OSCE

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Modernizing the system to select judges and activities of the High Judicial Council in Kazakhstan were the topic of an OSCE-supported international roundtable discussion held in Astana on 16 November 2018.

The event gathered some 100 high-level government officials, parliamentarians, representatives of the judiciary, non-governmental organizations, and local and international legal experts.

Participants discussed issues related to the objectivity and transparency of the selection process and the role of the legal community and civil society in the composition of bodies deciding on judicial selection. Representatives of the High Judicial Council presented key novelties in the procedure of competitive selection of judges and related qualification criteria.

Talgat Donakov, the Chairperson of the High Judicial Council, said: “The establishment of an independent and fair judiciary is one of the priorities of state policy. Today’s event is aimed at presenting the results of implemented measures to improve the system of selection of judges for public consideration.”

”Transparency is a key element for recruiting the best candidates for judicial posts and minimizing potential political influence in judicial decision-making. How these processes are undertaken is also essential for gaining public trust,” said György Szabó, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana.

Experts from Italy and Spain shared experiences on the selection of judges in other countries and representatives of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights focused on standards and practices in the selection and appointment process of judges in the OSCE region.

The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the High Judicial Council, and the Supreme Court, with support from the Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Elbasy. It was part of the Programme Office’s long-term efforts to support criminal justice reform in Kazakhstan.

403229 Kunduz Rysbek

The Second International Conference on Islam in a Contemporary Secular State took place in Bishkek on 15 and 16 November 2018. The Conference was opened by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sooronbai Jeenbekov and brought together representatives of government agencies, academics and independent experts working on religious issues from 20 countries across Asia and the Middle East, as well as representatives of embassies and international organizations based in Bishkek. 

The event was organized by the State Commission for Religious Affairs and supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the United Nations in Kyrgyzstan.

Building on the Bishkek Declaration adopted in 2017, the Second International Conference focused on ways to integrate Islamic traditions into a modern and secular state and approaches to harmonizing relations in Muslim communities. The participants developed recommendations for improving the effectiveness of democratic governance in the religious sphere, and brainstormed about new ways to prevent radicalization and the spread of extremist ideas.

Praising Kyrgyzstan’s multinational and multi-confessional space, President Jeenbekov said: “Kyrgyzstan has declared complete freedom of religion and confessions and religious organizations have been given the opportunity to develop freely. Modern Kyrgyzstan is a state in which religion is separated from the state.” The President expressed his disapproval of the misuse of Islam by certain groups who try to impose their traditions and culture on the Kyrgyz people.

Referring to Kyrgyzstan’s strategic approach to the issue, Pierre von Arx, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek said: “Just this month, the National Strategy for Sustainable Development 2040 was adopted. The document is comprehensive and it includes an entire chapter on religion in a democratic state, underlining the guarantee of civil rights including freedom of religion and belief by the Kyrgyz Republic.”

Von Arx added that the Office is also supporting the educational pilot project Basic History of Religious Culture, which introduces the history of world religions to secondary school students. The government made educating students about world religions mandatory for all schools in 2019.

403367 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

A group of Ukrainian civil society representatives improved their human rights monitoring skills, as well as their capacity to take measures to increase their own safety and security during a training course organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, from 12 to 17 November 2018.

The participants were ten women and seven men who work on various issues in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, including the human rights of Roma, women, LGBT persons, journalists, internally displaced persons and youth. They gained skills in applying a human rights-based approach in their monitoring work, improving professional conduct during field visits and verifying online evidence of human rights violations. They also learned techniques for improving their mental well-being during monitoring activities and how to use encrypted communication channels and secure their digital storage equipment.

“In addition to training the participants on how to conduct gender-sensitive human rights monitoring in a safe and secure manner, we built their capacity to develop and implement evidence-based advocacy activities and use effective communications methods and techniques to address human rights violations,” said Marc van Gool, Human Rights Adviser at ODIHR.  

Participant Olha Poliakova from Dnipro said: “This training was very useful. The new information I received and the tools we explored will be useful in my daily work, and also in future activities to monitor the position of women in police forces in the Dnipro region.”

Three women representatives of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) also took part in the training.

The training was organized as part of ODIHR’s project on strengthening dialogue among civil society and with key governmental stakeholders in Ukraine to address important human rights issues in the country. During the project, ODIHR has trained over 150 human rights defenders from Ukraine, as well as 20 representatives from Ukrainian state institutions, through capacity-building workshops on human rights monitoring, and has supported  a number of human rights monitoring and dialogue projects carried out by human rights defenders in Ukraine.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The sixth meeting of the Working Group on environmental protection under the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Chu-Talas Water Commission took place on 16 November 2018 in Bishkek. The meeting was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek in close co-operation with the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Chu-Talas Water Commission.

Some 20 water specialists from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan discussed the results of laboratory water quality assessments conducted in the transboundary Chu-Talas river basin by both countries with the support of the OSCE field operations in Astana and Bishkek. The participants shared opinions on how to harmonize approaches to assessing water quality and discussed opportunities for future collaboration.

