OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of fund administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 7,766 to 7,787 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 187 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 13 this week (compared to 24 last week); seven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and six into Ukraine (85 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, six families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when four families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (316 compared to 308 observed during the previous week). There were 167 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 149 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Stakhanov- Kyiv; Alchevsk-Kyiv; and Kyiv.  

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 735 to 762 (201 at the Gukovo BCP and 561 at the Donetsk BCP); 430 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 332 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” (sometimes “DPR”) plates.                                                                                           

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly increased to 33 (compared to 32 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 162 to 189: of the total number of trucks scanned, 90 trucks (48 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 99 trucks (52 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 107 to 160 vehicles; 83 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 77 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on seven occasions, compared to four last week; the OTs assessed that six trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and another one to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the train bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

On 3 February at Donetsk BCP, the OT observed two ambulances. The first ambulance (which bore Russian Federation licence plates) arrived at 06:15 and went behind the main building until it returned towards the Russian Federation at 08:32. One minute before it left, another ambulance (also with Russian Federation licence plates) arrived from the Russian Federation and parked in the same place.

At 08:50, the second ambulance also left towards the Russian Federation. From its position, the OT was not able to see whether the vehicles actually crossed the border to Ukraine, or whether they remained in the “blind spot” behind the main building of the BCP, where the OT does not have permission to move.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 1 January 2019 to 5 February 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).               

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission heard and saw explosions assessed as impacts 70-100m east-south-east of its position near the Zolote disengagement area. It also recorded other ceasefire violations inside and near the disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as in Staromykhailivka and near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 95 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 65 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions (81) were recorded in areas east, south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and south-west of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk).

On 2 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six men assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, three of them lying on the ground in firing position and holding small-arms weapons, near Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol). The Mission assessed this as probable live-fire training inside the security zone (in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone). (The SMM heard ceasefire violations in the area during the UAV flight, see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2019.)

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 320 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), including about 240 explosions assessed as mortar and artillery rounds, as well as inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (see the disengagement areas section below).

On 4 February, positioned near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, approximately 300m north of the disengagement area near Zolote, the Mission members heard three explosions assessed as impacts, and saw flames, smoke, soot and snow 70-100m east-south-east of its position. The SMM immediately left the area (see SMM Spot Report 4 February 2019).

Recent impact crater from shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 4 February, at 10 Vyrobnycha Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a recent crater about 3m from a single-storey house. The crater was covered in soot. The Mission could not determine the weapon used or the direction of fire. A man who identified himself as the owner of the house told the SMM the crater had been caused by shelling in the afternoon on 31 January 2019. The Mission also observed that the bottom part of a north-north-east-facing window pane of the above-mentioned house was covered with white tape. The owner said the window had been damaged by small-arms fire on 29 January 2019. (For previous observations from Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2019.)

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 3-4 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded ten projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east and south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), five projectiles at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and five projectiles at an assessed range of 1-3km east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 4 February, positioned near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north the Zolote disengagement area, the Mission heard five undetermined explosions and seven minutes of small-arms fire (uncountable shots), all at an assessed range of 2-3km east and south-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as nine undetermined explosions and about 50 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-5km north-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the Mission heard 30 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

4 February

The SMM saw:

• six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela10) at a train station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas:

2 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured personnel carriers (BTR-80) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Talakivka.

3 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured command vehicle (BMP-1Ksh) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• a recent crater, assessed as caused by an impact of a 122mm or 152mm artillery round, about 250m from the nearest house in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

4 February

The SMM saw:

• a trench digger (PZM-2) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

2 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• ten infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 2 February, near Talakivka, an SMM mini-UAV spotted over 60 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid in six rows on a road leading to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and in an adjacent field. (For previous observations in that area, see SMM Daily Report 29 June 2018.)

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water conduit near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) as well as to enable an assessment related to snow removal near the bridge in Shchastia. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint south of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage on three separate occasions, citing “orders from superiors” and “special activities in the area”.
• At a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “security reasons”. When leaving the checkpoint, the Mission heard an undetermined explosion 2km south-west (see the ceasefire violations section above and the attached table).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 5 February 2019 – The Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) will hold a conference on the safety of female journalists online (SOFJO), Expanding Opportunities for Freedom of Expression and Media Plurality, on Tuesday, 12 February, in Vienna.

To mark the occasion and to take stock of the work done to counter online abuse, the RFOM will present a Communiqué on Media Pluralism, Safety of Female Journalists and Safeguarding Marginalized Voices Online.

The Conference will gather women journalists, experts and practitioners on gender and media freedom from a number of OSCE participating States, to discuss the challenges of and opportunities for women journalists’ full participation online.

