OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* It continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska where it observed construction works. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk and Krasnyi Lyman.

The Mission resumed full operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, following earlier limited operations due to security considerations after an explosion in Donetsk city centre on 31 August.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions).

During the day on 4 September, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Midna Ruda (government-controlled, 69km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions 5km south-east, assessed as live-fire training in the security zone, in violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 3-4km south-west and west-south-west, and about 210 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south, the latter assessed as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone.[2]

Positioned on the eastern edge of Vidrodzhennia (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5km south-east, assessed as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone.[3]

Positioned in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 200-250m east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations (12 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions).

During the day on 4 September, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions, assessed as 120mm mortar rounds, 10-15km east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[4] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 4 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded a large fire moving east-south-east of the camera. A representative of the Forestry Department told the SMM that there was a wildfire burning in the area of Bolotene (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), in an area up to 3km north of the Siverskyi Donets River.

On 3 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) about 400m north of the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

During the day on 4 September, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces walking inside the Zolote disengagement area in a north-eastern direction.  

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard about 80 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and noted that 39 towed howitzers (13 2A36 and 26 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that one tank (T-64) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[5] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 3 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on trucks near residential houses east of Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk). On 4 September, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) on the eastern outskirts of Popasna, an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and an IFV (BTR-4) in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, the same UAV spotted eight armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) and two IFVs (MT-LB MB) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

The SMM monitored the situation at entry-exit checkpoints. The Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed. The SMM saw no pedestrians present at the entry-exit checkpoint or at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. It saw a crane, excavator, truck and a bulldozer involved in ongoing construction of shelters and road repairs, and three workers dismantling a bus station roof near the entry-exit checkpoint. The previous day, the SMM saw members of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service dismantling the entry-exit checkpoint and its defensive walls, as well as a shelter in the parking area of the entry-exit checkpoint. The SMM also noted that shelters about 1km north of the bridge had been completely dismantled.

The Mission observed that entry-exit checkpoints near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk)  and Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), as well as checkpoints near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were open (see SMM Daily Report 4 September 2018).

The SMM saw new checkpoints, including two in Horlivka, one near Styla (non-government-controlled 34km south of Donetsk), one near Dokuchaievsk, and one on the northern outskirts of Yenakiieve (non-government-controlled, 41km north-east of Donetsk).  

The SMM observed two mine hazard signs for the first time (one red sign with white lettering indicating “mines” and one sign with red handwritten letters on wood indicating the same message, both in Russian) placed next to concrete barriers and piles of soil blocking a road leading from road H20 to the eastern part of Novotroitske.

The SMM observed that a previously reported anti-tank mine (TM-62) near the southern edge of a road leading from the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) to a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) had been removed.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations nearby, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water systems near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[6]

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H15 east of Kreminets (nongovernment-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM were allowed to proceed only after an armed member of the armed formations inspected the SMM vehicle.

Other impediments:

• Staff at a school in Metalist (nongovernment-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that it could not visit the school without prior written approval from the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Kriakivka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] In violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the TCG of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

[3] In violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the TCG of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access   to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[5] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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PRAGUE, 5 September 2018- Harnessing the opportunities of the digital transition while curbing its negative security implications through human capital development, is the focus of this year’s  OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum which opened today in Prague.

In the next two days, participants will discuss how to achieve economic progress and security in the OSCE area, one of the priorities of the Italians Chairmanship, through innovation, human capital development and good public and corporate governance.  

Representing the 2018 OSCE Italian Chairperson-in-Office, Guglielmo Picchi, the Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation said that the technological revolution is producing significant changes in all sectors, modifying, in particular, the nature of work itself and the basic skills needed to access labour markets.

“The impact of the ongoing digital transformation on security and co-operation in the OSCE area is still uncertain and full of contradictions. However, there is no doubt that this is a transformation that goes beyond national borders and is already having an influence on the social and economic dynamics of our countries,” said Picchi. 

Opening the Forum, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic, Tomáš Petříček, said the effect of digitalization on stability and security, economic development and the labour market, good governance and transparency is indisputable. “New business models are changing rules in areas ranging from science to the provision of public services, including healthcare,” said Petříček. 

Petříček added that digital applications in a shared economy redefine access to financing and provide entrepreneurs with new business opportunities. “The digital world has far-reaching implications for those who fail to adapt,” he said.

Senior government officials, experts from academia and NGOs and representatives of international organizations will discuss policies that could to foster a solid business climate, aiming at encouraging the full development of human capital, promoting the fight against corruption and the improvement of transparency.

Vuk Žugić, Co-coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, said that the outcome of this transformation is still uncertain. “There is no doubt that it is a global phenomenon that, going beyond national borders, requires collective action and close collaboration among the 57 OSCE participating States.”

Žugić said that one of the most disruptive consequences of technology could be the impact on work: “There is a strong need to re-think corporate governance as well as public-private partnerships to steward a technological transformation that is fair and leaves no one behind.” 

Roberto Viola, the European Commission Director General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology said that the European Union is pursuing an ambitious plan, the Digital Single Market strategy, to make sure that Europe is in the best possible position to attract investments, foster creativity and innovation, provide top-class public services and protect citizens.

“Digital is part of a positive agenda, where we can deliver rapid, demonstrable and easy to understand benefits to European citizens,” said Viola.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger and Ambassador Vinicio Mati, 2018 Italian Chairmanship Co-ordinator, will present concluding remarks on Friday, 7 September.

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VIENNA, 5 September 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed his concern about a court decision in Kyiv ordering the disclosure of mobile-phone data of a Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigative reporter and the host of its Schemes programme, Natalia Sedletska.

“Investigative journalism plays the essential role of a watchdog in societies and journalists must be able to protect their sources. This is an established right for journalists and one of the basic conditions for media freedom,” Désir said. “I call on the Ukrainian authorities to ensure that all steps in line with international standards and OSCE commitments are taken to respect Natalia Sedletska’s privilege to keep her sources confidential.”

