OSCE

Bratislava/Copenhagen/Vienna, 13 May 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák,  OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA)  George Tsereteli  and OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella today strongly condemned the use of violence by this weekend‘s protesters in Albania’s capital Tirana, as well as the threats and attempted intimidation directed at the Head of the OSCE’s Presence in Albania and at the Organization in general. They also called on law enforcement officials to show restraint.

The Chairperson-in-Office, the President of the OSCE PA and the OSCE Secretary General stressed that the right to peacefully assemble and protest is a fundamental prerequisite of a democratic state. But strong domestic institutions - including, crucially, an effective parliament -, are cornerstones of democracy and essential for political stability and rule of law. Violence and the intimidation of international organizations’ officials are unacceptable. 

They thanked the Albanian authorities for swiftly protecting the residence of the OSCE Head of Presence and encouraged all sides to show moderation during today’s protests.  “Riots are not a substitute for democratic political engagement. They cut off any chance of dialogue - and therefore any chance of finding common ground. We call on all political leaders and on the citizens of Albania to show responsibility, demonstrate peacefully, and act with restraint.  The OSCE will continue to support the democratic process in Albania”.

“A protraction of the crisis would inevitably hamper Albania’s domestic and foreign strategic priorities. Time has come to devise a domestic platform for dialogue which includes all relevant stakeholders, including all parties, civil society and academia, to overcome differences and work together in Albania's best interest".

Bratislava/Copenhagen/Vienna, 13 May 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák,  OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA)  George Tsereteli  and OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella today strongly condemned the use of violence by this weekend‘s protesters in Albania’s capital Tirana, as well as the threats and attempted intimidation directed at the Head of the OSCE’s Presence in Albania and at the Organization in general. They also called on law enforcement officials to show restraint.

The Chairperson-in-Office, the President of the OSCE PA and the OSCE Secretary General stressed that the right to peacefully assemble and protest is a fundamental prerequisite of a democratic state. But strong domestic institutions - including, crucially, an effective parliament -, are cornerstones of democracy and essential for political stability and rule of law. Violence and the intimidation of international organizations’ officials are unacceptable. 

They thanked the Albanian authorities for swiftly protecting the residence of the OSCE Head of Presence and encouraged all sides to show moderation during today’s protests.  “Riots are not a substitute for democratic political engagement. They cut off any chance of dialogue - and therefore any chance of finding common ground. We call on all political leaders and on the citizens of Albania to show responsibility, demonstrate peacefully, and act with restraint.  The OSCE will continue to support the democratic process in Albania”.

“A protraction of the crisis would inevitably hamper Albania’s domestic and foreign strategic priorities. Time has come to devise a domestic platform for dialogue which includes all relevant stakeholders, including all parties, civil society and academia, to overcome differences and work together in Albania's best interest".

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 10 and 11 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 11 and 12 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and damage to houses caused by gunfire in residential areas of Dokuchaievsk, Pikuzy and Kalynove.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities and repairs to critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas near Oleksandrivske, Zaichenko and Novoazovsk, as well as near Voznesenivka, at a border crossing point close to the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Kyiv and Kharkiv, the SMM monitored gatherings of mothers of deceased and missing soldiers.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 200), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-west, west and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 11 and 12 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 190), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east, south and south-south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), and in areas south and south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), including about 140 explosions assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 2-4km south of the DFS.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 725 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 11 and 12 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), including over 260 explosions of artillery rounds, and in areas north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters and damage to houses caused by gunfire in residential areas of Dokuchaievsk, Pikuzy and Kalynove

On 11 May, in the western outskirts of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) at 7 Telmana Street, the SMM saw a hole in the west-facing side of the roof of a one-storey house and, beneath the roof, another corresponding hole in the west-facing outer wall of the same house. The SMM assessed the impacts as fresh and caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a north-westerly direction. A resident (a man, aged 40-50) of the house told the SMM that he had been inside the house when shelling had occurred in the area at around 18:15 on 9 May.

On 11 May, at 43 Akhmatovoi Street, on the north-eastern edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to the west-facing outer wall, consisting of innumerable holes, and to a west-facing metal door of a one-storey house, as well as a shattered west-facing window. It also saw that the edge of the west-facing side of the roof of the same house had been destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by the explosion of rounds of a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fired from a westerly direction. A resident of the house (a woman, aged 70-80) told the SMM that she had been inside the house with her sister when she had heard explosions in the area at around 17:00 on 7 May.

On 11 May, in the eastern outskirts of Kalynove, the SMM saw four fresh craters along a 50m-long section of a road running parallel to the north-north-eastern edge of a cemetery. The SMM saw an additional fresh crater about 50m south-west, inside the grounds of the cemetery, and saw that two gravestones next to the crater had sustained shrapnel damage. The SMM assessed all the aforementioned damage as fresh and caused by rounds of weapons with a calibre of at least 120mm (it could not assess the direction of fire).

About 100m east of the cemetery, the SMM saw that the panes of two west-facing windows of a barn located 25m from a one-storey house at 3 Klubna Street were missing and covered with plastic sheets, and that glass shards were scattered on the ground beneath them. A resident of the house (a woman aged 50-60) told the SMM that she had been inside her apartment when shelling had occurred in the area on the morning of 10 May.

At 4 Klubna Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-facing metal fence 1m north of a one-storey house. At 5 Klubna Street, it saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-facing slate fence about 1m north of a one-storey house, as well as four shattered panes in two windows (two north-facing panes and two west-facing panes). At 6 Klubna Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a south-facing metal gate about 3m south of a one-storey house.

About 100m north-north-east of the latter house, the SMM saw a fresh crater on the side of a road and, about 20m south-east, another fresh crater in a field, as well as shrapnel damage to trees near it. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by rounds of weapons with a calibre of at least 120mm (it could not assess the direction of fire). About 90m east of the craters, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a west-facing metal fence about 1m west of a one-storey house at 2 Kuibysheva Street. At 8 Kuibysheva Street, the SMM saw the shattered pane of a south-facing window and glass shards scattered on the ground beneath it.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 11 May, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 40 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west; it could not assess if they were inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). During the evening of 11 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight and a muzzle flash at an assessed range of 2-5km east-south-east and south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). The same camera also recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery).

During the day on 12 May, positioned on the southern edge of Zolote, the SMM recorded ten undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). The same day, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and 12 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-4km north, north-north-east and north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery).

