OSCE

KYIV, 25 January 2019 – A fully-equipped training room designed for conducting interactive and practical simulation exercises will be officially handed over by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine to the country’s Academy of Patrol Police at a ceremony in Kyiv on Thursday, 31 January. The training room will help the Academy train new and experienced officers in responding to domestic violence incidents.

Vadym Lisnychuk, Head of Academy of Patrol Police and Jeffrey Erlich, Senior Project Officer of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator, together with experts, police trainers and cadets will take part in the ceremony, which will include presentation of the room’s equipment and a demonstration of a simulation exercise.

Media representatives are invited to cover the ceremony at 10:00 am, on Thursday, 31 January in the Academy’s premises at 9 Narodnoho Opolchennia Street, Kyiv. Media professionals should confirm their attendance by sending an e-mail to pr_app@academy.np.gov.ua  or by calling +380954170170 by 16:00, Wednesday, 30 January 2019.

For more information, please contact Anastasia Staruk, Public Relations Specialist of the Academy of Patrol Police (+380954170170) or Andrii Dziubenko, National Programme Co-ordinator of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator (+380506767734, Andrii.Dziubenko@osce.org )

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In response to the announcement of SDA’s initiative to challenge the name of the Republika Srpska, the OSCE Mission to BiH notes that the Dayton Peace Agreement and the BiH Constitution clearly recognize two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.  The OSCE Mission encourages SDA leadership and all parties to find constructive ways to improve dialogue, understanding and trust between the Constituent Peoples.

Indeed, as the High Representative has stated, SDA’s initiative is particularly unwelcome in the midst of government formation and the urgent need to resolve several politically sensitive issues. It is a distraction from addressing the real needs of citizens and does nothing to resolve the issues that SDA legitimately raises in relation to the position of returnees in Republika Srpska, such as the Bosnian language. 

Rather than divisive rhetoric and maximalist positions that only lead to crises, the citizens of this country need political leaders to work toward a better future through dialogue, mutual understanding and compromise.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Man injured by small-arms fire during repair works near the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station.
• Apartment building in Chermalyk hit by small-arms fire.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a compound near Perevalsk in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.*
• In Uzhhorod, Kharkiv and Dnipro, the Mission observed public gatherings on the occasion of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine.

___________________________________________________________________________

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 15), compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including five explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds, were recorded in areas south-east of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk).

Man injured by small-arms fire near the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station

On 22 January, positioned on the northern outskirts of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station (see SMM Daily Report 23 January 2019), the SMM saw a man with bandages on his lower back walking to an ambulance. On 23 January, the SMM saw the same man (aged 29) in a hospital in Pokrovsk (government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk). He told the SMM that he was a member of a State Emergency Service demining team; during the day of 22 January he had been in the area of the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station during repair works, when he had heard small-arms fire and had been hit by a projectile shortly thereafter. Medical staff told the SMM that the man had been transferred from a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk) on the evening of 22 January with a bullet wound. 

Apartment building in Chermalyk hit by small-arms fire

At 21 Myru Street in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in a south-facing window pane on the second floor of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and as caused by a round of small-arms fire. The aforementioned apartment building is located about 50m west of a functioning kindergarten which the SMM previously assessed as having sustained damage by small-arms fire (see SMM Daily Report 23 January 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 22-23 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four bursts and a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 5km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 23 January, near Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east as well as their subsequent impacts at an assessed range of 8km south-west, as well as an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 10-15km east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

23 January

The SMM saw:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

22 January

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• seven anti-tank guided missile systems (9P418 Konkurs, 135mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk);
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) east of Valerianivka (51km south-west of Donetsk);  
• eight self-propelled howitzers (four 2S1 and four 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) east of Maloianisol (78km south-west of Donetsk);
• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) south-west of Kasianivka (81km south of Donetsk);
• four surface-to-air missile systems (S-300) in Nikolske (formerly Volodarske, 97km south of Donetsk); and
• four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) east of Azovske (121km south of Donetsk).

23 January

The SMM saw:

• four tanks (T-72) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Weapons storage sites:

At permanent storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

23 January

The SMM saw that:

• six tanks (five T-64 and one T-72) were again missing and
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

22 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles east of Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk);
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) south-west of Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk); and
• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

23 January

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Muratove (51km west of Luhansk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) with a red cross painted on the rear in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

23 January

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines in Popasna and in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and to a powerline close to the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to enable snow clearance at the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Public gatherings marking the 100th anniversary of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine

On 22 January, the SMM observed peaceful gatherings on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine in Uzhhorod (about 700 participants), Kharkiv (about 150 participants) and Dnipro (about 250 participants). It also observed the presence of law enforcement officers securing all three gatherings. (See SMM Daily Report 23 January 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 22 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Near Perevalsk (non-government-controlled, 38km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a compound, citing the need for permission from his “superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 22 January, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over government-controlled areas close to the contact line in north-western, south-western and southern parts of Donetsk region.[4]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Small-arms fire damaged a functioning kindergarten in Chermalyk.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a checkpoint near Yasynuvata.*
• The SMM followed up on reports of an incident at a newspaper office in Kherson.
• In Kyiv and Chernivtsi, the Mission observed public gatherings on the occasion of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 190), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including over 180 explosions, were recorded at northerly directions of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) during repair works to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station (see below).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 12 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including eight explosions assessed as outgoing artillery and mortar rounds, were recorded in a training area near Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk) (assessed as part of live-fire exercises outside the security zone).

