OSCE

410453 Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day consultation between the OSCE and Kosovo authorities on how to set up an Advance Passenger Information (API) system to detect and thwart the movement of foreign terrorist fighters was organized from 28 to 30 January.

Twenty-five representatives from relevant agencies with responsibility for passenger processing, including members of the Police and Customs Administration, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Agency for Personal Data Protection, as well as legal and IT experts from the Ministry of Internal Affairs participated in the consultation.

Organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department with the support of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, this was the third in a series of consultation meetings on this topic held across the OSCE area.

The main purpose of the consultation was to provide legal and technical support for the smooth implementation of the recommendations included in the roadmap for setting up an API system that was drafted during a workshop in Prishtinë/Priština from 20 to 22 February 2018.

An independent consultant analysed the existing laws on aviation security and identified ways for improving them to grant government officials the legal authority to collect, process and store passenger data in a way that the rights to privacy and data protection are guaranteed. Furthermore, participants reviewed and updated the roadmap based on the conclusions of the discussions and agreed on the next steps for implementing an API system.

The first day of meetings was attended by Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj and Ambassador Jan Braathu, Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. In his speech, Haradinaj highlighted the added value of API systems to combat global threats like terrorism and organized crime, and stressed the importance of close co-operation among law enforcement agencies to ensure its effectiveness.

API systems are electronic communications systems through which biographic data from a traveller’s passport and flight details are collected by airlines and transmitted to border control agencies before a flight’s departure or arrival.

The OSCE will continue working with local authorities across the OSCE area to develop API implementation plans as part of the Organization’s activities to enhance border security. The next API consultations will take place in Tashkent from 4 to 6 February and Chisinau from 18 to 20 March.

BELGRADE, 29 January 2019 – Concluding a three-day visit to Serbia, Samuel Goda, the Special Representative of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship on Youth and Security, highlighted the crucial role of youth in strengthening comprehensive security and co-operation. Goda reiterated that for Slovakia young people are key for a safer future in Europe.

Learning about the OSCE Mission to Serbia’s cross-dimensional initiatives with and for youth, Goda stressed the importance of the OSCE’s work to promote youth rights, strengthen inclusive youth policies and build capacities of young women and men in the areas of non-discrimination, media literacy and regional co-operation.

“Young women and men have unique perspectives on many key challenges of today’s world. We have to listen to their ideas and concerns,” said Goda, recalling the OSCE Declaration on the Role of Youth in Contributing to Peace and Security Efforts adopted at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan last month.

In his meeting with the Head of the Mission to Serbia, Andrea Orizio, Goda welcomed the Mission’s strategic approach to youth mainstreaming.

Head of Mission Orizio said: “Because of the cross-cutting nature of the challenges facing youth, the OSCE Mission to Serbia has been investing in youth across all our programmes. We are in the process of launching an innovative initiative that will allow us to embed a youth focus in all our activities in a systematic way, from the conception to the implementation of projects. We hope to serve as a role model for the region."

After an interactive exchange with youth-led civil society organizations, Goda was received by the Serbian Minister of Youth and Sports, Vanja Udovičić, to discuss how to promote the participation of young people.

“The OSCE provided substantial input on defining the goals for our National Youth Strategy,” said Udovičić. “We are looking forward to continuing the co-operation on projects through which young men and women will be engaged in strengthening security and peacebuilding in the region.”

The Special Representative later participated in the annual meeting of OSCE Youth Focal Points from field operations in the Western Balkans.

“Through their participation in inclusive education programmes and inter-communal dialogue, young people are making a real difference on the ground. The Slovak Chairmanship is committed to strengthening the organization’s ability to make better use of this expertise,” said Goda at the meeting. He spoke about the Chairmanship’s plans to support a young expert-led process, which will culminate in a Youth Forum in Bratislava.

While in Serbia, Goda also visited the city of Novi Sad to attend its inauguration as European Youth Capital. 

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Special Representative on Youth and Security represents a youth voice within the OSCE and advises the Chairperson-in-Office on youth policy issues. He advocates for systematic youth participation and the positive role youth can play throughout the whole conflict cycle and in protracted conflicts. Learn more at ww.osce.org/youth, Twitter: @OSCEyouthSR and Facebook: www.facebook.com/OSCEyouthSR and by following #OSCEyouth across social media networks.

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VIENNA, 29 January 2019 – The rapid digitalization process taking place across the OSCE area is generating substantial changes in all spheres of life and carries many security implications, including in the economic and environmental dimension, the Parliamentary Assembly’s Nilza de Sena and Elona Gjebrea-Hoxha said today in Vienna.

