OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission’s long-range unmanned aerial vehicle experienced severe jamming near Korsun. It followed up on reports of shelling at the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske. The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Bila Hora and Zhelanne. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as at two border crossing points not under government control. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to houses and essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. In Odessa, the SMM observed graffiti on two monuments associated with the 1905 mutiny on the battleship Potemkin.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 260 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 115 explosions).[2]

In the morning on 9 November, while in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 50 undetermined explosions over a period of 30 minutes, all at an assessed range of 5-8km north-west.

During the day on 9 November, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions (27 assessed as outgoing rounds of cannon (30mm) fire, two assessed as outgoing rounds of mortar (undetermined type) fire, three assessed as impacts of undetermined weapons, about 50 assessed as undetermined explosions of cannon (30mm) fire and the remainder assessed as undetermined rounds of undetermined weapons) and 350 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-6km at directions ranging from south-west to north.

During the day on 9 November, positioned 2km south-west of the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar round at an assessed range of 2.5-3km east-south-east, followed by about 20 bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-east and south-east.

During the day on 9 November, positioned 2km south-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard, in sequence, nine explosions assessed as impacts of undetermined weapon(s) rounds and about twenty bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-4km at directions ranging from north to east; an undetermined explosion at an undetermined distance north-north-east; five explosions (one assessed as outgoing and its resultant impact and four undetermined) 3-5km east and north-east; three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and their resultant impacts at undetermined distances north-east and east-north-east; and over 100 bursts of small-arms fire 3-4km north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions).

During the day on 9 November, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two bursts of 30mm cannon fire and six shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 6-8km north-west.

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) experienced severe jamming. On the evening of 8 November, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, near Korsun (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk).[3] The incident was assessed as particularly severe, as it caused most of the control and communication links (including backup systems) between the Ground Control Station and the UAV to fail. Despite the severity of the jamming attack, the operating team regained control over the aircraft after it left the jamming area in emergency mode. In 2016, an SMM long-range UAV was lost while flying over Korsun (see SMM Spot Report of 3 June 2016).

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). In a parking lot of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske, about 10m south of its northwest entrance, the SMM observed five fresh impact sites consisting of small craters and charred asphalt over an area of 100 square metres. Approximately 5-10m south of these impacts, the SMM observed about 30 to 50 fresh shrapnel marks on the north-facing wall of the farm building, 2-3m above the ground. About 150m west of these craters, the SMM saw a large oak tree missing some bark and smaller branches which had about 20 fresh scratches assessed as shrapnel scars approximately 5m above the ground on the south-facing side of its trunk. A member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that they had cleaned up the site after the shelling. The SMM assessed all the damage as having been caused by the explosion of 82mm mortar rounds fired from a southerly direction. A man (in his sixties) told the SMM he worked at the farm and had been present during the shelling which, he said, had occurred from 16:30 to 17:45 on 6 November.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[4] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 9 November, positioned on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The same day, positioned on the northern edge of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-7km north-north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Also on 9 November, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard eight bursts of small-arms fire followed by a minute of uncountable overlapping shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed distance of 2-3km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area), and then four instances (in total 15 minutes) of uncountable overlapping shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 2-3km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 8 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and three probable anti-tank guns (MT-12) near Zhelanne (36km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 8 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37 Buk): one near Petropavlivka (49km west of Donetsk) and one in Novooleksandrivka (36km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[5] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, on 8 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants), two ACVs (type undetermined) and a modified military truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) near Bila Hora; three IFVs (BMP-2) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk); an ACV near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk); and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). On 9 November, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) east of Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), an APC (BTR variant) in Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR variant) east of Mariupol.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 8 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted seven IFVs (four BMP-1 and three probable BMP variants) and an APC (MT-LB) near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk). On 9 November, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 400m-long trench (not seen in imagery from 25 August 2018) about 2.5km south-west of Naberezhne (77km south of Donetsk) and a new 270m-long trench with six firing positions about 1.5km north-west of Naberezhne.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works, on 9 November, to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a well in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk), power lines Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. In Luhansk region, the Mission facilitated and monitored a transfer of funds from non-government to government-controlled areas, reportedly in relation to a water payment. On 8 November, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to power lines in the Vilnyi neighbourhood of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk)

The SMM visited three border areas outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and 15 pedestrians (eight men and seven women, aged 20 to 55) entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw three women and a man (aged 40 to 65) entering Ukraine and two men and a woman (aged 45 to 65) exiting Ukraine. While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about three minutes, the SMM saw a woman in her sixties exiting Ukraine and a man in his sixties entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Odessa, the SMM continued to follow up on media reports of vandalism to monuments (see SMM Daily Report 6 November 2018). On 8 November, on Polskyi Descent, the SMM saw splashes of fresh red paint and the phrase “Death to the red slaughterers” in Ukrainian spray-painted onto a monument commemorating the 1905 mutiny on the battleship Potemkin. On 9 November, at 1 Mytna Square, the SMM observed that the words “Death to the Executioners” had been spray-painted in Ukrainian onto a statue to Hryhoryi Vakulenchuk, one of the sailors involved in the mutiny, and traces of red paint on a plaque honouring communists executed or sentenced to hard labour at 44 Preobrazhenska Street.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[6]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC. 6

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 8 November, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, on two occasions: near Novoselivka and near Korsun.[7]
• On 9 November, an SMM mini-UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal again, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).
• In Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), a morgue employee refused to provide the SMM information regarding a civilian casualty (see SMM Daily Report of 9 November 2018), telling it to contact the armed formations.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

[4]           Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5]           This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6]           The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. It corroborated a civilian fatality in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka as a result of shrapnel injuries. The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Novoselivka and Yasnodolsk. The SMM observed an anti-aircraft-gun inside the Zolote disengagement area and recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. The SMM observed anti-tank mines for the first time near Orikhove. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to houses and essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. In Kyiv, the SMM observed a public gathering related to an import tax on vehicles. In Kherson, the SMM followed up on the situation of the detained Mekhanik Pogodin tanker.  

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 115), compared with the previous reporting period.[2]

On the evening of 7 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and 210 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-7km south-east and south-south-west. The next day, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 40 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-6km south-east and south-west.  

During the day on 8 November, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about 2.5 hours, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-10km at directions ranging from north to west-south-west and about 50 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-5km south-west, west-south-west and west.

During the same day, positioned 2km south-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as impacts (three of mortar rounds and nine of rounds of undetermined weapons) at an assessed range of 2-3km north-east and about 220 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-5km north-east and east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions).

In the early morning of 8 November, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 10-15km north.

