OSCE

VIENNA, 8 April 2019 – The benefits of biometric technology in countering terrorism, and how to responsibly use and share collected biometric data, is the focus of a conference on Thursday, 11 April 2019 at the Hofburg in Vienna. The OSCE is this year partnering with the Biometrics Institute’s for its seventh annual borders conference. Media representatives are invited to cover the event’s opening session.

The two-day conference will bring together some 200 decision-makers, policy-makers, project managers and private sector representatives working in the area of border management.

The conference is designed to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017), which decided that States shall develop and implement systems to collect biometric data (such as fingerprints, photographs and facial recognition) in order to responsibly and properly identify terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters.

Participants will learn about how and why biometric data is valuable to States in identifying terrorists, how states can develop and implement systems to collect biometric data responsibly and explore good practices in the sharing of biometric data between States.

For representatives of those States already using biometric systems, the conference will facilitate the exchange of good practices in using these tools and help to identify potential partnerships with other States to further improve the efficiency or minimize the costs of their current systems.

Media representatives are invited to attend the conference’s opening session from 14:00 to 14:25, Thursday, 11 April, in the Neuer Saal of the Hofburg Conference Centre. The session will feature welcoming remarks by:

Thomas Greminger, OSCE Secretary General
Lukáš Parízek, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic and Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship
Isabelle Moeller, Chief Executive of the Biometrics Institute

To register, please send an e-mail confirming your attendance to press@osce.org by 11:00, 11 April.

WARSAW, 8 April 2018 – Governments and political leaders must do more to end the impunity of violent perpetrators who attack Roma and Sinti, said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), on the occasion of International Roma Day.

“It is unacceptable that Roma and Sinti continue to face hate-motivated attacks and violence,” the ODIHR Director said.

Such violence is often fuelled by racist and anti-Roma rhetoric promoted by high-level public officials as well as populist politicians, all attempting to increase their voting base. “This whips up a climate of prejudice and intolerance, potentially leading to an unending spiral of violence against Roma and Sinti,” the Director said. “Racism and incitement to hatred must be condemned promptly and unequivocally.”

Existing laws and mechanisms must be enforced to ensure rapid and effective investigation of hate crime against Roma and Sinti.  Participating States should also ensure the imposition of enhanced sentences for racially-motivated crimes, in line both with their own domestic legislation and international human rights standards.

To effectively address hate crime and violence, OSCE participating States have committed to improving the access of Roma and Sinti to effective remedies such as the provision of legal aid. This requires the establishment of specific programmes and policies, as well as easy access to information regarding legislation, reporting and support mechanisms for victims.

ODIHR is helping to address such discrimination, hate crime and violence, for example by regularly providing a much-needed space for dialogue between Roma and Sinti civil society and representatives of participating States, as well as other international organizations. These focus not only on current incidents of systemic racism and discrimination against Roma, but also on legal and policy measures undertaken around the OSCE region to address and prevent them.

On the principle that any action taken for Roma must also be carried out with Roma, any project or programme aimed at increasing Roma inclusion must involve them as full partners in all phases of planning, implementation and evaluation.

International Roma Day marks the date of the first international meeting of Roma representatives across Europe, which took place in the United Kingdom on 8 April 1971.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• It recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM observed fresh craters near Kalynove-Borshchuvate.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near Marinka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities and repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its freedom of movement was also restricted near non-government-controlled Starolaspa.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 440 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), including about 280 projectiles recorded by an SMM camera, west-south-west and north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), and at southerly directions  of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Staryi Aidar (government-controlled, 20km north-west of Luhansk), north-north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), and north-east and north-north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 4 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. The same camera recorded 13 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 1-2km east and east-south-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 5 April, positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-8km north-north east and an explosion at an assessed range of 2-3km north-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. The SMM again saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and a red-and-black flag near a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the disengagement area. [3]

During the day on 5 April, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violations of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled-areas

4 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) near Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk);

• three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk); and
• a probable tank (T-64) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

5 April

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Roty (66km north-east of Donetsk); and
• a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Kostiantynivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

4 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three tanks (one T-72 and two probable T-72) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and
• two tanks (type undetermined) near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 14 tanks (T-72) near Fedorivka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled

4 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a tank (T-72) on a transport trailer in Kostiantynivka and
• 22 tanks (T-72) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

5 April

The SMM noted that four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

5 April

The SMM noted that five tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M20-15 Molot, 120mm) were missing for the first time.

