OSCE

VIENNA, 30 September 2018 – On the second anniversary of the detention of Ukrainian National News Agency Ukrinform’s journalist Roman Sushchenko, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir repeated his call to the Russian authorities to release the journalist from prison. 

“Journalists in the OSCE region should be able to work without fear of intimidation or imprisonment,” Désir said, “Sushchenko’s 12-year sentence is exceptionally harsh, and I hope his conviction will be overturned on appeal.”

Suchshenko was detained on 30 September 2016 in Moscow. On 4 June 2018, the Moscow City Court sentenced him to 12 years in a high security prison on espionage charges.

The Representative raised the case on several occasions in the past, including during his official visits to Kyiv and Moscow in 2017 (see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/394064, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/383433, https://www.osce.org/fom/351561 and https://www.osce.org/fom/358456).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. In Pikuzy, the Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties and observed fresh damage caused by shelling. In Pervomaisk, the SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling. The Mission recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Novolaspa, Siedove and Novoazovsk near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission again observed anti-tank mines near Travneve and Holmivskyi. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema. In Lviv, the SMM followed up on reports of an attack against civil activists. The Mission monitored public gatherings in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Lviv in relation to attacks against activists in recent months.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 240 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

On the evening of 27 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions, five projectiles (four from west to east and one from east to west) and a muzzle flash, all 0.5km-1.5km south-east, south-south-east and south. The camera also recorded ten undetermined explosions, about 70 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east, from west-north-west to east-south-east and from west-south-west to east-north-east), a muzzle flash and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 27-28 September, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded over 100 projectiles (mostly from west-south-west to east-north-east and from north-west to south-east) and four bursts, all 1-5km at directions ranging from south-east and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 27-28 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion and about 50 projectiles in flight (the majority from south to north), all 2-5km at directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east.

On the evening of 27 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 80 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km south-west and west-south-west.

During the day on 28 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about 130 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km north, as well as an undetermined explosion and about 170 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-west.

The same day, positioned about 1km north-north-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 40 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 0.7-4km at directions ranging from north-north-east to south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions).

On the evening and night of 27-28 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded four undetermined explosions and about 70 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to east-south-east), all 2-4km south-west and south-south-west.

The SMM followed up reports of civilian casualties and fresh damage caused by shelling in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On 26 September, near Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 30km northeast of Mariupol), a couple (in their fifties) told the SMM that they had sustained shrapnel injuries due to shelling in Pikuzy earlier that day. The SMM saw a bandage on the man’s abdomen and did not see a visible wound to his wife. The man said that they had attempted to travel to a hospital in Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk) but their passage had been denied at a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol). Later, the SMM’s paramedic provided first aid to the man, and an ambulance arrived and picked up the couple. The following day, medical staff at a hospital in Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) told the SMM that the couple had been admitted on 26 September and that the man had undergone surgery. At the hospital, the injured woman told the SMM that two pieces of shrapnel remained in her leg and neck. (The SMM visited the hospital only upon being escorted by members of the armed formations. See SMM Daily Report 28 September 2018.)

In Pikuzy, on 27 September, a woman in her sixties, who introduced herself as a relative of the wounded couple (see above), told the SMM that at around 12:40 on 26 September when she and the couple had been in front of her house at 34 Akhmatova Street, an explosion had occurred nearby, injuring the three of them. The SMM saw a wound to her right arm. About 50m south-east of the house, the SMM saw fresh remnants of a round (consistent with a VOG-17 grenade) embedded in the tarmac in a vertical fashion, assessed as fired vertically from an undetermined weapon (with calibre no greater than 30mm). About 50m further east, within a 20m-radius, the SMM saw three more similar impacts in a field, assessed as fired from an undetermined weapon (with calibre no greater than 30mm) probably in a vertical manner.

At 24 Akhmatova Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to the west-north-west-facing side of a house and a nearby window, as well as two fresh craters about 10m west of the house assessed as caused by rounds of an automatic grenade launcher fired from a west-north-westerly direction.

At 17 Akhmatova Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater just south of a house, fresh shrapnel damage to a south-facing nearby fence, and fresh remnants of a grenade (PG-7) round, assessed as fired from a westerly direction. The SMM also saw two fresh small-arms casings nearby, assessed as remnants of rounds fired from the area.

At 15 Akhmatova Street, the SMM observed three fresh holes in the south-west-facing roofs of a storage building and another fresh hole in the north-east-facing roof. Inside the building, the SMM saw fresh remnants of at least four grenade (PG-7 and PG-9) rounds. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by rounds of an automatic grenade launcher fired from a direction between south and west.

