OSCE

418715 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

On 3 May 2019, journalists and media experts from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Afghanistan gathered to celebrate World Press Freedom Day in Dushanbe at the international conference Promoting Mass Media to the Sustainable Development of Peace and Democracy.

Some 130 Tajik and international journalists and high-ranking representatives of the government and the parliament participated in the conference. The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and the Tajik Media Council.

“The annual commemoration of World Press Freedom Day reminds all of us of the importance of freedom of expression for a democratic society. The OSCE takes pride in being the only international security organization which has enshrined freedom of expression and freedom of the media in its comprehensive concept of security,” said Fejzo Numanaj, Acting Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

“Media freedom and access to information feed into the wider development objective of empowering people. Empowerment is a multi-dimensional social and political process that helps people gain control over their own lives. This can only be achieved through access to accurate, fair and unbiased information,” said Numanaj.

During the conference, the participants discussed challenges for media in the era of digitalization and ways to strengthen the economic, legal and ethical basis of the activities of the media as a factor in ensuring their freedom and independence. They also discussed new technologies and trends, their impacts on the freedom of speech and the enhancement of democratic values.

As a result of the conference, the participants developed a list of recommendations addressed to the governments of the Central Asian countries.

During the conference, the Tajik Media Council announced the winners of the Etimod/Trust Award for journalists, which honours the best compliance with the Code of Conduct of Journalists of Tajikistan.

The conference was conducted with the financial support of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, the Open Society Institute - Assistance Foundation in Tajikistan, the embassies of the United Kingdom and the United States of America in the Republic of Tajikistan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Internews Network Tajikistan.

PODGORICA/VIENNA, 3 May 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák announced today that he will visit Montenegro on 7 and 8 May.

Chairperson Lajčák will meet with Speaker of the Parliament Ivan Brajović, Prime Minister Duško Marković, Minister of Foreign Affairs Srđan Darmanović, and representatives of civil society in Montenegro.

Chairperson Lajčak will also be the guest of honour at the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative in Budva.

In addition, the University of Montenegro will award Chairperson Lajčák the honorary title of Doctor Honoris Causa.

On 8 May 2019 at 11:15, media are invited for photo opportunities at the OSCE Mission to Montenegro’s office located at Boulevard Džordža Vašingtona 98/VII, Podgorica, where the Chairperson will present a cheque from the Slovak Government in the amount of 10,000 euros for the renovation of bathrooms in the Grammar School in Pljevlja to Dragan Zuković, Director of the School.

On behalf of his country, Lajčák will also donate a bio-microscopic slit lamp to the Clinical Hospital Centre in Podgorica.

For additional information, media representatives can contact Marina Živaljević, National Public Affairs Officer at the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, at marina.zivaljevic@osce.org or +382 67 626 010.

SKOPJE, 3 May 2019 – The international observers for the presidential election in North Macedonia will hold a news conference to present their preliminary post-election statement following the second round of the election on Monday 6 May, in Skopje.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

Sereine Mauborgne, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission will deliver the statement followed by remarks from Marie-Christine Dalloz, Head of the PACE delegation, and Corien Jonker, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission. They will subsequently be available to take questions from the media.

The international election observation mission comprises some 170 observers from 32 countries, including 156 long- and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 11 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, and 5 from PACE.

You are invited to attend the news conference at 14:00 on Monday 6 May, which will take place in the Platinum Conference Room at the Double Tree by Hilton Hotel, Bulevar ASNOM 17, Skopje. NB While the news conference is open to all and no accreditation is required to enter, only questions from journalists will be taken.

The press conference will be live-streamed on www.facebook.com/osce.odihr and www.oscepa.org.

For further information, please contact:

Andreas Baker, OSCE PA +389 70 636 321 or +45 601 08126, andreas@oscepa.dk

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR +389 72 807 826 or +48 609 522 266, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE Secretariat +389 70 636 302 or +33 6 50 68 76 55, Chemavon.Chahbazian@coe.int

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw a fresh crater on the side of a road near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near government-controlled Bobrove and at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of non-government-controlled Luhansk city.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Zolote-4/Rodina, Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and Katerynivka, as well as continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also denied access at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Pikuzy.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south, south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). Positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 400-500m south and left the area immediately.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 30 April, the SMM saw a fresh crater outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 300m south of its southern edge on the northern side of a road leading from Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, as well as dirt, gravel and pieces of concrete scattered across the same road. The SMM did not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

On 1 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

On 1 May, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

On 1 May, the SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), seven multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

On 1 May, the SMM saw six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and seven tanks (T-72) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[3]

At two heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

On 1 May, the SMM saw that three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 31 mortars (18 2B11 Sani, 120mm, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (D-30) continued to be missing.