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

5 April

The SMM noted that eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing, including six for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Non-government-controlled areas

4 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• at least four covered armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type unidentified), four IFVs (BMP-2) and three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (two MT-LB and one BTR-80) near Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) about 400m south-east of the Zolote disengagement area near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) within 300m of each other, parked about 15-20m from the nearest residential houses near Petrivske.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• six probable ACVs (type undetermined) near Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk);
• 22 IFVs (one BMP-1 and 21 BMP variants) and an APC (MT-LB) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk);
• seven IFVs (BMP variants) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• four ACVs near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• three ACVs near Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Holmivskyi (49km north-east of Donetsk).

5 April

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (60km west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled areas

4 April             

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), six IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four ACVs (type undetermined) and an APC (BTR-70) near Ozarianivka (52km north of Donetsk);
• seven armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Leonidivka (41km north of Donetsk); and
• an ACV near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk).

5 April

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP variant) under camouflage in Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy machine-gun and an APC (BTR-60) near residential houses occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk); and
• three IFVs (BMP-1) in Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM saw an unidentified mini-UAV flying at a height of around 100m above the Mission’s position approximately 2km north-west of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Fresh craters spotted near Kalynove-Borshchuvate

On 4 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted eight impact craters (not seen in imagery from 30 March) assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds in a forested area near Kalynove-Borshchuvate. For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 1 April 2019.)

Presence of mines in Marinka

On 29 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time ten anti-tank mines (type unidentified) laid across a road in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), as well as an additional eight mines laid out along the same road, about 1.3km south-west of the previously-mentioned mines. The UAV also spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines which appear to be part of an extension of previously-observed mines, as well as an additional 85 anti-tank mines about 150m of the abovementioned five anti-tank mines.

The same UAV again spotted 18 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62M) laid out in two rows across a road on the northern edge of Marinka, as well as an additional four anti-tank mines laid out along the same road, about 210m north-east of the previously-mentioned mines. The UAV again spotted an additional 12 anti-tank mines laid out across a road perpendicular to the aforementioned one, 40-50m from the nearest residential houses. For the first time, the UAV spotted eight anti-tank mines (type unidentified) laid across a road about 800m north-east from the nearest residential area at the northern edge of Marinka.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining activities

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power transmission lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities conducted by five members of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU) at a residential house in Stanytsia Luhanska. The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see  SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he was not aware of any demining activities having taken place in the past 24 hours.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations initially denied the SMM passage to Starolaspa. After 20 minutes, the SMM was allowed to proceed to Starolaspa but not to Novolaspa (see above).

Other Impediments:

• On 4 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas north of Donetsk region.[6]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometers of the UAV’s position.

BRATISLAVA, 5 April 2019 - At today’s High-Level Meeting on the Reform of the Scales of Contributions organized by the Slovak Chairmanship in Bratislava, OSCE participating States discussed the need and common will to find a long-term and sustainable solution to the pressing issue of financial contributions to the OSCE. 

Resolving issues related to the governance and the sound management of the OSCE is of utmost importance for participating States, in order to focus on the urgent security related issues in the OSCE area. 

Participating States confirmed their ownership of and shared responsibility for the OSCE through active engagement in the discussions on ensuring a stable financial footing of the Organization. They reiterated their commitment to resolving outstanding issues as a matter of priority. 

“It is my understanding that participating States will work together constructively towards a consensual solution of the current funding crisis of the OSCE, which adversely affects the Organization’s activities. I also have the feeling that all participating States agreed on the urgent need of addressing and solving the issue,” concluded Slovak State Secretary and Special Representative for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship Lukás Parízek. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed damage from a mortar round to a house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a railway station in government-controlled Kostiantynivka and near non-government-controlled Korsun and Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including most of the explosions, were recorded at directions ranging from north-north-east to south-west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-west and south-west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas).

