OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station; it heard small-arms fire overhead, despite security guarantees having been provided. The SMM followed up on reports that a man had been injured by an explosion while handling an explosive device in Lutuhyne. The Mission observed damage caused by gunfire in residential areas of Oleksandrivka and in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district. It recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Zoria.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines near Dokuchaievsk and Vilkhivka. An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle again spotted vehicles moving on a dirt road towards the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Artema, Vesela Nora, Donetskyi and Mykhailivka, as well as to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit. In Kyiv region, the Mission followed up on reports of an explosion at an apartment of a C14 member and monitored a public gathering in relation to the explosion.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 305 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 520 explosions).

On the evening and night of 9-10 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 60 undetermined explosions, seven airbursts, 22 muzzle flashes, about 70 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east and from north-west to south-east) and an illumination flare, all 0.5-4km at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 9-10 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 60 undetermined explosions and about 40 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south, from south to north and from west-south-west to east-north-east), all 1-4km at easterly directions.

During the day on 10 October, positioned on the northern edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four explosions (two assessed as impacts and two undetermined) 1-2km south-west, 12 undetermined explosions 2-5km at south-easterly directions, and about 40 undetermined explosions and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire 1-5km at directions ranging from west-north-west to north-north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions).

On the evening of 9 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded an explosion assessed as an impact 2-4km south-south-west, as well as six undetermined explosions, 15 muzzle flashes, about 90 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-south-east to west-north-west and from west-north-west to east-south-east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-5km south-south-west and south-west.

The following day, positioned about 2km south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 90 explosions assessed as rounds of automatic grenade-launcher(s) and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) cannon fire and 85 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-7km east-south-east.

The SMM heard small-arms fire overhead while monitoring the security situation in the area of the DFS to facilitate repair works and rotation of workers at the station. Positioned on road H20, about 1.5km south of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), SMM patrol members heard the whistling sound of two bullets flying 10-50m over their heads, despite security guarantees having been provided for adherence to the ceasefire. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire. The SMM left the location safely. It notified the Ukrainian Armed Forces side of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and the armed formations about the incident and requested follow-up. (See SMM Spot Report 10 October 2018.)

The SMM followed up on reports that a man had been injured by an explosion while handling an explosive device. In Lutuhyne (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Luhansk), on 10 October, medical staff at an emergency centre told the SMM that they had received an emergency call at around 10:15 on 3 October that a man who had been injured by an explosion in the town while handling an explosive device. They said that the man had been transferred by an ambulance to a hospital in Luhansk city. In Lutuhyne, a man and a women (both in their fifties) separately told the SMM that the explosion had occurred on Administratyvna Street. At 7/1 Administratyvna Street, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the fence and gate of a house but it was unable to assess whether the damage was recent. A guard of a factory about 50m from the house told the SMM by telephone that at around 10:00 on 3 October, he had heard an explosion from the house and had seen a man (in his fifties) in front of the gate, who had been injured with a part of his left arm and several figures of his right hand missing.

The SMM observed damage caused by gunfire in residential areas. In Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), at 344 Horkoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh gouge and shrapnel damage on the west-south-west-facing side of a garage in the courtyard of a house. At 346 Horkoho Street, the SMM saw eight fresh holes in the west-south-west-facing fence around a house and a shattered west-south-west-facing window. The SMM assessed that all above damage had been caused by a 30mm round fired from a west-south-westerly direction. Residents of the houses at 344 and 346 Horkoho Street separately told the SMM that they had had been at their homes when they heard an explosion at around 19:45. About 300m further north-west, at 336 Shkilna Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in the south-facing side of a garage, assessed as caused by a 30mm round fired from a west-south-westerly direction.

In the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), at 11/1 Vyborzkyi Lane, the SMM saw a broken south-west-facing window of a house and shrapnel damage to the window sill, as well as a fresh hole in the south-west-facing part of the roof. Residents (a man and a woman in their late sixties) of the house told the SMM that the damage had occurred on 8 October at around 18:45. At a neighbouring house, at 12/1 Vyborzkyi Lane, the SMM saw a fresh hole in the south-west-facing side of the roof. The SMM assessed that all damage had been caused by rounds of anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23, 23mm) fire from a south-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 8 October, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), near previously observed positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 150m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 9 June 2018).

During the day on 10 October, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 25 shots of small-arms fire 1km north-north-west, followed by nine shots of small-arms fire 1km north-north-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. The same day, the SMM saw two men (one in camouflage clothing) in a previously observed position (bunker) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces south of the railway bridge inside the disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 1 September 2018 and SMM Daily Report 10 October 2018).

During the day on 10 October, positioned 1.8km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard five minutes of uncountable and overlapping shots of small arms 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), followed by two undetermined explosions 2km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 9 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two tanks (one T-72 and one undetermined variant) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) and a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 9 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), two anti-tank guided missile systems (undetermined variant) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, the SMM saw two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) moving east in the northern outskirts of Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk). On 10 October, the SMM saw 24 tanks (T-72) in and near Rubizhne, as well as 24 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw a tank (undetermined variant) about 3km south-east of Rozkishne (9km south of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM noted that six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) were again missing. The SMM also noted that four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were missing for the first time.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that 11 tanks (four T-64 and seven T-72) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 9 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), three IFVs (BMP-1) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk) and three ACVs (type undetermined) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1 variant) just north of the Zolote disengagement area, an IFV (BTR-4) near Kamianka, three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one BMP-1) near Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) near Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three new trench systems (30m, 25m and 15m in length) north of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk)  (all not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018), one of them in the yard of a house. On 9 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured recovery vehicles (BTS-4A), an armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) and an IFV (BMP-1) in Kalmiuske (42km south-east of Donetsk) as well as new trenches (not seen in imagery from 17 July 2018) about 30m in length south-east of Dokuchaievsk. The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 55 craters in a field about 650m south-west of Petrovenky (40km west of Luhansk), assessed as caused by 122mm or 152mm artillery rounds probably fired from a northerly direction (not visible in imagery from 19 June 2018). An SMM mini-UAV spotted two craters in a field about 1km north-west of Zarichne (44km west of Luhansk), assessed as probably caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from a north-north-westerly direction (not visible in imagery from 9 July 2018).

An SMM long-range UAV again spotted vehicles move north-east on a dirt road near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. At around 23:00 on 9 October, the UAV spotted five covered cargo trucks (four Ural and one Kamaz) and four cars (three SUV and one sedan), all stationary, as well as about 20 persons walking between the vehicles on an unpaved dirt road near a treeline, all about 3.5km east-north-east of Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk). By 00:30 on 10 October, the UAV spotted all people enter the vehicles and four trucks (three Ural and one Kamaz) and three cars (two SUV and one sedan) moving further north-east towards the border with the Russian Federation while the fifth truck (Ural) and the fourth car (SUV) travelling south-west towards Manych.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north-west of Luhansk), to a power line in Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), to water distribution infrastructure in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and to power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. In Luhansk region, the SMM monitored the security situation to reportedly transfer funds from non-government to government-controlled areas in relation to a water utility debt. It monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire (see above).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw five cars and a van, all with Ukrainian licence plates, and 11 covered cargo trucks (nine with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine, and six cars and four covered cargo trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

In Boryspil (32km south-east of Kyiv), the SMM followed up on reports of an explosion at the apartment of a member of C14 (Sich) on the night of 9-10 October. At 52 Momota Street, the Mission saw a broken window on the second floor of a building and broken glass on the street. It saw that the area was cordoned off and that ten police officers and an investigation team were present. The Ministry of Internal Affairs later announced that that an investigation into the incident had been launched under Article 15 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (attempted murder).

