OSCE

417140 Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek supported the bringing together of more than 80 representatives of religious organizations and communities of Kyrgyzstan for a tree-planting event in the capital on 6 April 2019. Some 100 trees were planted during the event, which aimed at enhancing inter-confessional dialogue, promoting inter-religious tolerance and raising public awareness about the denominations represented in the country.

The event was jointly organized with the State Committee for Religious Affairs in partnership with the Bishkek Mayor’s Office and with the support of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) in Kyrgyzstan.

This is the first of several public events to be held under the auspices of the Inter-Confessional Council of Kyrgyzstan. The Council was established in 2018 with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek. It brings together representatives of 17 religious organizations from across the country, and its main goal is to strengthen interfaith dialogue, foster the principles of respect for various beliefs, build tolerance, as well as work towards the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism.

417131

Some 70 experts and practitioners involved in multilingual education shared their experiences at a conference on “Multilingual education in the OSCE region: experiences and perspectives for Moldova” on 11 April 2019 in Chisinau. The conference was organized by the office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research of Moldova.

The participants included representatives of regional education authorities and people working to develop educational content across Moldova; representatives of national minority communities; and international experts from Estonia, Georgia, Italy, the Netherlands, North Macedonia and Spain.

Opening the conference, Moldova’s Minister of Education, Culture and Research Monica Babuc said: “Creating the necessary conditions for a balanced approach to enable national minorities to learn the Romanian language and their mother tongue is one of the priorities of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research. In this regard, multilingual education brings added value to all citizens and is a tool to enhance mutual understanding and tolerance.“

The participants shared their experiences of multilingual education, both in Moldova and across the OSCE region, and discussed recommendations for the future of multilingual education in Moldova.

HCNM Director Christophe Kamp highlighted the concepts and good practices in multilingual education that the office of the High Commissioner and its partners have identified, tested and promoted over the past 25 years in the OSCE region.

“This conference offers an opportunity to engage in an open and critical discussion about the manner in which these multilingual education models and approaches can be applied and further developed in practice in Moldova,” he said.

International experts presented a variety of multilingual education models that can be adapted to accommodate diversity in different regional contexts.

The High Commissioner’s office emphasizes the need to strike a balance between preserving and developing the languages of minorities and creating opportunities to learn the State language in all multi-ethnic states so that all citizens can be fully engaged in public life, feel that they belong to their socisety and realize their full potential.

The conference was an opportunity for the High Commissioner’s office to deepen its co-operation with the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research, based on the understanding that multilingual education can offer solutions for the integration of diverse societies.

VIENNA, 11 April 2019 – The benefits and potential of biometric technology in countering terrorism, and how to responsibly use and share collected biometric data, are being explored at a two-day conference which launched today in Vienna. More than 200 decision-makers, policy-makers, experts in biometrics and private sector representatives from the OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation are taking part.

The ID@Borders and Future of Travel Conference is organized jointly by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department and the Biometrics Institute.

The conference is designed to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017), a milestone decision in the international efforts to detect and prevent the movement of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. The Resolution decided that States shall develop and implement systems to collect biometric data (such as fingerprints, photographs and facial recognition) in order to responsibly and properly identify terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters, and develop watch lists or databases of known and suspected terrorists.

The Resolution also calls upon international and regional organizations like the OSCE to provide technical assistance, resources, and capacity-building to States in order to implement such systems.

“The goal of the conference is to help the OSCE participating States to implement Resolution 2396: Preventing the movement of terrorists, building capacities where needed, and encouraging good practices in information sharing,” said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger. “The Biometrics Institute and the OSCE are a good match. The Institute brings its subject-matter expertise and network of biometrics professionals, while the OSCE is an inter-governmental organization with 57 States. We use politically-binding decisions to implement UN Resolutions, and have the local expertise to build capacity on the ground.”

Lukáš Parízek, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic and Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, stressed: “Part of our role, as the OSCE Chairmanship, is to promote dialogue and co-operation where it is most needed. In order for border security to be most effective and efficient, we need real information sharing. That’s where this conference can make a difference. It is bringing together countries, which are already using advanced biometric technology, with those who are in the development phase.”

Isabelle Moeller, Chief Executive of the Biometrics Institute, said: “The Institute’s mission is to promote the responsible and ethical use of biometrics in an international and independent forum. We are a multi-stakeholder community from around the world, not only of government agencies but also suppliers, and other user sectors such as aviation and travel as well as academics, privacy advocates and regulators. Over the past 17 years we have closely engaged with many countries on border management discussions and good practices. Finding like-minded partners who can help support our outreach was why we partnered with the OSCE for this conference.”

Ahead of the conference, experts from the OSCE and the Biometrics Institute conducted a half-day specialized training course for representatives and experts of States not yet using biometric technology.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh damage caused by probable mortar or automatic grenade launcher rounds to residential houses in Pervomaisk.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• It observed that the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka had re-opened following its closure on 6 April.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a compound in Luhansk city and at a checkpoint near Yasynuvata.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period (about 310 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north of Donetsk city and in areas south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 380), compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage to residential houses in Pervomaisk

On 9 April, at 59 Luhova Street on the northern outskirts of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), about 1km south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three shattered north-facing windows and a 1m by 0.5m hole in the north-facing side of the roof of a one storey house, as well as marks on a fence about 3m north of the house. About 5m east of the house, in the same compound, the SMM saw two shattered west-facing windows in another one-storey house. The SMM assessed that all damage was fresh and caused by rounds from a probable 82mm mortar or automatic grenade launcher; however, it could not assess the direction of fire. A resident of the house (man, 70 years old) told the SMM that he had heard shelling on the morning of 9 April.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 9 April and during the day on 10 April, in two locations close to the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM recorded nine projectiles and four undetermined explosions, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

Positioned about 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed distance of 5km south-west, unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area.

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

10 April

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in the north-western outskirts of Komyshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

9 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) about 20m from a residential house near Kalynivka (55km north-east of Donetsk);
• two multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk); and
• two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vynohradne (34km east of Donetsk).

10 April

The SMM saw six MLRS (BM-21 Grad) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the former Luhansk airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 10 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted five tanks (type undetermined) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (probable 9K37) near Dachenske (49km north-west of Donetsk).