National parliaments must keep abreast of developments in this field and respond appropriately with relevant legislation, de Sena said in an address to the First Preparatory Meeting of the 27th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum (EEF). She highlighted that human beings should remain at the center of the digitalization process and drew attention to the sharp increase of energy consumption and digitalization’s impacts on the labour market. Moreover, de Sena stressed that legal protection of personal data must be duly addressed.

A member of parliament from Portugal and Chair of the OSCE PA’s Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment, de Sena was speaking at session four of the EEF meeting, being held this week under the theme, “Promoting economic progress and security in the OSCE area through energy co-operation, new technologies, good governance and connectivity in the digital era.”

She was joined in Vienna by Gjebrea-Hoxha, a member of parliament from Albania and Rapporteur of the OSCE PA’s economic and environmental committee. Gjebrea-Hoxha also spoke today at the EEF, noting that the economy and the environment should be issues of focus of all governments. She emphasized the role of parliamentarians in promoting security and appreciated the support and recommendations of the OSCE on topics that are related to the daily lives of citizens and which need to be addressed properly with the support of all OSCE structures in co-operation with each other.

Gjebrea-Hoxha and de Sena held a series of bilateral meetings on the margins of the EEF. They met Monday with Ambassador Kairat Sarybay, Chair of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Committee, and Ambassador Radomír Boháč, Chair of the OSCE Permanent Council. Today they met with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger and Vuk Zugic, Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.

In meetings, de Sena and Gjebrea-Hoxha have stressed that the OSCE area must be one of co-operation between OSCE countries and noted that the Organization can also serve as a trendsetter for the broader international community.

Satisfaction was expressed for the OSCE Slovak Chairmanship’s focus on the economic and environmental dimension as a priority. The PA members also expressed appreciation that the PA’s work was duly reflected in the latest Ministerial Council documents in this context, noting the need to continue advancing this good co-operation.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons was 7,766 at both BCPs. The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 8,277 to 7,766 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 194 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 24 this week (compared to 12 last week); 13 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 11 into Ukraine (79 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, four families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and three were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (308 compared to 327 observed during the previous week). There were 150 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 158 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Stakhanov- Kyiv and Kyiv.  

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 725 to 735 (239 at the Gukovo BCP and 496 at the Donetsk BCP); 390 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 345 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation.                                                                                           

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 32 (compared to 59 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 214 to 162: of the total number of trucks scanned, 97 trucks (60 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 65 trucks (40 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 123 to 107 vehicles; 58 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 49 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on four occasions, compared to same amount (four) last week; the OTs assessed that two trains was travelling to the Russian Federation and the other two to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OM also noticed vehicles with “DPR” plates and Belarusian licence plates.

On 25 January at 20:11 at Donetsk BCP, one police vehicle entered the BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle went behind the main building and was no longer visible to the OTs. At 20:30, the police vehicle returned from the area of the main building heading towards the Russian Federation. Later, same day at 20:39, the OTs observed one ambulance arriving at the BCP from the Russian Federation, which parked outside the main building. At 20:57 the same day, the ambulance returned in the direction of the Russian Federation. Due to parked trucks and buses, it was not possible to observe any more detail.

On 28 January at 08:00 at Donetsk BCP, the OTs observed one civilian car with a red flag and inscription “Referendum for Donbas” on the side of the vehicle. The side window was open with the flag attached to a wooden pole. The vehicle crossed the BCP from the direction of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 25 December 2018 to 29 January 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).          

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM observed a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a man who died while crossing the contact line in Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted near Horlivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The highest number of ceasefire violations was recorded in areas west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), while the highest number of explosions was recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, compared with the previous 24 hours, when the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, including one explosion.

Man died while crossing the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

The SMM followed up on reports that a man (68 years old) died while crossing the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on 28 January. At the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), a representative of an international organization said that a man had collapsed at 13:45 near a humanitarian container used as a heating point and had not been able to be revived, despite having been provided first aid. A police officer at the same location told the SMM that the man had been traveling to non-government-controlled areas with his wife and son and that his body had been taken to the morgue in Stanytsia Luhanska.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned in the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

26 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• 14 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 28 December 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

26 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) stationary inside the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) waiting to be loaded onto trains.