The RFOM, Harlem Désir, will open the conference together with the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović. The introductory remarks will be followed by a number of panels, including on adopting a gender sensitive approach to policy developments and challenges; the nature of online offenses and the role of technology; and taking stock of counter measures.

The conference will also include a screening of the recently released SOFJO documentary, “A Dark Place” and a policy lab organized by UNESCO and the Global Diplomacy Lab.

Members of the media are invited to cover the conference and panel discussions on Tuesday, 12 February 2019, at the Hofburg Conference Center Heldenplatz, 1010 Vienna.

Contact person for members of the media:

Jennifer Adams, Media Freedom Project Officer, Office of the OSCE Representative on

Freedom of the Media

Tel: +43 514 36 6813

E-mail: Jennifer.adams@osce.org

For further information about the Conference, please visit: 

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/sofjoconference2019

For further information about the SOFJO project, please visit www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/safety-female-journalists-online

Follow @OSCE_RFOM to join the conference discussion on Twitter using the hashtag #SOFJO.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA, 5 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today condemned several threats against N1 TV and its journalists in Serbia.

According to reports, a deputy of the Serbian Progressive Party accused journalists from media outlet N1 TV on social media for recognizing the independence of Kosovo. This reaction triggered a wave of offensive and discriminatory statements on social media portraying N1 as “traitors” and “anti-Serbs”.

“Public figures must not create a hostile environment for journalists, since this could lead to serious pressure and threats against them,” said Désir.

In addition, N1 TV received a letter in which unknown perpetrators threatened the safety of their families and to blow up the outlet’s offices. These threats, which are reportedly connected to the media reporting on current affairs in Serbia, were shared with the police.

“Targeting and attacking journalists because of their work is an attack on freedom of expression which is a fundamental human right. I call on the Serbian authorities to do their utmost to identify and punish those responsible for these threats against N1 TV, and to ensure that journalists can perform their professional activities without being intimidated or threatened,” urged Désir.

The Representative underlined points 3 and 7 of the recent Decision on Safety of Journalists adopted last December at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan, which calls on participating States to: “condemn publicly and unequivocally all attacks and violence against journalists” and “urge political leaders, public officials and/or authorities to refrain from intimidating, threatening or condoning – and to unequivocally condemn – violence against journalists.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom. 

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KYIV, 5 February 2019 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 31 March 2019 presidential election in Ukraine, the mission will hold a press conference in Kyiv on Wednesday.

Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities.

The election observation mission, the office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine operate independently, under their separate mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 14:30, Wednesday, 6 February, in the Zoloti Vorota conference room of the InterContinental Kyiv Hotel, Velyka Zhytomyrska St., Kyiv.

For further information, please see https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/407660 or contact Francesca Boggeri, Media Analyst of the Election Observation Mission, on +380 67 339 6228 (mobile) or at Francesca.boggeri@odihr.org.ua (email).

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, on + 48 609 522 266 (mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl (email)

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On 4 February, an SMM patrol consisting of five members and two armoured vehicles was positioned near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, approximately 300m north of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), to monitor the security situation. 

Between 10:25 and 10:30, two patrol members, who were standing next to the vehicles, heard five undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km east and south-south-east. At 10:30, having just entered the vehicles, the SMM patrol members heard three explosions assessed as impacts, and saw flames, smoke, soot and snow 70-100m east-south-east. 

The SMM patrol immediately moved about 5km north to the eastern edge of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), where between 10:40 and 10:50, it heard an increasing number of ceasefire violations. The patrol left the area, and returned safely to its base in Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk). SMM notified the Ukrainian Armed Forces side of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination and the armed formations about the incident.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 1 and 2 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 2 and 3 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh damage from small-arms fire to a school and a house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area, as well as near the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians waiting to travel to government-controlled areas at checkpoints in Kreminets and near Olenivka.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko and Bezimenne and in Voznesenivka, close to the border with the Russian Federation and as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions). The majority of explosions were recorded in areas south and south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 2 and 3 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 65 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and north of Yasynuvata and south-south-west and south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement areas section below).

Between the evenings of 2 and 3 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations and explosions were recorded in areas west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from small-arms fire to a school and a house adjacent to a kindergarten

The SMM observed fresh damage to the three-storey building of a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations of damage to the same school, see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019). At Myru Street, on the ground floor of the building, the Mission saw that the outer pane of a west-facing double-paned window was broken and that its inner pane was scratched. On the first floor, the SMM observed two corresponding holes in a west-facing double-glazed window (one in the outer pane and one in the inner pane) and a corresponding hole in an inner wall opposite the window. On the second floor, the SMM saw that the upper left corner of a west-facing double-glazed window was broken. On the same floor, 5m from the abovementioned window, it observed that the lower left corner of another west-facing double-glazed window was broken and saw a corresponding hole in the inner wall opposite the window. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by small-arms fire. Two school staff members told the SMM that the incident occurred in the early morning hours of 2 February and that no pupils had been present at the time.

