OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

At about 08:00 on the morning of 18 February in non-government-controlled Donetsk city, while standing in front of the Mission’s residence on Pushkina Boulevard, two SMM staff members heard at least two explosions approximately 100-150 metres south-south-east. Other SMM personnel were in the residence. Nobody was injured.

Later, the SMM saw two fresh craters (about 70cm in diameter) in the area, about 100m and 300m south of the SMM’s residence. At the location of the first crater, 2m east of a gas distribution station (west of Pushkina Boulevard), the Mission observed that four bricks on the east-facing side of the station and an extended part of the corrugated roof on the same side were damaged. At the second crater, about 7-8m north of a residential apartment building at 70 Kobozeva Street, the SMM saw dirt and small holes on the north-facing side of the building, consistent with the dirt and pebbles on the ground. The Mission assessed the damage at both sites as having been caused by the detonation of explosive devices without casing (type undetermined).

The SMM noted no significant changes in the general security situation in the city.

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VIENNA, 18 February 2019 - Bertie Ahern, former Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of Ireland, will address a joint meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation and the Permanent Council in Vienna on Wednesday, 20 February. Media representatives are invited to cover Ahern’s address which will focus on lessons learned from conflict resolution, drawing on the 1998 Good Friday Agreement as a case study.

Ahern, who served as Taoiseach of Ireland from 1997 to 2008, will reflect on his experience in achieving peace in Northern Ireland through “inclusive dialogue” and highlight the conditions that made progress in the peace process possible.

Media representatives wishing to cover the address must register by sending an e-mail to press@osce.org, by 17:00, Tuesday, 19 February.

The address will begin at 10:00 on Wednesday, 20 February in the Neuer Saal (second floor) of the Hofburg Conference Centre, Vienna (entrance through Heldenplatz). Attending media representatives should bring a valid press card and allow time for a security check.

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MUNICH, Germany, 17 February 2019 – At the Munich Security Conference, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia Miroslav Lajčák and OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, both stressed that no single country can tackle today’s security challenges alone. Dialogue, co-operation and multilateralism are the only way to a safer future they reiterated, a message shared by many participants of this leading global gathering that focuses on security policy as well as current and future security challenges.

On the agenda for the 2019 conference were discussions on the future of the European Union; trade and international security; arms control; technological innovation; climate change; and the consequences of shifting power between China, Russia and the United States.

While in Munich, Lajčák met with government representatives from around the world to brief them on his priorities for the OSCE in 2018, including preventing and resolving conflict, a safer future, and effective multilateralism. He also discussed current developments, as well as peace and security challenges.

His meetings included Milo Đukanović, President of Montenegro; Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia; Taro Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan; Chyngyz Aidarbekov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic; George Camba, Minister Delegate for European Affairs of Romania; Fiona Hill, Special Assistant to the President of the United States of America and Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs; and Melanne Verveer, the Chair’s OSCE Special Representative on Gender.

OSCE Secretary General Greminger had a number of meetings with representatives of international organizations and government officials including with the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the first Under-Secretary for the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office Vladimir Voronkov, Foreign Minister of Canada Chrystia Freeland and the U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker.

He also took part in the high-level discussion on Security in Eastern Europe where he highlighted the unique role of the OSCE as a regional platform for dialogue.

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BRUSSELS, 17 February 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia Miroslav Lajčák met today with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin ahead of tomorrow’s discussion on Ukraine at the EU Foreign Affairs Council.

Following up on his visit to Ukraine earlier this year, Minister Lajčák suggested a range of concrete measures to ease the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in and around Ukraine for the people most affected by it. “These small but very concrete proposals would make a real difference for the people on the ground,” he stressed.

Minister Lajčák once again reiterated his deep regret about the decision of the Ukrainian authorities, which de-facto denies accreditation to ODIHR’s international observers with passports from the Russian Federation.

“Our Heads of State have all committed to invite observers from other participating States that wish to observe our elections, including through ODIHR,” the Chairperson-in-Office said. “I remain convinced that not accepting accreditation for all ODIHR’s observers is not in line with the OSCE commitments and therefore not in the best interest of the OSCE, Ukraine or its people.”

“As helping to resolve the crisis in and around Ukraine is a key priority for our Chairmanship, we count on Ukraine’s constructive engagement with the OSCE,” Lajčák said.

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office intends to discuss the situation in and around Ukraine, along with other issues, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later this week in Moscow.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed damage in Kruta Hora and Pikuzy as a result of shelling.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near non-government-controlled Khoroshe, Lobacheve and Pervomaisk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area. It observed damage as a result of shelling in residential areas near the Zolote disengagement area. Members of the armed formations fired 10m away from an SMM patrol at an SMM UAV flying over the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the operation of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and again near non-government-controlled Novoazovsk, Oleksandrivske and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 550 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east, south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), while the majority of explosions were recorded in the areas around the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 210 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at directions ranging from east to south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

On the morning of 15 February, positioned near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 20-50 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 200m north-east.

