko: +38 050 334 14 54; tetiana.tesliuchenko@osce.org; smm-press@osce.org

read more

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Life values, growth opportunities and essential needs of young people in the modern society were the focus of the annual three-day Zhas (Youth) Camp that concluded on 21 October 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Some 150 young people from across the country, sociologists, and representatives of academia, media and non-governmental organizations took part in the event comprised of expert panels, guest lectures and interactive workshops. Participants discussed issues related to the development of critical thinking and media literacy among youth, gender equality and the implementation of gender-oriented policies, as well as volunteering and civic engagement of young people.

Guest speakers from Germany, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation shared their vision of what steps should be taken in order to deliver successful social projects. The Youth Mapping study prepared by the NGO Youth Information Service of Kazakhstan on the needs of young people and related development programmes in a number of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries was also presented at the event.

The youth camp was co-organized by the Youth Information Service of Kazakhstan, a national NGO, and the OSCE Programme Office in Astana with support from the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the United States Embassy in Astana.

The event is part of the Office’s efforts to promote youth engagement in resolving issues of security and development.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas and observed enhanced military and military-type presence inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in Staromykhailivka and near Bezimenne.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines near Pyshchevyk. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station; it also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).

On the evening of 18 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 95 undetermined explosions and 140 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km at directions ranging from east to west.

On the evening and night of 18-19 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 58 explosions (35 assessed as impacts and the remainder undetermined) and about 125 projectiles in flight (most from west to east), all 1-4km south-south-east, south and south-south-west.   

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions and about 340 projectiles in flight (most from south-west to north-east), all 2-5km south and south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 29 explosions (six assessed as impacts and the remainder undetermined) and about 440 projectiles in flight (most from south to north and from north to south), all 2-4km in easterly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 13 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions).

During the day on 19 October, positioned 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 3-5km west-south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM saw a recently deepened trench leading to a position assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, about 500m south of its northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge. About 700m north-east of that trench, also inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw another recently deepened trench and fortified position, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, about 150m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and about 500m west of its eastern edge. From the same location, the SMM saw three members of the armed formations, one armed, outside the disengagement area moving to positions in a treeline north of its north-eastern edge.

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of agreed withdrawal lines, on 19 October, the SMM saw a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 18 October, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 18 self-propelled howitzers (11 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and seven 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), three towed howitzers (D-30), six anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) and six anti-guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a railyard near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Predtechyne (58km north of Donetsk), 12 tanks (T-64), 13 self-propelled howitzers (11 2S3 and two 2S1) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) near Rubizhne and a tank (T-64) near Siversk (99km north of Donetsk). On 19 October, the SMM saw four tanks (T-72) loaded onto trailers on the western outskirts of Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), five tanks (T-72) loaded onto trailers on the south-eastern outskirts of Sievierodonetsk, 17 tanks (T-72) being loaded onto trains in Rubizhne, a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) at the train station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 18 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted seven armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Leonidivka (41km north of Donetsk) and an SMM long-range UAV spotted four ACVs (type undetermined) 2km north-west of Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in Zolote, and three IFVs (BMP-1) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk). The same day, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Toretsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), an ACV (type undetermined) inside a compound of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk). On 19 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and an IFV (BTR-4) at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces west of Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 18 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted seven IFVs (BMP-1) and one armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk)[4]. It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM monitored a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM observed 12 cars (four with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine and eight cars (three with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM observed nine stationary gasoline tank railcars with inscription “RZhD” and 70 stationary coal railcars on tracks in Rovenky (non-government-controlled, 54km south of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “the need to submit a request to the armed formations for crossing the checkpoint”. The SMM observed that civilian vehicles were allowed to pass the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”. The SMM observed that civilian vehicles were also refused passage west at the checkpoint, however civilian vehicles were allowed to turn north towards Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel south across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 18 October, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost communications[6]  on five occasions, assessed as due to jamming, near Ivanopillia (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk), between Predtechyne and Klishchiivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), between Pokrovske (government-controlled, 74km north of Donetsk), Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), Novotoshkivske and Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk), near Kudriashivka (government-controlled, 83km north-west of Luhansk) and near Pryvillia (government-controlled, 90km north-west of Luhansk).
• At a school in Koshary (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Luhansk), staff refused to speak with the SMM, citing the need for written permission from the armed formations. 