At 2 Myru Street, about 150m north-west of the above-mentioned school building, the SMM observed fresh damage to a one-storey house (which is also located 30m from the building of a kindergarten under renovation). The SMM saw two corresponding holes in a north-facing double-glazed window (one in the outer pane and one in the inner pane), assessed as caused by a bullet (probably 7.62mm in caliber). A man, (55 years old) told the SMM that he was the kindergarten’s guard and that on the evening of 31 January, while he had been sitting inside the house, he had heard the sound of a bullet flying over his head and hitting the house.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 1 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), as well as two projectiles at an assessed range of 0.8-1.2km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 2 February, positioned inside the disengagement areas near Zolote and near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) as well as near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

On the morning of 3 February, positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote for 15 minutes, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-8km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the same morning, positioned about 3km north of Petrivske for about one hour, the SMM heard nine shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 3 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

1 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas

1 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 probable towed howitzers (D-30) and six probable anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk);
• 21 tanks (11 T-64 and ten T-72) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 29 tanks (ten T-72 and 19 T-64) near Bile.

Weapons storage sites:

At permanent storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region:

2 February

The SMM saw that:

• 23 tanks (nine T-64 and 14 T-72), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Indications of military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

2 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR variant) in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR variant) in Holubivske (51km west of Luhansk).

3 February

The SMM saw:

• a mobile jamming communication system assessed as R-330ZH “ZHITEL” entering a compound in Luhansk city.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 2 and 3 February, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk) and the DFS.

SMM facilitation of safe departure of civilians who reportedly came under fire in Chermalyk

On 2 February, following reports that three cemetery workers had come under fire at a cemetery in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to allow them to leave the area.

Long queues of civilians at checkpoints

On the morning of 3 February, at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a 500m-long queue of cars waiting to travel to government-controlled areas. Four people separately told the SMM that they had been waiting for hours and that the queue was moving very slowly. After about one hour, the SMM saw that the queue had only moved forward by 15m. On the same day, at a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a 700m-long queue of cars waiting to travel to government-controlled areas.

Border areas outside of government control

On 2 February, while at a border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 35 cars (six with Ukrainian, 13 with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and 15 with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 21 covered cargo trucks (16 with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine, as well as 12 cars (four with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates) and six covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

On 3 February, while at a border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 15 trucks (eight with Ukrainian licence plates and seven with “LPR” plates), 16 cars (ten with Ukrainian licence plates and six with “LPR” plates) and around 60 pedestrians queuing to exit Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the Mission observed more than 40 cargo rail cars (whose content could not be assessed). After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM observed a man on a bicycle entering Ukraine.

Also on 3 February, while at a border crossing point in Uspenka for about one hour and a half, the SMM saw ten cars, six trucks, two buses and two minivans exiting Ukraine, as well as 18 cars (four with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates and ten with “DPR” plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), one minivan (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 2 February, a member of the armed formations denied the SMM entry to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• On 3 February, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 3 February, at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 3 February, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), preventing the Mission from travelling west towards Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). The Mission saw a civilian car travelling through the checkpoint in the direction of Pikuzy.
• On 3 February, at a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one of them armed) again denied the SMM passage west, citing “orders from their superior”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 2 February, at a checkpoint on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the need for prior permission from his superiors. After about 45 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint, following an intervention by senior members of the armed formations, the Mission was allowed to proceed. (See SMM Daily Report 23 January 2019).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 4 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern regarding a court verdict to terminate the activity of the newspaper Novye Kolesa Igorya Rudnikova in Kaliningrad.

On 1 February the Kaliningrad Regional Court, upon the request of the local branch of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media of Kaliningrad region (Roskomnadzor), a governmental watchdog, ruled to terminate the activity of the newspaper following two warnings issued by the same authority.   

“This decision, along with other negative developments around the newspaper in recent years, has a negative impact on media pluralism and access to information and I hope it will be reversed on appeal,” stated Désir. “Any restrictive sanctions imposed on the media should be strictly necessary and proportionate to the actual harm caused, and the case law should take note of the freedom of the media in line with international standards and OSCE commitments.”