Small-arms fire damaged a functioning kindergarten in Chermalyk

Accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative, the SMM visited a functioning kindergarten at 21A Myru Street in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). Inside the kindergarten, the Mission saw a fresh hole in a south-facing window frame as well as fresh scarring on a western wall and a piano next to a northern wall. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by a small-arms round (7.62mm), which had pierced the window frame and ricocheted off the wall and the piano. An employee of the kindergarten told the SMM that she had found a bullet lying on the floor near the piano on the morning of 22 January.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 19 January, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three fresh impact craters assessed as caused by mortar (120mm) rounds inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 900m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge and about 1.5km west of its eastern edge – between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire.

On the evening of 21 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight from south-south-west to north-north-east at an assessed range of 1.5-3km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 22 January, positioned close to the disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) as well as inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

22 January

The SMM saw:

• six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) on stationary trains at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) moving south near Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

21 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three tanks (T-64) about 1.5km north-west of Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

22 January

The SMM saw:

• 26 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk). 

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

22 January

The SMM saw:

• three tanks (T-72B) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 January

The SMM saw:

• six towed howitzers (D-30, Lyagushka, 122mm) at a training area near Myrne (see above).

Weapons storage sites:

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 January

The SMM noted that:

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten towed howitzers (nine D-30 and one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five MLRS (two for the first time) were missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

22 January

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and
• three armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

21 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Lobacheve and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk).

22 January

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Luhansk city.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), to a powerline near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on reports of an incident at a newspaper office in Kherson

On 21 January, in Kherson, at the office of the Novyi Den newspaper, the SMM saw broken glass of a door and four holes in two windows. Three journalists told the SMM that during a press conference on 18 January, they had heard the “sound of five shots”.  A local police representative told the SMM that a traumatic [non-lethal] pistol and rubber bullets had been used and that a suspect had been charged under Article 296 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code.

The SMM observed public gatherings in Chernivtsi and Kyiv

In Kyiv and Chernivtsi, the SMM observed peaceful public gatherings on the occasion of the Day of the Unity of Ukraine. At Sofiiska Square in Kyiv, the SMM saw about 2,000 people (mixed gender and ages) gathered and approximately 500 law enforcement officers present. In Chernivtsi, the SMM observed two gatherings of about 200 people (mixed gender and ages) and about 300 people (mixed gender and ages) at two different locations. The SMM saw about 20 law enforcement officers present at both locations.

Also in Kyiv, the SMM observed a peaceful march of about 80 people (mixed gender and ages) dedicated to four Maidan activists who had reportedly been killed on 22 January 2014.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 22 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the need for prior permission from his superiors. After about 35 minutes at the checkpoint, following an intervention by senior members of the armed formations, the Mission was allowed to proceed.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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CHISINAU, 23 January 2019 – In meetings this week with senior officials in Moldova, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) stressed the importance of holding transparent and fair elections, noting that the conduct of the 24 February parliamentary elections would be watched closely by the OSCE PA and other international observers.

President Tsereteli met in Chisinau with President Igor Dodon, President of the Parliament Andrian Candu, Prime Minister Pavel Filip, and Foreign Minister Tudor Ulianovschi and Moldova’s delegation to the OSCE PA, headed by Serghei Sirbu. He also met Vlad Plahotniuc, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Moldova, and leading members from extra-parliamentary parties, as well as representatives of civil society and the international community.

“This election is a decisive moment in the life of the country. Last year’s court decision invalidating the Chisinau mayoral race clearly had a negative impact on people’s trust in institutions and raised concerns internationally, making the conduct of this election doubly important,” said Tsereteli. “Public trust in the rule of law and democratic institutions is once again at stake in this election, and I call on all forces to contribute to ensure that these elections meet democratic standards.”

This was President Tsereteli’s second official visit to Moldova in the past year, following his travel to both sides of the Dniester/Nistru River in June 2018. At that time, he expressed his concern regarding the nullification of the Chisinau mayoral race.

President Tsereteli called on the authorities and all relevant actors to commit to ensuring equal treatment of all electoral contestants. He also urged all players to ensure that any concerns raised will be fact-based and substantiated.

“I appreciated hearing assurances from government authorities that efforts are being made to minimize shortcomings and to make these the most democratic elections in Moldova’s history. A strong team of OSCE PA observers will be on the ground to observe and, together with our international partners, carefully assess whether the elections meet OSCE commitments,” continued Tsereteli.

Elections that meet the high standards expected by Moldovan citizens can both enhance public trust in institutions and lay the groundwork for further developments including in the economic sphere, he said.

Tsereteli expressed his hope that following the election, efforts on the Transdniestrian settlement process can continue without delay. He urged both Chisinau and Tiraspol to sustain momentum in the process.

The President reiterated the importance being paid to developments in Moldova by the OSCE, noting that his trip comes just days after a visit by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak. President Tsereteli also expressed his appreciation for the excellent work being done by the OSCE Mission to Moldova.

While in Chisinau, the President also met with Matyas Eorsi, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election observation mission. OSCE PA observers of the parliamentary elections will work closely with the observer mission deployed by the ODIHR on 15 January.

The President said that he and other Members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly would be closely following developments in the country in the coming weeks, and expressed appreciation for the open approach displayed toward international election observers.

