OSCE

VIENNA, 26 September 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today said he had taken note of the resolution by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which aims at improving judicial practice in cases of alleged online extremist content.

At its plenary session on 20 September 2018, the Supreme Court introduced amendments complementing its own Decree “On Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases on Crimes of an Extremist Nature” of June 2011. The amendments suggest to the courts to carefully distinguish between crimes of extremist nature and publicly harmless offences. The Supreme Court also underlined that restrictions must be based on narrowly-defined evidence, while simple posting or re-posting of online content, including content that may contain signs of criminal activity but has no direct intent and/or purpose of inciting hatred or enmity, should not be qualified as extremism.

“This decision goes in the right direction and will, hopefully, prevent citizens of the Russian Federation from being unduly prosecuted,” Désir said. “This is why I call on the authorities to continue further on this path and follow the recommendations made by the Presidential Council on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights regarding the improvement of legislation on countering extremism and the practice of its application. Any restrictions on expression must be carefully applied and based on legality, necessity and the legitimacy of the objective.”

Earlier, on a number of occasions, the Representative has raised his concern with the authorities regarding the problematic trend noted by his Office in recent years of disproportionate responses to online expressions in the country on the basis of countering extremism.

“While fully respecting the need to address security concerns in the OSCE region, I would like to reiterate my call on the authorities to reform the legislation on countering extremism and ensure that the need to protect public safety and order do not conflict with the fundamental human right to freedom of expression,” Désir said.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported three-day training seminar on climate change adaptation measures concluded on 26 September 2018 in Almaty.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Kazakh-German University and the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia for some 35 officials and decision makers from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan responsible for water management at the national level.

The training seminar was a follow-up to an earlier event of the Central Asia Leadership Programme that aimed to strengthen capacities of young leaders in the context of the changing climate.

Participants learned best practices in using financial instruments to foster environmentally sound investments through legal and governance mechanisms and identified local challenges in implementing the Paris Climate Agreement. The training also focussed on the effects of climate change globally and in the Central Asia context and advanced climate change mitigation measures.

This event is an example of the regional co-operation in the environmental governance sector and falls in line with the 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Council decision on the OSCE Strategy Document for Economic and Environmental Dimension, which emphasizes the importance of promoting sustainable development and addressing environmental degradation in the host country. 

CHISINAU / BOLZANO, Italy, 26 September 2018 - Best practices for developing and implementing bilingual and multilingual education programmes and curricula were the focus of a three-day study visit by a group of representatives from Moldova’s state and civil society institutions to the Autonomous Province of Alto Adige/South Tyrol in northern Italy, which concluded today. The visit was organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) with the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Italian Embassy in Moldova.

The study group, led by Moldova’s Minister of Education, Culture and Research, Monica Babuc, included representatives from the Executive Committee of the Autonomous Territorial Unit (ATU) of Gagauzia, Taraclia District Council, as well as the National Association of European Trainers in Moldova (ANTEM).  

In meetings with senior officials of the Provincial Government of Alto Adige/South Tyrol and local minority rights and linguistic experts, the Moldovan delegation learned about Alto Adige/South Tyrol’s successes in developing and implementing multilingual education programmes and language testing criteria. The province is home to three language communities –Italian, German and Ladin, a minority community with a language spoken by five percent of the population. While Italian and German can both be used for official purposes, all three languages of instruction are used in the education system of Ladin-speaking communities.

Upon the conclusion of the visit, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, expressed his hope that the experiences gained during the trip will translate into policies that promote multilingual education and send a strong signal for a truly inclusive Moldovan society. “Effective multilingual education contributes to making diversity a tangible strength,” he said.

"Although the national linguistic legislation is permissive enough, there are still challenges in promoting state and minority languages in the education system. I hope very much that Alto Adige/South Tyrol 's experience will help us overcome these challenges and take relevant examples to promote multilingualism and sustainable language policies at national  level," said Minister Babuc.

"We look towards Alto Adige/South Tyrol's economic development and language policies as we promote the Gagauz language and build our knowledge of the state language for our own development," said Deputy Chairperson of ATU Gagauzia Olesea Tanasoglo.

Since 2017, the OSCE Mission to Moldova and HCNM are supporting the Government of Moldova in implementing an action plan for the National Strategy on the Consolidation of Interethnic Relations, elaborated with the support from HCNM. The action plan foresees the development of state policies on national minorities’ access to teaching of the state language and to education in minority languages. Under the direction of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research, these language-related policies will benefit minority groups in Moldova, including those of the ATU Gagauzia and Taraclia. According to the 1994 law On the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia, the state language, Gagauz and Russian are the official languages of the autonomy. However, multilingual education institutions in Gagauzia are few.

In recent years, the HCNM has been facilitating bilingual education in state language and Gagauz at pre-school institutions in Gagauzia through ANTEM, and has funded programmes for teaching civil servants the state language nationwide. This year, the OSCE is supporting the Government’s efforts to take over the responsibility of promoting bilingual education through implementing the action plan.

The study trip is a follow-up to last year’s visit to the Autonomous Province of Alto Adige/South Tyrol, during which representatives from the Executive Committee of Gagauzia and the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia gained an insight into the province’s competencies and its methods of communicating with the central authorities. 