Damage in Kruta Hora and Pikuzy as a result of shelling

On 15 February, in Kruta Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed an impact crater about 20m north of a one-storey house about 50m from the main street through the village. The SMM could not assess the calibre of weapon or the freshness of the crater, but assessed that the direction of fire was northerly. A female resident of the house (in her seventies) told the SMM that she had been at home on 6 February when shelling had caused the impact. The woman and another local resident (man in his seventies) separately told the SMM that there had been shelling in the area on the evening of 6 February and that as a result the village had been without electricity for three days.

On 14 February, on a dirt road about 220m north-west of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a recent impact crater, which was about 220m north-west of houses on the edge of the settlement. The same UAV spotted another fresh impact crater near a position of the armed formations in a field about 800m south-west of Pikuzy. The SMM assessed that the impacts were caused by artillery rounds but could not determine calibre or direction of fire.

On 15 February, the SMM observed that a shop on Pobeda Street in the central part of Pikuzy had been destroyed: the tin roof had collapsed, all of the windows were shattered and the interior of the shop was burnt out. The SMM could not make further assessments due to security considerations. A local resident (a woman in her fifties) told the SMM that the area had been shelled on the morning of 13 February. On 13 and 14 February, the SMM had been prevented by members of the armed formations from accessing Pikuzy (see SMM Daily Report 14 February 2019 and SMM Daily Report 15 February 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 14 February, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in a compound, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) about 600m south-west of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 14 February, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 900m south of its northern edge and about 1.8km east of its western edge (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 6 February 2019) .

On 14 February, in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted two missing roof tiles on the south-eastern part of the roof of a house located about 850m west of the Zolote disengagement area (not visible in imagery from 5 November 2018). Analysis of additional SMM imagery revealed fresh probable shrapnel damage to the front yard and south-east facing fence and corner of the porch. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a 120mm mortar round. The UAV also spotted four Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers standing in front of the house.

On 14 February, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a recent impact crater, assessed as caused by a probable 120mm mortar round, in between residential homes in Zolote-5/ Mykhailivika (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), about 850m east of the Zolote disengagement area. The same UAV spotted 22 recent impact craters, assessed as caused by probable 82mm mortar rounds, near positions of the armed formations in a field north-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk).

On 14 February, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 15 impact craters surrounding positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, assessed as likely recent and caused by 82mm mortar rounds, about 300m north of the Zolote disengagement area.

During the evening of 14 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded eight projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and three projectiles at an assessed range of 1.5-3km east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

Armed formations members fire 10m away from an SMM patrol at an SMM UAV flying over the Zolote disengagement area

On 15 February, while positioned at a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM informed members of the armed formations present that an SMM mid-range UAV was flying in the area, operated by the SMM from a different location. The SMM observed five members of the armed formations standing at the same checkpoint, about 10m from the SMM, each aim an assault rifle at a UAV that was flying south of the checkpoint at an altitude of about 300m, and fire about 60 shots in total in its direction. The SMM informed the members of the armed formations that it was an SMM UAV and the members of the armed formations stopped shooting. The SMM left the area of the checkpoint. The SMM UAV was not damaged.

The same day, positioned north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled area

14 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a tank (T-64) in a compound near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range spotted:

• three tanks (T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

15 February

The SMM saw:

• a tank (T-64) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Pervomaisk. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

15 February

The SMM saw:

• a tank (T-64) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm) near a railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region[4]

15 February

The SMM noted that:

• four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were present and
• 32 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and 14 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) remained missing.

Weapons storage sites for weapons the SMM has verified as withdrawn

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

15 February:

The SMM noted that:

•  seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

14 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a fire control vehicle (MT-LB, 1VXX-variant) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk);
• four IFVs (BMD-1 or BMD-2) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk).

15 February:

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck west of Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an IFV (BMP variant) east of Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

14 February

An SMM mini-UAV again spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and a trench digger (TMK-2) near Khoroshe and
• two ACVs (undetermined variant) on the north-eastern edge of Pervomaisk.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (probable BMP-1) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB M) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk).

15 February:

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-1) north-east of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk) and
• an IFV (BMP-1) in Pervomaisk and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military truck near Pervomaisk.

Presence of mines

On 14 February, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows across road T0519 on the western edge of Pikuzy. Near Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), the same UAV again spotted nine anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a row across a road leading from Vodiane to Pikuzy.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of Government control

At a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM did not observe any traffic or pedestrians crossing the border.