The President will report on his visit to Moldova at the OSCE PA’s Winter Meeting next month. The OSCE PA has observed elections in Moldova nine times: in 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2009 (April and July), 2010, 2014 and 2016.

Photos from the visit to Moldova are available on Flickr.

Media contact: Nat ParryOffice: +45 33 37 80 40Mobile: +45 60 10 81 77Email: nat@oscepa.dk

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons was 8,227 at both BCPs. The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                     

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 9,000 to 8,277 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 514 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 12 this week (compared to 16 last week); eight of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and four into Ukraine (92 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and three were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and eight into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                        

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (327 compared to 412 observed during the previous week). There were 180 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 147 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Luhansk-Kharkiv.  

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 441 to 725 (209 at the Gukovo BCP and 516 at the Donetsk BCP); 377 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 348 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation, Armenia, Georgia and in Belarus.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 59 (compared to 44 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 47 to 214: of the total number of trucks scanned, 125 trucks (58 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 89 trucks (42 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 91 to 123 vehicles; 64 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 59 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on four occasions, compared to six last week; the OTs assessed that one train was travelling to the Russian Federation and the other three to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

On 19 January at 17:17 at Donetsk BCP, a police minivan entered the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked behind the main building. At 17:39, the same minivan returned in the direction of the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 15 January to 22 January 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Small-arms fire damaged a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations and continued to observe an armoured combat vehicle and anti-aircraft guns inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and near a border crossing point in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.*
• The SMM observed a gathering related to LGBTI rights. 

___________________________________________________________________________

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (25 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-west and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Small-arms fire damaged school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

Inside a functioning school building on Myru Street, in the south-western area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a fresh hole in a first-floor west-facing window pane and a scratch to the inner pane of another adjacent west-facing window. The SMM also saw minor damage (a chip) to the wall opposite the two windows. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a small-arms round (7.62mm). (The SMM assessed that the round had penetrated the first window pane, ricocheted on the opposite wall and then either the round or shrapnel from the wall chipped the inside of the second window pane.) A school representative told the SMM that the school had sustained damage on 17 January around 06:00, but no children were present inside the building at that time. She added that the school had been damaged by gunfire three times since 25 December 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 20 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 20 January, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) (both assessed as belonging to the armed formations). The same UAV spotted again an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) about 30m east of the road bridge, assessed as inside the disengagement area and belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

During the night of 20-21 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard six bursts of small-arms fire 2km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

20 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

21 January

The SMM saw:

• 12 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and
• three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

20 January

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) in a residential area of Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk) and
• eight tanks (T-72) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Yablunivka (49km north of Donetsk).

21 January

The SMM saw:

• 28 tanks (27 T-64 and one T-72), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and two self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska) at the railway station in Bakhmut and
• four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in Azovske (121km south of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn:

At a heavy weapons holding area beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region[3]

18 January

The SMM observed that:

• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas:

20 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) near Troitske;
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk);
• an APC (MT-LB) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) and a probable IFV (BMP-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an APC (MT-LB) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP variants) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk);
• an ACV (type undetermined) near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk).

21 January

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (60km west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

21 January

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Luhansk city.

Man died of heart attack at the entry-exit checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska

On 21 January, a representative of an international organization present near the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) told the SMM that at around 08:00, a man (aged 73) had been walking towards non-government-controlled areas when he had suffered a heart attack and passed away. Medical staff at a hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska confirmed that the body of the man had been brought to the hospital’s morgue the same day.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Horlivka, as well as to a powerline near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 12 pedestrians (nine females and three males, aged 20-25) entering Ukraine and 12 pedestrians (nine females and three males, aged 30-65) exiting Ukraine. At a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven pedestrians (five females and two males, aged 20-45) entering Ukraine. After about 35 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw four covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and 17 cars (four with Ukrainian and three with Georgian licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

SMM observed a gathering related to LGBTI rights

On 19 January, the SMM saw a group of about 40 young people (mixed genders) gathered at a commemoration event at Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv. The SMM observed that the participants were also expressing their support to LGBTI rights. The SMM saw another group of 50 young men gathered nearby, some of whom were making critical remarks against participants in the other group. There were about 200 law enforcement officers in riot gear onsite. The SMM saw the participants of the former group being escorted away from the site by the law enforcement officers. It did not observe further incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM found the gates of the compound locked and was told over the phone that no one was present at that moment to allow the SMM inside.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM visited an area previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as its storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted the site was empty.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 22 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his satisfaction following a decision by Azerbaijan’s authorities to drop new charges against the imprisoned blogger and chair of the media NGO Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, Mehman Huseynov.  The OSCE Representative called on the authorities to release Huseynov as soon as possible.

“I welcome the decision of the authorities in Azerbaijan to drop new criminal charges against Huseynov,” stated Désir. “I previously expressed my serious concerns about the situation and health conditions of Huseynov, in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and a public statement on 9 January, and called on the authorities to drop the new criminal charges and to release him as soon as possible.”

Reportedly, the Office of the Prosecutor-General, in accordance with recommendations of the President of Azerbaijan, instructed the investigating body to “terminate” the criminal case against Huseynov. The investigating body discontinued the criminal proceedings against Huseynov on the grounds that he is young, was not brought to disciplinary responsibility while serving his sentence, and has an elderly, widowed father who needs care; that the crime he committed was not considered serious; and that his acts and character currently do not pose a danger to society.