Damage from mortar round to residential house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 30 March, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted  a hole in the roof of a house, assessed as recent and caused by a mortar round, on Pervomaiska Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in this area, see SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 3-4 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and seven projectiles at an assessed range of 1-2km east and east-south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). On 4 April, positioned in five different locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 68 undetermined explosions, 24 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, as well as 18 shots of 30mm cannon fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 4 April, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violations of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled-areas

3 April

The SMM saw 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) stationary at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

4 April

The SMM saw:

• five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk), and
• two towed howitzers  (D-30) on road H-20 near Kostiantynivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

4April

The SMM saw 18 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled

4 April

The SMM saw:

• a towed howitzer (D-30) on a local road near Yelyzavetivka (43km north-west of Donetsk) and
• a towed mortar (2B16 Nona-K, 120mm­) near Kostiantynivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

31 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks (type undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) and 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). (Aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 78 armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) at the same training area, for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 29 March 2019.)

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

4 April

The SMM noted that four MLRSs (BM-21) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

1 April             

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2) close to houses in a residential area of Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 4 April 2019).

4 April

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60) near houses used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk); and
• three IFVs (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2 ) in Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

3 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• six IFVs (probable BMP variants) in Kozatske (36km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

4 April

The SMM saw an electronic counter measure system (RB-341V LEER-3) heading south-east on road T-0508 near Starobesheve (32km south-east of Donetsk).

Presence of mines and a mine hazard sign

On 1 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 50 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a field (from east to west for about 100m) about 2km east of Novotoshkivske.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time six anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a V shape across a road about 4km east of Novotoshkivske.

On 4 April, the SMM again saw six anti-tank mines (TM-62) (near previously observed mines) laid within 2m of the edge of road T-0504, about 180m south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna.

On 4 April, the SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign (with skull and cross bones and “Stop, Mines” written in Russian) on the western edge of road T-0513 approximately 4km north-east of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to power transmission lines near Novooleksandrivka (government-controlled, 65km west of Luhansk), Khoroshe (non-government-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk) and Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM observed a calm situation south of Kherson region

On 3 April, the SMM observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea. On 4 April, the SMM observed calm situations in areas along the Black Sea coast south of Kherson.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see  SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A minivan and four member of the armed formations blocked a road near Korsun (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), thus preventing the SMM from proceeding northward to Novoselivka (non-government-controlled, 37km north-east of Donetsk). One of them told the SMM that it could not proceed due to ongoing operational activities in the area.
•  An officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces denied access to the SMM at the train station in Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) citing “security procedures”. The SMM saw weapons in the area of the train station (see above).
• One armed member of the armed formations at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) prevented the SMM from continuing westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, two members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and requested to see the patrol plan which the Mission refused to show. On both occasions, they allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint after about 30 minutes.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

VIENNA / SARAJEVO, 5 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, and the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bruce G. Berton, expressed their concerns today regarding new amendments to the Law on Public Order and Peace in the Bosnia and Herzegovina entity of Republika Srpska (RS).

Amendments to the Law on Public Order and Peace adopted by the RS Government on 28 March, which would introduce the offence of unauthorized photographing or recording that impedes officials while carrying out their duties, envisaging fines of up to 1,500 BAM (some 767 euros) or imprisonment up to 60 days, may adversely affect freedom of expression and assembly, they warned. The RS National Assembly will be voting on the amendments on 16 April.

“Such provisions, if adopted, could severely endanger an already challenging environment for media professionals,” said Désir. “They run against international media freedom standards. Journalists must work in a safe working and legal environment, in order to report on issues of public interest, including street demonstrations, protests and the work of law enforcement authorities. I call on the RS National Assembly to refrain from adopting these amendments, and instead to engage in constructive discussions with the media community and other relevant stakeholders in finding a proper solution.”

Ambassador Berton said: “Given the limiting nature and severity of proposed sanctions in the draft amendment to the Law, a more extensive consultation process with relevant stakeholders, including the public, is necessary. Journalists must be able to cover events of public interest without fear. In addition, under international human rights standards, every person should enjoy the right to attend, observe and record a public peaceful assembly, which includes the right to record actions of law enforcement officers. The OSCE Mission to BiH stands ready to provide support to the relevant authorities on this matter.”

The Representative offered his Office’s legal assistance on this issue, stressing that he will be following the process closely.

VIENNA, 5 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed today’s court decision to convict the perpetrators responsible for killing one of the most prominent and critical journalists in Serbia, Slavko Ćuruvija.