At a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 70 minutes, the SMM saw 18 cars (five with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and two with Lithuanian licence plates and six with “DPR” plates), four closed trailer trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), a milk tanker (with Ukrainian licence plates), two mini-busses (both with Russian Federation licence plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also observed 29 cars (11 with Ukrainian, ten with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates and six with “DPR” plates), 11 closed trailer trucks (three with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates), three mini-buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses (both with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 12 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access

• An armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage east at a checkpoint of the armed formations on the eastern edge of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk) due to an “on-going military exercise”.
• Three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage east, south or west at a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), citing “on-going operations” in the area. The SMM observed civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in all directions. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that there had been no demining in the area.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from crossing the checkpoint for 23 minutes, at which time it was permitted to cross.

Other impediments:

• While an SMM mid-range UAV was flying in the Zolote disengagement area, members of the armed formations fired in the direction of the UAV at a distance of 10m from an SMM patrol present in the area. The SMM left the area immediately.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA/SARAJEVO, 15 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, and the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bruce G. Berton, today condemned several threats made against journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Earlier this month, Editor-in-Chief of a Public Service Broadcaster (BHRT) news program, Marko Radoja, received a letter with threatening messages including threats to his life.

According to media reports, Adnan Jašarspahić, an FTV journalist and owner of online portal Visoko.co.ba filed charges against two persons connected to a local politician,  for threatening him on social media.

In addition, journalist Milkica Milojević, from the daily newspaper EuroBlic in Banja Luka received threats over the phone. Reportedly, a police investigation into this case has already been launched.

“These threats against journalists are unacceptable and must be condemned at the highest level. Authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina must increase their efforts to guarantee safe working conditions for media professionals,” Désir said, expressing hope that all threats will be duly investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice.

“It is clear that threats and incidents involving journalists have intensified, even since the beginning of the year, which is a worrying trend. The authorities must take all necessary measures to create an environment that enables a truly free and independent media and to end intimidation of journalists. It is unacceptable that journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina face violence and intimidation for exercising their fundamental right to freedom of expression, a right that is essential for democracy.  All incidences must be thoroughly investigated,” Berton said.

“For the democratic development of the country it is of paramount importance to make sure that safety of journalists is ensured at all times and that impunity not become common place,” Désir said.

The Representative recalled the need for States to fully respect the OSCE Ministerial Council decision on Safety of journalists, adopted last December in Milan.

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VIENNA, 15 February 2019 – At today’s second meeting of the Informal Working Group on Scales of Contributions of the OSCE, Special Representative of the Chairmanship Slovak State Secretary Lukáš Parízek, who chairs the Group, urged all participating States to focus above all else on management and finances of the OSCE.

Re-confirming Slovakia’s commitment to the OSCE Chairmanship, and to the sense of responsibility and respect that comes with the role of assuring the Organization’s good functioning, Parízek stated: “Slovakia took up the OSCE Chairmanship with humility, but also determination from the very beginning. We are ready to listen and to address all sensitive issues raised by the participating States.”

He continued by encouraging compromise and reminded all States that “putting the OSCE on a sound financial footing is a step the international community should be willing to take today.”

“The Chairmanship will not spare any efforts in finding a solution to the serious challenges we face today and which jeopardize the work of the OSCE and divert our attention from the core security issues we need to tackle,” he stressed.

Acknowledging that the issue of the expired OSCE Scales of Contributions is a long-overdue, contentious and polarizing topic, the Chair of the Informal Working Group asked all participating States to look forward instead of backwards and “translate verbal expressions of support for the OSCE into concrete steps of action.”

The OSCE Informal Working Group on Scales of Contributions aims to reach consensus on the long-standing and sensitive issue of the expired Scales of Contributions, which will define how much each of the 57 participating States annually pays for the Organization for the coming years.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near government-controlled Krasnohorivka and Kapitanove.
• The Mission recorded a ceasefire violation near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to and operation of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and again near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 550 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and near Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (seven explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in non-government-controlled areas south-south-east of Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk) and at north-easterly directions of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 14 February, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area).

The same day, positioned north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

14 February

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) heading south near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) travelling south near Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

13 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• 33 tanks (24 T-72 and nine T-64) in a training area near Ternove (15km south-east of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

14 February

The SMM saw:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk);
• three IFVs (two BMP-1 and a BMP variant) near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (Saxon) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and maintenance works to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a representative of the Luhansk Energy Association told the SMM that the maintenance works in Katerynivka had been suspended due to ceasefire violations in the area (the Mission heard an undetermined explosion in the area). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

On 14 February, the SMM observed seven mine hazard signs around a compound in Amvrosiivka (non-government controlled, 56 km south-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 12 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access

• On two occasions, armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing special operations” both times (the SMM was subsequently able to cross the checkpoint and enter the village on the third attempt).
• Three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) after the Mission refused to show its patrol plan. This denial prevented the SMM from travelling to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Protecting and promoting human rights while policing assemblies, as well as police accountability, were the focus of a three-day training course organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) from 13 to 15 February 2019 in Yerevan.