“I call on the authorities to use similar grounds identified by the investigating body and to release Huseynov as soon as possible. Other bloggers and journalists serving their prison sentences in Azerbaijan on trumped-up charges must be freed as well,” added Désir.

Huseynov has now reportedly ended the hunger strike which he began last month in protest against a new investigation launched against him by the authorities, reportedly on 26 December 2018. New criminal charges against him would have seen Huseynov sentenced to up to seven more years in prison. During his hunger strike, Huseynov’s health seriously deteriorated.

The OSCE Representative’s statement of 9 January is available at: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/408380

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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COPENHAGEN, 22 January 2019 – OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) today welcomed reports from Azerbaijan that the General Prosecutor’s Office has terminated a criminal case against anti-corruption blogger and chair of the media NGO Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety Mehman Huseynov. Huseynov has been detained on defamation charges since March 2017 and in December 2018, new charges were initiated against him that could have extended his imprisonment by seven years.

“I am happy that the new charges against Mr. Huseynov have been dropped and that he can once again look forward to his expected release date in early March,” President Tsereteli said. “When I visited Mr. Huseynov and observed his prison conditions just under a year ago, I expressed hope that he would be released soon. Therefore, the initiation of new charges against him in December was a cause for deep concern and I am relieved that these criminal proceedings have been terminated. I have followed his case closely and regularly raised it in my discussions with parliamentary colleagues and Azerbaijani authorities, including President Aliyev, and am pleased that he has paid personal attention to this case.”

Tsereteli added that democratic reforms in Azerbaijan, particularly on freedom of the media and on creating conditions to maximize the contribution of civil society, should continue.

Last week, the Chair of the OSCE PA’s human rights committee, Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland), raised concerns over Huseynov’s treatment and reiterated the call by OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir for the authorities to drop new criminal charges brought against him. OSCE PA Vice-President Azay Guliyev (MP, Azerbaijan) also raised this case in a public statement issued 12 January in which he noted that he had discussed the matter with relevant bodies in Azerbaijan and had received assurances that it was being objectively examined.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 18 and 19 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 19 and 20 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas.
• Adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region was facilitated and monitored by the SMM.
• A calm situation was observed by the SMM at the crossing point with Crimea in Chonhar, south-east of Kherson.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a community changing church affiliation in Shandrovets, Lviv region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle experienced jamming.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 18 and 19 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and south-south-west of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 19 and 20 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 25 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), north-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol) and east and south-east of Avdiivka.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 18 and 19 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (two explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and west of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 19 and 20 January, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle spots recent impact craters near Luhanske

On 18 January, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 16 recent impact craters in a field about 5km south-east of Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable mortar (82mm) rounds. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire.  

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 18-19 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and 46 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 2-5km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south (34 projectiles assessed as inside the disengagement area, 11 projectiles that the SMM was unable to assess and one assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 19 January, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard nine shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area). 

During the evening of 19 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an illumination flare in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 19 January, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 20 bursts and about 20 shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-2km west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the morning on 20 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two shots of cannon (30mm) fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 19 January, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3] On 20 January, positioned about 2km south-south-east of Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-west (assessed as outside the Petrivske disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

19 January

The SMM saw:

• three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed by military trucks traveling south-west near Krasne (65km north of Donetsk);
• 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at a railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk);
• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) about 3km north-west of Berkhivka (73km north of Donetsk) loaded on flat-bed trucks, seven of which were in a field and one which was traveling south-east; and
• five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) about 3km south of Zaliznianske (79km north of Donetsk) parked in a field west of road M03.

20 January

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) being transported south-east on road M03 near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

20 January

The SMM saw:

• eight tanks (T-64) near Pidhorodne, five loaded on heavy equipment transporters and in movement and three stationary, and
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Osa) being transported on road M03 south-east near Pidhorodne.

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn:[4]

Heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

19 January

The SMM observed that:

• three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) were present, and
• 35 self-propelled howitzers (23 2S1 and 12 2S19 Msta-S, 152mm), 18 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 34 mortars (21 2B11, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and a BM-37, 82mm)  and  three anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

19 January

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2D) north-west of Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) military ambulance (MT-LB type) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk);
• an infantry fighting vehicle (type undetermined) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), about 10m south of a house; and
• two APCs (BTR-3) near Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk).

20 January

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-2) near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), and
• a freshly dug vehicle revetment, about 10m in diameter in a circular shape, north of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk.

On 20 January, while attempting to conduct a mini-UAV flight near Sofiivka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the UAV experienced loss of signal. While present, the SMM saw a truck with military-type plates and two armed members of the armed formations on board arrive. One of them got out of the truck and told the SMM that if any members of the armed formations saw the SMM UAV flying it would be shot down, based on instructions from his superiors. The SMM then departed the area.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 20 January, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to powerlines near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk. On 19 and 20 January, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border area outside of Government control

On 20 January, at the pedestrian border crossing point in Novoborovytsi (non-government-controlled, 79km south of Luhansk), the SMM did not observe pedestrians crossing in either direction.

The SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point in Chonhar

On 17 and 18 January, the SMM observed calm situations at the crossing point with Crimea in Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson).