On 11 and 12 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 May

The SMM saw:

• a stationary surface-to-air missile system (9K33, Osa) in Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk) and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) heading south-west on road M03, about 5km east of Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

12 May

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) about 3km south-south-east of Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) about 1km south-west of Vedenske (90km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and that 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM-mini UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) within a residential area of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

10, 11 and 12 May

The SMM saw an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and five IFVs (two BMP-1 and three BMP variants) in a compound on the eastern outskirts of Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a 50m-long trench network system in a field about 3km north-north-west of Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 5 April 2018).

11 May

The SMM saw:

• a military-type truck (Ural) with a mast-mounted cellular phone jamming system atop on the south-western outskirts of Horlivka (simultaneously, the SMM lost its connection to the Vodafone telecommunication network for about two hours, until it reached a different location about 2km east) and
• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Presence of unexploded ordnance

On 12 May, accompanied by an armed member of the armed formations, the SMM saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a 120mm mortar round, embedded in the asphalt in the middle of the carriageway of road T0519 close to Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), about 200m north of the nearest houses.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, as well as to enable demining activities by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in fields near Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 11 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour and 20 minutes, the SMM saw 59 cars (six with Ukrainian and 35 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 18 with “DPR” plates), 27 covered cargo trucks (23 with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and 11 pedestrians (mixed ages and gender) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw 16 cars (eight with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates and about 50 passengers on board entering Ukraine.

On 12 May, while at the same border crossing point for about one hour and ten minutes, the SMM saw 78 cars (14 with Ukrainian and 39 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 25 with “DPR” plates) and 30 covered cargo trucks (21 with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as eight with “DPR” plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw eight cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), a bus with “DPR” plates and about 50 passengers on board and seven pedestrians (mixed age and gender) entering Ukraine.

On 11 May, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw three pedestrians (a man and a woman aged 20-30 with a child) entering Ukraine and one pedestrian (a woman aged 50-60) exiting Ukraine. On 12 May, while at the same border crossing point for about 40 minutes, the SMM did not observe any cross-border traffic.

On 12 May, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven cars (four with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates and two additional cars whose licence plates were not visible) and four pedestrians (a woman aged 30-40 and three men aged 16-20) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (four with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Polish licence plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates, and 57 pedestrians (mixed age and gender) exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

SMM monitored gatherings of mothers of deceased and missing soldiers

On the occasion of annual commemorative events organized by the mothers of deceased and missing Ukrainian soldiers, coinciding with International Mother’s Day, the SMM monitored gatherings of about 250 people (mostly women aged 50-70) in Kharkiv on 11 May and about 300 people (mostly women aged 50-80) in Kyiv on 12 May.   

Resumption of long-range UAV flights

On 11 May, the SMM resumed its long-range UAV flights, which had not been conducted since 19 April, after an SMM long-range UAV crashed in an area near the contact line in Donetsk region (see SMM Spot Report of 19 April 2019).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 12 May, at a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors”.
• On 12 May, on two occasions at a checkpoint on road E58 in the northern outskirts of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol) and southward to Novoazovsk, citing “orders from their superiors”.  
• On 12 May, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint near Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), citing “orders from superiors”.
• On 12 May, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that “it had seen enough” and asked it to leave the area immediately.
• On 12 May, a member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka (see above).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delayed:

• On 12 May at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 18 minutes of waiting.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

CHISINAU, 13 May 2019 – The Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, today welcomed the decision of the Transdniestrian leadership to retract decree No.18 related to the village of Varnita.

“I welcome this decision, which will allow the Sides to maintain the trust and confidence built over the past years in the settlement process. The Varnita case should be made an example of good co-operation and freedom of movement for the benefit of the population,” Neukirch said. “A constructive discussion on various issues related to the treatment of inhabitants in this Chisinau-controlled village who have strong links to Transdniestria would be highly beneficial for the advancement of the settlement process.”

He underlined that the OSCE’s 57 participating States, at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Milan last December, had once again confirmed their commitment to a comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders with a special status for Transdniestria that fully guarantees the human, political, economic and social rights of its population.

“It is of paramount importance for the Sides to stay on the course of pragmatic solutions and constructive interaction as has been recently demonstrated also by the Moldovan Side in the case of Moldova Steel Works in Transdniestria (MMZ),” Neukirch added.

419399 Communication and Media Relations Section

The Netherlands chaired its first meeting of the OSCE Structured Dialogue with representatives of capitals on 6 and 7 May 2019, bringing together political and military representatives from across the OSCE region to Vienna for a combined session of the Informal Working Group (IWG) of the Structured Dialogue in Capital Format and an Expert-Level Workshop. The discussions were chaired by Ambassador Jeroen Boender, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the OSCE.

In his opening statement, Boender underlined the importance of the Structured Dialogue in the current security situation. “The Structured Dialogue is what we, as participating States, put into the process collectively,” he emphasized, adding he hoped that OSCE participating States would genuinely listen to each other’s perceptions, to hear what the other sides are saying and clearly articulate their own views.

Ambassador Radomir Boháč, the Chairperson of the Permanent Council under Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, said that the Structured Dialogue is a “long-term endeavour without predetermined outcomes.”

On the first day, keynote speakers Tom Middendorp, former Chief of Defence from the Netherlands, Mikaël Griffon, Head of Department for Arms Control and OSCE in the French Foreign Ministry, and Zohir Saidzoda, Deputy Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, focused on transparency, risk reduction and incident prevention, as well as on countering terrorism.

The second day of the meeting took place in the format of the Fourth Expert-Level Workshop. Keynote speakers Anna Tyszkiewicz, Deputy Director of the Department of Security Policy in the Polish Foreign Ministry, Colonel Bryan Haderlie from the United States of America, Vice-Admiral (ret.) Alexey Mezenin from Russia, and General Peter Braunstein from Germany kicked off discussions on the topics: Addressing implementation, or how to make best use of existing instruments; Enhancing predictability and confidence for certain military activities; Preventing and managing incidents; and, finally, Early warning and creating a less risk-prone environment: managing military activities that could cause incidents – “best practices”.

Following the meetings, Boender concluded that although there are divergent narratives, there are also possibilities for practical small steps to enhance confidence and trust. “Many felt that voluntary measures provide a strong utility for transparency, although they cannot replace mandatory measures and full implementation of the existing framework,” he said.