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The region of Oleksandrivka was incorrectly referenced in SMM Daily Report 19 October 2018 and should read 20km south-west of Donetsk.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

read more

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on a civilian car carrying a family that was struck by a ricocheted bullet at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas and observed military presence in the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Kovske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station; it also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The SMM observed public gatherings marking the European Union’s Anti-Trafficking Day in Kyiv, Sievierodonetsk, Mariupol, Lviv and Chernivtsi.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions).

On the evening and night of 17-18 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 13 undetermined explosions, about 45 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east) and 24 muzzle flashes, all 1-4km at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 17-18 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded seven undetermined explosions, about 330 projectiles in flight (most from northerly to southerly directions) and six muzzle flashes, all 2-4 east-north-east, east and east-south-east. The following day, the same camera recorded about eight undetermined explosions, 30 projectiles in flight (all from southerly to northerly directions) and a muzzle flash, all 3-4km east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 17-18 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km south-south-east and south-west. On 18 October, from the same location, the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions and 135 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-4km at south-east and south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations and no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (seven explosions).

Positioned in Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and ten shots of small-arms fire, all 5-7km north-east.

The SMM saw damage to a civilian car carrying a family of a man, woman and two children at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). In the line for traffic traveling east, the SMM saw a white Skoda Octavia with an 8mm hole in the upper left corner of the rear windshield. About 1.5-2m east of the car, the SMM observed a tall metal support pole that serves as part of an open shelter structure at the checkpoint. About 3.5m high the SMM saw a scratch on the pole about 8mm in diameter, which it assessed was caused by small-arms round (7.62mm) hitting the pole. The SMM assessed that the hole in the rear windshield was caused by a small-arms round (7.62mm), fired from a north-easterly direction in a downward trajectory, which had ricocheted off the nearby metal pole and penetrated the rear windshield. The Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint commander said that the car had been struck by a bullet about two minutes prior and that he had immediately notified the SMM for observation. The Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that the driver (male, late twenties) of the vehicle had been standing outside the car with a State Border Guard Service official who was inspecting the car at the time of the incident and that the woman (late twenties) and two children (boys, 18 months and seven years old) had all been in the back seat. The SMM saw the family standing nearby and observed that they appeared to be in shock and none of them could speak.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the night of 18 October, the SMM camera positioned at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight from west to east 2-4km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and ten projectiles in flight from north-east to south-west 3-5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, on 17 October, the SMM saw two Ukrainian military personnel walk south into a field on the northern edge of the disengagement area. On 18 October, the SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer carrying a chainsaw exit the disengagement area on the north-eastern edge near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and a black Volkswagen sedan with two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside drive into the disengagement area from Katerynivka and travel west. The same day, the SMM observed an IFV (BMP-1) on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-3km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and four bursts of small-arms fire 1-2km south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on two separate occasions, the SMM observed four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in the same area  being transported on trucks on road T-1306 2-3km east of Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 17 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 15 tanks (T-72) in a known training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 17 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted seven tanks (T-64), six anti-tank-guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a railyard in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). On 18 October, the SMM observed four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Rivnopil (65km south-west of Donetsk), eight MLRS (BM-21) near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk), six trucks each loaded with a tank (T-72) on the north-western outskirts of Sievierodonetsk and 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S3) and four towed howitzers (type undetermined) at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 17 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol). On 18 October, the SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-4) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk), five IFVs (BMP-2) on the northern outskirts of Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol), three IFVs (BMP-2) north-west of Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) and an IFV (BMP-1) in Zolote-4/Rodina (60km west of Luhansk).

On 17 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted at least 25 fresh craters, assessed as caused by (82mm) mortar rounds, in a residential area of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) (some of the impacts were 200m away from the closest house).

On 17 October, about 4km south of Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk) and 100m north-west of military-type positions, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four fresh craters, assessed as caused by mortar rounds. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire.

On 18 October, the SMM observed two members of the armed formations reinforcing a trench north of a road about 1km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM was restricted three times in this area.*

The SMM continued to observe mines for the first time. On 17 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least newly laid six anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road on the north-eastern outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). 

The SMM observed marking of mines and demining. On the western side of road P-66 between Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled 67km north-west of Luhansk) and Toshkivka (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw six workers wearing clothing with the logo of an international demining organization. They were working in an area about 20m west of the road where the vegetation had been cut and stakes and marking tape were being put in the ground.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water wells near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk), to electrical infrastructure in Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM monitored a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM observed 26 pedestrians exit Ukraine and seven cars (two with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates) and 29 pedestrians enter Ukraine.