The SMM saw a civilian fatality in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk). At 10:35, positionedin Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM saw four armed members of the armed formations carrying an injured man (63 years old) from 5 Chapaieva street in the Mariivka area of Zolote-5/ Mykhailivka to an area near a bus stop on Poshtova Street. Near the bus stop, the SMM then observed an ambulance arrive and heard medical staff declare that the man had already died due to shrapnel injuries. The SMM then observed the body of the man with injuries under his left arm being placed into an ambulance. A neighbour (woman, about 65 years old) of the deceased man told the SMM that at around 10:10, she had approached his house at 5 Chapaieva Street after hearing his wife screaming for help, and had found the man lying on the ground in his yard, breathing with difficulty. Shortly before seeing the casualty, between 09:55-10:10, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions about 1km north-west of its position in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable works to power lines in the area. The SMM could not reach the deceased man's house due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 7 November, an SMM long-range unmanned-aerial-vehicle (UAV) again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) on a military-type truck inside the Zolote disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 8 November 2018).

During the day on 8 November, positioned about 1km north of the centre of Zolote, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and two shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 1-3km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area); two explosions assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area); four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-8km east-south-east and south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area); and six shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).  

On the same day, positioned 400m north of the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-8km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned on the northern edge of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-8km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka on the same day, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1km north-west (see above),  an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-7km south-west and nine undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-12km north and east-north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).     

Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, at a forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM saw a hole (about 1cm) in a sheet of glass covering an observation post. The SMM assessed it as a bullet hole, but could not assess whether it was fresh or the direction of fire.  

During the day on 8 November, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard 65 shots of small-arms fire 2-4km east and south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 7 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five tanks (T-64) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk) and four towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) near Yasnodolsk (41km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 7 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa): one near Chervone (63km north of Donetsk) and one near Bila Hora (67km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, the SMM saw five tanks (T-72) near Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 8 November, the SMM saw five tanks (type undetermined) inside a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

On 7 November, the SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines and noted that 28 tanks (T-64) and 12 mortars (M120-15 Molot, 122mm) remained missing. The SMM also observed additional weapons present for the first time. 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[4]  in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 7 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Zemliane (11km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70/80) near Pakhalivka (40km west of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB) near Novoselivka and an IFV (BMP-1) near Rozsadky (62km north-east of Donetsk). On 8 November, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) in Kadiivka.

In government-controlled areas, on 7 November, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-1) parked close to residential houses near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk).  On 8 November, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines, including some for the first time, as well as mine hazard signs and de-mining activities. On 6 November, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted nine anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in a row across the road between Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) and Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018). On 7 November, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 82 anti-tank mines (TM-62) placed in two rows over about 190m in a field  about 2km south of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk). On 8 November, in a field about 3km north-west of Lebedynske and north-west of the junction of road T-0519 leading to Lebedynske, the SMM saw ten Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in military uniform engaged in de-mining activities.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and power lines in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, as well as to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering in front of the Parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street. It saw approximately 350-400 individuals (mostly men, mixed ages) carrying about 100 flags of “Auto Euro Power” as well as about 90 cars with foreign licence plates parked along the sidewalks of Shovkovychna and Hrushevskoho Streets during an ongoing plenary session in which Members of Parliament considered adopting amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine concerning a tax on imported vehicles. Participants on Hrushevskoho Street allowed only cars with EU registration plates to pass, and refused passage to cars with Ukrainian plates. At this location on the previous day, the SMM observed a gathering related to the same issue (see SMM Daily Report 8 November 2018).

In Kherson, the SMM followed up on the situation of the detained Mekhanik Pogodin tanker. It saw that the tanker remained moored and surrounded by Ukrainian Border Guard Service members in a port in the south-western outskirts of Kherson city (see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018). A man who introduced himself as the captain of the tanker, together with a male crew member, told the SMM that a court hearing regarding the tanker’s case would take place this month. Staff at the court told the SMM that the hearing was scheduled for 14 November.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 November 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM mini-UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).[6]
• At the city hospital in Khartsyzk (non-government-controlled, 26km east of Donetsk), while following up on civilian casualties, staff told the SMM that the hospital was not permitted to give information citing orders from the armed formations.  

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3]           Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]           This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5]           The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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THE HAGUE, 9 November 2018 – “We will continue to support not only the students of Jajce, but also any other student who wants changes that will lead to a better future,” said Azra Keljalić, a student and President of the Student Council of Jajce Vocational School, as she accepted the 2018 Max van der Stoel Award on behalf of high school students from Jajce, Bosnia and Herzegovina, at a ceremony in The Hague today.

Addressing some 200 representatives from governments, civil society and international organizations who attended the award ceremony in The Hague, Keljalić spoke of how the students, opposing policies that deepen ethnic divides, had successfully resisted the authorities’ decision to establish a new ethnically segregated school in the municipality in 2016.

“The moral satisfaction of every student lies in the fact that their efforts, work and commitment are recognized and rewarded by an expert and independent jury. This means so much to us and to the youth we represent,” she said.

Keljalić was one of the five students, together with two teachers, who travelled from Bosnia and Herzegovina to The Hague.

Speaking on behalf of the jury, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Lamberto Zannier, said: “This decision is not only symbolic. It is a sign of the investment the international community should be making in the new generation.”

The students of Jajce were presented with the Award certificate by the Dutch Foreign Minister Stef Blok. “Reconciliation – to some, it is just a fourteen-letter word. For the people of a war-torn country, it may be the hardest thing in the world,” he said.

Mirsada Čolaković, the Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Netherlands, said: “I am proud of these young people who said ‘NO’ to the implementation of the ‘two schools under one roof’ educational system, which was established in certain municipalities after the devastating war in our country. The system was imposed as part of the reconciliation process and at the beginning it was accepted, unfortunately, as a positive approach, but twenty years later it has obviously led to more ethnic division and unacceptable segregation.”

The Max van der Stoel Award - a prize of €50,000 - has been co-sponsored by the HCNM and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs every two years since 2003. It is presented to a person, group or institution, in recognition of their extraordinary and outstanding achievements in improving the position of national minorities across the OSCE countries.

In parallel to the Award ceremony, the event in The Hague also celebrated the 25th anniversary of the appointment of the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. An anniversary photo exhibition was launched by High Commissioner Zannier, which illustrates the legacy of the five successive High Commissioners, the HCNM’s work in the field, its partnership with international organizations, its early warning function, and its thematic recommendations and guidelines “in action”.

“It is thanks to the collective wisdom of successive High Commissioners that some early warning signs of inter-ethnic tension and crisis were detected and early action taken, that inter-ethnic disputes have often been contained, and that States have been encouraged to put in place long-term policies for diversity management. We can be proud of that,” said Zannier.

Welcoming the HCNM’s 25-year long contribution to the OSCE’s efforts on conflict prevention, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger stated that “the HCNM is not only one of the most effective tools in the OSCE toolbox, but also an internationally-recognized example of how preventive diplomacy can work.”

