OSCE

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-organized workshop for 20 representatives of civil society on the Open Government Partnership (OGP) initiative took place on 15 November in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

A Georgian expert from the Tbilisi-based Institute for Development of Freedom of Information delivered a presentation on the benefits of the OGP and identified key challenges for Kazakhstan to join it. The participants discussed the shortcomings in national anti-corruption legislation and proposed ways to strengthen interaction with the government to ensure transparency and civic participation in government decision-making.

The OGP is a multilateral initiative to help governments and civil society develop a dialogue platform to advance transparency, accountability and civic engagement. It aims to secure concrete commitments from national governments to promote open government, empower citizens, fight corruption and harness new technologies to strengthen governance.

The event is a follow-up to an OSCE-supported roundtable discussion in Astana last month involving non-governmental organizations.

The workshop is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance by focussing on anti-corruption activities in Kazakhstan.

Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek supported a round-table discussion, on 14 November 2018 in Bishkek, where Kyrgyzstan’s draft Unified Register of Functions of Ministries and State Agencies was brought for discussion to the public. The register is meant to systematize functions and bringing them into one coherent list.

“The register gives a clear overview of all functions in ministries and state agencies at the national level,” said Eni Gjergji, Acting Head of the Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek. “This functional review identified redundant functions, duplications between state agencies, missing functions, as well as inconsistencies and omissions in the legal framework that hinder state agencies from performing their duties.”

The register is the result of a six-month project, which was initiated at the request of the Prime Minister’s Office and implemented by the Centre for Public Policy NGO.

The register was drafted by a group of experienced national experts who worked in close co-operation with the Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy. This expert group profoundly analyzed the functions of 35 ministries and state agencies, as well as conducted an analysis of laws and legal acts regulating the activities of ministries and state agencies. The local expert community, representatives of state bodies and the Prime Minister’s Office collaborated on and contributed to the final version of the register. 

The register covers 35 ministries and state agencies. It does not include bodies that operate in the areas of national defence, state borders protection, national security and law- enforcement. 

Mirbek Akmatov, Head of the civil service sector in the Prime Minister’s Office, said: “Based on the results of this important analysis, we can clarify the tasks and functions, optimize the structure of the ministries and state agencies. Thus, this register allows creating the conditions for systemic changes in public administration.”

The aim of this project was to support the efforts of the host government in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the public administration system, with the ultimate goal of improving service delivery to the citizens of Kyrgyzstan. 

402935 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

On 12 November 2018, the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe started a new project “Patrol Field Capacity Building of the Tajik Border Troops through promotion of Regional Co-operation”. The project is supported by the Federal Republic of Germany and was launched in the Regional Training Centre of Khalkayor, some 230km south of Dushanbe.  

The five-year project aims to deliver specialized tactical trainings to 1,500 Tajik border troops who are part of a recently established border management team named “Special Border Unit under the Border Troops of the Republic of Tajikistan”. The first group of 25 senior Tajik border officers of the Special Border Units will be the first trainees attending a four-week course on Sustained Field Operational Capacities, which also started on 12 November 2018.

The First Secretary of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Dushanbe Maik Sydoruk, the Japanese Ambassador to Dushanbe Hajime Kitaoka and the Commander of the Border Troops for Khatlon Region, General Dilshod Tohirzoda, attended the project launch. Maik Sydoruk underlined that Germany “values international co-operation as the only way to address common challenges and the OSCE is the best placed organization to facilitate such co-operation on a large scale.”

The Japanese Ambassador to Tajikistan, Hajime Kitaoka, underscored the importance of global solidarity in the face of terrorism and all forms of organized crime. He stressed the importance of the OSCE’s work in building the capacities of the Tajik border troops and neighbouring countries.

General Dilshod Tohirzoda expressed high appreciation for the co-operation between the OSCE and the Tajik Border Troops, considering its assistance is “vital in addressing all types of security threats in Tajikistan and beyond.”      

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared to the previous reporting period. It observed for the first time anti-tank mines inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* It observed weapons in violation near Volnovakha. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to houses and essential civilian infrastructure, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple and the clearance of unexploded ordnance near Marinka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 170), compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions).

On the evening and night of 12-13 November, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 100 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-north-east to west-south-west) at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and south-south-east. During the day on 13 November, the same camera recorded four undetermined explosions and about 30 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-north-east to west-south-west), all at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, south-south-east and south.

On the evening of 12 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions).

On the morning of 13 November, positioned in the north-western part of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM heard 25 explosions assessed as caused by mortar rounds (120mm) at an assessed range of 4-5km north-north-east  and north-west.