In Kyiv, Sievierodonetsk, Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), Lviv and Chernivtsi the SMM observed gatherings marking the European Union’s Anti-Trafficking Day. The SMM observed between 20 and 300 people (men and women, mainly young adults) in each city gather and march through central squares, some people carrying banners reading “Walk for Freedom” and “People are not for sale.” The SMM observed peaceful situations at each gathering.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two separate occasions, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again prevented the patrol from traveling east to non-government-controlled area, on one occasion citing “orders from a superior”.
• At the northern entrance of Kovske (non-government-controlled, 91km south of Donetsk), two armed men in camouflage clothing at a checkpoint of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing “ongoing special operations in the area as well as attempting to capture some criminals”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• At the same checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske where two others patrols had again been denied access, three armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and prevented it from traveling east. After 60 minutes, the SMM was allowed to travel east.
• At a military compound near Rivnopil, a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that he had orders from his superiors not to allow anyone into the compound. After 50 minutes, the SMM was granted access.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 17-18 October an SMM temporarily lost communications[5] with an SMM long-range UAV near Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), Pikuzy (non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk), Vershynivka (non-government-controlled, 62km south-east of Donetsk), Novozarivka (non-government-controlled, 47km south-east of Donetsk), Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk), Petrivka (43km north of Donetsk).  

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

read more

VIENNA, 19 October 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today deplored the intimidation and death threats directed at journalists with the well-known Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta. He urged the authorities to swiftly and fully investigate these incidents and ensure journalists’ safety.

“Threats to media workers are completely unacceptable, as they undermine independent and investigative journalism, sow fear and affect freedom of expression and the free flow of information,” said Désir. “I deplore the latest death threats directed at Novaya Gazeta’s staff and urge the authorities to ensure the journalists’ safety and bring the responsible to justice.”

On 17 and 18 October, the editorial office of Novaya Gazeta received a funeral wreath and a dead lamb’s head, and the accompanying notes “Denis Korotkov – traitor of the motherland” and “To chief editor of Novaya Gazeta, greetings to you and Korotkov”. Korotkov is a journalist with Novaya Gazeta, who previously worked as an investigative reporter with the St. Petersburg-based online media outlet Fontanka.Ru. His recent investigative stories published by Fontanka.Ru uncovered the participation of mercenaries from Russia in the Syrian conflict, for which he reportedly has received threats. Additionally, on 17 October, Korotkov received a bouquet of four carnations with a mourning ribbon and a note stating “We will not forget you”.

According to Novaya Gazeta, there is also an ongoing online campaign accusing the newspaper of allegedly divulging the data about Russian pilots in Syria, which placed their families in danger, and calling for reprisals against journalists. The newspaper rejects these accusations and says that no such data has ever been published.

“I understand that law enforcement officials have already been notified of these incidents and have started looking into them,” said Désir. “I call on the authorities to prioritize the investigation into this case and find all those behind the attacks. If not addressed in a timely manner, such threats can easily escalate and incite hostility and violence.”

The journalists working with Novaya Gazeta have been subjected to intimidation, harassment and threats on numerous occasions in the past. Several of the newpaper’s journalists were murdered for their work, including Anna Politkovskaya, Igor Domnikov and others. 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

read more

PRISHTINË/PRIŠTINA, 19 October 2018 – Over 40 representatives of law enforcement agencies in Kosovo concluded today an advanced anti-corruption training programme, organized by the 2018 OSCE Italian Chairmanship, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo and the Italian Embassy in Prishtinë/Priština.

The three-day event, held under the auspices of the 2018 OSCE Italian Chairmanship, included officers from the Kosovo Police, Police Inspectorate, Anti-Corruption Agency, Financial Intelligence Unit and various judicial institutions. It was designed to strengthen capacities for fighting corruption through the presentation of experiences and best practices of the Italian Guardia di Finanza and Prosecution Service.

“We were happy to contribute by sending our best people to Prishtinë/Priština. Corruption is, unfortunately, a pressing issue throughout the world, but I believe my country, and the Guardia di Finanza in particular, have an edge on this matter, as we are quite advanced in investigating and prosecuting corruption,” said Alessandro Azzoni, Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE.

In the course of the programme, the participants attended modules on preventive and repressive activities; tracking of financial flows in money laundering investigations; international legal tools for investigations into corruption; investigative techniques; and criminal asset recovery.