The OSCE Structured Dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security was initiated by OSCE foreign ministers in their Declaration on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the OSCE Arms Control Framework at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Hamburg in December 2016. Addressing these challenges, the participating States aim to strengthen dialogue on how to overcome existing divergences, find common ground and reverse the negative trends in the European security architecture. The OSCE Structured Dialogue complements the ongoing work of the OSCE on wider issues of co-operation in the politico-military field. 

The next combined session of the IWG is to be held in September and will build upon the outcomes of these discussions. The Netherlands has been appointed IWG chair by the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship. Previous IWG chairmanships were held by Germany (2017) and Belgium (2018).

DUSHANBE, 13 May 2019 – Ambassador Valeriu Chiveri of the Republic of Moldova assumed his duties today as the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

“I will invest all my efforts into ensuring that the Office’s work can positively contribute to the lives of Tajik citizens throughout the country,” said Chiveri. “The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe is one of the Organization’s largest field operations. It supports Tajikistan in improving border security, eradicating the threat from landmines and explosive hazards, raising economic prosperity and promoting respect for human rights. There is a lot the OSCE can offer to the country, and I look forward to working with the government and civil society representatives to maximise the impact of our assistance.”

Ambassador Chiveri has over 24 years of diplomatic experience. Previously he served as Moldova’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration as well as Ambassador to Austria. He also has a long association with the OSCE, having served as his country’s Permanent Representative to the Organization, as well as in field postings to Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Ambassador Chiveri holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the National School of Political and Administrative Studies in Romania. He is fluent in Romanian, English and Russian. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

• The Mission saw fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw the body of a deceased man at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure as well as to enable demining in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed events commemorating Victory Day in Odessa, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Uzhhorod.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Shevchenko, as well as at a checkpoint near Siedove, close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 450 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 725 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). About 90 per cent of them, including about 630 explosions of outgoing artillery and mortar rounds as well as impacts of artillery rounds, were recorded in areas east, south and south-west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and areas west and west-south-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

 

Fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 8 May, at 4 Myru Street, on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed damage to a functioning school building. It saw two partially shattered first-floor windows in two of the building’s north-north-east-facing walls, one of which also had a hole in the remaining glass; one first-floor north-north-east-facing window with a hole in the glass; two first-floor west-north-west-facing windows with holes in the glass; and a second-floor west-north-west-facing window with a hole in the glass as well as a hole in the wall plaster inside of the window pane. All of the damage was assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel or small-arms fire. A school representative (woman in her forties) told the Mission that the damage had been discovered on the morning of 8 May and that no one had been present at the school at the time. The same school has sustained damage nine times since December 2018 (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 17 April 2019).

Fresh crater in Troitske

On 9 May, the SMM saw a crater on the south-eastern side of Lermontova Street in Troitske, about 160m south-east of a recently damaged school building on Kvitkova Street (see SMM Daily Report 10 May 2019). The Mission assessed the crater as recent and probably caused by an 82mm round fired from a south-easterly direction. The director of the school and a resident of Troitske (a woman in her fifties) separately told the SMM that there had been shelling in the area on the morning of 6 May. The director added that there had been classes at the school at the time when shelling had occurred.

Man died at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka

On 10 May at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw the body of a deceased man covered with a blanket. Earlier that day, at the same place the Mission had seen paramedics attending to a man (in his sixties) lying on the ground. An officer of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service told the SMM that the man had fallen unconscious soon after he had stepped of out the car in which he and his wife had been travelling to non-government-controlled areas.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 9 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km south, two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east, an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km east and two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3] 

 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted eight multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Nykanorivka (86km north of Donetsk).  

10 May

The SMM saw four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152 mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

The SMM saw:

• four tanks (T-72) on flatbed trailers heading west in Luhansk city and
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

The SMM saw four tanks (T-72) south of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that:

• eight towed howitzers (2A65, Msta-B, 152 mm) and 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and
• 69 towed howitzers (2A65) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that 24 tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) remained missing.

At a permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that eight tanks (T-72), four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) remained missing.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

On 10 May, the SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

9 May

The SMM saw:

• five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and two BMP variants), an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB S) in Popasna;
• an IFV (BMP variant) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP variant) in Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

10 May

The SMM saw four trucks assessed as electronic warfare systems (R-330U or R-330T) south-west of Pyshchevyk.

Non-government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (probable BMP) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time three trenches, each 3m long, (not seen in imagery from 5 March 2019) west of road M03 about 4km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

9 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a concrete bunker under construction in a field about 4.5km south of Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) and a recently improved trench system (about 100m long) about 1km east of the bunker. The UAV also spotted five recently dug 5m-long trenches in a field about 1.5km north-east of Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

10 May

The SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) in Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk).

UAV seen flying in the security zone

The SMM saw an unidentified UAV (assessed as a fixed-wing type) flying in a north-westerly direction at an altitude of about 200-300m about 2km south of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol). 

Mine hazard signs

The Mission saw for the first time two mine hazard signs (red squares with “ Stop Mines” written in Russian) about 500m west-north-west of the intersection of roads T1315 and T1303, about 3km north of Stepove (non-government-controlled, 27km west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to facilitate demining activities by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in fields near Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

Celebrations marking Victory Day

On 9 May, the SMM monitored two gatherings commemorating Victory Day at the Alley of Glory and at the Unknown Sailor Monument in Odessa. The Mission saw several hundred people (mixed genders and ages), among them about 25 people displaying the insignia of the Right Sector and Street Front, and about 40 law enforcement officers. It observed some verbal exchanges between the participants and minor scuffles between a few participants and police officers. The SMM also monitored peaceful gatherings commemorating Victory Day in Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Uzhhorod which were attended by 200-1,000 people (mixed genders and ages) (for observations from other cities, see SMM Daily Report 10 May 2019).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 10 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage after it refused to show its patrol plan.
• At a checkpoint in Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint near Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, six armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing exercises in the area.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the JCCC told the SMM by phone that there was no information on demining activities in the area. The SMM did not consider safe to proceed.

Delayed:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, about an hour after the SMM was denied passage (see above), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 30 minutes of waiting.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

CHISINAU, 11 May 2019 – Concluding his meetings today, the OSCE Special Representative for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, Franco Frattini, urged the Sides to step up efforts to maintain the positive dynamic in the settlement process for the benefit of people on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River.