The First Vice-President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, described the creation of the office of the HCNM as “one of the most innovative projects” of the OSCE in its investment in conflict prevention. Elaborating on the role of the HCNM in Europe, he said that “the HCNM has contributed substantially in lowering tensions, striking compromises and finding solutions for conflicts that otherwise would have spun out of control.”

Speaking about both the HCNM anniversary and the Award, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ambassador Bruce Berton, remarked: “The HCNM is dedicated to preventing ethnic conflict and discrimination. The students of Jajce embody these values. Overcoming difficult odds, they succeeded in continuing their studies together. A more deserving group of recipients for this Award could not have been chosen. They should inspire everyone in Bosnia and Herzegovina who looks to move beyond ethnic and nationalist politics.”

The HCNM 25th anniversary photo exhibition is open to the public from 12 November to 1 December at the Atrium, The Hague City Hall, Spui 70, 2511 BT The Hague. Entrance is free-of-charge.

Photos from the event are available here. Other event material can be found here.

Follow the discussion on Twitter using the hashtags #mvdsAWARD and #voice4diversity.

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SDGs SDGs:  9 - Industry, innovation and infrastructure 17 - Partnerships for the goals

TIRANA, 9 November 2018 – A two-day connectivity meeting on innovation and youth entrepreneurship hosted by the OSCE Secretariat focusing on “Building the skills needed for the Fourth Industrial Revolution” concludes today in Tirana. The meeting is part of The Young Developers and Entrepreneurs to Advance Start-ups (YDEAS) project in the Western Balkans and is supported by the Italian 2018 OSCE Chairmanship, the Central European Initiative and the Principality of Liechtenstein.

The discussion gathered some 100 participants, students and young innovators coming from the entire Western Balkans region, representatives of universities, investors, start-uppers, hubs as well as regional and international organizations.

“Supporting human capital development to address the challenges of digitalization is a priority of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship,” said Raffaella Campanati, First Secretary of the Italian Embassy in Tirana.  “Fostering the huge potential of young people in the Western Balkans is a long-term investment for the future of the whole region.”

Discussions focused on fostering university co-operation for the future of the job market, preparing students to be problem solvers, to know how to find and use information, and how to create new tools to solve problems.

Mayor of Tirana Erion Velija said that local authorities have a key role to play in creating an ecosystem where young people can act as drivers of positive change. “There is a need to foster co-operation at the municipal level and in the region to make this happen.”

By granting eighteen scholarships in one of the most innovative hubs in Europe - the European Innovation Academy (EIA) - the project offered young people from the Western Balkans the opportunity to boost entrepreneurial and innovation-intensive skills necessary to foster economic growth in the region.

Teresa Albano, Economic Affairs Officer in the Office of Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities said: “The YDEAS project is about building the skills needed for the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It is about supporting the creation of a regional community of young innovators that can boost efforts towards sustainable development as well as reconciliation”. 

Venturing out of the comfort zone, the importance of being bold, innovative and creative was also discussed.

Djuro Blanusa, Secretary General of the Regional Youth Co-operation Office (RYCO), Gazmend Turdiu, Deputy Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), Anna-Katharina Deininger, OSCE Special Representative on Youth and Security and Sandra Metsis, Project Co-ordinator of the European Innovation Academy discussed how to possibly leverage the potential of this project for the benefit of the region.

The eighteen YDEAS’ awardees were conferred the symbolic title of Ambassadors of Innovation with the aim to act as catalysts of prosperity, social cohesion and security.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The last in an annual series of five OSCE-supported training seminars on human rights protection mechanisms concluded in the Akmola Region, Kazakhstan, on 9 November 2018. 

The three-day event was organized by the Human Rights Commission under the President with support of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the Akmola Region Akimat (administration). It brought together 190 representatives of the local Akimats of the Akmola Region, the city of Kokshetau,  Zerendy and Sandyktau districts, as well as judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officers and civil society members.

Participants were familiarized with the international human rights commitments of Kazakhstan and the role of national and international human rights institutions in the protection of human rights and freedoms.  They learned about new developments in labour legislation that have major implications for employees, as well as about the right to access to information by lawful means.

During interactive question-and-answer sessions led by OSCE-supported experts, participants discussed a wide range of issues, including imperfections in the law that infringe upon the social, labour and civil rights of the individual and offered solutions to the existing issues. The feedback received from participants during the seminar will be included in special reports of the Human Rights Commission to be shared with respective government agencies.

Similar activities were supported earlier this year in the Turkestan, Zhambyl, Karaganda and East Kazakhstan Regions as part of the Office’s long-term efforts to support national human rights institutions in promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the host country.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Women’s contribution to the sustainable development of rural areas in Kazakhstan was the focus of the First Rural Women’s Forum which concluded on 9 November 2018 in Astana.

The two-day event was organized by the “EXPO&WOMEN” international organization and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development with support from the OSCE Programme Office in Astana. It gathered some 250 representatives of national and local government, development and financial institutions, business structures, international organizations, public associations and delegations from 14 regions of Kazakhstan.

The forum served as a platform to facilitate women’s involvement in the green economy, to promote the adoption of organic agriculture and to highlight women’s achievements and contributions to the implementation of state policies aimed at developing the agricultural sector.

The event was part of the Programme Office’s continuous efforts to support gender mainstreaming and economic empowerment initiatives in the host country. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded a ceasefire violation and observed new trenches, military and military-type presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk – close to the border with the Russian Federation – as well as near Kozatske, Orikhove and in Khrustalnyi.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings. In Kherson, the Mission monitored a mourning service for the deceased activist Kateryna Handziuk.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including fewer explosions (about 115), compared with the previous reporting period (about 220 explosions).[2]

On the evening and night of 6-7 November, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded five explosions (two assessed as outgoing rounds, two assessed as impacts and one undetermined), 260 projectiles in flight (mostly from northerly to southerly directions) and about ten muzzle flashes, all at an assessed range of 2-6km at directions ranging from east-north-east to east-south-east.

During the day on 7 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 70 undetermined explosions and about 180 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-7km east-south-east, south-east and south-west.

During the same day, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and about 160 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-5km at directions ranging from south to north.

During the same day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about 250 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-3km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

During the day on 7 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 1-3km south-south-east and south-west.

During the same day, positioned about 4km east of Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 70 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-10km east, south-east and south-west and about 20 shots and bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.3km-5km south.