Residents of the houses (a man and a woman in their fifties) at 17 and 24 Akhmatova Street told the SMM that they had heard explosions between 17:00 and 17:15 on 25 September. (The SMM had recently observed a tank (a possible T-72) on the eastern edge of Pikuzy, about 500m north-east of the abovementioned impact sites. See SMM Daily Report 22 September 2018.)

On 27 September, the SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). At 31 Vinnytska Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater about 10m east of a house as well as two shattered east-facing windows of the house. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire or the type of weapon used. Three neighbours (women in their sixties) told the SMM that they had heard explosions at around 20:00 on 26 September.

At 27 Luhova Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater and a tailfin inside the crater 1m south-south-east of a house, as well as two damaged west-facing windows (one shattered) of the house. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) round fired from an undetermined direction. A resident of the house (a woman in her fifties) told the SMM that she had heard explosions at around 19:55 on 26 September.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 28 September, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire 2-3km south-west, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area.

The same day, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed clam situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 27 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) on the north-western edge of Shumy (41km north of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw three towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) each towed by a military truck travelling north-east about 5km south-west of Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 27 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs)[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 27 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) on the north-western edge of Shumy (see above), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) north of Shumy, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-2) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Luhansk), four IFVs (BMP-1) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Sofiivka. On 28 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 28 September, the SMM saw three ACVs (BMP variants) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines. On 27 September, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 27 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in four rows near Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) and 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

In Lviv, on 28 September, the SMM followed up on reports of an attack against civil activists. A man and a woman (in their twenties) told the SMM that on the evening of 23 September they had been in a football field of the school no. 34 at Zamknena Street with two other people (a man and a woman), when 20-30 other people, some of them wearing balaclavas and scarves, physically assaulted them with maces, small hammers, knives and telescopic batons for five minutes, and shouted “Sieg heil! This is revenge for the National Corps!” and gave Nazi salutes. (The SMM saw National Corps denounce the attack on its social media page.) The SMM saw scrapes on the woman’s hands and arms, and bruises on the back of the man’s head. They said that the other woman had suffered wounds to her legs and arms and that the other man had a knife wound to his lungs and leg. A representative of Lviv police told the SMM that four people (two men and two women) had been attacked on 23 September and admitted to a hospital.  

On 27 September, the SMM monitored public gatherings in different cities in relation to attacks against activists in recent months (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 August 2018). In Kyiv, the SMM observed about 300 people (both men and women) on Instytutska Street at the entrance to the presidential administration building. The SMM saw some participants holding banners that read “Where are the authorities?” and “Activists are not a target”. The SMM saw also some members of Right Sector, National Corps and C14 among the crowd. The SMM saw about 20 police officers present. In Kharkiv, in front of the national police building at 5 Zhon Myronosyts Street, the SMM saw about 120 people (mostly men, 20-40 years old) participants, many from civil society organizations, and about 50 police officers present. In Lviv, at 1 Rynok Square, the SMM saw 70 people (mostly young men), some of whom were members of National Corps and C14. The SMM saw 20 police officers present. The SMM did not observe any incidents. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), saying that it would not be safe for the SMM.
• An armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk).
• At the north-western entrance to Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from entering the village.
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk, six members of the armed formations (four visibly armed) prevented the SMM from proceeding to the city, citing “anti-terrorist activities in the western part of the city”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.4

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference while flying near Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk).[4]
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV on several occasions due to signal interference while flying in a government-controlled area between Rybynske (49km south of Donetsk), Mykolaivka(40km south of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), in a government-controlled area Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk), as well as in an area between Rozdolne (non-government-controlled 46km south-east of Donetsk) and Heorhiievka (government-controlled, 27km south-west of Donetsk).
• A staff member of the “city administration” in Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 56km south of Luhansk) refused to provide information, citing the need for prior permission from the armed formations. The staff member also demanded to see the SMM’s patrol map, which the SMM refused to show.
• A staff member at a school in Mykhailivka refused to provide the SMM information, citing the need for prior permission from the armed formations. The staff member also demanded to see the SMM’s patrol plan, which the SMM refused to show.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Hranitne, Novolaspa and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including about 100 explosions, as in the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions).           

On the evening and night of 26-27 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 34 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 0.5-4km south-south-east, south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 26-27 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 160 projectiles in flight (mostly from south to north), 21 undetermined explosions, five muzzle flashes and one illumination flare in flight, all 3-5km east-north-east, east and south-east.

On the evening of 26-27 September, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 98 projectiles (mostly from west-south-west to east-north-east), one undetermined explosion, two muzzle flashes and nine bursts, all 2-4km east-south-east, south-east and south-south-west.

On the evening of 26 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 3-7km south-east and south. During the day on 27 September, while at the same location, the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km south-east and south.