Indications of military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

30 April

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Yashchykove (46km west of Luhansk) and
• two newly dug trenches (one about 160m-long and another about 50m-long) in fields about 2km south-west of Mytkovo-Kachkari (93km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 8 April 2019).

Presence of unexploded ordnance and mine hazard signs

On 30 April, the SMM saw exploded remnants of two of five previously observed anti-tank mines, with their fuses removed, about 10m south of road T-0504 and about 400m south-west of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint told the SMM that they had conducted demining activities in the area on 27 April.

On 1 May, in Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that a previously observed tailfin of a 120mm mortar round protruding from the asphalt on the edge of the road was still present.

On the same day, on the eastern edge of Chermalyk, the SMM saw that a previously observed red mine hazard sign, with “Stop Mines” written in Ukrainian and “Danger Mines” in English, attached to a rope extended across a road leading to a cemetery, was still present.

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 70 minutes, the SMM saw 36 cars (four with Ukrainian and 29 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), three mini-vans (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates), a bus (with “DPR” plates) and seven pedestrians entering Ukraine. It also saw 27 cars (two with Ukrainian and 16 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as eight with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and three buses (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

SMM facilitation of demining activities

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities reportedly carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in and around cemeteries near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north-east of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one of them armed) prevented the SMM from proceeding further, citing “ongoing heavy shelling in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that anti-tank mines present across the road leading north had not been cleared.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week. Three vehicles of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations crossed into Ukraine on 26 April and returned to the Russian Federation the next day.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,264 to 10,895 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 981 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 13 this week compared to 33 last week: eight of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and five into Ukraine. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and seven were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when four families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead, they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (368 compared to 344 observed during the previous week). There were 185 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 183 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the “irregular” route “Rovenky-Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 797 trucks (922 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at the both BCPs, (239 at the Gukovo BCP and 558 at the Donetsk BCP); 350 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 447 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 77 (compared to 44 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 179 to 133: of the total number of trucks scanned, 87 trucks (65 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 46 trucks (35 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 140 to 157 vehicles; 74 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 83 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 30 occasions; the OTs assessed that fifteen trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and fifteen to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, cars with Polish licence plates were also noted.

On 23 April, the OTs at both BCPs observed a helicopter, type Mi-17, flying along the border within Russian Federation airspace on four separate occasions.

A Mi-17 was first noted at 14:46 at the Gukovo BCP, flying from an eastern to a northern direction at an altitude of around 100m. Later on, at 15:04, the OT at the Donetsk BCP, observed a Mi-17 helicopter flying from an eastern direction at an altitude of around 50m. At 15:10, the helicopter made a turn and flew to the north. At 15:55, the same type aircraft arrived from a northern direction, flew over the Donetsk BCP and continued to fly in a southerly direction.During the same day, at 16:07 a Mi-17 helicopter again flew over the Gukovo BCP coming from the north before heading in an easterly direction.

On 26 April at 06:45, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed three vehicles (a “Gazel” and two “Kamaz” trucks) with the inscription of the Ministry of the Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation crossing the border from the Russian Federation to Ukraine (a Spot Report was issued the same day). On 27 April, the three vehicles crossed back into the Russian Federation at the Donetsk BCP after undergoing ten minutes of border control procedures.

On 28 April at 05:23, an ambulance was observed entering the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. After it parked near the border checking area, a female paramedic left the vehicle and went towards the main building. After around ten minutes, the paramedic came back to the vehicle and the ambulance returned towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 26 March 2019 to 30 April 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe supported the Government of Tajikistan in launching Tajikistan’s Trade Portal on 26 April 2019 in Dushanbe, which helps to intensify and increase access to trade information and comply with the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement.

The launch ceremony brought together 120 representatives from government institutions, the private sector, diplomatic representations and international organizations.

This initiative was implemented by Tajikistan’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, with the technical assistance of the International Trade Centre, UNCTAD the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, UNDP and the OSCE.

“With this initiative, the OSCE continues to support the Government of Tajikistan to increase trade opportunities for inclusive national and regional economic growth and development, and to create an enabling environment for digital innovation aimed at improving transparency and accountability and mitigating security risks,” said Filippo Crivellaro, Head of the Economic and Environmental Department at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Tajikistan’s Trade Portal is an online platform aimed at facilitating trade and investment operations for foreign and domestic representatives of the private sector. The electronic tool allows publishing detailed online information on trade and investment procedures in the country. Procedures are described step-by-step and show all contacts (authorities), forms, requirements, costs, duration, ways of recourse and the legal basis.