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MINSK, 26 September 2018 – How to utilize the Internet in preventing and countering terrorism, including the financing of terrorism, is the focus of a high-level international conference for foreign ministers and senior representatives of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation taking place in Minsk, Belarus on 9 and 10 October 2018.

The conference, organized by the Foreign Ministry of Belarus and the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat, will take stock of developments of the actions against terrorism by OSCE participating States and OSCE Partners for Co-operation in the digital age.

Participants will exchange national experiences and perspectives on recent trends and measures, and discuss challenges, responses and best practices on how to prevent and counter the misuse of the Internet by violent extremists and terrorists, while respecting fundamental rights and freedoms.

The discussions will focus on the legal framework for addressing terrorism, fostering public-private-partnerships in identifying and detecting the movement of terrorists, preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorism, and protecting critical infrastructure.

The conference will be opened by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Vladimir Makei; OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger; Under-Secretary-General of the UN and Head of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office Vladimir Voronkov; and Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Yuri Fedotov.

Media representatives are invited to cover the opening of the conference starting at 14:30, 9 October 2018, as well as the closing session on 10 October, at the President Hotel, Kirova Street 18, Minsk, 220030.

Media representatives wishing to attend must apply for accreditation directly with the Foreign Ministry of Belarus. Details of the accreditation procedure can be found on the Ministry’s website here: http://mfa.gov.by/en/press/news_mfa/cfa0d19d31071259.html

Please note that the Foreign Ministry of Belarus will accept accreditation requests by representatives of foreign media up to and including 3 October 2018.

For further information, please contact:

Lyubov Mayorova
MFA Belarus
Department of  Information and Digital Diplomacy
tel. +(375 17) 327 51 54
e-mail: press@mfa.gov.by

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KYIV, 26 September 2018 – Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Alexander Hug will hold his regular news briefing on Thursday, 27 September, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 27 September, at 13:30 (Kyiv time), at the Glavkom Press Centre, 8/20 Shovkovychna Street.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                        

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 10,798 to 10,836 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 56 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs remained the same (26 persons like last week); 11 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and fifteen into Ukraine (77 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, six families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (391 compared to 425 observed during the previous week). There were 201 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 190 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Luhansk-Kharkiv; Luhansk-Kharkiv-Kyiv; Luhansk-Kyiv-Moscow; Luhansk-Sevastopol; Pervomaisk -Kyiv; Rovenky- Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 838 to 880 (310 at the Gukovo BCP and 570 at the Donetsk BCP); 509 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 371 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                             

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 75 (compared to 87 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 84 to 95: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 72 trucks (76 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 23 trucks (24 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 164 to 191 vehicles; 98 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 93 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 24 occasions, compared to 25 last week; the OTs assessed that 11 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with “DPR” plates and with Lithuanian, Georgian and Belarusian licence plates.

On 20 September at 10:06 at the Donetsk BCP, a vehicle, coming from the Russian Federation side, with an inscription and flag of the “National Liberation Movement” (Национально́-освободи́тельное движе́ние - НОД) crossed into Ukraine. The car had  a Russian registration plate and the inscription “To Donbass!” (in Russian).

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 28 August to 25 September 2018, please see the attachment here. 

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM corroborated reports of civilian casualties and observed impact sites in Sakhanka. The SMM saw military presence inside the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted close to Dovzhanske, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Slovianoserbsk and near Artema, as well as demining in Pishchane. The SMM observed a protest in Odessa and followed up on reports of the explosion of a grenade in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 110 explosions).   

On the evening and night of 23-24 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded nine undetermined explosions and 17 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east), all 1-4.5km south-south-east and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 23-24 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions and about 110 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 2-4km east-north-east and east.

On the evening of 23 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-7km south-east and south.

During the day on 24 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 20 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km at westerly directions.

Positioned on the south-western outskirts of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 2-6km at southerly directions.

Positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and about ten bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 0.5-5km at southerly and northerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (11), compared with the previous 24 hours (16 explosions).

Positioned 2.5km north-west of Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 77km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire and their subsequent impacts, as well as four bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-1.4km south (all assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone).  

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. On 24 September, at a hospital in Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a man (aged 50-60) wearing bandages on his chest, legs and arms. He told the SMM that on 23 September at around 9:00, while he had been outside his house in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) with his wife, he had heard an explosion nearby, after which he felt pain and sought help (see below). He also said that his wife had been wounded in the same explosion. Medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that a man (aged 56) and his wife (aged 46) had been admitted to the hospital on 23 September, adding that the man had sustained shrapnel wounds to his legs, chest, arms and lower back and that his wife had sustained shrapnel wounds to her lower leg and arm. Medical staff added that the woman had been discharged the same day.

The SMM observed impact sites in Sakhanka. On 23 September, at 2 Zhovtneva Street, the SMM observed two fresh craters: the first one was in a yard, about 2m north-west of a one-storey house; the second crater was in the same yard, about 6m west of the house. The SMM saw blood stains on the western-facing steps of the front of the house (see above).The SMM assessed that both craters were caused by an automatic grenade launcher round but was unable to assess the direction of fire.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 22 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, five people, including one digging an extension of a previously observed trench, about 1-2km east of the western edge of the disengagement area (all assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel).