10 April

The SMM saw:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (a 9K37 and a S-300) near Lisne (20km north-west of Mariupol) and

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) in a compound in Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk).

9 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 15 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk) and
• ten tanks in a training area near Pokrovka.

10 April

The SMM saw seven tanks (type undetermined) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at the former Luhansk airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019); 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

8 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (one BMP-1 and two probable BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

10 April

The SMM saw:

• five APCs (BTR-70) in Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk);
• five IFVs (three BMP-1 and two BMP variants) in the eastern outskirts of Popasna;
• an IFV (BMP-2) south-east of Valuiske (20km north-east of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-80) in Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of ten probable military-type armoured vehicles (type unidentified) in a training area near Novoselivka (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 March 2019).

8 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-70) and an armoured communication vehicle (R-145) on an APC (MT-LB) chassis near Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk).

9 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

10 April

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A) in Luhansk city, and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

Re-opening of the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka

The SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) had re-opened on 10 April after its closure on 6 April following the wounding of two men (a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer and a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier) by gunfire at the EECP (see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019). The Mission saw lower than usual amounts of traffic at the EECP, with 20 civilian vehicles and about 100 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and fewer than ten vehicles queuing to exit government-controlled areas. At the checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) on the same day, the SMM saw 200-250 civilian vehicles and 50-60 pedestrians queuing to exit non-government-controlled areas and about 20 vehicles queuing to enter non-government-controlled areas.

Mines near Shchastia and unexploded ordnance spotted near Uzhivka

On 8 April, south of the bridge in Shchastia, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) across road H-21, south of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019).

In Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that a previously observed tailfin of a 120mm mortar bomb protruding from the asphalt on the edge of the road was still present.

In the eastern outskirts of Popasna, the SMM saw that four of the previously observed five anti-tank mines (TM-62) south of road T0504 had been destroyed by probable ground fire and that the remaining anti-tank mine was without a fuse as a result of probable ground fire.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); to power lines near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) and near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk); as well as to water pipelines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) and near Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a compound where the SMM observed ACVs in Luhansk city, citing safety concerns.
• Two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) refused to let the SMM travel on road M-04 past the turn to Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), citing “orders from their superior”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 9-10 April, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as jamming, while flying over non-government-controlled Yelyzaveto-Mykolaivka (45km south-east of Donetsk),  Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk), Berehove (38km south-east of Donetsk) and Olhynske (55km south-east of Donetsk). [4]
• On 10 April, while following up on a civilian casualty, medical staff at a hospital in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) again refused to provide the SMM with information or allow the SMM to speak with the alleged civilian patient, citing the need for written permission from those in control.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the BiH Ministry of Defence organized a visit to the new ammunition testing laboratory in a Technical Workshop for Repair and Destruction of Ammunition (TROM Doboj) on 11 April 2019 in Doboj.

The laboratory was opened within the project for the Safety Upgrade of Ammunition and Weapons Storage Sites in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SAFE-UP), being implemented by the OSCE Mission to BiH.

Representatives of donor countries which financed the project, the BiH Armed Forces, EUFOR and NATO Headquarters had an opportunity to observe first-hand the application of the latest technology in examining the chemical stability of ammunition.

“Less than a year ago, in July 2018, the SAFE-UP Project provided for the establishment of a laboratory for chemical and thermal analysis of ammunition,” said Alexander Chuplygin, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH. “This significant achievement will help our BiH partners in the safe-keeping of ammunition, contributing to the safety of both the civilian population and military personnel.”

The SAFE-UP Project aims to improve safety and security at prospective weapons and ammunition storage sites in BiH. It is financed by 14 donor countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina as a host country: Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Switzerland and Turkey.

The OSCE Mission to BiH will continue to provide assistance in ensuring the sustainability of the Laboratory through training and equipment. The Mission will also continue the partnership with the BiH Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces to support their efforts in implementing the set of important strategic documents and plans.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Two members of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine injured and one reportedly dead after the detonation of an explosive device near Maiorsk.
• The SMM observed damage from mortar rounds to residential houses in Trokhizbenka and damage from gunfire to residential houses in Pikuzy.
• It recorded ceasefire violations and military presence inside the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas, as well as mines seen for the first time in the Petrivske disengagement area. 
• The SMM observed long queues of civilians at a checkpoint near Olenivka and saw that the entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove had re-opened.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM observed, for the first time, mines and unexploded ordnance near Krasnohorivka and Debaltseve.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and demining activities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. In addition, the Mission was denied access near non-government-controlled Shevchenko, Hryhorivka and Novoazovsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 460 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), north-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly and easterly directions of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period  (about 150 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Two members of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine injured and one reportedly dead after the detonation of an explosive device near Maiorsk

At the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) on road T-0513, the SMM saw two ambulances, two men (aged 20-30) in State Emergency Services of Ukraine uniforms lying on stretchers  and with injuries to their faces and upper limbs. The SMM also saw six Ukrainian Armed Forces members (four men and two women), including three with Red Cross insignia, standing next to the injured men. The SMM saw the soldiers provide first aid to both injured men prior to putting them in the ambulances. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that a third deminer had died after the detonation of an explosive device during demining activities that all three were conducting between Maiorsk and Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk). At the hospital in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, government-controlled, 67km north of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that two men (aged 20-30) had been admitted with injuries caused by an explosion and that one of them had lost both eyes and needed a surgery on his right arm.

Fresh damage from mortar rounds to residential houses in Trokhizbenka

On 8 April, on the western edge of Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk), at 152 Donetska Street, the SMM saw four shattered windows and fresh scratches in their wooden frames, as well as fresh marks assessed as shrapnel damage in the south-facing wall of a barn located about 33m north of a single-storey house and about 600m from a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 1m further north, the SMM saw a hole in the roof of a second barn. At 154 Donetska Street, about 55m north-east of another single-storey house, the SMM saw a fresh crater and scorch marks within a 15m radius of the crater, as well as scorched tree branches on the nearby ground. About 32m north of the same house, the SMM saw a hole (assessed as fresh damage) in the west side of the roof of a barn. At 156 Donetska Street, the SMM saw 10-15 holes in the east- and north-facing walls of a single-storey house (all assessed as fresh shrapnel damage).