The training event brought together 28 representatives (22 men and 6 women) of police departments from the city of Yerevan, five of the country’s provinces, as well as the Police Academy of Armenia.

Participants in the interactive workshop explored human rights standards and internationally recognized good practices in assembly policing, drawing on real-life examples.

“It is an obligation of each OSCE participating State to uphold everyone’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly,” said Anita Danka, ODIHR Human Rights Adviser and a trainer at the course. “This means that the police have a positive duty to facilitate peaceful assemblies without discrimination. ODIHR has built up vast expertise in this area by monitoring the enjoyment of freedom of peaceful assembly in the OSCE region and developing tools to support the work of legislators, policymakers, law enforcement officers and independent observers.”

Colonel Vladimir Avagimyan, Associate Professor at the Police Academy’s Faculty of Law, said: “The protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens is the most important principle of work of democratic police forces. Therefore, this training and, in particular, an opportunity to look at the work of police during peaceful assemblies through the lens of international human right law and best practices of other democratic states was very useful for Armenian police officers. We can share the knowledge obtained at the training with our colleagues already responsible for facilitating assemblies, as well as with police cadets.”

ODIHR has previously conducted similar training sessions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Poland and Ukraine.

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission followed up on reports of a man who died at a checkpoint in Kreminets.
• An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted recent impact craters in non-government-controlled Sokilnyky and government-controlled Travneve.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in Khrustalnyi and near Sofiivka and Molodizhne.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission followed up on reports of graffiti on a church in Zaporizhzhia.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and near Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 170 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 310 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded south and west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and again at easterly, southerly and westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (seven), compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man died while waiting at a checkpoint in Kreminets

The SMM followed up on reports of a man who died on 12 February at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk). On 13 February, at the Kalinina Hospital morgue in Donetsk city, staff told the Mission that the body of a man (in his sixties) who had died earlier that day from a heart attack had been brought to the morgue in the afternoon on 12 February. They added that the ambulance staff who had brought in the body said the man had died while waiting alone in his car at the above-mentioned checkpoint. (For previous similar observations from the checkpoint, see SMM Daily Report 9 February 2019.)

Recent impact craters

On 12 February, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted at least ten recent impact craters near previously destroyed residential buildings and trenches on the western edge of Sokilnyky (non-government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk), as well as three additional recent craters about 600m west.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a recent impact crater (not seen in imagery from 1 October 2018) eight metres from residential buildings in the southern part of Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk). The UAV also spotted that roof panels of three of these buildings had been dislodged or had fallen to the ground; some of them were intact while others were broken. The Mission assessed the crater and the damage to the roofs as caused by a probable 120mm mortar round.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 13 February, positioned north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the disengagement areas near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

12 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 13 February 2019).

13 February

The SMM saw:

• five multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) on the northern edge of Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and
• a mortar (type undetermined, 120mm) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 February

The SMM saw that:

• 13 tanks (seven T-72 and six T-64) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

13 February

The SMM saw:

• a combat engineering vehicle (type undetermined) in Viktorivka (74km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• five infantry fighting vehicles (probable BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (a probable BTS-4A) in a training area near Sofiivka (see above) and
• two amoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) in Donetsk city.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water wells at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 28 cars with Ukrainian, Russian Federation, Georgian and Lithuanian licence plates; three covered cargo trucks with Russian Federation licence plates; and two buses exiting Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw five cars with Ukrainian and Russian Federation licence plates entering Ukraine.

Graffiti on a church wall in Zaporizhzhia

The SMM saw fresh traces of graffiti (a swastika symbol), which had been painted in black paint or coal, on a wall of St. Princess Olha’s Church (affiliated with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) at 161a Sobornyi Avenue in Zaporizhzhia (70km south of Dnipro). A police car was parked near the church. A priest from the church told the Mission that he had seen the graffiti for the first time in the early morning on 11 February and that the church’s night guard, who had seen the graffiti before him on the same morning, had tried to remove the markings. A police representative told the Mission that an investigation under article 296 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code had been opened. (For similar observations from Zaporizhzhia, see SMM Daily Report 9 February 2019.)[5]

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 12 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access

• Two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), preventing the Mission from travelling to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). They cited “the SMM’s safety”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations again on two occasions allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting its trailer.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The distance to Zaporizhzhia mentioned in the SMM Daily Report of 9 February 2019 should have read “70km south of Dnipro”.

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VIENNA, 14 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his serious concern regarding the amendments to the Russian federal laws on Communication and on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information, which were adopted by the State Duma, in the first reading on 12 February.

“I am concerned by the vagueness and broadness of the objectives of the new legislation and the risk of restrictions to access to information,” Désir said. “While the aim is to ensure the sustainability of the Internet in the Russian Federation, the new powers given to the regulator over the routing of Internet traffic, along with the requirements for all Internet service providers to install technical mechanisms to withstand threats, may seriously affect the free flow of information. The central control mechanism over the Internet could also be used to cut access to the global Internet and impair the ability of the population to receive and impart information. I call on the Parliament to carefully review the proposed amendments by taking into account the transnational nature of the Internet and its important role for access to information and media pluralism.”