The court ruling is part of a criminal investigation into the alleged disclosure of state secrets to journalists in 2017 by a high-level public official. Reportedly, the court decision would enable the Prosecutor-General’s Office to access all of Sedletska's phone contacts, as well as the date, time, and duration of all calls. The decision would also allow authorities to review all text messages sent and received on Sedletska’s phone during the 17-month period, as well as other data – such as the journalist’s geolocation when she received or made each phone call. Schemes is the RFE/RL’s investigative programme focusing on corruption issues.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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392498 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Five alumni of the Central Asian Youth Network (CAYN) met with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger in Vienna on 5 September 2018. They discussed security issues in Central Asia, the OSCE’s work and its comprehensive and co-operative approach to security.

The college students from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan travelled to Vienna to learn more about the work of various units of the OSCE Secretariat. They included the Conflict Prevention Centre, the Communication and Media Relations Section, the Transnational Threats Department, the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, Gender Section and the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

During their meeting with the OSCE Secretary General they discussed their ideas for promoting co-operation in the Central Asia region and ways to engage youth.

The group participated in a meeting of the OSCE Group of Friends of Youth and Security, where they spoke about their engagement in CAYN and shared their views on how the CAYN model might be applied in other regions.

OSCE Chairmanship Special Representative on Youth and Security and OSCE Focal Point on Youth and Security Anna-Katharina Deininger, who attended the CAYN seminar in 2015, discussed her role in promoting the role of youth in addressing the complex challenges to security in the OSCE area.

The group is scheduled to meet with representatives of the OSCE Italian Chairmanship and the delegation of the United States and their respective home countries. They will also have an opportunity to meet with the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, to discuss media issues across the OSCE region.

The members of the group were selected to visit Vienna based on their outstanding contribution to the 2018 CAYN seminar, which was held in June. It  focused on the theme “Innovating Central Asia” and involved some 40 students and CAYN alumni from the wider Central Asian region.

The visit was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, with financial and logistical support from the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the Conflict Prevention Centre.

The Central Asian Youth Network was launched in 2004 to enhance promising students' knowledge and understanding of contemporary security threats and the OSCE's role in addressing them.

VIENNA, 5 September 2018 – Transparency and openness will be the main theme of Sweden’s Chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security C-operation (FSC), said the State Secretary to the Swedish Minister of Defence, Jan Salestrand.

In his opening address, Salestrand stressed that sustainable peace, security and a rules-based order in Europe can only be achieved by restoring respect for the principles and commitments of the OSCE and international law. “This is the approach of Sweden in the OSCE, including for the Swedish chairmanship of the FSC,” he said.

Noting the need to make sure that the OSCE’s documents and agreements in the politico-military field are upheld, Salestrand said that there is room for improvement in how they are utilized.

“Sweden believes that challenges to European security must be met through deepened co-operation and joint action. But on a national level, every country must accept its share of the responsibility,” Salestrand said, adding that the rules-based order can only function when everyone adheres to the rules.

Touching upon priorities of Sweden’s FSC Chairmanship, State Secretary Salestrand said that one of the emphases of the discussions within the security dialogue will be on regional co-operation, with the goal of increasing transparency and confidence. “We will outline examples of Nordic-Baltic co-operation in the Baltic Sea region, such as the work carried out in the Nordic Defence Cooperation and the Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea.”

Salestrand noted that the Swedish FSC Chairmanship will contribute to the security dialogue on combating the spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) by presenting the experience of a country that is on the receiving end of the illegal flow of arms. “We will give attention to the experience of countering illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the Öresund region,” he said.  

This security dialogue will be followed by the Review Meeting on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (CA) in October. The aim is to start the process of reviewing the normative side of the work relating to non-proliferation of SALW and CA.

The role of international organizations in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be another topic for discussion during the Swedish FSC Chairmanship.

State Secretary Salestrand stressed the importance of women’s active participation in peace processes, as it essential for creating “legitimacy, ownership and sustainability” in peace and security. In this regard one meeting will be dedicated to the 18th anniversary of the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

“The Chairmanship has invited women flag officers from both east and west of Vienna as speakers. We look forward to a constructive and meaningful exchange,” Salestrand concluded.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 12,716 to 11,694 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 436 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased to 49 persons (compared to 24 last week); 18 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 31 into Ukraine (84 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and seven into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed a decrease in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (441 compared to 475 observed during the previous week). There were 237 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 204 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv, Luhansk-Simferopol, Luhansk-Yalta and Sevastopol.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 808 to 753 (248 at the Gukovo BCP and 505 at the Donetsk BCP); 430 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 323 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly decreased to 52 (compared to 55 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 86 to 121: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 78 trucks (64 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 43 trucks (36 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly decreased from 182 to 180 vehicles; 84 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 96 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 24 occasions, compared to 28 last week; the OTs assessed that 15 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Lithuanian and Georgian licence plates.

On 29 August at 14:12 in Donetsk BCP, the OT observed a Russian MI-8 type helicopter with stub wings (assault version of the Mi-8 transport helicopter) which flew over the Donetsk BCP. The aircraft came from 350 degrees North, made a U-turn and left towards 70 degrees East – North East. That same day at 14:31 in Gukovo BCP, the OT observed a helicopter with the same description as above, which came from 60 degrees East – North East and turned to 120 degrees East – South East. During both sightings the aircraft remained inside the Russian Federation airspace.

On 30 August at 17:02 in Donetsk BCP the OT noticed an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates which came from the Russian Federation side and went behind the central building of the BCP. During its stay the OT could not see any movement or action as to the purpose of its arrival at the BCP. The ambulance returned to the Russian Federation at 17:40.

