OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. It followed up on reports of a woman injured by a bullet in Maiorsk and injuries caused by an explosion in Donetsk city. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Novolaspa.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to power lines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and Olenivka, as well as to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Parliament building.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 175 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (205 explosions).

On the evening and night of 1-2 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 66 explosions (65 undetermined and one assessed as an airburst), about 70 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north), three illumination flares, four muzzle flashes and 17 bursts, all 0.5-5km at southerly directions.

On the evening of 1 October, the SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 26 undetermined explosions and about 40 projectiles in flight (mostly from south-west to north-east and from north-east to south-west), all 0.5-4km at easterly directions.

On the evening of 1 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 37 undetermined explosions and about 390 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 4-8km east and south-east. On the following day, while in the same location, the SMM heard eight explosions (seven undetermined and one assessed as the impact of a 120mm mortar round) and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-6km east and south-east.

During the day on 2 October, positioned about 2km south of Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (130 explosions).[2]

On the evening of 1 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded five undetermined explosions and about 50 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-south-east to west-north-west and from west-north-west to east-south-east), all 2-5km south-south-west and south-west.

On the morning of 2 October, positioned 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 10-15km south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Maiorsk. At a hospital in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, government-controlled, 67km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a woman (aged 58) with a large wound on the right side of her head. She told the SMM that on the evening of 28 September, while outside her apartment block in Maiorsk, she had heard the sound of shelling and of bullets flying around and had been hit in the head. Medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that the woman had been admitted to the hospital on 29 September with a gunshot wound to the right side of her head.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of injuries caused by an explosion in non-government-controlled Donetsk city on 29 September. (See SMM Daily Report 1 October 2018.) At the Institute of Emergency and Reconstructive Surgery in Donetsk city, the SMM saw a man (aged 40-45) and a woman (aged 30) with burns on their faces. The man told the SMM that he had been in the office of the “communist party” with other people, including the woman, when a loud explosion had occurred. Medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that they had both been admitted on 29 September and that the man was suffering from burns on his face, hearing impairment, and pain in both eyes and right arm, while the woman was suffering from burns on her face and injuries to one of her eyes. Medical staff at the Donetsk Trauma Hospital said that another man (aged 30-40) had suffered injuries in the same incident.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the morning of 2 October, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (type undetermined) 2km north and five explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (type undetermined) 2km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. During the day, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire and two shots of small-arms fire, all 0.6-1km south and assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 2 October, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw four surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) north of Shumy (41km north of Donetsk). The SMM also saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (probable BMP-1) on the northern edge of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 1 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (one BTR-70 and one MT-LB with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top) in a compound in the north-western outskirts of Luhansk.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Olenivka (non-government controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), as well as to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

In Kyiv, the SMM saw about 300 men (aged 17-30) gathered in front of the Parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street. Most of them were wearing insignias of and carrying flags of the Nationalni Druzhyny, National Corps and Svodoba. At the site, one of the participants gave a speech in support of the adoption of the draft law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine (regarding the legal status of foreigners and stateless persons who participated in the protection of Ukraine's territorial integrity and inviolability)”. The SMM saw about 200 police and National Guard officers, including some in riot gear, securing the entrance of the Parliament building. After about four hours, the gathering dispersed without incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 2 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Novolaspa (non-government controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding to the village, citing “security reasons”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”. The patrol was allowed to pass after about 20 minutes.

Other impediments:

• On 1 October, an SMM mini-UAV, which was flying over an area south-west of Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), spotted two men wearing military-style clothing pointing an assault rifle (probable AK-47 or AK-74) at the UAV and another man (also wearing military-style clothing) firing at the UAV. (See SMM Daily Report 2 October 2018.)
• At a school in Horodyshche (non-government-controlled, 57km south-west of Luhansk), a man who introduced himself as its director said that he could not provide information to the SMM without written permission from other members of the armed formations.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] The paragraph on ceasefire violations in SMM Daily Report 2 October 2018 should have read: “In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 130 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions)”.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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WASHINGTON D.C., 3 October 2018 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today officially opened a limited election observation mission for the mid-term congressional elections to be held in the United States on 6 November. The mission's deployment follows an invitation from the United States Government.

The mission is led by Tana de Zulueta and consists of 13 international experts based in Washington D.C. and 36 long-term observers to be deployed throughout the country in teams of two, from 10 October. The observers are drawn from 16 OSCE participating States.

Observers will assess these elections for compliance with international obligations and standards for democratic elections, including the commitments agreed to by all the OSCE participating States, and with national legislation. The mission will analyse the legal framework and its implementation and will follow campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant government bodies, including voter registration, and the resolution of election disputes. As part of its observation, the ODIHR mission will analyse and assess the media coverage of the campaign.

The mission will meet with representatives of relevant federal and state authorities and of political parties, as well as with representatives of the judiciary, civil society and the media. For election day, the mission will join efforts with a delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA).

The mission will publish one interim report in the course of its work. A statement of preliminary findings and conclusions will be presented at a press conference the day after the elections. A final report will be published approximately two months after the completion of the election process.