During the same day, positioned on the northern edge of Smile (non-government controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 20 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-8km north-east and north-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 6 November, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted: an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) on a military-type truck and five people nearby, 200m north of the area’s southern edge and 800m west of its eastern edge; about 40m of new trenches (not seen in imagery from 8 October 2018), a firing position and two people nearby, 1km north of the area’s southern edge and 1km west of its eastern edge; two people near previously observed positions (see SMM Daily Report 28 July 2018) about 200m north of the area’s southern edge and about 2km east of its western edge; and another person near previously observed positions about 400m west of road T1316 and about 750m north of the southern edge of the disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 24 September 2018). All the above-mentioned people were assessed as probable members of the armed formations and the positions were assessed as belonging to them.

On the same day, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted: an armoured combat vehicle (probable IFV) and three people near previously observed firing positions and trenches (see SMM Daily Report 3 August 2018) on the southern side of the railway line, about 600m south of the area’s northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge; a new 100m-long trench about 100m east of road T1316 and about 700m south of the area’s northern edge (not seen in imagery from 3 August 2018); a total of about 70m of trench extensions and an IFV (BMP-1) about 400m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1.6km west of its eastern edge; construction material (timber) north of the railway tracks; as well as two IFVs (BMP-1 and a probable BMP-1) and a person near previously observed trenches (see SMM Daily Report 20 August 2018) about 140m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge. The abovementioned person was assessed as a probable Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier and all of the above-mentioned positions and vehicles were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

During the day on 7 November, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned north of the Petrivske and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 6 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 7 November, the SMM observed eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21, Grad 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 6 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a tank (T72) near Siversk (99km north of Donetsk).

On 7 November, the SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that two MLRS (BM-21) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) in the security zone.[4] In government‑controlled areas, on 6 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) in Zolote-4/Rodina (about 150m north of the Zolote disengagement area’s northern edge). The following day, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 6 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 4 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and three ACVs (undetermined variant) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM observed the presence of mines. About 1.4km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), 1.5m north of a paved road, the Mission saw for the first time a mine fastened to a tree about 1.5m from the ground. It observed two wires hanging from the device and assessed the mine as a MON-100 anti-personnel type equipped with an electrically-driven detonator. The SMM saw no mine hazard signs in the area near the mine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings. In front of the Cabinet of Ministers building at 12/2 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street, the Mission saw about 300 participants (mostly men, mixed ages) expressing support for the establishment of a Ministry of Veterans Affairs.

Shortly after the abovementioned gathering, the Mission saw a group of about 3,000 people (mostly men, mixed ages) in front of the Parliament building as well as about 250 cars (mostly with Polish and Lithuanian licence plates) blocking the entrance to Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street. It observed yellow and blue flags of “Auto Euro Power” and posters with messages related to a lack of “safe roads.”

The Mission saw about 200 law enforcement officers positioned around the Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament buildings, on Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street and in nearby Mariinskyi Park. At both public gatherings, the Mission observed a calm situation.

In Kherson, the SMM monitored a mourning service for the deceased activist Kateryna Handziuk (see SMM Daily Report 5 November 2018). Throughout the service taking place in a hall at 158 Perekopska Street, the Mission saw about 1,000 people (mixed ages and genders) come to lay flowers and pay tribute, including representatives of various political parties and many representatives of domestic and international media broadcasters. It observed a peaceful situation and six uniformed police officers nearby.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint in Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), citing the “presence of UXO”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, five armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from travelling east through the checkpoint, citing an ongoing “special operation”.
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “demining activities” in the area.
• Armed formations members denied the SMM access to a compound near Khrustalnyi, citing ongoing “demining activities”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• South of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that no demining had taken place north of the positions of the armed formations. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• At a hospital in Zymohiria (non-government-controlled, 27km west of Luhansk), while following up on reports of a civilian casualty, medical staff told the SMM to either leave the premises or provide permission from senior members of the armed formation. The SMM left the hospital.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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402446 Marina Živaljević

Capacity-building training courses for 15 potential Regional Youth Co-operation Office (RYCO) applicants, held in the spirit of reconciliation among the youth in the region, were organized by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and RYCO, from 4 to 7 November 2018 in Podgorica.

“The OSCE Mission sees RYCO as a key player within the region able to promote the spirit of reconciliation and co-operation amongst youth,” said OSCE Mission National Programme Officer Ivana Vujović.

The RYCO Local Branch Officer in Montenegro, Edin Koljenović, said: “This training course was created as a result of the recognition of the clear need to work on strengthening the capacity of non-governmental organizations and high schools to improve their project proposal writing skills.”

The first training course, for 23 potential RYCO applicants, was held in September. During both courses participants learned about inclusion of young people in public life, international youth exchanges, partnerships and elements of project development. 

RYCO was founded in 2016 at the Western Balkans Sixth Summit in Paris as an independent institutional mechanism to promote the spirit of reconciliation and co-operation among youth in the region through exchange programmes.

ROME, 8 November 2018 - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Italy’s Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi today reiterated OSCE support to the implementation of the Minsk agreements for a peaceful solution to the crisis in and around Ukraine, in line with OSCE principles and commitments and in full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

“We are extremely concerned by the announcement of “elections” due to be held in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk on 11 November. Such a decision would run counter to the letter and the spirit of the Minsk agreements,” said Moavero Milanesi.

“We call on all relevant parties to contribute constructively to the negotiation efforts in the Normandy format and in the Trilateral Contact Group in order to prevent such a development.”

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TIRANA, 8 November 2018 – The OSCE Secretariat’s Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities is hosting a two-day meeting on connectivity, focusing on innovation and youth entrepreneurship, on 8 and 9 November in Tirana.

The opening session on Friday, 09:30 to 11:00, will be open to media, followed by a press opportunity at 11:00, at MAK Hotel, Tirana.

Erion Veliaj, Mayor of Tirana, and Raffaella Campanati, First Secretary at the Embassy of Italy in Tirana, will give opening remarks, followed by a ceremony to confer the “Ambassadors of Innovation” award.

Media representatives are invited to attend the opening session at 09:30 and press opportunity on Friday, 9 November, at 11:00. 

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ASTANA, 8 November 2018 – The 20th Central Asia Media Conference for media representatives and experts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia, organized by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, concludes today in Astana.

The two-day conference was opened by Representative Désir, the Minister of Information and Communication of Kazakhstan, Dauren Abayev, and the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Gyorgy Szabó.

“I am pleased that such a representative group of experts across Central Asia and Mongolia met here in Astana to review the media freedom situation in the region,” said Désir. “High interest in the event among media professionals and media rights advocates shows that this platform for exchange of opinions remains vital for the media community as much now as it was twenty years ago when we just started.”

Désir said that too often in the region, journalists work under pressure and fear; lacking access to information, especially public information which could be provided by the authorities.

“Journalists are afraid to report on sensitive political issues, on corruption cases, on dissenting views. And when they do so, they face problems in front of tribunals,” he said. “In different cases, we have seen charges brought against journalists for economic crimes, fraud or extortion. Unfortunately, there are still several bloggers imprisoned. This has led to a high level of self-censorship.”