“Kosovo is making progress on its track record in combating corruption and organized crime, but these efforts need to be sustained and further strengthened,” said Jan Braathu, Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. “The OSCE Mission in Kosovo is a partner for our counterparts in the Kosovo Police, Judiciary and Prosecutorial Services. Together with the Italian Embassy and the OSCE Chairmanship, we seek to support, encourage and enable Kosovo institutions in their efforts against corruption through specialized training.”

Piero Sardi, Italian Ambassador to Prishtinë/Priština, said that Italy supports the fight against corruption, which falls within the wider fight against organized crime as well as within the overall effort to reinforce, implement and, where needed, enforce the rule of law. “Fighting against corruption is an essential part of strengthening the rule of law, since corruption is detrimental to citizens, distorting the effective functioning of the institutions. It puts a financial burden on the economic system and entails the disruption of the social fabric. In the medium and long term, corruption hampers Kosovo’s development potential, both in the economic and in the social fields.”

As a follow-up, from November 2018 through March 2019, the Italian Government will support a project aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo in conducting criminal investigations into allegations of misconduct by members of Kosovo Police. The project will enhance the capacity of the Inspectorate to protect the identity of informants and whistle-blowers, investigate financial irregularities, conduct risk analysis of corruption in the police and strengthen integrity testing in the police.

The Italian OSCE Chairmanship has identified anti-corruption as one of its top priorities.

read more

400331 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported five-day training seminar on risk profiling at border checkpoints concluded in Zharkent, Kazakhstan on 19 October 2018.

Nineteen officers of the Border Service of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee took part in the event. The training seminar was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana together with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the US Embassy in Astana and the Border Service of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee.

The workshop was led by experts from the Central Asian Regional Information Co-ordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC) and the Academy of the Border Service of the Committee for National Security of Kazakhstan. They instructed personnel in employing statistical instruments to analyse information on criminal incidents and develop an actionable in-depth risk profile to assist in countering transnational threats. 

The curriculum included techniques for in-depth psychological analysis of a suspect’s verbal and non-verbal behaviour as well as ways to identify specific risk indicators. A number of practical exercises provided the participants with an opportunity to use their newly acquired knowledge.

The event is part of a series that builds on training events for border guards, organized in different locations around Kazakhstan for more than 200 border service officers since 2016. It is part of the Office’s activities aimed at enhancing the host country’s border security and promoting integrated border security management while countering transnational threats.

400316 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The implementation and monitoring of Georgia’s Justice for Children System Reform Strategy and National Action Plan were the focus of an OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe-supported study visit by members of the Tajik Inter-Agency Working Group for Juvenile Justice Reform to Tbilisi from 8 to 12 October 2018.

Georgia was chosen as the destination of the visit because of its successful implementation of system reforms in the sphere of Justice for Children. Topics highlighted during the visit included Georgia’s development of the Juvenile Justice Code, the Diversion and Mediation Programme, the specialization of justice system professionals to deal with child suspects, witnesses and victims, data collection, individualized rehabilitation and reintegration plans, and child-friendly environments and approaches in police and court settings.

“This trip was very beneficial for us, as we visited various Georgian agencies and institutions gaining insight into important implementation issues relevant to the reforms envisioned in the 2017-2021Tajik National Action Plan on Juvenile Justice Reform,” said Navruz Shohiyon, representative of the Juvenile Justice Department of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Justice who was one of the participants of the trip.

The visit was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe in co-operation with UNICEF Georgia.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The SMM observed weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Valianivske.* An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle again spotted vehicles in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region moving on a dirt road in the middle of the night away from and towards the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station; it also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in relation to public service and economy and observed it disperse peacefully.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including, however, a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions).

On the evening of 16 October, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion and five projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, all 0.5-1km east-south-east. Immediately thereafter, the camera recorded an explosion assessed as an impact of either a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7) or a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) about 100m east-north-east within the premises of the entry-exit checkpoint.

On the evening and night of 16-17 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 30 undetermined explosions and about 110 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east and from south to north), all 0.5-4km at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 16-17 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 22 undetermined explosions and about 500 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-west to south-east and from south-west to north-east), all 3-5km at easterly directions.

On the evening and night of 16-17 October, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 30 undetermined explosions and about 130 projectiles (mostly from west-south-west to east-north-east and from east-north-east to west-south-west), all 1-7km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south-south-west.

On the evening of 16 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 4-5km north-east as well as about 80 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km at south-westerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including seven explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions).