In April, June and October, the Office supported the research of Kazakhstan’s Hydro-Meteorological Centre’s territorial unit which analysed water samples at the Chu-Talas river basin in the Zhambyl region, covering16 different sites and conducting 17 different tests to identify possible contaminants. Based on the laboratory results, a national expert will produce a final report on water quality in the basin, which will be shared as part of a data exchange initiative between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

The Chu-Talas Water Commission promotes bilateral co-operation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and aims to improve access to information by involving stakeholders in the process of river management and promoting activities for the protection of water ecosystems.

The event is part of the both Offices’ multi-year efforts to raise awareness and build capacity of state institutions in the area of water governance and to contribute to the transboundary dialogue on managing water resources.

Marina Živaljević

With the aim to strengthen Parliament’s administrative capacities, in particular in the area of research, documentation and outreach, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized a working visit to the Italian Senate for six officials of the Parliament of Montenegro on 12-13 November 2018.

The heads of the departments of budget service, research, protocol as well as reports and official communications services presented their experience in the Senate and engaged in productive discussions with the Montenegrin delegation on these important matters for the work of the institution.

During the visit, the Secretary General of the Italian Senate Elisabetta Serafin and the Secretary General of the Montenegrin Parliament Aleksandar Jovićević, shared their experience and underlined the importance of exchanges to further improve their work and bilateral cooperation.

“It was interesting to learn that we share some of the same practices regarding protocol, publications and youth initiatives, but also to hear new and different approaches in dealing with these matters, said Jovićević. He added that they also greatly appreciated information received on budgetary matters and parliamentary research, which was an important segment in supporting the legislative and oversight function of any parliament.

To better understand the importance of the documentation and research processes, as well as of the public outreach, the delegation was informed about on-line publications and had the opportunity to visit the Senate Library, which boasts a collection of more than 600,000 volumes, including ancient ones.

As part of the visit, the delegation was greeted by Ms Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati,  President of the Italian Senate, at the opening of the 57th seating of the Senate on 13 November 2018.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A two-day seminar on delimitation and demarcation practices in the OSCE area concluded on 16 November 2018 in Athens. The event was jointly organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece.

Some thirty eight officials and experts from sixteen participating States took part in this interactive seminar. Specific bilateral experiences in co-operation related to delimitation and demarcation practices from across the OSCE area were presented to the participants. . They also discussed past and on-going border demarcation and delimitation processes and exchanged lessons learned and good practices in this field. In addition, they engaged in a practical exercise, based on a fictional scenario on boundary delimitation, demarcation and management by identifying ways to manage poorly demarcated borders .  

The seminar marked the launch of the English version of the Guidebook on Delimitation and Demarcation Practices in the OSCE Area, developed by the Border Security and Management Unit with the support of national experts Zenonas Kumetaitis of Lithuania and Alexander Arkhipov of Belarus. The Russian version of the Guidebook was launched in 2017 in Minsk, Belarus.

“This seminar, which launched the English guidebook on border delimitation and demarcation practices, is the culmination of sustained and successful collaboration across the OSCE area. The participants’ enthusiastic embrace of this guidebook inspires us to continue our work in this important area,” said Dennis Cosgrove, Head of the Border Security and Management Unit.

Challenges regarding delimitation and demarcation remain high on the agenda of the OSCE, as it was reiterated by the participating States in a number of fora in 2018. This event is the eighth seminar on this topic and builds on the success and recommendations of the previous events.

Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Mihajlo Lahtov, OSCE Mission to Skopje

Representatives of the municipal administration, local institutions, civil society, education sector, youth, women as well as religious and local community leaders gathered at an OSCE roundtable in Tetovo on 19 November 2018 to discuss the  implementation of the National Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Strategy and Action Plan at the local level.

The activity, organized by the OSCE Mission to Skopje in co-operation with the National Co-ordinator for Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism, is a first in a series of ten roundtable discussion, planned to be held throughout the country.

“The OSCE recognizes the need to place local stakeholders at the forefront of prevention efforts, as part of a whole-of-society approach,” said the Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, Jeffrey Goldstein.

Goldstein said that supporting the development of resilient and socially cohesive communities can be the best defense against violent extremism taking root. “While working together, communities can counter the corrosive appeal of violent extremism by promoting tolerance, mutual respect, pluralism, inclusion, and cohesion. These are the core values and principles of the OSCE: only through dialogue can we bridge our differences,” he said.

The OSCE Mission previously assisted the government with public consultations for the drafting of the National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism and the Action Plan in March 2018.

Apart from Tetovo, similar discussions will take place in the following municipalities, Skopje, Cair, Gostivar, Veles, Strumica, Kumanovo, Struga, Kichevo, Prilep and Shtip.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed a recent impact on a road in a residential area of Debaltseve. The SMM observed military-type presence and anti-tank mines in the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as at a military compound near Starohnativka and near Leonove, close to the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to houses and essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line in the Vilnyi neighbourhood of Zolote-4/Rodina. In Odessa, the SMM monitored a protest against illegal construction.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 285 explosions).

On the evening of 15 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 54 undetermined explosions and about 430 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-6km south-east and south-south-east. The following day, while in the same location, the SMM heard about 20 undetermined explosions, all at an assessed range of 2-5km south-south-east.

