OSCE

ASHGABAT, 17 April 2019 – Some 200 representatives of Central Asian and other OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation, as well as experts from international organizations, attended today in Ashgabat an OSCE high-level regional conference on countering terrorist financing and organized crime.

The two-day conference was organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, the OSCE Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), in co-operation with the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Finance and Economy Ministry of Turkmenistan.

The event brought together representatives and senior experts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia, and other OSCE participating States, Partners for Co-operation and relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations.

“Attacks around the world demonstrate that terrorist groups are still in a position to access financial resources,” said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger. He said that building the capacity of financial oversight and regulatory systems, as well as of prosecutorial and judicial authorities, is tremendously important. “I am confident that high-level discussions will help strengthen regional approaches to countering terrorist financing and, at the same time, give fresh impetus to evolving discussions at the global level.”

The conference is aimed at fostering regional co-operation among the Central Asian States in addressing this serious challenge to security and exploring potential links with organized crime through discussions and exchange of good practices related to countering terrorist financing and misuse of new internet technologies by organized crime.

“Turkmenistan attaches special attention to international co-operation and is actively interacting with the United Nations, OSCE, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Eurasian Group on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism EAG and other organizations in the area of ​​countering terrorist financing,” said Deputy Minister of Finance and Economy of Turkmenistan Sylap Velbegov. “We intend to further enhance our engagement as the country has applied for joining the Egmont Group, which will foster the efficient exchange of information with financial intelligence services of other countries.”

Velbegov said that he believes that the regional conference will help develop new partnership models, build on the compatibility of interests of the participating states, to counter terrorism and organized crime, which pose serious threats to universal security.

Lukáš Parízek, Slovak State Secretary and Special Representative for the OSCE Chairmanship stressed: “We must do more to detect and suppress terrorist financing channels. Terrorist groups have proven adept at exploiting the Internet and social media platforms for networking and raising funds. We need to develop more effective ways to prevent and counter the misuse of the Internet by terrorists while respecting fundamental rights and freedoms.” Parízek continued by expressing his wish that discussions today will help identify best practices and lessons learned and strengthen the foundation for pragmatic, regional co-operation.

The conference was attended by high-level and senior representatives of national ministries, Financial Intelligence Units, judicial authorities, banking and communications sectors from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation, in particular from Central Asian countries, as well as from Afghanistan and Mongolia, high-level officials from the OSCE Secretariat and the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, and from the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), INTERPOL, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation-Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO RATS), Anti-Terrorism Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS/ATC), Western Union (WU), and Facebook.

ASHGABAT, 17 April 2019 – The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Special Representative on Central Asia, Austrian parliamentarian Roman Haider, is in Turkmenistan this week, where he has attended the OSCE Regional Meeting of Heads of OSCE Field Operations in Central Asia and a conference at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the opening of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat. He has also met with Turkmen officials and members of the international community. 

In discussions, Special Representative Haider has stressed the importance of socio-economic and democratic development and welcomed the participation of Turkmenistan in the activities of the OSCE PA.

In a meeting with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vepa Hajiyev, the sides discussed the improved co-operation between Turkmenistan and the OSCE PA since Turkmenistan resumed regularly participating in the PA’s statutory meetings in 2014. This renewed participation reflects the heightened level of international co-operation between the parliament and international organizations, Hajiyev said.

The discussions explored prospects for further engagement of Turkmenistan in the activities of the OSCE PA, including in the field of election observation. Other topics included regional security and promoting stability in Afghanistan, common security challenges such as trafficking in narcotics, weapons and human beings, as well as countering terrorism.

“On so many issues, it is evident that challenges facing Turkmenistan and Central Asia are core concerns for the wider OSCE region,” said Haider. “It is in all of our interests to deepen our engagement in this region and I therefore welcome the increased participation in recent years of Turkmenistan in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.”

In a meeting with Deputy Chairperson of the Mejlis (Parliament) of Turkmenistan Kasymguly Babayev and a number of members of Turkmenistan’s delegation to the OSCE PA, the sides discussed enhancing Turkmenistan’s inter-parliamentary relations as well as action plans to address gender equality, combating trafficking in human beings, and human rights.

Haider also had exchanges with the EU Special Representative for Central Asia Ambassador Peter Burian, the Special Representative of the UN SG for Central Asia and Head of UNRCCA Natalia Gherman, and the Head of the EU Liaison Office in Turkmenistan, Chargé d'Affaires Lubomir Frebort.

On Wednesday, he participated in the Joint Session of OSCE Heads of Field Operations and EU Heads of Delegation in Ashgabat. Topics of discussion included co-operation with OSCE Institutions and the Parliamentary Assembly, including on the human dimension.

The conference marking the 20th anniversary of the OSCE Centre on Tuesday was attended by representatives of the Mejlis of Turkmenistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ombudsman of Turkmenistan, the Rector of the International University of Humanitarian Sciences and Development, and representatives from the international community.

For more background on the work of the OSCE PA Special Representative on Central Asia, please click here.

Željka Šulc

A two-day training course on trafficking in human beings (THB) and migration for judges and prosecutors from across Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) started today, 17 April 2019, in Teslic.

The training is organized by the OSCE Mission to BiH, in co-operation with entity judicial and prosecutorial training centres and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The aim of the training course is to increase participants’ knowledge of the processing of trafficking- and migration-related cases. Particular focus will be placed on identifying victims of THB among the migrant and refugee population and psychological aspects of working with them in order to ensure that the victims are provided with the assistance and protection they need. 

Boris Topic, Anti-trafficking Officer in the OSCE Mission to BiH, emphasized that mixed migration poses a particular challenge for the criminal justice system, as the distinction between the crime of smuggling of persons and the crime of trafficking in human beings becomes increasingly blurred. “To effectively respond to this challenge, the country needs better trained and qualified staff in the criminal justice system. Prosecutors need to demonstrate a more proactive approach in addressing these types of crimes related to migration.” 