On 31 August at 15:50 in Donetsk BCP, the OT observed an ambulance with “LPR” plates with a sign “urgent medical help” written in Russian on its side, which had arrived from Ukraine. The OT was able to observe two persons in red uniforms inside the ambulance. The ambulance remained within the compound of the BCP until 16:18 after which it crossed into the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 31 July to 4 September 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. Following the explosion on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city on 31 August, the Mission continued to observe a calm situation in the city centre. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area as well as near Topolyne and Pryvilne.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near Kremenivka. It continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska and to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM’s observations remained limited due to security considerations.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including a similar number of explosions (six), compared with the previous 24 hours (seven explosions).

On the evening and night of 2-3 September, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 34 projectiles in flight 2-4km south-east and south.

During the day on 3 September, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and six shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km south-west and west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (three explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours (five explosions).

Following the explosion on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city on 31 August, on 3 September, the SMM continued to observe a calm situation in the city centre (non-government-controlled).

The SMM followed up on reports of people injured in the above-mentioned explosion. While at the Kalinina morgue in Donetsk city on 3 September, the SMM was informed that the bodies of Aleksandr Zakharchenko and another member of the armed formations (a member of Zakharchenko’s personal security detail) had been brought to the facility with fatal wounds from the explosion. On the same day, at the Gusak Hospital in Donetsk city, medical staff told the SMM that after the explosion on 31 August six people had been admitted with various blast-related injuries, however, they refused to provide the Mission with further details.* On the same day, medical staff at the Kalinina Hospital in Donetsk city refused to provide the SMM information about people injured in the explosion on 31 August without permission from senior members of the armed formations.*

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 3 September, positioned 150m north-north-west of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-2km north-east. Positioned 700m north-north-west of the bridge, the Mission heard an undetermined explosion 5-6km south-east. Positioned 250m south-east of the bridge, it heard an undetermined explosion 700-800m south. The SMM assessed all explosions to have occurred outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM noted a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 3 September, the SMM saw 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on the eastern edge of  Kremenivka (27km north-west of Mariupol).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 1 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Luhansk), two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk) and four IFVs (three BMP-2 and a BMP-1) near Bohdanivka (41km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) near Syhnalne (23km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored the situation at entry-exit checkpoints. The Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed (see SMM Daily Report 3 September). It observed no pedestrians and saw an excavator, a crane, trucks and workers erecting a new structure in the parking area. Following the reported closure of checkpoints in non-government-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) after the above-mentioned explosion in Donetsk city and their re-opening on 1 September (see SMM Daily Report 3 September), the SMM observed a calm situation with pedestrian and vehicular traffic crossing through the entry-exit checkpoints on the other side of contact line in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

In Boiarka (21km south-west of Kyiv), the SMM monitored a dedication ceremony of a reconstructed monument at 42 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street. It saw about 100 people (mixed genders and ages) participating in the event, including members of the Jewish community. Participants told the SMM that the ceremony was to commemorate the Jewish victims of a pogrom at that location. Throughout the event, the Mission observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to a military compound near Topolyne (19km north-west of Mariupol), citing a need to obtain permission from superiors.
• An Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a military compound near Pryvilne (31km north of Mariupol) saying he had not received information about an SMM visit.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[4]

Other impediments:

• Medical staff at the Kalinina Hospital in Donetsk city refused to provide the SMM information about people injured in the explosion on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city on 31 August (see above) without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• Medical staff at the Gusak Hospital in Donetsk city requested the SMM to obtain permission from senior members of the armed formations in order to provide details of people injured in the explosion on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city on 31 August (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Kriakivka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access   to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 4 September 2018 - OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today condemned continued targeted attacks by extremists against journalists covering protests in Chemnitz, Germany. The condemnation follows the latest attacks during an anti-migrant demonstration on 1 September.

“These attacks against the press are unacceptable and should not be tolerated. Journalists must be able to safely report on public demonstrations, and it is the duty of law enforcement forces to ensure their safety and to take action against those who attack journalists,” said the Representative. “I welcome the fact that the police are investigating and have arrested a perpetrator of the assault on the camera team of the local public broadcaster MDR.”

Over the last few days, Chemnitz has seen a wave of demonstrations in support of extremist movements and political parties. During these protests, participants also targeted the press with historically loaded chants of “Lügenpresse” (lying press), and several journalists were physically attacked while covering the events.

• In one of the more serious incidents, a camera team from the local public broadcaster MDR was assaulted when the journalists requested access to a balcony to film the demonstrations;
• A reporter from Der Spiegel reported that demonstrators consistently attacked him and his colleagues, attempting to seize their camera equipment and toss it away;
• A reporter from Watson online news portal was physically attacked by protesters attempting to confiscate his camera and microphone, right next to a police tank;
• A female reporter with Buzzfeed Germany had her camera grabbed out of her hands and thrown away in an aggressive move by protestors;
• A camera crew of the network of regional public service broadcasters ARD was targeted and forced to stop filming;
• A journalist with Funke Medien was also attacked while filming the events.

“These latest attacks clearly show a very problematic trend of targeted attacks against journalists during demonstrations. No individual or group must be allowed to prevent journalists from doing their job,” said Désir. “It is of utmost importance that in the future the police take all necessary measures to ensure that journalists can safely report on issues of public interest.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A three-day training course on juvenile justice aimed at raising awareness about the rights of children in contact with the criminal justice system concluded on 31 August 2018 in Romit, Tajikistan (40 km north-east of Dushanbe). The course was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Eighteen mid- to senior-level officials from Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry and five members of the Tajik Inter-Agency Working Group on Justice for Children System Reform took part in the event.

The training course focused on international norms and standards as well as domestic legislation concerning children’s rights as applied to juvenile justice and the psychological characteristics of children in contact with the law. It included discussion and interactive exercises on communicating with child suspects, victims and witnesses.