During the night of 23-24 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 6-10km south-south-west and an undetermined explosion 3-4km west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 24 September, the SMM saw three armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel entering the Zolote disengagement area. On the same day, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire 1-2.5km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) in Dyliivka (49km north of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Ozarianivka (52km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Sofiivka (40km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air-missile-system (9K33 Osa) near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk). On 24 September, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm), three tanks (T-64) and three towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) near Perevalsk (see above).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines and noted that eight tanks (seven T-72 and one T-64) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 22 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) near Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), a probable ACV near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV and three IFVs (two BMP-1 and one probable BMP-1) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), an IFV (a probable BMP-1) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR-70) near Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk). On 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Ozarianivka and an ACV near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 24 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Vodiane (24km north-east of Mariupol).

On 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a 50m-long newly built extension of a previously observed trench near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). On 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a fresh 70m-long trench on the eastern edge of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Tavrycheske (76km south of Donetsk) and, on 23 September, four IFVs (one BMP-2, two BMP-1 and one undetermined variant), three APCs (MT-LB) and an ACV near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk); eight APCs (one BTR-80 and seven MT-LB) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), as well as an IFV (BMP-1) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk). On 22 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an excavator digging new trenches near Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) as well as five APCs (one MT-LB and four BTR undetermined variant) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM facilitated access for Vodafone employees from Horlivka to Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, as well as demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report of 24 September 2018).

The SMM visited two border areas outside of government control.* While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for 25 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 12 cars (four with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw a covered cargo truck with “LPR” plates and four cars (three with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw a bus with Russian Federation licence plates, two cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a pedestrian (man, aged 30-40) entering Ukraine. While present, two members of the armed formations, one of whom was armed, told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Odessa, the SMM saw about 100 people gathered in front of the police headquarters at 12 Yevreiska Street. From there, they moved to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office of Odessa Region at 13 Pushkinska Street, where some of the participants addressed the crowd, denouncing, among other things, the increase in attacks against civil activists. The SMM observed approximately 20 police officers securing the event. After about one and a half hours, the gathering dispersed peacefully. (See SMM Daily Report of 24 September 2018.)

In Kyiv, about 10m west of the entrance of a 12-storey building at 7 Revutskoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the tarmac road, assessed as caused by the impact of a grenade. The SMM also saw four broken ground-floor windows and one broken window on the first floor. According to media reports, an explosion occurred in the area at about 02:00 on 22 September.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, two members of the armed formations, one of whom was armed, told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional:

• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, three armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after conducting a visual inspection of the interior and trunk of the SMM vehicles.

Other impediments:

• An SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming near Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk).[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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VIENNA, 25 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern about the termination of the analogue distribution of public service broadcaster UA:PBC in Ukraine and repeated his call to the authorities to urgently resolve difficulties with funding the broadcaster’s activities.

“Expectations of the public service media to provide reliable, high-quality and informative programming are only possible when it is independent and financially viable,” Désir said.

On 25 September, UA:PBC announced that the Broadcasting, Telecommunications and Television Company of Ukraine had terminated its analogue distribution throughout the country, with the exception of six border regions, because of the broadcaster’s debts. The broadcaster cites significant budget cuts by the state as the main reason for its continuous financial difficulties.

“The important work of a public service broadcaster must not be interrupted at any time, particularly ahead of upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. A public service broadcaster is vital to ensuring that citizens are informed about election matters, including how to exercise the right to vote and the policy positions of the various parties and candidates contesting the elections,” Désir added.

“It is the responsibility of the state to ensure the continuity of public service broadcasting. I call on the authorities to urgently and fully restore the transmission of the broadcaster’s signal to all regions of the country, and finally secure sufficient funding for its activities.”

Désir also noted concerns of UA:PBC regarding the future of its digital broadcasting due to similar arrears in payment to a digital network operator.

The Representative previously highlighted the public service broadcaster’s problems in November 2017, and urged the Ukrainian authorities to take action (see: https://www.osce.org/fom/357316).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA, 25 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today criticized the Austrian Interior Ministry’s instruction to boycott and restrict the flow of information to certain media outlets, and called on the Ministry of Interior to refrain from attacking the media.

The instructions set out new guidelines aimed at limiting information to certain media outlets, in particular Der Standard, Falter, and Kurier, to only the most necessary, legally required, degree. The Interior Ministry criticized these media outlets for their “one-sided and negative coverage” and urged police departments to no longer grant them any “privileges”.

"While the Interior Ministry subsequently described the instruction as a ‘suggestion’, I urgently call on the Interior Ministry to immediately and officially revoke this instruction. I recall that protection of media freedom is key to democracy. Access to information must be provided to all media equally regardless of their editorial orientation,” Désir said.

The Representative noted with satisfaction comments by the President of Austria, Alexander Van der Bellen, who stated that “freedom of expression and freedom of the media are the cornerstones of a liberal democracy, and that discrimination against any single media outlet must not occur”, and the statement by the Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, which noted that “any restriction on press freedom is unacceptable” and that “the exclusion or boycott of any select media outlet is not permitted in Austria”.