At 166 Donetska Street (about 100m west of the previous house), in a field about 40m north of an abandoned single-storey house, the SMM saw a fresh crater with scorch marks around it. At 168 Donetska Street, the SMM saw five freshly shattered windows in the west-, north- and south-facing walls) of a single-storey house as well as a fresh crater about 5m west of the same house. At 237 Donetska Street (about 5m north of the previous house), the SMM saw a hole in the west-facing side of the roof of a single-storey house, assessed as fresh shrapnel damage, as well as a fresh crater about 75m west-south-west of the same house (and 12m south of a local road).

The SMM assessed all the craters and damage to residential houses as caused by mortar rounds fired from a south-south-easterly direction. Four residents of the above-mentioned street (three women and a man, aged 50-60) separately told the SMM that they had been in their houses with their families when shelling had occurred in the evening of 6 April. 

Fresh damage from gunfire to residential houses in Pikuzy

On the north-western edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk), at 26 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw the freshly burned interiors of a summer house,  a freshly burned and shattered north-facing window (with glass shards on the ground) and a burned and collapsed roof connecting the summer house to a main single-storey house. The SMM could not assess the cause of the damage. In the centre of Pikuzy, at 7 Peremohy Street, the SMM saw a hole in the tin roof of a barn located about 5m south-east of a house as well as scattered tin plates on the same roof. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by heavy-machine-gun fire from a north-westerly direction. At both locations, the owners of the houses (men, aged 60-70) said that shelling had occurred in the late morning hours of 5 April.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 8 April, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1), one north of the railway tracks and west of road T-316, with four people wearing camouflaged clothing assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in the vicinity, and the other two 550m and 750m north-east, respectively, of the abovementioned IFV and south of the railways tracks. The same UAV again spotted at least 12 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in two rows across road T-1316, about 200m south of the railway tracks. All IFVs and mines were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In the early morning of 9 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 14 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. The same day, positioned in five locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as 39 undetermined explosions and 69 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 8 April, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 200 anti-tank mines (TM-62) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), laid out in two rows running from north to south for about 300m, about 700m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1km east of its western edge. The UAV also again spotted 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows across the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 170m north of the disengagement area. On the northern side of the road, the UAV spotted 22 anti-tank mines (TM-62) as well as at least 150 anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the south side of the road which run from north to south in one row for about 500m and extend about 300m into the disengagement area. About 150m west of the aforementioned 11 anti-tank mines, the UAV also again spotted about 25 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in four rows across the road. (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 14 March 2018).

The same UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) inside the Petrivske disengagement area, about 1.2km east of its western edge and about 1.2km south of its northern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  

On 9 April, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-5km west-south-west, assessed as inside the Petrivske disengagement area. [3]   

On 9 April, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled

9 April

The SMM saw eight towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) at the railway station in Bakhmut (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

8 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 15 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk);
• seven MLRS (BM-21) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk); and
• three self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk). 

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (probable T-64) about 10m from a residential building on the eastern outskirts of Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

9 April

The SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika,122mm), seven MLRS (BM-21) and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

8 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• ten tanks (types undetermined) and three self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above) and
• four tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (see above).

9 April

The SMM saw six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and seven tanks (T-72) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (see above).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

5 April             

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near a residential building on the eastern outskirts of Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

8 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (Saxon) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km north-west of Luhansk).

9 April

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk);
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk); and
• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles  (BRDM-2) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

On 9 April, the SMM saw a green and yellow helicopter (assessed as a MI-2) flying from west to north at an altitude of 600m about 5km east-north-east of Raihorodka.

Situation of civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

On 9 April, the Mission again observed long queues of cars at a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). It saw that the queue of cars waiting to travel to government-controlled areas was about 3km long, and the queue of cars waiting to travel in the opposite direction was about 500m long. On the same day, the SMM saw that the entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) had been re-opened for civilian traffic. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019).

Unexploded ordnance seen for the first time near Debaltseve and Verkhnoshyrokivske

On 8 April, the SMM saw for the first time seven pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) assessed as MLRS rockets (six as Grad and one as Uragan, 220mm) protruding from the ground in a field on the eastern side of road M-03, about 3km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

On 9 April, about 1.2km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time a piece of UXO on a local road between Verkhnoshyrokivske and Pyshchevyk used by civilians. In a field about 3m south of the road, the SMM also observed for the first time two grenade launcher rounds (PG-7L): one lying on the ground and the tailfin of the second embedded in the ground.

Presence of mines

On 4 April, about 1km south-east of Krasnohorivka, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time eight anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows across a road between Krasnohorivka and Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 300 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows about 4km west of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol). About 1.5km north-east of Vodiane, the same UAV again spotted nine anti-tank mines laid across a road and again about 50 anti-tank mines laid out in four rows in the fields north and south of the road, as well as again about 90 anti-tank mines laid out in four rows north and south of a dirt track about 200m east of Vodiane. 

On 8 April, near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), about 2.5km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines laid out across the western lane of road H-21 as well as 42 anti-tank mines in a field south of the same road adjacent to the above-mentioned four mines. The same UAV again spotted at least eight anti-tank mines laid out across the same road about 550m north-west of the four mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); to water pipelines near Maiorsk and Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk); to power transmission lines near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) and Staromykhailivka (non-government controlled, 15km west of Donetsk); and to power lines near Holubivka and between Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), as well as to enable demining activities near the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 9 April, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw nine cars (eight with Ukrainian and one with Polish licence plates) and two pedestrians entering Ukraine, as well as 12 cars (four with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 40 minutes, the Mission saw four cars (one with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine, as well as two cars with “DPR” plates and two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.