During the day on 13 November, positioned about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 7-10km north-east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the morning of 13 November, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area for about ten minutes, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and 19 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 7-10km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same morning, the SMM saw a military truck (ZIL-131) entering the disengagement area from the north and driving south. It also observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier inside a black Volkswagen Passat civilian car with military plates driving out of the Zolote disengagement area, near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

On the same morning, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed for the first time six anti-tank mines (TM-62 variant) 2m east of road T1316, about 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, as well as an anti-tank mine (TM-62 variant) 8m west of the same road, about 450m north of the abovementioned checkpoint and 1.6km west of the disengagement’s eastern edge. About 600m south-east of the same anti-tank mine, the SMM also saw for the first time a remnant of an anti-tank guided missile 2m west of road T1316 and previously observed remnants of a grenade round (PG-9) 3m west of the same road, both inside the disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 15 September 2018).

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 12 November, the SMM saw a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) near Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 13 November, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 32 tanks (20 T-64 and 12 T-72) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). On 13 November, the SMM saw five tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM observed five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that 11 tanks (seven T-72 and four T-64) were again missing. The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that the site continued to be abandoned and that 53 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (two M120-15 Molot 120mm and five 2B9M Vasilek 82mm) were missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other signs of military presence in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, on 12 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) and an aircraft communications automatic jamming station (R-934B/BM VHF/UHF) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 13 November, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in Oleksandrivsk (10km west of Luhansk) and two APCs (one BTR-80 and one type undetermined) near Sentianivka (44km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the presence of a mine. About 1.4km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), 1.5m north of a paved road, the Mission again saw a mine, assessed as a MON-100 anti-personnel type, fastened to a tree about 1.5m from the ground.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the clearance by the Ukrainian State Emergency Services of a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round, on the side of road H-15 about 400m east of a checkpoint near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) (for previous observation, see SMM Daily Report 12 November 2018). The SMM heard an explosion and observed a plume of black smoke rising from the location of the UXO. Later on, it noted that the UXO was no longer present.

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a gas pipeline in Marinka, water pipelines near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and near a coal mine near the Gagarina settlement of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 90 minutes, the SMM saw 22 cars (eight with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as nine with “DPR” plates), three vans with Ukrainian licence plates and six covered cargo trucks (five with Ukrainian licence plates as well as one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine, and 27 cars (seven with Ukrainian, 15 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), a van with Ukrainian licence plates and three pedestrians entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 November 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]

The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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402926 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry inaugurated a second model police station in Tajikistan at a ceremony in the Esanboy community of the Rudaki district on 9 November 2018. The station will serve as a community policing centre where local community members can meet and discuss legal and strategic documents on police reform, and provide their recommendations to the Interior Ministry on improving community policing.

Tajikistan’s Deputy Interior Minister, Major-General Umarzoda Ikrom, Chairperson of the Esanboy community of Rudaki district, Saidzoda Bahodur, National Co-ordinator for Police Reform, Major General Farhodbek Shodmonzoda, representatives of the OSCE, of the local community and of the police participated in the opening ceremony.

Major-General Umarzoda Ikrom said: “We support the national police reform and the concept of community policing. The local government allocated a plot of land for the construction of a model police station at our request. We are grateful to the OSCE for its support in building and equipping it with new furniture and office equipment.”

Major General Farhodbek Shodmonzoda added: “The model police station in Esanboy community will serve as a centre to establish co-operation between police and community. Its establishment follows the success of the first station that has helped to promote community policing in rural communities of Hissor districts.”

402920 Communication and Media Relations Section Giovanni Davoli

From 6 to 9 November, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Gender, Melanne Verveer and OSCE Senior Adviser on Gender Issues, Amarsanaa Darisuren conducted a country visit to Uzbekistan. The visit was organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office.

During their visit, Verveer and Darisuren met with various counterparts including Deputy Chairperson of the Senate Svetlana Artykova, Director of the Scientific Research Centre “Oyila” under the Cabinet of Ministers Diloram Tashmukhamedova, Head of the National Human Rights Centre Akmal Saidov, Ombudsperson Ulugbek Mukhammadiev, and Chairperson of the Business Women Association Gulnara Makhmudova. The visit provided an opportunity for Uzbekistan’s representatives to discuss the progress achieved in increasing Uzbek women’s active participation in public, political and socio-economic life.  

The OSCE representatives received first-hand information and examples of Uzbekistan’s commitment to gender equality, reflected in national legislation, education curricula, and specific measures to strengthen women’s participation in different areas of the economy.