“Chisinau and Tiraspol were very successful in their step-by-step approach over the past two years. Today I have encouraged both Sides to continue this path in the spirit of dialogue and mutual co-operation regardless of internal political processes. The settlement process is an expectation of people on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River and deserves all the resources to keep it on track at all levels,” said Frattini.

During the first trip to the Republic of Moldova in 2019 as the Special Representative of the Slovak Chairmanship, Frattini met with the Co-ordinator of the Moldovan Governing Coalition Vlad Plahotniuc and chief negotiator Cristina Lesnic; the Transdniestrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky and chief negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev.

In his discussions, Frattini hailed the Sides for their leadership and dedication to achieving a significant breakthrough in the settlement process over the past years. In 2017 and 2018, the two Sides conducted over 100 expert working group meetings, where they found practical solutions for issues that had not been addressed in decades. These solutions have improved the day-to-day life of students, teachers, farmers and entrepreneurs on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River, he said.

“I have been reassured by the Sides that they will  maintain the rigorous pace of negotiations and intensify their efforts at the level of expert working groups and chief negotiators to close the outstanding priorities from the ‘Berlin-plus package’ and beyond. It is important not to lose the momentum”, Frattini noted.

“The settlement process is high on the agenda of the OSCE Slovak Chairmanship, which in co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Moldova will continue supporting the Sides in achieving a sustainable and peaceful settlement based on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova with a special status for Transdniestria,” he added.  

Since 2016, Chisinau and Tiraspol have signed agreements on six out of the eight priority issues included in the so-called “Berlin-plus package”. To date, the two Sides have reached major achievements on five of the signed agreements, including on apostilization of educational documents issued in Transdniestria, the functioning of the Latin-script schools, the use of farmlands in Dubasari district, the opening of the Gura Bicului – Bychok bridge and on the mechanism for the participation of vehicles from Transdniestria in international road traffic.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• It recorded ceasefire violations and military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including some used as part of military-style parades in Donetsk and Luhansk cities.  
• It observed fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Troitske and residential property in Zolote-4/Rodina.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka, in the area of which it recorded about 125 explosions.
• The Mission observed events in several regions of Ukraine commemorating Victory Day and Remembrance and Reconciliation Day.
• It observed military-style parades in non-government-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk cities.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske and a border crossing point near Dovzhanske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 450 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 115 explosions). More than three fifths of ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including about 125 explosions near the Pumping Station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period  (about 135 explosions). Over four fifths of ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Troitske and to residential property in Zolote-4/Rodina

On 8 May, on the northern edge of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) at a functioning school on Kvitkova Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in a second-floor south-facing window of a school building, assessed as caused by small-arms fire. The SMM also saw a fresh crater in a field, approximately 120m south-east of the school, along with nearby footprints and signs of digging, but was unable to assess the type of weapon or direction of fire. A local resident (male, 30 years old) told the SMM that he had been present in the area when he had heard shelling on the morning of 6 May.

On the same day, at 52 1-a Vilna Street on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a crater assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round (unable to determine the direction of fire) on the side of a road about 5-7m west of the front gate of an uninhabited house. The SMM also saw the tailfin of an 82mm mortar round embedded in the ground about 4-6m east of the crater. About 5m west of the previously mentioned house, at 53 1-a Vilna Street, the SMM saw fresh holes in and scratches on the roof of a one-storey summer kitchen located 1m east of the main house. The SMM also saw over 50 holes in the east-facing gate of the house, in two north-facing doors and in two north-facing window frames, all assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel. A resident (male, 40 years old) told the SMM that he had been at home when he had heard an explosion in the yard on the evening of 7 May.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) on 9 May, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 800m-1km north-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On 8 May, inside the Zolote disengagement area near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) as well as a person assessed as a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier.

While in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on the evening of 8 May, the SMM heard six shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area and within 5km of its periphery).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) during the day, the SMM heard nine shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 1-3km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area and within 5km of its periphery).[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas  

9 May

The SMM saw:

• nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk) and
• four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) near Butkivka (95km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 May

The SMM saw:

• seven tanks (one T-34, three T-64 and three T-72), three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1), three MLRS (BM-21), three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six towed howitzers (three D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and three 2A65 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Donetsk city (see below);
• six tanks (one T-34 and five T-72), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), five MLRS (BM-21), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and ten towed howitzers (five D-30 and five 2A65) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Luhansk city (see below);
• a tank (T-64), as part of an event commemorating Victory Day, about 80m from the SMM forward patrol base in Horlivka; and
• a tank (T-64) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 May

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 29 tanks (type undetermined) (as well as 11 impacts of undetermined weapons assessed as the result of recent training activities) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 25 April 2019) and
• 22 tanks (type undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers or mortars (type undetermined) and 12 towed howitzers or mortars (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

9 May

The SMM noted that:

• three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were present, and
• two self-propelled mortars (2S9), 31 self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and 28 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 22 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and 33 MLRS (BM-27) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

9 May

The SMM noted that this site was abandoned and that 15 mortars (11 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and four BM-37, 82mm) and 30 tanks (T-64) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

9 May

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 May

The SMM saw:

• three APCs (BTR-80), six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP-2) and two anti-aircraft guns  (ZU-23, 23mm) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Donetsk city;
• five APCs (BTR-80) and two IFVs (BMP-2) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Luhansk city; and
• an APC (BTR-80), an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), as part of an event commemorating Victory Day, about 80m from the SMM forward patrol base in Horlivka.

UAV seen flying in the security zone

On 8 May, about 2km north-west of Troitske, the SMM saw a grey fixed-wing unidentified mini-UAV flying about 400m north of the patrol’s position at an altitude of 200-300m for about 20 minutes.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka on 8 May and an assessment of the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) on 9 May. The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka.

The SMM observed celebrations marking Victory Day and Remembrance and Reconciliation Day

On 9 May, the SMM observed events in several regions of Ukraine commemorating Victory Day and Remembrance and Reconciliation Day. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a religious ceremony organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church at the Monument to the Unknown Soldier in the Park of Eternal Glory, which was attended by about 300 people (mixed genders, ages 40-70). It also saw about 3,000 people (mixed genders and ages) singing traditional songs commemorating the end of the war and marching to the aforementioned monument to lay flowers. The SMM also observed the presence of about 200 people (mixed genders and ages), some wearing the insignia of C14 (‘Sich’), along the route of the marching event, as well as at the abovementioned Monument to the Unknown Solider, where about 40 people sang patriotic songs and displayed banners with photos of various Ukrainian leaders, Ukrainian flags and flags of various political parties. At the aforementioned monument, the SMM also observed that more than 1,000 law enforcement officers were keeping the two groups separated as some people from both groups engaged in verbal altercations.