The SMM observed a calm situation in areas south-east of Kherson

On 7 April, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

Gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv on 9 April, the SMM monitored a pre-announced public gathering by National Corps and Natsionalni Druzhyny (see SMM Daily Report 25 March 2019). The Mission saw about 800 people (mostly young men, aged 18-30), some of them wearing insignia of the above-mentioned groups and carrying banners critical of government officials, gathered at 1 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street. The SMM saw about half of the group start to march towards the headquarters of the State Security Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska Street while the other half marched towards the Office of the Prosecutor General at 13/15 Riznytska Street, the Ministry of Interior Affairs at 10 Akademika Bohomoltsa Street and the building of the Presidential administration at 11 Bankova Street. At these last three locations, the SMM heard participants expressing views criticial of the government. It observed an overall calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 9 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area and prevented the Mission from continuing westwards.
• On the eastern edge of Hryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing orders “not to let anyone enter” the settlement.
• On the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM on road E-58 and prevented it from continuing westward to Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), citing an “ongoing operation” in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared (see above for observations).

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations stopped the SMM. They allowed it to pass through the checkpoint after about an hour.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

MINSK, 10 April 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 10 April 2019:

“Discussion of the overall security situation and preparation for the announcement of the ceasefire on the occasion of Easter holidays formed the basis of today's activities of the Security Working Group.

As a result, the TCG agreed on the need to declare this ceasefire and agreed to hold an additional videoconference on 18 April 2019 to finalize the details of this ceasefire.

Experience shows that the sides’ political will is essential for an effective and long-lasting ceasefire. When it is the case, it can be easily achieved.

Moreover, the Working Group on Security discussed additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire and humanitarian demining.

The participants of the Economic Working Group expressed their concern over the situation the "Voda Donbasa" company in connection with power supply disruptions early this month.

Once again, I urge the sides to ensure the safety and sustainable operation of the "Voda Donbasa" company and all other vital civilian infrastructure facilities.

The Co-ordinator of the Humanitarian Working Group, Ambassador Toni Frisch, presented the results of his visit to the detention centres in the east of Ukraine on both sides of the contact line as of April 3 to 9. During the visit, he met detainees, their relatives and friends, as well as relatives of missing persons”.

416780 Communication and Media Relations Section

Current trends and challenges in securing and managing borders were highlighted at the two-day 13th Annual Meeting of the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Points Network, which concluded on 10 April 2019 in Bratislava.

The event brought together more than 100 participants from across the OSCE area.

Organized by Slovakia's 2019 OSCE Chair and the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, this year’s meeting focused on crisis management at the borders, combating trafficking in human beings, gender mainstreaming in the security sector and effective cross-border management tools and mechanisms for the 21st century.

Opening the meeting were the Director of the Border and Foreign Police of the Slovak Republic, Ladislav Csémi; Co-ordinator of OSCE Activities to Address Transnational Threats, Rasa Ostrauskaite; and Head of the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, Dennis Cosgrove.

“We live in the era of growing human mobility when women and men, children and elderly people travel and cross borders more frequently than ever before. It is imperative to ensure that border security and management is carried out in ways that are effective, consistent and firm, yet flexible when needed,” said Csémi.

Ostrauskaite said: “To increase security in the OSCE area, it is vital to address the phenomenon of trafficking in human beings, which remains a major concern for the OSCE participating States. We have to promote and ensure gender equality in border services as this will increase its operational effectiveness.”

In discussions with experts from the Slovak Interior Ministry’s Crisis Management Directorate General, the International Organization for Migration, the Refugees Initiative Regional Centre and the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre, the National Focal Points spoke about the level of preparedness for crises in their national services as well as the available mechanisms and tools addressing cross-border crises in the OSCE area.

With experts from Belgium, the OSCE Gender Section and Slovakia’s Interior Ministry, they explored the importance of women in border security, and looked at effective ways to include a gender perspective in border security and management and to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Furthermore, the OSCE’s National Focal Points on Border Security engaged in discussions on possible ways to optimize standard operating procedures to better prevent and combat human trafficking, and were provided with innovative training approaches to combat this crime.

The Focal Points also visited the Academy of the Police Force of Slovakia, where they were introduced to the technical means used by the country’s Border Police.

VIENNA, 10 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, denounced the search conducted on 9 April in the editorial office of the Belsat TV channel in Minsk, Belarus. He called on the authorities to exercise restraint in bringing libel charges against media and journalists, and reiterated his call on the authorities to decriminalize defamation. 

During their search, law enforcement authorities seized data and notebooks after a public official filed a complaint for libel against one of the journalists of the TV channel in January 2019. The complaint relates to inaccurate information that Belsat initially published on 11 July 2018, and which it corrected on 25 July 2018.

“I am alarmed by the search at the Belsat editorial office in Minsk and the seizure of data and notebooks from the journalists,” Désir said. “This obstructs the work of the independent media, and raises concerns about the protection of the journalists’ confidential sources. The media published a correction after a mistake in publication. It is crucial that public officials refrain from bringing criminal charges against journalists, and I call on the authorities to decriminalize defamation in line with international standards.”

In December 2018, the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists called on the participating States to “ensure that defamation laws do not carry excessive sanctions or penalties that could undermine the safety of journalists and/or effectively censor journalists and interfere with their mission of informing the public and, where necessary, to revise and repeal such laws.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce

BISHKEK, 10 April 2019 – Marking the 20th anniversary of OSCE presence in Kyrgyzstan during his visit to Bishkek yesterday, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák emphasized the strong Kyrgyz-OSCE partnership and close collaboration on promoting good governance, strengthening democratic institutions and reforming the electoral system.

Discussing past and future OSCE initiatives, in his meetings with the political leadership in Bishkek, including President Sooronbai Zheenbekov, Foreign Minister Chyngyz Aidarbekov, and Speaker of the Parliament Dastanbek Djumabekov, Minister Lajčák stressed that “the OSCE and the Slovak Chairmanship stand ready to support Kyrgyzstan in consolidating stability, and furthering development and reform efforts.”

Being in Kyrgyzstan a day after visiting Kazakhstan, the Chairperson emphasized that Central Asia is adding to the rich spectrum of perspectives embodied by the 57 OSCE participating States: “You are at the crossroads of ancient civilizations; of different religions, languages and worlds,” he said.