In relation to the abovementioned explosion, the SMM monitored a public gathering outside the Ministry of Internal Affairs building at 10 Akademika Bohomoltsia Street in Kyiv, where it saw approximately 60 protesters (mainly men, 20-50 years old), some of whom were wearing jackets with the C14 (Sich) insignia. The Mission saw that the street in front of the building was blocked by a police car and about 60 police officers, including some in riot gear, securing entrances to the building. The SMM heard a member of C14 (Sich) say that the abovementioned explosion had occurred at his apartment. The Mission then saw three men splash a bottle of dairy product over the head of a female journalist and police intervene. The SMM saw the right arm of another male protester bleeding. The Mission did not observe further incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to the village, citing “demining in the area”.
• At an agricultural compound in Zoria (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Mariupol), two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers said that the SMM could access only some parts of the compound.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• At three schools in Luhansk city, staff refused to provide information to the SMM, citing the need for prior permission from members of the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

read more

399428 Meeting of the OSCE Political Directors, Rome, 8 October 2018 Communication and Media Relations Section Giovanni Davoli

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation hosted, on 8 October 2018 in Rome, a meeting of the Political Directors of the OSCE's 57 Participating States.

Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi, Political Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation opened the meeting with introductory remarks.  Three working sessions were respectively dedicated to: the priorities of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the Organization’s three security dimensions (politico-military, economic-environmental and human rights), and the proposals to reform the organization, with the aim of stimulating a common reflection among Participating States in line with the objectives set for the OSCE Ministerial Council scheduled in Milan on 6 and 7 December.

In his address, Ambassador Cardi reaffirmed the importance of strengthening the Mediterranean dimension of the OSCE, managing migration flows and combating human trafficking. Remarks were also made by the Secretary General of the OSCE, Ambassador Thomas Greminger, and by the Special Representatives of the Italian OSCE Chairperson-in-Office.

399374 Communication and Media Relations Section SDGs SDGs:  5 - Gender equality

At an event on 10 and 11 October in Vienna, the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department launched an online training course on mainstreaming gender in the security sector.

During the event Gender Focal Points from 11 OSCE participating States were guided through the e-learning course, learned how to benefit most from this programme and how to disseminate the acquired knowledge within their respective services.

Participants discussed existing challenges to mainstreaming gender in the field of border security and management. They also, shared good practices and success stories on how to integrate a gender perspective in their work.

Alessandra Scalia, Advisor for the Politico-Military Dimension of the 2018 Italian OSCE Chair said: “Inclusion of women increases the operational effectiveness of border security and management activities. Therefore, given the many challenges modern border management agencies face, the need to hire more women and support their career development has never been more urgent.”

On the second day of the event the Gender Focal Points engaged in discussions with the Vice Chair of the Institute for Inclusive Security on why women’s participation in the security sector is vital to preventing and resolving conflicts. Fully involving women in all efforts for the safeguarding and promotion of peace and security was also discussed. Participants also engaged in an exercise on drafting National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security as one of the new tools to translate commitments on promoting gender equality into concrete actions.

The online training course was developed under an extra-budgetary programme and made possible by the contributions of Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway.

GENEVA, Switzerland, 11 October 2018 – The 45th round of the Geneva International Discussions took place on 10 October 2018.

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Geneva International Discussions (GID), the Co-Chairs acknowledge the participants’ continued commitment to this unique mechanism, which allows them to meet and to address important issues and concerns in order to reach tangible results.

Throughout the years, the GID have contributed to improved stability and accountability on the ground. A key achievement has been the establishment of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) and the related hotlines, which enable local security actors to address incidents on the ground. However, the Co-Chairs regret the current difficulties surrounding the IPRMs. While taking note of the positions of the participants, the Co-Chairs call on them to resume the regular meetings of the IPRMs without further delay.

Despite some achievements, core issues on the GID agenda remain to be resolved. While the principle of the non-use of force is largely being adhered to, efforts to agree on a joint statement on the non-use of force and to work towards steps implementing this commitment have so far been inconclusive. Further work is required to provide sustainable security.

While there has been progress, challenges also remain regarding the needs and rights of conflict-affected communities. To address those, a broad range of humanitarian issues are being extensively discussed, such as livelihoods, documentation, freedom of movement as well as missing persons. Positive steps have been undertaken on archives and environmental threats, but much more needs to be done. Unfortunately, substantial discussions on IDPs and refugees have not been possible in recent years, due to repeated walkouts by some participants.

As we mark the 10th anniversary of the GID, the Co-Chairs call on the participants to adopt a forward-looking and more constructive approach that will allow this unique format to fulfil its mandate. The primary responsibility for making effective use of this format lies with the participants.

The Co-Chairs remain fully committed to do their utmost to facilitate this process.The participants agreed to hold the next round on 11-12 December 2018.

read more

SARAJEVO, 11 October 2018 –The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) supported the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Sarajevo and unions of social workers of the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska at a conference dedicated to the education of social workers that concluded today in Sarajevo.

The focus of the conference, that gathered more than 200 social workers from across the region, was on international standards and current practices in the education of social workers.

Mirnes Telalovic, President of the FBiH Association of Social Workers, said that BiH’s social protection system requires further development and improvement toward international standards. “BiH is in need of qualified social workers. Education and professional development of social workers is the only way to achieve this goal,” said Telalovic.

The conference was also an opportunity to mark the establishment of a state-level association of social workers. “This was one of our major goals in the social work sector in BiH,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Ambassador Bruce G. Berton. “Now, the BiH Social Workers Union will be able to co-operate with other national associations and submit its application for membership in the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW). This will make a significant contribution to the status of social workers in BiH as well as the provision of services to BiH’s most vulnerable people.”

Srdjan Baralic, President of the Republika Srpska Association of Social Workers, said that challenges in the area of social protection are common across BiH: “This is why it is important for us to unite our efforts and capacities, as well as to strengthen co-operation with other national associations to address these challenges. We are glad that the OSCE Mission to BiH recognized the importance of the establishment of the BiH Social Workers Union and supported this initiative.”

The OSCE Mission to BiH continues to enhance the capacities of social protection professionals to improve the reach and effectiveness of their services as well as their capacity to advocate for needed legislative and policy changes.

read more

COPENHAGEN, 11 October 2018 – OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) has appointed Austrian parliamentarian Roman Haider to serve as the Assembly’s Special Representative on Central Asia.