“Today, it is time to not only reaffirm the commitments on media freedom. It is time to turn them into the living reality of a pluralistic and free media landscape. No journalists should be prosecuted, no media shut down for doing their work,” said Désir

During the two-day conference, journalists, media workers, representatives from NGOs and inter-governmental organizations, together with international experts and state representatives discussed a broad range of issues related to media freedom and the future of journalism in Central Asia, particularly access to the Internet, the quality of information in the age of digital transformation, “fake news”, the spread of disinformation, and the role of media in the development of the countries of the region.

Participants had a chance to participate in side events and group discussions, focusing on topics such as user-generated content, fact-checking tools, concerns regarding regulation and self-regulation, as well as online freedom of expression and hate speech.

The conference participants discussed recommendations of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media addressing media freedom in the region, regulation of content, including harmful content, self-regulation and media literacy. The recommendations will be conveyed to the governments of all Central Asian states and to the media community.

On the occasion of the conference, the Representative also met with Kazakhstan’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Kairat Abdrakhmanov, and with the Information and Communications Minister, Dauren Abayev. They discussed the negative impact of certain provisions of the criminal code on the media and freedom of expression in the country, the need to have a more transparent system to distribute state subventions to the press, the benefits of greater access to public information, as well as some ongoing media cases.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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WASHINGTON D.C., 7 November 2018 – The 6 November mid-term elections in the United States were highly competitive and contestants could campaign freely, with media presenting a wide array of information and views, enabling voters to make an informed choice. However, campaign rhetoric was often intensely negative and at times intolerant, including on social networks, the international observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) concluded in a statement released today.

The fundamental right to suffrage was undermined in places by the disenfranchisement of some groups and the lack of full representation in Congress. Campaign finance rules do not guarantee full transparency, the observers said. While the elections were largely administered in a professional manner and voters turned out in high numbers, decisions on important aspects of the electoral process were often politicized, the statement says.

“The American people once again demonstrated their commitment to democratic elections in a hard-fought and vibrant campaign that clearly engaged voters and had millions eagerly awaiting results last night,” said George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “While the rhetoric we heard from the campaign trail was often divisive, Americans came together to vote in professionally run elections.”

There was an overall respect for fundamental freedoms in a campaign that was dominated by the two main parties. The intolerant rhetoric included several statements with xenophobic and anti-Semitic connotations, the statement says. Concerns were raised regarding online disinformation from both domestic and foreign sources, as well as regarding the transparency of online advertising.

The legal framework and the administration of elections are complex and diverse. As there are few nationwide procedural standards, detailed rules are made only at the state and sub-state level. Some states have amended laws to facilitate voter registration, early voting and the voting rights of ex-prisoners, partially addressing prior ODIHR recommendations. However, fundamental deficiencies remain, particularly with respect to the disenfranchisement of citizens on various grounds, the observers said. Lack of agreement in Congress to update a key aspect of the 1965 Voting Rights Act diminishes its effectiveness in safeguarding against discrimination on racial or linguistic grounds.

Voter registration is active and implemented by states, with minimum conditions set by federal law. A number of states enhanced efforts to facilitate voter registration, including online and automatic registration, but an estimated 50 million eligible citizens were not registered for these elections, for various reasons. Legislation and established practices effectively disenfranchised around 11 million otherwise eligible voters, the statement says. Voter identification is a politically divisive issue, and rules in some states can present obstacles, particularly for low-income voters, racial and linguistic minorities, and Native Americans.

“These were well-run elections, but the diverse nature of the American system means that there isn’t a single picture. We welcome progress in some states to facilitate voter registration and to reinstate voting rights to citizens, but we cannot ignore that countless millions remain effectively disenfranchised,” said Isabel Santos, Head of the OSCE PA delegation. “Much more attention and investment in democracy remains critical if the United States is to overcome these longstanding challenges and address new ones, like effectively securing election infrastructure.”

The media landscape is pluralistic and vibrant, offering voters a wide range of opportunities to inform themselves, but is increasingly polarized. There is limited regulation and few rules for broadcast media during elections. Verbal attacks on journalists and news media by senior officials raised concerns over their safety and undermined the essential role of media in a democratic society.

“The broad range of professional and active media sources available to voters is one of the strengths of the American political landscape, so it is troubling to see journalists being threatened, as we have during this campaign,” said Tana de Zulueta, Head of the ODIHR limited election observation mission. “This undermines the essential role of media in a democratic society.”

A total of 1,262 candidates stood in the mid-term elections, providing voters with a variety of choice, the observers said. While districts are generally equal in size, there are widespread concerns that redistricting is often a partisan process, resulting in a number of uncompetitive contests. In 42 House races, a Democrat or Republican ran unopposed.

A number of grassroots movements raised the profile of issues related to women’s rights, promoting a diverse range of views. There were both a record number of women who ran as candidates and who were ultimately elected, although women remain underrepresented in the Congress. There was an increased number of candidates from historically underrepresented groups, including persons with disabilities, Native Americans and openly LGBT persons.

Campaign finance rules are enforced at the federal level, with few limits on donations and no limits on expenditures, including by so-called Super PACs. While financial reports were submitted and published expeditiously, some non-profit organizations are not required to disclose their reports, undermining an otherwise transparent system.

The use of new voting technologies (NVT) is extensive and varies considerably across the country, and federal and state authorities launched a number of robust initiatives to help secure election technologies, including from cyber-threats. While there is a general trend to return to paper-based voting, voting machines without a voter-verified paper trail were used in 15 states, with 5 states relying on them exclusively. The Election Assistance Commission expeditiously disbursed $380 million allocated by Congress to replace outdated voting machines, strengthen existing computer and network infrastructure, and build cybersecurity capacity, but more investment is needed to replace aging voting equipment and to maintain security, the statement says. Positively, in line with prior ODIHR recommendations, efforts to strengthen public confidence in the accuracy of election results were introduced, including through certification of NVT and post-election audits.

Election observation is regulated by states, and restrictions on election day observation by international observers were in place in 12 of these. While federal government departments and agencies supported and facilitated the work of the international observers, political and electoral authorities in several states declined to meet with ODIHR observers, and in one state prevented observation altogether. Such restrictions are not in line with OSCE commitments undertaken by the United States. Voting was observed extensively by parties and civil society, providing oversight and transparency. In the limited number of polling stations visited by the international observers, prescribed procedures were generally followed, although secrecy of the vote was not always ensured.