Olga Korzhova, a trainer from Kyrgyzstan, said: “Standards of communication with child victims, witnesses of crimes and children in conflict with the law are an important element of child-friendly justice. The participants in the seminar are professionals who demonstrated a high level of motivation to implement the international standards on the rights of the child in their practical work.”

“Learning about worldwide practices and studying international standards relevant to justice for children will help the participants to improve their professional skills,” said Gulchehra Rakhmanova, a local trainer from Tajikistan. “They will apply the obtained knowledge in their day-to-day activities and share their experience with colleagues in their respective agencies.”

The training course complements Activity 11 of the Tajik National Action Plan on Juvenile Justice Reform 2017-2021, which provides for training of employees of the Interior Ministry, prevention police, investigators and police officers on Justice for Children.

392399 Kunduz Rysbek

The Sixth Annual Anti-Terrorism Expert Meeting organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek in close co-operation with the Secretariat’s Action against Terrorism Unit and with the direct support of the Kyrgyz State Committee on National Security’s Anti-Terrorist Centre took place from 3 to 4 September 2018 in Issyk-Kul.

This year’s meeting focussed on criminal justice responses to terrorism and internationally recognized good practices that align effective prevention and responses to terrorism with rule of law considerations.

The Meeting gathered 25 representatives of national agencies working in the counter-terrorism field. Representatives of relevant ministries, law enforcement agencies, prosecutor’s offices, judges and penitentiary facilities discussed handling cases related to terrorism in an efficient, timely and law abiding manner. They also discussed how to enhance co-ordination mechanisms between national government agencies, and stressed the importance of international co-operation, particularly when confronted with terrorism.

Good practices listed in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Rabat Memorandum on Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector were discussed by experts from Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the United States and the Anti-Terrorism Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The GCTF Rabat Memorandum offers insights into effective terrorism prevention and prosecution methods, while emphasizing the need to respect human rights and other applicable international law.

The Annual Anti-Terrorism Expert Meeting organized by the Programme Office in Bishkek has become a platform for information exchange and discussion regarding all aspects of preventing and countering terrorism, including the prevention of terrorist financing. The Annual Meeting contributes to the development and refinement of counterterrorism practices in Kyrgyzstan and beyond, in line with related UN strategies and binding requirements listed in UN Security Council resolutions.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region between the evenings of 31 August and 1 September, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. In Donetsk city, the SMM saw a gathering relating to the reported death of Aleksandr Zakharchenko and at least one hundred members of the armed formations securing the area. The SMM recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement area as well as near Yasynuvata.* The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Ozarianivka. The Mission observed anti-tank mines near Popasna. The SMM saw that the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska was closed and observed that checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region had been re-opened. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM’s observations were limited during the reporting period for security considerations.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 31 August and 1 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including nine explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (18 explosions). Between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (seven), compared with the previous 24 hours.

Following the explosion that reportedly killed Aleksandr Zakharchenko and injured another member of the armed formations and at least nine other people on 31 August, the SMM observed a calm situation in Donetsk city centre (non-government-controlled). (See SMM Daily Report 1 September 2018.) On 2 September, the SMM saw several thousand people (men and women, aged 18-60) gathered in front of the opera house at 82 Artema Street for a pre-announced “lying-in-state ceremony” relating to the death of Zakharchenko. The Mission also saw a large poster of Zakharchenko on the façade of the opera house. There were at least one hundred members of the armed formations, some of whom were armed with assault rifles and pistols, securing the area. The SMM also observed at least one hundred members of the armed formations, some of whom were armed with assault rifles, on Pushkina Boulevard where the explosion had occurred. Some of them told the Mission that their presence on Pushkina Boulevard was related to “anti-terrorist attack drills”.

On the evening of 31 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded six projectiles in flight (all from north-west to south-east) and four illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 31 August-1 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 12 projectiles in flight (six from south to north, five from north to south and one from north-west to south-east), all 3-3.5km east-north-east. On the evening and night of 1-2 September, the camera recorded 80 projectiles in flight (64 from south to north, 14 from north to south and two from north-west to south-east) and two undetermined explosions, all 3-3.5km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-south-east. 

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 31 August and 1 September, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations (two explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions). Between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 31 August-1 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening of 1 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-4km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening and night of 1-2 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an  undetermined explosion 1-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), followed by an undetermined explosion 1-2km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and a projectile in flight from east to west 1-2km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 2 September, positioned about 650m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as artillery rounds 3km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 31 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) west of Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 1 September, the SMM observed nine self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S,152mm) and five towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), all stationary at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[2] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 31 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB variant) near Ozarianivka and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 2 September, the SMM saw two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1), a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Popasna.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 31 August, the SMM saw an ACV (type undetermined) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 22 craters, assessed as probably caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from west-north-westerly, north-westerly and northerly directions (not visible in imagery from 22 August 2018), near well-maintained trenches, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, in the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 31 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time nine anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field north-east of Popasna about 550m north of road T0504 (not visible in imagery from 21 August 2018) which appeared to have been damaged, assessed as possibly due to a fire.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of the temporary closure of the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska from 2 to 7 September (see SMM Daily Report 1 September 2018). On 1 September, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 15 pedestrians in a queue to travel towards government-controlled areas and no pedestrians in the opposite direction. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw about 50 pedestrians in a queue to travel towards government-controlled areas and no pedestrians in the opposite direction. Five people (men and women, aged 40-60) told the SMM that the opening of entry-exit checkpoints near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) and the replacement of wooden ramps of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge with a straight bridge installation were needed. On 2 September, the SMM saw both checkpoints closed and did not observe any pedestrians queuing at either of the checkpoints. The same day, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM saw a crane, an excavator and three trucks and observed a container module arrive at the site. A representative of the water company Popasna Vodokanal onsite told the SMM that new facilities, including a civilian shelter and 16 sanitary facilities (two for disabled people), would be installed at the checkpoint.