The High Court in Belgrade sentenced former state security officials Radomir Marković and Milan Radonjić to 30 years in prison, and Ratko Romić and Miroslav Kurak to 20 years in prison for organizing and taking part in the murder of Ćuruvija, former owner of the newspaper Dnevni Telegrafand the weekly magazine Evropljanin, who was gunned down on 11 April 1999 in Belgrade.

“I welcome this first instance court decision against those who committed this heinous crime 20 years ago. Slavko Ćuruvija was a courageous journalist, not afraid to write about sensitive issues during very turbulent times in Serbia. He paid the highest price for his journalistic work and that is why it is of utmost importance that justice is served. This long-awaited ruling is significant, as it shows that there can be no impunity even for crimes committed 20 years ago,” Désir stated.

The Representative noted that his Office has been following the case closely for many years, stressing that impunity for crimes against journalists is unacceptable and constitutes a second crime against them. 

“This decision needs to be used as positive momentum, and I urge the Serbian authorities to finally shed light on other killings of prominent journalists, including Dada Vujasinovićin 1994 and Milan Pantić in 2001,” Désir said.

Désir recalled the Safety of Journalists Decision adopted at the Ministerial Council in Milan that calls on OSCE participating States to “take effective measures to end impunity for crimes committed against journalists, by ensuring accountability as a key element in preventing future attack…”.

The Ministerial Decision on Safety of Journalists is available at https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/406538

The Representative’s previous public statements on SlavkoĆuruvija’s case are available at https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/377563, https://www.osce.org/fom/232486,https://www.osce.org/fom/100637, https://www.osce.org/fom/110303

Marina Živaljević

Strengthening regional and Adriatic-Ionian cross co-operation among youth was the topic of a conference organized by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro with the Ministry of Sport and Youth in Budva, Montenegro on 4 and 5 April 2019. 

The conference was organized within the framework of Montenegro’s Presidency of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) and gathered participants from countries of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative as well as from regional youth organizations, including the Regional Co-operation Office (RYCO), the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO), the Western Balkan Fund and the European Youth Card Association (EYCA). The interactive nature of the conference encouraged participants to network, share good practices and discuss experiences and key challenges of regional cross co-operation.

In her opening remarks, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, emphasized that “the OSCE has recognized the importance of working with youth especially in contributing to peace and security”. She thanked the Slovakian OSCE Chairmanship for identifying youthengagement as a top priority for 2019.

Montenegro’s Minister of Sports and Youth, Nikola Janović,underlined his Government’s commitment to “strengtheningco-ordination mechanisms and creating better synergies with regional initiatives and organizations.” He stressed that theconference is an opportunity to highlight activities that promote the European Union’s strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian region and foster good neighbourly relations and co-operationwith the goal of enhancing opportunities for young people.

This conference was part of the overall assistance that the Mission provides in the area of enhancing youth participation through the better positioning and increased co-operation among youth in the region. This support includes assistance to the RYCO initiative and the Directorate for Youth in the Ministry of Sports and Youth.

Željka Šulc

Discussion on the implementation of strategic documents for the fight against corruption and the legal framework for protection of persons who report corruption in Republika Srpska, organized by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, was held on March 3 in Trebinje.

Some 20 representatives of local self-governance units and the civic sector from the region of Eastern Herzegovina attended the workshop.

The participants discussed the implementation of the Republika Srpska 2018-2022 Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan as well as the Law on Persons who Report Corruption at the local level.

The representative of the Republika Srpska Ministry of Justice provided a detailed explanation of the Law and its Action Plan to the participants, familiarizing them not only with these legal and strategic documents, but also with their obligations regarding their implementation.

The OSCE Mission to BiH plans to organize a similar event in December 2019 in order to assess the progress achieved in the implementation of the aforementioned documents.

VIENNA, 4 April 2019 - Improving our understanding of how technology is being misused to facilitate trafficking so that we can build better responses and exploring how technology can be adopted to help combat all form of trafficking, will be in focus at the 19th Alliance against Trafficking in Persons high-level conference, which will be held on 23 and 24 April in Vienna. 