Désir also recalled that the Minister of Interior, Herbert Kickl, in a recent broadcast on ORF in June, suggested that certain journalists may be under investigation for their reporting on the work of the Austrian intelligence services.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.  

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ROME, 25 September 2018 – How to lower the risks of conflict and misunderstandings between states in cyberspace through emerging technological features, policy engagement, public-private partnerships and other innovative measures is the focus of the 2018 OSCE-wide Conference on Cyber/ICT Security, which will be opened in Rome on Friday by Italy’s Deputy Foreign Minister Guglielmo Picchi.

Organized by Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship with the support of the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat, the conference will facilitate face-to-face interaction between policy makers, the technical community and private sector representatives on how to mitigate the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs).

The opening session of the conference will be moderated by the Co-ordinator for Cyber Security Issues at Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Francesco Maria Talò, and feature addresses by:

Guglielmo Picchi, Italy’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation;
Oleg Khramov, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation;
Karoly Dan, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the OSCE and Chair of the Informal Working Group on developing confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs;
Christopher Painter, Former Co-ordinator for Cyber Issues at the United States State Department and Commissioner for the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyber Space.

Media are invited to attend the opening session of the conference from 10:00-11:30 on Friday, 28 September 2018 at the Parco dei Principi Grand Hotel & Spa, Via G. Frescobaldi 5, Rome.

Media representatives wishing to attend the conference can register in one of the following ways by sending an email to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation’s Institutional Press and Communication Service at: accreditamentostampa@esteri.it (telephone 06/3691.3432-8573-8210), and attaching the letter from their media organization (or press card for journalists) and, for members of the foreign press, a Note Verbale issued by the Rome embassy of the media organization’s country.

Media representatives should apply for accreditation by 15:00, Thursday, 27 September 2018. 

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PODGORICA, 25 September 2018 – Some 50 participants from the police, border and customs services, and the Ministries of Justice and Culture from South-east Europe and the South Caucasus are taking part in a five-day regional workshop in Podgorica next week on combating the illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property.

The workshop will feature sessions on the structures and capacities required for the fight against the illicit trafficking in cultural property, the international legal framework and best practices in criminal justice responses, co-operation, and the monitoring of archaeological sites and museums. It will draw heavily on case studies and be led by international experts from a wide range of security, police and cultural bodies.

The initiative also aims at fostering co-ordination and co-operation among relevant agencies, international organizations, the private sector, and educational institutions.

The workshop, which begins on 1 October, is organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, in co-ordination with the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the Ministry of Culture of Montenegro.

Opening the workshop will be Minister of Culture of Montenegro, Aleksandar Bogdanović; Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE, Ambassador Luca Fratini; Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Ambassador Maryse Daviet; and the Co-ordinator of Activities to Address  Transnational Threats, Rasa Ostrauskaite.

Media representatives are invited to cover the workshop’s opening session from 09:45 to 10:30 on Monday, 1 October, at the Conference Room of the Centerville Hotel, Podgorica. Media representatives wishing to attend are required to send an e-mail confirming their attendance to Karen.Gainer@osce.org and Marina.Zivaljevic@osce.org, no later than 15:00, 28 September 2018.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 21 and 22 September. Between the evenings of 22 and 23 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty in Popasna. The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling in residential areas in Yasynuvata, Pikuzy and Uzhivka. The SMM continued to observe civilians facing hardships crossing the contact line. The SMM saw military-type presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne, as well as near Novolaspa and Voznesenivka, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines in Sakhanka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Avdiivka, Yasynuvata and Stanytsia Luhanska, and to power lines in Zolote, as well as demining in Pishchane. The SMM observed a protest in Odessa and followed up on reports of an activist being shot later the same day.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 21 and 22 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including 124 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (115 explosions). Between the evenings of 22 and 23 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.    

On the evening and night of 21-22 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion, 20 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east) and two illumination flares in vertical flight, all 1-4km south-south-east, south-south-west and south-west. The following evening and night, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion and 28 projectiles, all 1-4km north-east, south-south-east and south-west.

On the evening of 21 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and about 80 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 4-7km south-east and south-south-east. On the evening of 22 September, from the same location, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions, five bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire as well as heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km south-south-east. During the day on 23 September, the SMM heard 66 undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km south-east, south and south-west.

During the night on 22 September and into the morning of 23 September, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and 25 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-8km west and north-west.

During the day on 22 September, positioned 1.6km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 90 explosions (43 assessed as outgoing rounds of IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire and the remainder undetermined) and almost 200 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east and west.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 21-22 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). Between the evenings of 22-23 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 16 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 21 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded four undetermined explosions and 20 projectiles in flight, all 2-5km south and south-south-west. The following evening, the same camera recorded three undetermined explosions and three projectiles, all 2-4km south-south-west. 

The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty. On 23 September, at a hospital in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a man (47 years old) with bandages on the upper left side of his torso. The man told the SMM that on the morning of 18 September, he had been grazing goats on the eastern outskirts of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) when one of the goats had activated a tripwire and he had heard and felt an explosion. The head of the hospital told the SMM that the man had sustained shrapnel injuries to his chest, left lung and shoulder, and would remain in the hospital for several days.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and shooting in residential areas. On 22 September, at 2 Vorovskoho Street in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in the outer pane of a north-west-facing double-paned window and a bullet lying between the two panes of glass. The SMM assessed that it was a 7.62mm bullet fired from a westerly direction. A resident (36 year old man) told the SMM that he had been at home when the bullet had hit the window in the early morning hours of 22 September.

