OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 8,760 to 8,813 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of plus 196 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 21 this week (compared to 59 last week); 15 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and six into Ukraine (81 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, nine families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when two families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and two into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (328 compared to 307 observed during the previous week). There were 171 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 157 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Rovenky - Kyiv and Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 665 to 782 (214 at the Gukovo BCP and 568 at the Donetsk BCP); 403 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 379 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” (sometimes “DPR”) plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 35 (compared to 49 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 203 to 246: of the total number of trucks scanned, 154 trucks (63 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 92 trucks (37 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 133 to 116 vehicles; 57 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 59 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 23 occasions, compared to nine last week; the OTs assessed that 14 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 29 January 2019 to 5 March 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

BAKU, 5 March 2019 – Concluding his visit to Azerbaijan today, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, welcomed the decrease in violence on the Line of Contact and on the international border, and discussed further perspectives for progress towards a comprehensive peace agreement for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as co-operation between the OSCE and Azerbaijan.

Emphasizing Azerbaijan’s role in the Organization, Lajčák said: “Azerbaijan is an important OSCE participating State. We are ready to explore areas for increased OSCE engagement in and with Azerbaijan across all three dimensions of comprehensive security.”

Accompanied by his Personal Representative on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, and his Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák met with the political leadership in Baku, including President llham Aliyev, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, Speaker of Parliament Ogtay Asadov, as well as representatives of the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lajčák reaffirmed the OSCE’s continued support to finding a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and to the efforts of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group as well as his two representatives, Kasprzyk and Michalka, in promoting confidence building and dialogue: “Through continuous and increasing dialogue, small improvements to the lives of the people most affected by the conflict can be made. And in this, preparing the populations for peace is an important element.”

He expressed the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship’s willingness to support small, tangible steps to promote co-operation and dialogue.

"The OSCE is encouraged by the dialogue we have seen so far. We are watching closely for signs of constructive progress and commitment, and stand ready to facilitate when needed,” Lajčák said.

413057 Marina Živaljević

A set of guidelines, developed with OSCE support,  that elaborates rules, ethical standards and guidance on how to moderate readers’ comments on internet portals was presented to the Montenegrin public on 4 March 2019 in Podgorica.

The Guidelines for Applying Section 2.8 of Montenegrin Journalists’ Code of Ethics were drafted by the Technical Working Group on Self-Regulation, composed of representatives of the Media Council for Self-Regulation and representatives and ombudspersons of Dan, Vijesti and Monitor, under the auspices of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro.

The Head of the OSCE Mission Maryse Daviet said that only in Montenegro have representatives of various self-regulatory bodies teamed up and worked together on a document of this kind.

“The Guidelines are relevant for moderators of portals, as well as for editors and readers, and further clarify Section 2.8 of the Journalists Code of Ethics. They were presented to the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in Vienna in July 2018, who acknowledged the importance of the document,” said Daviet.

Paula Petričević, Ombudswoman of Daily Vijesti and Weekly Monitor, explained that the Guidelines are structured in four basic segments: rules for commenting, moderation, procedures and sanctions. “The idea of the document is to provide rules for an argumentative, decent, engaging discussion and a space for freedom of expression, not its abuses,” said Petričević.

Aneta Spaić, Member of Montenegrin Media Council for Self-Regulation said that guidelines by the BBC and the British media outlet The Guardian were used as a basis, and that some solutions were taken from the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. “Internet portals are obliged to use software for the automatic filtering of inappropriate expressions. This means that everything that automated filtering finds to be an inappropriate expression will be placed in quarantine that will be subject to moderation,” said Spajić.

The Guidelines for Applying Section 2.8 of Montenegrin Journalists’ Code of Ethics are available here in English, Montenegrin and Albanian.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 1 and 2 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 2 and 3 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh damage to civilian properties from shelling in Pikuzy.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near Lysychansk.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas, near Izvaryne, at a border crossing point outside government control, in non-government-controlled Pikuzy and again at a checkpoint near government-controlled Popasna.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north-west of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled) and at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 2 and 3 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 260 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (including about 30 undetermined and impact explosions at an assessed range of 0.2-1km south-south-east, south and south-south-west), at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and again at easterly directions of Hnutove.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions).