During the day on 27 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 40 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km south-south-west, west-north-west and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

On the evening of 26 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded 22 projectiles in flight (from north-west to south-east) and two muzzle flashes, all 2-4km south-south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the evening and night of 26-27 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded one burst and five projectiles in flight (four from north to south and one from south to north), all 2-4km east and east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as three projectiles 2-4km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted on 24 September two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37 Buk) near railway cars in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) (for previous observation at the same site, see SMM Daily Report 26 September 2018). On 27 September, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 26 September, on a ridge north-east of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three new military positions (not visible in imagery from 25 September 2018), four men working in a 20m-long trench, as well as another four men doing trench work nearby (both trenches not visible in imagery from 25 September 2018). (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 26 September 2018.) On 27 September, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) and a command vehicle (undetermined variant) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 26 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 30m-long trench (not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018) near residential houses in a northern part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the presence of mine hazard signs. The SMM observed for the first time about 20 mine hazard signs reading “Danger Mines” (in Ukrainian and English) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km north-west of Luhansk), consisting of red and white square boards attached to 1.5m-high wooden poles, placed on the northern side of a road.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM observed a convoy of trucks marked “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” in Luhansk region. In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, a senior member of the armed formations refused to provide information to the SMM on reports of the arrival of a humanitarian convoy from the Russian Federation, citing the need for the SMM to write a letter in advance to the members of the armed formations. Later the SMM saw a convoy of ten white covered cargo trucks with “Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation” in Cyrillic written on them heading south-east on road M04 (for previous observations of a similar convoy, see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018). The convoy was followed by two technical support trucks and four cars (all with “LPR” plates). Later in the day, the SMM also saw a convoy of trucks in Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, non-government-controlled, 43km south-east of Luhansk), assessed to be the same convoy, heading east towards the border with the Russian Federation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a military compound near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), citing orders from his superiors not to allow access to anyone.
• Two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) five members of the armed formations (three visibly armed) stopped the SMM and allowed it to proceeded into the town only upon being escorted by another four armed members of the armed formations in a military-type van.

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).[5]
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV due to signal interference while flying in a government-controlled area between Petrivka (43km north of Donetsk) and Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), and later while flying in a non-government-controlled area between Fedorivka (34km north-east of Donetsk) and Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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SDGs SDGs:  5 - Gender equality

VIENNA, 28 September 2018 – The correlation between the security sector’s effectiveness and the inclusion of women and ways to overcome operational and institutional challenges in increasing women’s participation in the security sector will be the focus of a conference on 1 October in Vienna.

The conference, entitled Women in the Security Sector: Challenges and Opportunities in the OSCE Area and Beyond, is organized by Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship and supported by the OSCE Secretariat’s Gender Section.

Expert-level discussions will involve senior politico-military experts, gender advisers and peace mediators from participating States, Partners for Co-operation and other international organizations as well as representatives from OSCE field operations.

The opening session of the conference will be addressed by:

Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council

Thomas Greminger, OSCE Secretary General

Stefania Palmiero, Captain of the Italian Air Force.

Media are invited to cover the opening session, set to begin at 10:00 on 1 October 2018 at the Hofburg’s Neuer Saal, 2nd floor.

Journalists wishing to attend are required to send an e-mail confirming their attendance to press@osce.org, no later than 30 September at 17:00.

More information about the conference can be found here

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SKOPJE, 28 September 2018 – The international observers monitoring the 30 September referendum in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will present their preliminary post-referendum statement at a news conference on Monday, 1 October, in Skopje.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

The statement will be delivered by Ambassador Jan Petersen, Head of the ODIHR referendum observation mission, followed by Stefan Schennach, Head of the PACE delegation.

The international referendum observation mission comprises a total of 206 observers from 33 countries, including 198 long-term and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR and eight parliamentarians and staff from PACE.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference on Monday, 1 October, at 15:00 in Ballroom 1 of the Skopje Marriott Hotel, Plostad Makedonija 7, Skopje.

The press conference will be live streamed at: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +389 72 443 791 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Bogdan Torcatoriu, PACE, +33 6 50 39 29 40, bogdan.torcatoriu@coe.int

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397838 Željka Šulc

The third annual edition of the Extracurricular Workshop on International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice, organized by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, for law students was held between 23 and 28 September 2018 in Sarajevo.

Students from five universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) had an opportunity to gain practical experience in applying the principles of international criminal law and in tackling particular issues arising in war crimes cases.  The students, who will shortly graduate from law school and enter the judiciary, learned about the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of war crimes cases from judges, prosecutors, attorneys, witness support officers, and investigators.