On 22 September, at 2 Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a 1.5-2.5m hole in the roof of a cultural centre. At 6 Peremohy Street, the SMM observed numerous holes in the metal fence and metal yard doors in front of a house. At both locations, the SMM could not make more detailed assessments due to security considerations. At a local shop at 1 Peremohy Street, the SMM observed holes about 1cm in diameter, which it assessed as caused by small-arms fire originating from a westerly direction. A local resident told the SMM that shelling had taken place during the early evening of 21 September.

On 23 September, on the eastern edge of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed two fresh craters on the eastern side of a road leading south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), both assessed as caused by mortar rounds (calibre undetermined) fired from a south-south-westerly direction. About 30m south-east, inside a power substation compound, the SMM observed three fresh craters, all of which the SMM assessed were caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-south-westerly direction, as well as shrapnel damage to the westerly wall of a nearby metal equipment container and to a nearby large transformer.

At 79/1 Serhiivska Street, the SMM observed a hole in the roof of a house, which had been covered in a plastic sheet and was being repaired by workers. From inside the house, the SMM saw that the hole was in the ceiling of the living room and that there was debris all over the room. The SMM also saw an impact in the floor of the living room and two shattered south-facing windows. About 8m north-east of the house, the SMM saw a large fresh crater and a tail fin of a 120mm mortar round near the crater. The SMM saw a hole in the glass of a north-facing window of the house as well. The SMM assessed that the crater and damage were caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a south-south-westerly direction. The SMM observed that a nearby tree had been hit on its south-west facing side by a projectile, which caused shrapnel damage to a brick barn located about 2m south of the tree. The SMM assessed that the damage to the house was caused by at least one 120mm mortar round fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A local resident (male, in his forties) told the SMM that shelling had taken place on 22 September at around 16:00.

The SMM continued to observe civilians facing hardships crossing the contact line. On 23 September, at a government checkpoint in Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a body lying on the ground, partially covered with a white cloth. A woman (in her fifties) present told the SMM that her husband (58 years old) had collapsed suddenly while they had been waiting to cross the checkpoint and had then died. She said that he had suffered from heart problems. Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint personnel said that the man had been waiting to travel to Donetsk. The SMM saw a morgue vehicle arrive to collect the body.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 21 September, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted building materials (wooden planks and poles) near a position of the armed formations in a tree line about 400m west of road T1316 and about 750m north of the southern edge of the disengagement area, as well as a person assessed as a member of the armed formations walking near a position about 1km east of the same road, both inside the Zolote disengagement area.

During the day on 22 and 23 September, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area as well as near and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 22 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) in a defensive position of the armed formations with their barrels oriented west as well as two ammunition crates, one next to each mortar, on the western edge of Sakhanka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At such sites in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed eight self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm), including two for the first time, as well as four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-30 Smerch-M, 300mm), and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S19) were missing for the first time and that four MLRS (BM-30), 32 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 28 mortars (15 2B11 Sani, 120mm; 12 M-120 Molot 120mm; and one BM-37 82mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, two recoilless guns (SPG-9 Kopye, 73mm) and four rounds of ammunition laid out on a tarpaulin, as well as a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) parked nearby in the eastern outskirts of Zolote and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (variant undetermined) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk). On 22 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-4) on road H20 near Kamianka and an APC (BTR-4) 3km west of Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 21 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck at an industrial facility near Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), Yasynuvata and Stanytsia Luhanska, as well as power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 19 September 2018). The SMM also saw a group of 15 people wearing the logo of an international demining organization and surveying the area on the side of the road near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) for mines.

The SMM visited three border areas outside of government control.* While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes on 22 September, the SMM saw four pedestrians entering Ukraine and four pedestrians exiting Ukraine. The SMM did not observe any members of the armed formations operating the border crossing point in Ukraine.

While at the pedestrian border crossing point near Popivka (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes on 22 September, the SMM did not observe pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine and or members of the armed formations operating the border crossing point in Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes on 23 September, the SMM saw two cars (both with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates and about 15 passengers) entering Ukraine.

In Odessa, on 22 September, the SMM observed a protest of about 300 people on the southern edge of Shevchenko Park, about 250 of which were wearing clothing with National Corps insignia as well as displaying affiliations with other activist groups known to the SMM as members of Svoboda, Sokil, Power to the People, Street Front and Automaidan. Some of the people wore masks or balaclavas and five people carried large hammers. The group marched to a construction site on Lanzheron Beach and proceeded to tear down the external metal fence (about 200m long) around the site. After the group tore down the fence, the SMM saw about 300 police officers, about 60 of which were in riot gear, form a cordon around the construction site. Shortly afterwards, the group dispersed.

The same evening, the SMM followed up on reports that a man known to the SMM as a member of the group Power to the People had been shot at his home the same day. Police in Odessa told the SMM that the man had been shot twice in the chest and once in the forearm and was being treated at hospital no. 1. The police said they had initiated an investigation under article 15/115 (Attempted Murder).  