“The OSCE´s direct contribution to the stability of Kyrgyzstan, and the wider region, is vivid and vast. I strongly welcome the work of the OSCE - in establishing the building blocks for peace and stability from the ground up. It is clear that the organization is not here to teach or impose anything. Instead, it is here to listen and learn, to create new platforms for dialogue and exchange, to build capacities,” Minister Lajčák said opening the event on “20 years OSCE presence in Kyrgyzstan, achievements and future prospects”.

The breadth of the Programme Office’s work over the past 20 years is illustrated by activities ranging from working with national actors to counter terrorism and corruption, facilitate cross-border trade, and raise environmental awareness, to promoting participation of women in political life and supporting efforts to improve the access of persons with disabilities to the electoral process.

Highlighting the OSCE Academy, a flagship project on engaging young people in security and stability, Minister Lajčák said: “It is a crucial platform - linking not only universities from across the entire OSCE area, but also young people from this region, including Afghanistan and Mongolia.”

“This is positive in the short-term. It builds new bridges; pools information; fosters understanding. But the real benefits will also be seen in years to come – when the Academy’s alumni continue to interact and indeed lead from within their communities, workplaces and governments,” he added. “It embodies the spirit of Kyrgyzstan-OSCE co-operation.”

Addressing the students, Minister Lajčák said: “The world is finally waking up to the potential of youth; to the fact that young men and women are the change-makers, the peacebuilders, the innovators of both today and tomorrow. I know this is particularly true in Central Asia. But there is still more room for engagement and inclusion.”

Before leaving Kyrgyzstan, the Chairperson-in-Office used the opportunity to listen to the views of civil society representatives, who help to ensure that the work of the OSCE is in line with the realities on the ground. He told the group of people active in different areas that civil society is now part of our multilateral ecosystem. “We know that security is not something that is installed from the top down. Rather, it must be built - block by block - on foundations such as tolerance, pluralism, human rights and democracy. And you here today are the people helping to lay down these building blocks.”

VIENNA, 10 April 2019 – Additional information is now available for the international conference on the safety of journalists organized by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in Vienna on 12 April 2019.

The material includes biographies on key speakers at the event, a backgrounder on the violent attacks or threats of violence experienced by many journalists in the pursuit of their work, and an updated conference agenda. The information kit is available for download here: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/416588. All event information is available here: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/415115.

The conference will bring together many journalists who have experienced violence, or relatives and co-workers of victims of such attacks, including the son of killed Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia and the Chief Editor of Aktuality.sk, where murdered Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak worked. The event will also be attended by international media experts, academics and policymakers from over 30 countries.

Representatives of the media are invited to attend the event from 9:00 to 18:30 on 12 April 2019 in the Neuer Saal of the Hofburg Conference Centre. Please register by sending an email to nicolas.ebnother@osce.org by 12:00 noon, Thursday, 11 April 2019. For interview requests, please contact Alexander Nitzsche at alexander.nitzsche@osce.org.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on facebook.com/osce.rfom. 

Contact:

Alexander Nitzsche

Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 

Wallnerstrasse 6

1010, Vienna, Austria

Mobile: +43 664 425 4152

alexander.nitzsche@osce.org

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• A man and a woman were injured by an explosive device in Verkhnotoretske.
• The Mission observed fresh damage from small-arms fire to a functioning hospital in Donetsk city.
• The SMM observed fresh craters and unexploded ordnance in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and mines and unexploded ordnance near Dolmitne and Novotroitske.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. In addition, the Mission was denied access at a border crossing point near non-government-controlled Dovzhanske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 460 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 90 explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), south-westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), and northerly directions of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 270 explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-easterly and south-westerly directions of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

A man and a woman were injured by an explosive device in Verkhnotoretske

At a hospital in Toretsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a woman (54 years old) with bandages on her face and head. Medical staff told the SMM that the woman had been admitted on 6 April with shrapnel injuries to her face, eye and skull, and had undergone surgery. The woman told the SMM that on 6 April she had been cleaning graves with her husband in a cemetery in Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) when an unidentified explosive device detonated and wounded her and her husband. In Verkhnotoretske, the SMM spoke with the woman’s husband (mid-50’s) and saw that he had sustained approximately 20 small scratches to his face and hands.

Fresh damage to a functioning hospital in Donetsk city

At Donetsk City Hospital No. 21, located at 12a Kremlovskyi Avenue on the north-western edge of non-government-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM saw a fresh bullet hole in a north-west facing window of the hospital’s laboratory and two fresh marks on the adjacent wall. Hospital staff told the SMM that they had discovered the damage along with one bullet on the floor in the morning of 6 April.

Fresh craters and unexploded ordnance in and near residential areas

About 20m south of Dundycha street in the south-western part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a fresh crater about 50m from the nearest residential houses. The SMM was unable to assess the direction of fire or type of weapon. About 120m south-west of the crater, the SMM saw a tailfin assessed as from a 73mm fragmentation round (probable OG-series grenade) lying horizontal on the ground. Approximately 1.3km east-north-east of the previous observation, near the centre of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM saw a fresh unexploded 73mm round protruding from soft ground approximately 200m from the nearest house.

On 7 April, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 40 fresh craters, assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (120mm) in a field about 4km south-south-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 4 April 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 5 April, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows across road T-1316, about 1.1km south of the area’s northern edge and 1.9km east of its western edge.

Also inside the Zolote disengagement area, near residential areas, the same UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and a modified military truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted in the rear - near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 600m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1.1km east of the area’s western edge. The UAV also spotted two other IFVs (BMP-1), about 950m and 1.3km, respectively, east-north-east of the aforementioned positions (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 3 April 2019).

On the evening and night of 7-8 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion and 24 projectiles, all at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east and south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. The same camera recorded 14 explosions assessed as impacts at a distance of 2-3km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 8 April, positioned at two different locations in Zolote, the SMM heard 23 shots and bursts of small-arms and eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 6 April, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) on a hill approximately 450m north of the disengagement area’s southern edge, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 4 July 2018).

On 8 April, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

6 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) next to the railway tracks near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika,122mm) and five towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

8 April

The SMM saw:

• 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (also spotted by an SMM long-range UAV on 7 April), and
• eight towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) in Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk).