Verveer and Darisuren shared good practices to enhance women’s participation from the OSCE region at the conference on “The Role of Women in Democratic Renewal and Modernization of the Country: Best International Practice and Experience of Uzbekistan”, organized by the Women’s Committee under Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Tanzila Narbaeva. 

The OSCE representatives on gender also explored possible areas of co-operation with Uzbekistan’s government representatives with the objective of effectively implementing existing legislation that fosters equal opportunities for women.

The OSCE Gender Section also took the opportunity to discuss gender mainstreaming opportunities with the OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan who assisted in arranging meetings with various counterparts.

Communication and Media Relations Section OSCE Guidebook Intelligence-Led Policing Intelligence-Led Policing – From Reaction to Prevention

The OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Strategic Police Matters Unit presented the Arabic translation of the OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing at a launch event organized jointly with the League of Arab States (LAS) at the League’s headquarters in Cairo on 14 November 2018.

The event brought together 52 participants, including representatives of 19 of the 21 LAS Member States as well as law-enforcement representatives from the Arab-speaking OSCE Partners for Co-operation – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

OSCE experts introduced the OSCE-recommended model of intelligence-led policing presented in the guidebook, its advantages, and how it can be implemented in practice.

“Police-related activities are one of the fundamental components of the OSCE’s efforts aimed at strengthening security and stability through enhancing the capacities and professionalism of law enforcement services of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation,” said Rasa Ostrauskaite, OSCE Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats. “However, the evolution of transnational threats and the ever-changing criminal patterns call for a constant update of skills and capabilities, adopting new strategies, plans and methods. Intelligence-led policing has already proven its significant potential in a number of countries around the world to address these challenges.”

The OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing, which has already been translated into seven languages, is designed as a practical tool for policy-makers, law enforcement managers, criminal intelligence analysts and other law enforcement practitioners in their efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the police. The guidebook puts a strong emphasis on adherence to national and international legislation, human rights and data protection principles in intelligence-led policing practices.

During the launch event, international experts from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, INTERPOL and Europol also highlighted the intelligence-led policing programmes in which they are engaged.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Marinka. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Bezimenne and Zaichenko. The SMM observed weapons in violation near Shymshynivka. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to houses and essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. The SMM observed two protests in Kyiv and a gathering commemorating the founding of Karpatska Sich in Ivano‑Frankivsk.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 115 explosions).[2]

On the evening and night of 11-12 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 76 explosions (27 assessed as outgoing rounds, seven as impacts and the remainder undetermined) and about 130 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-6km east and south-east. The following day, from the same location, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-5km south-east.

During the day on 12 November, positioned in the south-eastern part of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and 25 bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-5km south and south‑east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 40 explosions).

During the day on 12 November, positioned on the southern edge of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions assessed as from mortar rounds at an assessed range of 5-7km south.

On the same day, positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 25 explosions assessed as from 120mm mortar rounds at an assessed range of 7-10km south.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Marinka (government‑controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). At a hospital in Kurakhove (government‑controlled, 40km west of Donetsk), a man (in his fifties) with a bandaged right thigh told the SMM that at around 18:00 on 10 November, he was in his outhouse on Prokofiev Street in Marinka when he heard small-arms fire and felt a sharp pain in his right thigh. A doctor in the hospital told the SMM that the man had been struck by a 5.45mm bullet, which perforated his right thigh and bruised his left thigh.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 11 November, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded two muzzle flashes of undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 100-150m south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 12 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 7-10km north-north-east. Positioned in Zolote‑5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and about 160 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-3km north‑north-east. Positioned on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions assessed as from mortar rounds, five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and 50 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-3km east. Positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government‑controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four explosions assessed as from artillery rounds at an assessed range of 7-10km south. Positioned in Zolote, the SMM heard eight explosions assessed as rounds of artillery at an assessed range of 7-10km west‑south‑west. All of these observations were assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the same day, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government‑controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 20 shots and bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km east‑south-east, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines on 11 November, in a non-government-controlled area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 12 November, the SMM saw three surface-to-air missile systems: an S-300 near Nikolske (formerly Volodarske, 21km north-west of Mariupol), a 9K37 near Shevchenko (19km north-west of Mariupol) and a Strela variant near Polkove (65km south of Donetsk). In non-government-controlled areas, on 11 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted ten tanks (T-72), one of which had no barrel, in a training area near Shymshynivka.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[4] in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, on 12 November, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk) and an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the sewage system near the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM observed no traffic transiting the border.