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 22 September, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage south to Zaichenko and southward to Sakhanka. The SMM observed civilian traffic passing through the checkpoint.
• On 22 September, at a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage. The SMM observed civilian traffic passing through the checkpoint.
• On 22 September, at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the risk of presence of snipers in the area.
• On 23 September, at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to the site.
• On 23 September, at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, three members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) denied the SMM access to the area, citing ‘orders’ from their superiors.
• On 23 September, at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, told the SMM to leave the area. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 22 and 23 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 22 and 23 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.5
• On 22 and 23 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 23 September, an SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming north of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 30km north-east of Donetsk).[5]

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]     Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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ASTANA, 24 September 2018 – An OSCE-organized week-long simulation exercise on how to identify and rescue victims of human trafficking kicks off today at the Regional Hub for Countering Global Threats in Astana. More than 50 professionals from law enforcement, labour inspectorates, financial investigative units, prosecutorial offices, NGOs and social services from 14 OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation are participating in the live-action training.

Delivered for the first time in the Russian language, this pioneering training exercise offers front-line responders the opportunity to simulate real-life anti-trafficking responses, using live actors to create trafficking scenarios. Fictitious brothels, a construction site and an agricultural field have been re-created to simulate cases of labour and sexual exploitation, including of child victims.

“By gathering experts from different fields, including financial investigation units, social and migration services, lawyers and NGOs, we are working toward bringing together a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary network of professionals across the OSCE region,” said Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. “Our simulation exercises are realistic, practical and cross-dimensional to effectively enhance participating States’ ability to identify victims, investigate suspected trafficking cases and prosecute exploiters and perpetrators.”

Previous training courses have left participants, including Italy’s Public Prosecutor David Mancini, praising the approach as “truly unique” and the results as “genuinely extraordinary” with enhanced learning outcomes as “the border between reality and simulation becomes increasingly blurred for all participants”.

Andrey Lukin, Deputy Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan, said: “International co-operation is extremely important. The efficiency of the anti-trafficking response depends on the co-ordinated and coherent work of practitioners from different countries. The goal of this simulation training, involving participants from 14 countries, is to rally all of us and to unite our efforts to combat this crime.”

This project is part of ongoing efforts by the Office of the OSCE Special Representative for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings to facilitate better identification and assistance of trafficking victims through a new, multi-national and cross-sectoral approach.

The simulation exercise in Astana, supported by the OSCE field operations, including the Programme Office in Astana, follows four similar exercises in Vicenza, Italy. A further exercise will be conducted in Vicenza in December 2018.

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VIENNA, 24 September 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today denounced the arrest of three journalists from the Greek daily newspaper Fileleftheros on defamation charges and welcomed that the prosecutor decided not to immediately press charges, a move that led to their release. He called on authorities to decriminalize defamation.

“I denounce the detention of journalists for several hours following criminal defamation charges by the Minister of Defence relating to a story about the alleged misuse of European Union funds,” said Désir. “Political leaders should refrain from bringing criminal charges against journalists for their investigative reporting and need to display a higher tolerance for criticism and scrutiny from the press. Such intimidation of journalists is unacceptable.”

The publisher, editor-in-chief and political editor of Fileleftheros spent a night in jail after being accused of defamation by Greece’s Minister of Defence, Panos Kammenos. The Minister filed charges against them and four other journalists from the newspaper following the front-page article, published on 21 September, on the alleged mismanagement of European Union funds linked to the Defence Ministry.

“I welcome that the three journalists were released and that no immediate charges were pressed by the Prosecutor,” Désir continued. “Defamation should be decriminalized in line with international standards on freedom of expression. I call on the authorities to use this incident as a way to revise the current laws and to decriminalize defamation.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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397118 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in co-ordination with the BiH Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Co-ordination of the Fight against Corruption, organized a one-day workshop for the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (HNC) Anti-corruption Team and anti-corruption focal points within the ministries of the Herzegovina-Neretva cantonal government on 20 September 2018 in Mostar.

The aim of the workshop was to assist the anti-corruption team with the monitoring and implementation of the cantonal anti-corruption strategy and the effective planning and co-ordination of its anti-corruption activities.

The training was facilitated by the state-level anti-corruption agency personnel who focused on addressing the above-named priorities and strengthening the anti-corruption team’s capacities.

The OSCE Mission to BiH is committed to supporting anti-corruption efforts and activities and strengthening capacities of anti-corruption teams at all levels in BiH.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM saw military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Betmanove and, again, near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM observed weapons in violations of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, Avdiivka and near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including 115 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions).

On the evening and night of 20-21 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 45 explosions, 36 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east) and two illumination flares in vertical flight, all 0.6-4km south and south-south-west.

On the evening of 20 September, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded nine explosions (one assessed as an impact, six undetermined and two assessed as airbursts) and three projectiles in flight, all 2-4km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening of 20 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded four undetermined explosions, about 80 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south) and two illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km east-north-east and east.

During the day on 21 September, positioned 2km south-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and four bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km at northerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 30), compared with the previous reporting period.

On the evening of 20 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 35km north-west of Luhansk) recorded 13 undetermined explosions, 2-4km south-west and south-south-west.