Producing a single portal containing all trade regulations and procedures will save businesses time and operational costs, especially for traders and enterprises involved in the import, export and transit sectors.

Tajikistan became a member of the World Trade Organization in March 2013 and has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement in May 2015, which is aimed at facilitating trade by simplification of transport movement procedures, reduction of costs and time for release and clearance of goods in cross-border trade.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw for the first time anti-tank mines near Prychepylivka, unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and a mine hazard sign near Novoselivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also denied access at checkpoints near Novolaspa, Oleksandrivske and Novoazovsk in southern Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (50), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south, south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 30 April, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions, as well as nine bursts and eight shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area, within 5km of its periphery). [3]

On the same day, positioned on the north-western edge of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 13 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-5km west-north-west (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area within 5km of its periphery).

Also on the same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites

Government-controlled areas

On 30 April, the SMM saw eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

On 29 April an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) and an armoured combat vehicle near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk).

30 April

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

On 27 April, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a trench digger and two trench extensions in areas not controlled by the government near the Petrivske disengagement area: a 60m trench about 800m east and a 50m trench about 1.7km east of the eastern edge of the disengagement area (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 28 March 2019).

Presence of mines, unexploded ordnance and mine hazard signs

On 28 April, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 150 anti-tank mines laid out in three rows running from east to west in a field about 2.5km south-east of Prychepylivka (government-controlled, 50km north-west of Luhansk).

On 30 April, the SMM observed for the first time two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (one assessed as a part of an MLRS (BM-21 Grad) rocket, and the other as a probable part of the same type of rocket), both assessed as not recent, on the earth mound surrounding an abandoned bunker west of road M-03 on the western edge of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), about 100m south of an improvised mine hazard sign (for previous observation in the area see SMM Daily Report 29 April 2019).

On the same day, the Mission saw an obstacle with the inscription “mines” in Ukrainian sprayed onto it on the northern side of a road about 1km north-west of Novoselivka (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); it also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 28 and 29 April, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “the SMM’s safety”.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “live-fire exercises in a nearby training area”. While at the checkpoint, the SMM heard three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire from the direction of the training area.
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk) and west to Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), citing an “ongoing operation in the area”. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay/Conditional access:

• At a military compound near Peredove (government-controlled, 68km south-west of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative prevented the SMM from entering, saying that the SMM needed to wait for the commander. After about 30 minutes, the commander allowed the SMM to enter, but demanded that the SMM’s vehicles remain outside (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw unexploded ordnance in Kadiivka and new mine hazard signs near Novoluhanske and Debaltseve.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and at checkpoints of the armed formations near Yasynuvata and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 20 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and nearly half of the explosions were recorded in areas north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). On the evening and night of 28-29 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 38 projectiles in flight, nine undetermined explosions, and three muzzle flashes at a range of 100-800m south and south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded slightly more ceasefire violations, but the same number of explosions (one), compared with the previous 24 hours. All of the ceasefire violations were recorded close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and south-south-west of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 28 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 17 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 4-6km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area (within 5km of its periphery).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019);
• three tanks (T-72) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk); and
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Zbirne (19km south-west of Luhansk).

28 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report of 25 April 2019); and
• a towed howitzer (D-30) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12) near Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk).

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 11 tanks (T-72) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12) in a training area near Shymshynivka (see above).

28 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 18 tanks (T-64), ten towed mortars (120mm) and four surface-to-air-missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above); and
• two tanks (T-64) near Perevalsk.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

29 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Muratove  (51km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-60) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Kalynove.

Unexploded ordnance in Kadiivka and new mine hazard signs near Novoluhanske and Debaltseve

On 29 April, the SMM saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) about 1.5m west of road T-0504 and about 30m north of residential buildings in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), assessed as a 30mm round (of an undetermined weapon).

On 28 April, the SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs on wooden stakes with “Dangerous - Mines” written in Russian and Ukrainian near a former checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 2km north of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) on the east side of a road leading to Semyhiria (government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). On 29 April, the SMM saw for the first time a wooden sign with “Mines – Driving Prohibited” written in Russian, on the north-eastern edge of road M03 near Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 29 April, at a checkpoint in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM passage on a road leading towards Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and the disengagement area near Zolote, citing orders from superiors.
• At a checkpoint north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (one armed) denied the SMM passage on road M-04 past the entrance to a road leading to the Vasylivka pumping station, citing orders from superiors.
• On three occasions at a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, thus preventing it from proceeding eastward, twice citing orders from superiors and once following the SMM’s refusal to show its patrol plan.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

418502 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported workshop on human rights education and awareness-raising among students concluded in Nur-Sultan on 30 April 2019.