The SMM observed a gathering of individuals wearing balaclavas. In Ivano-Frankivsk, on 10 November, the SMM observed about 100 people (mainly men, different age groups), many of whom were wearing black clothing (some with emblems of Runas and Karpatska Sich) and balaclavas and carrying flares, marching from the Ivan Franko monument on Nezalezhnosti Street  to Ratusha Square. Posters around the city announced that the march was held to commemorate the eighth anniversary of the founding of the Karpatska Sich. At Ratusha Square, the SMM observed several individuals, including a senior member of Karpatska Sich, address the crowd and conduct a roll call of Karpatska Sich members who had died in the conflict. After each name was called, someone from the crowd shouted “present”, and all the participants extended their right arms upwards from the neck with hands straightened. The SMM observed about 25 police officers and three police cars directing traffic.

In Kyiv, the SMM observed two protests by individuals wearing C14 (Sich) insignia. At the Kyiv Central Bus Station at 1 Nauky Avenue on 10 November, the SMM observed a protest of about 60 people (aged 20-50, one woman), about 40 of whom were wearing C14 emblems on their clothes. A senior member of C14 told the SMM the gathering had been organized to protest bus companies that were not providing discounted tickets to veterans, as per Ukrainian law. The SMM saw a man come out of the station, identify himself as the deputy director of the station and then get pushed to the ground by protestors (the man was able to get up, and the SMM did not see him get further assaulted). Other protestors were seen spraying red graffiti on the station’s windows and on the office of a bus company which, they alleged, transports passengers into areas beyond government control. Some of the protestors then blocked buses from entering or exiting the station. The SMM did not observe a police presence at the station.

On 12 November, the SMM observed about 20 people (20-25 years old, one woman), including a senior member of Sich (C14), erecting posters criticizing the Prosecutor General in front of the Office of the Prosecutor General at 15 Riznicka Street in Kyiv. The SMM observed nearly 50 police officers (including about 30 in riot gear) standing on both sides of the protest. The SMM saw the protesters disperse without security incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 November 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from superiors.”
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “orders from superiors.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that there had been no demining activities in the area and that there were mines on the bridge. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The security needs of Jewish communities were at the centre of discussion at a regional conference co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Skopje on 12 and 13 November 2018.

The conference, organized in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the OSCE Mission to Skopje and the local Jewish community, was designed to raise awareness of and discuss ways to address the security needs of Jewish communities in the Western Balkans region. The event brought together more than 50 law enforcement officials and Jewish community representatives (35 men and 17 women) from the host country, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.

The conference featured a presentation of ODIHR's practical guide Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crime and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities.

“The security of Jewish communities is the responsibility of governments,” said Christie Edwards, Deputy Head of ODIHR's Tolerance and Non-Discrimination department. “Only strong co-operation between governments and Jewish communities can pave the way to safer and more tolerant societies in the OSCE region.”

Participants discussed methods to strengthen co-operation between law enforcement agencies and Jewish communities, and the role that international organizations, such as the OSCE, can play.

“Responding to contemporary anti-Semitism and ensuring the safety of Jewish, and other communities, is particularly important for our government,” said Oliver Spasovski, the host country's Minister of Interior. “I believe that today’s event will allow my colleagues from law enforcement institutions from the Western Balkans region to enhance their understanding of anti-Semitism and how best to collaborate with community representatives in preventing and addressing crimes grounded in anti-Semitism.”

Ambassador Clemens Koja, Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, said: “Our Mission supports the host country in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement that stipulates in its basic principles that ‘non-discrimination and equal treatment of all under the law will be respected completely’. Discrimination, hate crime and hate speech are serious problems in this region and represent a potential threat to improving inter-ethnic relations.”

The conference was organized as part of ODIHR’s Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism project.

402992 Representatives of civil society, national and international legal associations participating in the conference. Vienna, 14 November 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

A toolkit developed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to assist participating States in adopting a comprehensive approach to countering hate crime was presented to government officials and civil society representatives at a conference organized by ODIHR in Vienna on 14 November 2018.

The toolkit, developed as part of the Office's Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime project, includes training packages, methodologies and guidelines that can be used by public institutions and civil society involved in addressing hate crime. The materials were developed based on project work in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Poland.

“It is only through a whole-of-government approach that states and criminal justice systems can effectively respond to hate crimes. This lesson, along with many others that we have drawn from our co-operation with partners, can be applied across the OSCE region,” said Cristina Finch, Head of ODIHR’s Tolerance and Non-discrimination department. “While this project provides the building blocks for a comprehensive approach to hate crime, major challenges still lie ahead for international organizations, national institutions and civil society. ODIHR will continue to provide support and expertise to all those who are ready to collect data, strengthen capacities and partnerships and, most of all, protect the victims of hate crimes.”