Technology can be employed to deter the criminal operations of traffickers in the virtual space and disrupt the human trafficking marketplace by carrying out innovative, targeted and large-scale interventions. The Alliance Conference will raise awareness about such practices and participants will discuss how national legal and institutional frameworks could be adjusted to allow replicating these good practices on a wider scale. 

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) can also help victims by empowering them to report their exploitation, seek shelter and assistance, and engage in rehabilitation programs.

Opening and welcoming remarks will be made by Valiant Richey, Acting OSCE Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings; Rudolf Urbanovič, State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior of Slovakia, the National Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings; Melanie Thompson, Human Trafficking Survivor; Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Princess Eugenie of York and John Richmond, the United States Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons and the Director of the U.S. Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Person will deliver keynote addresses. The world's leading anti-trafficking experts will attend the Conference, as well as human trafficking survivors, NGOs and Tech companies’ representatives involved in the development of new technology tools tackling these crimes - including Microsoft, Nokia, Thorn, British Telecom -  who will display their new tools at the Conference.

During the Conference, four panel discussions and five side events will take place.

Representatives of the media who wish to attend and/or cover the meeting, should register by writing to press@osce.org by Sunday at 18:00 at the latest.

The conference will be streamed live at www.osce.org/live

Follow the conference and engage with leading anti-trafficking experts on Twitter via @osce_cthb using the hashtag #cthb19.

416429 Communication and Media Relations Section

A regional workshop on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, was organized by the Belarus’ Foreign Ministry on 3 and 4 April 2019 in Minsk for representatives of countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The workshop was organized in co-operation with the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts, and supported by the OSCE and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, with funding from the European Union.

The workshop gathered more than 60 participants from Armenia,  Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, together with representatives of the Belarusian industrial sector and experts from international and regional organizations, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the CIS Executive Committee, Interpol, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Implementation Support Unit for the Biological Weapons Convention.

Participants shared national best practices, assessed the progress made, identified further measures to enhance implementation of the Resolution, and discussed how to build capacities at the national and regional levels.

In his opening speech, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus, Oleg Kravchenko, said his country is pursuing a consistent and responsible policy in this field.  He said a comprehensive approach to implementing the Resolution implies close co-operation and co-ordination at the regional and global levels so to effectively counter the proliferation of materials and technologies that can be used to create weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Head of the Forum for Security Co-operation Support Section of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Robin Mossinkoff, said that the OSCE, as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, has been recognized by the international community for its efforts in assisting the CIS States in improving their implementation of Resolution 1540 in recent years.

On behalf of Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, Aaron Junhoung Yoo noted with appreciation the efforts of the States in implementing Resolution 1540 and related ongoing activities arising from the recommendations of the first workshop in Minsk in 2013. This led to the development and submission of additional national implementation action plans, and the trilateral peer-review between Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, he said. Co-operation between the three States accelerated their process of accession to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and enhanced efforts towards harmonizing their national control lists with relevant multilateral export control regimes.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines at a railway station in government-controlled Kostiantynivka.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted while driving on a road north of Dokuchaievsk, at a heavy weapons holding area and at a checkpoint near Zaichenko, all in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The highest number of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as in areas south, south-east and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). All ceasefire violations (seven projectiles) were assessed as near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas). 

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 2 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded seven projectiles in flight at an assessed distance of 2-4km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation. 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violations of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

3 April 

The SMM saw at least 23 self-propelled howitzers (13 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and 10 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on flatbeds at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk). 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

2 April

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) stationary on road M03 about 5km south-east of Minkivka (78km north of Donetsk) and
• three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) loaded on trucks heading east on road M03, about 4.5km north-east of Vesela Dolyna (64km north of Donetsk).

3 April 

The SMM saw: 

• 29 tanks (19 T-72 and ten T-64) loaded on flatbeds at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (see above) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Pryovrazhne (19km north-east of Mariupol). 

Non-government-controlled areas

On 31 March, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 12 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 28 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)(for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 March 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region[3]

3 April

The SMM noted that seven multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) remained missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

1 April

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).

3 April 

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) within a residential area of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk). 

Non-government-controlled areas

1 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five IFVs (two BMP-1, two BMP variants and one BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

2 April

The SMM saw seven IFVs (BMP variants) in Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk). 