The position will help support the active participation of Central Asian countries in the work of the Assembly, encourage expanded parliamentary dialogue among countries in the area, promote the values of parliamentarism, and increase contacts with OSCE field presences and other organizations in the region.

“What happens in Central Asia is felt throughout the OSCE area, which is why this region has always been one of the Parliamentary Assembly’s top priorities. It is vital that we in the OSCE and the broader international community pay close attention to developments in Central Asia, and work to not only assist these countries in their democratic development, but also learn from the close co-operation they have developed in the region,” Haider said in accepting the appointment.

“I look forward to closely working with the Central Asian countries, with their parliaments and members of civil society, as well as with the OSCE governmental side in Vienna and of course the OSCE field presences in Central Asia, to promote more active engagement within the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly,” he added.

The Special Representative on Central Asia is mandated to:

• Encourage active participation by parliamentarians from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), in the work of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to strengthen parliamentarism in the region;
• Liaise with and support the work of the OSCE field presences in the region, as well as relevant OSCE institutions, international and regional organizations and diplomatic missions;
• Encourage closer contacts between the parliaments in the region to promote greater intra-regional co-operation in all three OSCE dimensions;
• Report to the President of the Assembly on developments in the region, including opportunities for enhanced parliamentary dialogue and further inter-parliamentary co-operation among the Central Asian States.

Haider has been a member of the Austrian Parliament since 2008, where he serves as Deputy Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and is a member of the Austrian-Central Asia parliamentary Friendship Group, among other responsibilities.

There are currently six other OSCE PA Special Representatives. Each holds a mandate pertaining to a specific issue within the Assembly’s work or to a specific geographical area represented in the Assembly. Click here for a full listing.

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

At 8:59 on 10 October, an SMM patrol consisting of five members and two armoured vehicles was positioned on road H-20 approximately 1.5km south of Kamianka (government‑controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), and 3km north of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The patrol was monitoring the security situation in the area of Donetsk Filtration Station to facilitate repair works and the rotation of workers at the station. Three patrol members were standing next to the vehicles and the others were inside the vehicles when, despite security guarantees having been provided, they heard the whistling sound of two bullets flying 10‑50m over their heads. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire, and at 09:03, departed the location safely. The SMM notified the Ukrainian Armed Forces side of the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination and the armed formations about the incident and requested follow‑up.

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region but fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of casualties in Maiorove and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. It continued monitoring all three disengagement areas, where its access remained restricted. The SMM’s access was also again restricted near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM saw weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines near Ocheretyne, Smolianynove and Metolkine. The Mission observed newly laid mines on both sides of the contact line. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 520 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 240 explosions).

On the evening and night of 8-9 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 17 explosions assessed as impacts 0.1-1km south, as well as about 185 undetermined explosions (including about 20 explosions within 100-500m of the SMM camera), 54 projectiles in flight (mostly west to east and north-west to south-east), a burst and an illumination flare, all 0.1-4km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-west.

On 9 October, positioned about 3km south-west of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard and felt shockwaves of two explosions, after which it saw smoke in the sky, and then heard two additional explosions, all assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 1-2km south. About 20 minutes later, from a nearby position in Avdiivka, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-4km south-east and south.

Positioned about 1km north of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw two undetermined explosions and heard five undetermined explosions, as well as three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km south-west.

On 9 October, positioned about 2km south-west of Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs, the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions and 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km south-east and south-south-east and six undetermined explosions 2-3km north-west.

On the evening and night of 8-9 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 23 undetermined explosions, about 325 projectiles in flight (almost half from northerly to southerly directions and half from southerly to northerly directions), 12 bursts and five muzzle flashes, all 2-4km at directions ranging from east-north-east to east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (210 explosions).

On the evening of 8 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded eight explosions (five assessed as impacts and three undetermined) and about 75 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east), all 2-5km south, south-south-west and south-west. The following day, the same camera recorded three explosions assessed as impacts 2-4km south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of casualties. A community member in Michurine (non-government-controlled, 61km south of Donetsk) told the SMM that a man (55 years old) had lost his left foot as the result of an explosion on 24 September. In Maiorove (formerly Krasnyi Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 57km south-east of Donetsk), three local residents (two women in their forties and sixties, respectively, and one man in his fifties) separately told the SMM that a 55-year-old local resident had lost his foot on September 24 in a landmine explosion on the bank of a nearby river and that he had been taken by ambulance to a hospital in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk). At the hospital in Boikivske, medical staff refused to provide information about the civilian casualty.* Staff at a local ambulance station in Boikivske told the SMM that the ambulance service had transported a man who had lost his foot in an explosion from Maiorove to Boikivske at the end of September.

In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) a woman (in her forties) told the SMM that a boy (nine years old) had received shrapnel injuries to the his head during shelling on the evening of 7 October and that three houses had also been damaged (see below). At a hospital in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), medical staff told the SMM that a child from Zolote-5/Mykhailivka had been admitted with injuries to his scalp on 7 October and had received stitches. The SMM was unable to access the area in order to speak with the boy or his parents due to security considerations.

The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. At 39 Kotovskoho Street, the SMM saw three broken south-south-westerly windows of a single-storey house and a hole in the roof of a garage located east of the house. The SMM assessed that the damage to the garage was recent and caused by a projectile fired from a southerly direction.

At 10 Korchahina Street, the SMM observed that about 1.5m of a fence constructed of roofing material had been shattered into small pieces as well as two impact sites inside the garden, between the fence and a single-storey house. The SMM assessed that the impacts were fresh and caused by projectiles fired from a northerly direction. Inside the house, the SMM observed three broken south-facing windows and a damaged mirror on the east-facing wall, all assessed as caused by shrapnel from a projectile fired from a northerly direction.

About 30m west of 10 Korchahina Street, the SMM saw an impact in the middle of a road, which it assessed as fresh and caused by a projectile fired from a northerly direction. The SMM could not conduct further assessments due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Inside the Zolote disengagement area, at a recently established Ukrainian Armed Forces position south of the railway bridge, the SMM observed a visibly armed soldier. About 300-400m south, between the forward positions of the sides, the SMM observed for the first time a discarded anti-tank missile tube.

During the day on 9 October, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk). On 9 October, the SMM observed ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) near Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk) and a towed howitzer (D-20) near Metolkine (69km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk), 12 tanks (T-64) near Tymofiievka (39km north-west of Donetsk), a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Kalynove (31km north-west of Donetsk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) in a residential area of Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk) (the same UAV also spotted an armoured personnel carrier and eight military cargo trucks nearby in Oleksandropil[3]). On 9 October, the SMM observed five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12) near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM observed a tank (T-64) on a transporter 3.5km south of Luhansk city.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[4] and other indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1KSh and a BMP variant) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km north-west of Luhansk) as well as about 60m of new trenches not visible in imagery of 6 October 2018. On 9 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1) in Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted on a truck about 9km east of Plotyna (28km north-east of Luhansk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) south-east of Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six firing positions in and near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, two of which are within 100m of residential houses, and 40m of trenches not visible in imagery of 28 September 2018. It also spotted 50m of trenches not visible in imagery from 29 September 2018 and a fortified position under construction by three men wearing camouflaged clothing, assessed as members of the armed formations.