The OSCE Mission to BiH, in its Assessment of the Migrant and Refugee Situation in BiH, published in September 2018, made specific recommendations for managing the migrant crisis. These included calling upon the relevant institutions to ensure a sufficient number of trained and qualified staff and appealing to the judicial and prosecutorial training centres to sensitize judicial actors about migration-related crimes.

The training is implemented as a part of the OSCE Mission to BiH’s wider efforts to support the fight against trafficking in human beings in BiH by strengthening the capacity of the relevant institutions to detect, investigate and process this crime.

ASHGABAT, 17 April 2019 – An OSCE-organized conference dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat took place yesterday at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan in Ashgabat.

The conference brought together some 80 representatives of the host government, national partner institutions and organizations, civil society and diplomatic corps as well as the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE Secretariat, institutions and other structures.

Opening the conference, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger commended the efficiency and positive impact of OSCE-Turkmenistan joint activities during the past 20 years: “OSCE field operations are an excellent tool for co-operation. Setting priorities together is helping us to advance active co-operation and understand better where comparative advantages lie in supporting the partnership with Turkmenistan.”

“Active participation in the OSCE’s activities is one of the important directions of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy strategy,” said Rashid Meredov, Deputy Chairperson of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan. “The work of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat over the past 20 years is commendable. We intend to continue and strengthen our co-operation.”

Tomáš Bičan, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the OSCE, representing the 2019 OSCE Chairmanship said: “The last 20 years have demonstrated that the OSCE is a flexible and responsive organization, working hand in hand with its participating States. With its open-ended mandate, the Centre in Ashgabat, together with the government of Turkmenistan, has established a solid foundation to continue their positive co-operation in the coming years.”

Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat said that OSCE-Turkmenistan relationship has come a long way in the two decades of the Centre’s existence. “There is a great potential for continuing and strengthening our important dialogue based on trust and co-operation,” she said.

Jehangir Khan, the Director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), Elena Panova, UN Resident Coordinator in Turkmenistan, and Lubomir Frebort, EU Liaison Office in Turkmenistan, elaborated on the interaction between the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat and other international organizations present in Turkmenistan.

Kasymguly Babayev, Deputy Chairperson of the Mejlis of Turkmenistan, Yazdursun Gurbannazarova, Ombudsperson of Turkmenistan, and Esen Aydogdyyev, Rector of the International University for Humanities and Development, highlighted the main areas of co-operation and joint achievements in the 20 years of the OSCE Centre’s activities.

The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat was established in 1999 to assist Turkmenistan in implementing its OSCE commitments in the politico-military, economic and environmental and human dimensions of security. The main areas of the OSCE’s co-operation with Turkmenistan include border management, transnational threats, confidence- and security-building measures, good governance, economic connectivity, transport facilitation, development of renewable energy and environmental protection, as well as human rights, gender equality and media development.

To mark its 20th anniversary, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat also organized a photo exhibition entitled The World Around Us, presenting photographs taken by the participants of the photography and photojournalism master class for persons with disabilities organized by the Centre in February. The Centre also exhibited photographs taken during the 20 years of its activities.

417389 Communication and Media Relations Section

The OSCE Best Practice Guide on Deactivation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) was the focus of a two-day regional workshop organized by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and the Ministry of Defence of Belarus on 16 and 17 April 2019.

The regional workshop brought together participants from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, France, Germany Latvia, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom, INTERPOL and EUROPOL. It aimed at supporting OSCE participating States in applying the SALW deactivation standards, approaches and procedures in their efforts to combat the diversion and the illicit transfers of such weapons. It also provided guidance on how to streamline and implement legislation strengthening SALW controls to prevent illicit firearms trafficking.

Opening the workshop, the Chief of Staff of Armament, the Belarus Armed Forces Major General Andrei Fedin said that one of the prerequisites to the safety of and stability in societies is the control of SALW. Belarus has developed a comprehensive set of norms and regulations as well as good expertise in this field, he said. “Deactivation is one of the means of control of the firearms,” said Major General Fedin.

Representative of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the OSCE, Frank Gillissen, said: “Germany has always considered SALW as a potential threat to peace and security, and your presence underlines that your governments shares this point of view. In order to reduce these threats it is absolutely necessary to foster international co-operation in countering terrorism and to join efforts and to share relevant information in regard to illicit trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives.”

The Head of the Support Section to the Forum for Security Co-operation at the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Robin Mossinkoff, noted that the OSCE’s co-operation with Belarus in the field of small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition is exemplary and highly valued. He also thanked Germany for its support to important initiatives that contribute considerably to stability and security in societies.

“The OSCE is a frontrunner in setting the minimum standards for SALW deactivation and in addressing the issue of deactivation in practice,” he said. “The OSCE participating States are incorporating these standards into their national norms and legislation. The stronger the laws on deactivation are, and the clearer the deactivation procedures and the subsequent enforcement of these in practice are, the more useful this will be for all stakeholders dealing with weapons of any sort.”

The workshop also included a visit to a weapons deactivation facility of the Belarus Armed Forces.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage caused by gunfire to two apartments in Dokuchaievsk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area and again saw mines inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both side of the contact line.
• The Mission saw upgrades at the entry-exit checkpoints in Hnutove and Maiorsk.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including close to the pumping station near Vasylivka, which reportedly resumed its operations.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission was also restricted at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Zaichenko, Lukove, Tavrycheske and Bezimenne, as well as at a railway station in and a border crossing point outside government control near Voznesenivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 33 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas between of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

Two houses damaged due to gunfire in Dokuchaievsk

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to two apartments in the western part of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), about 3km from the contact line. At 78 Lenina Street, in an apartment located on the first floor of a six-storey building, the Mission saw a hole in the pane of a north-west-facing window; another hole in the metal case of a microwave standing opposite the window; and a hole in the wall behind the microwave. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. A woman (in her sixties) and a man (in his forties) who introduced themselves as the residents of the apartment told the SMM that a bullet had gone through the window in the late afternoon of 14 April.