“I am continuously impressed by the commitment of law students I meet in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” said Bruce G. Berton, Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. “These students, through their engagement and learning, have gained new skills that will have a positive impact in their forthcoming careers as legal professionals and help them contribute to the achievement of truth and justice in this country.”

Selma Kunic, a fourth year law student at the University of Tuzla said: “This workshop is a successful amalgam of theory and practice of international criminal law. It is workshops like this that enable us to learn more and expand our existing knowledge, since they offer a wealth of experience one cannot get within our institutions of higher education, especially given the fact that the system of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not organized in a way that fosters the adequate application of lessons learned in practice.”  

The concluding activity of the workshop was a mock trial held at the Court of BiH, where students practiced their trial advocacy skills and demonstrated the knowledge they gained during the workshop in front of senior members of judiciary.  

Ioanna Lachana, OSCE Mission to Skopje Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

Enhancing the capacities of law enforcement officers to counter religiously motivated terrorist organizations in line with international best practices was the aim of a five-day training course for some 20 counter-terrorism officers from the Interior Ministry, which concluded on 28 September 2018. The course was organized by the OSCE Mission to Skopje, in co-operation with the Turkish National Police.

“It is encouraging for the OSCE to see that the officers are willing to enhance their capacity in the area of countering terrorist organizations abusing religion. Sharing experiences and best practices in this area is of vital importance to the fight against terrorism,” said Serkan Serin, the Mission’s Adviser on Counter-Terrorism/Violent Extremism.

The course participants were trained on better identifying terrorist individuals and movements, defining terrorist ideologies and radicalization processes, and understanding recruitment and propaganda methods, which would have a long-term impact on public safety.

ROME, 28 September 2018 - Innovative measures to lower the risks of conflict between states in cyberspace such as emerging technological features, policy engagement, public-private partnerships are the focus of the 2018 OSCE-wide Conference on Cyber/ICT Security taking place in Rome today.

The conference, which opened yesterday with a hands-on scenario-based discussion for senior government officials and their policy and technical advisors, is organized by Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship with the support of the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat.

More than 170 representatives of the OSCE’s 57 participating States, the OSCE’s Partners for Co-operation, international and non-governmental organizations, academia, as well as representatives of the private sector have gathered to discuss how to mitigate the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs).

"This conference is very timely considering how relevant these topics are becoming in the agendas of world leaders. We may not exactly have the same ideas on how to tackle this challenge posed by the digital revolution, but this is actually why it is important to talk about it today and confirm the importance of this Organization," said Guglielmo Picchi, Italy’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, representing the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Italy's Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi, as he opened the conference.

Through the adoption of 16 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), the OSCE has come to play a unique and pioneering role in reducing the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs.

Currently, a key priority for participating States is the implementation of the CBMs and an Informal Working Group chaired by Ambassador Karoly Dan, Permanent Representative of Hungary to the OSCE, has intensified efforts to operationalize the CBMs.

“Through full implementation of the CBMs, the OSCE will contribute to preventing and resolving conflicts stemming from the use of ICTs and show the way forward for other regional organizations. The OSCE is a shining example for organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Organization of American States who are facing the same cyber/ICT security challenges and threats,” said Dan.

Oleg Khramov, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, said: “The OSCE cyber CBMs are practical measures and our future work at the OSCE shall focus on creating conditions for their full implementation to continue reducing the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs.”

Christopher Painter, Former Co-ordinator for Cyber Issues at the United States State Department and Commissioner for the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyber Space, said: “The negotiations of the two sets of the cyber CBMs were ahead of time. With its long and successful history of negotiating and implementing military Confidence and Security Building Measures, the OSCE is the best suited international forum for the full implementation of the cyber CBMs.”

Over the course of the conference, participants will have an opportunity to present their national views on various aspects of national and transnational threats to and in the use of ICTs, and will later discuss desirable goals to strive for that might help to address current international cyber/ICT security challenges.

The conference’s third and final session will focus on enhancing cyber resilience

through public-private partnerships and cover areas such as working with small businesses and start-ups to more effectively improve and retain cyber/ICT security expertise; establishing secondment schemes between national agencies and cyber/ICT security companies; and filling cross-border gaps in cyber/ICT security expertise.

The conference was preceded by a scenario-based discussion on 27 September, which provided national delegations with an opportunity to experience and be actively involved in a simulated, escalating high-impact cyber/ICT security incident.

Each delegation was handed a tablet and asked to choose responses to questions coming up in the scenario. Responses by delegations were anonymized, aggregated and later presented as overall percentages, with the aim of highlighting what participants perceived as effective emergency responses and procedures.