6 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a probable surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk) and
• a probable mortar (type undetermined) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

6 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted six MLRS (BM-21), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1), five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 April 2019).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

7 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-72) and two mortars (a 2B11 Sani, 120mm and a probable 2B11) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

8 April

The SMM saw three tanks (one T-72 and two T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled

7 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two tanks (a T-72 and an undetermined type) near Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk);
• eight tanks (type undetermined) near Vozdvyzhenka (40km north-west of Donetsk); and
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) near Novooleksandrivka (36km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Shyroke (34km south-east of Luhansk);
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasni Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk); and
• seven tanks (T-72) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• 28 tanks (20 T-72, four T-64 and four types undetermined) and three probable mortars (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

8 April

The SMM noted that 20 MLRS (BM-21) remained missing, and that three MLRS (BM-21) were missing for the first time.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

8 April

The SMM noted that four towed howitzers (D-30) and seven tanks (T-72) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) in the southern outskirts of Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) and
• an IFV (BMP-1) about 3km east-north-east of Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and about 50m north of the Zolote disengagement area.

6 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BTR-3E) as well as an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Novoluhanske.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a probable armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) on the south-eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska;
• a probable ACV (type undetermined) and a trench digger (PZM-2) near Voitove  (33km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-variants) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).

7 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-variants) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a counter-fire radar system (AN/TPQ-36) near Lebedynske (99km south of Donetsk).

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

8 April

The SMM saw:

• an (APC) (BTR-70) at a checkpoint near Berezove and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (SNAR-10) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (type undetermined) near Sentianivka.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV  (BMP-1) near Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• 22 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk;
• four IFVs (BMP-2) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk);
• seven IFVs (BMP-1), three APCs (two MT-LB and a MT-LBMA with  an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on top) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near Holubivka; and
• three IFVs (BMP-2) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate.

7 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four ACVs (type undetermined) in Kalmiuske.

8 April

The SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and unexploded ordnance near Dolomitne and Novotroitske

On 6 April, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted ten anti-tank mines (TM-62) across the road about 200m south-west of residential areas of Dolomitne (non-government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

On 8 April, 2.5km south-east of Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) on a road running south-east to Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw a tailfin assessed as from a recoilless-gun (SPG-9 Kopie, 73mm) hanging from a tree approximately 2m from the roadway.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 8 April, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a dam near Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and to power transmission lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), Holubivka and Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM was informed that repair works at Olenivka were successfully completed. The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds reportedly related to water payments across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three cars (one with Russian Federation, one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates) and seven pedestrians (mixed genders) exiting Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 8 April, at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 8 April, while following up on reports of a civilian casualty, medical staff at a hospital in Donetsk city refused to provide the SMM with information or allow the SMM to speak with the alleged civilian patient, citing the need for permission from those in control. 
• On the evening and night of 6-7 April, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over non-government-controlled areas south, south-west, south-east and north of Luhansk, as well as government-controlled areas north of Donetsk.[6]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

VIENNA, 9 April 2018 – How technology can be developed, harmonized and deployed to help combat all forms of human trafficking was the focus of the two-day 2019 OSCE Alliance against Trafficking in Persons Conference, which concluded in Vienna yesterday. More than 400 practitioners from across the OSCE’s 57 participating States and the Partners for Co-operation took part.

Although great progress has been achieved in combating human trafficking over the last two decades, traffickers have unfortunately learned to misuse technology to recruit, control and exploit victims more efficiently and at greater scale, said the conference’s opening speakers.

“The misuse of technology has facilitated a scale of exploitation that seemed impossible only a decade ago,” said Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. “The time has come for a change: we must harness technology as an asset in prevention, protecting victims and prosecuting traffickers.”

The OSCE Alliance Against Trafficking in Persons is a unique global platform that lays the foundation for policy action on emerging issues and trends in trafficking, shedding light on challenges and opportunities across the OSCE region. The meeting highlighted contemporary approaches and promising practices to use technology to support victims and break the vicious cycle of human trafficking.

"Technology played a vital role in my exploitation”, said human trafficking survivor and anti sex-trafficking advocate Melanie Thompson. “It is important that survivors’ voices like mine are included in any discussion on policy on trafficking and sexual exploitation”. 

Princess Eugenie of York echoed this message in her keynote address: “Human trafficking is far more deep-rooted than we could ever imagined. We stand for all the people that cannot stand here today.” 

The United States Ambassador to Combat Human Trafficking at the country’s Department of State John Cotton Richmond said: “There is no magic tech solution to end human trafficking, and innovation should not be overstated. Yet technology, in the right context, can help move us forward.” 

Further opening remarks were made, on behalf of the 2019 Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, by Rudolf Urbanovič, State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior of Slovakia and National Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, and Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), who highlighted the need for collaboration with civil society and the private sector to address human trafficking, which disproportionately harms women and girls.

Over the two days, the conference laid the foundation and policy recommendations for concrete action for participating States across the OSCE region. Technology firms, civil society and international organizations presented applications and tools including facial recognition software and artificial intelligence (AI) to fight trafficking and online exploitation.

"ICT-facilitated trafficking is a grave threat to security in the OSCE region and the human rights of its people. Our task now is to figure out how to overcome these challenges and harness technology as an asset in combating human trafficking," said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger in his closing remarks. "Technology carries great potential for advancing OSCE commitments and implementing the OSCE’s Action Plan to end the trafficking of human beings."

416627 Marina Živaljević

The Slovak 2019 OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized a two-day seminar on cyber/ICT security and use of the Internet for terrorist and organized crime purposes on 3 and 4 April 2019 in Podgorica.

Experts from Slovakia and the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threat Department in Vienna took part in the event. They exchanged experiences and know-how with 32 participants, including seven women, from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Administration, Justice, Army, Agency for National Security, Agency for Personal Data Protection and Police Directorate.

“We all face vast and complex domestic, regional and global cyber security challenges and we all work tirelessly to keep all citizens and businesses safe,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet. “We know that the threat of today will be dwarfed by the threat of tomorrow, and so our responses too must be ever evolving. We need to be aware of that when working on plans for future actions.”

Slovak Ambassador Roman Hlobeň said that cyber threats and attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated and harmful to states. “The attacks on government websites in Montenegro in recent history are still very fresh in our minds,” Hlobeň added.