The SMM observed newly laid mines. On 8 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four newly laid anti-tank mines (TM-62) in front of a house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, which were not visible in imagery of 4 October 2018. The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four anti-tank mines near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Zolote-4/Rodina, which were not visible in imagery of 4 October 2018.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north-west of Luhansk).  

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM observed an 82mm mortar tailfin assessed as fired from a south-easterly direction embedded in the ground.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to the village, citing “demining in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM on 8 October temporarily lost communications with a long-range UAV, assessed as due to signal interference[6] near Svyrydonivka (government-controlled, 41km north-west of Donetsk) and Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).
• Medical staff at a hospital in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM with information about a reported civilian casualty without prior approval from members of the “regional administration.”
• At a school in Rodakove (non-government-controlled, 22km west of Luhansk), staff told the SMM it was not permitted to enter the school and said that all school personnel have been told to “watch out” for the OSCE and that it should get permission from the armed formations to speak with them.
• At a school in Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, non-government-controlled, 43km south-east of Luhansk), staff told the SMM to leave and said that they had been given instructions not to allow it on school premises.
• At a school in Novosvitlivka (non-government-controlled, 16km south-east of Luhansk), staff told the SMM that it could not access the school, based on instructions from the armed formations.
• In Khriashchuvate (non-government-controlled, 10km south-east of Luhansk), a community member told the SMM that it could not access the school in the village, based on instructions from the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera on the northern edge of Popasna was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

read more

399290 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Lamberto Zannier launches recommendations on access to justice and national minorities Moldova’s civil servants learn to implement national interethnic relations strategy with support of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Multilingual education the focus of OSCE-organized study visit of Moldovan state and civil society representatives to Alto Adige/South Tyrol ExplAnimations: High Commissioner's thematic work explained in three short animated videos The Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies

The role of legal professionals in ensuring the adequate protection of national minorities’ rights, by way of fair and effective investigation and adjudication, especially in cases related to hate crime, was the focus of a two-day regional roundtable held in Chisinau, which concluded on 10 October 2018.

Organized by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Moldovan National Institute of Justice, the event brought together around 70 high-level representatives of the judicial authorities of Moldova as well as law practitioners and academia from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Ukraine. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) contributed to the event with a session focused on hate crime.

The Director of the office of the HCNM, Henrik Villadsen, presented the High Commissioner’s Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities, the latest thematic recommendation by the HCNM, which was launched in November 2017.

“The Graz Recommendations are a practical tool for justice sector professionals to improve access to justice for persons belonging to national minorities”, said Villadsen. He reminded participants that “previously, the HCNM assisted the Moldovan Bureau of Inter-ethnic Relations and the Georgian State Ministry for Reconciliation in drafting national Integration Strategies based on the HCNM’s 2012 Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies.”

He offered support in matters pertaining to access to justice, where the HCNM could assist the countries’ relevant authorities in drafting legal and regulatory frameworks based on the Graz Recommendations.

The participants shared their experiences of how the provisions of the Graz Recommendations are being applied in practice in their respective countries, focusing particularly on the representation of national minorities in the composition of courts, tribunals, prosecution offices and law-enforcement bodies as well as access to courts, witness protection schemes, victim-support services, and targeted legal assistance programmes in situations and cases involving national minorities.

In his speech Lajos Karakas, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, said: “Respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities is an important cornerstone for social cohesion, justice, stability and democracy. International conferences like this one allow legal professionals to learn best practices and apply them to support their governments’ efforts to build inclusive societies.” 

WARSAW, 10 October 2018 – While underlining that most OSCE participating States had fully abolished capital punishment, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), expressed concern over suggestions in some countries that the death penalty be re-introduced in certain instances.

Speaking on the occasion of the International Day against the Death Penalty, she stressed that OSCE commitments call for governments to keep the idea of abolition under discussion, rather than suggesting re-instatement.

“The vast majority of OSCE participating States have either completely abolished the death penalty or maintain moratoria on executions as an important first step towards abolition,” the ODIHR Director said. “But the idea of reinstating capital punishment in specific instances is worrying, and runs entirely counter to the global trend towards abolition.”

Gísladóttir cited troubling suggestions by senior politicians in certain participating States to put the death penalty back on the agenda or expand its use.  

“All countries in the OSCE have committed to keeping the complete abolition of the death penalty under consideration, and political leaders have a responsibility to promote such discussion, not the opposite,” the ODIHR Director said.

The 2018 edition of ODIHR’s Background Paper on the Death Penalty in the OSCE Area, published annually, found that 54 of the 57 OSCE participating States have either abolished the death penalty outright or do not impose the penalty in practice, although it remains in law. Kazakhstan is classified as abolitionist only for ordinary crimes, having sentenced a person to death in 2016 on terrorism charges. Belarus and the United States remain the only two OSCE participating States that continue the use of capital punishment in criminal law. 

read more

ANTALYA, 9 October 2018 – Participating in the Third Meeting of Speakers of Eurasian Countries’ Parliaments today, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) voiced the necessity to respect international commitments to support sustainable growth across the OSCE area and beyond.

“Enhanced co-operation on issues such as environmental protection, water management, and cross-border economic projects can be a first step towards building trust and promoting greater stability and security. But this requires constant dialogue, and more importantly, respect for agreed rules and principles,” he said. “In the OSCE area, unfulfilled agreements have failed to prevent continued human suffering, and, in the end, this has made it more difficult to work together in the pursuit of economic success.”

President Tsereteli deplored that the persistence of tensions in the Eurasian region maintained significant disparities between countries: “Conflicts are flaring at every corner of Eurasia. Commitment to OSCE principles and to international law have been set aside in the case of Ukraine, Georgia, and in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. This continues to prevent us from reaching our full potential.”

The OSCE PA President underlined that the size and scope of Eurasia’s challenges necessitate closer collaboration between Eurasian countries and regional and international organizations. He welcomed the conference as an opportunity for parliamentarians to promote the deeper ties necessary to reinforce co-operation throughout Eurasia. Tsereteli also encouraged the parliaments of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation to maintain their strong engagement with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

“The OSCE PA is ideally placed to help build more bridges between our countries,” said President Tsereteli. “Faced with an erosion of trust between our governments, OSCE parliamentarians have carried on pushing them to live up to their commitments. We have continued to encourage dialogue and the pursuit of multilateral diplomacy in our region.”

The meeting, hosted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, was held under the theme “Economic Cooperation, Environment and Sustainable Development in Eurasia” and brought together the parliamentary leadership of 39 countries.