“What better way is there to reduce the risks of possible tensions than to practice the mechanisms that were designed to prevent them?,” asked Rasa Ostrauskaite, Co-ordinator of OSCE Activities to Address  Transnational Threats, at the start of yesterday’s discussion. The activity, she added, was “an opportunity for national representatives from policy and technical backgrounds to identify common approaches and whole-of-government responses to a major cyber/ICT security incident. The speed and ability of such cross-sectoral interaction is a core requirement when it comes to effectively applying the CBMs.”

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VIENNA, 28 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed today the arrest of eight persons in Slovakia in connection with the murders of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová in February 2018.

“I welcome the important progress in the investigation on the murder of Jan Kuciak and his fiancée, and the arrest of eight persons allegedly linked to this crime. I hope that this will lead to the identification and prosecution of the perpetrators and all involved, especially those who ordered this horrendous assassination,” said Désir “There must be no impunity for killing journalists.”

Kuciak was an investigative reporter who contributed to the news portal aktuality.sk.

The OSCE Representative met with Slovakia’s Prime Minister and Minister of Interior just after the murders to urge the authorities to pursue a full, transparent and swift investigation.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA, 28 September 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, in a letter to the authorities of the United Kingdom today, conveyed his concerns regarding the draft Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill currently under consideration by the country’s Parliament. While the draft law sets out additional powers to help tackle terrorism, Désir said he was concerned about the potential impact of the proposed legislation on media freedom.

“I fully understand the importance and the need for governments to counter terrorism and terrorist propaganda through security legislation. However, it is necessary that any new security norms will not hinder or undermine the work of journalists or impact the freedom of expression and access to information,” said Désir.

The Representative drew attention to Clause 2 of the Bill, regarding the ‘publication, by a person, of an image of an item of clothing or an article in such a way as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organization’.

“I recommend that the UK government adopt more narrow definitions to ensure that journalistic work in particular will not fall within the scope of this provision, including that ‘reasonable suspicion of being a member or supporter of a proscribed organization’ is more clearly defined,” said Désir. “As it stands, the law could have an impact on the freedom of the media. I am concerned that the provision has the potential to criminalize a too broad range of behaviour, and risks creating a chilling effect on journalistic freedom to report on the concerned organization.”

Désir expressed reservations regarding Clause 3, related to obtaining or viewing proscribed material online, noting that, while an excuse defence is included in the bill, this clause could criminalize too broadly the searching of material, including for journalistic purposes or other research.

The Representative also conveyed his concerns regarding the expansion of border control powers to obtain evidence. “New powers to search and question individuals entering the UK should include a specific provision which respects the protection of confidential journalistic sources. Any new powers must be governed by strict and independent judicial oversight along with adequate safeguards against their abuse,” said Désir.

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VIENNA, 28 September 2018 – A genuine willingness is required if a full sustainable ceasefire is to be achieved in eastern Ukraine, the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ertugrul Apakan, said in his address to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna yesterday.

The Chief Monitor pointed out that there had been three attempts to cease fire through seasonal recommitments since the beginning of the year, the latest happening on 29 August. Although initially resulting in a decrease in the level of recorded violence, each attempt invariably failed as weapons remained in place and little progress was made on the disengagement of forces and hardware.

“Commitments already made have to be translated into concrete action on the ground,” the Ambassador said.

Meanwhile, Apakan said, civilians continue to be killed and injured, and infrastructure providing gas, electricity and water – upon which civilians on both sides of the contact line depend – remains vulnerable. With the support of the SMM, long-stalled repairs were finally made possible on a number of key infrastructure facilities, benefitting hundreds of thousands of people.

“Local solutions only work in the short term,” Apakan said. “Political will is needed to find more long-lasting solutions.”

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397712 Karen Gainer Marina Živaljević

Considering the Regional Youth Co-operation Office (RYCO) as a key partner for promoting the spirit of reconciliation among the region’s youth, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, with the RYCO Local Branch Office, organized a three-day capacity-building training for 23 potential RYCO applicants between 25 and 28 September 2018.

Opening the workshop, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Siv-Katrine Leirtroe said: “We see RYCO as very important because it works on enhancing youth mobility and social inclusion. This is crucial for the future of young people as this is their chance to change the view on their neighbours through the opportunities that the RYCO offers to them.”

RYCO Local Branch Officer in Montenegro, Edin Koljenović, said: “This training course was created as a result of the recognition of the clear need to work on strengthening the capacity of non-governmental organizations and high schools to write project proposals.”

Praising the results achieved by the RYCO in its first year of operation, the General Director for Youth in the Ministry of Sports and member of the RYCO Steering Board Nenad Koprivica said that the Government of Montenegro supports the establishment and functioning of RYCO and its local office in Podgorica. Montenegro was the first country in the Western Balkans to meet all conditions provided by the Agreement on the establishment of an RYCO local office.