He said that with changes brought about by the digitalization and continuing globalization of computer networks, cyber/ICT security threats are becoming one of the most serious challenges of the 21st century. “With even more frequent cyber-attacks around the globe, which do not have any border controls or check-points, securing cyberspace is now a critical issue globally, for all governments, businesses, citizens and consumers,” said Hlobeň.

The seminar reflects one of the priorities of the OSCE Slovak Chairmanship to address the negative consequences of rapid technological change and build on existing commitments by promoting dialogue and exchange of expertise on cyber/ICT security.

The seminar also familiarized participants with OSCE cyber/ICT confidence-building measures that aim to reduce tensions and risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies. It further focused on education and early recognition of radicalization and violent extremism which leads to terrorism; the impact of the internet on investigations and intelligence-gathering from a policing point of view; digital forensic evidence; the use of internet for terrorist purposes and how responding to threats on cyber related incidents.

416666 Melanie Thompson, an expert and survivor of human trafficking. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Opportunities and benefits technology provides to governmental institutions, law enforcement agencies, corporations and civil society in identifying victims of human trafficking were the focus of discussion at an event on 9 April 2019 during the 19th Alliance against Trafficking in Persons Conference in Vienna. The panel discussion was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department.

The panel brought together a multi-disciplinary group with representatives of ODIHR, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Children’s Rights, the Spanish National Police, Western Union, Thorn, a non-profit group working to combat  child trafficking, and a trafficking survivor leader.

“Technology has played a pivotal role in providing easy access to traffickers for the recruitment and exploitation of victims of trafficking. At the same time, today we clearly see that technology can be effectively utilized to identify victims of trafficking and gather evidence to convict traffickers,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director. “All OSCE participating States should both promote and prioritize the use of technology to combat the trafficking of human beings.”

Speakers and participants highlighted that only a small fraction of the estimated 40 million victims of trafficking in human beings have currently been identified. As technology and globalization increasingly connect the world, traffickers’ ability to recruit and exploit their victims, especially children, has also exponentially increased and moved online. The event featured presentations on promising technologies to address these gaps, ranging from artificial intelligence software and tools for intelligence-led financial investigations to web-based training curricula for targeted audiences.

“The SOAR to Health and Wellness (“Stop, Observe, Ask, Respond”) training equips professionals with skills to identify, treat and provide trauma-informed responses to human trafficking,” said Katherine Chon, Director of the Office on Trafficking in Persons at the United States Department of Health and Human Services. “In 2017, we trained 288 participants through SOAR. The following year, we trained 5,078 participants – a seventeen-fold increase, largely attributed to the launch of SOAR Online.”

The SESTA/FOSTA (Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act and Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act) legislation recently passed in the United States was also highlighted at the event.

Mykola Kuleba, Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Children’s Rights, said: “Investment in technology is essential not only in identifying child trafficking victims, but also in preventing this and other forms of exploitation and abuse of children.”

During the conference, ODIHR launched an online survey for stakeholders from across the OSCE region to provide suggestions on improving and strengthening the OSCE participating States’ capacities in combating all forms of trafficking in human beings through a comprehensive human rights-based, gender-sensitive and survivor-centered approach.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

 OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

 OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                       

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 9,562 to 9,304 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 11 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. 

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 19 this week compared to 35 last week: nine of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and ten into Ukraine (all the crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, eight families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and nine were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and eight into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (346 compared to 339 observed during the previous week). There were 176 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 170 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the “irregular” route to “Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a slight increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 854 to 874 (300 at the Gukovo BCP and 574 at the Donetsk BCP); 469 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 405 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.                                                                                           

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 53 (compared to 47 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 109 to 188: of the total number of trucks scanned, 101 trucks (54 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 87 trucks (46 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 156 to 168 vehicles; 82 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 86 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 25 occasions, compared to 30 last week; the OTs assessed that 13 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 12 to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, some cars with Georgian and Lithuanian licence plates and with “Abkhazian” plates were also observed.

On 6 April at 03:16, a funeral services van with Russian Federation licence plates arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Ukrainian side, underwent the border control procedures and crossed into the Russian Federation. The van bore the inscription “Ritual Services” (in Russian).

Later the same day at 16:40, an ambulance with licence plates from the Russian Federation registered in the Rostov Region arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side. The ambulance bore the inscription “urgent medical help” (in Russian). After it parked near the border checking area, two paramedics exited the vehicle and went towards the main building. At 17:00, the ambulance returned towards the Russian Federation.

On 8 April at 16:40, a police vehicle entered the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation and parked behind the main building. At 16:50 on the same day, the vehicle returned towards the Russian Federation. The OT was unable to notice any other details from its position.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 19 February 2019 to 26 March 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

COPENHAGEN, 8 April 2019 – Meeting today in the Danish capital, the elected Bureau of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly heard remarks from Albanian President Ilir Meta related to Albania's upcoming Chairmanship of the OSCE, as well as OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, and Head of the OSCE PA’s Danish Delegation Peter Juel Jensen. Bureau members discussed current international issues and offered feedback on the reports and draft resolutions being prepared for the 28th Annual Session this summer in Luxembourg. 

The Bureau also unanimously endorsed the renewal of the mandate of Roberto Montella for a second five-year term as OSCE PA Secretary General. The Bureau’s proposal will be voted on by the Standing Committee in Luxembourg on 4 July 2019.

In his opening remarks, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) noted the importance of overcoming the political differences that have stood in the way of principled discussions and removing obstacles that continue to delay the OSCE budget from being adopted in a timely fashion.

“We all must work hand-in-hand to push our countries and governments to achieve some tangible progress in a number of challenging areas,” he said. “These include putting an end to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, protecting human rights in conflict zones, protecting journalists, enabling the contributions of civil society, and promoting the participation of more women, youth, and underrepresented peoples in public life.” 

He noted that the work of the OSCE hangs in the balance of budget decisions in Vienna and stressed the importance of resolving political impasses in order to enable OSCE institutions to carry out their mandates. 

President Meta discussed preparations underway in Albania for its assumption of the 2020 OSCE Chairmanship and thanked President Tsereteli and Secretary General Montella for their support of Albania’s work in this field.