On 17 October, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near the southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire 0.5-1km north, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV, which was undamaged, and departed the area.*

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 16-17 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire 4-5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 17 October, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 8-12km east-south-east, followed by 16 bursts of small-arms fire 0.6-1.5km east-north-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The same day, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 17 October, the SMM saw four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) being transported by trucks on the eastern edge of Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw ten stationary multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in government-controlled areas, on 16 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a railyard in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk) and four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in a compound about 400m south of the aforementioned railyard. The same day, the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S7 Pion, 152mm) at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk). On 17 October, the SMM saw four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Khlibodarivka.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in a non-government-controlled area, on 17 October, the SMM saw eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in firing positions at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that four MLRS (BM-21), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (five D-30 and a 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] and a UAV in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 16 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 17 October, the SMM observed an unmarked, fixed-wing UAV flying from south-west to north-east about 2km south-west of Chermalyk at an altitude of about 100m and then turn west towards Kyrylivka (26km north-east of Mariupol).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 16 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk). On 17 October, the SMM saw an ACV (BMP or MT-LB variant) near Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk).

In a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted vehicles on the unpaved road moving north-east towards the border with the Russian Federation and then south-west away from it where there are no border crossing facilities. At around 23:00 on 16 October, the UAV spotted a truck (Ural) and a car (SUV) near Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk) heading north-east on an unpaved road until it reached a parking area in a field about 3.5km east-north-east of Manych. The truck then moved in reverse on the dirt road a few metres further north-east and stopped there with its rear cargo deck facing north-east towards the border with the Russian Federation. About one hour later, the UAV spotted a group of at least 12 people walking from the border to the parked truck and some of them entering the rear of the truck, which remained in the area. At around 00:20 on 17 October, in the same area, the UAV spotted three trucks separately moving south-west from the border: one of them continued to travel south-west along the aforementioned dirt road while the others remained in the aforementioned parking area.

The SMM continued to observe unexploded ordnance (UXO). On the asphalt road about 1.5 km east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM noted that a previously observed anti-tank mine (TM-62M) was no longer present. (See SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018.) However, the Mission continued to observe anti-tank mine fuses scattered on the southern part of the road.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to electrical infrastructure in Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored about 5,000 people (mixed ages and genders) gather at Shevchenko Park and walk to the Cabinet of Ministers building at 12/2 Mykhayla Hrushevskoho Street. Participants were demanding lower utility costs and higher salaries. On the way to the Cabinet of Ministers building, the SMM saw police officers surround and detain two participants. The SMM saw approximately 400 police officers securing the building. After about four hours, the gathering dispersed peacefully.  

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the patrol from traveling west, citing “orders from superiors.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near the southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard small-arms fire 0.5-1km north, assessed as aimed at the UAV.
• An SMM mid-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming[5], near Chermalyk.
• An SMM mini-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, near Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

read more

Communication and Media Relations Section The Role of Civil Society in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Focus on South-Eastern Europe

Civil society has a critical role to play in preventing violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) and more can be done to strengthen partnerships between government and civil society in order to address this security challenge, said speakers at a two-day regional meeting in Tirana on 17 and 18 October 2018. A new OSCE guidebook that focuses on the role of civil society in addressing VERLT in the context of South-East Europe was also launched at the event.

More than 60 participants from across the South-East Europe region including both government officials and civil society groups participated in the meeting. They discussed and shared emerging good practices in strengthening the role and the voice of civil society and focused on building their capacity.

“Effective counter-terrorism efforts are critical but insufficient without an emphasis on prevention,” said Albanian Deputy Minister of Interior Romina Kuko. “Engaging civil society organizations through a trust-based relationship with government actors creates an understanding of a shared responsibility for security.”

The Albanian National Co-ordinator for countering violent extremism, Agron Sojati, observed that increased efforts had been made at both the national and regional levels to improve co-operation, co-ordination and communication in practice and policy concerning preventing and countering VERLT. He highlighted the example of a newly established multi-agency platform in Albania.

The Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania, Bernd Borchardt, noted that in tackling VERLT “engagement with civil society actors– giving them the tools and support they need to flourish– enhances the value of individuals, communities and civil society in strengthening security.”

Participants also learnt about the new Guidebook on Good Practices in Strengthening the Role of Civil Society – a Focus on South-Eastern Europe, developed by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, which aims to promote  inclusive, multi-stakeholder processes in developing strategies and programmes to prevent and counter VERLT through safe, impactful and sustainable initiatives..