The two-day event is the first in a series of four seminars organized by the OSCE Programme Office Nur-Sultan in partnership with the Ombudsman of Kazakhstan and the NGO Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. The event was held at KAZGUU University for some 30 university students, representatives of the Ombudsman’s office and local human rights experts to discuss the international and national mechanisms of human rights protection, related law enforcement practices, and key challenges.

Participants learned from experts about the foundation of human rights concepts and reviewed the practical examples of how to properly ensure and promote citizens’ rights and fundamental freedoms.

A separate session was devoted to activities of National Human Rights Institutions, in particular, the role of the Ombudsman in handling complaints on human rights violations and monitoring closed institutions.

The event will be followed by three workshop sessions in Almaty (South Kazakhstan), Karaganda (Central Kazakhstan) and Ust-Kamenogorsk (East Kazakhstan) during the year. The series is part of the Office’s long-term efforts to promote human rights education in the host country.

418487 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

Strengthening co-operation between police and border guards in the identification and suppression of channels of illegal export, import and transit of victims of human trafficking was the focus of a two-day training seminar, which concluded on 30 April 2019 in Shymkent, Kazakhstan.

The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the United States Embassy in Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan.

Some 20 representatives of the Police departments of the city of Shymkent, the Zhambyl, Kyzylorda and Turkestan regions, as well as officers of the ‘Ontustik’ regional administration of the Border Service of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee,  participated in the training seminar.

They learned about the mechanisms of human trafficking, the specifics of investigation of human trafficking, as well as the international and national anti-trafficking legislation. The curriculum also included techniques for in-depth psychological analysis of a suspect’s verbal and non-verbal behaviour as well as ways to identify specific risk indicators. A number of practical exercises provided the participants with the opportunity to apply their newly acquired knowledge.

The event was part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to support the host country in combating human trafficking and in implementing the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.

418475 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A series of training courses focused on best practices in responding to cases of domestic violence, organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, for deputy heads of the Interior Ministry of Tajikistan concluded on 26 April 2019 in Kulyab city of Khatlon region.

The courses were organized in co-operation with the Interior Ministry’s Departments of Police Reform and Public Order.

A total of 43 participants from the Interior Ministry of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), and the Khatlon and Sughd regions took part in the activities from 10 to 26 April 2019.

The courses were conducted with the use of interactive methods combining presentations, discussions, group work, short videos and role plays.

The participants learned about the forms of violence within the family; the linkage of violence in the family with gender stereotypes and its negative impact on families; international legal obligations to fight domestic violence and international standards of work with aggressors and protection of victims by law enforcement agencies; the psychological aspects of work with aggressors and victims, and the national legal framework to prevent and fight domestic violence.

“The main goal of these training courses was to increase the participants’ knowledge with regard to combating domestic violence,” said expert and psychologist Mahmadullo Davlatov.  “Increased knowledge on the psychological and legal aspects of addressing cases of violence in the family is important for the successful implementation of the Law on prevention of violence in the family in Tajikistan.”

Major General Farhodbek Shodmonzoda, the National Co-ordinator for Police Reform and Mahkam Shukurov, a representative from the Department of Public Order of the Interior Ministry participated in the events and delivered a presentation on existing mechanisms for implementing the law on preventing violence in the family and gender mainstreaming into police reform.

Similar courses were held for regional police officers in Garm, Khujand and Romit in 2018.

MINSK, 29 April 2019 – OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) met today with Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to emphasize the importance of close co-operation between Belarus and the PA, discuss efforts to put an end to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine through the Minsk negotiating process, and address the status of democratic reforms.

“In light of the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine, I am thankful that Belarus has actively engaged with the international community to support mediation efforts and alleviate human suffering,” said President Tsereteli. “These efforts on the international scene must inspire Belarus to also follow through on commitments to democratic reform and ensure that all Belarusian voices are heard.

”The conversation also considered the proposal to convene a summit aimed at strengthening the Helsinki principles and preventing conflicts in the OSCE area. President Lukashenko encouraged such a high-level meeting as a way to break the deadlock in a number of challenging areas for the Organization, recalling that the last OSCE Summit took place in 2010.

In Minsk, President Tsereteli also met with the Chairman of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus, Vladimir Andreichenko, and the Head of the Delegation of Belarus to the OSCE PA, Boleslav Pirshtuk. Talks focused on co-operation between the OSCE PA and the Belarusian parliament, as well as ways to strengthen parliamentary democracy. Tsereteli encouraged his counterparts to make use of OSCE instruments and increase the contributions of civil society to deepen democratic reforms. 