The conference brought together civil society activists, officials from project countries and national points of contact on hate crime from OSCE participating States, as well as representatives of the European Union, the Council of Europe, the International Association of Prosecutors and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Petya Karayaneva, a Protection Officer with the UNHCR, told the conference: “One of the main challenges in combatting racism and xenophobia is under-reporting due to the victims’ fear and lack of trust in redress mechanisms. The protection of victims should be at the epicenter of all efforts to combat racism and xenophobia. Bringing affected communities closer to authorities will ensure that community fears and perspectives feed into appropriate policies and strengthen support for victims.”

The ODIHR toolkit includes a manual on conducting joint training for police and prosecutors, a methodology on developing an inter-agency co-operation protocol on addressing hate crimes, an innovative methodology to map unreported hate crimes and guidance on implementing a comprehensive approach to addressing hate crime on a regional level.

The event marked the closure of the project, which ODIHR implemented with financial support from the European Union and the United States.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO).The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 10,434 to 9,790 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 130 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was ten this week; seven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and three into Ukraine (100 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

During this reporting week, no family travelling with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars was observed, compared to the previous reporting period when eight families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and five into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (389 compared to 393 observed during the previous week). There were 207 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 182 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Rovenky-Kyiv; Pervomaisk-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 684 to 737 (247 at the Gukovo BCP and 490 at the Donetsk BCP); 428 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 309 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and in Belarus.                                                                                           

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 62 (compared to 47 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 91 to 114: of the total number of trucks scanned, 74 trucks (65 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 40 trucks (35 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly decreased from 169 to 167 vehicles; 87 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 80 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 21 occasions, compared to 23 last week; the OTs assessed that ten trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 11 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Georgian licence plates.

On 6 November at 19:00, an ambulance entered the Donetsk BCP. The vehicle arrived from the Russian Federation and stopped outside the main building. At 19:54 on the same day, the ambulance left the BCP and returned to the Russian Federation.

On 7 November at 14:47, a Russian police vehicle entered the Donetsk BCP from the direction of the Russian Federation. The vehicle stopped outside the main building and at 14:57 the police vehicle left the BCP in the direction of the Russian Federation.

On 8 November at 08:37, the OM observed a vehicle (Mercedes Vito van) with “LPR” plates passing through the Gukovo BCP.  The vehicle bore the sign “GRUZ 200” and crossed the border from Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

On 9 November at 08:37, the OM at the Donetsk BCP noticed an ambulance with “LPR” plates. The vehicle crossed the border from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. The car bore inscriptions “Ambulance” (in English) and “Urgent medical help” (in Russian). 

At 16:20 on the same day at the Donetsk BCP, an ambulance with “DPR” plates and a crew consisting of two people entered the BCP. They travelled from the Russian Federation to Ukraine.

Later on the same day, the OM observed a Russian police vehicle entering the area of the BCP at 10:21. The vehicle returned to the Russian Federation at 10:24.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 17 October to 13 November 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

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VIENNA, 13 November 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania expressing concern about an investigative journalism organization being requested to reveal its confidential sources, and asking for this request to be withdrawn.

On 8 November, the RISE Project non-profit journalism organization in Bucharest received a letter from the Romanian data protection authority, the National Supervisory Authority for Personal Data Processing (ANSPDCP), requesting information related to the sources of an investigative report on a case of alleged fraud involving European funds. The Authority also threatened the organization with a fine in case of non-compliance.

"I call for the withdrawal of this request in order to safeguard the journalists' right to confidential sources," said Désir. "The confidentiality of journalists’ sources is one of the basic preconditions for press freedom.”

“This case shows that there is a need to strengthen the protection of journalists’ confidential sources in line with international standards, in order to avoid similar cases in the future” concluded Désir.

The RISE Project is a member of the regional network Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and of the Global Investigative Journalism Network.           

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom. 

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YEREVAN, 13 November 2018 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today formally opened an election observation mission for the 9 December early parliamentary elections in Armenia. The mission’s deployment follows an official invitation from the country’s authorities.

The mission is led by Ambassador Urszula Gacek and consists of a core team of 13 election experts, based in Yerevan, and 24 long-term observers to be deployed in teams of two across the country. In addition, ODIHR will request that OSCE participating States provide 250 short-term observers to monitor proceedings on election day.

The mission will observe the elections for their compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. Observers will closely monitor the candidate registration process, campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant governmental bodies, election-related legislation and its implementation, and the resolution of election-related disputes. As part of the observation, the mission will also monitor the media coverage of the campaign.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives of state authorities, the election administration and political parties, as well as with individual candidates. It will also meet with representatives of civil society, the media and the international community.