In Kherson, the SMM monitored a commemoration event with at least 5,000 people (mixed genders and ages) marching through the city centre from Heroes Square to the Park of Glory. The SMM saw that some of the marchers were holding photos of those who had served in World War II and banners of a political party.

On 8 May, the SMM monitored events marking Remembrance and Reconciliation Day in Kherson, Lviv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv, and saw local and regional elected officials and groups of local residents laying flowers at various monuments and cemeteries in remembrance of World War II victims. The SMM observed calm situations at all the events.

Military-style parades in Donetsk and Luhansk cities

The SMM observed military-style parades in non-government controlled Donetsk city and Luhansk city. In Luhansk city, the SMM observed a parade of about 1,500 members of the armed formations in ten formations, most of them armed, as well as weapons and military vehicles (see weapons in violation above), being watched by about 7,000 onlookers. Senior members of the armed formations gave speeches, and many people were seen carrying photos of World War II participants.

In Donetsk city, the SMM observed a parade of at least 300 members of the armed formations, most of them armed, as well as weapons and military vehicles (see weapons in violation above), being watched by about 5,000-6,000 onlookers (mixed genders and ages). Following the parade, the SMM saw more than 5,000 people marching on Artema Street and holding pictures of World War II participants as well as deceased members of the armed formations.

Border area outside government control

On 9 May, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 14 cars (one with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four with “LPR” plates and two with plates not visible) entering Ukraine, as well as three cars (one with “LPR” plates and two with plates not visible) and two pedestrians (male and female, 65 years old) exiting Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “security concerns for the SMM.”
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that the SMM did not have the necessary approvals from those in control.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

419243 Communication and Media Relations Section

A four-day specialized training course on appropriate and effective responses to gender-based violence for criminal justice practitioners from Hungary was held from 6 to 10 May 2019, at the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) headquarters in Budapest, Hungary.

The course for police and prosecutors was organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department and is the first of a series of three national specialized training courses held as part of the regional project Effective Criminal Justice Strategies and Practices to Combat Gender-based Violence in Eastern Europe. The project is currently being implemented in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and is financially supported by the European Commission and the government of Austria.

Delivered by trainers who have previously participated in a regional training-of-trainers programme, this course aimed at consolidating the skills and knowledge of first responder police officers and prosecutors to better meet the needs of victims of gender-based violence, including noticing the signs and signals of violence and referring them to specialized support services.

The course also explored how to improve the attitude and behaviour of criminal justice practitioners towards victims and perpetrators of gender-based violence, to avoid secondary victimization.

Built on a victim- and rights-centred approach, the course promoted the EU legislation on the wide protection of victims of violence, and focused on localized scenarios based on real-life cases.

Following the course was a one-day workshop where judges and social workers joined the police officers and prosecutors. The workshop highlighted the importance of a co-ordinated and integrated approach when fighting gender-based violence cases. Participants strengthened their understanding of how improving multi-disciplinary co-operation and interaction on gender-based violence cases can contribute to better meeting the needs of victims. They also discussed best practices that could significantly improve efforts to counter gender-based violence crimes.

419249 Communication and Media Relations Section

A training course jointly organized by the OSCE and UNODA on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation was held for 50 young female professionals from the OSCE’s participating States and Partners for Co-operation from 6 to 10 May 2019 in Vienna. The course was held as part of the OSCE Scholarship for Peace and Security.

The training course aimed to contribute to a deeper understanding among the participants of the key conceptual and analytical issues in conflict prevention and confidence- and security-building with a specific focus on the OSCE. The course also aimed at improving the knowledge of and increasing women’s participation in policy-making, planning and implementation processes in the areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Importantly, the course is designed to build up a network of young professionals and bridge the gap between education, training and career opportunities.

“I was highly motivated to apply my expertise, experience as well as education and insights from the discussions among the participants of this course,” said course participant Lena Strauss from Germany.

Throughout the week, participants learned about the different institutions active in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

They also learnt about emerging technologies, gender perspectives and the relationship between disarmament and development. Issues such as the concept of co-operative and indivisible security, political versus legal commitments, the importance of political will, and the illicit trafficking of weapons, were also discussed. The participants also engaged in debates on gender equality and explored the different impact disarmament and non-proliferation activities have on women and men, as well as the role women play in the field.

Thuy Nguyen, a course participant from Australia, stated: “Looking at the nexus between emerging technologies and international security excites me - we do need women in critical positions, participating in decision-making processes, able to make a big difference in contributing to peace and security.”

The training in Vienna will be followed by an additional five-week online training course, offering further insight into the inter-related areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. This part of the course will continue to take into account a gender perspective in order to deepen the participants’ understanding of practices in international security issues and enable them to spread this understanding among their peers.

The training course in Vienna was supported with financial contributions from the governments of Andorra, Germany and Switzerland.

SARAJEVO, 10 May 2019 - Women’s participation and leadership is not just good for women; it can benefit whole societies. This was the message delivered by Ambassador Melanne Verveer, the Special Representative of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship on Gender, during a three-day visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

At a meeting with staff of the OSCE Mission to BiH in Sarajevo, Verveer praised efforts to mainstream gender across all dimensions of the Mission’s work - from its engagement with security actors and work aimed at preventing violent extremism, to efforts to promote and protect fundamental freedoms and stamp out corruption. “Women must be given the space to contribute what they see, think and hear to decision-making processes. Otherwise, societies cannot get ahead,” she said. “The Mission’s work is, gradually, helping to make this is a reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

Head of the OSCE Mission Bruce G. Berton elaborated on the country’s progress since Verveer’s last visit in 2016. “There have been some bright spots on the horizon, for example the adoption of new laws at the state and entity levels, dealing with issues such as discrimination and domestic violence,” said Berton. “However, these laws have not always been followed up by implementation, with the current political impasse significantly hampering progress,” he added.

During her visit to Sarajevo and Banja Luka, Verveer met with the Minister of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Marina Pendeš, as well as officials of Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska.