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, (202) 423 5511 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Nat Parry, OSCE PA, +45 60 10 81 77, nat@oscepa.dk            

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. It observed recent damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in residential areas of Staromykhailivka. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk - close to the border with the Russian Federation – as well as near Oleksandrivske, Bezimenne, Zaichenko and Troitske.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema, power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on media reports of searches at apartments and offices of two activists.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 220), compared with the previous reporting period (about 235 explosions).[2]

On the evening and night of 5-6 November, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded seven undetermined explosions and 70 projectiles in flight (from west to east), all at an assessed range of 0.5-4km south and south-south-west.

On the evening of 5 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 380 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-7km east and south-east. During the day on 6 November, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about 100 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-7km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening and night of 5-6 November, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded six undetermined explosions and 85 projectiles in flight (mostly from easterly to westerly directions and from westerly to easterly directions), all at an assessed range of 2-5km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening and night of 5-6 November, the SMM camera about 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 17 explosions (three assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons and the remainder undetermined) and about 210 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north), all at an assessed range of 2-6km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions).

On the morning of 6 November, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) to facilitate repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard a single shot of small-arms fire 60-100m east-south-east. The SMM immediately left the area.

The SMM observed recent damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in residential areas of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk). On 5 November, accompanied by members of the armed formations, the SMM saw damage at six impact sites, assessed as caused by 30mm armour piercing rounds fired from a west-south-westerly direction. At each impact site, residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place in the area on the evening of 29 October.

At 2 Zhukovskoho Street, from inside a residential one-storey house, the SMM saw a hole in the west-south-west-facing side of the roof and a hole in the east-north-east-facing side of the same roof (covered on the outside with an asbestos roofing material sheet), assessed to be the exit hole of the same round.

About 300m west-north-west from the first impact site, at 17A Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM saw a small fresh hole in the west-facing exterior wall of a one-storey house as well as damage to the brickwork, assessed as due to impacts of rounds, in the west-south-west-facing and west-facing exterior walls.

About 30m east-south-east from the second impact site, at 17 Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM saw a hole in a west-south-west-facing metal gate near a one-storey house.

About 25m east-south-east from the third impact site, at 16 Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM saw multiples holes in a west-south-west-facing concrete fence, a west-south-west-facing wooden wall and the chimney of a one-storey house.

About 30m east-south-east from the fourth site, at 14 Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM observed a hole in the west-facing exterior wall of a one-storey house and a corresponding hole in the east-facing interior wall of the house’s kitchen.

About 15m east-south-east from the fifth site, at 13 Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM saw a hole in a west-south-west-facing brick fence and the imprint of the side of a round in the west-south-west-facing door of a garage as well as pieces of freshly stripped bark from the west-south-west-facing side of trees 15m away from the house.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-4km south-east and two shots of small-arms fire 0.6-1km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 1 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six multiple launch rocket systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 24 October 2018).

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk). On 5 November, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six tanks (T-64) near Pidlisne (70km north-west of Luhansk). On 6 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Ozarianivka.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 1 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 17 tanks (type undetermined) and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and 12 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018). Aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence on 1 November of 42 tanks (type undetermined), five pieces of self-propelled artillery and 12 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Miusynsk (see above), 29 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 26 October 2018), and 22 tanks (type undetermined), nine pieces of self-propelled artillery and 18 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018).

The same aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence of 66 armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Buhaivka, 28 ACVs (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Shymshynivka and 78 ACVs (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Myrne.[4]

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 5 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Valerianivka (51km south-west of Donetsk), six tanks (type undetermined) near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Maloianisol (78km south-west of Donetsk), two tanks (T-64), two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol) and four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) located behind a non-functional school in Azovske (121km south of Donetsk). On 6 November, the SMM saw a mortar (type undetermined) near Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 1 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 20 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Buhaivka.

The SMM observed ACVs and anti-aircraft guns in the security zone.[5] In government‑controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4, Shilka, 23mm) and a modified armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) near Ozarianivka. On 5 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two APCs (undetermined variant), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), three ACVs (undetermined variant) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-2) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk). On 6 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4) and a modified APC (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) near Ozarianivka. On the same day, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Hirske (63km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (see above), power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka, as well as to enable demining activities in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM visited two border areas outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (two with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about ten minutes, the SMM saw six cars (two with Russian Federation, one with Lithuanian and one with Armenian licence plates as well as two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on media reports of searches carried out by Ukrainian law enforcement authorities at apartments and offices of two activists at Sichovykh Striltsiv Street and Shovkovychna Street on 6 November. At the first address, the Mission observed a fire truck, an ambulance and four firefighters entering the building. At the second address, it observed a calm situation. It was later announced that the searches had been conducted under a warrant issued by the Pechersk District Court of Kyiv City in the framework of criminal proceedings under Article 109 (Actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order or take-over of government) and Article 111 (High treason) of the Criminal Code.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint near Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel allowed the SMM to proceed through the checkpoint but asked the patrol not to drive further than 100m away from the checkpoint on the other side, citing “orders from his superiors”. The SMM refused the condition and did not proceed through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the presence of a sniper in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “possible shelling in the area”. While present, the SMM saw a civilian car travelling east through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from travelling east through the checkpoint, citing “an ongoing police operation in the area”. While present, the SMM saw several civilian cars passing the checkpoint in both directions.
• On two occasions, at a checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from travelling east towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “an ongoing exercise”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[6]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations requested to see the SMM’s patrol plan. The SMM declined and was allowed to proceed through the checkpoint after about 20 minutes.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 5-6 November, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over areas near Maloianisol.[7]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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MINSK, 6 November 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 6 November 2018:

“According to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), the current situation in the conflict area in eastern Ukraine is far from being calm. Unfortunately, a relatively high level of ceasefire violations has been registered lately.

In this regard – as I did last time – I once again solemnly urge all the sides to prevent such a development and to show full restraint.

Accordingly, the overall security situation in the conflict area was again in the focus of the TCG and its Security Working Group.

As you know, on October 27, 2018 a SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle went missing on the territory of certain areas of Donetsk region.

In connection with this incident, I once again call on the signatories of the Minsk agreements to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of SMM personnel and assets and to provide conditions for the Mission’s unimpeded operation in accordance with its mandate.

I would like to emphasize that the SMM in Ukraine is the largest and most costly mission in the OSCE history and is financed by taxpayers of all the OSCE participating states. Also in light of the above, a detailed investigation of the incident is needed.

The Economic Working Group focused on the issues related to water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems as well as on the improvement of Vodafone-Ukraine mobile communications in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR).

The Humanitarian Working Group further considered questions related to the exchange of detainees and the crossing conditions at the contact line via entry-exit checkpoints.

The participants of the Political Working Group exchanged views, in particular, on the modalities of the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’ in light of the sides’ latest decisions.