The SMM followed up on reports of the community changing church affiliation in Shandrovets, Lviv region

On 18 January, at the Church of St. Michael in Shandrovets (113km south-west of Lviv) the head of the village council (male, 40-45 years old) and five local parishioners (one female and four males, 50-65 years old) said that at a community meeting on 13 January the community had voted to change their affiliation from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). The UOC priest said that on 16 January he had not given keys to the church and the parish residence to community members (according to the five parishioners, about 200 people, mixed age and gender) who had come to the parish residence and requested them. The head of the village council and five parishioners told the SMM that local residents had then broken the lock on the parish residence and asked the priest to leave, which he did. At the church, the SMM observed about eight police officers and two police cars and that the church was open to the public. A police representative told the SMM that they had maintained a constant presence at the church since the incident on 16 January.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 18 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 20 January, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its dual GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Donetsk), Chasiv Yar (government-controlled, 62km north of Donetsk) and Bakhmut. [6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational and winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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VIENNA, 21 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today condemned a physical attack against a journalist in Skopje last Saturday.

On 19 January, during an event celebrating the Orthodox Christian holiday of Epiphany in the city centre, Mirjana Mircevska-Jovanović, a Kanal 5 journalist, was assaulted while carrying out her work. She began receiving verbal and physical attacks by security guards after attempting to pose questions to a participant at the event. Mircevska-Jovanović sustained arm and neck injuries.

“Journalists must be safe to perform their professional activities without being intimidated, threatened or attacked. I hope that the investigation launched by the authorities will swiftly identify and bring the perpetrators to justice,” stated Désir, adding that targeting journalists because of their work is an attack on the public’s right to be informed.

The Representative welcomed the swift reactions and condemnations by the political parties, SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE and DS, as well as the Associations of Journalists AJM and MAN, the Independent Union of Journalists, the Council for Ethics in the Media (CEMM), and the Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services (AVMU).

“It is important that every incident is condemned by the local authorities,” said Désir, expressing hope that public condemnation from high-level officials would contribute to preventing similar attacks in the future.

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VIENNA, 21 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, condemned the attacks yesterday on reporters and photojournalists by extremist groups in Athens.

On Sunday, Thomas Iacobi, a correspondent of various international media, was attacked while covering a protest against the name change deal with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The attack took place after a group of people from an organized extremist group recognized him as one of the co-authors of Golden Dawn: a Personal Case, a documentary about the Golden Dawn far-right political party. The group hit him in the face and forced him to delete files from his mobile and destroyed his audio equipment, before the police could intervene.

Other photographers and camera operators were also targeted, and their equipment smashed or stolen by protesters. Photojournalist Kostis Ntantamis suffered serious head injuries and had his equipment stolen.

“I strongly condemn these terrible attacks, and urge the Greek authorities to swiftly investigate them,” said Désir, “Journalists must be able to work freely and to cover protests and events of public interest without fear.” 

The Representative recalled that the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, adopted last December, calls on participating States to condemn publicly and unequivocally all attacks and violence against journalists.

“I call on the Greek authorities to do their utmost to swiftly bring the perpetrators to justice as to dissuade future violence, and to ensure that journalists can work safely,” stated Désir, adding that he will continue to monitor the situation.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Referendum, 30 September 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the 30 September 2018 referendum in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia recommends revising and harmonizing the legal framework to provide clarity to referendum campaign rules, including campaign finance and media obligations.

The report, published on 21 January 2019, also recommends prioritizing the ongoing development of a permanent register of addresses to improve the inclusiveness and accuracy of the voter list, and removing restrictions on suffrage based on mental or intellectual disability.   

The report states that the State Election Commission administered the referendum impartially, generally meeting legal deadlines, and conducted an enhanced voter education campaign, in line with prior ODIHR recommendations.

There were no restrictions on fundamental rights associated with the campaign, which was active and peaceful across the country, the report notes. However, the absence of clear campaign and campaign finance rules led to confusion among stakeholders. To enhance the transparency of campaign finance, the report recommends revising the referendum legislation to clarify the use of public funding, as well as requirements for disclosure, auditing and sanctions.

In the absence of an active “against” campaign or organized “boycott” campaign, the media struggled to provide balanced coverage, but did convey extensive information and diverse views to voters, the report notes. The report recommends the revision of the referendum legislation to guarantee the equality of opportunity in media coverage of the campaign.

The report notes that the State Election Commission accredited international and citizen observers in an inclusive process; however, to further enhance transparency, it recommends that legislation provide for partisan observation of the referendum process, and that accreditation badges of all observers identify the organization they represent.

For referendum day observation, ODIHR was joined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

409512 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Researchers and practitioners from the OSCE region discussed a wide range of analytical perspectives in the study of political parties, party systems, elections, representative democracy and closely related areas, and the practical implications of these for democracy-support efforts during a Winter School held in Warsaw from 14 to 20 January 2019.

The Winter School on Political Parties and Democracy was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), in partnership with the Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw and the Research Centre for the Study of Parties and Democracy at the University of Nottingham.

The participants, 11 men and 11 women, were MA and PhD researchers, practitioners and civil society leaders in the field of political parties and democratic governance from 15 selected OSCE participating States.

Marcin Walecki, Head of the ODIHR Democratization Department, stressed the unique combination of expertise this first ECPR/ODIHR Winter School brought together.

“The variety and high level of the research presented, as well as the number of OSCE participating States represented at the Winter School, is evidence of the distinctive importance of bringing academics and practitioners together in Warsaw to discuss current challenges to political party systems across the OSCE region,” he said.

Irina Kulikova, a student at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, said: “This event is an excellent opportunity in my professional and academic career, offering a solid link between the study of political parties and the international human rights framework. Feedback and insights received from leading professors, researchers and practitioners have been invaluable.”