Between the evenings of 2 and 3 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north and south of Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from shelling in Pikuzy

On 3 March, at 49 Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), about 15m east of an inhabited one-storey house, the Mission saw a crater in soft ground and shrapnel marks on a fence. It assessed the damage as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction.

On Vatutina Street, the SMM saw that three south-east-facing windows of a one-storey house were shattered and that there were numerus shrapnel marks on the house’s south-east-facing wall and front door. The Mission also saw one fresh crater 1m and another fresh crater 2m south-east of the house. It assessed the craters as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-westerly direction. A man (in his fifties) who introduced himself as a resident of Pikuzy told the SMM there had been shelling in the area on the morning of 2 March.

Members of the armed formations restricted the SMM’s access to certain areas of Pikuzy.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 1 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded eight projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as an undetermined explosion, ten projectiles and an illumination flare, all at an assessed range of 1-6km east-north-east and east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the following evening, the same camera recorded ten projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as two undetermined explosions and a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 3 March, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed for the first time a piece of ammunition, assessed as a remnant of an exploded rocket-propelled grenade round, about 3-5m west of the main road (around 70m north of the wooden ramps at the bridge).

On 2 and 3 March, positioned north-east of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines[4]

Government-controlled areas

2 March

The SMM saw:

• four towed howitzers (2A65, Msta-B, 152mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

3 March

The SMM saw:

• 24 tanks (T-64) at a train station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

3 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR 70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) and
• an APC (BTR-60) in Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

2 March

The SMM saw:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1 and BMP-2) near Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

3 March

The SMM saw:

• two trucks assessed as parts of a TORN electronic warfare system in Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk).

Fresh impact craters

On 1 March, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted at least 20 fresh impacts craters assessed as caused by 82mm or 120mm mortar rounds in a field about 1.5km east of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Casings of multiple launch rocket system in Donetsk city

On Putylivska Roshcha Street in Donetsk city, about 3.5km north-east of Donetsk central railway station, the SMM spotted an object lying on the side of the street which it assessed as a casing of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (a Grad type) rocket.

On 2 March, on Ananchenka Street in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), about 10m from nearest inhabited residential houses, the Mission saw an object embedded in the asphalt in the middle of the street which it assessed as a casing of an MLRS rocket.

On 3 March, at the Oktiabr mine compound (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw that the 120mm mortar round it had seen on 25 December 2018 25-50cm south of a road (about 100m south of the SMM camera site) was no longer present. A member of the armed formations told the Mission that the piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) had been removed.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 2 and 3 March, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 3 March, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw four cars (two with Lithuanian, one with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates) and six pedestrians (four women and two men, mixed ages) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw six pedestrians (four men and two women, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.*

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw three men (in their forties) entering Ukraine and a man and a woman (in their forties) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 2 March, at a checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier again did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T-0504, citing orders from his commander.
• On two occasions on 3 March, members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to certain areas of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On the first occasion, one of them denied the Mission access to Kirova Street. On the second occasion, another member demanded that the Mission leave the area “within one minute” due to safety concerns.
• On 3 March, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 2 and 3 March, the sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.  For example, on 3 March, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the Mission that anti-tank mines on the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Petrivske were still in place.

Delay:

• On 3 March, at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM and requested to see the patrol plan which the Mission refused to show. After about 30 minutes, he allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at Oktiabr mine were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] In Withdrawal of weapons section in SMM Daily Report of 1 March 2019, the sentence “22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk)” should have read “22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).”

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Communication and Media Relations Section

The Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department met with Montenegro’s Deputy Minister of the Interior, Milanka Bakovic, and her technical team during a country visit on 28 February and 1 March 2019 to facilitate the country’s participation in the Public Key Directory of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO PKD) – a central repository simplifying and facilitating the fast and secure authentication of electronic passports at borders.

Dennis Cosgrove, Head of the Border Security and Management Unit, outlined what benefits Montenegro could gain by becoming a member of the ICAO PKD and how the OSCE can support the country in this process.

Christiane Dermarkar, global focal point for the ICAO PKD membership, described the administrative requirements for joining the Public Key Directory.