Electronic counter measure systemin non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

On 2 April, the SMM saw an electronic counter measure system (RB-341V LEER-3) on a military truck (KamAZ-5350) near Konkove (non-government-controlled, 79km south of Donetsk), heading south on road T-0508 (in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014).  

Presence of mines and a mine hazard sign

On 1 April, about 3km east of Novotoshkivske, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 64 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across road T-1303 in four rows and the remainder north of the same road (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 June 2018). On 3 April, the SMM saw six anti-tank mines (possible TM-62) laid within 2m of the edge of road T-0504, about 180m south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), near previously observed mines (see SMM Daily Report 30 March 2019). 

On the eastern edge of Nova Marivka, the SMM again saw a fallen tree spanning more than half of the width of a road, with a white board with “Stop! Mines” written on it in Russian, assessed as an improvised mine hazard sign. 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• After the SMM refused to show its patrol plan, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM access at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), thus preventing the SMM from proceeding westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• An armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing “orders from his superiors”.
• A minivan and five nearby members of the armed formations blocked a road north of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), thus preventing the SMM from proceeding onwards. One of them told the SMM that it could not proceed due to “ongoing operational activities” in the area. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 1 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk) and Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).[5]
• On 3 April, staff at the Hospital no. 2 in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to share information related to civilian casualties, citing instructions from those in control.

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, Maiorsk and Chermalyk were partially operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]The SMM visited an area previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that such site continued to be abandoned. 

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons

[5]The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

VIENNA, 4 April 2019 – Despite the latest recommitment to cease fire, beginning on 8 March, the security situation in eastern Ukraine remains volatile, the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, said in his address to the OSCE Permanent Council today in Vienna.

Civilians are still paying a heavy price, Ambassador Apakan said in his briefing to representatives of the OSCE’s participating States and Partners for Co-operation, with mines and unexploded ordnance, combined with a fluctuating number of ceasefire violations, already claiming 20 civilian casualties this year.  In addition, he noted that 16 mostly elderly people crossing the contact line had died of natural causes since the start of winter, a stark reminder of the wider hardship they have been forced to endure for five years now. 

Calling for full adherence to the ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons, Ambassador Apakan added that recent lives lost had underlined also the urgent need for humanitarian mine action. In line with the Chairmanship’s priorities, he said the SMM would continue to focus on people, especially the most vulnerable. He highlighted the need to repair the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska, saying “such essential humanitarian measures should be expedited.”

415973 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A five-day OSCE regional course, Introduction to Humanitarian Mine Action Systems, started on 1 April 2019 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. 

The course, jointly organized by Kazakhstan’s Defence Ministry, the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan and the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, gathered 31 military and civilian experts from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 

The event provides a platform to enhance awareness of and skills for the safe, effective and efficient establishment of Humanitarian Mine Action Systems. The theoretical part of the training is delivered at Kazakhstan’s Partnership for Peace Training Centre (KAZCENT) in Almaty, while practical exercises are conducted at the Demining Centre of Kazakhstan’s Defence Ministry in Kapshagay on 4 April 2019.

During the event experts from the United States Army Central, the United States Air Forces Central Command, KAZCENT, the Demining Centre of Kazakhstan’s Defence Ministry, the Croatian Mine Action Centre, the Norwegian People’s Aid Tajikistan, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine and the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe are sharing experiences and best practices.

The course is part of the OSCE’s long-term support for the development of a co-operation mechanism among states in Central Asia to address concerns and challenges stemming from the disposal of explosive hazards.

416309 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported roundtable discussion on environmental problems in the Atyrau Region including the recent death of numerous tonnes of fish in the Ural River concluded on 3 April 2019 in Atyrau, Kazakhstan.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in partnership with the Association of Environmental Organizations.

Some 50 representatives from the local administration, regional water authorities, business community, and non-governmental environmental organizations participated in the event. The participants discussed possible causes of the fish death and preventive mechanisms to avoid similar environmental accidents in the country. National experts from the Association of Environmental Organizations presented the recent water samples analysis based on the private laboratory results to identify possible contaminants in the Ural river. Authorities are currently investigating possible causes of the incident.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s long-term efforts to promote the green economy and sustainable development principles to strengthen environmental security.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

KYIV, 4 April 2019 – On the occasion of International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, observed to raise awareness about mines and progress towards their eradication, the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Ertugrul Apakan, and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, Henrik Villadsen, highlighted the importance of mine action in the conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine. 