The draft law, among other things, proposes the introduction of new regulations on traffic routing and the granting of additional powers to the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) to increase the supervision of Internet control and traffic, manage the public communications networks, and restrict access to information deemed illegal under Russian law.  

“The Internet should be overseen by a regulatory authority which is protected from any external interference, while restrictions on online content should be balanced and transparent and imposed only in strict conformity with international law,” Désir added.

“I recall that at the Ministerial Council meeting in Milan in December 2018, in the Decision on Safety of Journalists the OSCE participating States reaffirmed that the right to freedom of expression includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers and in the Declaration on the Digital Economy, they committed to the greatest possible access to the Internet and acknowledged its benefits. They recognized that the free flow of and access to information, including on the Internet, are essential for the digital economy and beneficial to development.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Parliamentary openness and the improvement of the parliament’s interaction with civil society through the legislative process were the focus of an OSCE-supported international conference held in Astana on 14 February 2019.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the NGO Fund for Parliamentary Development in Kazakhstan.

Some 80 Members of Parliament, the Parliament Apparatus staff, representatives of state bodies, civil society, international organizations,academia and university students participated in the event. National experts from non-governmental organizations and academia, as well as a representative of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights delivered presentations on the event topics.

The conference aimed to promote dialogue between the parliament and civil society. The conference’s sessions focused on the current law-making process in Kazakhstan, ways to strengthen the openness and transparency of the parliament to the public, national and international standards and mechanisms of human rights protection, modalities of public participation in the legislative process in the parliament of Kazakhstan, and civic engagement in public decision-making process.

The conference was part of the Office’s activities aimed at enhancing the work of the parliament and strengthening its co-operation with civil society.

MINSK, 14 February 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 13 February 2019:

“Yesterday, we marked the fourth anniversary of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements.

This document, together with the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Memorandum of September 2014, is the basis of the Minsk Agreements that also define our current work.

Unfortunately, a solution to the conflict has not yet come nearer. I mentioned this yesterday, along with Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, in my VTC briefing to the United Nations Security Council.

This meeting of the UN Security Council was convened on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Package of Measures. It has once again demonstrated the great concern of the international community about the situation in the east of Ukraine.

The meeting's participants –  representatives of both the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, including those of Asia, Africa and Latin America – have highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the conflict and the necessity to ensure the protection of the civilian population.

The particular contribution of the OSCE to solve the conflict has been acknowledged as well.

Now as for the results of today's discussions in the Working Groups.

The Humanitarian Working Group has welcomed the transfer of thirty-three detainees not related to the conflict from certain areas of Luhansk region (CALR) to the government-controlled areas of Ukraine. The transfer took place on February 7, 2019. Today, the Working Group continued to discuss issues related to further transfers of such detainees.

The Economic Working Group considered topical issues of water deliveries. The participants have agreed that it is essential to introduce a simplified mechanism to pay for water delivered to CALR in the “Karbonyt” supply system. Also, the schedule of the audit for the “Voda Donbassa” company has been agreed upon, so that the ICRC can now start its work in this regard.

The Security Working Group has worked on ensuring sustainability of the ceasefire and on humanitarian demining near civilian infrastructure.

The Political Working Group took forward its exchanges on its well-known agenda, namely the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as stipulated by the Minsk agreements.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.  
• The Mission observed craters assessed as caused by mortar rounds in residential areas in Pervomaisk and fresh craters inside the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The Mission saw weapons in violation on both sides of the contact line.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (430 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and at directions ranging from east-south-east to west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).  

On 12 February, positioned about 2.5km south of Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten outgoing explosions and saw three tanks (T-72) at about 2-3km west-north-west of its position. The SMM assessed this as probable live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone (see withdrawal of weapons section below).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). 

Disengagement areas[2]                                                                         

On 11 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)spotted at least 50 recent craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, inside the disengagement area near Zolote and about 600m north-east of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area.

On 11 February, on the north-western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted eight craters in the gardens of four houses (at a distance ranging between 6m and 50m from the houses), assessed as recent impacts caused by 120mm mortar rounds (for further observations in the same area, see SMM Daily Report 12 February 2019). About 1.5km east of this location and 300m south of the south-eastern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the same UAV spotted two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) and four recent craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, near a position of the armed formations.

Between the evenings of 11-12 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), 42 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-4km east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 12 February, positioned on the western edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 12 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw: 

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) heading south on road H-20 near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three tanks (T-72) in Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk);
• a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and two probable mortars (one 2B11 and one 82mm type undetermined) north-east of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk); and
• four tanks (T-64) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk).