Jeen de Swart, Senior Information Architect from the Dutch Ministry of Justice, demonstrated the technical steps for the integration of the Montenegrin National Public Key Infrastructure with the ICAO PKD. 

Deputy Minister Bakovic positively received the initiative and stressed Montenegro’s interest in improving existing border security systems. She highlighted that Montenegro is working on upgrading to third-generation e-passports and joining the ICAO PKD will be the pre-requisite to meeting the ICAO standards.

After meeting the Deputy Minister, the OSCE delegation also met with representatives of the Civil Aviation Agency of Montenegro and discussed how the agency could support the government in joining the ICAO PKD.

The country visit was a follow-up activity to the first OSCE Regional Workshop for South-East Europe on ICAO PKD, which was organized in Montenegro in November last year. At the workshop Montenegro presented an overview of its e-passport system and together with recommendations from experts drafted a road map on how to join the ICAO PKD.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission followed up on reports of an injured man in Donetskyi.
• The Mission spotted refurbishment of military positions inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including again ata checkpoint near Popasna.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewerceasefire violations, including about 180 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 470 explosions). The majority of ceasefireviolations, including the majority of the explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded about 280 ceasefire violations, including about 260 explosions. During the previous reporting period, the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations in the region. The majority of ceasefireviolations were recorded at westerly directions of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) including about 150 explosions of artillery rounds, 40 of which assessed as outgoing.

Man injured reportedly as a result of shelling in Donetskyi

At a hospital in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), medical staff told the Mission that a man (in his forties) had been admitted to the hospital on 18 February with shrapnel wounds to his right foot and ankle. The man told the SMM he had been injured during shelling while he had been at his house in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk).

Fresh impact crater

In Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field 130m south-east of a functioning school and 85m east of the closest civilian house. It assessed the crater as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction. 

Disengagement areas[2]

On 27 February, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted new wooden poles and tarpaulin sheeting on the roofs of two bunkers assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 550m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1.3km west of its eastern edge. On 24 February, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a military truck inside the area, about 700m east of its western edge and about 600m south of its northern edge.[3]

On the evening of 28 February, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines 

Government-controlled areas

1 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10) near Pionerske (14km east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four tanks (types undetermined) and a probable self-propelled howitzer (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

1 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-3E) in Pionerske.

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Yasnobrodivka (26km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 February 

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted: 

• two IFVs (BMP-1) and a probable armoured combat vehicle near Styla (34km south of Donetsk).

28 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four IFVs (BMP-1) near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

1 March

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) nearMius (65km south-west of Luhansk)

Presence of unexploded ordnance

About 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske(formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as 152mm artillery rounds,with the nose fuses pointing upwards,lying on the northern side of the road, about 4m of its edge.

About 2.6km north-east of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), on Kyivskyi Avenue, the SMM observed for the first time two parts of an UXO (a grey round tube which was broken in two pieces), assessed as a multiple launch rocket system (Grad) (type undetermined) rocket embedded in the asphalt. The UXO was located around 110m from the closest civilian house.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works topower transmission lines in Sakhanka(non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), after the electricity poles had fallen down further breaking the electricity cables. The SMM observed that power supply in Sakhanka had been restored the same day. 

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access: 

• At a checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier again did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T-0504, citing orders from his commander.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 
• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that there had been no demining in the area.

Other impediments:

• In Horlivka(non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the head doctor of the hospital refused to provide information to the SMM without prior authorization from senior members of the armed formations.

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivkaandat Oktiabr mine were not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

412904 Communication and Media Relations Section

Supporting the economic empowerment of women in vulnerable situations in Armenia was the topic of discussion at an OSCE meeting held on 1 March 2019 in Yerevan. The event was part of the Organization’s overall efforts to promote social cohesion, stability and security by tackling socio-economic inequalities.

Representatives of national and local authorities and international and civil society organizations debated ongoing and future initiatives to promote gender equality in the economic sphere in the country. The goal was to explore synergies and maximize the impact of the OSCE project “Economic empowerment of women in the Syunik region and other regions of Armenia”, which will be implemented over the next two years. The project is aimed at improving the employability and income-generation capacities of women in vulnerable situations.