As a participating State in the OSCE, the United States has committed itself to conducting elections in line with OSCE standards and inviting international election observers. ODIHR has observed and assessed elections in the United States since 2002.

For further information, please contact Pietro Tesfamariam, Mission Media Analyst at (+1) 202 553 1247

 or pietro.tesfamariam@odihr-elections.us

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 or Thomas.Rymer@odihr.pl.

Additional information on the observation mission for the United States general elections can be found at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/usa.

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398483 Ukrainian civil servants participate in an excercise to identify the key elements of national human rights strategies and action plans during the ODIHR workshop. Kyiv, 3 October 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Monitoring the implementation of national human rights strategies and action plans was the focus of a workshop for Ukrainian civil servants organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) from 1 to 3 October 2018 in Kyiv.

The participants – 11 men and 9 women – were representatives of the Ministry of Justice and other ministries working on the National Human Rights Strategy and the related Action Plan. Representatives from a number of civil society organizations also participated.

“With this workshop we build the capacities of national actors to integrate a human rights-based approach into their monitoring work, and we stimulate dialogue and co-operation between state and civil society actors,” said Marc van Gool, ODIHR Human Rights Adviser.

Yevhenii Shakotko, an expert working on human rights at the Ministry of Justice, said: “Among other things, ODIHR’s checklist for assessing the impact of legislation on human rights, which was presented at this workshop, will help its participants do their work more effectively.”

The participants also learned how to effectively mainstream gender into human rights monitoring.

The workshop was part of ODIHR’s project, ongoing since 2015, aimed at enhancing effective mechanisms for dialogue among civil society and key government stakeholders to address human rights issues in the country, in line with OSCE commitments and other international standards.

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) organized two panels – on war crimes and on trafficking in human beings and gender-based violence – at the three-day Annual Prosecutorial Conference on Criminal Matters, held on 1-3 October 2018 in Neum, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The panel on war crimes focused on challenges in transferring war crimes cases from the BiH Court to courts and prosecutor’s offices on the entity .The panel on trafficking in human beings and gender-based violence focused on improving the practices of BiH prosecutors’ offices in tackling cases in these areas.

“Trafficking in human beings is a complex crime and a serious human rights violation with many gender-related aspects. This panel was an opportunity to emphasize the importance of having improved and more efficient practices in tackling this issue, as well as of gender-based violence issues,” said Boris Topić, Anti-trafficking Officer in the OSCE Mission to BiH.

The OSCE Mission to BiH used this opportunity to present the latest relevant OSCE reports to over 200 prosecutors and judges from all over Bosnia and Herzegovina: Assessment report: Migrant and Refugee Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Report of the OSCE Special Representative and Coordinator on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings on Identifying and Protecting Human Trafficking Victims in Mixed Migration Flows as well as the Training Manual for Judges and Prosecutors on Trafficking in Human Beings.

The OSCE Mission to BiH will continue to advocate for the strengthening of victim-centred criminal justice responses to human trafficking cases, in line with international standards.

MINSK, 3 October 2018 - Ambassador Martin Sajdik, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, and Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, issued yesterday the following statement:

“We are deeply saddened that three children lost their lives, and two others were injured in recent days in Horlivka and Staromyhailivka in the east of Ukraine. There have been too many cases involving the death or injury of children as a result of ongoing violence and in particular the indiscriminate laying of mines and other explosive devices along the contact line. This situation cannot continue; all areas where mines and improvised explosive devices present a life-threatening risk for the civilian population, in particular for children and teenagers, must be demined without delay out of humanitarian considerations.

We urgently appeal to the sides to proceed with the rapid and full humanitarian demining of populated areas and entry-exit crossing points and, using adequate means of communication, to keep the population clearly informed of risk areas as well as areas where demining has been completed. We recall that mine action is a commitment that has been undertaken by all the sides to the Minsk agreements.”

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MINSK, 2 October 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 2 October 2018:

“Last weekend was one of the saddest ones in recent times. As you know, on September 30, 2018, three children were killed and one was injured as a result of a mine blast near Horlivka. On the same day, another teenager was injured by shelling in Staromyhailivka.

Obviously, urgent measures for ‘humanitarian demining’ shall be taken. In this regard, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission Chief Monitor Ertugrul Apakan and I issued a joint statement.

In the statement, we call on the sides - I am quoting now only partially - “to proceed with the rapid and full humanitarian demining of populated areas and entry-exit check points”. We also recall that “mine action is a commitment that has been undertaken by all the sides to the Minsk Agreements.”

This set of questions was today in the focus of the Trilateral Contact Group and its Security Working Group. The Working Group also discussed additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire.

The Economic Working Group continued the discussion of topical issues related to water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems, including further steps to carry out repair works on the south Donbas water pipeline in Avdiivka’s industrial zone.

The Humanitarian Working Group further considered issues related to the exchange of detainees and the search for missing persons. One of the discussion topics was also the possibility to improve contact line crossing conditions on the side of certain areas of Luhansk region at the Stanytsia Luhanska check point.