Earlier, in April 2018 the Representative also expressed his concern about the seizure of copies of the Novye Kolesa Igorya Rudnikova newspaper and vendors’ refusal to distribute it following the arrest of its editor Igor Rudnikov, who continues to serve a pre-trial detention since November 2017 (see: https://twitter.com/OSCE_RFoM/status/982191136373587969  and https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/402110). Reportedly, the publishing house has also declined to print the newspaper since April of last year.

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VIENNA, 4 February 2019 – The Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM), together with the European Parliament, European Commission and EU Delegation to the OSCE, will host a panel discussion on 5 February, to debate issues of safety in the digital space and related challenges for media freedom.

The Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, will speak on a panel together with the Head of the UK Delegation to the OSCE, Ambassador Sian MacLeod and Austrian journalist and author, Ingrid Brodnig. The panel discussion will be moderated by the President of Reporters without Borders Austria, Rubina Möhring.

The panel discussion takes place on 5 February at 17:30, at the Haus der Europäischen Union (Wipplingerstrasse 35, 1010 Vienna), and will be followed by a small reception afterwards.

This event is open to the public; please register with maria.perez-lopez@eeas.europa.eu to ensure your participation.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He/she provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 25), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (60 explosions).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On 1 February, the same camera recorded an illumination flare in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 1 February, at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw that the some of the pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (tailfins of 120mm mortar rounds) which it observed for the first time on 30 January were no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019). A member of the armed formations told the Mission that they had been removed on 31 January.

On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two muzzle flashes at an assessed range of 1-2km north (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned north and west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

1 February

The SMM saw:

• two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

31 January

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• seven stationary tanks (T-80) near Aslanove (85
• km south of Donetsk); and
• four anti-tank guns (MT-12), two tanks (T-64), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 1 February 2019).

1 February

The SMM saw:

• three tanks (T-64) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol);
• six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Dianivka (formerly Kirovske, 38km north-west of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018); and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Holubivka (81km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

1 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Saxon) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk);
• two APCs (BTR-70) parked in the yard of a house near Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk); and
• an APC (MT-LB-variant) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

31 January

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) in Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk); and
• two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1 and a BMP variant) near Lozove (52km north-east of Donetsk).

Mine near Verkhnoshyrokivske removed

On 1 February, the Mission saw that a device it had seen fastened to a tree near a road about 1.4km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) on 7 November 2018 and assessed as a MON-100 anti-personnel type mine (see SMM Daily Report 8 November 2018) was no longer present.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and a water conduit near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 19 cars (five with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) and five covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) exit Ukraine and four cars (one with Russian Federation and two with Estonian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates enter Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the Mission saw two men and a woman (in their fifties) exit Ukraine and two men (in their forties and fifties) enter Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge.

Other impediments:

On 31 January, staff at two schools in Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM it needed permission from senior members of the armed formations to visit the facilities.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh impact craters in Kriakivka and Molodizhne as the result of shelling.
• The SMM observed a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as in non-government-controlled Izvaryne and Sievernyi, areas near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded mainly at southerly and south-westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-west and west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 165 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were explosions, of which about 95 per cent were recorded at south-south-westerly and east-south-easterly directions of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk), including about 40 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds recorded in areas east-south-east of Kriakivka.

Fresh impact craters as the result of shelling in Kriakivka and Molodizhne

On the western edge of Kriakivka, the SMM observed a fresh crater on the northern side of a road. The snow around the crater was covered by soot, and small trees and branches north of the impact site were lacerated, which the SMM assessed as shrapnel and blast damage. The SMM assessed that a projectile had been fired from a southerly direction but could not assess its type or calibre. The SMM observed civilian houses about 100m from the crater and a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint about 250m from the crater.

About 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh impact craters near road T-0504: the first, 5m north of the road, and the second around 50m south of the road. Due to security considerations, the SMM could not make further assessments.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a burst at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

30 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• 26 tanks (T-64) in a wooded area near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk).

31 January

The SMM saw:

• a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) traveling north-west on T-1306 road in Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk) and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) being transported on a flatbed truck traveling north-west on road T0516 near Ivanopillia (51km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

30 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019.)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

30 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Loskutivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

31 January

The SMM saw:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) near Sentianivka (44km west of Luhansk);
• six armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) on the eastern edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) in northern Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir in Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), power lines in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and water pipelines near the neighbourhood of Shakta 6-7 in Horlivka, as well as to enable an inspection of water wells at the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside of Government control*

While at a border crossing point near  Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 11 minutes, the SMM observed 41 trucks (15 with Ukrainian, nine with Belarusian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as nine with “LPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. A truck driver in the queue told the SMM he had already been waiting 41 hours at the crossing point. Two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw four people exiting Ukraine and one person entering Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 11 minutes, the SMM observed four people entering Ukraine and no pedestrians exiting Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, told the SMM that it did not have “permission” to be present at the border crossing point and to leave the area. (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019.)
• At a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that there “is no cooperation between the “LPR” and the OSCE” and told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its   camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 1 February 2019 – Although there was a decrease in the level of violence following a recommitment to the ceasefire on the occasion of the New Year/Christmas festivities, an increase in ceasefire violations in recent weeks has again brought more suffering to civilians living along the contact line, the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ertugrul Apakan, said in his address to the OSCE Permanent Council today in Vienna.