RYCO was founded in 2016 at the Western Balkans Sixth Summit in Paris as an independent institutional mechanism to promote the spirit of reconciliation and co-operation among youth in the region through exchange programmes.

NEW YORK, 28 September 2018 - The first-ever memorandum of understanding between the OSCE and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) was signed on 27 September by OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger and UN Women Deputy Executive Director Yannick Glemarec.

”Gender equality is a prerequisite to achieving comprehensive security, and we need to combine our forces to fight gender inequality in all dimensions of security,” said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger. “We have always highly valued our co-operation with UN Women.”

The Memorandum of Understanding provides a strong framework for co-operation between the organizations to address key gender equality challenges in the OSCE region, including at the national level between OSCE field operations and UN Women Country Offices.

It aims to improve information sharing and the seeking of synergies, but also to facilitate the exchange of knowledge, good practices and lessons learned, in order to support OSCE participating States in implementing their international commitments to promote gender equality.  

“UN Women and the OSCE are strong allies in the pursuit of a safer and more just world for women globally. We are confident that today’s signature will lead to a fruitful cooperation,” said UN Women Deputy Executive Director Yannick Glemarec.

Eleven joint areas of work are included in the memorandum of understanding, ranging from the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda to ending violence against women and girls, combating trafficking in human beings, especially women and girls, and preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism.

It also includes joint efforts to advocate for achieving gender parity in the UN system and the OSCE, and building capacity for gender mainstreaming in all sectors relevant to politico-military, economic and environmental and human dimensions of security.   

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397673 Communication and Media Relations Section OSCE Guidebook Intelligence-Led Policing

The Arabic version of the OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing was published in Vienna on 28 September 2018.

A launching event of the Arabic version will be jointly organized between the OSCE and the League of Arab States in its Headquarters in Cairo on 14 November 2018.

The guidebook, first published in English in July 2017, presents intelligence-led policing (ILP) as a modern and proactive law enforcement model and a realistic alternative for OSCE participating States to traditionally reactive forms of policing.

It aims to promote a common understanding of the terminology related to criminal intelligence, thereby enhancing trust, co-operation and sharing of information between agencies and countries.

ILP, which has already been adopted in a number of countries in recent years with promising results, combines intelligence gathering, evaluation and analysis with informed decision-making procedures and mechanisms, therefore providing more efficient and effective management of national law enforcement services.

The Arabic translation follows the Albanian, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and Macedonian versions of the handbook, which were published in September 2017, and a Russian version published in November of that year. 

NEW YORK CITY, United States of America, 27 September 2018 – The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stephane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) met separately and jointly with the Foreign Minister of Armenia, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, and the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, between 25 and 27 September on the margins of the UN General Assembly.  The Co-Chairs were joined in their meetings by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Andrzej Kasprzyk.  They also met with the OSCE Secretary General, UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, and a representative of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

The Ministers continued negotiations on the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The Co-Chairs and the Ministers discussed the situation in the region and sought clarification with respect to several recent statements and incidents of concern.  The Co-Chairs expressed deep regret over the continuing and unnecessary loss of life.  They cautioned the Ministers about the dangers of escalation, called on the parties to engage constructively in a positive atmosphere, and to avoid inflammatory rhetoric.  The Co-Chairs underscored that a comprehensive settlement will require compromises on all sides.

In this context, the Ministers confirmed the importance of taking measures to intensify the negotiation process and to take additional steps to reduce tensions.  The Ministers agreed to meet again before the end of the year.

The Co-Chairs plan to visit the region in the near future and will then brief the OSCE Minsk Group and the Permanent Council on the status of negotiations.

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VIENNA, 27 September 2018 – Yesterday's attack on another investigative journalist in Bulgaria is unacceptable, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, said in Vienna today.

Dimitar Varbanov, of the television show “Gospodari na Efira” (Lords of the Airwaves), was severely beaten in Veliko Tarnovo on 26 September by several assailants working at the warehouse which he had investigated. The journalist, who was investigating the sale of expired products, sustained several injuries and was hospitalized.

“Investigative journalists carry out an important and dangerous duty of informing society on issues of public interest, often risking their health, and sometimes their lives, in the search for truth. Perpetrators of this attack must be identified and face justice. The journalists must be protected from such unacceptable violence,” Désir said.

The Representative noted the reaction by the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Boyko Borissov, who reportedly commented on this case earlier today, saying that “the bullies must be punished with the full force of the law.”

The Representative recently condemned the attack on Khristo Geshov, producer of the ‘Targeted’ television programme  (see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/381145) and threats against Georgi Ezekiev of Zov News  (see: https://www.osce.org/fom/358966).