“Agreement to remove mines and stop the laying of new ones was reached in Minsk years ago,” said Apakan. “Yet, mines continue to take and disrupt the lives of Ukrainians on both sides of the contact line, leaving no doubt that more humanitarian de-mining is immediately required. The SMM is facilitating de-mining efforts, particularly in areas around schools, hospitals, residential housing and entry-exit checkpoints, in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and stands ready to continue its support in the future.”

Mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) pose an imminent threat to the civilian population in eastern Ukraine. In the past 12 months, the SMM confirmed that at least 70 people had lost their lives or sustained injuries as a result of explosions of mines and UXO. Eighteen of them were children. In addition to civilian casualties, mines and UXO also impede basic socio-economic activities, restrict movement, hinder recovery and development, and separate people.

“Reducing risks posed by mines and UXO requires the consolidated efforts of all partners – State and non-governmental agencies, and local and international organizations. In support of these efforts, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator helps develop supporting legislation and regulations; together with Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, supports the roll-out of IMSMA, a digital system for mine action planning; and provides equipment and training to national authorities,” Villadsen said.

 

416027 Communication and Media Relations Section

The OSCE Mobile Training Team delivered an interactive training course on the identification of foreign terrorist fighters at the borders for 27 first- and second-line border officers and instructors of Kyrgyzstan’s border institutions from 2 to 4 April 2019 in Bishkek.

This training course is the tenth deployment of the Mobile Training Team, organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department. The course was supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and conducted in close co-operation with the State Border Service of Kyrgyzstan.

The participants learnt about the international, regional and national legal frameworks, the effective use of Interpol databases, Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record Systems, travel document security as well as risk analysis and management practices in the identification of potential foreign terrorist fighters at borders in compliance with international human rights standards.

“This training course stressed the importance of both operational and legislative measures aimed at effectively addressing the cross-border movement of foreign terrorist fighters and other criminal groups,” said Almaz Maksutov, Deputy Head of Regional Directorate of the Border Services of Kyrgyzstan. “To implement these measures Kyrgyzstan introduced a number of amendments to its Criminal and Criminal-Procedural Codes which came into force this year.”

As well as covering the background, trends and current cases related to the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, participants also engaged in interactive exercises on the detection of forged documents and imposters, and on understanding the behavioural indicators of foreign terrorist fighters.

The Mobile Training Team was represented by national border officers from Georgia, Romania and Ukraine, together with international experts from Interpol and the OSCE, who shared their knowledge and expertise.

The OSCE Mobile Training Team was established by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in 2016. It is composed of 17 selected border and counter-terrorism experts from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation.

416279 Communication and Media Relations Section

Strengthening sustainable development in the Dniester basin was the focus of the OSCE-supported second meeting of the Transboundary Dniester Commission held on 4 April 2019 in Kyiv, Ukraine.

The meeting brought together high-level representatives from Moldova and Ukraine, along with officials of different agencies and representatives of other international projects, civil society and academia from both countries. The Commission is supported by the Global Environment Facility and by the OSCE in partnership with UNDP and UNECE. 

“Regular meetings of the Commission are of great importance for dialogue in order to catalyze win-win solutions essential to the sustainable development and stability of the region and for people of both states,” saidOSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine Henrik Villadsen. 

Representatives of the OSCE’s project team presented a transboundary diagnostic analysis of the Dniester and its basin and planned project activities in 2019. 

The aim of the transboundary project is to further support Moldova and Ukraine in implementing the bilateral Dniester Treaty and in enhancing the water sector on both sides of the border. Current co-operation efforts, supported by the project, include an integrated analysis of the state of the river and improving approaches to mutually beneficial use of water resources of the whole Dniester basin.

The Co-chairs of the Dniester Commission, Valentyna Tapis and Mykola Kuzio, high-level representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, Regional Development and Environment of Moldova and of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine, presented interim results of joint work accomplished under the aegis of the recently established Dniester Commission and noted contributions of other international technical assistance projects relevant in the context of the Dniester basin. 