Briefing representatives of the OSCE’s participating States and Partners for Co-operation, Apakan called for a full and sustainable ceasefire and the full withdrawal of heavy weapons, in particular from populated areas. He also emphasized the threat posed by the continued presence of mines and unexploded ordnance. “We are hopeful that we will see in the coming months renewed efforts in the field of humanitarian mine action, to enhance safety around schools, kindergartens, hospitals, and entry-exit check points,” he said.

Citing the example of many women on the contact line – who have remained to ensure the maintenance of facilities critical to the well-being of the civilian population – Apakan said the priority must be on protecting civilians. “In line with the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship’s priorities, the Mission will increase its focus on people, on dialogue, and on peacebuilding,” he said. “Inclusivity is a crucial aspect of these efforts.”

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ATHENS, 1 February 2019 – A two-day regional conference on preventing trafficking in human beings through government procurement practices and measures, with a focus on the Balkan region, concluded yesterday in Athens, Greece.

The conference, organized by the Office of the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings in partnership with the Mayor’s Office of Athens, the Office of the National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ONR), the Athens Partnership and Bloomberg Associates, brought together over 200 participants from 15 countries.

Public procurement amounts to trillions of euros of public spending in the OSCE region.

Procurement and anti-trafficking experts, representatives of the city, regional and national governments, and representatives of international and non-governmental organizations explored how governments can leverage this purchasing power through their procurement practices and measures to help prevent human trafficking and labour exploitation in their supply chains.

During the conference, the Mayor of Athens, Yiorgos Kaminis, announced a new pilot program to develop policies and implement practices aimed at ensuring, to the fullest extent possible, that the City of Athens does not purchase goods manufactured or contract services provided by victims of human trafficking.

“Governments have a crucial part to play in working towards a supply chain that is free of human trafficking and forced labour – and not just at the national level,” said Heracles Moskoff, National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings. “We see with the City of Athens’s pilot programme a tremendous leadership role by a municipal government in this fight, and it is an example that we want to replicate throughout other cities in Greece.”

Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, noted the importance of the conference’s cross-sectoral group of stakeholders, including attorneys who have worked with trafficking victims, procurement and anti-trafficking officials, multi-national companies, and NGOs. “By bringing together all of the stakeholders who can play a role in developing important government anti-trafficking measures, we can ensure that our efforts can have a significant – and sustainable – impact, in Athens, Greece, the Balkans region, and beyond,” said Richey.

Rose Gill Hearn, former Commissioner of the New York City Department of Investigation during the Bloomberg Administration and Principal of the Municipal Integrity Practice at Bloomberg Associates, an international philanthropic consultancy and a co-organizer of the conference, said: “The City of Athens, through its anti-trafficking and public procurement pilot programme, is demonstrating its commitment to working against the scourge of labour exploitation in supply chains. We truly applaud Mayor Kaminis for supporting this conference and initiative to analyse how cities can use their buying power – collectively billions of euro – to safeguard against tainted procurement.”

The second day of the conference featured in-depth sessions on the recommendations of the OSCE’s Model Guidelines on Government Measures to Prevent Trafficking for Labour Exploitation in Supply Chains.  

Speakers discussed action that governments can undertake to prevent trafficking in supply chains, such as identifying industry-specific trafficking risks, training public procurement officials and vendors, implementing anti-trafficking due diligence in the procurement process, and developing monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.

This year, the OSCE will continue to lead efforts to address labour exploitation through responsible public procurement. The office of the Special Representative will run a series of workshops to strengthen the capacities of practitioners from OSCE participating States to prevent human trafficking in supply chains.

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PRISTINA, 1 February 2019 – The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly encourages all channels of dialogue, including parliamentary diplomacy, as a means to support and improve reconciliation and co-operation in the South East European region, British parliamentarian Mark Pritchard emphasized today in a visit to Pristina, Mitrovica and Gracanica.

Pritchard, who serves as the PA’s Special Representative on South East Europe, has met over the past two days with leaders including Ramush Haradinaj, members of parliament and religious figures, as well as representatives of the OSCE’s Mission in Kosovo.