During the day on 16 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-6km east, south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 15-16 November, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded two explosions assessed as impacts of undetermined weapon(s) rounds and about 110 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), all at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 15-16 November, the SMM camera located 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion and about 85 projectiles in flight (mostly from south to north and from north to south), all at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however fewer explosions (ten), compared with the previous reporting period (18 explosions).

On the morning of 16 November, positioned about 1.5km north-north-west of Kalynove- Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 4-5km north-east.

The SMM observed a recent impact on a road in a residential area of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). At 21 Lenina Street, on 16 November, the SMM saw a crater in the middle of an asphalt road, about 8m from the closest residential building, assessed as caused either by the impact of a projectile or by the explosion of a grenade. A woman (aged 40-50), who said she was a resident of the neighbourhood, told the SMM that she had heard an explosion on the evening of 15 November.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 15 November, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted in excess of 300 anti-tank mines (TM-62) placed in three rows running over about 500m from east to west about 60m west of road T1316, about 500m north-north-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area. The same SMM mini-UAV also spotted in excess of 300 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in six rows from a trench of the armed formations running west to east over about 500m, about 700m north-east of the above-mentioned checkpoint. About 200 of these anti-tank mines were seen for the first time (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 April 2018). The same SMM mini-UAV spotted a new trench about 150m in length (not visible in imagery from 15 October 2018) with two people inside assessed as members of the armed formations about 1km north-north-west of the above-mentioned checkpoint, as well as a camouflaged-style jeep about 30m north-west of the same checkpoint, all inside the disengagement area.

On 16 November, positioned on the south-western outskirts of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire, 3-4km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.[3]

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 16 November, the SMM saw a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 16 November, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-21) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 14 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 tanks (type undetermined) and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and 11 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (see also SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018). Aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence on 14 November of 29 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018), and 22 tanks, nine pieces of self-propelled artillery, 18 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (see also SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018).

The same aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence of 76 armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Buhaivka, 23 ACVs (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Shymshynivka and 79 ACVs (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Myrne.[4]

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM visited two such sites and saw eight towed howitzers (six 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and two D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm).

The SMM revisited two permanent storage sites, including one site which continued to be abandoned, whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal line in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that, in total, 18 tanks (ten T-64 and eight T-72) were missing.

In a non-government-controlled area, on 14 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 27 pieces of towed artillery in the above-mentioned training area near Buhaivka (see also SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018).

The SMM observed ACVs[5] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 15 November, the SMM saw two armoured personal carriers (APC) (a BTR-70 and a BTR-80) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). On 16 November, the SMM saw an APC (BTR variant) near a residential house in Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk), an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-70) near Mariupol, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Pionerske (14km east of Mariupol), as well as seven infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 16 November, the SMM saw an ACV (type undetermined) near Petrivske (outside the disengagement area).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines between Zolote and Popasna and near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM continued to observe civilians facing hardships at checkpoints. On 15 November, at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that the road was blocked due to the high number of civilian vehicles and pedestrians queuing. A man (aged 50-60) told the SMM that the passengers of approximately 50 cars had spent the night (14-15 November) in their vehicles after waiting all day the previous day to pass through and not being able to do so before the end of the day.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living along the contact line. In the Vilnyi neighbourhood of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), a resident (woman, aged 60-70) told the SMM that the neighbourhood has been without electricity for almost a month. Other residents in previous days had separately told the SMM that the area was without electricity for a month. In Zolote, the Head of the Zolote Civil-Military Administration (man, aged 50-60) told the SMM that many houses in the neighbourhood do not have heating and electricity.

The SMM monitored a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the SMM observed no traffic. Two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 15 November, the SMM monitored a protest at Gagarin Plateau in the Arcadia neighbourhood of Odessa. At 9А Rishelievska Street, the SMM saw about 45 people (mixed ages, mixed genders) including seven participants wearing jackets with insignia of the National Corps blocking the intersection between Rishelievska Street and Hretska Street. The SMM observed banners in Russian language with messages critical of illegal construction. The SMM observed that about ten law enforcement officers were present. Shortly thereafter, the SMM saw the same group of people in front of the City Hall building at 1 Dumska Square, as well as seven police officers. The protest ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a border crossing point near Leonove, two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to a compound in Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) citing the need to obtain “permission from their superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[6]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said that there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC. 6

Other impediments:

• Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM with information about a civilian casualty without permission from senior members of the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera located at the Oktiabr mine and the SMM camera located 1km south-west of Shyrokyne were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed military-type presence in the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Verkhnoshyrokivske and again near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to houses and essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. The SMM followed up on reports of vandalism to crosses commemorating Polish prisoners in Kolomiya during World War I. In Kyiv, the Mission followed up on an attack on St. Andrew’s Church and a ceremony in honour of political prisoners. The SMM observed the first meeting of the temporary parliamentary commission charged with investigating the death of Kateryna Handziuk. In Kherson, the SMM observed a court hearing related to the detained Mekhanik Pogodin tanker.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 285), compared with the previous reporting period (about 265 explosions).

On the evening of 14 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 37 undetermined explosions, ten bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire, about 225 bursts of heavy-machine gun fire and at least six minutes of uncountable heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west. The following day, from the same location, the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east.

During the day on 15 November, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km south-west and 27 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-12km south-east. Positioned on the north-western edge of Horlivka the same day, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-6km east-north-east and six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km in south-westerly directions.