28 January

The SMM saw:

• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a military compound near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk) and
• a military truck towing a mortar (2B9)  near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

26 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 19 tanks (18 T-64 and one T-72), 11 towed mortars (120mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at a training area near Buhaivka (weapons in violation seen at the same location, see above) and
• 11 tanks (ten T-64 and one T-72 with main gun removed) at a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 28 December 2018).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

28 January

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Saxon) about 3.5km north-east of Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck and two APCs (a BTR-60 and a Saxon), all in areas north-west of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk);
• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-1 and a BMP variant) and an APC military ambulance (MT-LB type) on the eastern outskirts of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military vehicle on an APC (MT-LB) chassis west of Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

28 January

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military truck in Luhansk city.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to water pipelines near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) and to facilitate the inspection of water wells at a pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Public gathering in honour of Maidan activist

In Kyiv, on 26 January, the SMM observed about 80 people (mostly men, about 20-50 years-old) marching from Mykhailivska Square to an area near Dynamo Stadium in tribute to a Maidan activist who lost his life on 22 January 2014. Some participants were wearing camouflage military-style uniforms and others were carrying torches as well as flags, including those of the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People's Self-Defence and the Right Sector. The SMM observed 15 police officers present along the route and a bus of about 30 police officers in riot gear near the stadium. The SMM did not observe any incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an armed man wearing camouflage clothing told the SMM that it had to leave the area because his “superior” was not informed about the SMM’s arrival. The SMM explained its mandate, and the armed man then asked the SMM to wait. About ten minutes later, another man in camouflage clothing told the SMM it had to leave the area, as he had spoken with “people in Donetsk”, and that the SMM had no right to be present at the checkpoint or speak with civilians present.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of the majority of the SMM cameras throughout the reporting period.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its   camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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BRATISLAVA, 29 January 2019 – Strengthening the security of Jewish people and communities, and the roles that education and Holocaust remembrance, media and social media, and civil society can play in combating anti-Semitism are the focus of a major conference to be opened by OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, in Bratislava on 5 February.

The conference is the first to be organized by Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship and will bring together government representatives, political leaders, as well as stakeholders from academia, civil society and the media to discuss diverse and complementary approaches to addressing anti-Semitism.

The participants will review the relevance of these approaches to the domestic contexts of OSCE participating States, and their applicability to strategies promoting tolerance and non-discrimination.

The conference is organized with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

Alongside the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Minister Miroslav Lajčák the conference will open with remarks by: Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director; Ronald S. Lauder, President of the World Jewish Congress; Igor Rintel, President of the Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Slovakia; and Rabbi Andrew Baker, Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Anti-Semitism.

Media representatives are invited to cover the conference’s six opening speakers starting at 15:00 on Tuesday, 5 February 2019 at the Grand Hotel River Park, Dvořákovo nábrežie 6, Bratislava.

Media representatives wishing to attend must complete the registration form by 1 February, available at: https://www.cognitoforms.com/ODIHR1/CiOConferenceOnAntiSemitism2019

For further details, please contact:

Róbert Zoľák, at Slovakia’s Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs at +421 918 660 634 or robert.zolak@mzv.sk

or

Samuel Pavlíček, of Slovakia’s Vienna-based OSCE Chairmanship team, at +43 1 368 94 33 349 (telephone), +43 660 789 7544 (mobile) or samuel.pavlicek@mzv.sk

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A three-day national Table-top exercise on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes began on 29 January 2019 in Tashkent. The exercise, for some 45 representatives of the parliament, judges, investigators, law enforcement officers, relevant state institutions and agencies, the ICT industry, civil society, youth organizations, academia, and the media, is organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan in co-operation with the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department.

The exercise will focus on developing national capacities to counter terrorist content online by enhancing international co-operation and the sharing of best practices in engaging with private companies and other non-state actors.

“As always, the OSCE promotes sharing of best practices among participating States,” said Ambassador John MacGregor, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan. “This event does precisely that, by providing information to state, academic, media, and civil society representatives. Moreover, there is recognition of the vital importance of further improving the role of public-private partnerships – for example, by working with social media companies like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Telegram, VKontake, and Odnoklassniki - in countering the use of the internet for terrorist purposes.”

The exercise centres on a fictional and interactive scenario developed by the Action against Terrorism Unit in collaboration with the Asia-Pacific Foundation. It serves as a realistic and strategic-level case study that is based on real-world events and emerging security threats relevant to Central Asia.

“Striking a fair balance between the methods to fight against terrorism and violent extremism online and protecting human rights can certainly be a challenging process”, said Rasa Ostaruskaite, Co-ordinator of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department. “This task can only succeed by taking a ‘whole-of-society’ approach when all stakeholders are fully involved from the start in the design of relevant responses.”

The exercise will include a number of presentations from international experts from Canada, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as advisers from the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. They will highlight relevant best practices on effectively addressing the threats posed by the exploitation of the Internet by terrorists while respecting privacy and freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and religion or belief, as well as the need to preserve global connectivity and the free and secure flow of information.