The guidebook, funded by the Austrian Government, is one of the first in a planned series of regionally-focused guidebooks by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department on challenges in developing and implementing effective programmes in this area.

The Head of the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, Argo Avakov, said the guidebooks highlight the OSCE’s ongoing role in supporting its participating States with good practices to prevent and counter VERLT.

400289 Communication and Media Relations Section

Strengthening protection and preparedness against terrorist attacks aimed at critical energy infrastructure was the focus of a risk-assessment and crisis management exercise held in Turkmenistan’s capital on 17 and 18 October 2018, organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department and the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.  

The exercise was held as part of the OSCE’s efforts to advance the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2341 (2017) on the protection of critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, and is the eighth national exercise on enhancing the capacities of OSCE participating States to mitigate terrorist attacks emanating from cyberspace on their critical energy infrastructure.

The exercise sought to raise awareness on the threat and vulnerabilities of critical energy infrastructure and to improve interagency co-ordination and collaboration in order to increase resilience. Through a simulation, 28 national experts, including representatives from the state and the energy sector tested the effectiveness of their existing protection and crisis management systems, including co-ordination with external crisis management mechanisms to mitigate the impact of a terrorist cyber-attack.

“The use of ICT to conduct disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure is an increasing possibility,” said Koen De Smedt of the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department. “This exercise will help test and develop Turkmenistan’s national, sectoral and company-level capabilities to respond to a terrorist cyber-attack directed at industrial control systems.“ 

The training is based on the OSCE Good Practices Guide on Non-Nuclear Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection from Terrorist Attacks Focusing on Threats Emanating from Cyberspace.

VIENNA, 18 October 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed concern about the announcement of a new registration system for 44 websites in Albania and their potential closure.

On 15 October, the Electronic and Postal Communications Authority in Albania published a list of 44 media websites required to register with the National Business Centre and to acquire their tax number (business registration number) within 72 hours, which they must then publish online. Failure to comply would result in the websites being closed down. This initiative, supported by the government, reportedly aims to address concerns about online defamation.

“States should not impose mandatory registration to online media as a precondition for their work which can have a very negative effect on media freedom. This practice, when applied, could seriously restrict public access to diverse sources of information, the plurality of voices, and erode the right of freedom of expression and information online,” said Désir.

The Representative appealed to the Albanian authorities to reconsider these actions, to examine all possible alternatives to address the defamation issue and launch an inclusive debate with relevant civil society and media stakeholders.

“It is of crucial importance to have more information about the exact objectives of the announced measures, as well as the criteria based on which these 44 websites have been selected,” said Désir. He further asked for clarification on the legal basis for requiring these websites to publish their business company’s tax number and the legal basis for the closure of websites.

In a letter addressing this issue sent to the Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama, the Representative offered his legal assistance. Désir also recalled his Office’s recommendations on protecting media freedom and freedom of expression in the regulation of online content in South-East Europe, emphasizing that any regulation of online content needs to take into account international obligations, including OSCE commitments.

read more

400247 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

A roundtable discussion of Tajikistan’s legislation on the country’s transition to digital broadcasting was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and the Parliament of Tajikistan on 18 October in Dushanbe. The discussion focused on a legal analysis of the existing relevant Tajik law conducted by legal experts of the OSCE in the summer of 2018.

Some 50 representatives of the Parliament, civil society, media community and international organizations attended the discussion.

The legal analysis of Tajik law was conducted at the request of Tajikistan’s Parliament, in relation to the revision of existing legislation and preparation of the legal ground for the transition to digital broadcasting. 

In his opening remarks, Scott Kearin, Head of the Human Dimension Department of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, underlined the importance of the transition to digital broadcasting. “Transition to digital broadcasting is not a simple switch from an old to a new technology. It is an important opportunity to accelerate the convergence process, whereby information technology, broadcasting and telecommunications can interact and provide new opportunities to develop the economy, empower citizens, and provide the whole society with new tools of communication,” he said.

Olim Salimzoda, Chairperson of Tajikistan’s Parliamentary Committee on International Relations, Public Organizations and Information, thanked the OSCE for its continuous support in improving the country’s legislation and emphasized the importance of preparing a legal basis for the digital switchover. He said: “Based on the analysis prepared by the OSCE experts, our Committee will develop a draft law on amendments and additions to legislation on media by the end of 2018, which will establish a good legal basis for the transition to digital broadcasting, in line with the OSCE standards and principles.”