On the margins of the conference, President Tsereteli held several bilateral meetings, including with Turkish Speaker Binali Yildirim, Slovak Speaker Andrej Danko, Kazakh Speaker Nurlan Nigmatulin, and Uzbek Speaker Nurdinjon Ismoilov. He also exchanged with Belarussian Speaker Vladimir Andreichenko, Kyrgyz Speaker Dastanbek Dzhumabekov, South Korean Speaker Moon Hee-sang and with Heads of Delegation from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia. Discussions focused on participation in OSCE PA activities, including the recent Autumn Meeting in Bishkek and future statutory meetings, election observation, and pending presidential visits.

Photos from President Tsereteli’s participation are available on Flickr.

For President Tsereteli's full remarks, please click here.

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of a woman who died due to natural causes at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Horlivka. It continued monitoring all three disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, Staromarivka and Syvash, as well as in Michurine, at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, and again near Zaichenko.* The SMM saw weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to power lines near Olenivka, as well as to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 240 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (120 explosions).

On the evening of 7 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 75 undetermined explosions 2-6km east and west. On the evening and night of 7-8 October, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk recorded about 60 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south) and two bursts, all 2-5km east-north-east and east. The following day, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard about 45 undetermined explosions and 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km south-east.

On the night of 7-8 October, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 26 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 2-4km east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 7-8 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded six undetermined explosions, about 85 projectiles in flight (mostly from northerly to southerly directions) and 12 bursts, all 2-4km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-east.

During the day on 8 October, positioned 1km north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and 16 undetermined explosions, all 2-4km south-south-east.

On the same day, positioned about 2km south-south-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of an artillery round and 27 undetermined explosions, all 2-3km east-north-east and east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 210 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (12 explosions).

During the day on 8 October, positioned in the eastern outskirts of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 140 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-5km north-east.

On the same day, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Slovianoserbsk (non-government controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions 10km west.

On the same day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons and nine bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south.

The SMM followed up on reports of a woman who died at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Horlivka. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that on the morning of 6 October a woman (in her sixties) had collapsed as she had been walking through the checkpoint and died despite medical assistance having been provided. On 8 October, staff at the morgue of hospital no. 2 in Horlivka told the Mission that the woman’s body had been brought to the morgue and that autopsy indicated she had died of natural causes. They said the deceased woman had been a resident of Chystiakove (formerly Torez, non-government controlled, 62km east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 7 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three explosions assessed as artillery rounds and 31 projectiles in flight (from northerly to southerly and from southerly to northerly directions), all 1-4km east-south-east (the Mission was unable to assess whether they occurred inside or outside the disengagement area). During the day on 8 October, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-7km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) as well as 18 shots and bursts assessed as infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and 20 bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-5km north-north-east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

During the day on 8 October, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and near the Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a piece of artillery (calibre greater than 122mm) near Zoria (80km south of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw ten multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) (eight being offloaded from a train and two on train cars) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 7 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at a compound in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 6 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Ahrobaza (8km west of Mariupol). On 7 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) near Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk). On 8 October, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-27) near Lyman (91km north of Luhansk), three self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm) near Sloviansk (95km north of Donetsk), and in total at least 12 surface-to-air missile systems: one 9K37 near Topolyne (19km north-west of Mariupol), two 9K35 near Shevchenko (19km north-west of Mariupol), six 9K33 Osa near Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk) and at least three 9K33 near Marynivka (39km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 6 October, near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant), an IFV (BMP variant) as well as positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with craters nearby assessed as caused recently by mortar and artillery fire (the craters were not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018) possibly coming from a southerly direction. On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-70) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk) and three APCs (two BTR-70 and a BTR-80) near Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three ACVs (type undetermined) north-east of Illinka (38km west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Hnutove. On 8 October, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Artema.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 6 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one BMP-1) and a probable IFV (BMP-1) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a 500m-long trench extension (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018) about 2km west-south-west from Naberezhne (77km south of Donetsk). On 8 October, the SMM saw three IFVs (BMP-1) near Slovianoserbsk.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Olenivka (non-government controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). It also continued to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The Mission visited two border areas outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw nine cars (four with Ukrainian licence plates and five with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine and three cars and a bus (all with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw eight people (four women aged 30-60 and four men aged 25-60) entering Ukraine and nine people (three women aged 35-60, five men aged 20-40 and a child about five years old) exiting Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored two gatherings. The Mission saw about 150 people (mainly men, aged 18-35) gathered outside the headquarters of the State Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) at 32–35 Volodymyrska Street. The Mission saw some protestors carrying the flags of National Corps and wearing its insignia on their clothes, while others were wearing the insignia of Natsionalni Druzhyny. A member of National Corps stated that they had gathered to protest a senior SBU official (according to media reports the official is currently under investigation by the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine). On the spot, the SMM observed 20 men it assessed to be plainclothes law enforcement officers as well as about 30 uniformed police officers and no security incidents.

On 6 October, the SMM observed about 300 people (mainly men in their twenties) march from Shevchenko Park to Independence Square in Kyiv, several of whom were displaying the flags of “Democratic Axe” and “Tradition and Order”. Participants were demanding Ukrainian legislation pertaining to firearms possession to be liberalised. The SMM observed about 40 police officers near the park and no security incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), saying “shelling was expected in the area”.
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to the village, citing “demining in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Staromarivka (non-government-controlled, 62km south of Donetsk, three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “security reasons”.
• In Michurine (non-government-controlled, 61km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM it was not permitted to stop next to a school. The Mission immediately left the area.
• At a security post near Syvash (162km south-east of Kherson), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that it could not access the area, citing orders from his commander.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 7 and 8 October, the SMM temporarily lost communications with a long-range UAV, assessed as due to signal interference[5] between Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Oleksandropillia (government-controlled, 71km west of Luhansk) and near Zolote. The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• On three separate occasions on 8 October, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference6 near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference6 near Chermalyk. The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• Medical staff at hospital no. 14 in Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city refused to provide the SMM information about a reported civilian casualty without prior approval from senior members of the armed formations.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera on the northern edge of Popasna was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                            

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 10,636 to 10,317 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 50 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs decreased to 33 (compared to 40 last week); 24 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and nine into Ukraine (76 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, ten families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and 11 were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (335 compared to 409 observed during the previous week). There were 176 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 159 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Alchevsk - Kyiv; Kyiv; Luhansk - Kharkiv; Luhansk - Kyiv-Moscow; Luhansk -Sevastopol; Luhansk - Simferopol; Luhansk - Yalta.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 903 to 834 (281 at the Gukovo BCP and 553 at the Donetsk BCP); 478 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 356 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                       