The exercise’s findings will lead to the creation of a road map outlining ways to improve the efficiency of efforts to address the threats posed by the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. They will help policymakers in formulating relevant, human-rights compliant and gender mainstreamed policies and frameworks on preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism online, and to integrate these recommendations into broader strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism.  

The seminar is part of a joint project with Uzbekistan aimed at providing assistance to national law enforcement agencies and relevant institutions from the non-governmental sector in building the capabilities of practitioners to effectively respond to terrorism-related threats in compliance with human rights and the rule of law.

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period.
• Between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM observed damage from gunfire in residential areas in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. 
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area. 
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area in Donetsk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted near Kostiantynivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violationswere recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and south-east of Svitlodarsk, west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)(see the disengagement areas section below).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement areas section below).

Between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours. 

Damage from gunfire to residential buildings in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 26 January, at 59 Naberezhna Street in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw two fresh impacts in two south-east-facing walls (close to the front door) of a single-storey house, assessed as caused by small-arms fire. The SMM also saw older shrapnel damage to the same walls. The owners of the house (a couple in their fifties) showed the SMM a bullet which they said they had found on the ground below one of the impacts. They told the SMM that their house had been hit twice by gunfire on 24 January and that they are afraid to leave their residence past the late afternoon hours due to the ongoing gunfire. 

On the same day, at 13 Vojkova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw bullet holes in five west-facing windows (one bullet hole on the first floor, two on the third floor and two on the fourth floor) of a five-storey residential building. In a second five-storey residential building (next to the first one), the SMM saw a bullet hole in a north-facing window frame located on the second floor. The Mission assessed the damage as recent and to have been caused by small-arms rounds. According to three residents of the buildings (two women and one man in their sixties), the windows were hit in the early evening hours of 11 January. A resident of the damaged apartment on the first floor of the first building said that at the time she had been hiding with her two grandchildren in a back room of the apartment due to the ongoing gunfire.

On 27 January, on the playing field of the stadium in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (and 60m south-east of the closest residential house), the SMM saw a fresh crater (1.5m in diameter), assessed to have been caused by the impact of a mortar round or recoilless-gun (SPG-type) fired from a north-north-easterly direction. At the location, three civilians (two men and one woman, aged 20-40) told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 27 January.

Disengagement areas[2]

Between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 23 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 40 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east and east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

In the morning of 27 January, positioned about 3.5km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard 35 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-east and west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

On 26 and 27 January, positioned close to the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

27 January

The SMM saw:

• 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

25 January

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• two probable surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Syrotyne (71km north-west of Luhansk).

26 January

The SMM saw:

• five MLRS (BM-21) inside a military compound near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk) and
• three towed mortars  (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) loaded on three military trucks near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

27 January

The SMM saw: 

• 11 self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) at a railway station in Kostiantynivka and
• five self-propelled mortars (2S9) near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

25 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four armoured combat vehicles (undetermined variants) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk);
• an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk); and
• five armoured combat vehicles (undetermined variants) near Toshkivka (60km north-west of Luhansk).

26 January

The SMM saw:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM variants) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) on the northern edge of Chermalyk
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) loaded on a military truck near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

25 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) near Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk)

26 January

The SMM saw:

• two military vehicles with electronic warfare equipment (one with an antenna mast and the other with a square box for an antenna mast on its roof) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 26 and 27 January, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas outside of Government control

On 26 January, while at a border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 73 cars (eight with Ukrainian and 40 with Russian Federation licence plates, and 25 with “DPR” plates), 14 covered cargo trucks (eight with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Bulgarian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) and 14 pedestrians exiting Ukraine as well as 24 cars (two with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, and 14 with “DPR” plates), a bus with “DPR” plates and six pedestrians  entering Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM did not observe any vehicles or pedestrians crossing in either direction. 

The SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point in Chonhar

On 23 January, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point with Crimea in Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson).

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access: 

• On 26 January, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to a fenced cargo area at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM cameras in Svitlodarsk and Stanytsia Luhanska were not operational. Between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of the majority of the SMM cameras throughout the reporting period.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 28 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today strongly condemned the arson attack on the studios of the France Bleu Isère radio station in Grenoble, France.

Last night, the premises of the France Bleu Isère public radio station in Grenoble were completely burned down. No victims were reported, but the damage was extensive - broadcasters, journalists and technicians cannot currently use the premises.

The fire appears to have been started in two areas of the premises and the front door was forced. There has been no claim of responsibility for the attack so far.