11 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted: 

• two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a residential area of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• three tanks (T-72)  at a training area near Sofiivka (see above).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas 

11 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 18 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B,152mm and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), two tanks (T-64, one without main gun) and a self-propelled mortar (2S9Nona-S, 120mm) north of Khrustalnyi (56km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn:[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

12 February

The SMM saw:

• three tanks (a T-64 and two T-72) present for the first time and noted that 33 anti-tank guns (30 MT-12 and three D-48, 85mm) and 12 towed howitzers (2A65) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Practika Kozak-2) in the yard of a residential house in Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk).

12 February 

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-60) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas 

10 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant) and an APC (BTR-80)in Novoselivka.

11 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck and two APCs (MT-LB) in Debaltseve.

On 10 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three impact craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, in a field about 2km north of Sentianivka.

On 11 February, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about 70 recent craters, assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (82mm and 120mm) near positions of the armed formations west of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled,  96km south of Donetsk). 

On 12 February, the SMM saw a mast with an antenna and an unidentified UAV land next to four armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers on a concrete plot on the south-eastern edge of  Valuiske (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 11 February, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 63 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in two rows in a field near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces close to Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily 11 July 2018).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) as well as to power lines in Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk) and to water wells at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable visual inspections related to the possible presence of explosive remnants of war and mines by members of the armed formations near a school and two kindergartens in Holmivskyi, as well as two schools in Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). 

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv. 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 12 February 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access: 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The SMM visited heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, whose storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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411305 Communication and Media Relations Section

Forty policymakers, technical officers and private sector representatives from ten OSCE participating States and Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation completed a two-day sub-regional training course in Athens on how international cyber/ICT security mechanisms can enhance regional cyber stability.

The training course held on 7 and 8 February 2019, was organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the National Cyber Security Authority of Greece’s Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications & Media.

The participants learnt about regional and global efforts to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs, in particular, the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) that have been developed by OSCE participating States. There was also a focus on encouraging representatives of OSCE participating States and the Mediterranean Partner States to build or strengthen ties with each other on confronting cyber/ICT security issues and exploring how these ties can be formalized through the OSCE as a platform.

On the first day, the training course featured multiple experts and discussion panels on the prevailing threats stemming from cyberspace in the region, the mechanisms that can be deployed to address them and how the Mediterranean Partners can be engaged in future OSCE cyber/ICT security efforts. The participants were joined by experts from Microsoft and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

On the second day, participants visited the premises of the EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and took part in an OSCE-led scenario-based discussion. Through four stages of an escalating fictitious cyber/ICT incident, participants were asked to flesh out their national perspectives, mitigation and national co-ordination policies, give their views on international co-operation with affected and/or suspected states, and clarify what roles the OSCE, as a platform and guardian of the CBM process, can play.

Communication and Media Relations Section

Strengthening security sector governance was the focus of an event jointly organized by the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 13 February 2019 in Yerevan.

A wide range of stakeholders, executive bodies, legislative oversight bodies, law enforcement agencies, as well as representatives of civil society took part in the event to discuss reform priorities and opportunities in the security sector.

The discussions marked the conclusion of a comprehensive OSCE needs assessment focusing on democratic control and oversight of the security sector, conducted with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in 2018. Findings of the assessment were presented at the event in order to identify future areas of OSCE assistance in strengthening the oversight of the security sector in Armenia.

Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia, Artak Apitonian, stressed that security sector governance and reform is one of the priorities of Armenia's co-operation with the OSCE. “Professional, efficient and accountable security institutions promote human rights and democracy, rule of law and good governance. Therefore, democratic oversight of the security sector constitutes one of the pillars of the OSCE comprehensive security," said Minister Apitonian.

Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, confirmed that Slovakia is a long-term supporter of SSG/R in multilateral organisations and will continue in these efforts during the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship this year. “This workshop is an important contribution to building a common understanding of the concept in the OSCE based on national and regional experience and needs,” stressed Ambassador Michalka and thanked Armenia for hosting this event.

Graziella Pavone, Human Rights Officer at ODIHR, said: "Security sector governance promotes an idea of security centred on individuals and their different needs, in the framework of the protection of human rights, compliance with the rule of law, strong accountability measures and gender equality.”

Support to ongoing reforms in the security sector is one of the priority areas that were agreed with the authorities of Armenia in the framework of the Armenia Co-operation Programme.

411329 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities

States need comprehensive and concrete policy advice on how to use media as a powerful tool for conflict prevention and social integration, said OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Lamberto Zannier as he presented The Tallinn Guidelines on National Minorities and the Media in the Digital Age in the Estonian capital on 13 February 2019.

The publication, the latest in the set of OSCE thematic recommendations produced by the OSCE High Commissioner, contains 37 concrete guidelines. They address issues arising from the fact that information and communication technologies continue to evolve at an exponential rate and have the potential to both unite and divide different groups in society.