The Political Working Group continued work on its regular agenda issues, such as, for instance, the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’.

Today was also the last time when President Leonid Kuchma participated in our meetings as head of the Ukrainian delegation to the TCG. To work with him has been a great honour and immense pleasure for all of us.

On behalf of all the participants of the TCG and on my own behalf, I would like to express our sincere gratitude to President Kuchma for his invaluable contribution to our work.

I personally learned a lot from this wise politician devoted to his country, and, first of all, a trustworthy person. I am sincerely grateful for that”.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 10,836 to 10,636 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 29 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased to 40  (compared to 26 last week); 12 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and twenty-eight into Ukraine (93 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, six families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and four into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (409 compared to 391 observed during the previous week). There were 215 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 194 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Stakhanov-Kharkiv; Kyiv; Luhansk-Kyiv; Rovenky- Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 880 to 903 (284 at the Gukovo BCP and 619 at the Donetsk BCP); 493 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 410 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                          

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 60 (compared to 75 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 95 to 124: of the total number of trucks scanned, 87 trucks (70 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 37 trucks (30 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 191 to 156 vehicles; 72 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 84 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 17 occasions, compared to 24 last week; the OTs assessed that 9 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with “DPR” plates and with Czech, Lithuanian, Georgian and Belarusian licence plates.

During the reporting period the OTs observed ambulances on three occasions: twice at the Donetsk BCP on 27 September and on 2 October, and once at the Gukovo BCP on 25 September. Only in one case, on 27 September, did an ambulance (with Ukrainian licence plates and the inscription “Urgent medical help”) cross the border from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. On the remaining occasions, the ambulances arrived from the Russian side, parked within the BCP areas and, after a short stay, travelled back to the Russian Federation. On all occasions, the OTs could only observe medical personnel on board the vehicles.

On 26 September, at both BCPs (in Donetsk 15:28 and in Gukovo at 15:45), the OTs observed a military type helicopter flying over the BCP area, along the border line (in Donetsk flying from north-west to south-east and in Gukovo from north-east to east), without leaving the Russian airspace.

Convoy

On 27 September at 06:33 (Moscow time), the seventy-ninth[3] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 16 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 16 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 14:01 on 27 September (for more details see: https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-donetsk/397661).

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 4 September to 2 October 2018, please see the attachment here.  

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

[3] According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the eighty-first Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the seventy-ninth convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Zhovte. The Mission followed up on reports of a girl injured by shelling in Staromykhailivka and children killed and injured by an explosion in Horlivka. The SMM recorded a ceasefire violation near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Tavrycheske, Bezimenne, Sosnivske, and Novoazovsk near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station and to high-voltage powerlines near Zhovte. In Kyiv region, the SMM observed an incident during a court hearing for a journalist and followed up on reports of damage to the offices of the Russian Federation Trade Representation and of a member of parliament.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including 205 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 100 explosions).

On the evening and night of 30 September-1 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion, about 60 projectiles (mostly in vertical flight) and an illumination flare in flight from east to west, all 1-4km south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 30 September-1 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 22 undetermined explosions, about 330 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north) and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km at easterly directions.

On the evening of 30 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about 160 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-8km south-east, south-south-east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (six), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions).

On the evening 30 September, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded two explosions assessed as impacts 3-5km south-south-west, as well as two undetermined explosions, about 130 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-north-east to west-south-west and from east-south-east to west-north-west) and an illumination flare in flight from west-north-west to east-south-east, all 1-5km south-south-west and south-west.

The same evening, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 120 undetermined explosions and about 200 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 10-15km north-west and north-north-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of a girl injured by shelling in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk). On 1 October, medical staff at the Kalinina Hospital in Donetsk city told the SMM that a 16-year-old girl had been admitted the previous day with a wound caused by shelling and had been transferred the same day to the city’s Children’s Clinical Centre. Medical staff added that the girl was not in serious condition. Medical staff at the clinical centre told the SMM that the girl had been admitted on 30 September after having been injured by shelling. According to the girl’s mother, with whom the SMM spoke over the telephone, her daughter told her that at around 16:30 on 30 September, she had heard a whistling sound near their home on Leninabadska Street in Staromykhailivka and then seen her abdomen bleeding.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of children killed and injured by an explosion in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report 1 October 2018.) On 1 October, medical staff at a morgue in Horlivka told the SMM that the bodies of three boys (12, 13 and 14 years old) had been brought to the morgue on 30 September. They added that the boys had died from shrapnel and blast-wave injuries and organ damage.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 29 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a military truck, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, about 1.2km east of the western edge of the area and about 800m north of its southern edge (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 1 October 2018).

On the evening of 30 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight from west-north-west to east-south-east 2-4km east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 1 October, positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.[2]

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 29 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35, Strela-10) on the south-eastern edge of Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 29 September, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a tank (T-64) parked near a residential building in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) loaded on a flatbed truck near the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). (See SMM Daily Report 1 October 2018.)