In meetings, Pritchard has conveyed full support to the European Union-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, while reiterating the OSCE PA’s status-neutral approach. He has followed recent discussions regarding proposed border changes, the taxes issue and the transformation of the security forces, Pritchard said.

“Progress is urgently needed in the normalization of relations between Belgrade in Pristina,” Pritchard said. “For real progress to be made it is vital that dialogue continues in good faith and that provocative actions are avoided. As we saw in last week’s agreement between Skopje and Athens over the ‘Macedonia’ name issue, compromise is sometimes difficult but it is the only way forward. I hope that Pristina and Belgrade can follow the same spirit of compromise.”

The Special Representative emphasized that effective regional co-operation is vital for South East Europe and the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue plays a key role in this respect.

In meetings at OSCE Mission in Kosovo offices in Pristina and Mitrovica, as well as in Gracanica, Pritchard expressed support for the Mission’s work in promoting civic participation, developing democratic institutions, gender mainstreaming, promoting anti-discrimination mechanisms, advancing police training, and countering terrorism and cyberthreats. The Mission’s work in supporting the implementation of agreements stemming from the EU-facilitated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade is also vital, he said.

“As Prime Minister Theresa May recently stated, history has shown that a secure and stable Western Balkans region means a secure and stable Europe,” Pritchard said. “The work of the OSCE in the region has been indispensable in promoting that stability.”

He highlighted examples of the OSCE PA’s work in the region, including the visit of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Migration to Serbia on 10-12 June 2018, and a visit of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 5-8 June 2018.

Pritchard continues his programme with meetings with religious leaders in Gracanica and additional meetings in Pristina.

Photos of Special Representative's field visit are available on Flickr.

For a video of a recent interview that Pritchard gave about his work as Special Representative, please click here. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed fresh damage from shelling at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, as well as military presence in the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line; it also saw a high number of weapons, including about 60 tanks, beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas.
• It continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*
• The SMM observed that the wooden boxes at the Myronivskyi reservoir had been removed.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 75 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded mainly at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM camera at the DFS recorded ceasefire violations, including explosions assessed as impacts, as close as 100-500m from the camera.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 165 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north and west-north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

Fresh mortar impacts at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area

On 30 January, at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw nine fresh impacts, assessed as caused by mortar rounds, as well as nine tailfins of 120mm mortar rounds and two fuse tips located within a 4m radius of the impacts. At the same checkpoint, the SMM also saw fresh shrapnel marks on a north-facing concrete block (which had been moved 1m south of its regular position) and dents and fresh shrapnel damage on a north-facing wall of a prefabricated container. The Mission also observed the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round and fuse tip fragments 2m north of the concrete block. About 10m south of the same checkpoint, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (tailfin of a 120mm mortar round) covered with a used tire and tree branches and an improvised red square mine hazard sign with “Stop, Mines” written in Russian 2m south from the UXO, as well as the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round embedded in the asphalt of the road,. The SMM also saw three fresh mortar impacts and fragments of the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round nearby. The SMM assessed that all the above mortar rounds were fired from a west-north-westerly direction. An unarmed member of the armed formations told the Mission that there had been shelling in the early afternoon hours of 29 January.

On the evening of 29 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight (all from north to south) at an assessed range of 2-4km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the morning of 30 January, positioned near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and 12 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km east and north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Inside the Zolote disengagement area (south of the northern edge), the SMM saw three armed soldiers and a military truck  and two other soldiers about 200m west of the above soldiers.

Positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two shots at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) close to residential areas in Zoloti Pisky (12km north-west of Donetsk);
• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a residential area in Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk); and
• a mortar (a probable 2B11) stationary near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk).

30 January

The SMM saw:

• two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) being transported south on road H-21 near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three stationary mortars (2B11) in Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk) and
• seven stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 January 2019).

30 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a stationary tank (T-64) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 30 January 2019).

The SMM saw:

• four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) stationary on road H-21 near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

30 January

The SMM saw:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) being transported south on road H20 near Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk) and
• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and three tanks (T-72) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne.

Non-government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 58 tanks (55 T-72 and three T-64) at a training area near Ternove (see above);
• nine mortars (2B11), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1), three tanks (T-64) and six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 18 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) at a compound in Zelenyi Hai (49km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top, two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) in Krasnohorivka and
• an APC (BMP-1KSh) near Shchastia.

Non-government-controlled areas

30 January

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two fresh craters, assessed as impacts of mortar (82mm) rounds next to road T0504, about 3.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At 10:10 on 30 January, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw about 2,500 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and no people queueing in the opposite direction. About two hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 600 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 200 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction.  