More than one hundred media experts, policymakers and national minority representatives attended the launch event, which opened with remarks by Estonia’s President Kersti Kaljulaid, the country’s Foreign Minister Sven Mikser and OSCE High Commissioner Zannier. This was followed by an interactive expert discussion on best practices and challenges related to the role of the media and information technologies in diverse societies.

Reflecting on how today’s media could effectively be used by states to prevent conflict occurring in their respective countries, Zannier advocated the following recipe: “a combination of multilingualism reflecting the linguistic diversity in society; participation of various groups in media content production and delivery; and restraint by states in their interference in other countries’ affairs”. 

The launch of the Tallinn Guidelines is part of a concerted drive by Zannier to raise public awareness about the benefits of the OSCE High Commissioner’s thematic recommendations and guidelines for conflict prevention and encourage their practical application by governments. 

Why Tallinn? The Tallinn Guidelines are aptly named on two counts: Estonia’s reputation as an innovator, user and promoter of digital technologies on the one hand, and its continuous efforts to integrate Estonia’s diverse society, stated Zannier.

In keeping with the media theme, prior to the event a digital platform was set up at www.tallinn-guidelines.info to enable everyone interested in this subject to follow the live-streamed discussions, engage with the discussants, and access all related materials.

While in Estonia, Zannier will meet with representatives of the Ministry of Education and national minority representatives in Tallinn. He also plans to visit the city of Narva  where he will continue to discuss the situation concerning the integration process in this predominantly minority populated area, focusing on matters such as language, education, access to media and participation in public life for national minorities. Zannier will meet with local authorities, minority representatives, as well as with students and education professionals at the Narva College and one of the local schools with minority language education.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights United States, Mid-term Congressional Elections, 6 November 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the 6 November 2018 mid-term congressional elections in United States recommends that representation rights be provided for citizens resident in the District of Columbia and United States overseas territories.

The report, published on 13 February 2019, also recommends that restrictions on voting rights for persons with criminal convictions be reviewed to ensure that limitations are proportionate and that those rights be restored upon completion of sentences. It further recommends that the deprivation of the right to vote for persons with intellectual disabilities or those under guardianship be based on individualized assessments.

Lack of agreement in Congress to update a key aspect of the 1965 Voting Rights Act diminishes its effectiveness in safeguarding against discrimination on racial or linguistic grounds. Highlighting the need to ensure the right and opportunity of all citizens to vote, the report recommends that Congress update the formula for determining jurisdictions to be subject to Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, in line with the relevant Supreme Court ruling.

Noting that drawing the boundaries of electoral districts should respect the equality of the vote, not discriminate against any group and be free from political influence, the report recommends establishing independent bodies for this purpose, well in advance of elections.

The report states that campaign finance rules do not guarantee full transparency, and recommends that federal legislation be amended to require disclosure of the sources of funding for all non-profit organizations that engage in campaign activities.

The report also recommends that effective measures be put in place to ensure the safety of journalists and media, including protection against threats, intimidation and attacks.

Taking note of the robust technical support and co-ordination mechanisms that enhanced preparedness for cyberattacks, the report recommends providing sufficient and sustainable funding to replace aging voting equipment and improve cyber security.

While noting that election observation is regulated by individual states, the report highlights instances where observers were not allowed and recommends that legislation guarantee access to international observers invited by the United States authorities for all stages of the electoral process, in line with OSCE commitments undertaken by the United States Government.

Additional recommendations relate to improving the transparency of campaign finance, the secrecy of the vote, the participation of voters with disabilities, ballot access, early voting and the administration of elections. The report affirms ODIHR’s readiness to support the United States in its efforts to bring electoral legislation and practice further in line with OSCE commitments.

COPENHAGEN, 13 February 2019 – Some 45 observers from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly will deploy to Moldova for the 24 February parliamentary elections.

OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) will serve as Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, following an appointment by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak. President Tsereteli has led numerous OSCE PA observer missions in the past, including in the United States, United Kingdom and Germany.

“Having experienced its share of political instability and gridlock, Moldova is for the first time holding parliamentary elections under a new mixed electoral system. Ensuring that these elections meet international standards and enjoy the trust of the Moldovan people is of utmost importance,” said Tsereteli.

President Tsereteli conducted a pre-electoral visit to Moldova last month, meeting in Chisinau with President Igor Dodon, President of Parliament Andrian Candu, Prime Minister Pavel Filip, Foreign Minister Tudor Ulianovschi, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Moldova, leading members from extra-parliamentary parties, and representatives of civil society and the international community.

Tsereteli has appointed OSCE PA Vice-President Kari Henriksen (MP, Norway) to lead the OSCE PA observer delegation. Vice-President Henriksen has extensive experience in politics in her home country and as an election observer with the OSCE PA.