Through a combination of capacity-building activities targeting the network of Women’s Resource Centres in Armenia and direct assistance measures benefitting women in vulnerable situations, the project helps to improve women’s access to psycho-social, technical and financial services provided by civil society organizations and public social services at the local and national levels.

“Developing women’s human capital is critical to rebalancing inequalities,” said Ermelinda Meksi, Deputy Co-ordinator of the Office of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. “Consolidated economic research demonstrates that women reinvest close to 90 per cent of their incomes into their families and communities. Investing in women means investing in everybody else.”

“At the global level, women continue to experience significant gaps in accessing the labour market, income-generating opportunities, education, and innovation,” said Meksi. “Armenia is no exception and we wish to join forces with a wide variety of actors who play a role in fostering positive change for women in this country.”

Based on the lessons learned during the project’s implementation, the OSCE in co-operation with relevant stakeholders will upon its completion develop a set of guidelines for the economic empowerment of women in vulnerable situations in Armenia, to be used as an advocacy tool by the Women’s Resource Centres.

The project is financially supported by Finland, Italy, Norway and United States.

Edita Buçaj

A 4-module specialized training program organized by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo for 49 officers of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) on combating corruption and increasing police integrity concluded today in Prishtinë/Priština.

The modules, held over the last two months, covered: Criminal Investigation of Financial Irregularities and Corruption in the police (14 -18 January); Handling and Protecting Informants and Whistle-blowers (28 January - 1 February); Risk Analysis and Risk Assessment of Corruption in the police (11 - 15 February); and Integrity Testing (25 February – 1 March).

“This program was designed to advance the investigative capacities of the PIK to effectively perform its role of police oversight,” said Ake Roghe, Director of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo Department of Security and Public Safety.

“Improving the skills of PIK officers and successfully holding police officers accountable, will increase the general public’s trust in a fair and impartial investigation of allegations of wrongdoings by police officers,” he added.

PIK officers were trained by professional trainers from Italy, the United Kingdom and Canada. They deepened their knowledge of conducting criminal investigations into allegations of misconduct involving members of the police; methods used to effectively conduct financial investigations in accordance with the best international standards; handling and protecting informants and whistle-blowers; conducting risk analysis and assessments; and explored the best practices in mechanisms and related methods for integrity testing, and how those mechanisms contribute to ensuring that the best ethical standards are implemented within the Kosovo Police.

The training program was supported by the Italian Delegation to the OSCE in Vienna.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day train-the-trainer course for Albanian participants on countering terrorist financing was organized in Vienna from 27 February to 1 March 2019 by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Presence in Albania, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Global Programme against Money Laundering (UNODC/GPML).  

The six participants of the course will go on to deliver training courses for local government officials upon their return to Albania, together with OSCE and UNODC international experts.

The course, which took place in the premises of the OSCE Secretariat, was led by international experts and tailored to the Albanian context. It covered national, regional and transnational threats, sources of information, money flows, tackling financial intelligence, and strategic analysis. More than half of the course consisted of practical exercises, often based on localized scenarios.

The aim of the course was to assist Albania in countering terrorist financing, in line with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, standards of the Financial Action Task Force and OSCE commitments.

Participants deepened their understanding of how improving inter-agency co-operation can help to identify and disrupt terrorist financial networks and how specific instruments and techniques can significantly improve efforts to counter terrorist financing. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area and noted that a piece of unexploded ordnance previously observed near the road inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area had been removed.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at checkpoints near Popasna, Verkhnoshyrokivske and in Staromykhailivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 470 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. During the previous reporting period , the SMM had recorded 72 ceasefire violations (about 20 explosions).

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 28 February, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. [3]

Inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM noted that a metal object assessed as a mortar (possibly 82mm) tailfin, previously observed 1-1.5m west of the road and about 270m north of the bridge (first reported on 25 December 2018, see SMM Daily Report 27 December 2018), had been removed.

During the day on 28 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

28 February

The SMM saw:

• a mortar (type unknown) on a truck parked inside the yard of a residential house in Kyrylivka (26km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

28 February

The SMM saw:

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

28 February

The SMM noted the presence of weapons observed previously.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

28 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Kyrylivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

27 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• an APC (BTR variant) in the yard of an apparently abandoned building on the northern edge of Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk), as well as a previously observed extensive trench system and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an APC (MT-LB M) near the village.