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and water pipelines near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) as well as to enable an inspection of water wells at the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Wooden boxes removed at Myronivskyi reservoir in Donetsk region

The SMM observed that the two dark green square wooden boxes (and connected wires) previously seen at the metal gates of a sluice on the northern side of the Myronivskyi reservoir and close to a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Roty (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 15 January 2019) were no longer there. An unarmed soldier told the SMM that the boxes had been removed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on 23 January.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia, an armed member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Other impediments:

• On 29 January, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas north and north-east of Donetsk as well as in areas south-east of Luhansk.[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its   camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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CHISINAU, 31 January 2019 – The Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, today expressed his concern that recent developments with regard to the village of Varnita and the opening of a Transdniestrian socio-cultural centre in Moscow could undermine the trust and confidence built over the past years in the Transdniestrian settlement process.

“As the OSCE mediator in the Transdniestrian settlement process, I call on both Sides to keep to the course of constructive interaction and confidence building and to refrain from any unilateral actions which could be perceived as provocative or would lead to tensions,” Neukirch said.

He underlined that the 57 OSCE participating States confirmed at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Milan last December once again their commitment to a comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders with a special status for Transdniestria that fully guarantees the human, political, economic and social rights of its population.

“It is equally clear that the village of Varnita is administered by the local authorities confirmed in the Moldovan local elections of June 2015,” the Head of Mission added.

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Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

TIRANA, 31 January 2019 - Transparency International published the results of its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2018 ranking Albania at place 99 among the 180 countries and territories included in the index.

Albania scored 36 out of 100 points, registering a drop of two points from the 2017 rating and a drop of three points from 2016.

"The lack of progress in fighting corruption remains one of the most serious problems confronted by many countries around the world, weakening democratic regimes by undermining citizen’s trust in democratic process. Corruption erodes public trust and slants economic growth in newly democratized countries. Unfortunately, most of the countries of South-Eastern Europe register a regress compared with last year. The negative trend in Albania is all the more worrying as it is a reversal of a notable improvement in corruption perceptions between 2013 and 2016", said OSCE Head of Presence Bernd Borchardt.

Transparency International notes that a possible cause of this reverse trend is the political stalemate that the country has seen in 2018, which led to the blocking of important anti-corruption reforms, while the continuation of the judicial vetting process and the setting up of new anti-corruption institutions are encouraging, but still to produce results.

"We see with concern the reverse in perceptions of corruption in Albania," said Borchardt. "The results of the index show that Albania still has to reform its system of public institutions, which is perceived as more corrupt than in the last two years."

Borchardt said that ongoing reforms including the vetting of the judiciary should be completed and new anti-corruption institutions set up: "We look forward to the establishment of the new anti-corruption institutions, and continue to call on public institutions and the rule of law agencies in Albania to proceed with the implementation of justice and anti-corruption reforms in line with international recommendations and obligations of the United Nations Convention against Corruption."

He stressed the role citizens and civil society can play: "Albanian citizens should refuse corruption and report any corruption cases to the government. Civil society should also continuously monitor public life in the country and report regularly on corruption-related issues, keeping the topic alive in the public space, while supporting the development of relevant legislation, institutions and expertise."

"The OSCE Presence in Albania regrets that the positive trend in public perceptions since 2013 was reversed in 2017 and even worsened in 2018. We remain committed to supporting Albania in its fight against corruption," concluded Borchardt.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe donated forensic training equipment to the Forensics Department and Academy of Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry on 30 January 2019 in Dushanbe. The donated equipment includes six compact bullet catchers, four metal hardness testers, four laboratory scales, one microscope, thirty handbooks on forensic topics, five desktops, one projector with screen, and two digital video cameras.

Major-General Ikrom Umarzoda, Deputy Minister of Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry; Major General Farhodbek Shodmonzoda, the National Co-ordinator for Police Reform; Major General Fayzali Sharifzoda, Head of the Interior Ministry’s Academy; Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf Abdurahmonzoda, Deputy Head of the Interior Ministry’s Forensics Department as well as representatives of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe participated in the donation ceremony.

"This technical support will help to strengthen technical capacities of the Interior Ministry’s Forensics Department to effectively prevent and counter crimes and to protect the safety of the public,” said Major-General Ikrom Umarzoda, Deputy Minister of Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry.

Major General Fayzali Sharifzoda, Head of the Interior Ministry’s Academy noted the importance of the OSCE’s help for practical training of police officers.