The SMM followed up on reports of temporary closures of checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, following the reported death of Aleksandr Zakharchenko (see above). On the evening of 31 August, members of the armed formations told the SMM that checkpoints of the armed formations near Horlivka, Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk) in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region had been closed. On the afternoon of 1 September, they said that the checkpoints had been re-opened. During the same afternoon, the SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Pyshchevyk – across the contact line from Horlivka, Oleksandrivka and Verkhnoshyrokivske, respectively – recorded pedestrians and vehicles travelling in both directions. Later in the day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted civilian vehicles passing through the entry-exit checkpoints near Maiorsk and Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk, across the contact line from Olenivka) as well as the checkpoint near Horlivka.

On 2 September, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 1 and 2 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[3]

Conditional access:

• On 2 September, two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Yasynuvata (nongovernment-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) only after inspecting the SMM vehicle trunks.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Kriakivka and on the northern edge of Popasna were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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JAHORINA, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 September 2018 – More than 100 journalists and media professionals from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the region gathered to discuss media and terrorism at a conference organized by the OSCE Mission to BiH, which concluded yesterday in Jahorina.

The discussion focused on the latest trends, challenges and standards in reporting on violent extremism and terrorism in the modern media landscape.

“Journalists and editors face many challenges when approaching sensitive subjects such as terrorism.  One of those challenges is how to respond to the right of the general public to be informed while remaining objective and avoiding the pitfall of adding to the atmosphere of fear that often surrounds these issues,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Bruce G. Berton.  

UNESCO Assistant Director-General for Communication and Information Moez Chakchouk said that media development is essential for the development of a country. “Ethical and professional reporting means informing the public without giving in to exaggeration or sensationalism.  This is essential since sensationalism offers the heightened visibility that terrorists desire and that could inadvertently inform copycat attacks. Through balanced and pluralistic coverage, the media can help to bridge ethnic, political, religious, and social boundaries.  Professional and ethical journalism help to make peace, dialogue and mutual understanding a reality,” said Chakchouk.

Unwilling or inadvertent amplification of the violent extremist narrative is an extremely difficult dilemma faced by journalists, highlighted Terri Judd, a consultant on countering violent extremism and strategic communication: “This is why forums such as this one are vital to empower the media with the knowledge and skills to counter the message, build resilience and support communities that may have individuals vulnerable to destructive terrorist propaganda,” she said.  

Serving as a platform for the exchange of experiences and best practices in preventing intolerance and societal divisions when reporting on terrorism, the conference contributed to the professional development of the journalists and media professionals who participated and helped to promote stability in BiH. It was a part of ongoing programmes being implemented by the OSCE Mission to BiH aimed at promoting freedom of the media and countering violent extremism in BiH.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and the same number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. At 17:27 on 31 August, the Mission heard an undetermined explosion less than 200m north-north-east from its residence on Pushkina Boulevard in Donetsk city. A senior member of the armed formations told the SMM that in the explosion Aleksandr Zakharchenko had suffered fatal injuries, another member of the armed formations had been severely wounded and nine other people had sustained injuries. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Verkhnotoretske. It saw a trench that had been recently fortified and Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers inside the Zolote disengagement area, and heard ceasefire violations near the Petrivske and the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Luhanske and Shchastia.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Prychepylivka and Novoamvrosiivske. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region, at a gas distribution station in Krasnohorivka and the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports of a protest outside the consulate of the Russian Federation on 30 August.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including 18 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions).

At 17:27 on 31 August in Donetsk city, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion less than 200m north-north-east from the Mission’s residence on Pushkina Boulevard. The explosion occurred in Separ restaurant located in a park next to 13 Pushkina Boulevard. The Mission saw that the area around the restaurant had been fenced off. A senior member of the armed formations told the SMM that in the explosion Alexandr Zakharchenko had suffered fatal injuries, another member of the armed formations had been severely wounded and nine other people had sustained injuries. SMM staff was not harmed.

On the evening and night of 30-31 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and four shots of small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-east. On 31 August, at the same location, the Mission heard 50 bursts and shots of small-arms fire 2-3km west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded the same number of ceasefire violations (three explosions) as in the previous reporting period.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. On 31 August, in Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), a woman (in her twenties) told the SMM that on the afternoon of 27 August, when she had been standing outside the kindergarten at 75 Zaliznichna Street with her daughter, she had heard a sound, felt a sharp pain and seen blood on her right forearm and a bullet on her foot. On the woman’s forearm the SMM saw a haematoma with a small, scabbed wound in the centre. On the same day, staff at the military medical point in Verkhnotoretske told the Mission that on 27 August they had treated a woman (in her twenties) for a small-arms wound to her right forearm.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 30 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a previously observed trench fortified with sandbags, about 120m south of the railway bridge (see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). On 31 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a 4x4 car with a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier driving, as well as two armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers on foot.

On the same day, the SMM saw eight armed members of the armed formations next to a vehicle with a machine gun mounted on its frame at a checkpoint on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area. About 700m north from the disengagement area’s southern edge and 20m west of road T1316 it saw a wire-guided missile (a probable 9K111 Fagot). The Mission also saw previously observed concrete positions about 200m north from the disengagement area’s southern edge and 90m west of road T1316, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, and, on the side of the road, a piece of barbed wire.

During the day on 31 August, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-5km south-south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and 20 bursts of small-arms fire 1km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same day, while in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-4km south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 30 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two towed howitzers (D-30) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 31 August, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 30 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) north-west of Klishchiivka (60km north of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that 11 tanks (four T-64 and seven T-72) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) and anti-aircraft guns[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 30 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Vodiane (78km south of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), five IFVs (BMP variants), five armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Prychepylivka, two ACVs (type undetermined) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB), an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), two probable artillery command vehicles (BTR-60PB), four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two BMP-2) and an APC (BTR variant) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk). On 31 August, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on August 30, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) about 20m from a non-functional school building in Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk) where the Mission had previously observed damage caused by shelling (see SMM Daily Report 14 August 2018).