The participants discussed ODIHR’s core areas of work, such as political party regulation, political corruption, elections and campaign financing, as well as the political participation of youth, women and persons with disabilities. The event also included two roundtable discussions,  “The Crisis of Political Parties and Representative Democracy” and “The Life and Work of Peter Mair”, a professor of Comparative Politics at the European University Institute in Florence whose research focused on political parties and party systems. The discussions were attended by leading international professors.

The Winter School followed the ECPR/ODIHR Summer School, which took place in July 2018.

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission saw the body of a deceased man near the entry-exit checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*
• The SMM followed up on reports of a confrontation at a church in Zhytomyr region.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (about 145 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area as well as in areas south-west and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 17 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and two projectiles at an assessed range of 4-5km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 18 January, positioned close to the disengament areas near Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

17 January

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk); and
• three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) within a residential area of Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk).

18 January

The SMM saw:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) on road M03 near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk), heading south-east.

Non-government-controlled areas

17 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three tanks (T-72) about 1km west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a compound in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

17 January

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• seven tanks (T-64) and one surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) at a railway station in Bakhmut; and
• ten tanks (T-64) at a military compound on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.

Weapons storage sites:*

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region[3]

18 January

The SMM observed that:

• six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present and
• four MLRS (BM-21) and two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were again missing.

At a permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

18 January

The SMM observed that:

• 13 tanks (nine T-72 and four T-64) were again missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

17January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 16 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (eight BMP-2 and eight BTR-3E), four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and four anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm), as well as two armoured ambulances (an MT-LB S and a BMM-4S) on the north-western edge of Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-2) and an IFV (BMP variant) loaded on a heavy-equipment transport truck south-west of Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Myronivka (64km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk).

18 January

The SMM saw:

• four IFVs (three BMP-2 and one BMP-1) near Zaitseve.

Non-government-controlled areas

17 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-2) and an APC (BTR-80) near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk) and
• two APCs (MT-LB) and an IFV (BMP-1) in Debaltseve.

Positioned about 2km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a mini-UAV flying south to north at an altitude at about 20m and approximately 50-100m north of its position.

Mine hazard signs in Druzhne        

The SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs in a field about 2km south of Druzhne (non-government-controlled, 37km south-east of Luhansk), one of which was a white board with “Mines” written on it in Russian (the second sign was not visible).

Body of a deceased man observed near the entry-exit checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska

About 50m north of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw the body of a deceased man (aged 70-80) lying on the asphalt. The SMM saw two police officers and the deceased man’s two daughters standing next to the body. The daughters told the SMM that their father had been walking towards non-government-controlled areas when he had likely suffered a heart attack and passed away.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a powerline near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border area not under government control

On 17 January, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw 64 covered cargo trucks with trailers (40 with Ukrainian, four with Russian Federation, six with Belarusian, one with Azerbaijani and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as 12 with “DPR” plates), and five trucks with liquid-tanks (with markings indicating the transport of gas) with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw a truck (licence plate unreadable), 15 cars (seven with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates as well as seven with “DPR” plates) and 20 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine.

On 18 January, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka for about an hour, the SMM saw 52 cars (ten with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates as well as 31 with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM saw a bus (with destination signs “Donetsk-Moscow”) with Russian Federation licence plates and 81 covered cargo trucks (46 with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation and two with Belarusian licence plates, as well as 19 with “DPR” plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine.  

SMM followed up on reports of a confrontation at a church in Zhytomyr region

On 15 January, in Malyn (Zhytomry region, 94km north-west of Kyiv), a man who introduced himself as a member of the Svoboda party told the SMM that, on 11 January, he had helped organize a vote among residents of the nearby village of Vorsivka to change its community’s affiliation from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine; he added that everyone (about 60 people) had voted in favour. He also said that, on 13 January, in Vorsivka, together with some of his friends from Malyn, including ATO veterans, and other residents of Vorsivka, he had prevented representatives of the UOC from entering St. Nicholas Church. On 15 January, a UOC priest told the SMM that, after the vote to change the community’s affiliation (see above), representatives of the Vorsivka village council had sealed St. Nicholas Church and had forbidden UOC priests to enter its premises. He also said that, on 13 January, a cordon of about 15-20 men (aged 30-50) wearing uniforms with symbols of former “volunteer battalions” prevented him and a group of some 25 parishioners from accessing the yard of the church. The Svoboda party representative and the UOC priest separately told the SMM that the two groups had engaged in a verbal confrontation in the church’s yard, but police officers present on the scene had prevented it from escalating.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 18 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge.  

Delay:

• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, a guard allowed the SMM to access the area after about 45 minutes. 

Other impediments:

• On the morning of 18 January, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk) and Ilovaisk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-east of Donetsk).[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational and fog limited the observation capabilities of the majority of the SMM cameras.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one of such sites continued to be abandoned.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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CHISINAU, 19 January 2019 – Concluding his visit to Moldova today, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák said Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship attaches great importance to advancing the Transdniestrian Settlement Process as part of Slovakia’s focus on the prevention and mediation of conflicts, and in mitigating their impact on people.

“We don’t want to engage in conflict prevention and mediation just from Vienna; it needs to come from the ground. That is why I am here – to meet with and listen to the people most involved, or the most affected,” he said.