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 50 (compared to 60 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 124 to 81: of the total number of trucks scanned, 48 trucks (59 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 33 trucks (41 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 156 to 143 vehicles; 74 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 69 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 20 occasions, compared to 17 last week; the OTs assessed that 12 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with “DPR” plates and with Slovak, Polish, Lithuanian, Georgian and Belarusian licence plates.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed ambulances on four occasions, one in Gukovo and three in Donetsk BCP. On 4 October at 21:33 in Gukovo BCP, an ambulance with “LPR” plates passed from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. On 5 October at 19:30 in Donetsk BCP, an ambulance was observed crossing from the Russian Federation into Ukraine. The OT could not observe any additional details. Again on 6 October at 23:21, an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates (with two paramedics inside) entered the BCP from the Russian Federation. It bore the inscription “Ambulance 112” (in English) on the front and rear, and “Urgent Medical Help 112” (in Russian) on its sides. The ambulance stayed near to the main building until 23:43, after which it returned to Russian Federation. The OT could not observe if they had taken any patients with them. On 6 October at 04:50, the same ambulance entered the BCP from the Russian Federation. It stayed near to the main building until 05:04 and then returned to the Russian Federation.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

read more

399176 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Enhancing responses to sexual and gender-based violence in Albania was the focus of a capacity building event that brought together police officers and civil society representatives in Tirana on 8 and 9 October 2018. The event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with Albania’s Ministry of Interior and the OSCE Presence in Albania.

The 35 participants (31 women and 4 men) included 20 police officers and investigators and 15 civil society representatives. They received training and discussed current challenges and lessons learned in responding to sexual and gender-based violence while enhancing co-operation as mandated by the state’s Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, peace and security, which was adopted last month.

“The recent adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution1325 Action Plan in Albania sends a powerful message about the willingness of state authorities and civil society to work together to strengthen the country’s peace and security infrastructure. This event is a first step in this direction,” said Graziella Pavone, Human Rights Officer at ODIHR.

Romina Kuko, Deputy Minister of Interior, said: “Women’s involvement in peace and security should become a priority for national governments, international organizations and civil society. Every action to incorporate women as key actors will exponentially and efficiently create a transparent and comprehensive strategy towards lasting peace and security.”

This interactive event covered the root causes and dynamics of gender-based violence, harmful gender stereotypes and their impact on policing, as well as good practices of investigation and co-operation between the police and civil society. During the event, civil society and police participants from various regions of Albania committed to strengthening their co-operation in this area.

The training also focused on civil society oversight of police services to victims of gender-based violence.

“Gender-based violence is intolerable in any society and in particular in a democracy. Police forces play a crucial role in preventing and combating it,” said Bernd Borchardt, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania. “Albania has made progress, but a lot still needs to be done in addition to adopting legislation: concrete action is needed. Citizens’ trust in the rule of law is also based on police performance and conduct. This training comes at the right time.”

PODGORICA, 9 October 2018 – Business challenges and opportunities for the sustainability of traditional media, the importance of diversifying revenue streams and investing in quality journalism in the digital age, is the focus of a two-day conference, which opened today in Podgorica.

The conference, Media Sustainability and Successful Media Business Models, is organized by OSCE Mission to Montenegro and OSCE Mission to Skopje, in co-operation with the Media Association of South East Europe. It offers participants an in-depth overview of certain solutions that have successfully contributed to resolving important financial challenges for media outlets, thereby contributing to the sustainability of their operations.

OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Desir said that without the necessary investment, without sufficient revenues, without fair economic rules for the development of the media, we will have less and less media because of the disappearance of newspapers and of the difficulty to develop new media.

“It is crucial to ensure that the legal framework, the political climate towards the press, the safety of journalists and the economic environment is supportive of a pluralistic and quality media landscape in the region,” said Desir.

Montenegrin Prime Minster Duško Marković said that media freedom and the safety of journalists are not a condition for accession to the European Union. “It is about the moral and democratic obligation of Montenegro's authorities, which we will ultimately carry out, even if we never join the EU.”

Markovic also said that it is absolutely unacceptable to endanger the personal safety of journalists as a method for resolving misunderstandings and dissatisfaction over media reports.

Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet said that it is of paramount importance to open the dialogue on financial sustainability. “The OSCE is strongly supporting media outlets in their efforts toward achieving sustainable business models,” she said.

Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Clemens Koja said that in the digital age, print media face the challenge of sustaining themselves due to shifting revenue streams or an increased focus on online media. “With increased digitalization also come opportunities: Media outlets can offer content online, interact with media users in the digital sphere, and broaden reader bases.”

President of the Assembly of the Media Association of South East Europe, Željko Ivanović said that this conference marks the beginning of a new era in South-Eastern Europe, where the focus is on the sustainability of the media and less on media freedom. “The Government and its institutions create an environment in which media operate and this is one of the most important factors in media sustainability.”.

Representatives of international organizations and diplomatic missions, representatives from state institutions, media outlets and civil society organisations today discussed strategies for improving business operations of printed media in the digital era, mechanisms for cutting losses in media outlets through the prism of new media business concepts, the importance of media literacy in creating media content, as well as networking as a gate towards a successful media business.

The second day of the conference will be opened tomorrow by Montenegro’s Minister of Culture Aleksandar Bogdanović and will be dedicated to media regulatory practices and the growing influence of new media on the media market.

read more

MINSK, 9 October 2018 – While the widespread exploitation of the Internet and social media platforms by terrorists poses serious challenges to security, the Internet as a communication channel also plays an important role in preventing and countering terrorism, underlined participants today at the start of a two-day high-level international conference in Minsk.

Organized by the Foreign Ministry of Belarus and the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat, the conference brings together more than 250 participants, including senior national representatives of OSCE participating States, OSCE Partners for Co-operation, international and regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector.

They will exchange national experiences and perspectives on recent trends and measures, and discuss challenges, responses and best practices on how to prevent and counter the misuse of the Internet by violent extremists and terrorists, while respecting fundamental rights and freedoms.

“The use by terrorists all over the world of information technologies and means of communication is one of the most dangerous challenges undermining the sustainable development of humankind,” said the President of the Republic of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko in a statement read aloud to conference participants by State Secretary of the country’s Security Council Stanislav Zas. “The efficient countering of this threat is only possible through co-ordinated actions by partners at the national, regional and global levels. I am confident that a constructive and interesting exchange of opinions and experience will help developing common approaches and bring us closer to resolving the problem of terrorism,” the President’s statement read.

In his own statement to the conference, State Secretary Zas added: “It is extremely important to develop interactions and information exchanges among law enforcement and special services as well as comprehensive partnerships between the state, civil society and business.”

“We favour a comprehensive approach in fighting terrorism based on the principles of international law,” stated Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Vladimir Makei. “Therefore we support efforts to create a united front against terrorism and call for concerted action by the UN, the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and other relevant bodies. We hope that today’s meeting will help improve synergies in international efforts to counter the terrorist threat.”

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger noted that the conference’s agenda goes beyond the legal and policy aspects of preventing and countering terrorism, and thanked the Government of Belarus for organizing the conference, and its timely and relevant agenda.