In an apartment located on the second floor of a six-storey building at 86 Lenina Street, the SMM observed a hole in the windowsill of a north-west-facing window, a burn mark on the windowsill, as well as another hole in a concrete wall perpendicular to the window. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. A woman (in her eighties) who introduced herself as the resident of the apartment told the SMM that a bullet had hit the window in the late afternoon of 14 April.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 15 April, positioned at two locations in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 12 April, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted 12 anti-tank mines laid out in one row inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 450m south of its northern edge and about 100m west of its eastern edge, near previously reported positions of armed formations. Outside the disengagement area, the same UAV spotted for the first time 55 anti-tank mines, laid out in two curved rows in a field about 200m east of its eastern edge and about 500m south of Petrivske.[3]

On 15 April, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

12 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near residential houses in Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk) and
• a mortar (probable 2B14 Podnos, 82mm) east of Novoselivka.

13 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Roty (66km north-east of Donetsk).

15 April

The SMM saw:

• two self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska) being transported from east to west near Maksymilianivka (30km west of Donetsk) and
• four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) near Proizhdzhe (95km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm; one of them probable) near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

13 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (T-72) in a residential area of Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk).

15 April

The SMM saw

• seven MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

15 April

The SMM saw three self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska) near Stritenka (formerly Oktiabrske, 62km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 14 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and six D-30) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 24 tanks (19 probable T-72 and five probable T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

15 April

The SMM saw:

• seven tanks (T-72) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the former Luhansk international airport (see above) and
• four tanks (T-72) near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

15 April

The SMM noted that six MLRS (six BM-21) were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

12 April           

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk) and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) near Novoselivka.

13 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 25 IFVs (BMP variants) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk).

14 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (probable BMD or BTR-D) close to residential houses in Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

15 April

The Mission saw an IFV (BMP-1) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five IFVs (three BMP-2, a BMP-1 and a BMD-2) and an APC (MT-LB) in Sosnivske, as well as 14 members of the armed formations, three of whom were aiming their weapons at the UAV which was flying over Prymorske (39km north-east of Mariupol) (where the SMM had heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the UAV on the same day; see SMM Daily Report 15 April 2019). The same UAV also spotted about 25 fresh craters nearby, assessed as impacts of 122mm artillery rounds fired from a north-westerly direction.

13 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an artillery target acquisition radar system (1L259) near Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).

Mines near Novoselivka and Shyroka Balka, unexploded ordnance (UXO) near Tavrycheske

On 12 April, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least 200 anti-tank mines in a field about 4km north-east of Novoselivka. The same UAV spotted at least 77 anti-tank mines about 3.7km south-south-west of Shyroka Balka (about 800m east of the above-mentioned mines). (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 14 March 2019.)

On 15 April, the Mission saw two objects in the field 2m north of a local road leading from Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol) to Kaplany (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol). It assessed the objects as 73mm rounds from a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, Kopye) or an IFV (BMP-1) cannon.

Mine hazard sign near Sarabash, demining activities near Volnovakha

On 14 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a mine hazard sign (a red square with “Danger Mine” written in Russian and English) near positions of the armed formations south-west of Sarabash (formerly Komunarivka, non-government-controlled, 26km south of Donetsk).

On 15 April, the Mission saw two people in protective gear bearing the logo of an international organization in a field on the eastern side of road H20 about 4km north-east of Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk).

Upgrades at entry-exit checkpoints in Hnutove and Maiorsk

On 13 April, the Mission observed that two new overhead structures had been set up and six new metal booths had been placed at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol). It also saw that a new layer of tarmac had been laid within the area of the EECP (the EECP had been closed for repairs on 5-8 April; see SMM Daily Report 10 April 2019).

On 12 April, the SMM spotted that two new overhead structures were being set up and that the access road was being widened at the EECP in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a water pipe near Kruta Balka, which connects to the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), and to power transmission lines near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka. Representatives of Voda Donbassa water company told the Mission that the pumping station had resumed its operations and would reach its full working capacity in the next two days. During the day on 15 April, positioned near Avdiivka, Kamianka (government-controlled, 23km north of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 25 undetermined explosions as well as shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire.

Border areas outside government control

On 15 April, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 55 cars (41 with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and ten with “LPR” plates) and a truck with Ukrainian licence plates queueing to exit Ukraine. After about five minutes, two members of the armed formation told the Mission to leave the area.

While at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw a queue of cargo cars and a tank car. After five minutes, two members of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage north through the checkpoint on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
• On two different occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “sniper fire” and “demining activities” in the area.
• At a checkpoint near Lukove (non-government-controlled, 72km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage after the Mission refused to show its patrol plan.
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west, citing “ongoing operations in the area.”
• A member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage as it was travelling on a road near Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), saying there was a mine on it. The SMM saw the road ahead was blocked by three branches.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka, two members of the armed formations told the SMM that it had to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• Medical staff at a hospital in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre) refused to provide the SMM information about a civilian reportedly injured due to shelling without permission from those in control.
• On the evening of 13 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas of northern Donetsk region.[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, fog limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 9,304 to 10,134 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 29 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 32 this week compared to 19 last week: 12 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 20 into Ukraine (all the crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when eight families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and nine into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (324 compared to 346 observed during the previous week). There were 172 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 152 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the “irregular” route “Stakhanov-Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OT observed 874 trucks (same number as the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at the both BCPs, (305 at the Gukovo BCP and 569 at the Donetsk BCP); 469 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 405 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 56 (compared to 53 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 188 to 179: of the total number of trucks scanned, 117 trucks (65 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 62 trucks (35 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 168 to 140 vehicles; 73 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 67 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 25 occasions; the OTs assessed that 14 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 11 to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, some cars with Polish licence plates were also observed.