Representatives of Moldova and Ukraine discussed draft rules for the operation of hydropower reservoirs and opportunities for addressing current challenges from the national perspectives. Members of the Dniester Commission agreed on modalities of marking International Dniester Day on 26 May 2019 in Chisinau, Moldova. 

Supporting the Dniester Commission as a tool for achieving the sustainable development and protection of the Dniester River basinis one of the most important project objectives. The Commission will provide an opportunity to fulfill the obligations undertaken by Moldova and Ukraine under the  UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1992) and the EU Water Framework Directive(2000).

This Global Environment Facility funded project is implemented by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities in close co-operation with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, the OSCE Mission to Moldova and in partnership with UNDP and UNECE.

For more details, please visit https://dniester-commission.com/en/joint-management/dniester-commission/.

Communication and Media Relations Section

The Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department as part of a country visit aimed at facilitating Bosnia and Herzegovina’s participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Public Key Directory (ICAO PKD)held meetings with the country’s Ministry of Security, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Border Police and the Agency for Identification Documents, Registers and Data Exchange (IDDEEA) from 2 to 3 April 2019 in Sarajevo.  

During the meetings, Simon Deignan, Manager of the Travel Document Security Programme of the Border Security and Management Unit, emphasized the benefits of joining ICAO PKD from the perspectives of passport issuers, border control agencies and passengers.  He said the ICAO PKD is a secure and cost-effective central repository for exchanging the public keys of ePassports and allowing for their fast and safe authentication at the borders. He also highlighted the regional approach of the PKD initiative and that improving the border security of Bosnia and Herzegovina will support the country’s efforts to join the European Union. 

During the meeting with IDDEEA, Jeen de Swart, Senior Information Architect from the Ministry of Justice of Netherlands discussed step-by-step guidelines on the technical and administrative requirements for joining the PKD.  The OSCE’s support during the entire process was discussed as well. 

The OSCE’s facilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s participation in the ICAO PKD was welcomed by government representatives, the main contact points for PKD implementation were identified and future steps were discussed. 

This was the fifth country visit on ICAO PKD to the Western Balkans as a follow-up activity to the first OSCE Regional Workshop for South-Eastern Europe on the Directory, which was organized in Montenegro, in November last year. 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 3 April 2019 – Discussing the main priorities of the 2019 Slovak OSCE Chairmanship and current developments across the OSCE at his congressional U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (“Helsinki Commission”) hearing, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák called on members of the Helsinki Commission to work together for a more stable and prosperous OSCE area – and one in which every person enjoys security and individual rights.

“We believe in multilateralism - this fundamental problem-solving and war-preventing tool in international relations; the raison d´être of the OSCE,” Lajčák stressed in his address. “We believe in nations coming together, building foundations of trust and working together to advance security and prosperity. We believe in the story of Helsinki,” he continued, as “this story ties together 57 states spanning three continents, helping to make security, human rights and the rule of law a reality for over a billion people.”

“The OSCE and the Helsinki Commission engaged on Slovakia’s road to democracy from the beginning. And today, we ourselves actively pass on our experience and expertise regarding democratic transitions,” he said.

The Chairperson-in-Office urged the Helsinki Commissioners to unlock the potential and rediscover the added value of the OSCE for the people it was created to serve, which includes local know-how, a vast presence on the ground, and outstanding, targeted expertise, including through its three independent institutions that deal with human rights, national minorities, and media freedom.

“We believe the OSCE is equipped with many of the tools we need to overcome the challenges of today and tomorrow. And we are dedicating our Chairmanship to adapting, updating and making better use of them,” Lajčák underlined.

Emphasizing the crucial role of the Helsinki Commission, Lajčák pointed out: “You keep us alert to emerging challenges – from cyber-terrorism, the use of technology in organized crime and human trafficking, to the safety of journalists and shrinking space for critical voices from civil society.”

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office concluded his hearing with a call for more dialogue and better co-operation. He also commended the Commissioners for their active role in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, saying that their participation brings the hopes, ideas and concerns of the people they represent to the Organization.

While in Washington, D.C., Lajčák attended the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) Ministerial Forum and a NATO Ministerial meeting on NATO at 70: Commemorating the Past. Preparing for the Future.

He also met with U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton; Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan; U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker; and Chairman of the Helsinki Commission Alcee Hastings.