Against this background, the issue of the so-called “elections” in CADR and CALR announced for the upcoming Sunday was raised in the TCG plenary session. In this context, let me reiterate my already uttered position: I consider that the holding of the so-called “elections” does not correspond either to the letter or to the spirit of the Minsk agreements”.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. It observed damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas and military presence inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Dovzhanske – close to the border with the Russian Federation – and near Zaichenko, Bezimenne and Naberezhne.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Vesela Hora and to damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. In Odessa, the SMM followed up on reports of vandalism to a monument. In Kropyvnytskyi, Kirovohrad region, the SMM followed up on reports of a grenade attack against a social activist.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 235), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 260 explosions).[2]

On the evening of 4 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 250 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-7km at directions ranging from east to south-west. During the day on 5 November, at the same location, the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions and about 480 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-6km south-east.

On the night of 4-5 November, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions and about 90 projectiles in flight (mostly from south to north), all at an assessed range of 2-5km at easterly directions.

During the day on 5 November, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1.5-5km north and in south-westerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including ten explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 420 explosions).

The SMM followed up on reports of damage from gunfire in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM saw a hole, about 3cm in size, in both layers of a double-glazed south-west-facing window of a second floor apartment in a four-storey building at 49 Lenina Street. The SMM assessed that the fire came from a south-westerly direction. The resident of the apartment (woman, 51 years old) told the SMM that she had noticed the broken window about two weeks previously and had not been at home when the damage had occurred.    

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned 400m north of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-8km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The SMM also saw three empty cargo trucks with Russian Federation licence plates moving from the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area north-east inside the disengagement area. About 30 minutes later, the SMM saw two of these trucks loaded with coal heading south-west inside the disengagement area.

On 3 November, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, a 16m extension of an existing trench about 500m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and 1.4km east of its western edge, as well as a 17m extension of an existing trench about 850m north of the southern edge of the disengagement area and about 1.9km east of its western edge (both extensions were not visible in imagery from 2 November 2018). On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the same UAV spotted five people, assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, near existing defensive positions.

Positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 27 tanks (T-72) (most of them with the engine cover opened) and two self-propelled howitzers (one 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and one 2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) in the Leninskyi district of Donetsk city and a tank (T-72) near Sarabash (26km south of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Chystyi Kliuch (26km north-west of Donetsk) and two towed howitzers (probable D-20, 152mm) near Rybynske (49km south of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted ten towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Novomaiorske (64km south-west of Donetsk) and two tanks (T-64) on transporters near Stara Krasnianka (92km north-west of Luhansk). On 5 November, the SMM saw three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) on train cars travelling south near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns and other indications of military presence in the security zone.[4] In government‑controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 13 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (both BTR-70 and BTR-80) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) parked near residential houses in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), three IFVs (BMP-1) and four APCs (MT-LB) near Zoloti Pisky (12km north-west of Donetsk); four probable APCs (MT-LB) and three probable IFVs (BMP-1) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk); and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk). On 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a new 40m trench extension about 7km north-east of Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2, 23mm) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Chystyi Kliuch, an ACV (type undetermined) near Halytsynivka (29km north-west of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk), an IFV (type undetermined) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Bohdanivka and an IFV (BMP-2) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Starohnativka.

On 5 November, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km north-west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-1) outside the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), an APC (BTR-80) in Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded an IFV (BMP-1) near Kriakivka in a location where multiple ceasefire violations were recorded (see table below).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six APCs (two BTR-70/80 and four MT-LB), 32 IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2, assessed as not operational) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in the Leninskyi district of Donetsk City; two IFVs (BMP-1) and four APCs (one BTR-70/80 and three MT-LB) in Kalmiuske (42km south-east of Donetsk); and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk). On 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-80) near Petrivske (about 1km east of  the disengagement area) and an IFV (BMP-1) in the western outskirts of Petrivske (outside the disengagement area, about 80m north of its northern edge). On 4 November, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) near Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to electrical power lines near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM observed demining activities and new mine hazard signs. Near Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk), on both sides of road P-66, the SMM saw seven people in civilian clothing clearing vegetation. About 800m south-east of Kaplany (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM encountered for the first time a barrier of large tree branches spanning the road and a red mine hazard sign with a skull and crossbones and “Stop Mines” in Russian and “Danger Mines” in English, also seen for the first time. The SMM also saw a barrier of large tree branches across another road about 800m south of Kaplany, and a black sign with a white skull and crossbones and “Mines” written in Russian.

The SMM continued to monitor the conditions of civilians at the Stanytsia Luhanska entry-exit checkpoint. The Mission saw a man (45 years old) being transported by medical emergency services after they said he had fainted while waiting to pass the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint. Medical staff added that he had been transported to a hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska, and that based on his symptoms the patient had suffered a stroke. Five people at the entry-exit checkpoint separately told the SMM that it had taken them one hour to pass through the checkpoint of the armed formations and three more hours to enter government-controlled areas at the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.    

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw five cars (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian federation licence plates) and two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine and seven cars (two with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Lithuanian licence plates) and three covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. Two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Odessa, the SMM followed up on media reports of vandalism to a monument related to the 1918 Bolshevik Uprising in the city. At Kulykove Pole, on 4 November, the SMM saw fresh writing ("Glory to Ukraine" and "Glory to the nation!")  spray-painted in Ukrainian language and six red-and-black flags painted on the corners of the monument (for a similar incident at the same location, see SMM Daily Report 3 July 2018).

In Kropyvnytskyi (206km west of Dnipro), Kirovohrad region, the SMM followed up on media reports of a grenade attack against a social activist. On 4 November, in a courtyard of a two storey house at 23/1 Bratyslavska Street, the SMM observed a small crater with splash marks in the asphalt surface surrounding the crater, assessed as consistent with damage caused by an explosion of a grenade, as well as shrapnel damage to nearby aluminum window frames (filled in with polymer), metal house siding and a rain gutter. The resident of the house, a social activist who said he was campaigning in favor of the construction of a cathedral for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate in the town, told the SMM that around 03:00 on 12 October 2018, while he had been at home at the same address with his wife and their six-year-old child, he had been woken up by the sound of an explosion in the courtyard of their house. Regional police told the SMM that the attack had been registered under Article 296 of the Criminal Code (hooliganism).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko, an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from superiors”.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “orders from their superiors”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, an armed member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing south through to the city and accessing Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), citing “special measures and orders from superiors”. The SMM was allowed to proceed west through the checkpoint. While present, the SMM saw several civilian cars passing the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• In Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage to the western areas of the village, citing “security concerns”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that there had been no demining activities in the area south of the bridge. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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402134 Communication and Media Relations Section

New approaches and practical tools to prevent corruption at the local level were the focus of a two-day expert seminar organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) in partnership with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (OECD/ACN) in Vienna on 5 and 6 November 2018, which gathered over 70 experts and practitioners from some 30 OSCE participating States.