The SMM observed craters assessed to have been caused by mortar rounds near Zholobok (non-government-controlled, 47km west of Luhansk) and Prychepylivka, in an area where the SMM had previously recorded at least 500 explosions (see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018). On 30 August, about 3km south-east of Prychepylivka, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 30 recent craters, assessed to have been caused by artillery rounds (122mm) coming from a southerly direction. On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a well-maintained trench system and four recent craters assessed as probably caused by mortar rounds (120mm) about 200m north-east of Zholobok, four recent craters assessed as probably caused by mortar rounds (120mm) on the southern edge of Zholobok, as well as over 30 recent craters assessed as probably caused by mortar rounds (120mm) about 1km south-east of Zholobok. The SMM assessed that the mortar craters were caused by fire coming from a northerly direction. (On 17 August, an SMM long-range UAV had spotted at least 16 houses engulfed in fire in the eastern part of Zholobok; see SMM Daily Report 20 August 2018.)

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines. On 30 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time over 500 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a field (not visible in imagery from 24 July 2018) north of Vodiane. Some of the mines appeared to have been damaged, assessed as possibly due to a fire. (On 27 August, the SMM saw plumes of smoke emanating from the direction of Vodiane.)

The SMM continued to follow up on the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 31 August, at the Stanytsia Luhanska entry-exit checkpoint the SMM saw three cranes, four trucks and workers conducting construction works, as well as about 100 people in a queue to cross. At various places throughout the entry-exit checkpoint, the Mission saw notes advising of the checkpoint’s temporary closure from 2 to 7 September (see SMM Daily Report 30 August). A paramedic from the Ukrainian Ministry for Emergencies told the SMM that at around 10:00 on 31 August a man (in his seventies) had collapsed on the bridge and died despite medical assistance provided.

On the same day, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer in the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) informed the Mission that the entry-exit checkpoint in Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the checkpoint in Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) had been re-opened on the morning of 31 August. (The checkpoints were previously closed; see SMM Daily Report 30 August 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water pipelines near Zolote and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), as well as demining and repairs to a gas distribution station near Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports of a protest on 30 August outside the consulate of the Russian Federation (3-5 Volunteer Battalions Street). At the address, pasted on a wall opposite of the consulate building, the Mission saw at least 50 posters containing images and messages critical of the Russian Federation and “#FREESENTSOV” hashtags. The SMM also saw that a gate adjacent to the wall had been painted in blue and yellow with black stencilling reading “FREESENTSOV”. While present, the Mission observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers stopped the SMM near Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk) and denied it passage, citing “security reasons” and the presence of mines on the road ahead.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in governmentcontrolled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• While conducting a miniUAV flight near Roza (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM lost contact with the UAV due to signal interference[5]. The SMM was unable to recover the UAV.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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VIENNA - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir expressed serious concern today about arrests of two journalists and search of their property in Northern Ireland.

Trevor Birney and Barry McCaffrey were arrested on Friday morning in connection with an investigation into alleged theft of documents from the office of the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland. The journalists produced a documentary about the murder of six men at Loughinisland in County Down. The documents relate to a police investigation into the 1994 murders.

“I am seriously concerned by the arrest of two journalists in Northern Ireland. Journalists have the right to use any confidential information for reporting on stories of public interest,” said Désir. 

Birney and McCaffrey were released on bail the same evening and the material seized during the investigation will not be examined pending the outcome of a legal challenge brought by the film company behind the documentary to the validity of the search warrant.

“It is positive that independent judiciary will decide whether journalists’ property can be examined since it is essential that journalists' privilege to confidential sources is protected andthat journalists are free to do their work,” said Désir.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Following a recommitment to the ceasefire as of 00:01 on 29 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period, however 85 per cent of violations in Donetsk region were attributed to training in non-government-controlled areas. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian fatality near Dokuchaievsk. It heard ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. TheSMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as again in Zaichenko and near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Horlivka, Starolaspa and Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enabledemining and repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region, at a gas distribution station in Krasnohorivka and the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. The SMM continued to see a fire near Berezove and noted that the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske remained closed; it facilitated adherence to the ceasefire to enable firefighting activity near Berezove. In Kyiv the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation. The SMM monitored gatherings in commemoration of the “Ilovaisk battle” in Lviv and Chernivtsi.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). Eighty-five per cent of all violations in Donetsk region were attributed to live-fire training exercises within the security zone in Yenakiieve (non-government-controlled, 41km north-east of Donetsk) (see below).

On the evening and night of 29-30 August, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 17 explosions (nine assessed as airbursts, five assessed as outgoing and three undetermined) and about 70 projectiles in flight, all 1-4km south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 29-30 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 31 undetermined explosions and 16 shots of small-arms fire, all 2-7km in directions ranging from south-east to south.

Positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata  (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions and five bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-5km east, south-east and south-west.

Positioned in Yenakiieve, over the course of about one and a half hours, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 1,250 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-3km west, assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded three ceasefire violations (all explosions),compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions). 

The SMM followed up on a report of a civilian fatality. An employee of the company told the SMM that at around 10:00 on 28 August, he had heard small-arms fire followed by an explosion at the premises of the Vitiazcompany at 42 Tsentralna Street in the western outskirts of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). A few minutes later he was informed that a colleague who had been working at a nearby quarry had been injured by the explosion. He told the SMM that when he had reached his colleague, he found him dead and said that his body had been severely burned. Medical staff at a morgue in Dokuchaievsk told the SMM that on 28 August, parts of a charred corpse of an employee of the Vitiazcompany had been brought to the morgue. The wife of the deceased told the SMM by telephone that her husband (aged 57) had been killed while at the quarry near Dokuchaievsk in the morning of 28 August.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardwareo f 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 29 August, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a 5m extension of a 25m-long trench running from west to east 120m south of the railway bridge (not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 20 August 2018). The UAV also spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) south of the railway line and about 440m north-east of the bridge.