On 9 April at 13:20, a Russian Federation Armed Forces helicopter type Mi-17 (with red star painted on the underneath), overflew the Donetsk BCP, coming from the north before heading away in a south-easterly direction. No weapons were carried under the fuselage fins. The helicopter flew only over Russian Federation territory.

On 10 April at 01:03, an ambulance arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side and parked near the passport control area. The vehicle bore Russian Federation licence plates and the inscription “Urgent medical help” (in Russian) on the side. Inside the vehicle two paramedics were observed who exited the vehicle carrying a medical suitcase and went towards the main building. At 01:36 the same day, the vehicle returned towards the Russian Federation.

On 11 April at 11:37, at the Gukovo BCP, the OT observed a helicopter type Mi-8 flying from an eastern direction at an altitude of 30-50m. The helicopter made a turn to the right and then flew to the north. For the entire duration of its flight in the OT’s line of sight, the helicopter flew only over Russian Federation territory.

The same day at 13:10, an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side. The vehicle drove behind the main building and was not visible to the OT. At 16:27 the same day, the ambulance was observed returning towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 12 March 2019 to 16 April 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

VIENNA, 16 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern regarding the legislative amendments introducing a liability for distribution of foreign print media on the territory of the Russian Federation without the permission of the authorities.

On 2 April, the State Duma adopted, in the first reading, amendments to the Federal Code of the Administrative Offences, which envisage fining individuals, public officials and legal entities, along with confiscating the media materials in question.   

“I encourage the members of the State Duma to carefully review the proposed amendments, so as to avoid hindering the public’s right to access foreign print publications, and to avoid obstructing the dissemination of information from other countries on the territory of the Russian Federation,” Désir said. “The OSCE participating States have committed to take all necessary steps to ensure basic conditions for the unimpeded transborder and intra-State flow of information, which they consider to be an essential component of any democratic, free and open society.”

The Representative also noted reports that the proposed amendments may affect foreign print media sold within the country, as well as printed materials brought into Russia by individuals for personal use.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) presented ODIHR’s final report on the 7 October 2018 general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina during a visit to Sarajevo on 15 and 16 April 2019.

The report’s findings and recommendations were presented at a conference dedicated to the general elections and the challenges of the electoral process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The event brought together representatives from the Central Election Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other government ministries, the media and civil society.

The ODIHR representatives noted that the elections, while genuinely competitive, were marked by continuing segmentation along ethnic lines. They drew attention to recommendations on revising the legal framework for elections and the way polling station commissions are formed, as well as on preventing pressure on voters, strengthening the transparency and accountability of campaign finance and measures to guarantee the voters’ right to a free and secret ballot.

“This conference is a positive step that demonstrates the will to follow up on ODIHR’s electoral recommendations,” said Alexander Shlyk, Head of the ODIHR Elections Department. “This discussion provides a basis for further improvements to the electoral processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and ODIHR is ready to support such efforts.”

The participants also discussed topics such as the formation of lower-level election administration bodies, election day procedures, including measures to safeguard the secrecy of voting, and ways to prevent pressure on voters.

ODIHR’s potential engagement in providing legal and technical expertise to assist the electoral reforms was discussed in separate meetings with representatives of the country’s Central Election Commission and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to promptly following up on ODIHR electoral assessments and recommendations.

BRATISLAVA, 16 April 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák stated today that constructive dialogue and concrete, small steps in confidence-building are needed to keep the positive momentum in the Transdniestrian settlement process.

“Thanks to their commitment, leadership and political will, both Sides last year have implemented five agreements bringing concrete benefits for the people such as neutral license plates or Latin script schools. This gave new impetus to the Transdniestrian settlement process. To keep this momentum, Chisinau and Tiraspol have now to intensify their dialogue, work towards the finalization of the “Berlin-plus package” and identify new areas of joint work,” said Lajčák .

Referring to the ongoing political process in Chisinau following the 24 February parliamentary elections, Lajčák said that the Chairmanship is looking forward to the swift formation of a stable Government in Chisinau, ready to further engage constructively on the Transdniestrian settlement process on all its levels.

When visiting Chisinau and Tiraspol in January, the Minister had underlined that the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship attaches great importance to advancing the Transdniestrian settlement process based on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova with a special status for Transdniestria.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 12 and 13 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 13 and 14 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission followed up on reports of a man injured by the explosion of a damaged cartridge in Dmytrivka.
• It saw fresh damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Chermalyk.
• Small-arms fire was directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles near Prymorske, Vershyna and Heivka.*
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near Vynohradne.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. In addition, the Mission was denied access at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Starolaspa.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 12 and 13 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 310 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 13 and 14 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (190), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of Yasynuvata and at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 12 and 13 April, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (23 explosions). About half of the ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 13 and 14 April, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 70) compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were again recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Popasna.

Man injured by explosion of a damaged cartridge in Dmytrivka

The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured by the explosion of a damaged cartridge in Dmytrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Luhansk). On 13 April, at a hospital in Novoaidar (government-controlled, 49km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a 62-year-old man with his left ring finger missing, as well as deep cuts on his face and the palms of both hands. He told the SMM that on 11 April a damaged cartridge he had found at a scrap metal collection centre in Dmytrivka, where he is employed, had exploded when he had tried to cut it with an electric saw.

Damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Chermalyk[2]

On 13 April, accompanied by Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the SMM followed up on reports of damage to a garage and a storage house due to gunfire on the eastern edge of Chermalyk. At 28 Nikitina Street, the SMM saw fresh burn marks on the north-east-facing side of the roof of a garage, about 8m north of a one-storey house. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire. About 10m south-west of the house, the SMM saw a fresh crater in a back garden, as well as shrapnel scars on the north-east facing side of the tin roof of a storage house 1m further north-east, assessed as caused by rounds of a recoilless gun (SPG-type) fired from a north-easterly direction. Two residents of the house (a man in his sixties and a woman in her fifties) told the SMM that the damage to the storage house had been caused by gunfire on the evening of 8 April, whereas the damage to the garage had occurred in the early morning hours of 12 April, both while they were inside the house. (For previous observations regarding damage to residential buildings on this street, see SMM Daily Report 5 December 2018 and SMM Daily Report 26 January 2019.)