During the day on 21 September, positioned 1.5km north-west of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions (of which some were assessed as outgoing rounds of self-propelled grenade or rocket-propelled grenade launchers and others as impacts of the same weapon systems), all 2-3km north-east. The SMM assessed all of the above-mentioned explosions as live-fire training in the security zone, in violation also of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone as described in the Addendum to the Package of Measures.

Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 2-3km north-north-east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 21 September, the SMM saw a military truck (Kamaz) loaded with wood entering the Zolote disengagement area (travelling west from the government checkpoint north of the disengagement area towards Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk)). The same day, the SMM saw three people (two men and a woman) wearing uniforms inside the disengagement area travelling on board of a black car with military licence plates from Katerynivka towards the government checkpoint.

During the day on 21 September, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, as well as near and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 21 September, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a tank (a possible T-72) in the yard of a house on the eastern edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 21 September, the SMM saw a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Topolyne (19km north-west of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 21 September, the SMM saw a tank (a probable T-64) loaded on a flatbed trailer near Mykhailivka (31km west of Luhansk) heading west on road T0504.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 20 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) (of which two were assessed as probable) near Pobieda (55km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that six MLRS (BM-21) and12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing. The SMM noted that six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were missing for the first time.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that 18 tanks (eight T-64 and ten T-72), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 82mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 20 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (five BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (MT-LB) near Troitske.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 20 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable APC (BTR-80) near Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) at a compound in a residential area of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Avdiivka, Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 September) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing risks to the SMM’s security.
• At a checkpoint near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, 23km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, thus preventing the SMM from accessing a school located about 50m from the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC. [4]

Other impediments:

• At a school in Petrovenky (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk), a woman who introduced herself as a school representative said that she could not provide information to the SMM, citing “orders” from senior members of the armed formations.
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mid-range UAV flying over Pikuzy, assessed as due to jamming. The SMM landed the UAV safely.[5]

[1]   Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]   Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM saw military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as again near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a multiple launch rocket system in violation of withdrawal lines near Buhaivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and Slovianoserbsk and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka, as well as demining in Pishchane. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering regarding the status of non-Ukrainian ATO veterans.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (58 explosions).

On the night of 19-20 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two explosions assessed as impacts of 30mm grenades 0.5-1.5km south as well as four explosions (one assessed as an impact and three undetermined) and 22 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), all 2-5km at southerly directions.

During the day on 20 September, positioned about1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and two shots of small-arms fire, all 2-4km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (41 explosions).

During the day on 20 September, positioned about 2km east-north-east of Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 artillery explosions over a period of 15 minutes, 1km north-east, assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone. (See observations from training area near Myrne below.)              

During the day on 20 September, positioned near Malomykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven artillery explosions over a period of about 15 minutes, 6km north-east, assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

South of the railway bridge crossing road T1316 in the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw two soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, each carrying an automatic rifle, walking south along the road.

Near but outside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw an ambulance with military licence plates and a green Volkswagen Transporter minivan with Ukrainian civilian licence plates driving from the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the disengagement area towards Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk). Five minutes later, the SMM observed another ambulance with military licence plates and a dark green minivan driving through Zolote‑1/Soniachnyi (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) towards the aforementioned checkpoint at high speed. Through the window of this ambulance, the SMM was able to see two persons holding intravenous bags.                                                                                                                        

Positioned north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact and saw a cloud of black smoke emanating from 2-3km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) on 18 September.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm), five towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) loaded on a train. (Loaded on the same train, the SMM saw ten armoured personnel carriers (APC), one command and fire control vehicle and more than ten military trucks. [3]) Later the same day, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S5) loaded on trailers near the same railway station.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence, on 18 September, of 26 tanks (undetermined types) in a training area near Buhaivka, 20 tanks (undetermined types) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 18 tanks (undetermined types) 14 pieces of towed artillery (undetermined types) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). On 20 September, the SMM saw a tank (type undetermined) and seven towed howitzers (undetermined types) near the same training area near Myrne.

Also on 18 September, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 26 pieces of towed artillery (undetermined types) and four surface-to-air-missile systems (undetermined types) in a training area near Buhaivka (in the same area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 75 armoured combat vehicles) and a probable piece of towed artillery in a training area near Shymshynivka (in the same area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 27 armoured combat vehicles).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[4] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 19 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). On 20 September, the SMM saw an APC (BTR‑4) near Novobakhmutivka, an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) being towed near Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol) and an APC (BTR-4) being towed in Artema (26km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas on 20 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska, where workers installed water pipes to sanitary facilities about 100m south of the nearby entry-exit checkpoint, and Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM observed no pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a large gathering regarding the status of non-Ukrainian ATO veterans. Gathered in front of the national parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street, the SMM observed about 500 individuals (90 per cent men between 16 and 35 years old), some displaying flags of National Corps, Natsionalni Druzhyny, Svoboda, Veterans Brotherhood and Right Sector, chanting “passports to volunteers” and carrying a large banner reading “Citizenship for Volunteers.” According to speeches being given at the gathering, the group was demanding that all non-Ukrainian ATO veterans be granted Ukrainian citizenship. The SMM saw about 800 National Guard and riot police officers, some carrying anti-riot shields, standing between the national parliament building and the crowd. At one point, the SMM observed some members of the gathering throw fireworks and attempt to break through a police cordon protecting the entrance to the national parliament building.  Later, about 100 people broke off from the crowd and proceeded to the entrance of the Presidential Administration Building at 1 Bankova Street (where about 200 National Guard and riot police officers were stationed), where some of them chained themselves to a fence. The participants subsequently dispersed without further incidents.