“The changes to Moldova’s electoral system could have a far-reaching impact on issues as diverse as women’s participation, campaign finance and constituency delimitation. We look forward to seeing how these reforms are implemented and offering a full assessment based on our observations,” Henriksen said.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ election observation mission is headed by Matyas Eorsi, a former Member of Parliament in Hungary. It consists of 11 international experts based in Chisinau and 28 long-term observers deployed throughout the country who will be joined by an expected 200 short-term observers.

OSCE PA observers will be deploying throughout Moldova, along with OSCE/ODIHR observers, observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

It is the 11th time for the OSCE PA deploying election observers to Moldova since 1994. The elections will be assessed for their adherence to democratic commitments laid out in the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document of 1990.

Preliminary findings and conclusions of the election observation mission will be presented at a press conference in Chisinau on 25 February.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.  
• A man reportedly died of natural causes while waiting at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka to travel to government-controlled areas.
• The Mission observed gunfire damage at a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and inhabited houses in Pervomaisk, as well as fresh impact craters in Slovianoserbsk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also denied in Dovzhanske, close to the border with the Russian Federation, as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk regions, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 430 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including nearly 60 per cent of explosions, were recorded at directions ranging from east-south-east to west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and south-west and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (five), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man reportedly died of natural causes at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka

At a morgue in Horlivka, staff told the SMM that a man in his fifties had been brought to the morgue on 7 February. The man’s wife (in her sixties) and son (in his thirties) told the SMM that the man had been waiting inside a bus to cross a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka to travel to government-controlled areas when he had died. They told the SMM that the man had a history of heart problems and recently suffered a heart attack.

Damage related to shelling and shooting at a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and inhabited houses in Pervomaisk, as well as fresh impact craters in Slovianoserbsk

At a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a 15cm hole in the outer pane of a north-facing double-paned window. In the wooden frame of an adjacent window, the SMM observed a hole and a fragment assessed as from a small-arms bullet. The SMM assessed that the damage was fresh and caused by small-arms fire. The school staff told the SMM that the impacts had happened earlier the same morning and that classes had been suspended until 13 February. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 February 2019.)

In Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), at 11 Polova Street, the SMM observed a hole (about 1m in diameter) on the western side of the roof of a single-storey house and a shattered west-facing double-paned window. At 9 Polova Street, the SMM observed two holes, one on the western and another on the north-eastern side of a barn located about 10m from a house. About 25m away from the house, the SMM observed two impact craters and metal fragments. At 16 Polova Street, the SMM observed an impact crater in the north-facing side of a house. At all three houses, the SMM assessed that the damage was fresh and had been caused by projectiles (unable to determine the type) fired from a north-westerly direction. Three local residents (a woman and two men, all in their sixties) told the SMM that shelling had caused the damage the morning of 8 February. They added that an elderly couple had been in their house at 16 Polova Street at the time of the incident and that the elderly man had been hospitalized with heart problems afterwards. On Polova Street (near single-storey houses no. 9, 11 and 16), the SMM observed three impact craters within four to seven metres of each other in the middle of the street. The SMM saw fragments and a part of a tailfin assessed as from a recoilless gun (73mm) round near the craters. Both the craters and the fragments appeared to have been altered. The SMM could not determine the type of projectile or direction of fire. 

On 10 February, about 1km south-west of Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh impact craters in the snow on both sides of road P-66. The following day, the SMM saw a third fresh impact crater about 400m north-east of the abovementioned craters. The SMM could not make further assessments due to security considerations.

Disengagement areas[2]                                                                         

On the evening of 10 February, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5km-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the evening of 11 February, the same camera recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). 

During the day on 11 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Positioned about 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard a single shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• three mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) being towed by military trucks about 6km north-east of Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and
• four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) about 1km south-west of Lysychanskyi (77km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 February:

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a tank (T-64) near a house being used by the armed formations in Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• at least three tanks (type undetermined) at a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn: [4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

11 February:

The SMM noted that 39 towed howitzers (26 2A65 and 13 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

10 February:

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near a residential house in Zolote-3/ Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

11 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured recovery vehicle (BMP variant) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 15 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Sofiivka (60km west of Luhansk) and
• a surveillance and acquisition radar system (P-19) near Fashchivka (60km south-west of Donetsk).

10 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) (of which one was parked in the yard of a residential house) and a TORN radio intelligence system on a truck (KamAZ) parked near a residential house in Novohryhorivka.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water conduit near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).  It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three cars (two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw a bus (with “LPR” plates, approximately 30 passengers on board) and two vehicles (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine. After about 12 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound on the north-western edge of Donske (government-controlled, 57km south of Donetsk).
• At a border crossing point in Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area and that its monitoring was not “authorized”.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier and a private security guard denied the SMM access to the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place and that the road leading north was still mined.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations insisted on inspecting an OSCE trailer before allowing the SMM to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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