The PA President is scheduled to meet tomorrow with Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei and representatives from opposition parties and civil society to further discuss the need to safeguard fundamental rights and ensure an even playing field ahead of parliamentary elections expected later this year. 

President Tsereteli is taking part in a two-day visit to Belarus, where he is participating in the parliamentary conference of the Silk Road Support Group, hosted by the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus under the theme “Belt and Road: Deepening Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Prosperity.”

In opening the conference, President Tsereteli noted concerns regarding the growing influence of China in the OSCE area and welcomed the opportunity to encourage greater parliamentary oversight over Belt and Road projects.

“As representatives of our citizens, we all have their best interest at heart. It is our ambition to have our populations benefit to the fullest from new projects and investments,” said President Tsereteli. “This requires transforming any initiative to connect our countries more closely into a joint project with co-ownership for all participating States, and to make sure that local workers are hired to multiply the economic benefits of these investments.”

The event includes the participation of high-level members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. It carries on tomorrow with a visit of a Chinese-Belarusian industrial park, located outside of Minsk. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 26 and 27 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 27 and 28 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A 26-year-old man was injured by gunfire in Chermalyk.
• Small-arms fire was directed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicles on two occasions near Azov.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations and saw fresh craters inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw fresh craters, mines and unexploded ordnance between Talakivka and Pikuzy.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Bezimenne, at two heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, as well as at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 26 and 27 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), in areas east and east-south-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) and south-south-east, south-west and west of Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

On the evening and night of 26-27 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 28 projectiles in flight and eight explosions (one assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon, one as an airburst, and six undetermined) at an assessed range of 0.1-1km south and south-south-west. It also recorded a fire about 800-900m south at the junction of road M-04 and road H-20.

Between the evenings of 27 and 28 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 26 and 27 April, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however a similar number of explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk) and in areas north-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 27 and 28 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Man injured by gunfire in Chermalyk

On 28 April, at a hospital in government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM saw a man (26 years old) with his right leg wounded and bandaged below the knee. The man told the SMM that on the morning of 26 April, in Chermalyk, he had suddenly felt a bullet hit his right lower leg while walking in civilian clothing from Myra street towards a fenced-in Ukrainian Armed Forces compound to request permission to visit a nearby cemetery in the village. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the man had been admitted on 26 April with fractures and tissue damage to his right leg caused by a bullet.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicle on two occasions near Azov

On 27 April, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Azov to locate an SMM mid-range UAV which had been lost in the area on 25 April (see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2019), the SMM heard 12 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 600m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 650m south-west of the patrol. About an hour later, while conducting a second mini-UAV flight from the same location, the SMM heard 15 bursts and ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 600m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 500m south of its location. On both occasions, the SMM safely landed the UAV.*

Aggressive behaviour directed at SMM by members of the armed formations in Pikuzy

On 27 April, while stationary near a shop in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), a civilian car with two men, (30-40 years old) inside, one with military-style clothing, drove towards the SMM rapidly from the road, stopping about 10cm from the front of an SMM vehicle. Upon exiting their vehicle, one of the two men told the driver of the same SMM vehicle in Russian “guard my vehicle” in a loud and aggressive tone, before entering the shop. The men returned shortly to their cars and drove away rapidly.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 26 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 13 projectiles in flight and an illumination flare at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), and a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area (within 5km of its periphery). On 27 April, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw two fresh craters on the road, about 600m east of the checkpoint of the armed formations. It also saw a tailfin of a mortar round inside one of the craters and another near the other crater. The SMM assessed that both craters were caused by mortar rounds fired from a north-westerly direction. About 20m south of the craters, the SMM saw five other fresh craters in a field about 20-100m south of the road. The SMM was unable to assess the weapon used or direction of fire.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), on 27 and 28 April, the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

26 April

An SMM mini-UAV again spotted two probable surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) less than 50m from residential houses on the northern outskirts of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27. April

The SMM saw six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a compound near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

26 April

The SMM saw a tank (T-64) on a truck west of Paraskoviivka (31km south-west of Donetsk).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

28 April

The SMM noted that one site was abandoned and that a total of 23 tanks (nine T-64 and 14 T-72) and nine mortars (2B-14 Podnos, 82mm) continued to be missing.   