On election day, observers will monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results. For election day, the ODIHR election observation mission will join efforts with delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

A statement of preliminary findings and conclusions will be issued on the day after the elections. A final report on the observation of the entire electoral process will be published approximately two months after the completion of the electoral process.

For further information please visit https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/401984 or contact Ivan Godársky, Media Analyst of the ODIHR election observation mission, on +374 99 903 804 (mobile) or at ivan.godarsky@odihr.am.

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, on + 48 609 522 266 (mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region between the evenings of 9 and 10 November, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 10 and 11 November, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. Two SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles came under small-arms fire in Kadiivka and Novotoshkivske. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM monitored the security situation on the day of reported “elections” announced for 11 November. An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted fresh mortar impacts at the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in three separate areas near the border with the Russian Federation, including Novoazovsk. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple.                                                                                                          

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 9 and 10 November, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (260 explosions).[2] Between the evenings of 10 and 11 November, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 115 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 9 November, the SMM camera located 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions and 25 projectiles in flight (about half from north to south and about half from south to north), all at an assessed range of 2-5km east-north-east, east and east-south-east. On the evening of 10 November, the same camera recorded 17 projectiles in flight (mostly north to south) at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On the evening of 9 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about 105 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-7km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west. The following day, from the same location, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-6km east, south-east and south-west.  

During the day on 10 November, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and about 130 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 5-8km south-west and north-west.

During the evening of 10 November, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions, about 130 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-7km at directions ranging from east to south-west. On 11 November, from the same location, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-5km east, south-east and south-west.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 9 and 10 November, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about four explosions). Between the evenings of 10 and 11 November, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 40), compared with the previous 24 hours.  

On 10 November, while flying a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over a military-type compound near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), about 2km south-east of the SMM’s position, the SMM heard about 20 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV.*

On 11 November, positioned on the south edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-5km north.

On 11 November, while flying a mini-UAV near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), about 50m south-east of the SMM’s position and at an altitude of 120m, the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire originating from 30-50m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM had seen at least three armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint 20-30m south-west of the SMM’s position and had launched the UAV in view of the checkpoint.*

In areas outside of Government control in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the SMM monitored the security situation on the day of reported “elections” announced for 11 November. (See SMM Spot Report 12 November 2018 for more details.)

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of recent shelling near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report 10 November 2018.) On 9 November, in a concrete parking area on the northern edge of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable fresh mortar impact on the top of a concrete wall surrounding the parking complex and fragments of concrete spread out on the ground below, as well as a fresh hole in the roof of a large single-storey garage on the southern edge of the parking compound assessed as caused by a mortar round. The SMM assessed that the fresh impacts were caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-south-easterly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 10 November, positioned 500m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard 12 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.4-1km south-west and west (five shots assessed as inside the disengagement area and seven shots assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned 800m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge a short time later, the SMM heard two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and 12 shots of small-arms fire, all about 2km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 11 November, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM noted a calm situation.

On 10 November, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard nine explosions (three undetermined and six assessed as impacts of mortar (calibre undetermined) rounds), 18 shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, 14 shots of small-arms fire and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 1-5km south-east, south-south-east and south. All violations were assessed as inside the disengagement area except the three undetermined explosions, assessed as outside the disengagement area, and two shots of IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, which were not able to be determined as inside or outside the disengagement area. The same day, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard seven shots and five bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-east and north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). The SMM saw a black Volkswagen Passat with military licence plates and two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside drive into the disengagement area.

On 11 November, positioned in Zolote, the SMM heard 15 explosions assessed as artillery (calibre undetermined) rounds at an assessed range of 3-8km east and 16 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 10 and 11 November, positioned north of the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 9 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) with four missiles (9M317) mounted on top near Shevchenko (87km south of Donetsk). On 11 November, the SMM observed a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) about 2km east of Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[4] in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, on 9 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). On 11 November, the SMM observed an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM variant) north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 11 November, the SMM observed an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) in Donetsk city.

The SMM observed unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 10 November, about 3km west of Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), the SMM again saw an unexploded mortar (82mm) round embedded in the paved surface of a road and a fallen tree spanning half the width of the road with two mine hazard signs fasted to the tree, one reading ‘Stop, Mines’ in Russian and the other painted white and red (see SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018). On 11 November, about 400m east of a checkpoint near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a tailfin directly under the driver’s side front tire of a civilian vehicle, which had driven and parked over it, on the side of road H-15 facing west.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) on 10 November. On both 10 and 11 November, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM visited border areas outside government control on five occasions. On 10 November, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM observed 33 civilian vehicles (six with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation and one with Belorussian licence plates, and 12 with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine and two cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) and ten cargo trucks with canvas-covered trailers (seven with Ukrainian and one with Belorussian licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The same day, at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM observed no traffic in either direction.