During the day on 30 August, on the north-eastern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a minivan driving with five men in military uniforms followed by a car driven by a man in military uniform traveling from inside the disengagement area in the direction of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). Later, the SMM saw a military truck mounted with a heavy-machine-gun driving from Katerynivka east across the disengagement area and a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer armed with an assault rifle (AK-74) walking from Katerynivka north-east through the disengagement area. 

During the same day, positioned at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw white smoke and a fire in a field about 400m south which was spreading on the western side of road T1316 as well as two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers armed with hand-gun (Makarov-type pistol, 9mm) walking south-west in the direction of a fire inside the disengagement area.

While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, during the night of 30 August, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-7km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 29 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) with barrels raised to the firing position near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk) and three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in firing positions east of Dokuchaievsk.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw nine towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and noted that 11 MLRS (one BM-21 Grad, 122mm and ten BM-27) were missing, including four (BM-27) for the first time. 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3]in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 29 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted eight IFVs (six BMP-2 and two BMP variants) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-2) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk). On 30 August, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-2) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).   

In non-government-controlled areas, on 29 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) in Horlivka and an APC (BTR-80) near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk). On 30 August, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) near Horlivka.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). On road H20, about 1km south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), the SMM observed an unexploded 82mm mortar shell on the road, three projectiles embedded in the tarmac several hundred metres apart and assessed as MLRS (BM-21) missiles, as well as several tailfins of mortar rounds (82mm) and remnants of rocket-propelled-grenade projectiles. The SMM noted that the area was highly contaminated with UXO.

The SMM continued to follow-up on the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. The Ukrainian Armed Forces notified the SMM that it would be closing the entry-exit checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge from 2-7 September in order to complete construction works related to the checkpoint. On the non-government-controlled side of the entry-exit checkpoint, the SMM observed a posted notice that read that as of 2 September the Ukrainian Armed Forces would be closing the entry-exit checkpoint.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repair works to a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, a water pipeline near Zolote,a gas distribution station near Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and to the South Donbas water pipeline between Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata. 

The SMM continued to facilitate adherence to the ceasefire to enable firefighting activity near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 30 August 2018). Positioned in Vodiane (government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM could see smoke in the direction of Berezove. The Mission also noted that the nearby entry-exit checkpoint at Novotroitske (government-controlled 36km south-west of Donetsk) remained closed. 

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a pre-announced public gathering in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation (27 Povitroflotskyi Avenue) marking the International Day of Victims of Enforced Disappearances. The Mission saw about 25 people (mixed genders and ages), some of them holding posters with the names of Ukrainian citizens from Crimea who have reportedly gone missing. The SMM saw 18 National Guard officers, two police officers and one police car present and observed a calm situation. 

On 29 August, the SMM monitored public gatherings in Lviv and Chernivtsi commemorating “Ilovaisk battle” that took place in August 2014 (see SMM Daily Report 30 August 2018). In Chernivtsi, at the Central Square, the SMM saw about 70 people (mostly women, mixed ages). The Mission saw eight police officers present. At the square in front of the Taras Shevchenko monument on Svobody Avenue in Lviv, the Mission saw about 250 people (mixed genders and ages) including several holding flags with the emblems of Right Sector and Azov battalions. The SMM saw two police officers present. Throughout both events, the Mission observed calm situations. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non/government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non/government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s security”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non/government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “an ongoing operation in the area”. As a result of this denial, the SMM was unable to follow up on reports of civilian casualty.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a miniUAV flight near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM lost contact with the mini-UAV due to signal interference. The SMM later retrieved the UAV about 1km north-east of the southern edge of the disengagement area, where it was laying in the middle of an asphalt road. (For recent UAV-related impediments in this area, see SMM Daily Report 29 August 2018.)

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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392243 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Training Against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement (TAHCLE): Programme Description

Strengthening skills in recognizing and investigating hate crimes was at the centre of a train-the-trainer workshop for women police officers organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Network of Police Women (ENP) from 29 to 31 August 2018. The event was hosted by the Scottish Police College in Kincardine, the United Kingdom.

The workshop brought together 20 trainees from eight countries. Participants learned about ODIHR's definition of hate crime, international obligations related to hate crimes and techniques to recognize and investigate such crimes. 

"This training course is intended to further empower women police officers and help improve their knowledge and skills to ensure a robust response to hate crimes," said ODIHR Programme Officer Yulia Korysheva. "The workshop was also an opportunity for participants to share their expertise, personal experiences and best practises in addressing hate crimes."

ENP President Montserrat Pina said: "I am proud that our network was able to secure the participation of policewomen from countries across Europe, as well as officers from organizations representing minorities in law enforcement. Hate crime is now, more than ever, a matter of great concern in policing all over Europe. Training police officers and instructors who can then train members of their own forces is important to effectively deal with this growing problem."

The workshop was based on the curriculum of the Training against Hate Crime for Law Enforcement (TAHCLE) programme, which has been implemented in 15 countries across the OSCE region.

392237 Course participants discuss good practices for human rights-compliant assembly policing. Kyiv, 30 August 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

International human rights standards guaranteeing the freedom of peaceful assembly and good assembly policing practices were the focus of a train-the-trainer workshop for representatives of Ukrainian law enforcement training institutions and police, which took place in Kyiv from 27 to 31 August 2018. The training was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).  

The workshop brought together 15 participants (8 women and 7 men) from the National Academy of Internal Affairs, the State University of Internal Affairs in Dnipro, Lviv, Odesa and Kharkiv, and the National Police. The training was based on the ODIHR Human Rights Handbook on Policing Assemblies.