On 28 February, the SMM saw two automated jamming stations (R-330T) near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, government-controlled, 67km north of Donetsk).

Presence of new mine hazard sign

The SMM saw for the first time a red metal plate with “Stop Mine” written in Russian language attached to a post in the western outskirts of Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside of government control

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw a man exiting Ukraine, and no pedestrians entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier again did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T-0504, citing orders from his commander.
• On two occasions at a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing a “lack of security guarantees”.
• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), five armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “subversive activities in the area”. While present at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at Oktiabr mine were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded a workshop for the promotion and implementation of the 2019 Community Cohesion Action Plan on 1 March 2019 in Trebinje.

The workshop gathered over 20 participants from city and local authorities, police, media and civil society organizations clustered around the Coalition against Hate, Security Forum and youth. They discussed the plan’s activities and agreed on future concrete steps for its implementation and promotion within local communities.

The implementation of the Community Cohesion Action Plan will focus on establishing a mechanism for a public response in cases of bias-motivated incidents and the promotion of a more tolerant and open community.

Supported by the Mission, this plan was developed in 2018 by a working group appointed by the mayor. The first document of this kind in BiH, the plan was adopted by the mayor in late November 2018, and has also received support from the City Assembly leaders.

This was the first of three workshops facilitated by the OSCE Mission to BiH, with similar events planned in Nevesinje and Bileca in the coming period.

VIENNA, 1 March 2019 – The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stéphane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan on 20 February and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on 21 February to discuss preparations for a meeting of the leaders in the near future, including possible topics for discussion.  The Co-Chairs also held discussions with the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in their respective capitals.  The Co-Chairs were joined by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Andrzej Kasprzyk.

During the meetings in the region, the leaders briefed the Co-Chairs on their recent conversation on the margins of the World Economic Forum in Davos in January.  The leaders and the Co-Chairs discussed the situation on the ground and their expectations for next steps. 

The Co-Chairs assessed positively the continuing lack of casualties on the line of contact.  They also welcomed the developing discussions in the region about preparing populations for peace.

The leaders accepted the Minsk Group Co-Chairs‘ proposal to meet soon under their auspices.

Following their visit to the region, the Co-Chairs and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office travelled to Vienna and Bratislava from 28 February to 1 March to brief the Permanent Representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group countries, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák.

412712 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

16 representatives of the Akimats (regional administration) of 14 regions of Kazakhstan responsible for the work of the regional commissions on combating illegal export, import and trafficking in human beings took part in an OSCE-supported training seminar on combating human trafficking, which concluded on 1 March 2019 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Representatives of law enforcement bodies and non-governmental organizations also participated in the two-day event, which was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the United States Embassy in Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The seminar focused on the role of the Akimats in the fight against trafficking, co-operation between governmental agencies and international, non-governmental organizations, the working mechanisms of the Interdepartmental Commission on combating trafficking in persons, as well as on the monitoring and exchange of information.

“The OSCE supports the efforts of the government of Kazakhstan in combating trafficking in persons through training and enhancing the professional skills and knowledge of law enforcement officials, judges, social workers and non-governmental organizations involved in providing social services to victims of trafficking,” said György Szabó, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Madiyev Sagat, Deputy Chief of the Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, added: “The police devote considerable attention and are taking increased measures to prevent human trafficking. For instance, in 2018, the police uncovered 14 cases of trafficking, 5 cases of child trafficking, and 20 cases of abduction and illegal deprivation of liberty for the purpose of exploitation.”

“We are proud of our long-term co-operation with the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the OSCE Programme Office in Astana. Over the period of 17 years, together with our partners, we have implemented many projects aimed at training law enforcement personnel, improving legislation and assisting victims of trafficking. The seminar for the representatives of Akimats was conducted for the first time and is a timely initiative,” said Jorgan K. Andrews, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

The event is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to support the host country in combating human trafficking and in implementing the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.