Other meetings on her agenda included interactive discussions with civil society representatives from across the country - many of whom focus on reconciliation and peacebuilding, as well as domestic violence - , working lunches with businesswomen and women mayors, meetings with the BiH Gender Agency and gender centres from the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska . She also attended a brainstorming session with multilateral partners operating in BiH, as well as meetings with other ministries and officials at the state and entity level.

Speaking at a public event in Sarajevo, Verveer reflected on her first trip to BiH as a White House official during the conflict. Since then, she noted, the women of BiH have continued to demonstrate their resilience, determination and strength, including through their ability to “cross the lines” and promote reconciliation.

Verveer concluded with a message of unity: “When we start crossing our divides - our ethnic divides, our religious divides, and our divides between men and women - only then can we really move forward.”

419045 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Katya Andrusz SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

On 8 May, ODIHR and Transparency International (TI) launched a platform bringing together international organizations, civil society and academia to combat political corruption by building a shared awareness of the concept and its practice, and at the same time increasing the ability of TI offices across the OSCE region to analyse, monitor, and investigate real and potential cases.

“The public perception of widespread corruption among political officials is often at the core of growing dissatisfaction with democratic institutions,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “Unfortunately, we observe political corruption to a greater or lesser degree in a number of countries across the OSCE region. The platform we are launching today together with Transparency International will play an important role in both raising awareness of the problem and doing more to counteract it.”

“Political corruption can have very different meanings, but they all share the same root: The very conflictive relationship between money and politics,” said Delia Ferreira Rubio, Chair of Transparency International. “Rules are needed, but they are not enough. We need to strengthen enforcement, oversight, monitoring and sanctioning, and to understand that rules are contextual and need to have a goal.”

A broader understanding of political corruption and its key forms will ultimately lead to more effective implementation of anti-corruption initiatives and the promotion of reforms across the OSCE region. At the same time, it will also act as an early-warning mechanism if political corruption becomes an issue in any particular country.

The launch event was the first day of a two-and-a-half-day boot camp on combating political corruption. It covered issues including money in politics, the integrity of electoral processes, and abuse of state resources and electoral integrity. It also included case studies from a number of OSCE participating states. As well as giving ODIHR and TI the opportunity to promote a comprehensive understanding of political corruption, the platform established today will help develop future paths of co-operation between the two organizations.

“Political corruption affects the regular functioning of democratic institutions, ultimately eroding the confidence of citizens in a democracy,” said Gianluca Esposito, Executive Secretary of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). “We are glad to work with ODIHR in its important work in fighting political forms of corruption and promoting public integrity across the OSCE region.”

Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights supported a three-day training course for local prosecutors on Kyrgyzstan's new criminal justice legislation. The event was organized by the Prosecutor General's Office of the Kyrgyz Republic and held from 6 to 8 May 2019 in Bishkek. This is the first round of training for staff of Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office. Similar training courses will be conducted in all regions of Kyrgyzstan throughout the year.

The purpose of the course was to improve the skills of prosecutors in the practical application of criminal legislation, procedures and the use of an automated information system called the Unified Register of Crimes and Misdemeanours.

The workshop was opened by Gulmira Davletbaeva, the Director of the Training Centre for Investigation Officers of the Prosecutor General’s Office and Kakhramon Sanginov, the Rule of Law Officer of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

In her welcoming speech, Davletbaeva thanked the partners for their ongoing fruitful co-operation in the regular organization of such training events and noted that the course contributes to the professional capacity and skills of the Prosecutor General's Office staff members.

Since 2018 more than 2,500 staff members of law enforcement agencies have completed training on new criminal legislation with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

CHISINAU, 10 May 2019 – The OSCE Special Representative for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, Franco Frattini, will visit Chisinau and Tiraspol on 10 and 11 May 2019 for talks with high-level Moldovan officials and the political leadership in Tiraspol.

During the visit, in his capacity as the Special Representative of the OSCE Slovak Chairmanship for 2019, Frattini will focus on ways to advance the Transdniestrian Settlement Process within the parameters endorsed by all 57 participating States at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan in December 2018.

In Chisinau, media representatives are invited to a press briefing with the OSCE Special Representative Franco Frattini and the Moldovan Chief Negotiator Cristina Lesnic, on 11 May, at 09:15 at the Government Building (entrance from Mitropolit G. Banulescu-Bodoni Street). On the same day in Bender, a press briefing with the Special Representative Franco Frattini and the Transdniestrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky will be held at 13:15 in the Bender Fortress.  

For more information, please contact Anna Vorobeva, Spokesperson of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, at +373 22 887 846 (landline), +373 69 149 510 (mobile), e-mail: Anna.Vorobeva@osce.org.

For further details please visit the website of the OSCE Mission to Moldova: http://www.osce.org/moldova/

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• It recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.  
• The SMM saw for the first time anti-tank mines near Bila Kamianka and Starohnativka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 115 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). On the evening of 7 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about ten explosions (three of which were assessed as impacts) and about 20 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed distance of less than 1km.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 135 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period  (about 460 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 7 May, while on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 75 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-7km east-north-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). On 8 May, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.7-1km south-south-east (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).

Positioned 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk)).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

7 May

The SMM saw three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stationary in parking areas near the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 14 MLRS (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 6 May 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

7 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Pavlivka (51km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 12 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019);
• 12 tanks (type undetermined), seven self-propelled howitzers or mortars, 13 towed howitzers or mortars and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (for previous observations in the area see above); and
• 24 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019).

7 May

The SMM saw at least five tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

8 May

The SMM noted that:

• six tanks (T-72) and eight self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) were present, and
• 52 tanks (T-64), three self-propelled mortars (2S9) and 22 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

8 May

The SMM noted that four mortars (one 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three BM-37 82mm) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

7 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (one BTR-D and one type undetermined) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk), and
• three IFVs (BMP-1) in Novoselivka (66km south of Donetsk).

8 May

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Olhynka (40km south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and four IFVs (three BMP-1 and one BMP variant) in Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

7 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted seven IFVs (six BMP-1 and one probable BMP variant) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

Helicopter and UAV seen flying in the security zone

On 8 May, the SMM saw a military helicopter flying north to south at a low altitude about 7.5km east of Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk). It also saw an unidentified UAV (assessed as a fixed-wing type) flying in a south-easterly direction near Petrovenky (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk).    