He also wrote to the authorities regarding the detention of investigative journalists Dimitar Stoyanov of Bivol and Atilla Biro of Rise Romania.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed impact sites in Horlivka. The SMM recorded an explosion inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted again near Zaichenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines in Bezimenne. The SMM observed long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema, as well as demining in Pishchane.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100).           

On the evening of 25 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and about 115 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-west and south.

On the evening and night of 25-26 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, a muzzle flash and 16 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 0.5-4km south, south-south-west and south-west.

On the evening and night of 25-26 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded five undetermined explosions and about 150 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), all 2-4km east-north-east and east.

On the evening and night of 25-26 September, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) recorded about 30 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east) 2-4km south-east and south-south-east as well as a muzzle flesh 2-4km south-south-west.

During the day on 26 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and about 40 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km north, south-west and west.

Positioned on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km north, west, north-west and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (34 explosions).

During the day on 26 September, positioned 2km south-east of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 7-9km south-east.

The SMM observed impact sites in Horlivka. At 13 Nansena Street in Horlivka’s Shakhta Haharina neighbourhood, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the west-north-west-facing outer wall of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM also saw a west-north-west-facing shattered window on the second floor of the same building. The SMM saw a crater in a yard about 25m west-south-west of a two-storey apartment building at 11 Nansena Street. The SMM could not assess the weapon used or direction of fire. A group of residents in the same area (two women and four men) told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 23 September.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 26 September, positioned about 250m south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 300-500m north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned about 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire 300-500m north-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and four shots of small-arms fire 2-3km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 26 September, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five tanks (three T-64 and two T-72) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in an area outside government control in Luhansk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that five tanks (three T-64 and two T-72) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicle[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, on 26 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) about 1km west of Shumy (41km north of Donetsk) and  an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk). On 26 September, the SMM saw an APC near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and two amphibious transporters (PTS-2) in a compound in Luhansk city. At an airfield in the south-eastern outskirts of Luhansk city, the same UAV spotted a recently flattened field surrounded by berms, assessed as a newly built shooting range and part of a training area (inside the security zone). At about 100m south-east of the shooting range, the SMM UAV also spotted a man, assessed as a member of the armed formations.   

While conducting an SMM mid-range UAV flight near Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw, in a field approximately 200m south of its position, a group of five people wearing balaclavas and unidentified uniforms (two of them had a flag of the United Kingdom attached to the arm), launching an unmarked UAV flight. The SMM saw that they recalled the UAV after about a minute. The same group of people approached the SMM and asked in Russian to see identification of the SMM patrol members. The SMM did not comply with the request. About an hour later, at the same location, the SMM observed an unmarked UAV flying north to south at an altitude of about 300m above the SMM’s position.

The SMM observed the presence of mines. On 22 September, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 300 anti-tank mines (AT-62) in a field about 4km south-east of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report of 17 July 2018.)

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure, including demining, to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka, and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM saw that a demining team had removed anti-tank mines from an area between road H15 and the entrance to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station. The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. A representative of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine told the SMM that demining activities in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk) were completed on 26 September.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians travelling across the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. On 26 September, at a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, at 09:45 the SMM saw about 1,200 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 50 people queuing in the opposite direction. Approximately two hours later, the SMM saw about 1,000 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 50 people queuing in the opposite direction.

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for 50 minutes, the SMM saw 18 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation and seven with “DPR” plates), ten covered cargo trucks (five with Ukrainian licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), two minibuses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 16 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation and five with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Russian Federation licence plates entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superior” and “poor road conditions”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the general public and the media. 

SUMMARY

On 27 September at 06:33 (Moscow time), the seventy-ninth[1] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 16 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 16 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 14:01 on 27 September.

DETAIL

Leaving the Russian Federation

On 27 September at 06:33, the Observer Mission observed the arrival of a Russian convoy at the gate of the Donetsk BCP. A Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) team co-ordinated and led the movements of the convoy. The convoy consisted of ten cargo trucks and six support vehicles, including one ambulance. Five out of ten cargo trucks bore the inscription “Humanitarian help from the Russian Federation” (in Russian). The ambulance bore the inscription “Don Rescue Centre” (in Russian).

At 06:33 the vehicles entered the customs control area and queued in three lines. Once the convoy arrived, the vehicles were visually checked from the outside by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers. The Russian MES staff rolled up/opened the tarpaulins of the trucks and the border guards and customs officials performed a visual observation from the outside.

Three Ukrainian border guards and one customs officer were observed accompanying their Russian counterparts; they also performed a visual observation of the vehicles from the outside (without entering the trucks’ cargo space). They had clipboards in their hands and were taking notes. One service dog was present during the procedure. By 06:47 all of the vehicles had left the BCP towards Ukraine.