“Upholding the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is vital for any democracy as it allows people, including groups with little or no political power or influence on public life, to call attention to their concerns,” said Anita Danka, ODIHR’s Human Rights Adviser and a trainer at the course. “Facilitating assemblies in a human rights-compliant way is not only an obligation of the police, but also an opportunity to increase public confidence in police work and thus make it more efficient.” 

“The training underlined how crucial it is to facilitate people’s freedom to assemble peacefully, a topic which is extremely relevant in Ukraine,” said Vasyl Polyvaniuk, Senior Lecturer at the Dnipro State University of Internal Affairs. “I am looking forward to sharing with my students the key components of the course, such as the applicable human rights framework, the planning and decision-making model and the human rights assessment of various crowd management tactics.”

The workshop was the latest in a series of similar capacity-building events for Ukrainian law enforcement officers organized by ODIHR over the past two years.

CHISINAU/TIRASPOL, 1 September 2018 – Two Vehicle Registration Offices were opened in the left-bank cities of Tiraspol and Ribnita today by the Chief Negotiators in the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, from Moldova and Transdniestria, respectively. This event marks the beginning of the implementation of the so-called “licence plate” agreement signed by the Sides on 24 April 2018 to establish a mechanism for allowing for access of vehicles from Transdniestria to international road traffic.

The opening is the result of the joint efforts and resources dedicated by the Sides to set up and make the Vehicle Registration Offices operational by the 1 September deadline agreed upon by the Sides in the 30 May 5+2 Rome Protocol. Staffed by 30 officials from Moldova and Transdniestria, the Vehicle Registration Offices will issue internationally recognized Moldovan neutral-design licence plates to vehicles from Transdniestria to allow for their participation in international traffic. 

“I commend the Sides for their continuous local ownership and leadership. Their close collaboration to address technical and practical issues together was the key to meeting this ambitious deadline of 1 September,” Acting Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova Lajos Karakas said following the opening ceremony. “This agreement and other agreements signed and implemented by the Sides contribute to reaching the end state of the settlement process endorsed by all 57 OSCE participating States, as they affirm rights that need to exist throughout a reintegrated Moldova and reflect the essence of a special status for Transdniestria within Moldova.”

The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, Franco Frattini, will visit the Vehicle Registration Office in Tiraspol on 10 September to hand over the first neutral-design licence plates.

The “licence plate” agreement is the fifth of the “package of eight” to have been signed and implemented by the Sides since the end of 2017. This approach affirms the new norm of the negotiation process, where the Sides reach agreements with structured timelines and mechanisms that guide the ensuing implementation. 

In addition to this agreement, on 1 August Moldovan farmers regained access to their farmlands in the Dubasari district for the first time since 2014. This year the Sides have also ensured the functioning of Latin-script schools on the left bank, initiated the apostilization of Transdniestrian university diplomas and opened the Gura Bicului – Bychok bridge. 

Currently, Chisinau and Tiraspol are in the process of finalizing the steps to implement the agreement on the reintegration of telecommunication networks between the two banks. 

With the resolution of the issues related to the freedom of movement, criminal cases and the implementation of the telecommunication agreement, the Sides will have met their commitment, documented in the 30 May 5+2 Rome Protocol, to have fully finalized the “package of eight” by the end of 2018.

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A two-day train-the-trainers course for Kyrgyz government officials on countering terrorist financing was organized in Vienna on 30 and 31 August by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Global Programme against Money Laundering (UNODC/GPML) and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (EAG).  

The aim of the course was to assist Kyrgyzstan in countering terrorism financing, in line with relevant FATF standards and OSCE commitments. The five participants in the course will deliver training courses for local government officials upon their return to Kyrgyzstan, together with OSCE, UNODC/GPML, EAG international experts, and a terrorist financing specialist from the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the Russian Federation (ROSFINMONITORING).

The course, which took place on the premises of the OSCE Secretariat, was led by international experts and included sessions on inter-agency co-operation, investigation, case management, financial disruption and prevention of abuse of non-profit organizations for terrorist financing. The training process focused on localized scenarios based on real-life cases.

The course strengthened the participants’ understanding of how improving inter-agency co-operation can help to identify and disrupt terrorist financial networks and highlighted specific instruments and techniques that could significantly improve  the ability to counter terrorist financing. Part of a comprehensive capacity-building programme to support efforts to counter terrorism financing in Central Asia, the course follows similar train-the-trainer courses organized for Kyrgyz officials in June, July and September 2017.

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392201 Edita Buçaj

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo concluded a five-day ‘train-the-trainer’ course on identification of domestic violence for community policing units. The course  was held from 27 to 31 August 2018 at the Kosovo Academy for Public Safety in Vushtrri/Vučitrn.

The course focused on early indicators such as physical evidence and psychological signs of the victims; the first police response and assistance to the victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse; and on ensuring the safety of police officers and victims involved. 

“The fight against domestic violence is a priority for the Mission,” said Kilian Wahl, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. “Prevention is crucial to effectively reduce cases of domestic violence. We support the Kosovo Police in expanding the knowledge and skill sets of police officers on the prevention aspect. This will enable them to properly identify early indicators for domestic violence and react before something happens.”

Ramadan Krasniqi, police sergeant, said that the course was an excellent opportunity to learn new approaches in dealing with cases of domestic violence. “Along with such training activities in the future, we need to also focus on raising the awareness of the public about domestic violence and enhancing our co-operation with them, in order to minimize this negative phenomenon.”

Following the course, the participants will become certified trainers and will develop similar training course to be delivered in turn to their fellow patrol officers in their police stations. 

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo is mandated with the protection and promotion of human and community rights, as well as with democratization and public safety sector development. It regularly delivers advanced and specialized training courses for law enforcement agencies to further improve their capacities.