Anti-tank mines near Bila Kamianka and Starohnativka

On 7 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time 40 anti-tank mines near a road leading from Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) to Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations. About 20m east of the aforementioned mines, the UAV again spotted two anti-tank mines. About 1.5km west of the former mines, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid across the road and again spotted six anti-tank mines (type undetermined) about 100m west, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 7 May, the SMM saw for the first time a freshly dug trench and a mine hazard sign (red square with “Mines” written in Russian) about 2km south of Novokyivka (non-government-controlled, 25km east of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines between Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), as well as to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-east of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 12 cars (three with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Polish licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian (a woman, aged 20-30) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (ten with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates and about 15 passengers on board exiting Ukraine.

People apply for passports of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions 

In non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, the SMM observed about 50 people (mixed gender and ages) in a queue in front of a building in Antratsyt (55km south-west of Luhansk). Outside the aforementioned building, the SMM noted four pieces of paper informing about eligibility, costs and documents tied to the submission of applications for passports of the Russian Federation. Several people waiting told the SMM that there were three queues: one for receiving information about obtaining the passports of the Russian Federation, one for receiving information about obtaining “LPR” “passports” and a third for receiving “LPR” “passports”.

In non-government-controlled Donetsk city, in front of a building at 56 Aksakova Street, the SMM observed two queues of about 15 and 45 people (mixed gender and ages). People in the first queue told the SMM that they had been submitting applications for passports of the Russian Federation; those in the second queue told the SMM that they had been waiting to receive other documents valid in non-government-controlled areas, including “DPR” “passports”. In Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 15 people queuing outside a building. Six of them told the SMM that they had been submitting applications for passports of the Russian Federation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delayed:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 20 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• At a hospital in Donetsk city, medical staff told the SMM that it could not provide information without permission from those in control. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

419075 Marina Živaljević

PODGORICA/CETINJE 7-9 May 2019 – To further strengthen Montenegro’s capacities in creating a digital cultural property database, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro with the support of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) organized a three-day workshop on best practices in protecting cultural heritage from traffickers in cultural property from 7 to 9 May 2019 in Podgorica and Cetinje.

This event was a follow-up to a regional workshop on combating illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property organized jointly with TNTD and the Italian OSCE Chairmanship in October 2018.

Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Siv-Katrine Leirtroe thanked all the participants and experts from Austria, North Macedonia, and representatives from the Ministries of Culture and Justice, the Basic Court Nikšić and the University Mediterranean for their participation.

“In addition to lectures, this workshop will facilitate discussions on best practices, mechanisms and tools to monitor archaeological sites and maintain controls in museums, protect museum artefacts and share good practices in inter-agency co-operation,” said Leirtroe opening the workshop. She also announced that two back-to-back workshops on the same topic will be organized in November this year.

Dražen Blažić, State Secretary of the Ministry Culture said that, on the one hand, cultural heritage testifies to our proud history, achievements and to the most valuable courses of our state and society. And on the other hand, cultural heritage in a contemporary context is an extremely important resource with economic potential for its valorisation. “Today we can conclude that cultural heritage is very often a target of numerous abuses and attempts of smuggling. For that reason, the prevention of illegal cross-border trade in cultural goods is an extremely important task, and requires a vigilant attitude by the state towards this emerging challenge,” said Blažić.

The first two days of the workshop were held in Podgorica with the third day held in the Historic Royal Capital of Cetinje where participants visited the National Museum of Montenegro, the old Government House, exhibition spaces of the Artistic, Historical and Ethnographic Museum, and King Nikola’s Palace.

Communication and Media Relations Section OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan

The OSCE-recommended model of intelligence-led policing (ILP) and its advantages for contemporary policing to the Uzbek Police, training workshop organized by the OSCE Secretariat, in co-operation with the OSCE Office of the Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, was held on 10 May 2019 in Tashkent.

The training workshop was attended by 25 police managers occupying decision- and policymaking positions in the Uzbek Police, operational structures and educational institution.

The OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit experts introduced the concept of ILP, as presented in the recently published OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing, and explained how this law enforcement model can complement and improve traditional policing approaches. Law enforcement experts from Estonia and Sweden gave presentations and shared information on ILP practices in their countries. Following the presentations, participants discussed the potential for implementing the ILP model in Uzbekistan.

ILP is a modern law enforcement model which facilitates proactive and efficient law enforcement management through combining intelligence gathering and analysis with informed decision-making procedures. The OSCE Guidebook on ILP has been translated into several languages and is used by law enforcement authorities and training institutions across the OSCE area.

“The success of ILP is to a large extent determined by the awareness and commitment of senior- and middle-level police management. Therefore today’s event has special significance, hopefully providing the Uzbek law enforcement management with new tools to improve their police services and strengthen their efforts against criminal activities,” said Guy Vinet, Head of the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department.

Juergen Becker of the OSCE Office of the Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan stressed that in line with its mandate, this OSCE field mission has been supporting the police services of Uzbekistan in further improving their competencies and skills in the field of a criminal investigation for more than ten years. This workshop, jointly implemented with the OSCE experts from Vienna, is another important step in this direction, he said.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission observed fresh damage caused by shelling to residential houses in Marinka.
• It recorded the presence of military hardware inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The Mission continued to monitor the situation of civilians crossing the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Novoazovsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). The highest numbers of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and south and south-south-east of  Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 460 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period  (about 60 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations, including most explosions, were recorded at north-easterly and south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 75 explosions, including 34 assessed as outgoing artillery rounds at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east.

Fresh damage caused by shelling to residential houses in Marinka

On the eastern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), at 128 Zhovtneva Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-eastern facing metal fence about 2m of an inhabited single-storey house and a fresh crater in an asphalted road about 4m north-east of the same house (and about 600m west-south-west of an old industrial compound displaying a red and gold flag on the western edge of Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled). The SMM assessed the crater as caused by the impact of a fragmentation grenade (VOG-25 or VOG 25-P, 40mm) fired from a south-westerly direction. The SMM saw several members of the State Emergency Services conducting repairs to the roof of the same house (which was covered by a nylon sheet) and replacing asbestos sheets on the roof of another house at 137 Zhovtneva Street. One of them said that they were performing scheduled repairs in the area.