“I strongly condemn this criminal attack against France Bleu Isère. I urge the authorities to do their utmost to identify and arrest the perpetrators who must be brought to justice,” said Désir. “Such an attack is exceptionally serious and could have had dramatic consequences for human life. It amounts to an unacceptable threat and pressure against the journalists of the public service radio station who provide independent and pluralistic information.”

The Representative recalled that this is not an isolated incident involving journalists in France. In recent weeks, several media premises and journalists have been attacked.

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Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan

SKOPJE, 28 January 2019 – The OSCE Mission to Skopje condemns attempts to market and sell the OSCE-sponsored Commentary to the 2010 Law on Criminal Procedure.

The Commentary issued in December 2018 is a comprehensive legal resource aiming to enable the consistent application of the Law on Criminal Procedure. The publication was produced by the OSCE Mission jointly with a number of national legal experts.

"The publication sponsored by the Mission will be distributed free-of-charge to the members of the legal community in the country," said Clemens Koja, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje. "The book, as well as other similar resources developed by the Mission, is intended to help them to contribute to strengthening the rule of law in the country," he added.

The Mission owns exclusive copyrights, titles and content related to the Commentary and strongly encourages the use of the official electronic version available at www.pf.ukim.edu.mk .

Hard copies of the publication will also be disseminated among legal practitioners in the coming days.

VIENNA, 28 January 2019 – Looking into how technological change impacts security was the focus of today’s First Preparatory Meeting of the 27th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum held in Vienna.

Under the theme “Promoting economic progress and security in the OSCE area through energy co-operation, new technologies, good governance and connectivity in the digital era” participants from the OSCE region, international organizations, civil society, academia and the business community discussed opportunities and threats related to rapid technological change, digitalization and innovation.

Opening the meeting on behalf of the 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, Slovak Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council Ambassador Radomír Boháč, highlighted the positive and negative aspects of technological innovation: “Thanks to new technologies human well-being, including longevity, education and affluence have increased over time. On the other hand, technologies are evolving and spreading so quickly through all sorts of platforms that they have often outgrown the control of their creators.”

In 2019, the Slovak OSCE Chair aims to work towards a safer future for all people in the OSCE region. “Innovations are unstoppable. Even a small country like Slovakia is the birthplace of many breakthrough technologies,” Ambassador Boháč continued.

Much of today’s discussions revolved around good governance and energy co-operation, with participants arguing that digitalization is leaving its mark on both.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger noted that “the impact of the digital economy on how we produce and consume energy is already clearly visible. Increasing the use of renewable energy can only work because digital technologies make both consumers and producers more flexible and responsive.”

Greminger added that, at the same time, the increased monitoring and data gathering capacities of new technologies show a clear need for good governance and better co-operation: “We need to ensure that the technology is safe and secure and that privacy rights are respected. Our success in addressing issues such as e-governance, economic connectivity, and green energy while promoting digital security will depend in large measure on whether we can interact with the private sector in a meaningful manner.”

The Economic and Environmental Forum is the main platform for engagement within the Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE. Its objectives are to identify needs and priorities, to raise awareness and to stimulate the political will of the 57 OSCE participating States in dealing with economic, environmental and security-related challenges, and to share best practices, as well as to provide a platform for dialogue with representatives of international organizations, business and academic communities, and civil society.

The second preparatory meeting will be held on 27 and 28 May in Bratislava, Slovakia. The concluding Forum will take place from 11 to 13 September 2019 in Prague.

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410159 Željka Šulc

The Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presented the Protected Documents Handbook developed with the support of the OSCE Mission to BiH, at an event in Sarajevo on 28 January 2019.

The purpose of the Handbook is to enhance the professional ability of the BiH Border Police officers to detect new document forging techniques and improve their knowledge of the latest document protection technologies. The Handbook is a part of the Border Police’s efforts to stay abreast of the continuous introduction of ever more sophisticated physical, optical and electronic document protection techniques in this field and to raise awareness of the adaptability of criminals to the new technologies.

“The abuse of identification documents presents a transnational threat to security, as it can be used for committing crimes, including those related to illegal migration, human trafficking and smuggling. Since forged travel documents are most frequently used during state border crossing, their detection is a key element of border control and a prerequisite for its efficiency,” said Sanja Fitzgerald, Project Officer in the Security Co-operation Unit of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

“The Handbook provides explanations, illustrated with photographs, of the methods of designing protected documents, including all printing techniques, both conventional and digital, as well as protective features. Special attention is paid to the ways in which protected documents may be forged and how to verify whether they are genuine or not. It also explicates the latest trends in forgery, such as Morphing, which is not widely known, but is increasingly used in the course of illegal migrations," highlighted Emir Kulaglić, a police officer with the BiH Border Police, who is one of the authors of the Handbook.