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

26 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk); and
• a steel turret near previously observed positions and trenches north of Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

The SMM saw an armoured combat vehicle (BMP variant or MT-LB variant) in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters, mines and unexploded ordnance between Talakivka and Pikuzy

On 26 April, about 4km east of Talakivka, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines (probable TM-62M) laid out in a single row across a road leading to Pikuzy, as well as again spotted a total of 166 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid across the road and into a field north of the same road (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 5 February 2019). About 650m south-east of the latter mines, the same UAV spotted two fresh craters about 10m south of the same road, each with a tail boom of a rocket-propelled-grenade (RPG) (PG series) inside, assessed as caused by RPG rounds fired from a westerly direction. About 150m east of the craters, the UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines (TM-62M) across the road, one of which was assessed as having a damaged fuse, as well as a tail boom of an RPG in the middle of the same road, about 10m east of the mines.

Long queues for civilians at checkpoints

On the morning of 26 April, at the checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka, the SMM saw a higher than usual number of vehicles queuing in a 3km long line to travel towards government-controlled areas. In the afternoon, at the same location, the SMM saw about 130 vehicles queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 120 vehicles and about 400 pedestrians queuing to enter non-government-controlled areas. In the morning at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 500 pedestrians waiting to exit government-controlled areas. In the afternoon, the SMM saw about 100 vehicles (including two full buses) and about 100 pedestrians queuing to exit government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 27 April, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). On 27 and 28 April, the SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

On 28 April, positioned at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw five pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 28 April, positioned at the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw at least 100 stationary railway cars, but could not determine the contents.

On 28 April, positioned at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (three with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates) and one bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 12 cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), one bus with Ukrainian licence plates and five covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 27 and 28 April, at a checkpoint about 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing security concerns for SMM members.
• On 28 April, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 28 April, at two heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, members of the armed formations denied the SMM access.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 27 April, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 12 bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely (see above).
• On 27 April, while conducting a second mini-UAV flight near Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 15 bursts and ten shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely. The SMM immediately left the area (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek supported a training course entitled “Women, peace and security: trends and development perspectives”. The event was organized by the Kyrgyz Association of Women in the Security Sector (KAWSS) on 25 April 2019 in Bishkek.

About 150 women working in the Kyrgyz security sector and other government agencies participated in the training course. The ending of this eight-day extensive training event was marked by a roundtable discussion, which was attended by 30 officials, most of them female, from the Ministry of the Interior, the State Service on the Execution of Punishment, the State Border Service and staff of Armed Forces and National Guard.

National and international experts gave lectures on human rights, rule of law, security sector reform and gender equality. The international experts also shared their knowledge about international standards and good practices in implementing security sector reforms through the prism of gender approach, as well as prevention of crime and violence against children and women.

The acquired knowledge and skills will serve as a catalyst for promoting the role of women in the security sector and the important contribution they make to enhancing comprehensive security.

The training is in line with the recently adopted National Action Plan and relevant strategic documents, as well as the OSCE commitments related to gender aspects of security.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission continued to observe hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and damaged houses in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM was also restricted in Shevchenko, at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Bezimenne and near Dovzhanske, a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period. Most ceasefire violations were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 25 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four projectiles in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 26 April, positioned at four locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire (unable to assess whether inside or outside the area) and six undetermined explosions (assessed as outside the area, within 5km from its periphery).

Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 shots from undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 4-5km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). [3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

26 April

The SMM saw:

• two tanks (T-64) on flatbed trucks in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk) on road H20 heading south and
• a tank (T-64) loaded on a transport vehicle near Dmytrivka (55km south-west of Donetsk) on road H20 heading west.  

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

On 21 April, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a probable armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol).

26 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk),
• an APC (BTR variant) about 3km north-west of Stanytsia Luhanska, and
• an unidentified unmanned aerial vehicle flying in circles at approximately 50m above the ground and descending about 1km south-east of the SMM’s position near Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk).  

Demining activities near Myrne and removal of unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne

On 26 April, on road T-0512, about 5km east of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), two demining team members of an international non-governmental organization told the SMM that the demining team had removed three anti-tank mines next to the road. About 300m west, the SMM saw two additional members of the same organization conducting demining activities in a field south of the road (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019). 

The SMM noted that the two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), previously observed embedded in the tarmac of a road leading from Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk) to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, had been removed (see SMM Daily Report of 24 April 2019).