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that the site continued to be abandoned and the following weapons were missing: 53 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (five 2B9 Nona-S, 120mm, and two PM-38, 120mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), an anti-aircraft system[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 29 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near residential houses in Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), two IFVs (BMP-2) near Hnutove, a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4, 23mm) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Starohnativka, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-variant) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) on the eastern edge of Avdiivka (17km north-east of Donetsk). On 30 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On 1 October, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 30 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-1) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk). On 1 October, the SMM saw two APCs (BTR variants) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Luhansk city, as well as a convoy of about 30 military-type vehicles, including three APCs (two BTR-80 and one BTR-60) and two armoured command vehicles (undetermined types), near Oleksandrivsk (10km west of Luhansk) travelling towards Luhansk city.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and high-voltage powerlines near Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM did not observe the presence of the armed formations or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

On 28 September in Zhytomyr, west of Kyiv, the SMM monitored a hearing in the trial of a journalist charged with treason who is currently under house arrest. The SMM observed approximately 30 young men, most of whom had Sich insignia on their clothes, present in the courtroom. The SMM heard the young men verbally insulting the journalist and his defence team and saw small objects being thrown at them. Later, ten police officers in riot gear entered the courtroom, at which point the disruptions ceased. The judges ruled for the journalist’s house arrest to be extended by two months.

Also in Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports that the premises of the Trade Representation of the Russian Federation had been spray-painted on 28 September. At 8A Shcherbakivskoho Street, on 29 September, the SMM saw remnants of cleaning agents on the gate and fence of the building housing the representation and, in front of the building, graffiti critical of the Russian Federation spray-painted on the pavement. Two women (aged 50-60), who said that they had been in a nearby shop at the time of the incident, told the SMM that, in the late afternoon of 28 September, a group of about 15-20 young men with covered faces had sprayed some graffiti on the fence and the pavement.

The SMM also followed up on reports that the office of a member of parliament had been damaged on the night of 29-30 September. At 16 Marshala Tymoshenko Street in Kyiv, on 30 September, the SMM saw that the glass of a window on the ground floor of the building had been shattered and the window had been covered with red paint. The SMM saw two young men attempting to remove the paint and noted that the entrance door to the building was locked.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”.
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding to the city or towards the border with the Russian Federation.
• At a checkpoint north of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding west, citing “security reasons”.
• At the entrance to Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), a car (Lada), which had come from the opposite direction, stopped and blocked the road, preventing the SMM from entering the village. An armed member of the armed formations then stepped out of the car and told the SMM that it would not be allowed to travel further “for the safety of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zhovte, the SMM heard about 50 shots of small-arms fire where the UAV was flying, about 2km south of the SMM’s position, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV safely and departed the area. (See SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018.)
• On two occasions, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference while flying near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).[5]

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The paragraph on weapons observed in violation of withdrawal lines in SMM Daily Report 1 October 2018 should have read: “In violation of withdrawal lines, on 28 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a mortar (probable 82mm) within a known position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Petrivske disengagement area.”

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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398231 Communication and Media Relations Section Giovanni Davoli

Persisting challenges within and beyond the OSCE area with regard to the meaningful participation of women to international peace and security efforts were the focus of discussions at the OSCE-wide conference “Women in the Security Sector: Challenges for the OSCE Area and Beyond”, held in Vienna on 1 October 2018. The event was organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship in co-operation with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Gender section.

A wide range of stakeholders from OSCE participating States, OSCE executive structures and institutions and other international organizations, as well as military personnel, peace-building and politico-military advisers, gender experts, and academics discussed how increasing women’s participation in the security sector makes it more diverse and effective.

“We strongly advocate and support the need for an increased participation of women in the security sector,” said Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council, in his opening speech. “Women’s participation in military and peace-keeping activities is a force multiplier in operational planning and mission implementation. It also contributes to situational awareness and improves the perception of the peace operation, thus increasing its acceptance by the local population,” he added.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger said: “Gender equality and women’s rights are essential elements of the OSCE’s concept of comprehensive security. We need further constructive dialogue to advance women in the traditionally male-dominated security sector”.

Despite UN Security Council Resolutions and national action plans addressing and mandating women’s participation in the security sector, it is often discounted or overlooked, both in the field and at the decision-making level. Nevertheless, positive models of inclusivity do exist within the OSCE area and beyond.

"Integrating a gender perspective throughout all ranges of military activities can significantly boost their effectiveness,” said Captain of the Italian Airforce Stefania Palmiero. “The Italian Military Forces are highly committed towards a full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, peace and security and subsequent resolutions. Over the last few years, gender has been mainstreamed across all levels and branches of the military, reflecting Italy’s traditional focus on responding to the different needs of men, women, boys and girls, especially in military operations."

Within the framework of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship’s effort to further advance the Organization’s efforts in this domain, the conference built on existing OSCE commitments with regard to women’s contribution to international peace and security and the legacy of the former Austrian OSCE Chairmanship.

398318 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

More than 25 representatives of the Agency for Interethnic Relations, the Ombudsman’s office and the Council for Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination and Ensuring Equality completed a two-day training course on national minority issues on 2 October 2018 in Chisinau. Organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the course aimed at enhancing the capacity and co-operation among the state actors involved in implementing the National Strategy for Consolidation of Interethnic Relations for 2017‒2027.