Kulaglić further said that the Handbook will be available to BiH Border Police officers at all border crossing points both in print and in electronic version form, in order for the officers to learn about its content, increase their knowledge and use it during their performance of everyday document control tasks.

Other authors include Selvedin Sakić from the Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Nenad Šajtinac, Miloš Voštinić and Miloš Cvetković of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Serbia.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The role of women in the political and decision-making processes and the techniques to improve professional skills to assume leadership positions was the focus of a training seminar which concluded on 28 January 2019 in Shymkent, Kazakhstan.

The three-day event was organized by Kazakhstan’s “Women’s resource centre”, non-governmental organization, with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana. It gathered some 25 representatives of local administration, business structures, public associations and students from the Turkestan region.

The seminar was designed to broaden participants’ understanding of the key components of leadership, the tools and strategies of effective political campaigns and political ethics, as well as to develop and practice skills in negotiation and effective communication.

The event was part of the Programme Office’s continuous efforts to support gender mainstreaming and economic empowerment initiatives in the host country. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Damage to a house in Chermalyk and small-arms damage to a hospital in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations and observed newly dug trenches inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable maintenance works to essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access in all three disengagement areas continued.*

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Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in south-westerly and westerly directions of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including at least 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (14 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and north-north-west of Kadiivka (non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk). Positioned in Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 31km west of Luhansk), the SMM also heard at least ten outgoing explosions and salvos of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and ten explosions assessed as impacts of MLRS rockets, all at an assessed range of 5-10km south (assessed as live-fire training exercises outside the security zone but with the weapons being in violation of withdrawal lines).

Damage to a house in Chermalyk and small-arms damage to hospital windows in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

In Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at 25 Nikitina Street a man (in his sixties) showed the SMM eight holes in a south-south-east-facing external wall of his single-storey house. The SMM could not assess if the damage was fresh, the type of projectile(s) that caused the holes or the direction of fire. The man told the SMM that he had been at home with his wife during the afternoon of 23 January when he had heard impacts on his house.

At a functioning hospital on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed holes and broken glass in two windows on a north-north-west facing wall (one on the first floor and one on the third floor). The SMM assessed that the two holes and broken glass were caused by small-arms fire. Staff at the hospital told the SMM that they had discovered the damage on 23 January.

Disengagement areas[2]

Inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), on 24 January an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a recently-dug trench about 200m south of the northern edge and about 500m west of its eastern edge, and another recently-dug trench about 150m south of its northern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.   

On 25 January, positioned on the south-western edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 50 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-2.1km south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of an undetermined weapon and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 5-5.5km south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

25 January

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) being transported north on a truck  near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk),
• an anti-tank guided missile system (9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm) on the north-western edge of Chermalyk.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

25 January:

The SMM saw:

• four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at a railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk), one loaded on the train platform and three lined up to be loaded,
• three self-propelled mortars (2S9) on trucks, five self-propelled mortars (2S9) loaded on railway flatbeds and three self-propelled mortars (2S9) on a railway ramp, all at a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

25 January:

The SMM saw:

• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites:

A heavy weapons permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region:

25 January:

• seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

25 January

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) north-west of Chermalyk;
• an APC (BTR-60) being towed near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-60) being towed near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed mine hazard signs

In north-eastern Sopyne (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol), next to a transformer station and an antenna (about 30m tall) assessed as for telecommunications, the SMM observed two mine hazard signs affixed to a fence. The signs were red, with “Danger Mines” written in Russian in white lettering. About 3km north of Lyse (non-government-controlled, 22km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a mine hazard sign for the first time, written in Russian and placed about 2m north of the road.

SMM facilitation of maintenance works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one minivan (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine as well as two cars (one with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates) and two passenger buses (route marked in Russian as Moscow to Donetsk) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 26 January 2019 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today welcomed the thorough police action which has led to the arrest of the alleged instigator of the arson attack against journalist Milan Jovanović in Serbia.

Yesterday, law enforcement authorities arrested Dragoljub Simonović, President of Grocka municipality, who is suspected of ordering the arson attack on the house of Milan Jovanović, a correspondent of the news portal Žig info.

This follows the arrest of three persons for this crime in December of last year.

„I welcome the effective police investigation in identifying and bringing to justice all those responsible for this crime, the alleged perpetrators and the instigator. This is a very positive step forward in the fight against impunity for attacks against journalists in Serbia“, said Désir.