During the trip, which was undertaken just one week after the official launch of Slovakia’s OSCE Chairmanship, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office met with political leadership in both Chisinau and Tiraspol, including Moldovan President Igor Dodon; Prime Minister Pavel Filip; Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Tudor Ulianovschi;  Co-ordinator of the Governing Coalition, Vlad Plahotniuc; and opposition politicians Maia Sandu and Andrei Năstase in Chisinau; and the Transdniestrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky and chief negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev in Tiraspol.

In his discussions, Lajčák focused on small, concrete steps and real dialogue to move the settlement process forward at all levels of the negotiations. “I have now seen first-hand that real, tangible progress is happening – on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River. The Gura Bicului-Bychok Bridge is open, children are attending Latin-script schools, students from Tiraspol university get apostilles for their diplomas, farmers are back working in the Dubasari farmlands, cars from Transdniestria are driving around with neutral-designed licence plates. So, we have the momentum. Now, we need to focus on outstanding issues to improve the day-to-day life for all people in Moldova,” Lajčák said.

“Slovakia together with international partners and the OSCE Mission will actively support Chisinau and Tiraspol to promote progress in achieving a sustainable and peaceful settlement based on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova with a special status for Transdniestria,” he added.

Speaking about the plans for 2019, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office urged Chisinau and Tiraspol to fully finalize the “Berlin-plus package”, including the telecommunications agreement, and to identify new areas to be addressed in the same spirit of confidence-building. “We need to keep taking small, concrete steps forward. Some of the progress we have seen was almost unimaginable a few years ago. The more we engage in dialogue, the more trust we will build.”

Lajčák underlined the need to ensure that the electoral process for the 24 February parliamentary elections is conducted in a free and transparent manner – and in compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. He reassured the Moldovan authorities that the OSCE’s Mission and institutions would continue to assist the country in promoting an inclusive, tolerant and resilient society, noting the establishment on 15 January of an election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Moreover, he stressed that the elections should not impact the negotiation process.

Before leaving Moldova, the Chairperson-in-Office informed the representatives of the ODIHR election observation mission about his meetings and was briefed by them about the pre-election situation and the state-of-play of the ongoing preparations.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw damage from gunfire to a residential house in Zolote-4/Rodina.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission followed up on reports that a woman had died while waiting at a checkpoint near Horlivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a border crossing point with the Russian Federation near Voznesenivka.*
• In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing at which the pre-trial detention of the former editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine was extended.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 145 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area, south-west of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

Damage from gunfire to a residential house in Zolote-4/Rodina

On 17 January, the SMM observed damage to a one-storey residential house in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk). At the location, the SMM saw a small hole in a windowpane in an east-facing wall. Inside the house, it saw a similar-sized hole in the curtain hanging in front of the window, corresponding with the location of the hole in the windowpane, as well as damage to a wall opposite the abovementioned window and pieces of plaster on the floor below. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a 12.7mm heavy-machine-gun bullet fired from an easterly direction. A resident (woman, 80-90 years old), who said she was at home when gunfire occurred, told the SMM that on 8 January she had entered her living room and had found a broken window and a bullet on the floor.

Woman died while waiting at checkpoint near Horlivka

On 17 January, at an armed formations checkpoint near Horlivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that a woman (71 years old) had died on 16 January while waiting in a taxi to cross the checkpoint. Staff at a morgue in Horlivka said that the woman’s body had been brought to the morgue on 16 January and that she had died of natural causes.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 16 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same evening, the camera recorded a projectile at an assessed range of 2-4km south and five projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east, all of which were not able to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area. 

During the day on 17 January, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

16 January

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

17 January

The SMM observed:

• 12 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) on a stationary flatbed train at the railway station in Kostiantynivka

Non-government-controlled areas

16 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three tanks (T-72) parked near residential houses in Zaichenko (93km south of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

16 January

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk) and
• a probable surface-to-air missile system (9K35) in Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk).

17 January

The SMM observed:

• seven tanks (T-64) on a stationary flatbed train at the railway station in Bakhmut (67km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

17 January

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• • 20 tanks (type undetermined) and nine self-propelled and 18 towed artillery or mortars in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

16 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) in Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk);
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A) in Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk);
• four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two IFVs (BMP-1) south-west of Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk).

17 January

The SMM observed:

• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)
• an IFV (BMP-1) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk)
• an IFV (BMP-1) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) and two APCs (MT-LB) at a military compound in Zaitseve (62km north-east Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

16 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) in Pikuzy (92km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (one BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and an APC (BTR-70) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to phenol sludge ponds near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to an electrical powerline near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border area not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Kherson court extends pre-trial detention of former editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti

In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing on the extension of pre-trial detention of the former editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine, arrested in Kyiv on 15 May 2018 on charges of high treason under Article 111.1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The court ruled that the defendant would remain in custody for pre-trial detention until 16 February 2019. (See SMM Daily 28 December 2018.)

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access

• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments

• On the morning of 17 January, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near Kostiantynivka as well as near Chasiv Yar (government-controlled, 62km north of Donetsk) and Bakhmut.[4]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational and fog limited the observation capabilities of the majority of the SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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VIENNA, 18 January 2019 – OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (Georgia) has wrapped up a visit to Vienna, in which he addressed the ambassadors of the OSCE’s 57 participating States and held a number of bilateral meetings with OSCE counterparts.