KYIV, 28 February 2019 – OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) and Treasurer Doris Barnett (MP, Germany) have wrapped up a two-day visit to Kyiv where they were on a pre-electoral visit ahead of the observation mission to be deployed for the 31 March presidential election.

The OSCE PA delegation, which included Secretary General Roberto Montella and Special Representative Ambassador Andreas Nothelle, met with Andriy Parubiy, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada and the Head of the OSCE PA Delegation Artur Gerasymov. They held talks with presidential candidates Yulia Timoshenko, Yuriy Boyko and MP Svitlana Zalishchuk representing Anatoliy Grytsenko.

The PA delegation took note of concerns regarding the campaign including allegations of misuse of state resources and vote-buying. Tsereteli and Barnett said that every allegation needs to be fact-based, substantiated and addressed to the appropriate state bodies. They praised the co-operation they have received and encouraged all authorities and stakeholders to send a clear signal that electoral violations will not be tolerated.

“It has been five years since the momentous Euromaidan events of February 2014 and all of the tragic developments that followed, including the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing military conflict in eastern Ukraine,” said President Tsereteli. “Holding a competitive, peaceful and well-administered presidential election next month is vital to advance the democratic development of Ukraine and promote stability and security in the OSCE region.”

“We look forward to continuing our strong co-operation with the authorities in Ukraine as we prepare to deploy a robust observation mission for this important election,” said Barnett. “The circumstances in Ukraine present particular challenges to holding elections and to observing elections. From our side, we will diligently follow the process and provide a fair and solid assessment.”

Meetings were also held with Tatyana Slipachuk, Chair of the Central Election Commission; Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission; Ambassador Henrik Villadsen, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, as well as representatives of the international community, civil society and the media. The PA delegation lauded the PCU’s efforts to assist Ukraine in ensuring that the elections are in line with international standards and to advance a broad package of reforms.

President Tsereteli appointed Barnett to lead the PA’s delegation of observers to the 31 March election and President Emeritus Ilkka Kanerva (MP, Finland) was nominated to serve as Special Co-ordinator. It is expected to be one of the biggest election observation missions the OSCE PA has ever deployed. The PA has previously observed 12 elections in Ukraine.

Photos of this week's visit to Kyiv are available for public use on Flickr.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM followed up on reports of three men who sustained shrapnel wounds following the explosion of a device near government-controlled Hrodivka.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines and military hardware on the road inside the Zolote disengagement area and recorded ceasefire violations near the same area.  
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of both Luhansk and Donetsk region.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the recovery of human remains from an area in Luhansk region close to the contact line.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region, at a checkpoint near Popasna and, on three occasions, at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*
• In Odessa, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 180), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and close to essential civilians infrastructure, including the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), in areas south-west, west and north of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk).

Three men injured by explosion of a device

At a hospital in Myrnohrad (formerly Dymytrov, government-controlled, 52km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw two men (aged 25 and 34) with bandages on their hands, elbows and legs. Medical staff told the SMM that the two men had been admitted to the hospital on 25 February with several shrapnel wounds. Medical staff added that a third man (aged 29) had also been admitted with shrapnel wounds to his legs, chest and right hand, as well as a bone fracture in his left foot; however, at the time of the SMM’s visit, medical staff told the SMM that the man had been undergoing medical examinations. The two men told the SMM that they had been collecting wood in a forest near Hrodivka (government-controlled, 43km north-west of Donetsk) when their friend (the aforementioned 29-year-old man) had stepped on a device and triggered an explosion. They added that they had not seen any sign marking the area as contaminated by mines. Police in Pokrovsk (government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that an investigation into the incident was ongoing and that the remnants of the explosive device had been sent for expert analysis.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 26 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) on road T-1316, about 900m south of the area’s northern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 200m further south, inside the disengagement area, the same UAV spotted at least 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows across the same road (spotted for the first time on 15 February 2019, see SMM Daily Report 19 February 2019).

During the night of 26-27 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight from north-west to south-east at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 27 February, positioned 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions as well as bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 0.6-6km north and north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). 

During the day on 27 February, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

25 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk).