Small-arms fire aimed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicles

During the day on 13 April, on two occasions, while conducting mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights near Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol) and Vershyna (government-controlled, 63km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard bursts of small-arms fire in the area where the UAVs were flying, assessed as aimed at the UAVs. During the day on 14 April, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Heivka (government-controlled, 27km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard shots of small-arms fire in the area where the UAV was flying, assessed as aimed at the UAV. On all three occasions, the SMM landed the UAVs safely and immediately left the area. *

Disengagement areas[3]

On the evening of 12 April, while in Popasna, the SMM heard three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 5-7km east, assessed as close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). On the evenings and nights of 12-13 April and 13-14 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three undetermined explosions and 34 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 28 projectiles and a muzzle flash (assessed as near the disengagement area). On the night of 13-14 April, while in Popasna, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and six bursts of small-arms fire near the disengagement area, as well as 11 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 7-10km east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). During the day on 14 April, positioned on the eastern edge of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and 55 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire near the Zolote disengagement area.

On 13 and 14 April, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed calm situations.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

12 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

12 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted six anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) in a compound in the northern outskirts of Mariupol.

14 April

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 April

The SMM noted that:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were present, and
• 35 MLRS (BM-21) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) were again missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

12 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB), an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-80) in a compound near Kalynivka (11km north-east of Mariupol).

13 April

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) with a heavy machine-gun mounted on top in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP variant) near Popasna.

Unmanned aerial vehicle seen near Molodizhne

On 13 April, positioned near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a black UAV flying above its location before heading west-north-west at an altitude of around 100-200m.

Mines near Popasna and mine hazard signs seen for the first time near Styla

On 13 April, the SMM again saw six anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid within 2m of the edge of road T-0504 (used by civilians and the SMM every day), about 180m south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna.

On 13 April, approximately 5km north of Petrivske, the SMM saw for the first time two red mine hazard signs (one on a wooden stick, the other lying on the ground) with “Mines” written in white in Russian on each side of a road leading to Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk).

On 13 April, the SMM observed two red mine hazard signs with “Mine” written on them in Russian near Novokyivka (non-government-controlled, 25km east of Luhansk), one on each side of a road leading to Ohulchansk (non-government-controlled, 25km east of Luhansk).

On 13 April, the SMM saw that two previously reported mine hazard signs on the south-western edge of Avdiivka had been removed.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 13 April, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). On 13 and 14 April, the SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

On 13 April, the SMM continued to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), which provides potable water to about 1.2 million people on both sides of the contact line. On the same day, employees of the Voda Donbassa water company told the SMM that the pumping station remains non-operational because of non-conflict-related damages to a water pipeline whose repair had been interrupted due to shelling in the area on the evening of 12 April and in the early morning hours of 13 April (see SMM Daily Report 13 April 2019). On 13 April, a resident of Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk) told the Mission that there were water shortages in the town on that day. On 13 and 14 April, in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), residents said that there had been no running water in the town since 12 April.

Border areas outside government control

On 14 April, while at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 23 pedestrians entering Ukraine and 25 pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On 14 April, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM saw 27 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, three with Lithuanian and one with Polish licence plates, as well as 12 with “DPR” plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and 57 pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 31 cars (seven with Ukrainian and 15 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as eight with “DPR” plates and one with Transdniestrian plates), eight covered trucks with their cargo not visible (two with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates) and 50 pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On 14 April, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw a pedestrian exiting Ukraine.

SMM monitors security situation south-east of Kherson region

On 12 April, the SMM observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea. On 12 and 13 April, the SMM observed calm situations in areas along the Black Sea coast south and west of Kherson.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 13 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 13 April, two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• On 14 April, at a checkpoint near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from travelling westwards toward Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), citing the “safety and security risks to the SMM patrol due to shelling in the area during the past two days”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evenings and nights of 12-13 April and 13-14 April, two SMM long-range UAVs temporarily lost their GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas of northern Donetsk region.[7]
• On 13 April, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Vershyna (government-controlled, 63km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire about 300m west of its position, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 400m west of the patrol. The SMM safely landed the mini-UAV and immediately left the area.
• On 13 April, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard approximately 30 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 2.5km south-west of its position, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 3km south-west of the patrol. The SMM safely landed the mini-UAV and immediately left the area.
• On 14 April, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Heivka (government-controlled, 27km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard nine shots of small-arms fire about 100-200m north of its position, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 300m north of the patrol. The SMM safely landed the mini-UAV and immediately left the area.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 13 and 14 April, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The paragraph in SMM Daily Report 13 April 2019 on fresh damage from shelling “in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk)” should have said “in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk)”.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

MOSCOW, 15 April 2019 - On 15 April, the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia – Sergey Lavrov, Elmar Mammadyarov, and Zohrab Mnatsakanyan – held a working meeting in Moscow at the initiative of the Russian side. The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Andrew Schofer of the United States of America, and Stéphane Visconti of France), as well as Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk, joined the meeting.

As a follow-up to the agreements reached by President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan at their summit in Vienna on 29 March of this year, the participants in the meeting discussed the situation at the border and the line of contact, as well as the prospects for establishing humanitarian co-operation. They also exchanged detailed views on key aspects of the settlement process.

The Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia reaffirmed the intention of the parties to continue their efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through political and diplomatic means. The Ministers emphasized their interest in the further stabilization of the situation in the conflict zone, in particular during agricultural activities. They also agreed to take measures, on a mutual basis, to allow families to have access to their relatives held in custody in the respective detention centers of the parties. The Ministers expressed their willingness to start concrete work on establishing contacts between people, including through mutual visits of media representatives.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group reiterated their commitment to the mediation mission aimed at achieving a sustainable peace in the region. The participants of the meeting agreed to continue their contacts in the near future.