The Representative also commended the engagement of President Aleksandar Vučić in resolving this case and his strong statement yesterday that violence against journalists will not be tolerated, that journalists will be protected and attacks punished most severely.

„It is essential that all attacks against journalists are publicly and strongly condemned at the highest political level, to make it clear to everyone that they will not be tolerated and that all those involved will be brought to justice”, said Désir. “I will continue working closely with the Serbian authorities and all relevant media stakeholders on improving the media freedom situation and the safety of journalists as its key pillar“.

The arson attack against journalist Milan Jovanović that took place on 12 December 2018 was publicly condemned by the Representative. (see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/406535)

 The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more

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DAVOS, Switzerland, 25 January 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovakia’s Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák and OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger today welcomed the ratification of the Prespa Agreement by the Hellenic Parliament and commended the governments in Athens and Skopje for their commitment to pursuing peace and stability in the region. 

“This success demonstrates that vision, courage and dialogue help solve even the most complicated problems and that leaders can deliver a more secure and prosperous future for people,” said Lajčák.

Greminger added: “This achievement represents a victory for diplomacy and strengthens stability in the region.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line at the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable maintenance works to essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a border crossing point near non-government-controlled Izvaryne.*
• In Kyiv, the SMM followed the sentencing hearing of the former President of Ukraine.

Ceasefire violations

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

During the day on 24 January, positioned at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions about 500m west of its position. At the time, about 250 civilians, ten buses and 40 cars were present at the location.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (14), compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk) and inside and close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas

On the evening of 23 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four explosions (assessed as airbursts) and six projectiles, all at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area) as well as two projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 23-24 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions as well as 19 bursts and 22 shots of small-arms fire 5km south-west and west-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 24 January, positioned near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 45 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km east and south-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

23 January:

The SMM saw:

• • a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Topolivka ( 80km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

23 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• • 22 tanks (12 T-72 and ten T-64) and about 150 crates of ammunition (probable 125mm rounds) at a training area north-east of Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019).
  • a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 2km south-east of Myrne; and
  • 20 tanks (nine T-72 and 11 T-64) of which four were being used to conduct exercises (two were fitted with KMT mine ploughs), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk);

Indications of military presence in the security zone

Government-controlled areas

23 January

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Long queues of civilians at checkpoints

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw about 1,000 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and no people queueing in the opposite direction. About two hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 1,000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 600 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of maintenance works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus with Ukrainian licence plates (with 40 passengers on board), two cars (with Russian Federation licence plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine as well as 14 pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Sentencing hearing of former President of Ukraine in Kyiv

The SMM followed a court hearing which took place in the Obolonskyi District Court of Kyiv for the trial in absentia against the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. The defendant had been charged under relevant provisions of Articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine with high treason (Article 111, paragraph 1), planning, preparing and waging of aggressive war (Article 437, paragraph 2) and trespassing against the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (Article 110). The court found the defendant guilty of the first two charges and acquitted him of the third one and sentenced him to 13 years of imprisonment (the defendant can appeal the verdict within 30 days). The SMM saw 20 law enforcement officers inside and about 50 law enforcement officers in front of the court building, some of whom were checking vehicles on Marshala Tymoshenka Street, as well as two police trucks, two buses and a fire engine parked nearby. It also saw that the majority of observers in the courtroom were media representatives.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• • At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• • The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• In Kyiv, the SMM followed the sentencing hearing of the former President of Ukraine.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a border crossing point near non-government-controlled Izvaryne.*
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable maintenance works to essential civilian infrastructure.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line at the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.

Ceasefire violations

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

During the day on 24 January, positioned at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions about 500m west of its position. At the time, about 250 civilians, ten buses and 40 cars were present at the location.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (14), compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk) and inside and close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas

On the evening of 23 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four explosions (assessed as airbursts) and six projectiles, all at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area) as well as two projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 23-24 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions as well as 19 bursts and 22 shots of small-arms fire 5km south-west and west-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 24 January, positioned near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 45 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km east and south-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

23 January:

The SMM saw:

• • a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Topolivka ( 80km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

23 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• • 22 tanks (12 T-72 and ten T-64) and about 150 crates of ammunition (probable 125mm rounds) at a training area north-east of Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019).
  • a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 2km south-east of Myrne; and
  • 20 tanks (nine T-72 and 11 T-64) of which four were being used to conduct exercises (two were fitted with KMT mine ploughs), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk);

Indications of military presence in the security zone

Government-controlled areas

23 January

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Long queues of civilians at checkpoints