Under the guidance of the international expert, Professor Frederick John Packer, Director of the Human Rights Research and Education Centre at the University of Ottawa, the participants discussed international conventions and treaties in the area of national minorities. They also learned about best practices of national minorities’ rights protection employed by international human rights bodies and worked on case studies. During the training course, the representatives of state bodies jointly identified ways to boost co-operation in the field of minority rights protection and elaborated upon a mechanism jointly to identify and address drawbacks in the state policies on national minorities.

“Promotion of interethnic harmony is a way forward to promoting inclusivity and tolerance in societies. Both are important preconditions for achieving the end state of the Transdniestrian settlement process,” the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova Claus Neukirch said.

Ian Feldman, President of the Council for Prevention and Elimination of Discrimination and Ensuring Equality, said: “This training is of utmost importance for the Equality Council and other state institutions dealing with the protection of the rights of national and linguistic minorities. It highlights state-of-the-art international standards presented by a well-known international expert and serves as an effective team building exercise.”

Moldova is a home to different ethnic and linguistic groups. According to the 2014 census, out of all people interviewed more than 75 per cent identified themselves as Moldovans, with the rest identifying themselves as Romanians (seven per cent), Ukrainian (6.6 per cent), Gagauz (4.6 per cent), Russians (4.1 per cent), Bulgarian (1.9 per cent), and other ethnic groups (less than one per cent). To promote intercultural dialogue and interethnic harmony in the country, in 2016 the Government adopted the National Strategy for Consolidation of Interethnic Relations, which was developed with the support of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities.

The training course is the first in a series of events planned by the OSCE Mission to Moldova for 2018 to establish a coalition of government actors promoting and protecting the rights of national minorities in Moldova. To this extent, the OSCE Mission to Moldova is facilitating the signing of a Memorandum of Co-operation among the Agency for Interethnic Relations, the Ombudsman’s office and the Council for Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination and Ensuring Equality.

VIENNA, 2 October 2018 – How to advance, streamline and ensure an effective OSCE approach to the non-proliferation of Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and in strengthening the safety and security of Stockpiles of conventional ammunition is the focus of a two-day meeting which opened today in Vienna.

More than 120 representatives of OSCE participating States, Partners for Co-operation and other partnering organizations have gathered for the Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition.

Opening the meeting, Chairperson of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation and Sweden’s Permanent Representative to the OSCE  Ambassador Ulrika Funered said that the issues of SALW proliferation and the stockpile management of conventional ammunition, explosive materials and detonating devices continues to pose serious threats to safety and security in the OSCE region and globally.

“Thousands of people are killed every year with Small arms and light weapons, leading to the deterioration of security, escalation of violence, economic slowdown and affect other factors constituting the framework for regional, national and individual security,” she said.

Nonetheless, she added, it was reassuring to see continuing improvements in efforts to obtain data on the gender aspects of the problem and in mainstreaming gender in relation to SALW.“For too long have we been missing a comprehensive account and approach to the different effects of violence involving the use of Small arms and light weapons on women and men. Equal participation in security and proliferation analyses, negotiations and decision-making processes will increase the legitimacy, quality and effectiveness of our work,” said Ambassador Funered.

Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Ambassador Marcel Peško, further highlighted innovative projects conducted under the OSCE’s Assistance Mechanism where participating States request support and expertise on SALW-related measures.

“The OSCE works on 10 to 12 projects each year, with annual funding of around three million euros,” he said. “Moreover, the demand for assistance is steadily growing. It is a sign of increased confidence in the OSCE’s capability to provide effective and result-oriented support.”

“Most recently, an overarching project on strengthening OSCE action against the illicit proliferation of SALW and Stockpiles of conventional ammunition has been launched. This is designed to assist the participating States in more effective planning, implementing and, where necessary, strengthening of their work in the area of combating the illicit proliferation of weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices,” said Ambassador Peško.

Over the course of the meeting participants will examine the outcomes of the UN’s Third Review Conference on the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects and its International Tracing Instrument, which was held from 18 to 29 June 2018 in New York. Later, the objectives of the meeting’s working sessions will be to launch an inventory of the OSCE’s existing tools and seek ways to streamline them to current developments, lessons learned and upgrades, where and if necessary.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The implementation of the Aarhus Convention’s principles in Kazakhstan was the focus of an OSCE-supported roundtable discussion held on 2 October 2018 in Astana.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the country’s Energy Ministry and the Information and Analytical Centre of Environment Protection for some 60 representatives from government entities, local Aarhus Centres, environmental NGOs, the private sector and expert community.

Participants discussed a draft concept paper on the Environmental Code, prospects for the national ratification of the Aarhus Convention’s Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers as well as the Amendment on Genetically Modified Organisms. They also reviewed the 2018-2020 Aarhus Centres’ development plan for Kazakhstan and outlined current challenges that preclude access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.