417227 Željka Šulc

The first debating competition among universities from across Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was organized by the OSCE Mission to BiH, in co-operation with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the Students’ Union of the Dzemal Bijedic University of Mostar, the Gorgija Debating Club of the University of Zenica. The event was held at the Faculty of Law of the Dzemal Bijedic University from 12 to 14 April 2019 in Mostar.

The competition gathered debating clubs of five public universities from Tuzla, Banja Luka, Zenica, and Mostar.

Over the course of two days, students debated various topics, including combating discrimination, the freedom of assembly, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the quality of higher education in the country.

The final debate was held between the debating clubs of Universities of Tuzla and Banja Luka on the question whether it is possible to eradicate corruption in BiH’s society, with the University of Tuzla as the affirmation side winning first place. The University of “Dzemal Bijedic” Mostar won third place.

The competition aimed at encouraging academic debate and the exchange of arguments among students and young people in general on the issues that are of crucial importance for the advancement of BiH’s society and which highlight the significance of respecting human rights and rule of law.

The OSCE Mission to BiH will continue to support activities aimed at encouraging young people as future leaders to actively engage in social and political processes and in this way contribute to the progress of the country.

The debating competition was supported by the Ministry of Culture and Sports of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

417221 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Judicial Academy of the Czech Republic have agreed to co-operate in enhancing the ability of prosecutors to recognize and prosecute hate crimes in the country, ODIHR and Czech officials announced on 15 April 2019.

“Prosecutors play a key role in addressing hate crimes, as they bring hate crime cases before national courts and make sure that the fact a crime is based on bias is reflected adequately in indictments,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “In so doing, they ultimately build the confidence of hate crime victims towards the justice system. ODIHR’s Prosecutors and Hate Crimes Training (PAHCT) programme will help build prosecutors’ skills to face this challenge.”

Pavel Zeman, the Czech Republic's Prosecutor General, said: “The Czech criminal justice system has a crucial role in countering the general rise of intolerance, one of the main challenges facing us today. Effective prosecution makes perpetrators of hate crimes understand that their actions will never be tolerated in a society based on the values of dignity of each individual and equality of all.”

PAHCT was created in 2014 and has been implemented in four OSCE participating States, so far, with a number of others in discussions to follow suit. The training is fully tailored to the local needs. It is based on a cascade model, which involves the delivery of a train-the-trainer session and consequent training of a pre-defined target group of prosecutors. The agreement to implement the programme in the Czech Republic follows an awareness-raising seminar co-organized by ODIHR and the country’s Government Agent for Human Rights in December 2018.

417215 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe conducted a two-day training course for 28 young men and women, youth representatives of seven registered political parties of Tajikistan, on 12 and 13 April 2019 in Dushanbe.

The participants learned about the significance of gender equality for a secure society, as well as the role of youth in promoting gender equality within their respective parties. The interactive training sessions included group work, role plays and presentations developed by young people themselves.

“The participants had an opportunity to learn key principles of gender equality and its importance to a secure society that functions well for everyone,” said Robert Heuer, Head of the Human Dimension Department of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.  “The Government of Tajikistan has adopted a number of laws and strategies for the advancement of women in politics and society, and this course is complementary to that framework.”

As a result of this course, the most engaged youth representatives were invited to join the OSCE-established network of “Gender Champions” in Tajikistan. The OSCE continuously works with the network and its enlargement, engaging new members from political parties and civil society.

417230 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe donated computer equipment to the Training Centre of the Committee of Emergency Situation and Civil Defence of Tajikistan on 12 April 2019 in Dushanbe.

The donated equipment includes 20 desktop and notebook computers, ten LED monitors, three laser printers and a multimedia projector.

The Committee will use this equipment to collect data in the field, which will allow producing of GIS-maps and advanced analysis. This contributes to better preparedness and response of Tajik authorities in case of emergencies.

“Our Office would like to further strengthen co-operation with the Committee on disaster risk prevention,” said Filippo Crivellaro, Head of the Economic and Environmental Department at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Rustam Nazarzoda, Head of the Committee of Emergency Situation and Civil Defense, thanked the OSCE for its support in enhancing the capacity of Committee’s training centre and expressed interest in future collaboration with the Office.

The donation was made at the request of the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence of Tajikistan.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a woman injured due to shelling in Staromykhailivka on 8 April and the death of a member of State Emergency Services near Maiorsk on 9 April.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from shelling in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and fresh impact craters near populated areas in Orlivka.
• Shots were fired close to the Mission near a compound of the armed formations in Smile on 11 April.
• The SMM recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas near Zernove, Michurine, Smile and Starolaspa.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line. It heard ceasefire violations while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipe near Kruta Balka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The Mission was also denied access at two heavy weapons holding areas in non-government areas of Donetsk region, at a compound near Smile and near Izvaryne close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 315 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 500 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south and south-west of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), west and north of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk) and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (23), compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, were recorded in areas north-east, east and south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and south-south-west of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk).

Shots fired close to the SMM near a compound of the armed formations in Smile

On 11 April, positioned outside of a locked compound of the armed formations in Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a tank (T-72) inside the compound. While speaking with a member of the armed formations who told the SMM that it could not access the compound, the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire at a distance of approximately 20m. The Mission left the area.

Woman injured due to shelling in Staromykhailivka

On 11 April at a traumatology hospital in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled), the Mission saw a woman (in her eighties) lying in bed. She told the Mission that on the morning of 8 April she had been working in the garden of her summer kitchen on Artema Street in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) (a settlement located less than 2km from the contact line) when she had heard explosions. She added she had felt something hit her and seen that her right arm was injured as she was running back to the summer kitchen to take cover there. Medical staff at the traumatology hospital told the SMM that the woman had been transferred from a hospital in Staromykhailivka on 8 April with a fractured left leg and shrapnel injuries to the left leg and left arm.