In his address to the Permanent Council on Thursday, President Tsereteli urged doing more for the security of citizens of the OSCE area, including by increasing efforts on democracy, human rights and civil liberties. He highlighted positive developments but regretted that too many people remain victims of unresolved conflicts or human rights violations.

“The environment we are in and the behavior of several participating States clearly demonstrates the need for more sustainability in the OSCE’s work and to provide the OSCE with the resources it needs to do its job,” President Tsereteli said. “With East-West relations now at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, what we need is a strong OSCE that can serve as a forum for real confidence-building.”

He noted that “scarce financial resources, diminished trust and misperceptions or a diminished sense of purpose for multilateralism are serious obstacles we must tackle when defining a medium- to long-term strategy for our Organization.” He highlighted the PA’s position regarding the need for a reform of the consensus rule and establish modalities that allow for this organization to function.

He also noted the OSCE PA’s belief in the strong value the field presences add to the OSCE’s work.

The President stressed that the new Slovak OSCE Chairmanship’s emphasis of co-operation to benefit those we ultimately serve mirrors the Assembly's focus on delivering effective results. “At the OSCE PA,” he said, “we try our best to be useful. When doing so we apply the Slovak guideline ‘ambition and realism’.”

In meetings with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, OSCE Representative on Media Freedom Harlem Désir and Permanent Representative of Slovakia Radomir Bohac earlier in the week, discussions focused on ways to further strengthen institutional co-operation and make use of the parliamentary toolbox in support of OSCE commitments and priorities. Tsereteli emphasized the importance of the PA promoting co-operation with the Representative on Freedom of the Media on individual cases.

President Tsereteli met on Wednesday with the President of the Austrian National Council and Head of the Delegation of Austria to the OSCE PA Wolfgang Sobotka for talks focused on the crisis in and around Ukraine. While in Vienna, President Tsereteli met with Reinhold Lopatka, the Deputy Head of the Austrian Delegation, for talks on the work and priorities of the Austrian delegation, as well as future PA activities, including election observation and participation in OSCE events.

Tsereteli also exchanged with the PA’s Special Representative on Central Asia, Roman Haider, regarding his plans in the run-up to the 2019 Annual Session.

For the President's full remarks, please click here.

Video of the address is also available on YouTube.

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GENEVA, 18 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today met with the Director General of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), Noel Curran, and EBU experts in Geneva to discuss political and public support for public service media across the OSCE region, highlighting the important role they can play in strengthening democracy.

“States have a responsibility to ensure independent and adequately funded public media that inform the population and contribute to access to culture and education,” said Désir, “Their mission is an essential component of democracy.

”The Representative stressed that public service media can play a vital role in society by providing quality information, promoting a plurality of views and strengthening investigative journalism.

“The role of public service media in providing reliable information is even more important in the age of fake news and manipulation of information,” he added.  “I see too many cases of political interference or underfunding of public service media, which are detrimental to their mission.

”In 2018, the Representative intervened in a number of cases of threats to independence and financial sustainability of public service media in several OSCE participating States. The OSCE media freedom representative regularly provides legal reviews and assistance to the States on legislation and reforms of public service media. The Representative and EBU Director General agreed on closer co-operation on the safety of journalists and in responding to legislation and reforms that affect public media and media freedom.

“It is important that public service media are supported in adapting to the digital media landscape and to changes in how the audiences consume media. They need to adapt to the trend towards online, on-demand content and reach young audiences,” said Désir.

During his visit, the Representative and his team also had the opportunity to meet with news, legal and broadcasting experts at the new EBU facilities.

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MINSK, 18 January 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 17 January 2019:

“The TCG and its Working Groups convened today for the first time this year.

Looking at our achievements last year, I would like to highlight a significant decrease in the number of civilian casualties, by more than half compared with 2017. This is an important outcome. Even so, however, I always say and I will repeat again today that every human victim is one too many.

I also would like to mention the Statement by the Trilateral Contact Group on recommitment to the ceasefire adopted in late 2018 on the occasion of the New Year and Christmas holidays.

As its result, the number of ceasefire violations from 29 December to the day before yesterday decreased more than by half compared with the previous two-week period. However, in the in recent days, the number of ceasefire violations has tended to rise.

Compliance with the ceasefire was thus the major topic for the Security Working Group.

In this regard, I once again call on the sides to take all steps necessary to prevent civilian casualties, protect critical infrastructure and ensure a sustainable ceasefire.

Safeguarding decent living conditions for civilians in the conflict zone is the key priority of the new OSCE Chairmanship in the current year, Foreign Minister of Slovakia, Miroslav Lajčak.

The Economic Working Group has considered current issues of water delivery in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems. The sides agreed to conduct an audit of the "Voda Donbasa" company, with ICRC assistance. Another discussion topic has been the payment of pensions to residents of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR).

Today was Per Fisher’s last meeting as Co-ordinator of the Economic Working Group. On behalf of the TCG and on my own behalf, I would like to express deep gratitude for his invaluable contribution to solving the many issues that are vital for the population in the conflict zone.

I also want to greet the new Co-ordinator of the Economic Working Group, an experienced diplomat, former German Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Ulrich Brandenburg. I am confident that his profound professional experience will contribute to the continued successful work of the Group.

The Humanitarian Working Group further discussed the issues related to the exchange of detainees.

The Political Working Group took forward its exchanges on its well-known agenda, namely the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as stipulated by the Minsk agreements.”

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