“The conference will integrate discussions on the importance of public-private partnerships, strengthening dialogue and co-operation between governments and non-state actors, and on the need to strategically leverage the role of the ICT while protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks emanating from cyberspace,” said Greminger.

He highlighted that the OSCE was among the very first multilateral organizations to stress the need for sustained, multi-faceted, human rights-compliant and gender-mainstreamed efforts to counter the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.

Under-Secretary-General of the UN and Head of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office Vladimir Voronkov said: “To win this war, we must join forces and act together to prevent and curb the risks of terrorist abuse of digital technologies, while respecting human rights and freedoms, including the freedom of expression. Enhanced co-ordination and collaboration between government agencies, the private sector, civil society and faith-based organizations is vital.”

Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Yuri Fedotov added: “The need for cross-border co-operation to prevent and counter the global threats of terrorism is abundantly clear, even more so in view of the capabilities afforded by advanced technologies and the internet. We need to urgently step up capacity building to counter the terrorism-organized crime nexus in cyber space.”

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 5 and 6 October, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 6 and 7 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM saw damage caused by shelling to a farm near Novoluhanske. The SMM continued monitoring all three disengagement areas; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation, and again near Zaichenko.* The SMM saw multiple launch rocket systems near Novoamvrosiivske. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including a similar number of explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 6 and 7 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 5 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north or Donetsk) recorded 16 undetermined explosions, about 20 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-south-east to west-north-west) and a muzzle flash, all 0.5-4km south and south-south-west. During the evening and night of 6-7 October, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion, 18 projectiles and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-2km at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 5-6 October, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded seven undetermined explosions and about 60 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-east to south-south-west and from west-north-west to east-south-east), all 3-7km south-east, south-south-east and south. During the evening and night of 6-7 October, the same camera recorded three undetermined explosions, about 40 projectiles (mostly from east-north-east to west-south-west) and five muzzle flashes, all 3-5km south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 5-6 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three undetermined explosions and about 90 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-westerly to south-easterly directions), all 3-4km east-north-east and east. On the evening and night of 6-7 October, the same camera recorded six undetermined explosions, about 140 projectiles (mostly from westerly to easterly directions and from northerly to southerly directions) and 14 muzzle flashes, all 2-4km at easterly directions.

On the evening of 6 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 125 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-7km at southerly and westerly directions. While at the same location during the day on 7 October, the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km east and west.

On the night of 6-7 October, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 24 undetermined explosions 2-5km west.

During the day on 7 October, positioned in Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 1km north-west and their subsequent impacts 2-3km north-east and an undetermined explosion and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at undetermined distances east-north-east. Positioned 1km north-west of Pavlopil, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 2-4km east-north-east.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about eight explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). Between the evenings of 6 and 7 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (12), compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 5-6 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded six undetermined explosions, about 100 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east), two bursts and four muzzle flashes, all 2-5km at south-westerly directions. On the evening and night of 6-7 October, the same camera recorded seven undetermined explosions, 14 projectiles (mostly from northerly to southerly directions), eight muzzle flashes and two illumination flares, all 1-5km south-east and south-west.

The SMM observed damage caused by shelling to a pig farm in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). On 6 October, the SMM, accompanied by a representative of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) and the farm’s chief engineer, saw shrapnel damage and holes in the southern part of the roof of a pig enclosure. It also saw shrapnel damage to the southern and northern outer walls of the pig enclosure; most southern- and northern-facing windows of the same building had been shattered. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a possible mortar round, but it could not assess the direction of fire. The pig farm’s chief engineer told the SMM that the building had sustained damage during shelling on 29 September 2018. While present at the site, the SMM saw four armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier walking south from the area of the farm.[2]

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 5-6 October, the SMM camera positioned at the Prince Ihor monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east at undetermined distances north and west-north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). During the day on 7 October, positioned 2.5km south-west of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire 2-3km north-north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and ten shots of small-arms fire 2-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 6 October, positioned on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire 1.5km north-west (unable to assess whether outside or inside the disengagement area). On the evening of 6 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three bursts 4-5km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 7 October, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire 1-2km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). The same day, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire 1-4km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 7 October, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km south and heard and saw an undetermined explosion 0.5-1km north-west (both assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 6 October, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 5 October, the SMM saw an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk) heading north, a stationary tank (T-64) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and two stationary surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk). On 6 October, the SMM saw a stationary surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) and a stationary tank (T-64) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). It also noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines and noted that 18 tanks (eight T-64 and ten T-72), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 4 October, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and a recently dug 20m-long trench with two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in it east of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km north-west of Luhansk) (the trench and the IFV were about 50m from the closest inhabited residential house); about 300m east, it spotted a recently dug approximately 75m-long trench network. About 700m west of the latter, the same UAV spotted a truck loaded with boxes and household items, including chairs and tables. (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 28 September 2018.) On 5 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and four IFVs (one BMP-1 and three BMP-2) near Orikhove and two IFVs (BMP-2) south of Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On 6 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk). On 7 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) north of the Zolote disengagement area.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 5 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and a probable IFV (undetermined variant) near Sentianivka (44km west of Luhansk).

The SMM saw new mine hazard signs. On 7 October, on the north-eastern edge of Rybynske (government-controlled, 49km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw five hazard signs for the first time: two were placed on each side of a road block preventing passage; the other three were placed on the side of the road. The SMM noted that the signs were yellow with “Warning, Mines” written on them in Russian.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). On 6 and 7 October, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.[4]

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 6 and 7 October, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), saying “that it was unsafe for the SMM to proceed.”
• On 6 October, at a checkpoint on road E58 north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), five members of the armed formations (four of whom were visibly armed) denied the SMM passage eastward towards the border with the Russian Federation, citing “a special forces operation ongoing in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 6 and 7 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[5]
• On 6 and 7 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions. [5]
• On 6 and 7 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• On 7 October, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage. After about one hour, the SMM could proceed through the checkpoint.

Other impediments:

• On 4 October, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV due to signal interference near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk) and Opytne (government-controlled, 12km north-west of Donetsk).[6]
• On 5 October, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV due to signal interference in government-controlled areas near Zolote, Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk), Teple (31km north of Luhansk), Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk) and Mykhailiuky (48km north of Luhansk).

Further analysis of footage taken on 3 October by an SMM long-range UAV revealed four people firing small arms, assessed as in the direction of the UAV, near Nyzhnie Lozove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk).

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] The paragraph on an impact site assessment in Pikuzy in SMM Daily Report 29 September 2018 should have read: “At 15 Akhmatova Street, the SMM observed three fresh holes in the south-west-facing roofs of a storage building and another fresh hole in the north-east-facing roof. Inside the building, the SMM saw fresh remnants of at least four grenade (PG-7 and PG-9) rounds, assessed as fired from a direction between south and west.”

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The paragraph on reports of a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer suffering an eye injury in SMM Daily Report 5 October 2018 should have read: “The SMM followed up on reports of a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer suffering an eye injury on 3 October at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).”