Death of a member of State Emergency Services

The SMM followed up on the death of a member of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine after the detonation of an explosive device near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) (two other members of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine suffered injuries from the same detonation, see SMM Daily Report 10 April 2019). Medical staff at the morgue in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) told the Mission over the phone that the body of the man (in his thirties) with injuries from a mine explosion had been brought to the morgue on 9 April.

Fresh damage from shelling in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets

On 12 April at 2 Nyzhno Dachna Street in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the Mission saw that all window panes on the north- east-, and west-facing walls of an inhabited house were shattered and that shards of glass were scattered on the ground. It observed shrapnel damage to the wooden frames of the windows as well as to the north- and west-facing wall. The SMM saw that five south- and west-facing windows of a summer kitchen located about 2m north of the house were broken and observed shrapnel damage to its south- and west-facing walls, as well as to the top part of a root cellar that is attached to the kitchen’s east side. West of the house, it observed a shed whose windows and roof were destroyed. The Mission saw at least 15 holes in the ground (5-20cm in diameter), most of them in the area between the house and the summer kitchen. It also observed that branches on the south-eastern side of a tree growing west of the shed were broken and that parts of the bark had been torn off. The SMM assessed all damage as fresh and caused by a mortar round fired from a south-south-easterly direction which impacted in the upper branches of the tree. A man and a woman (in their seventies) who introduced themselves as the residents of the property told the SMM that the damage had been caused during shelling on the morning of 11 April when they were at the property.

Fresh impact craters in Orlivka

The SMM saw five fresh impact craters in fields near populated areas in Orlivka (government-controlled, 22km north-west of Donetsk). The closest crater was located about 40m from an inhabited house. The Mission assessed that three craters, one of which contained an unexploded projectile, were probably caused by artillery rounds coming from a north-easterly direction; two craters also as probably caused by artillery rounds but the direction of fire could not be determined.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 11 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 12 April, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-west (it was unable to assess whether they occurred inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission heard and saw 16 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-7km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed on 10 April the presence of two new trench extensions (not seen in imagery from 25 March 2019) totalling about 160 meters, about 1.2km south of Petrivske and about 950m east and 1.5km east-north-east, respectively, of the eastern edge of the Petrivske disengagement area.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

11 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Zernove (70km south of Donetsk);
• nine tanks (probable T-72) near Michurine (61km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014; and
• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk).

The SMM saw a tank (T-72) inside a compound in Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

11 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (types undetermined), two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and nine self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

11 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted ten tanks (T-72) in a training are near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Weapons permanent storage sites[4]

At permanent storage sites in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

12 April

The SMM noted that 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Non-government-controlled areas

9 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 11 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (types undetermined) in a training area near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

11 April 

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two ACVs (types undetermined) in a compound in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol);
• nine infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in a training area near Zernove and five ACVs (types undetermined) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), all in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014; and
• four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and an IFV (BMD variant) in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled areas

11 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

12 April

The SMM saw

• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);

• two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk); and
• seven IFVs (four BMP-1 and three BMP variants) and an APC (MT-LB-S) in Popasna.

The Mission saw an unidentified UAV flying at a height of around 100m above its position approximately 2.7km west of Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk).

Demining activities

The SMM saw five people in civilian clothing, each holding a mine detector, in a field about 300m west of road P66, about 2km east-south-east of Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to power lines in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and to water conduits near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).

During the monitoring of adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipe near Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), a representative of Voda Donbassa water company told the Mission over the phone that the works had to be cancelled due to shelling in the area. The SMM was not able to follow up due to security considerations. Positioned near Kruta Balka, the Mission heard 21 undetermined explosions as well as shots and burst of small-arms fire in the area (for all ceasefire violations recorded in the area, see the attached table).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates) and two covered cargo  trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 44 cars (22 with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation, one with Lithuanian and one with Belarusian licence plates, and six with “LPR” plates), 25 covered cargo trucks (nine with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, four with Belarusian and one with Uzbek licence plates, and five with “LPR” plates) and 35 pedestrians waiting in a queue to exit Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven pedestrians entering Ukraine and 11 pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On 11 April, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw a car with “DPR” plates, a tanker truck with Ukrainian licence plates, a covered cargo truck with “DPR” plates, a bus with “DPR” plates and seven pedestrians entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 21 cars (three with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and ten with “DPR” plates), 20 covered cargo trucks (ten with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation, two with Georgian and two Lithuanian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian exiting Ukraine.

On 11 April, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the Mission did not see any cross-border traffic.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 11 April, at a compound of the armed formations in Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations refused to let the SMM enter, stating that he did not have the authority to grant access (see above).
• Members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to two heavy weapons holding areas in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing “lack of permission.”
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he was not aware of any demining activities having taken place in the past 24 hours.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations stopped the SMM on two occasions. They allowed it to pass through the checkpoint respectively after about 20 and 50 minutes.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass only upon being escorted by a car of the armed formations during its patrol of the settlement.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 10-11 April, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as jamming, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.[6]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The last sentence in the weapons permanent storage sites section of SMM Daily Report 12 April 2019 should have read “The SMM noted that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one towed howitzer (D-30) were missing.”