At 128a Zhovtneva Street, the SMM saw cracked glass in a north-west facing window and shrapnel damage to the north-west facing side of a single-storey house. It also saw cracked glass in a south-west facing window and in a south-west facing door of a summer kitchen (about 2m south-west of the same house), as well as fresh shrapnel damage to the south-west facing side of a small construction and to a tree in the garden (about 3m and 2m north-west of the same house, respectively). About 2m north-east of the house, the SMM observed freshly moved soil which, according to the owner of the house (woman, aged 60-70), was used to cover a crater in the yard. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

At 144 Zhovtneva Street (about 40m of the previous house), the SMM saw over 80 holes in a south-west facing metal fence about 2m south-west of an inhabited single-storey house and in two nearby parked cars. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire. Three residents of the abovementioned street (two men and a woman, aged 50-90) told the SMM that they had been in their houses (some of them with their families) when shelling had occurred in the morning hours of 3 May.

About 1.5km east-south-east of the abovementioned location, at 285 Heroiv Chornobylia Street, the SMM saw two collapsed south-eastern facing walls. It also saw about five members of the State Emergency Service replacing wooden sections of the roof of the same house. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

About 70m west of the abovementioned house, at 291 Heroiv Chornobylia Street, the SMM saw at least seven holes in the south-eastern and south-western-facing sides of a single-storey house (assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel) and three shattered south-west-facing windows (covered by wooden panels), as well as fresh shrapnel damage to the plastic frame of one of the windows.

In the same area, the SMM saw a position of the Ukrainian Armed forces and that two houses were being used by them. Three residents of the above-mentioned street (three women, aged 30-80) told the SMM that they had been in their houses when shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 3 May.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 4 May, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), next to previously observed positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) covered with camouflage netting along with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck, as well as an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) north of the railway tracks and west of road T-1316 (about 500 east-south-east of the abovementioned IFV), all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 17 April 2019).

On 7 May, positioned in three locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 90 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire and about 193 explosions: 154 assessed as undetermined and 34 assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (see above), all assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

On 5 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three mortars (type undetermined) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

7 May

The SMM saw:

• eight tanks (one T-34 and seven T-72), ten towed howitzers (five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm ) and five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in the centre of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019) and
• four tanks (two T-64 and two T-72), four towed howitzers (2A65), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1), two MLRS (BM-21) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in the centre of Donetsk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 May 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

On 4 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 20 tanks (type undetermined), two pieces of anti-aircraft artillery (type undetermined) and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Other weapons observed:

On 4 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 16 self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 17 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Buhaivka.[4]

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

On 6 May, the SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

4 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• an ACV (type undetermined) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk);
• an ACV (type undetermined) north of the disengagement area near Zolote; and
• an ACV (type undetermined) near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

4 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an IFV near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), and
• four IFVs (BMP-1) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

7 May

The SMM saw:

• four IFVs (BTR-80) near Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk) and
• eight armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

On 4 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a new 60m trench running north-east from a position of the armed formations near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk).

5 May

On 5 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two type undetermined) and a probable IFV (BMP variant) near Sentianivka.

On 6 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Kypuche (formerly Artemivsk, 46km west of Luhansk).

7 May

The SMM saw:

• six IFVs (BMP-2) and six APCs (BTR-80) in the centre of Luhansk city (see above), and
• two armoured recovery vehicles (BREM-1), two APCs (BTR-80) and four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two BMP-2) in the centre of Donetsk city (see above).

Mines seen near Orikhove

On 4 May, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 82 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows in a field south of Orikhove.

Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints

In the morning of 7 May, at a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 200 vehicles and about 200 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 100 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction. In the afternoon, at the same location, the Mission saw about 100 vehicles queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas and about 120 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction.

In the morning of the same day, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on road H15 near Marinka, the SMM saw 80 cars and around 150 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas, as well as 12 buses stationary between the abovementioned checkpoint of the armed formations in Kreminets and the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka. In the afternoon, at the same location, the Mission saw no cars queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 25 vehicles as well as 100 people queuing in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and Popasna, as well as to damaged houses in Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 7 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates) and a mini-van (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine, and ten cars (three with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), a mini-van (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 6 May, while at a border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw no pedestrians or traffic entering or exiting Ukraine.

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 5 and 6 May, the Mission observed calm situations at a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service security post in Valok (188km south-east of Kherson) and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (see SMM Daily Report 1 May 2019).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM entrance to the town, citing ongoing operation in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their type.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

VIENNA, 8 May 2019 – Politico-military co-operation in Central Asia, how to increase women’s participation in decision-making processes in the security sector, and eliminating the threat posed by small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition are among the priorities of Tajikistan’s Chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), which the country’s Deputy Foreign Minister Zohir Saidzoda formally opened in Vienna today.

Addressing representatives of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation at the FSC, Saidzoda said that Tajikistan intends to perform its duties as Chair in good faith, guided by the established principles of equality, mutual respect, balance and continuity. It was the first time that his country assumed the role of FSC Chair, he added.

“Our main task will be to continue the ongoing work in further improving the control mechanisms in the politico-military field,” he said.

Saidzoda said that his country sees the OSCE as a unique regional organization capable of addressing a wide range of security and co-operation issues with significant potential for effective action.

He highlighted the already close co-operation between his country and the OSCE in the politico-military field, and said that Tajikistan’s FSC Chairmanship would build on this.

“As of today, in Tajikistan, about 26,000 units of seized small arms and over 30 tonnes of surplus ammunitions were destroyed by the OSCE. Between 2009 and 2018 some three million square metres of land contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance were cleared,” he said.

How to counter the threat of small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition across the OSCE region would be among the Tajik Chair’s priorities, he said.

Referring to his country’s other priorities, Saidzoda said: “A special focus of Tajikistan’s Chairmanship will be drawing the FSC’s attention to politico-military aspects of security in the Central Asian context, and the need to strengthen the OSCE’s co-operation with regional organizations in Central Asia.”

Linked to this is the security situation in Afghanistan, he said, where “the presence of an immense number of munitions and weapons in the northern territories of Afghanistan suggests that the long-term border situation will remain unstable.”

He added that Tajikistan will also hold discussions on the importance of the role of women in the security sector, in particular their participation in decision-making.

Other areas of focus will include strengthening the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; confidence-and security-building measures in the politico-military area; and continued efforts to consolidate common positions among States on the updating of the Vienna Document.

“Tajikistan hopes to contribute to the promotion of genuine dialogue,” he said. “I assure you that Tajikistan will conduct its FSC Chairmanship on the basis of a balanced and impartial approach.”