In Kherson, the SMM attempted to follow up further on reports of the hazardous pollution emanating from a chemical plant on the Crimean peninsula (see SMM Daily Report 14 September 2018). Representatives of the State Consumer Service of Kherson told the SMM that tests had been conducted on air, water, soil and food chain samples, and all had fallen within acceptable limits but that monitoring would continue.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 September) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing risks to the SMM’s security. The SMM saw civilian cars crossing the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]   Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]   Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5]   The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, 24 June 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on Turkey’s 24 June early presidential and parliamentary elections, published on 21 September 2018, recommends a review of legislation to bring it in line with international obligations and standards for conducting democratic elections. The report also recommends lowering the threshold for parties to qualify for seat allocation and ensuring equality of the vote across constituencies. It further recommends making eligibility requirements for political parties to run in elections less restrictive.

The report notes that the authorities need to take necessary measures to ensure that the campaign is conducted in an atmosphere free from intimidation and fear of retribution, and to ensure a clear separation between the state and party.

To improve transparency, the report recommends that meetings of electoral boards be open to media and observers, and that preliminary election results be published immediately. An additional recommendation is to amend legislation to explicitly provide for the presence of observers, both international and citizen.

The report reiterates an earlier ODIHR recommendation that the authorities refrain from applying anti-terrorism legislation to prosecute journalists based solely on the content of their reporting, and that media outlets should be able to operate free from intimidation or pressure. In addition, the report recommends that laws and regulations be brought in line with international obligations on freedom of expression and media freedom.

To provide for an effective means of redress, the report recommends that decisions by the Supreme Board of Elections be subject to judicial review.

It also recommends training election commission members in the area of counting procedures and completion of protocols. To ensure that voters are able to vote freely, the report recommends that the police presence be limited to ensuring public order, and that only commission chairpersons have the authority to call the police into polling stations.

For election day observation, ODIHR joined efforts with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

BELGRADE, 21 September 2018 – Beginning his second visit to the region since his appointment in July, the OSCE PA’s Special Representative on South East Europe, Mark Pritchard (United Kingdom), has met in Belgrade the past two days with a range of governmental and parliamentary leaders, as well as representatives of the international community and civil society.

In meetings with Chairperson of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee Žarko Obradović, Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija Government of the Republic of Serbia Marko Durić and the Serbian Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, key topics of discussions have included regional co-operation, the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, parliamentary oversight, and the OSCE’s role in the region.

“I look forward to continuing my substantive discussions with key figures in the region on a range of topics,” said Pritchard today. “Parliamentary diplomacy is a vital component of enhancing regional dialogue on all of the challenges facing Serbia and the region as a whole.”

Pritchard is accompanied by Ambassador Andreas Nothelle, the OSCE PA’s Special Representative in Vienna. In meetings Thursday with Ambassador Andrea Orizio, Head of Mission of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, and representatives of civil society, the OSCE PA delegation heard about OSCE activities as well as Belgrade’s achievements and remaining challenges.

Pritchard praised Serbia for remaining actively committed to bilateral relations and regional co-operation. He also commended the OSCE Mission to Serbia for the valuable expertise and assistance it continues to offer the country. Special Representative Pritchard will continue his visit to Pristina. Last month, he was in Albania and Montenegro in his first visit to the region since being appointed Special Representative in July.

He welcomed in particular the progress that Serbia has made in its European Union accession bid and urged continued commitment to the process. He also highlighted relevant resolutions adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and encouraged follow-up to election-related recommendations made by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

For more information on the Special Representative on South East Europe, please click here.

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PRISHTINË/PRIŠTINA, 21 SEPTEMBER 2018 - The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will organize an event on Monday, 24 September 2018, to launch two reports on bilingual legislation and on language compliance in the Kosovo Police, as one of numerous activities to mark the European Day of Languages. All activities are organized with the support of the Office of the Language Commissioner.

The first report presents the progress made by Kosovo institutions in the implementation of the legal framework governing language rights, while the second analyses the implementation of this framework by one of these institutions in particular – the Kosovo Police.

The European Day of Languages – 26 September – was declared by the Council of Europe in 2001, to be marked annually. It is celebrated across Europe with the goal of promoting the values of multilingualism, cultural diversity and lifelong language learning.

As part of its mandate, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo monitors the compliance of institutions with human rights standards, including language rights, and supports those institutions through means that are tailored to further improve that compliance.

Media are invited to attend the event on Monday, 24 September 2018, at Swiss Diamond Hotel in Prishtinë/Priština, starting from 10:30 hrs.

The Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Ambassador Jan Braathu; General Director of Kosovo Police, Rashit Qalaj; Language Commissioner, Slaviša Mladenović; Legal Director in the Office of Prime Minister, Mentor Borovci, and Member of the Assembly of Kosovo,  Duda Balje, will speak at the event. 

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