The seminar covered experiences and challenges from the entire OSCE region with a special focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. The participants included representatives of central government bodies and local level officials responsible for integrity and corruption prevention in cities and regions as well as experts from international organizations and civil society.

“The topics discussed here today are extremely important in the fight against corruption,” said Ermelinda Meksi, Deputy Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. “Transparency in decision-making and the delivery of public services will prevent the government at every level from misusing power and public funds. This in turn will increase citizens’ confidence in their local institutions, ensure sustainable development and stability and security in the OSCE region.”

Matteo Pianca, Deputy Head of Mission for the Economic and Environmental Dimension at Italy's Delegation  to the OSCE, and representing the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship said: “Italy attaches great importance to the anti-corruption component of the OSCE’s economic and environmental dimension. Our Chairmanship’s decision to appoint Professor Paola Severino as the first-ever OSCE Special Representative on combating corruption is a confirmation of our wish to further support the OSCE in assisting its participating States to implement their commitments in good governance and anti-corruption. Thanks to her engagement these commitments have been further promoted across the OSCE region, also through several country visits during which former Italian Justice Minister Severino shared her knowledge as well as lessons learned from the Italian experience with relevant stakeholders.”

The seminar’s discussions focused on how to best leverage the impact of anti-corruption policy and initiatives on economic development and improving the business climate; and how to transform local integrity plans into practical tools that can guarantee broader engagement and achieve change.

Invited experts also spoke about innovative approaches, successful practices and solutions in planning and executing local budgets in order to minimize corruption risks in procurement at the local level.

Other sessions explored good practices of reducing corruption risks in regulatory activities, undertaking risk assessments, and on guidance tools developed by international organizations. There was also a practical exercise.

Olga Savran, OECD/ACN Manager, added: “This seminar is an important step in the OECD/ACN project that aims to develop a thematic study on corruption prevention at the local level. The study will review trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and include examples of good practices from the region and from several OECD countries. This seminar is also an excellent example of fruitful cooperation between the OSCE and OECD where we combine our efforts to help countries in the region to prevent corruption.”

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO).The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 10,210 to 10,434 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 20 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 19 as the previous week; seven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 12 into Ukraine (68 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, eight families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and two into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (393 compared to 433 observed during the previous week). There were 206 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 187 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Rovenky-Kyiv; Luhansk-Yalta and Stakhanov- Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 751 to 684 (240 at the Gukovo BCP and 444 at the Donetsk BCP); 389 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 295 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and in Belarus.                                                                                          

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 47 (compared to 42 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 134 to 91: of the total number of trucks scanned, 51 trucks (56 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 40 trucks (44 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly decreased from 172 to 169 vehicles; 87 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 82 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 23 occasions, compared to 27 last week; the OTs assessed that 13 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with German, Georgian and Uzbek licence plates.

On 3 November at 20:17, the OT observed a police vehicle entering the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle drove behind the main building. At 20:43 vehicle crossed back into the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 10 October to 6 November 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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VIENNA, 6 November 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed concern regarding the lengthy detention of journalist Igor Rudnikov in Kaliningrad in the Russian Federation and reiterated his call on the country’s authorities to release him.

“The lengthy arrest of Igor Rudnikov for more than a year and repeated extension of his detention is very worrying and raises serious concerns,” Désir said. “I call on the Russian authorities to release the journalist and allow him to continue his important journalistic work without undue interference.”

On 1 November 2017 Rudnikov, editor and founder of the Noviye Kolyosa newspaper, was forcefully detained by representatives of the Russian Federal Security Service on allegations of extorting money from a high-level law enforcement official in the Kaliningrad region. His detention has been extended several times, and the current one is scheduled to end in March 2019. The journalist and his newspaper are well known for their investigative journalism, particularly in relation to the activities of local authorities.  

The Representative has previously raised this case (see www.osce.org/fom/354601).

In March 2016, Rudnikov was attacked and received multiple stab wounds in an incident condemned by the Representative (see www.osce.org/fom/230601).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Ivana Milatovic, OSCE Mission to Serbia

BELGRADE, 6 November 2018 – The OSCE Mission to Serbia, in close partnership with the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) on 6 and 7 November organized a training course for building police capacities in cyber forensics and investigating cybercrime. 

The course was the first in a series of four which will take place across Serbia by April 2019, with the aim to establish a countrywide network of 60 cyber forensics investigators.

Experts from the MoI’s Department for Suppression of Hi-Tech Crime, who conducted the training with the OSCE’s support, formed a mobile team of trainers that will travel and spread its expertise in this domain among police officers countrywide.

To support them in this endeavour, the OSCE Mission to Serbia donated ten laptops and one projector to the mobile training team.

The Head of OSCE Mission to Serbia, Ambassador Andrea Orizio, and the Police Director, Vladimir Rebic, addressed the participants at the opening of the training in Belgrade.

“Keeping up to date with world-wide trends while building local networks of experts is the only way to be on top of investigating 21st century cybercrime and cyber forensics.  By supporting this training course and donating IT equipment, the OSCE Mission to Serbia is fostering close partnership with the MoI, which has already yielded important results in the Ministry’s efforts to combat cybercrime. The ultimate goal is full local ownership of these accomplishments,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, Ambassador Andrea Orizio.

“The OSCE Mission stands ready to further support the MoI in building a  pool of cybersecurity experts in the police force across Serbia,” he added.

This activity is a part of the OSCE Mission to Serbia’s project “Strengthening Serbian Authorities in the Fight against Organized and Transnational Crime”. It also complements activities in the second stage of the regional project “Capacity Building for Criminal Justice Practitioners Combating Cybercrime and Cyber-enabled Crime in South-Eastern Europe”, implemented by the Serbian MoI and the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Strategic Police Matters Unit, with the assistance of the OSCE Mission to Serbia.

WASHINGTON D.C., 6 November 2018 – The international observers for the mid-term elections in the United States will present their preliminary post-election statement at a news conference on Wednesday, 7 November, in Washington D.C.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA).

The statement will be delivered by George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, followed by Isabel Santos, Head of the OSCE PA delegation, and Tana de Zulueta, Head of the ODIHR limited election observation mission.

The International Election Observation Mission is comprised of a total of some 140 observers from 35 countries, including 84 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA and 55 long-term observers and election experts deployed by ODIHR.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, 7 November, in the Junior Ballroom of the Washington Marriott at Metro Center, 775 12th Street NW, Washington D.C.

Live stream of the press conference will be available at: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr and www.oscepa.org.

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, (202) 423 5511 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Nat Parry, OSCE PA, +45 60 10 81 77, nat@oscepa.dk      

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