On 11 November, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM observed five cars (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates and about 60 passengers) and six pedestrians exiting Ukraine and four cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) and six pedestrians entering Ukraine. While present, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave.*

The same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka for about an hour, the SMM observed 39 cars (12 with Ukrainian and 16 with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 with “DPR” plates) as well as a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also observed 12 cars (two with Ukrainian and seven Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) and a truck (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. Also on 11 November, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske for about an hour, the SMM saw four pedestrians exiting Ukraine and a pedestrian entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 11 November, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, an armed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 11 November, at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, an armed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the railway station area.
• On 11 November, at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through the checkpoint in the direction of Novoazovsk.  

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 10 and 11 November, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[5]
• On 10 and 11 November, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions. [5]
• On 10 and 11 November, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• On 10 November, at a checkpoint about 7km north of Horlivka, a member of the armed formations insisted on inspecting the trunks of the SMM vehicles as a condition of it passing through the checkpoint. After inspection, the SMM was allowed to pass.

Delay:

• On 10 November, at a checkpoint near Ozerianivka (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that he needed “permission” from his superiors in order to allow the SMM to pass. After 20 minutes, the SMM was allowed to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 10 November, while flying a mini-UAV near Kadiivka over a military-type compound about 2km south-east of the SMM’s position, the SMM heard about 20 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV. The SMM retrieved the UAV and left the area.
• On 11 November, while flying a mini-UAV near Novotoshkivske, about 50m south-east of the SMM’s position and at an altitude of 120m, the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire 30-50m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM retrieved the UAV and left the area.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] On 10 and 11 November, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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ROME, 12 November 2018 – Greater transparency is needed to achieve comprehensive security in the OSCE area, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) said in a speech today in Rome. He noted that parliamentarians are essential partners in the fight against corruption.

“More transparency and accountability should be on the very top of our political agenda, especially in times when digital access has considerably raised the expectations of our citizens,” said President Tsereteli. “We must realize that corruption is not inevitable, no matter our traditional local culture. It is the responsibility of all our participating States, poor and wealthy alike, to increase our efforts in this fight.”

The PA President addressed the opening of the conference on “Developing anti-corruption strategies for the digital age: recent trends and best practices in the OSCE area,” held under the auspices of the Italian Chairmanship of the OSCE. The conference was co-organized by the International Affairs Institute and hosted by LUISS University.

In his remarks, President Tsereteli emphasized the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s role as an effective platform to share experiences and best practices, encouraging OSCE participating States to rely on parliamentarians and the PA’s acquis to increase efforts in combating corruption.

“Strong and sustained political will is essential to unroot corruption, while permanent oversight is needed to ensure that achievements are not reversed. This makes parliamentarians good partners to promote anti-corruption efforts,” said the PA President.

He also stressed that the OSCE PA is currently undergoing a review of its internal Code of Conduct for election observation missions to ensure the highest levels of integrity within the Assembly. “Towards this end, we are introducing more stringent procedures regulating appointments and conduct of observers in our election observation missions,” Tsereteli said.

On the margins of the conference, President Tsereteli, Head of the OSCE PA’s Cyprus Delegation Irene Charalambides, and Secretary General Roberto Montella met with the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Corruption, Paola Severino, to discuss synergies between the OSCE executive structures and the Parliamentary Assembly in enhancing transparency and accountability across the OSCE area.

Charalambides said: “It should go without saying that MPs across the OSCE area, particularly when they are committed in the fight against corruption, must enjoy enhanced protection. Corruption in all its manifestations and organized crime have strong links and thus our resolve must be stronger.”

President Tsereteli welcomed the Italian Chairmanship’s active work in the field of anti-corruption and expressed hope that future OSCE Chairmanships will maintain this strong engagement.

For the President’s full remarks, please click here.

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COPENHAGEN, 12 November 2018 – In response to the holding of “elections” in the so-called “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine over the weekend, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (Georgia) issued the following statement:

“The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and has long called for the full implementation of the Minsk agreements by all sides, which remains the best path to a long-term solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

“I therefore deeply regret that the separatist leaders who control parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions ignored the many calls from the international community for this weekend's ‘elections’ to be cancelled. Holding any kind of elections without Ukraine’s consent is a clear violation of the country’s sovereignty. Also, without a robust ceasefire and the full withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides, such elections will automatically be flawed.