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

read more

VIENNA, 8 October 2018 –Education is key to promoting human rights, peaceful coexistence and security in the OSCE region, participants said today at the opening of a two-day OSCE meeting in Vienna.

This Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting, organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), focused on human rights approaches in education policy, how new technologies can be leveraged for human rights education and how the effective enjoyment of the right to education can foster peace and security.

“Through human rights education we can help ensure that individuals act in a responsible manner, enhancing peaceful and inclusive societies,” said Ambassador Luca Fratini, Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE, on behalf of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, First Deputy Director of ODIHR, said: “What was once considered the domain of human rights and civic education has now become an indispensable mainstream. Top education experts around the world today agree that the must-have skills for our dynamic world include communication, collaboration and teamwork, leadership and responsibility, global and cultural awareness, civic literacy and citizenship. We need to make sure that education systems do not stay in the past, but equip our 21st century children with skills to become active, responsible and engaged citizens.”

In the keynote address, Kaari Mattila, Secretary-General of the Finnish League for Human Rights, told participants: “In times when human rights are increasingly questioned across the world, we need to ensure that people know what human rights are. Teachers and schools are in an important position − they can either reproduce existing hierarchies and injustices, or dismantle them. With human rights education, they are better equipped for the latter.”

The meeting brought together some 120 representatives of governments and civil society organizations working on issues related to human rights education from the Organization’s 57 participating States to explore innovative policy initiatives and the use of new technologies to support human rights and access to education.

read more

SARAJEVO, 8 October 2018 – The 7 October general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were genuinely competitive but characterized by continuing segmentation along ethnic lines, the international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today. Long-standing deficiencies in the legal framework remain, and recent discussions on reform were stalled by political disagreements, further eroding trust in public institutions, the observers said.

Voters were presented with a wide choice of candidates, who were able to campaign freely. The contestants, however, focused more on personal attacks and fearmongering than on providing political alternatives, the statement says. The dependence of media on political and business interests often led to biased coverage, and instances of improper efforts to influence voters in favour of incumbents were not effectively addressed, the observers said.

“We saw polling station commissions, many of them made up of young women and men, who showed eagerness to cope with the complex system during a long election day,” said Mavroudis Voridis, the Special Co-ordinator and Leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “The complexity and the deficiencies of the post-Dayton system should have been properly addressed a long time ago. I urge the institutions not to waste time now, but to immediately tackle the necessary reforms.”

Dame Cheryl Gillan, Head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, said: “Yesterday’s voting was calm, and electors made their choice freely among a large number of parties and candidates, The PACE delegation regrets that, once again, the elections were held in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights concerning discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and residency. The delegation also expressed its disappointment that the election campaign remained segmented along ethnic lines.”

The freedoms of speech, movement and association were generally respected, in a campaign that was largely segmented along ethnic lines, with contestants resorting to polarizing and negative rhetoric. There were instances of preferential treatment of incumbents by local authorities and of misuse of state resources, the statement says.

“We cannot change the past, but we can shape the future,” said Pia Kauma, Head of the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. “People of this country, and especially the younger generations, deserve more political alternatives.”

Frank Engel, Head of the European Parliament delegation, said: “Materially credible elections were held, and there will be a result. Now, the challenge for political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be to ensure that the result is used in favour of the common good, and not of particular interests.”

The legal framework is generally conducive to holding democratic elections, but important long-standing shortcomings remain, as political deadlock has stalled constitutional and electoral reforms. Restrictions on the right to stand based on ethnicity and residence are contrary to OSCE commitments and Council of Europe and other international standards, and the European Court of Human Rights judgments on this issue remain unimplemented.

“The fundamental issues with the constitutional and legal framework must be addressed, but what we saw yesterday was also many election administration officials committed to making the system work, and many voters committed to shaping their country’s future,” said Rasa Juknevičienė, Head of the delegation from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) administered the process efficiently, despite limited budget and staff, and against the backdrop of continued criticism and allegations regarding technical preparations. There was a lack of trust in the election administration at all levels and questions about its impartiality, including due to numerous credible claims that contestants were trading positions to obtain control over particular polling station commissions. Municipal election commissions acted in a more professional manner, the observers said. On election day, polling station commissions worked transparently but faced some difficulties in following procedures, particularly during counting.

The lack of transparency in media ownership and the influence of political and business interests on editorial policies raised concerns about the ability of most outlets to provide unbiased coverage, the statement says. Public broadcasters provided contestants with free airtime in the official campaign period. Media monitoring showed that Republika Srpska’s public broadcaster provided significantly more coverage to one of the state presidential candidates.

“We saw that fundamental freedoms were respected but, at the same time, there is enduring mistrust in the country’s institutions,” said Ambassador Peter Tejler, head of the ODIHR election observation mission. “ODIHR’s final report will highlight the positive elements in these elections and provide recommendations to address the shortcomings we have identified.”

The observers heard repeated concerns over the accuracy of the Central Voters Register, in particular regarding deceased voters remaining on the list. The CEC took measures to improve the register’s accuracy and referred cases of suspected fraud in postal voting registration to the prosecutor’s office.

Gender equality was not a prominent element in the campaign, including when social and family issues were discussed. Although women appeared in electoral events, they rarely campaigned on their own and women candidates were not actively promoted by political party structures, nor covered extensively in the media, the statement says.

Mechanisms for complaints and appeals are in place and provide for timely consideration, including through judicial review. However, a restrictive interpretation by election commissions in deciding which complaints are admissible meant effective remedies were denied and alleged irregularities went unaddressed. The CEC reviewed a number of complaints in public sessions and maintained a register of these, but the transparency of the process remained an issue. It provided the reasoning for its decisions, which were usually adopted by consensus, so as to maintain the overall ethnic balance in the CEC’s approach to dispute resolution.

For further information contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +387 67 130 1572 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Iryna Sabashuk, OSCE PA, +387 62 361 066 or +45 60 10 81 73, iryna@oscepa.dk

Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE, +387 62 032 847 or +33 (0) 6 50 68 76 55, chemavon.chahbazian@coe.int

Tim Boden, EP, +387 60 302 0657 or +32 498 3414, timothy.boden@europarl.europa.eu

Ruxandra Popa, NATO PA, +32 484 690 848, rpopa@nato-pa.int

read more

VIENNA, 7 October 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his shock and condemnation at the news of the brutal murder of Viktoria Marinova, anchor and administrative director at TVN in Ruse, Bulgaria.

“I am shocked by the horrific murder of investigative journalist Viktoria Marinova in Bulgaria,” said Désir. “I will closely follow the investigation opened by the authorities. I urge them to swiftly identify and bring to justice those responsible and to clearly determine whether this attack was linked to her work.”

Marinova was killed on 6 October, after being heavily beaten and raped.

“I am deeply saddened by this horrific murder and express my deep condolences to her family at this difficult time,” said Désir.

The Representative notes a trend of increased attacks against female journalists. Safety of journalists, especially female journalists, is paramount.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

read more