During the evening of 14 November, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded ten undetermined explosions, an airburst, a muzzle flash and 40 projectiles in flight (mostly from south-easterly to north-westerly directions), including two projectiles fired from the south-east that subsequently exploded, impacting inside the entry-exit checkpoint area near the processing booths for civilians crossing the contact line, all at an assessed range of 0.1km-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 18 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions).

On the morning of 15 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-10km south-south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 14 November, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted about 100m of trenches and at least two firing positions, all seen for the first time (not visible in imagery from 15 October 2018), north of the railway line north-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), between 10-70m west of the western edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

On 15 November, along road T1316 inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed about 1km north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM saw a portable rocket launcher (RPO-A Shmel, 93mm). (See SMM Daily Report 14 November 2018.)

Positioned at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and north of Petrivske, the SMM observed calm situations in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three towed howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Zarichne (44km west of Luhansk), a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a compound near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and ten towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM observed eight towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) at a military compound in Dianivka (38km north-west of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted ten tanks (T-72) in a training area near Shymshynivka; 21 tanks (type undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and eight towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); and 20 tanks (type undetermined), eight towed mortars (2B11) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Buhaivka.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Zolote 4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk). On 15 November, the SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70 and BTR-80) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and one APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

On 14 November, the SMM saw about 100 spent assault rifle (AK-74) shell casings (5.45mm) and two casings of rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-22), all assessed to be one or two months old, scattered on the edge of a road next to residential houses in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk).                                                              

In non-government-controlled areas, on 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two ACVs (type undetermined) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk), five ACVs (type undetermined) and an APC (BTR variant) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk), three ACVs near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk), two APCs (BTR variant) on the western outskirts of Luhansk city, four APCs (MT-LB) near Katerynivka, four ACVs (type undetermined) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk). On 15 November, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) in Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR variant) near Vasylivka (47km south of Donetsk).

On 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted new defensive positions about 30m in length about 1km south-east of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM monitored a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for over an hour, the SMM observed 32 cars (six with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates, and 15 with “DPR” plates) and 22 cargo trucks (seven with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and six with Belarusian licence plates, and eight with “DPR” plates, all cargo not visible) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also observed 21 vehicles (four with Ukrainian license plates, nine with Russian Federation, two with Georgian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates), a cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates, cargo not visible) and a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine.

In Kolomyia (Ivano-Frankivsk region), on 12 November, the SMM followed up on reports of vandalism to crosses at a cemetery commemorating Polish prisoners in Kolomiya during World War I. The head of a Polish civil society organization responsible for maintaining the cemetery told the SMM that on the night of 4-5 November, 94 crosses commemorating Polish prisoners to Kolomyia had been uprooted from the ground. A police representative told the SMM that they had found nearly 100 crosses on the ground, had identified suspects and an investigation had been launched under article 296 (hooliganism). The SMM visited the cemetery and saw that the crosses were in place and freshly dug and moved soil had been placed around the base of the crosses.

In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on media reports of an attack on St. Andrew’s Church.[4] Around 10:00 on 15 November at the church located at 23 Andriivskyi Descent in Kyiv, the SMM saw pieces of a shattered brown glass bottle and a bottle cork scattered around the doorstep of a side door to the church, and noted a strong gasoline smell in the vicinity of the area. The SMM saw ten police officers present at the scene and that the area around the door was blocked off by tape. Two men (both 60-70 years old), who identified themselves as security guards of the church, told the SMM that between 07:00-07:15 on the same day, they had been standing outside the church when they had heard a “crashing sound” and then seen two men (age unknown) in civilian clothing. One of the security guards added that he had unsuccessfully tried to stop the two men and was sprayed with pepper gas in his eyes.

In Kyiv, the SMM observed a ceremony in support of Ukrainian political prisoners. At Mykhailivska Square, the SMM saw senior Ukrainian officials and family members of Ukrainian political prisoners reportedly held in the Russian Federation, on the Crimean peninsula and in non-government-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine. The SMM saw empty chairs with the names of Ukrainian political prisoners written on them, including Stanislav Aseev, a blogger being held in a non-government-controlled part of Donetsk region.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored the first meeting of the temporary parliamentary commission charged with investigating the death of Kateryna Handziuk, an anti-corruption activist and Kherson city council official who died after having been attacked with sulphuric acid on 31 July 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 5 November 2018). Sixteen Members of Parliament serving on the commission as well as representatives of civil society, the State Security Service of Ukraine, the General Prosecutor's Office and the National Police attended the meeting.