The Aarhus Convention is a key UN document adopted in 1998 on access to environmental information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. Aarhus Centres provide platforms to engage citizens, governments and the private sector in a dialogue on environmental challenges at national and local levels.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year activities to promote good environmental governance and to assist the host country in meeting its commitments under the Aarhus Convention.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region between the evenings of 28 and 29 September, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 29 and 30 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on reports of children killed and injured by an explosion in Horlivka, as well as a person injured and damage caused by an explosion in Donetsk city. The Mission recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Petrivske disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Novoazovsk, Tavrycheske, Bezimenne, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Izvaryne.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines in the Petrivske disengagement area and near Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne. The Mission monitored public gatherings in Mariupol, and followed up on reports of water contamination in Makiivka.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 28 and 29 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including, however, more explosions (265), compared with the previous reporting period (about 240 explosions). Between the evenings of 29 and 30 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 28-29 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a projectile in flight from north to south, 200-400m south-south-west, about 80 explosions (one outgoing, the remainder undetermined) and about 30 projectiles (one from north-west to south-east, the remainder from west to east), all 0.5-3km at southerly directions. On the following evening and night, the same camera recorded 17 explosions (two assessed as impacts, one airburst and the remainder undetermined), about 80 projectiles in flight (mainly from west to east) and six illumination flares, all 0.3-4km at southerly directions

On the evening of 28 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about 60 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-7km at southerly directions. The following evening, from the same location, the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 30 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-7km at southerly directions.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 28 and 29 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). Between the evenings of 29 and 30 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, about 30 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM followed up on reports of children killed and injured by an explosion in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). At a hospital in Horlivka, a doctor told the SMM that on 29 September a ten-year-old boy had been admitted to the hospital with shrapnel injuries (scratches) to his face and abdomen. Also at the hospital, the boy’s grandfather told the SMM he believed the boy had been injured by an explosion from a mine or other explosive device while near a railway station in Horlivka. The doctor, the grandfather and a member of the armed formations in Horlivka, told the SMM separately that three other children had been killed by the same incident. Reportedly, the three killed children were 12, 13 and 14 years old.

The SMM followed up on media reports of civilian casualties and damage caused by an explosion at the office of the “communist party” in non-government-controlled Donetsk city on 29 September. On 30 September, a doctor at Hospital no. 24 in Donetsk city told the SMM that a woman (about 50 years old) had been admitted the previous day with bruises and burns; the SMM saw numerous bruises and red spots on the woman’s back and legs. She told the SMM that on 29 September, after about 13:00, she had been standing in the entrance hall of the building housing the party’s office at 107 Khlibodarna Street in Donetsk city, talking to the head of the party, when she heard an explosion from a lamp directly above her head.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 28-29 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard ten bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening of 29 September, from the same location, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions 5-7km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening of 30 September, from the same location, the SMM heard about ten bursts and shots of small-arms fire 3-4km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the evening of 28 September, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion, four projectiles in flight and a burst, all 2-3km east and east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area

On 30 September, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard two shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 28 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a mortar (probable 82mm) within a known position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Petrivske disengagement area. The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in firing positions near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) in Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk) on 28 September. On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) at the railway station in government-controlled Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). On 29 September, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) at the same railway station and, later the same day, a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) loaded on a flatbed truck near the same railway station. On 30 September, the SMM saw three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and two multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at the railway station in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs)[2] in the security zone.[3] In government-controlled areas, on 28 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (undetermined variants) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), as well as an IFV (BMP-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk). On the same day an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six IFVs (BMP-2) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) and three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one probable BMP-1) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk). On 30 September, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk) as well as an armoured reconnaissance vehicle and an IFV (undetermined variants) in a residential area of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 28 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Kamianka (24km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed construction at the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM observed the installation of new containers and sanitary facilities, as well as the paving of new lanes of travel. According to a representative of the State Border Guard Service, the construction works are expected to last three weeks and will temporarily limit the capacity of the checkpoint, which he said he expects will lead to long queues.

In Mariupol, the SMM observed approximately one thousand people gathered in Teatralna Square listening to speakers demanding improvements to air quality in Mariupol. Many of the participants were wearing white overalls and gas masks, while others were carrying banners stating “I want to breathe” in Russian. The SMM saw about 100 police officers in the area and no security incidents.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM visited three border areas outside of government control.* While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes on 29 September, the SMM saw a woman and three men exiting Ukraine and four men and two women entering Ukraine. The SMM noted that the wooden bridge traversing the Velyka Kamianka river, which pedestrians must cross to enter or exit Ukraine, was missing a few planks and was, in general, in very poor condition.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes on 30 September, the SMM saw seven women and two men exiting Ukraine and eight women and four men entering Ukraine before the SMM was told by a member of the armed formations to leave the area.* The same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Popivka (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw a man entering Ukraine.

On 30 September, at the train station in Fashchivka (non-government-controlled, 60km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed around 60 wagons of coal and 20 wagons of iron ore, all stationary.