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge

At 12:20, at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 500 people queuing to exit and about 40 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. About two hours later, the SMM saw about 600 people queuing to exit and about 20 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. In the parking lot near the checkpoint, a woman and a man (aged 50-60) told the SMM that it took them a total of two hours to travel from non-government- to government-controlled areas. Medical staff present at the EECP told the SMM that on 25 April a total of 120 people received treatment after they had felt unwell (30 of them lost consciousness) due to the high temperatures.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and to a water pipeline between Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

Positioned at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 14 cars (five with Ukrainian and seven with Russian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates), one covered cargo truck with “DPR” plates and eight pedestrians (three women and four men aged 30-50 and a child) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 17 cars (one with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), two buses (both with about 40 passengers on board and “DPR” plates) and three covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.  

At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three cars (two with Russian Federation and one with “LPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. It also saw five cars (three with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, a member of the armed formations asked the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), four members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing security concerns for SMM members.
• In Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk) two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled) after the SMM refused to show the patrol plan.  
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, a member of the armed formations asked the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a representative of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined. The SMM did not consider safe to proceed.

Conditional:

• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only accompanied by a member of the armed formation.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was partially operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle was lost in Donetsk region.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The SMM again saw mines near Novoluhanske and a mine hazard sign for the first time near Petrivske.
• The Mission continued to observe hardships faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Zaichenko, as well as on roadways in Pervomaisk and near Korsun.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at east-south-easterly and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). More than two-thirds of ceasefire violations were recorded south-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 25 April, positioned at four locations near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons and 23 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

SMM loses mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle near the contact line in Donetsk region

At 11:21 while flying in an area near Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) encountered signal interference assessed as jamming.[4] At 11:22, the SMM, which was flying the UAV remotely from a location near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), lost control of the UAV. An SMM mini-UAV flying in the vicinity of Lebedynske shortly afterwards also experienced signal interference. The SMM is making efforts to locate the mid-range UAV.*

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

On 24 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four tanks (one T-64 and three undetermined) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 25 April 2019).

On 25 April, the SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), seven multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 16 April 2019 and SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019.)

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

On 25 April, the SMM saw 25 tanks (T-64) at a railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

18 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 13 tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 4 April 2019);
• 23 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 16 April 2019); and
• 21 tanks, 15 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (type undetermined) and six self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 5 April 2019).

On 25 April, the SMM saw six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and seven tanks (T-72) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

On 25 April, the SMM noted that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one towed howitzer (D-30) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

On 24 April, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-3) about 350m west of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk).

25 April

The SMM saw:

• three IFVs (BMP variants) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and
• five members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces launching a large white fixed-wing UAV (about 3m long and 2m wide) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 12 IFVs (BMP-1) near Sukhodil (21km west of Luhansk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk).

On 25 April, the SMM saw three IFVs (BMP-1) on the south-eastern outskirts of Luhansk city.

Presence of mines near Novoluhanske and mine hazard signs near Petrivske and Syhnalne

On 24 April, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted ten anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road about 500m south-west of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske about 200m north of residential areas of Dolomitne (non-government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

On the same day, about 600m west of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 40km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a white improvised mine hazard sign on a stick in the ground with “Attention! Mines!” written in Russian outside a compound.

On 25 April, on the north-western edge of Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM again saw a red mine hazard sign with “Stop! Mines!” written in Russian attached to a chain blocking the road leading to a compound.

Demining activities near Myrne and Nikishyne

On 25 April, on road T-0512 about 4.5km south-east of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw 11 members of an international demining organization conducting demining activities. The SMM also saw four persons conducting demining activities in an area of a field marked with red and white tape approximately 400m west of the road leading from Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk) to Ridkodub (non-government-controlled, 61km north-east of Donetsk).

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw an elderly man (in his eighties) being loaded into an ambulance by medical personnel. Ambulance personnel told the SMM that the man had had a heart attack while queuing to enter non-government-controlled areas.

At 12:30, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 400 people queuing to exit and about 1,200 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. In the parking lot near the checkpoint, two women and two men (all 45-65 years old) told the SMM that it took them three to four hours to travel from non-government-controlled areas to government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) (for previous repair works, see SMM Daily Report 29 December 2018), to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to a water pipeline near Popasna. The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS).

The SMM was informed by personnel at the Donbass Fuel Energy Company (DTEK) that repair works to power lines near Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km east of Donetsk) were completed on 24 April, restoring power to approximately 2,000 civilians.

SMM monitored and facilitated the distribution of humanitarian aid in Katerynivka

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of coal by an international humanitarian organization in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 23 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 24 April, on a side road in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations prevented the Mission from proceeding further, citing “demining activities in the area”.
• On road M-04 near Korsun (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding further.
• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from “superiors”. While present, the SMM saw civilian cars passing through the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• An SMM mid-range UAV encountered signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying in a region near Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol). (See above.)
• An SMM mini-UAV encountered signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).[6] (See above.)