On 14 November, in Kherson, the SMM attended a court hearing at the Kherson Administrative Court related to the detained Mekhanik Pogodin tanker by the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the port of Kherson. The court ruled that the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine should provide it with copies of communication related to the detention of the tanker ship within seven days and the next hearing was scheduled for 3 December 2018. (See SMM Daily Report 9 November 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 November 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint south of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the area, saying that the SMM needs “permission” from an unspecified “ministry.”
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding, citing risks to the “security of the SMM” and saying that the SMM needs “approval” from an “administration” in Novoazovsk to travel there.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• During the evening and night of 14-15 November, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference[6] (dual GPS jamming) near government-controlled areas of Vyskryva (76km west of Luhansk) and Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk) and in the vicinity of non-government controlled areas of Zarichne, Khoroshe, Stepove (27km west of Luhansk), Dovhe, Zemliane (11km north-west of Luhansk), Katerynivka, Rozkishne (9km south of Luhansk), Luhansk city and Peremozhne (19km south of Luhansk).
• At a hospital in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), while attempting to follow up on reports of a civilian casualty, medical staff denied the SMM’s request to meet with the victim, citing the “need for permission” from a “ministry” of the armed formations in Luhansk city.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] On 18 October, the SMM monitored a plenary session in Parliament at which members of Parliament adopted the law “On peculiarities of the usage of the St. Andrew’s Church of the ‘Sophia of Kyiv’ National Reserve” with 237 votes in favour. The law foresees the lease of the St. Andrew’s Church to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople for use to perform religious services.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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403274 Communication and Media Relations Section

The key steps in joining a technologically advanced ePassport verification system - the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Public Key Directory (ICAO PKD) – were explored at a regional workshop organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in Budva, Montenegro on 15 and 16 November 2018.

The workshop brought together the heads of the Travel Document Issuing Authorities, chiefs of the IT Departments of the Travel Document Issuing Authorities and heads of the Passport Verification Departments from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro, to get acquainted with the ICAO PKD, which enables countries to effectively validate the chip stored in electronic passports.

Electronic passports are fraud resistant travel documents which make it harder for terrorists and criminals to forge travel documents. But having ePassports is not enough, the workshop’s experts said. The receiving authorities need to confirm that the ePassport belongs to its holder, and the ICAO PKD enables this.

"Joining the ICAO PKD is a proactive approach in fighting recurring organized crime, illegal migration and the movement of Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” said Jean Salomon, a Border Security and Identity Management Expert, and member of the ICAO Implementation and Capacity-Building Working Group. “To sustain and further develop an efficient management of safe borders and achieve stability in the long run requires an unwavering commitment: Embracing the PKD to bolster the secure world usage of ePassports.”

Christiane Dermarkar, representing the ICAO, said: “States participating in the ICAO PKD will facilitate international travel for their citizens - citizens from PKD Participant States will be more trusted at foreign borders and can enjoy easier border crossings.”

Representatives from each state presented the ePassport systems and the National Public Key Infrastructures they currently have in place, enabling the experts to assess which of the requirements they meet in order to join the ICAO PKD. 

Jeen de Swart, a senior information architect from the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security, described how the PKD was implementation in the Netherlands. The workshop concluded with participants drafting national road maps on joining the PKD.

As a follow-up, the OSCE will arrange country visits to encourage decision-makers to join the ICAO PKD. This will be followed by technical support to provide on-site practical guidance and operational support in developing national compatibilities with the ICAO PKD.

403247 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Fifteen prosecutors and police officers completed a three-day workshop on investigating transnational cases of trafficking in human beings on 15 November 2018 in Chisinau. The workshop was organized jointly by the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the Moldovan General Prosecutor’s Office and the General Police Inspectorate, with the support of the European Union Judicial Co-operation Unit (Eurojust).

The best practices of setting up and managing joint investigation teams (JITs) were the focus of the hands-on course delivered by the Eurojust experts, who specialize in providing financial, legal and practical support to the operational activities of JITs. A JIT is an effective tool used by states to improve the speed, efficiency and co-ordination of investigating and prosecuting transnational crimes. The setting up of JITs on human trafficking cases is one of activities envisaged under the 2018-2020 Action Plan of the Moldovan Anti-Trafficking Strategy, which was developed with the support of the OSCE Mission.

Under the guidance of the trainers, the participants elaborated a standard inter-state JIT agreement, organized a mock JIT co-ordination meeting and identified strategies to raise funds to support operations of a joint team.

“Participation in this training will help us to establish contacts with, and build trust among the international partners to ensure the speedy exchange of information and intelligence as well as the collection of evidence to facilitate the detection and investigation of cases of trafficking,” said Sergiu Russu, the chief of the Section to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings at the General Prosecutor’s Office.

This workshop is part of capacity-building efforts on combating trafficking in human beings undertaken by the OSCE Mission’s human rights programme. The Mission’s work in the field of human rights is in line with the priorities of the Human Rights sub-Working Group, reconvened by Moldova and Transdniestria this year.

403268 Event participants discuss activities and draft a road map to contribute to implementing the country’s action plan on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. 13 November 2018, Osh. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Increasing civil society’s potential to partner with state institutions in implementing the recently adopted action plan on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in Kyrgyzstan was the focus of two capacity building events, which the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) organized in Osh on 12 and 14 November and in Bishkek on 14 and 15 November 2018.

The two events gathered 40 representatives (28 women and 12 men) of human rights and women’s organizations, who discussed the action plan’s provisions, gendered approaches to the oversight of the security sector and ways to become more engaged in the country’s efforts to promote the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

“Security sector reform processes, political will and first-hand experience of conflict have all been ingredients for advancing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Kyrgyzstan,” said Graziella Pavone, Human Rights Officer at ODIHR. “An effective implementation of the Action Plan, the third one adopted by the country, will now depend on the degree of engagement by all stakeholders and on co-operation between state institutions and civil society.”