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw about 1,000 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and no people queueing in the opposite direction. About two hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 1,000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 600 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of maintenance works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus with Ukrainian licence plates (with 40 passengers on board), two cars (with Russian Federation licence plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine as well as 14 pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Sentencing hearing of former President of Ukraine in Kyiv

The SMM followed a court hearing which took place in the Obolonskyi District Court of Kyiv for the trial in absentia against the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. The defendant had been charged under relevant provisions of Articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine with high treason (Article 111, paragraph 1), planning, preparing and waging of aggressive war (Article 437, paragraph 2) and trespassing against the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (Article 110). The court found the defendant guilty of the first two charges and acquitted him of the third one and sentenced him to 13 years of imprisonment (the defendant can appeal the verdict within 30 days). The SMM saw 20 law enforcement officers inside and about 50 law enforcement officers in front of the court building, some of whom were checking vehicles on Marshala Tymoshenka Street, as well as two police trucks, two buses and a fire engine parked nearby. It also saw that the majority of observers in the courtroom were media representatives.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• • At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• • The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

read more

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Bosnia and Herzegovina, General Elections, 7 October 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the 7 October 2018 general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina highlights the lack of proper follow-up to previous ODIHR election-related assessments and recommends a comprehensive review of legislation to prevent the abuse of public resources for campaign purposes.

The report, published on 25 January 2019, also recommends abolishing discriminatory ethnicity- and residency-based restrictions of the right to stand for elections, in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations, as well as judgments of the European Court on Human Rights.

While acknowledging the overall efficiency of the election administration, the report encourages revising the way polling station commissions are formed, to ensure their impartiality. The report also recommends providing adequate resources to the Central Election Commission and strengthening recruitment and training methods to ensure the necessary professionalism of election management bodies.

The report encourages political parties to follow the law and refrain from exercising pressure on voters. It calls on the authorities to investigate allegations of electoral violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively, and to hold perpetrators accountable.

The report recommends a revision of voting procedures to fully guarantee the freedom and secrecy of voters’ choices. It also notes a need to enhance voter education programmes, including to prevent family voting and irregular assisted voting, and encourages the authorities to ensure that polling stations are fully accessible for persons with disabilities.

The report calls for greater transparency and accountability of campaign finance and recommends specific bank accounts be used for all campaign finance activities. It further recommends introducing proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for financial violations.

For election day observation, ODIHR was joined by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

WARSAW, 25 January 2018 – Enhanced educational efforts and stronger condemnation of anti-Semitism and all forms of intolerance must be part of any commemoration of the Holocaust, OSCE officials said ahead of Sunday’s International Holocaust Remembrance Day. Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and Rabbi Andrew Baker, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Anti-Semitism, stressed in a statement today that this was the truest way to commemorate the victims of genocide under the Nazi regime.

“We cannot forget the genocide of Europe’s Jews and of all the victims of the Nazi regime. Millions were killed simply because of who they were,” Gisladottir said. “As we commemorate the victims of the Holocaust, we must recommit ourselves to taking action against anti-Semitism. Governments and civil society must work together to address anti-Semitism and all forms of intolerance and discrimination, to ensure we will never again witness such atrocities.”

Underlining the need for such work, Rabbi Baker stressed that this must come in the form of concrete, comprehensive measures.

“Our remembrance on this Holocaust Commemoration Day must also be a call to action. Anti-Semitic incidents are increasing, Jewish communities are fearful of attacks and uncertain about their future,” he said. “We know where hatred, prejudice and anti-Semitism can lead. But knowing alone is not enough. This must be coupled with strong and comprehensive measures – including security and education – and a commitment that ‘Never Again’ is not an empty phrase but our guiding principle.”

Gísladóttir also stressed the importance of education: “We need to make sure that the history of the Holocaust is taught in every school, in every country, so that our children learn the importance of open and tolerant, democratic and inclusive societies, based on respect for human rights.”

“It is also important to honour those who had the courage to act and protect Jews, Roma and Sinti and other victims of the Nazi regime. Their individual acts of heroism are a powerful example of the ability each of us has to do good in the face of unspeakable evil,” the ODIHR Director added. “The Holocaust provides the strongest example of unbridled prejudice. Each and every one of us, especially those in positions of authority, must take responsibility for addressing anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance."

Gísladóttir and Rabbi Baker will be speaking at a conference on combating anti-Semitism in the OSCE region, which is being organized by Slovakia, as the 2019 OSCE Chair, in consultation with ODIHR. The conference will take place in Bratislava on 5 and 6 February.

ODIHR works actively to promote remembrance and education about the Holocaust and the Roma and Sinti genocide. More information on these efforts can be found on the ODIHR website, at: www.osce.org/odihr. 

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