27 February

The SMM saw:

• a stationary tank (type undetermined) in the northern outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn*

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region[4]

21 February

The SMM noted that:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were present and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 35 MLRS (BM-21) were missing, including 12 MLRS missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

26 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP variant) inside a partially destroyed building on the eastern edge of Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) and
• four IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

27 February

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP variant) in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

25 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an APC (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) next to a former school building used by the armed formations in Donetskyi.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• three new trench networks near Vedenske (90km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 27 October 2018).

Presence of new mine hazard signs

The SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs in the eastern outskirts of Horlivka: one wooden board with “Stop Mines” written in Russian language and one wooden stake with “Stop Dangerous Zone, Access Forbidden” written in Russian language.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to water pipelines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water pipeline near Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. Due to ceasefire violations in the area, the SMM was unable to monitor the security situation near the Vasylivka Pumping Station (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM monitoring recovery of human remains in Luhansk region

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the recovery of human remains from an area between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations near Novooleksandrivka.

Gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Odessa

On 26 February, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation at 14 Haharinske Plateau in Odessa. Onsite, the SMM saw about 25 people (mostly men, aged 20-40), including one holding a red-and-black flag, placing about 20 disposable plastic bags filled with pieces of paper and other items into the grating of the fence at the main entrance of the Consulate building. It also observed about 25 law enforcement officers present in the area. The gathering dispersed without incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel (one of them visibly armed) denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• On three occasions, armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint after the SMM refused to show its patrol plans all three times.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) again did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T-0504, citing orders from his commander.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
   

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at Oktiabr mine were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

An OSCE-organized photography and photojournalism master class for persons with disabilities took place from 22 to 26 February 2019 in Ashgabat.

The five-day class introduced 17 participants to the basics of photojournalism and build their photography skills.

The master class was delivered by national experts who provided insights into the history of photography and its types. They also explained the rules of composition and the basics of light as well as the use of photo cameras and photo equipment.

The participants discussed the role of photography in journalism, principles of photo journalism and skills that photo reporters should possess to create powerful, yet impartial and truthful stories.

“Being one of the most creative forms of journalism, photojournalism tells us a news story through images, which communicate information, send messages and evoke emotions,” said Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat organized the master class as part of its activities in the area of media development and journalism education. We believe that this event will help our participants discover their own talents and identify opportunities to create photo reports that show the world as they see it”.

The practical part of the master class included indoor and outdoor photo sessions.

The Centre plans to exhibit the photographs of the participants at a photo exhibition “The World Around Us” dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat which will be celebrated in April 2019.

VIENNA, 28 February 2019 – Key stakeholders will report on the progress of Ukraine’s reforms in the areas of the judiciary and decentralization at an event organized for Vienna-based delegations to the OSCE, on Monday, 4 March 2019, from 10:00 to 12:45.

The first part of the event will provide an opportunity to review the progress of judicial reforms. The discussion will focus on  outcomes of the first year of the Ukraine’s newly formed Supreme Court and the process of selection of High Anti-Corruption Court judges. The impact of decentralisation on enhancing the ability of communities to deal with local issues, independently of the central government will be discussed during the second part of the presentation.   

Speakers at the event will include OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger;  Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the OSCE Ihor Prokopchuk; OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine Henrik Villadsen; President of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice George Stava; Judge of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and Secretary of the Grand Chamber Vsevolod Kniazev; Judge of the Supreme Court of Ukraine Hanna Vronska; Chair of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine Serhiy Koziakov; Chair of the Judicial Reform Council, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine Oleksiy Filatov; Head of European Union Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine Eka Tkeshelashvili; First Deputy Minister for Regional Development of Ukraine Vyacheslav Nehoda; and Deputy Governor of Luhansk Oblast Olha Lishyk.

The event will take place at the Hofburg Conference Centre's Neuer Saal, and is open to the media. Journalists interested in attending the event should register by e-mail to Liana.Khorovytska@osce.org, by 17:00, Friday, 1 March 2019.

The event is organized by Ukraine’s Delegation to the OSCE with the support of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Georgia, Presidential Election, 28 October and 28 November 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the 28 October and 28 November 2018 presidential election in Georgia recommends a comprehensive review of the election legislation in order to eliminate gaps and ambiguities and ensure uniform application. The report, published on 28 February 2019, also recommends enhancing regulations on what constitutes acceptable speech during election campaigns.