The participants identified practical areas where they could contribute to the implementation of the action plan. This includes the development of monitoring and evaluation tools, such as indicators and checklists tracking the progress of the plan’s implementation, the provision of expert advice and training to central and local authorities on gender aspects of security and close co-operation with security sector oversight mechanisms, such as national human rights institutions and public councils.  

“The experience of women’s organizations in the country demonstrates that NGOs are ready to provide expertise and methodological support to the authorities on policy and practice, both at the central and the local levels,” said Arsen Ambaryan, a lawyer at the Osh-based Positive Dialogue NGO. “However, given the scope of the UNSCR 1325, all human rights organizations can take part in its implementation and work to integrate the Women, Peace and Security Agenda into all their endeavours.”

The events were part of ODIHR’s efforts to promote human rights-compliant and gender-sensitive security, which entails empowering external oversight bodies with knowledge and skills.

Anara Niyazova, professor of law, gender expert and one of the trainers, said: “While not being formal implementers of the Action Plan, civil society organizations can be significant drivers in the implementation process. Acknowledging this role calls for supporting non-governmental organizations, including with resources for their institutional development.”

403232 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Young professionals from across the Western Balkans improved their knowledge about democratic institutions and OSCE commitments in the field of democratic governance during the Young Policy Adviser Course organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The course took place at the CEELI Institute (Central and Eastern European Law Initiative) in Prague from 12 to 16 November 2018.

The event was designed to help participants better understand the role of policy advisers and the skills needed to undertake core policymaking tasks and functions. The students – 23 women and eight men – explored ways to navigate complex political environments and participate effectively in policy-related decision-making. The course highlighted the importance of exercising professional ethics, mainstreaming gender into policies and upholding democratic values.

“Helping support young professionals in their learning process in building relevant knowledge and skills is incredibly rewarding, especially considering that these individuals will take this knowledge and apply it in the future,” said Augusta Featherston, ODIHR Youth Focal Point and Associate Democratic Governance Officer.

Eneida Marku, a participant from Tirana, said: “This course is an opportunity for the younger generation to learn skills relevant to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and we can take that knowledge home with us in the Western Balkans. I learned from a highly-skilled team of mentors whose expertise and teaching methods helped make the link between policy advising theory and practical application.”

The course methodology and content, originally developed by ODIHR in collaboration with the Folke Bernadotte Academy, was subsequently refined to suit specific audiences in the OSCE area with input from the School of Public Policy at the Central European University in Budapest.

The participants were professionals up to the age of 35 who work as political or policy advisers in government ministries, presidential administrations, parliaments or other public institutions in the Western Balkans. Facilitated by experts in the field of policy advising, the course provided a rich base for the participants to explore real world applications and outcomes, both positive and negative.

WARSAW, 16 November 2018 – As the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) released its hate crime data for 2017 today, on the International Day for Tolerance, ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir called on OSCE participating States to strengthen their efforts to counter hate crime.

“The International Day for Tolerance is an opportunity for us to send the clear message that there can be no space for discrimination or intolerance in our societies. Any attack against someone simply because of who he or she is reinforces a message of hate and rejection that can undermine the security of our societies. This is why every single OSCE participating State has committed to make great efforts to counter hate crime,” the ODIHR Director said. “Collecting data is only the first step, but it puts into place elements that can be used by public institutions and civil society to make a real difference for victims.”

The 2017 data, published on ODIHR’s dedicated hate crime reporting website, contain information provided by participating States, civil society and international organizations. This includes official data reported by 39 states, including disaggregated official hate crime statistics for 23 countries. These are complemented by information on hate incidents in 47 participating States, as reported by 124 civil society groups, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration and OSCE field operations.

"Our data show that the quality of the information provided to us by countries is improving, along with their ability to generate detailed statistics. However, much remains to be done. This is why I call on states to meet their commitments on hate crime, in close co-operation with ODIHR. We have developed a host of programmes to help ensure a comprehensive approach to hate crime and stand ready to assist states with implementation," Gísladóttir said.

The data were presented to national points of contact on hate crime, who are public officials responsible for reporting hate crime data to ODIHR, during an annual meeting held on 15 and 16 November in Vienna. Participants were introduced to ODIHR’s data collection assistance programme Information Against Hate Crimes Toolkit (INFAHCT), as well as other tools recently published by ODIHR as part of a two-year project on defining a comprehensive approach to counter hate crime.

ODIHR’s hate crime data, and more information on ODIHR's capacity-building programmes, can be found at http://hatecrime.osce.org.

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MADRID, 15 November 2018 – Terrorism is a transnational threat that requires a concerted multilateral response at global, regional and national levels, said Greek parliamentarian Makis Voridis, Chair of the OSCE PA’s Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (CCT), at a conference in Madrid today. At the same time, the tragic human cost of terrorism must remain at the forefront of policy-making discussions, he said.

“We must never forget the tens of thousands of people who have been injured, traumatized or lost their lives during terrorist attacks,” said Voridis. He emphasized that the extreme sacrifice of the victims has empowered countries to become more resilient against the terrorist threat.