At a hospital in Makiivka (non-government-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk), two staff members told the SMM that they were currently treating 21 persons for ailments resultant of contaminated tap water, including 12 suffering from an undetermined infectious disease.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 29 and 30 September, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”.
• On 29 and 30 September, at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding to the city or towards the border with the Russian Federation.
• On 29 September, at a checkpoint north of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering the village.
• On 29 September, at a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering the village.
• On 30 September, at a checkpoint near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from passing through the checkpoint.
• On 30 September, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 29 and 30 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[4]
• On 29 and 30 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.5
• On 29 and 30 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]    For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]    On 27 September an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), not Sofiivka (government-controlled), as originally reported in SMM Daily Report 29 September 2018.

[4]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The situation of human rights defenders in Mongolia was the topic of discussion during a roundtable event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 28 September 2018 in Ulaanbaatar.

The event brought together 43 participants (25 women and 18 men) from state institutions, the National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia (NHRCM), civil society organizations working on human rights issues, individual human rights defenders and representatives of intergovernmental organizations. The participants examined issues affecting the work of human rights defenders in Mongolia and proposed recommendations for addressing existing challenges in a gender-sensitive, inclusive and sustainable manner.

“Open dialogue between state institutions and human rights defenders is important to reach a common understanding about the current situation of human rights defenders and potential challenges they may face in their work,” said Jennifer Croft, Deputy Head of the ODIHR Human Rights Department. “We welcome the willingness of stakeholders in Mongolia to engage in this crucial dialogue and to discuss what role ODIHR can play to facilitate their co-operation.” 

Byambadorj Jamsran, Chief Commissioner of the NHRCM, said: “Bringing together state representatives and civil society organizations in a roundtable event such as this is important as it allows for the development of recommendations on protecting human rights defenders. The Commission appreciates and respects human rights defenders’ work and stands ready to support their efforts in promoting and protecting human rights in Mongolia.”

Anaraa Nyamdorj, co-founder of Mongolia’s LGBT Center NGO, said: “More young people in Mongolia are becoming active in different civic spaces on various issues, ranging from environmental protection to sustainable human development. Civil society is making the best of the situation, often utilizing international legal instruments to promote change. However, structural challenges remain, which could be partially addressed by granting NGOs tax-exempt status and by allocating dedicated state funds to civil society organizations through a transparent and fair process, including for projects focusing on youth, gender and LGBTI issues.”

The event was organized on the margins of a country visit ODIHR undertook to assess the situation of human rights defenders in Mongolia. The findings of this and other similar country visits will be published in a report in 2019. The report will highlight challenges and good practices in the protection of human rights defenders in OSCE participating States, including by examining the implementation of ODIHR’s Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders.

VIENNA, 1 October 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today welcomed the entry into force of a new law in the Netherlands which provides enhanced protection for the confidentiality of journalists’ sources.

The law enshrines the right of journalists and other publicists to protect their sources, even if these sources do not explicitly demand confidentiality.

"I welcome this important step to protect journalists in the Netherlands. The fact that it covers a broad definition of 'journalists', which includes publicists, is significant in safeguarding investigative reporting," said Désir. “It is also very positive that the law is accompanied by a clear set of instructions to prosecutors and law enforcement bodies. These will hopefully help to avoid any future cases of infringements of journalists’ rights to protect their sources in the Netherlands.”

The law offers to journalists the same rights to confidentiality as to other professions, such as lawyers.

In June this year, the Representative raised a case of an undue breach of confidentiality in the Netherlands, where the authorities openly acknowledged that law enforcement bodies should have acted differently.

For the statement on this case, see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/383931

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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398192 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Thirty-five legal professionals and civil society activists from both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River participated in an OSCE-supported training workshop in Ribnita on 28 September 2018 on the legal aspects of providing assistance to survivors of domestic violence.

During the workshop, the trainers presented existing international standards and best practices of providing assistance to victims of domestic violence, as well as effective courses of actions available to victims. The participants were sensitised to the psycho-social aspects of working with victims of domestic violence. The format of the workshop included small group work on case studies, during which time the participants shared views about domestic violence on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River. 

“The discussions during the training allowed us to exchange information about legal instruments available to the victims of domestic violence on both banks of the river. The participants also commended the recent opening of a shelter for victims in Transdniestria,” said Iuliana Abramova from the left-bank Resonance Centre for support and development of civic initiatives.

This is the second workshop on domestic violence organized by the Mission this year. These workshops build upon Human Rights Club meetings, which were organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova from 2013 to 2018 to serve as a communication platform and a confidence-building measure between legal and civil society professionals on both banks of the Dniestr/Nistru River. In 2018, these meetings evolved into professional workshops with a greater focus on international law and case studies. At least one more workshop is planned for 2018 in Chisinau. 

Combating domestic violence is one of the priorities of the joint Moldovan and Transdniestrian Human Rights Sub-Working Group within the settlement process. This Sub-Working Group reconvened this year after a five-year break.

SKOPJE, 1 October 2018 – Although the legal framework did not sufficiently cover all aspects of the process, the 30 September referendum in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was administered impartially and fundamental freedoms were respected, the international observers concluded in a statement today. The absence of an organized “Against” or boycott campaign meant the media struggled to provide balanced coverage, although they did convey extensive information and a diverse range of views to voters.