“The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe supports the Tajik law enforcement forces in increasing their capacity to conduct evidence-based investigations, in accordance with modern approaches to policing,” said Acting Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe Fejzo Numanaj. “In close co-operation with the Interior Ministry, the OSCE offers systematic training for police officers and prosecutors on forensics-related topics, leadership and management, respect for human rights and gender mainstreaming. The Ministry’s forensic units play an important role in providing fair and timely criminal proceedings, and protecting the rights of citizens.”

MINSK, 31 January 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 30 January 2019:

“In my previous speeches, I have repeatedly stressed that safeguarding decent living conditions for civilians in the conflict zone is the key priority of our activities.

As you know, last year the number of civilian casualties has significantly decreased, reaching the lowest level since the beginning of the conflict. This trend continues. According to preliminary data of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, no civilian deaths have been registered since the beginning of this year until the day before yesterday.

This is a clear achievement of our work here, in Minsk.

Drawing on my more than three years of experience, I would like once again to emphasise my full commitment to the Minsk Agreements and personal conviction that they are indispensable and irreplaceable for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the east of Ukraine.

This is our common task – mine, that of the Coordinators of the Working Groups and of all the participants of the Minsk process – to do our utmost for their swift and full implementation.

At the end of last week, on 25 January 2019, a teleconference of Diplomatic Advisers of the Normandy Four took place. It was agreed to give priority to certain humanitarian issues, such as improved access to and crossing of the line of contact, the exchange of detainees, the preservation of vital civilian infrastructure and many others. Accordingly, these topics have become the subject to discussion today for the TCG and its Working Groups.

The Economic Working Group discussed topical issues of water deliveries, including preparations for the audit of the "Voda Donbasa" company. The intended duration of the audit is one year. Together with a few others, issues concerning the payment of pensions to residents of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR) were also considered.

This was the first meeting of the Economic Working Group that was led by its new Co-ordinator, the former German Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Ulrich Brandenburg.

On behalf of the TCG and myself, I once again congratulate Mr Brandenburg on his appointment and wish him success on this post.

In the Working Group on Security, the main topic of discussion was the general security situation in the conflict zone and issues of compliance with the ceasefire.

The Humanitarian Working Group paid attention, inter alia, to the discussion of issues related to the exchange of detainees.

The Political Working Group took forward its exchanges on its well-known agenda, namely the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as stipulated by the Minsk agreements.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM observed more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*
• In Lviv and Chernivtsi, the SMM observed gatherings marking International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no ceasefire violations). The highest number of ceasefire violations was recorded west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh impact craters in Raivka       

At the checkpoint of the armed formations in Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw five fresh craters in a field about 15m north of the checkpoint and about 300m from the nearest residential building. The SMM assessed the craters were caused by mortar rounds (82mm), likely fired from a westerly or north-westerly direction. Members of the armed formations told the SMM that there had been shelling on the evening of 27 January. 

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 28 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six projectiles in flight (four from north-west to south-east and two from north to south) at an assessed range of 1-4km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area), as well as a projectile in flight from south-west to north-east at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). In the early morning hours of 29 January, the same camera recorded two projectiles in flight from south to north at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 29 January, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

29 January

The SMM saw:

• five stationary multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and
• five anti-tanks guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed by trucks near Metolkine (69km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

28 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• six tanks (T-72) and six self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm, two probable) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 28 January 2019).

29 January

The SMM saw:                  

• ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), an anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm), six self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm, two probable), 11 tanks (ten T-72 and one undetermined type) in the same abovementioned area of the railway station in Rubizhne;
• a tank (T-72) east of Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an anti-tank gun (MT-12) near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn[4]

Heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

29 January

• 63 towed howitzers (45 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and 18 2A36 Giatsint-S, 152mm) remained missing.

Indications of military in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

28 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) near Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol).

29 January

The SMM saw:

• an APC (Saxon) near Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) east of Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to power lines in Berehove (non-government-controlled, 23km east of Luhansk) and a water pipeline near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk), as well as to facilitate inspection and repairs to a water conduit near Nyzhnie (government-controlled, 56km north-west of Luhansk) and Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point in Chonhar

On 27 and 28 January, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 28 January 2019).

Gatherings marking International Holocaust Remembrance Day

On 27 January in Lviv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings to commemorate International Holocaust Remembrance Day. At the first gathering, taking place on Chornovola Avenue, the former location of the Jewish ghetto during the Second World War, the Mission saw about 80 people (men and women, 60-80 years old) and seven police officers present. At the second gathering, on the location of the former Yanivskyi concentration camp on Omelian Kovch Street, it saw about 25 people (men and women, 60 years old) and three police officers present. The SMM also monitored a similar public gathering in Chernivtsi on 28 January. On Cheliuskintsiv Street, it saw about 70 people (mixed gender, mixed ages) and six police officers. During all three gatherings, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that some of these sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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