“The ‘elections’ held on 11 November were unlawful and provocative. Steps such as these only serve to hinder the implementation of the Minsk agreements and must be avoided. I urge all parties to renew efforts within the Normandy format and in the Trilateral Contact Group to advance meaningful negotiations.”

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VIENNA, 12 November 2018 – In Vienna today, Makis Voridis, Chair of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, addressed the Security Committee of the OSCE and is holding a series of bilateral meetings to build synergy between the OSCE’s executive and parliamentary structures on preventing and countering terrorism.

At the Security Committee, Voridis presented the OSCE PA’s resolution on counterterrorism adopted last summer at the 27th Annual Session in Berlin. The resolution, he said, emphasizes the need for joint and co-ordinated approaches to counterterrorism efforts including through implementing relevant international commitments, and focuses on the need to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, strengthen border control and enhance information-sharing at all levels.

Concerning the issue of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), Voridis reported that the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism recently launched an initiative aimed at strengthening the implementation of commitments on border security and information sharing, especially those on Advance Passenger Information, passenger name record data and biometrics contained in UN Security Council Resolution 2396.

“In essence, we are encouraging all members of the PA to officially inquire – in accordance with national procedures – into the status of implementation of these commitments with their respective governments,” Voridis said.

He noted that in Berlin, the PA stressed the need to promote deradicalization and increase the involvement of civil society, religious leaders, media, youth, victims of terrorism and the private sector in countering extremist narratives. The PA emphasized the centrality of education in promoting tolerance, the urgency of countering the financing of terrorism and disrupting the links between terrorist networks and organized crime, as well as new terrorist threats stemming from cyberspace, Voridis said.

In bilateral meetings, Voridis stressed the importance of co-operation between the OSCE’s executive structures and the Parliamentary Assembly, and has discussed the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism.

For more information on the OSCE PA's counterterrorism work, please click here.

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YEREVAN, 12 November 2018 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission sent by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 9 December early parliamentary elections in Armenia, the mission will hold a press conference in Yerevan on Tuesday, 13 November.

Ambassador Urszula Gacek, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities.

For election day observation, the ODIHR election observation mission will join efforts with delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 12:00, Tuesday, 13 November, in the Dvin Hall of the Alexander, a Luxury Collection Hotel, 3/4 Abovyan Street, Yerevan.

For further information, please contact Ivan Godársky, Media Analyst with the election observation mission, on +374 99 903 804 or ivan.godarsky@odihr.am

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, on + 48 609 522 266 or thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

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The Mission saw buildings with signs that read “polling stations”. It noted a slight increase in the presence of armed formations in some areas of non-government controlled Donetsk city centre. Some civilians expressed concern to the SMM about “voting”.

The SMM gathered information on the security situation on the day of reported “elections” announced for 11 November in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

Before 11 November, the SMM had observed billboards in non-government-controlled areas, encouraging participation in and providing information on “elections” on 11 November.

At the entry-exit checkpoint in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw a billboard warning people against participating in the “elections”. (See SMM Daily Report 5 November 2018)

On 11 November, in non-government-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM observed a slight increase in the presence of armed formations members in some areas of the city centre. It saw buildings with signs that read “polling stations”, with two to four people in full combat gear and with assault rifles present outside most of them. In the vicinity, the SMM saw stalls similar to market ones. The SMM also noted that mobile phone networks (Vodafone and Phoenix) were unavailable for a period of time.

From 9 to 11 November, several people in different settlements in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region separately told the SMM that they had “voted”. Others told the SMM that they were not “voting” and some said that they were aware of the “elections”.

In non-government-controlled areas of both regions, civilians expressed concern to the SMM about possible consequences for people who would “vote” and then travel to government-controlled areas. Other civilians separately shared concerns that people felt compelled “to vote”, as otherwise they would face interruption of salaries or health care in non-government-controlled areas.

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Vienna, 11 November 2018. Today, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir, called on all authorities to drop the request to the editor of the Times of Malta to disclose a source of information used in a report on a planned takeover of a building project, after the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) made such request to the daily newspaper.

Désir stated: "I call to reconsider and withdraw the request to the Times of Malta to disclose its sources on an issue of public interest. The confidentiality of journalistic sources is an important element of media freedom, widely recognized and protected by international standards and Maltese legislation. The new Media and Defamation Act that came into force in Malta on 14 May 2018, includes strong protection of sources. This is a test case", Désir added.

In 2017, The OSCE media Freedom Representative provided legal advice to the Government of Malta upon its request, in the drafting of the Media and Defamation Act. 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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