Voters were asked “Are you in favour of EU and NATO integration by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?”, with implementation of the agreement considered a precondition for EU and NATO integration. The Constitutional Court received three challenges to the parliament’s decision to hold the referendum and the formulation of the question, all of which were rejected.

“The fundamental freedoms of assembly, association and expression were respected throughout the process and, although the lack of an official ‘Against’ campaign meant the views of the ‘For’ campaign dominated, the media provided extensive information and a broad spectrum of opinions,” said Ambassador Jan Petersen, Head of the ODIHR referendum observation mission. “The State Election Commission issued regulations to fill gaps in the legal framework, which raised questions about their legal authority to do so.”

While the authorities made some efforts to provide public information related to the agreement, its content was insufficiently explained, the statement says. The parliament, primarily through the ruling parties, led the “for” campaign, which also featured a high degree of engagement by foreign leaders and representatives of the EU, NATO and the United States. Although there was no active ‘Against’ campaign, a coalition of civic associations and two smaller political parties advocated a boycott through rallies and on social media, often featuring inflammatory, nationalistic rhetoric, the observers said.

“If we respect those who chose not to vote, we definitely must also respect those – more than half a million – who took the referendum seriously and decided to cast their ballot for the future of the country. They expressed their will, on this occasion, in a calm environment,” said Stefan Schennach, head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. “Looking forward, we hope the issue of the accuracy of the voters’ lists will ultimately be solved.”

The State Election Commission administered the referendum impartially and held efficient and collegial public meetings, although these lacked substantive debate on key issues, the statement says. Lower level commissions generally worked in a professional manner and despite minor irregularities, voting on referendum day was assessed positively in 98 percent of polling stations visited by international observers.

The campaign finance rules do not include spending limits and lack clear disclosure and auditing requirements or related sanctions, the observers said. The government allocated some 1.3 million euros to the parliament to spend on television advertising, but the opposition declined, so only the “For” portion of public funds was spent.

The legal framework provides for monitoring by international and citizen observers. The “proposer” of the referendum – in this case the parliament – had the right to appoint representatives to observe in polling stations, but declined to do so.

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +389 72 443 791 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Bogdan Torcatoriu, PACE, +33 6 50 39 29 40, bogdan.torcatoriu@coe.int

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398090 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) handed over to the Gender Centre of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) software for an electronic database on domestic violence cases, at a ceremony held on 1 October 2018 in Sarajevo.

In 2014, the Mission supported the development of a database on domestic violence cases in the FBiH, which helped the authorities to respond to such cases, while also easing the social and psychological burden of victims.

“Data collection, as an invaluable and essential part of the process of prevention of domestic violence, is the only way to ensure effective analysis of policy implementation, assess the quality of support services, and meet international standards,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Bruce G. Berton.

Director of the FBiH Gender Center, Ana Vuković, highlighted the significance of the electronic database as it will connect police, social welfare centres, safe houses and SOS help lines. “The electronic database will ease the work of professionals and reduce the additional burden of victims of domestic violence as this software will ensure that victims only once answer the set of questions in the process of seeking assistance and protection.”

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana SDGs SDGs:  7 - Affordable and clean energy 12 - Responsible consumption and production 13 - Climate action

The OSCE-supported ninth annual Central Asian Leadership Programme (CALP) on Environment for Sustainable Development involving young leaders from the Central Asia and Afghanistan concluded on 23 September 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The seven-day event was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, the Government of Norway and the US Agency for International Development.

Some 30 young representatives from the state, academic, business and non-governmental sectors of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan focussed on understanding the trends and efforts required to promote sustainable development and to address environmental challenges.

Participants learned about issues including integrated water resources management, protected areas governance, global platforms for co-operation on protection of the environment, Agenda 2030 (a Kazakhstan government development programme) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Participants were encouraged to use the opportunity of the event to network with potential future partners to help promote regional co-operation.

“During the last decade, CALP has developed into a unique platform where the voices of young environmental leaders can be heard,” said Iskandar Abdullaev, Executive Director of the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia. “CALP participants not only develop their professional skills but also build long-lasting connections that will help them in their professional life.”

György Szabó, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana said: “The OSCE highly values the role of youth in addressing environmental challenges. By supporting the CALP, we are building a network of young leaders who will contribute to promoting mutual trust and addressing environmental challenges.”                                                                                           

The event is part of the Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to engage youth and promote environmental leadership in the Central Asia region and Afghanistan.

WASHINGTON D.C., 1 October 2018 – The limited election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 6 November mid-term congressional elections in the United States will hold a press conference in Washington D.C. on Wednesday, 3 October, at 12:00.

Tana de Zulueta, the head of the ODIHR limited election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 12:00, Wednesday, 3 October, at the The National Press Club, 529 14th Street NW, 13th floor, Washington D.C.

For further information, please contact Pietro Tesfamariam, Mission Media Analyst, at (+1) 202 553 1247 or pietro.tesfamariam@odihr-elections.us

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 or Thomas.Rymer@odihr.pl.

Additional information on the observation mission for the elections in the United States elections can be found at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/usa.

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