Returning to the Russian Federation

At 13:49 the convoy returned and queued in the customs area. The tarpaulins of the trucks were opened and Russian Federation border guards and customs officers visually checked the returning convoy from the outside. Ukrainian representatives – three border guards and two customs officers – were present during this check. The Ukrainian officials also performed visual checks of the opened trucks from the outside. By 14:01 all 16 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation.

[1]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the eighty-first Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the seventy-ninth convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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397628 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presented its spot report on the implementation of the National War Crimes Processing Strategy in Sarajevo on 27 September 2018.

The report, “Observations on the National War Crimes Processing Strategy and its 2018 Draft Revisions, including its relation to the Rules of the Road Category A cases”, reviews the progress achieved by the BiH judiciary since the introduction of the National War Crimes Processing Strategy in 2008 and identifies challenges and obstacles in its implementation that the Revised Strategy aims to address. 

The OSCE Mission to BiH urged the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Revised National War Crimes Processing Strategy without further delay. “While delivering justice and ending impunity for these terrible crimes will continue to require a great deal of effort by the entire justice sector, it also requires political will and support. This support should come from ordinary citizens as well as the highest levels of government,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH, Bruce G. Berton.

The Revised National War Crimes Processing Strategy addresses the challenges that remain in ensuring that these cases are processed efficiently. By building on the progress achieved since the adoption of the original strategy, it will help secure justice for war crimes victims and will support the country as it moves forward towards reconciliation and lasting peace. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM heard ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted in Pikuzy and Kozatske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines in Dyliivka and Kalynove. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, water pipelines near Maiorsk and Horlivka, the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka, and water infrastructure in Slovianoserbsk and near Artema, as well as to enable demining in Pishchane. The SMM observed a calm situation at the ABL near Chonhar in Kherson region.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period.           

On the evening and night of 24-25 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions, a muzzle flash and 54 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), all 1-2km south-south-east, south and south-south-west, including a projectile that was fired 430m south-south-west, which passed as close as 10m below the SMM camera.

On the evening of 24 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and about 115 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east, south and west-south-west.

On the evening and night of 24-25 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions and about 165 projectiles in flight (just over half from north to south and the remainder from south to north) and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km east-north-east and east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions).

On the evening and night of 24-25 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded two undetermined explosions and 34 projectiles in flight (about half from north-east to south-west and half from south-west to north-east), all 2-5km east-south-east and south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven outgoing explosions of recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm), 15 shots of automatic grenade-launcher fire and 35 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-1.5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Shortly thereafter, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) near Dyliivka (49km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) and 16 missiles (9M317) loaded on railway cars in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk). On 25 September, on the outskirts of Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) and four more surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 23 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk). On 24 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk). On 25 September, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

On 24 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted five Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel standing next to a building with a Ukrainian flag, speaking to eight civilians in a residential area east of Zolote-4/Rodina. Nearby, the same UAV spotted a 50m-long trench, which six Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel were digging in the backyards of two residential houses, as well as another 20m-long new trench 250m east, also in the backyard of a residential house. The same UAV also spotted a new military position on a ridge with five Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present near Zolote 4/Rodina, at a location where an SMM mid-range UAV had spotted two recoilless guns and four Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel two days prior (see SMM Daily Report 24 September 2018). While conducting the UAV flight, the SMM heard approximately 15 shots of small-arms fire 1-2.5km east of Zolote-4/Rodina. Footage from the SMM mini-UAV shows a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier firing a shot of small-arms fire in the direction of the UAV.

On 24 September, in Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted three firing positions on the roof of a building about 50m north-west of a functional school across the street. Near the school, the same UAV spotted four persons in camouflage clothing, assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, one of whom was armed with a long-barreled weapon.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (probable MT-LB) near Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk) and five IFVs (BMP variants) near Kalynove.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure, including water pipelines between the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to enable repairs at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), where works were interrupted due to ceasefire violations (see table below for ceasefire violations in the area), and demining at and repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as demining in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk).

In Kherson region, on 24 September, the SMM monitored the ABL at the checkpoint near Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and observed both vehicular and pedestrian traffic traveling in both directions, without delays.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• In Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), five members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) denied passage to the SMM to proceed to an abandoned school in the village, citing risks to the “security and safety of the SMM patrol and scattered UXO around the school area.”
• At a checkpoint in Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders not to allow the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• In Perevalsk (non-government-controlled, 38km west of Luhansk), a representative of the “city administration” told the SMM that it needed permission from the armed formations in order to gather information.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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