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

SUMMARY

On 26 April at 06:45 (Moscow time), the observer team (OT) at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP) observed three vehicles with the inscription “Russian Emergency Situations Ministry” crossing the border from the Russian Federation to Ukraine.

DETAIL

The vehicles arrived from the Russian Federation and bore the inscription “Russian Emergency Situations Ministry”. The make of the vehicles were as follows:  one “Gazel” and two “Kamaz”. Both of the Kamaz trucks bore the additional inscription “Mountain Rescue” written in Russian.

After administrative procedures – without opening the tarpaulins of the trucks – all three vehicles crossed the BCP in the queue that is intended for travelers from Ukraine to the Russian Federation and left for Ukraine. The vehicles had blue emergency lights on. The OT noticed six people (two people in each vehicle) inside the vehicles and the vehicles’ licence plates indicated their registration in the Rostov District of the Russian Federation.

418316 Liana Khorovytska Andrii Dziubenko

Forty-eight officers of Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service and State Fiscal Service were trained to identify toxic chemicals and respond to emergency situations at border crossings in a series of two intensive four-day sessions in the Orshanets Training Center, the Cherkasy Region.

The workshops for personnel working at border crossings were organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine and concluded on 26 April 2019. The sessions were conducted jointly with trainers representing both Services.

The training sessions covered principles of detection and identification of chemicals and dual use goods during inspection, algorithms of personnel action and interagency co-ordination and emergency response. Twelve trainees from each agency will be selected to become trainers for their colleagues in the future. 

“Effective control of cross-boundary movement of chemicals is highly important to address potential threats to the health and lives of those people who work at the border, and those who can be affected after hazardous chemicals enter the country,” said Henrik Villadsen, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine. “We expect this training programme to be incorporated into the standard training of the agencies”. 

Additionally, the Co-ordinator provided 25 sets of personal protection equipment, detection kits, decontamination equipment and simulators of hazardous chemicals to cover training needs of border personnel.

This assistance is part of a project implemented by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in partnership with the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine. The project is funded by the European Union and the United States of America.

VIENNA, 26 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today called for the release of the former journalists of the newspaper Cumhuriyet, after they were returned to prison yesterday.

“I am appalled by this decision which is a terrible setback and confirms the continuous harassment against Cumhuriyet journalists in Turkey. This is particularly disturbing after several Cumhuriyet journalists were released from detention in the past months and the trial demonstrated that the accusation of terrorism against the journalists was groundless. This criminal prosecution against media professionals for holding independent or critical views leads to the weakening of media freedom and grave restriction of freedom of expression in the country,” Désir said.

Cumhuriyet’s cartoonist, Musa Kart, and other former employees of the newspaper, including Önder Çelik, Mustafa Kemal Güngör, Hakan Karasınır, Güray Öz and Emre İper, were sent back to prison to serve the remainder of their jail sentences, having already spent some time in pre-trial detention. Their prison sentences are between three and four years.

According to media reports, prominent journalist Kadri Gürsel and lawyer Bülent Utku are not among the journalists returned to jail.

“I once again urge the Turkish authorities to stop treating journalism as a criminal activity and journalists as terrorists. These prison sentences against former Cumhuriyet journalists need to be immediately overturned and the journalists released from jail,” Désir stressed.

The Representative expressed his readiness to assist Turkey in revising and changing parts of its legislation, especially the anti-terror law that is widely used to imprison journalists in the country.

The Representative’s previous statement on the Cumhuriyet trial are available at: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/411830;  https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/378883; https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/375619; https://www.osce.org/fom/219021

418256 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

A five-day OSCE-supported train-the-trainer course on the detection of forged travel documents and identification techniques for 21 border service officers concluded in Almaty, Kazakhstan on 26 April 2019.

Experts from the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior developed a tailored programme for Kazakhstan’s officers of the National Security Committee’s Border Service. Participants learned about paper production processes, security features introduced into paper, security inks and different printing technologies. Experts presented some 200 samples of real and forged travel documents and discussed how to identify a number of security features in these documents.

Practical exercises allowed the participants to work with banknotes of more than a dozen countries from around the world. Experts provided them with illuminated magnifiers, USB-digital microscopes and a Docubox device to allow the border control officers to apply their acquired skills. In addition to learning best practices in document verification, the future instructors were given guidance on how to best teach these concepts to others. The seminar will be supplemented by two additional one-week courses to complete the trainers’ preparation.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in co-operation with the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programme of the United States Embassy in Nur-Sultan, Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC), and the Border Guard Service under the National Security Committee. The training course was supported by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Travel Document Security Programme.