The report notes that the election was competitive and professionally administered, candidates were able to campaign freely, fundamental freedoms were generally respected and voters had a genuine choice, although there were instances of misuse of administrative resources, and senior state officials from the ruling party were involved in the campaign.

The legal framework provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, even though key aspects of the second round were not sufficiently regulated, the report says. It recommends reviewing the appointment formula for lower-level commissions to ensure more balanced political representation.

The report notes that the use of negative, harsh and at times violent rhetoric significantly overshadowed the campaign, particularly for the second round, and went unaddressed by the authorities. Enhancing regulations on acceptable speech during election campaigns would allow reviewing potential cases of hate speech and, where appropriate, applying sanctions in a timely manner.

The report further recommends establishing an effective and timely mechanism for addressing complaints on cases of misuse of state resources during the campaign before an impartial and competent authority, to ensure a clear separation between party and state.  

Additional recommendations include aligning the number of commission members at each level to the actual need, introducing expedited deadlines to address campaign finance violations, making all decisions and legal opinions of the media regulator publicly available, reviewing the legal framework for election dispute resolution and ensuring that voters cast their ballot free of fear of retribution.

For election day observation, ODIHR was joined by delegations from the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO, and a European Parliament delegation.

MINSK, 28 February 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 27 February 2019:

“I have repeatedly stated that last year the number of civilian casualties was reduced to the lowest level since the beginning of the conflict. This trend continues also in the current year.

Yet, on February 23, 2019, two civilians died and one was injured when a minivan detonated an explosive device on the road in the ‘grey zone’ very close to Olenivka checkpoint in the Donetsk region.

This tragic incident points to the indisputable importance of demining, in particular along the roads around the checkpoints.

Along with the demining issue, I would like to touch upon another aspect of entry-exit checkpoints. The number of crossings of the contact line via the existing checkpoints is constantly increasing.

In this regard, I call on the sides to take urgent measures to improve the capacity of the checkpoints, especially in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR).

These issues, along with the sustainability of the cease-fire, were today in the focus of the Security Working Group.

The Humanitarian Working Group also discussed the question of improving the conditions for crossing the contact line. Of course, the topic of exchange of detainees was also duly considered.

The Economic Working Group considered topical issues of water deliveries, including the audit for the “Voda Donbassa” company to be conducted according to the previously agreed schedule. Another discussion topic was the payment of pensions to residents of CADR and CALR.

Today, the Head of the ICRC in Ukraine, Alain Aeschlimann, also participated in the meetings of the Humanitarian and Economic Working Groups. He will soon leave his post. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Mr Aeschlimann for his valuable contribution to the solution of several important issues discussed in the TCG.

The Political Working Group took forward its exchanges on its well-known agenda, namely the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as stipulated by the Minsk agreements.”

STRASBOURG, France, 27 February 2019 – Presenting the priorities of the 2019 Slovak OSCE Chairmanship to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg today, Chairperson-in-Office and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Miroslav Lajčák called on all 47 Member States of the Council of Europe to defend institutions, rules and effective multilateralism. 

“Human rights”, he said speaking at Europe’s leading human rights organization, “need defence and renewal. So let´s continue the trek towards a future where democracy flourishes, autocracy fails and the human rights of every woman, man, boy and girl are guaranteed.”

Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe is currently preparing for its 70th anniversary. “For seven decades, this Council has been preserving and promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law. But – fortunately - for a long time now, it does not stand alone. Built on the same ideals of security and democratic governance – the OSCE tied together over a billion people spanning three continents,” – the Minister stated.

The two organizations “translate the words of human rights into the reality of people´s everyday lives” and “have close and solid co-operation” – he continued.

Praising the long-standing relations between the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office pointed out similar challenges facing the two organizations - from shrinking resources to maintaining trust and constructive dialogue between the participating or member States, despite their differences in mandate, membership or functions.

Before concluding his address, he urged all Member States to work together more closely: “Different characteristics must be seen and utilized as comparative advantages - creating space for complementarity of actions.”

While in Strasbourg, Lajčák also met with Council of Europe Secretary-General Jagland.