“Our society owes a debt to the victims of terrorism and we should do whatever it takes to render them justice and dignity for what they have suffered, including through adequate compensation,” he said.

Voridis was speaking at the opening session of the Conference on Victims of Terrorism in the Sphere of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, hosted by the Spanish Senate. The conference is taking place Thursday and Friday in the Spanish capital.

CCT member Ignacio Cosidó Gutiérrez, Head of the Spanish Delegation to the OSCE PA Pere Joan Pons, and Vice-Chair of the Spanish Senate Pedro María Sanz Alonso are also participating in the conference, along with several other members of the PA.

In his opening remarks, Cosidó Gutiérrez said that terrorism has generated much suffering and cut short many lives and dreams in Spain and other countries. But fighting terrorism has made Spanish society stronger and more united in defence of democracy and freedom, he said.He added that the defeat of ETA terrorism in Spain would never have been possible without placing the victims at the center of counter-terrorism policies and decision-making.

The two-day conference is exploring topics such as increasing support to victims of terrorism in Spain, victims of terrorism in the sphere of the OSCE, and the Spanish experience in the fight against terrorism.

Representatives of victims are sharing experiences of suffering terrorist attacks and discussing their personal situations and their experiences with authorities and public administrations. Security experts from police corps are also participating, explaining how their departments manage the fight against terrorism, the problems they face, the way they confront threats, and how they organize their actions and institutions.

Participants have emphasized that survivors of terror attacks require long-term support with adequate psychological, judicial, legal and social assistance in order to cope with the trauma and carry on with their lives. Greater investment in the rehabilitation and reintegration of victims helps to build more resilient and inclusive societies is also needed, they said.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Novolaspa and Novoselivka Druha.* The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to houses and essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. The SMM observed two protests in Kyiv regarding heating supply in Dnipropetrovsk and Cherkasy regions.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 265 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions).

On the evening of 13 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 54 explosions (49 assessed as outgoing rounds and five undetermined) at an assessed range of 2-4km east and south-east and about 280 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-5km north-east, east and south-east. The following day, from the same location, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west.

On the evening and night of 13-14 November, the SMM camera located 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), recorded 16 explosions (three assessed as impacts and 13 undetermined) and about 90 projectiles in flight (mostly from northerly to southerly directions and from southerly to northerly directions), all at an assessed range of 2-5km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On the day of 14 November, positioned in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 90 undermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-8km in directions ranging from east-north-east to south-west. The Mission also heard 26 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and 30mm cannon fire as well as about 20 minutes of uncountable overlapping shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 1-5km east-south-east, south and south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 180 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

On the morning of 14 November, positioned on the western edge of Tsarivka (government-controlled, 41km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 40 explosions assessed as anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) rounds and 100 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4km north-east (all assessed as live-fire exercise outside the security zone).

On the same morning, positioned in Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and 17 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-5km north and north-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the day of 14 November, positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 80 undetermined explosions and 200 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 4-6km south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned 1km south-south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire, 1km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw two stationary surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa), one of them in a firing position, near an inhabited residential building in Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that a tank (T-64) was again missing.

The SMM saw two anti-tank guns (type undetermined) being towed near Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed an armoured combat vehicle[3] in the security zone. In a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) in Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a gas pipeline in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), water pipelines near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and near a coal mine close to the Gagarina settlement of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings protesting lack of heating in Dnipropetrovsk and Cherkasy regions. On 13 November, in front of the headquarters of NaftoGaz Ukraine at 6 Bohdana Khmelnytskoho Street, the SMM saw 40-50 people (25-60 years old, 60 per cent men), some carrying banners with messages such as “Supply heating to houses of Kryvyi Rih inhabitants” and “Children and the elderly are freezing”. One participant (male, 50 years old) told the SMM that the group had travelled from Kryvyi Rih (133km south-west of Dnipro) where, he said, many inhabitants were without heating. The SMM observed about 40 police officers in riot gear and National Guard officers surrounding the building. On 14 November, in front of the Cabinet of Ministers building at 12/2 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street, the Mission saw about 30 people (mixed genders and ages), half of whom were waving flags with the emblem of the town of Smyla (169km south-east of Kyiv). About 20 National Guard officers were positioned around the building. Shortly thereafter, the Mission saw the same group of people in front of the NaftoGaz Ukraine headquarters, as well as about 30 police officers around the entrance of the building. At both public gatherings, the Mission observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 November 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “security risk for the SMM”.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a compound in Novoselivka Druha (government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol) citing “instructions from superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 15 November 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today condemned an attempted arson attack at the home of Rai 3 investigative journalist Federico Ruffo near Rome.

“I condemn this unacceptable attack on a journalist. It could have had ended tragically and it is a very serious act of intimidation,” Désir said. “Journalists should be able to do their work without fear. I call on the authorities to fully investigate this attack and punish the perpetrators.”

Early in the morning on 13 November, petrol was poured in front of the entrance to Ruffo’s apartment and a red cross was painted on a wall in the doorway. When Ruffo got up after he heard a noise, the perpetrators fled. The Italian police have launched an investigation. Ruffo stated that he and his team received threats before airing an investigative report on the Juventus football club, their supporters and possible connections with the mafia.