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw gunfire damage and a crater at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government controlled areas.
• It saw unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and the Donetsk Filtration Station and mines in Trokhizbenka.
• The SMM saw mine hazard signs in Krasnyi Lyman and Pryshyb and demining activities in Volnovakha.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a checkpoint near Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 500), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and areas south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), both of which are in the vicinity of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 260), compared with the previous reporting period (about 380 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded in easterly, north-easterly, and south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Gunfire damage and a crater at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 10 April, at School No.4 located at 4 Myru Street in the south-eastern outskirts of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), about 1.3km east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a large (35x35cm) hole in a west-facing window of a one-storey school building assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel and a crater in a yard 35m west of it (direction of fire and type of weapon could not be assessed). It also saw a smaller hole in a third-floor west-facing window of a three-storey school building located 5-7m east assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. An employee (female, 45 years old) of the school told the SMM that classes had been in session when she had heard shelling in the morning of 9 April and that pupils and staff took cover in the school shelter until the afternoon. When the SMM was present on 10 April, classes had resumed. The school was previously damaged by small-arms fire on 17 January 2019 (see SMM Daily Report 22 January 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned about 3km south-west of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard 16 explosions and 12 bursts of small-arms fire (unable to be assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as three undetermined explosions and seven shots of small-arms fire all originating 1-2km south-west which were assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned about 3km north of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 106 shots of small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. [3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

9 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three tanks (type undetermined) north of Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

9 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a probable tank (type undetermined) east-north-east of Svobodne, in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (see above).

11 April

The SMM saw three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1, Gvozdika 122mm) and four tanks (T-72) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

10 April

The SMM noted that:

• 52 tanks (T-64), 22 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona, 120mm) remained missing and
• eight self-propelled mortars (2S9) were present and six tanks (T-72) were present for the first time.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

10 April

The SMM noted that four mortars (one 2B9 Voloshka, 82mm and three BM-37, 82mm) remained missing. It also noted weapons present for the first time.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

11 April

The SMM noted that nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and eight towed howitzers (D-30) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

10 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

11 April

The SMM saw:

• a trench digger (type unidentified) in the yard of a civilian house along with freshly-dug trenches extending 70m towards a checkpoint near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and three unidentified) and an armoured ambulance (MT-LB-S) near Popasna (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 April 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 April

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four IFVs (BMP variants) near Kozatske (86km south of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (see above).

Presence of mines in Trokhizbenka and unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and the Donetsk Filtration Station

On 10 April, the SMM again saw ten anti-tank mines (TM-62) on road 1315 about 50m north-west of a destroyed bridge in Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as rockets from a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (probable BM-21, Grad 122mm), and several other objects, assessed as remnants of BM-21 rockets, lying on the ground on both sides of road M03 on the north-western edge of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM assessed that the UXOs are not recent.

On 11 April, the SMM saw again three pieces of UXO assessed as rockets from an MLRS (probable BM-21) embedded in roads in the vicinity of the DFS. Two rockets were embedded in road H-20 about 160-230m south-west of the DFS and one rocket was embedded in road M-04 about 900m south-south-east of the DFS. About 70m north-east of the previous observations, embedded in a sandy surface between lanes of road M-04, the SMM saw an unexploded high-explosive anti-tank warhead (HEAT).

Mine hazard signs in Krasnyi Lyman and Pryshyb and demining activities in Volnovakha

For the first time, the SMM saw seven red square signs with “MINES” written in Russian, assessed as mine hazard signs. One sign was next to a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and the other six were located on both sides of road T-13-15 near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the south-eastern outskirts of Pryshyb (non-government-controlled, 34km north-west of Luhansk).

Near Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw four members of an international demining organization conducting demining and UXO-clearing activities near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water conduits near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, to a water pipeline near Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), and to power lines near Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), and Khoroshe (non-government-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated repairs to power lines near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and was told by senior personnel that the repairs have been completed, providing electricity to about 1,300 civilians. The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two different occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons

COPENHAGEN, 12 April 2019 – The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is deploying nearly 50 observers, including 31 parliamentarians, to North Macedonia next week for the 21 April presidential election. The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office has appointed French parliamentarian Sereine Mauborgne as Special Co-ordinator to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission. Austrian parliamentarian Reinhold Lopatka will lead the OSCE PA’s delegation of observers. 

“This election presents an opportunity for voters to give direction on what they see as the future and long-term goals of North Macedonia,” Mauborgne said. “I hope to observe a competitive election and a constructive campaign, in line with international standards.”

Lopatka said: “North Macedonia has the opportunity with this election to demonstrate a clear commitment to democratic processes. I expect the authorities and electoral contestants to seize this opportunity and to ensure a well-run election that meets international expectations.”

Mauborgne serves as Head of the French Delegation to the OSCE PA and Lopatka serves as Deputy Head of the Austrian Delegation to the OSCE PA. They will deliver the post-election statement of preliminary findings and conclusions at a press conference in Skopje on 22 April.

For the 21 April presidential election, the OSCE PA will work closely with observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

This will be the ninth election the OSCE PA has observed in the country since 1994.

For previous assessments of North Macedonian elections, please click here.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day training course aimed at further strengthening the capacity of Albania to counter terrorist financing was organized from 10 to 12 April 2019, in Tirana.

The training seminar was delivered to Albanian experts and practitioners from the General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering (GDPML) (Albanian Financial Intelligence Unit), the State Intelligence Service (SHISH), the Albanian State Police, the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecution Office for Serious Crimes. Thirty-four participants attended the course, of which seventeen trainees and five local trainers. Seven trainees and local trainers were women. The course was attended by thirteen female participants.

The course was organized jointly by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, the OSCE Presence in Albania, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Global Programme against Money Laundering, and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and hosted by the Security Academy of Albania.

The training course was conducted to strengthen Albania’s compliance with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments. It was led by OSCE, UNODC and Western Union international experts together with five local government officials who were previously trained by the OSCE and the UNODC in a train-the-trainer setting.

The course emphasized the key role of inter-agency co-operation in disrupting terrorist financing.  Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, it included sessions on national, regional and transnational threats, sources of information, money flows. More than half of the course was devoted to practical work on exercises and actual case studies, highlighting specific instruments and techniques that play an important role in countering the financing of terrorism.

The course was organized as part of a comprehensive multiannual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in in South-Eastern Europe.