The Representative expressed concern that there have been multiple cases of intimidation and threats against journalists in Italy recently and called on the authorities to do their utmost to ensure a safe work environment for media workers.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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The Academy under the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Uzbekistan welcomed some 100 representatives of state bodies to a two-day training workshop on increasing the efficiency of anti-corruption measures in state organizations on 14 November 2018 in Tashkent. The event was organized jointly with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, the General Prosecutor’s Office and NGO the Regional Dialogue.   

During the workshop the participants discussed how to implement measures to prevent anti-corruption in the state bodies and were familiarized with the international experience in promoting a zero-tolerance to the corruption across the population. The participants also learned how to raise public awareness on anti-corruption topics.

Juergen Becker, Senior Project Officer of the Human and Politico-Military dimensions at the Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, said: “Government services should be a sector where corruption has no place. Corruption is not something that is driven top-down, but it is something that can be stopped that way. Without clear regulations and strong compliance mechanisms, without establishing the ethics on which state servants should base themselves at the top it will be difficult to speak about the efficiency of state measures towards combating corruption.”

The workshop was organized as part of the Project Co-ordinator’s efforts to assist Uzbekistan in achieving its international commitments in regard to combating corruption by facilitating collective action against corruption in the business sector.

Communication and Media Relations Section SDGs SDGs:  17 - Partnerships for the goals

The importance of a well-governed and accountable security sector in effectively addressing transnational organized crime, including trafficking in persons and illicit drugs, corruption and terrorism, was the focus of a sub-regional expert-level workshop for senior practitioners and policy-makers from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in Minsk on 14 and 15 November 2018.

Discussions focused on the promotion of regional co-operation and information exchange among national security sector actors, as well as the importance of shared responsibility in addressing the security threats and their prevention in line with the UN Peace and Security Agenda and UN Security Council Resolution 2151 on Security Sector Reform.

The workshop was organized by the OSCE and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in partnership with the Government of Belarus and the Government of Slovakia, which chairs the OSCE Group of Friends of Security Sector Governance and Reform, and is also Co-Chair of the UN Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform.

Held at the International Training Centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, the workshop brought together representatives of security and law enforcement agencies, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Health, anti-corruption authorities, customs and taxation departments, parliamentary oversight bodies and civil society, as well as experts from neighbouring countries, regional and international organizations, and relevant think tanks.

“Modern transnational organized crime is a factor that seriously destabilizes public safety and significantly undermines the efforts of states to improve security,” said Ivan Podgursky, Belarus’ First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. He added that the workshop was an excellent opportunity to boost regional and international co-operation in this sphere.

Katarína Žáková, Deputy Permanent Representative at Slovakia’s Permanent Mission to the OSCE emphasized the centrality of national ownership in Security Sector Governance and Reform that must be informed by the needs of the population and developed through inclusive national political processes.

Fred Tanner, Senior Advisor at the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, added: “Ensuring that the security sector is capable to respond to today’s challenges requires constant adjustments and the improvement of police, border security institutions and judicial systems.”

The sessions of the workshop focused on multilateral and regional co-operation approaches, crime prevention, the effective regulation and management of borders, ensuring the democratic oversight of security sector institutions, and strengthening public health security.

Gilberto Gerra, Chief of the Health Department at UNODC, said: “The role of the UN Drugs Convention is to protect the health and well-being of people, and stresses the need for an integrated approach in addressing drug-related challenges. This does not only involve law enforcement, but also includes the health and justice sectors.”

The workshop was organized under the OSCE-UNODC Joint Action Plan for 2018-2019, which commits both organizations to support the implementation of Security Sector Governance and Reform.

403094 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

The three Moldovan human rights institutions – the Agency for Interethnic Relations, the Ombudsman’s Office and the Council for Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination and Ensuring Equality - signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 15 November 2018 to work together on protecting and promoting the rights of national minorities in the country. The ceremony took place on the premises of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, which facilitated the development of the document.

Earlier this year, at the request of the three institutions the Mission conducted an assessment of the national human rights institutions’ competences which recommended the creation of a joint co-operation mechanism between the institutions.

The Memorandum of Understanding is an effective tool to support the implementation of the National Strategy for the Consolidation of Interethnic Relations till 2027, which was adopted by the Moldovan Government in 2017. It sets a framework for strengthening the co-operation between the three national human rights institutions through regular meetings, the exchange of information, joint research and mutual support. The Memorandum of Understanding places a specific focus on the national minorities’ right to education, access to information, public participation and other cultural, religious and linguistic rights, which are reflected in the National Strategy.

“The OSCE Mission to Moldova together with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities supported the commendable efforts of the Moldovan Government to develop the Strategy, which seeks to create an inclusive and tolerant society in Moldova. This kind of environment, where human rights, including the rights of national minorities, are respected, builds a strong foundation for the settlement process,” said Claus Neukirch, Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova during the signing ceremony.

The Memorandum of Understanding was developed as part of an OSCE Mission project to strengthen the co-operation and capacity of actors in promoting and protecting the rights of national minorities. It complements the Mission’s two-day training course held on 2 and 3 October 2018 in Chisinau in which an international expert explored issues related to national minority rights for representatives of the three institutions. It also complements the ongoing training seminars for lawyers throughout Moldova on the rights of national minorities.