It is important that the OSCE remains a forum for dialogue and security, President Meta stressed, highlighting the role of the PA in this regard. “I highly appreciate the increasing role of the Parliamentary Assembly, particularly in election monitoring, which helps to promote democracy, security and confidence within and between participating States,” he said. Meta also welcomed the work of OSCE PA ad hoc committees on migration and countering terrorism.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger discussed ways to make the best use of the unique set of OSCE structures and institutions, including the PA, to tackle current challenges. “The most acute,” he said, “is the crisis in and around Ukraine, as well as broader tensions and the breakdown of trust between Russia and the West. What concerns me is that we face again the risk of military incidents or accidents.”

The Secretary General noted that the OSCE is at its best when it provides a platform for dialogue, a toolbox for solutions, and a place for managing relations peacefully. But to be effective it is necessary to rebuild trust and ensure the Organization is equipped with needed resources, he said. 

In an open discussion with President Meta and Secretary General Greminger, OSCE PA Bureau members raised issues including the challenges related to resolving protracted conflicts and addressing the crisis in and around Ukraine in a way that respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity and places responsibility where it belongs. Members also expressed significant concern about the state of discussions related to financing the OSCE, with delays and differences threatening to halt the important work done by the Organization.

Secretary General Montella noted that the presence of Meta and Greminger at the Bureau meeting underlines the growing relevance of the Parliamentary Assembly and urged the continuation of constructive dialogue within the OSCE. He assured President Meta of the PA’s support to Albania as it assumes the Chairmanship of the OSCE.

Rapporteurs of the OSCE PA’s three general committees presented their ideas and intentions for the reports and draft resolutions they are preparing for the Luxembourg Annual Session. Irish parliamentarian Alan Farrell, the rapporteur of the Committee on Political Affairs and Security, highlighted the importance of multilateral responses to emerging security challenges to advance security, the challenge of protracted conflicts in the OSCE area, and how parliamentarians can promote sustainable development and security.

In her report, Albanian parliamentarian Elona Hoxha Gjebrea, rapporteur of the economic and environmental committee, stressed the unique role of national parliaments in developing legislative proposals with the aim of advancing sustainable development and security. In particular, she said, parliaments have an essential role in addressing climate change, energy security and sustainable energy; preventing and combating corruption, money laundering, and financing of terrorism; and developing effective approaches to migration and environmental governance.

The protection of human rights in conflict areas is one of the OSCE PA’s overarching goals, said Kyriakos Hadjiyianni, a parliamentarian from Cyprus and rapporteur of the Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions. In his report to the Bureau, he stressed that the PA must renew its call for the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in every OSCE country, noting that where respect of human rights is guaranteed, peace can also be safeguarded.

His report touched on several key themes, including human rights as a dimension of foreign policy, the use of states of emergency as temporary suspension of some democratic commitments, children in areas of military conflict, and violence against women.

Bureau members offered comments on the rapporteurs’ draft reports, highlighting a number of areas for strengthening and clarifying language, feedback which the rapporteurs will now take into consideration in finalizing the documents for consideration at the Luxembourg Annual Session.

Other items on the agenda of the Bureau meeting included reports from the Treasurer, Special Representatives and Ad Hoc Committees.

Photos of the OSCE PA Bureau meeting are available for public use on Flickr.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 5 and 6 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 6 and 7 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• It observed the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka following a reported gunfire incident.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. In addition, the Mission was denied access at a checkpoint near Zaichenko and near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, close to the border with the Russian Federation. It faced further restrictions at a railway station in Kostiantynivka and in Nova Marivka and Slovianoserbsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including explosions (about 280), compared with the previous reporting period (about 440 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and north-north-east, north and west of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre).  

Between the evenings of 6 and 7 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including explosions (about 90), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk, east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 April, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 335 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), south-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and south and south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). On the evening of 5 April, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded 36 explosions assessed as impacts, at an assessed range of 1-3km south-south-west and south-west.

Between the evenings of 6 and 7 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including explosions (about 270) compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna and north-east of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 5-6 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded six projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and four projectiles at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). On the same evening and night, in two areas near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM recorded eight projectiles and heard about 15 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area. During the day on 6 April, positioned in three areas near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned in two areas near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 260 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the evening and night of 6-7 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 13 projectiles at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). During the day on 7 April, positioned in two areas near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM recorded 24 explosions (16 undetermined and eight assessed as impacts) and about 100 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 7 April, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 7 April, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:        

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) on the northern outskirts of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk).

7 April

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) loaded on a truck about 2km north-west of Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk); and
• six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being loaded onto train flatbeds, as well as six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) stationary at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 April

The SMM saw:

• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six MLRS (BM-21) and nine towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and four D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two tanks (possible T-72) in Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk); and
• three surface to air missile systems (9K33 Osa) in Kasianivka (81km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk).

6 April

The SMM saw:

• seven tanks (T-72) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (see above); and
• four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk) (seen also on 7 April).

7 April

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk);
• six anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) each mounted on an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variants) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka; and
• two tanks (T-64) south-west of Krasne (65km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a probable tank (T-64) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk).[4]

7 April

The SMM saw:

• seven tanks (T-72) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city. 

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

5 April

The SMM noted that:

• 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present; and
• five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing for the first time. 

6 April

The SMM noted that:

• eight towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• five armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (types undetermined) near Romanivka (41km north-west of Donetsk);
• three ACVs (types undetermined) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
• three ACVs (types undetermined) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk);
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk);
• an ACV (type undetermined) in Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk);
• two ACVs (types undetermined) near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk);
• two ACVs (types undetermined) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP variants) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk); and
• two IFVs (BMP variants) near Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk).

6 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) mounted with a heavy-machine-gun and an APC (BTR-60) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• three IFVs (BMP-1) at a checkpoint in Kriakivka; and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

7 April

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) near a functional primary school in Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP variant) in the yard of a residential house in Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk);
• an ACV (type undetermined) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk);
• four IFVs (BMP-1) in the yards of residential houses in Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Tavrycheske (76km south of Donetsk).

Closure of Marinka entry-exit checkpoint following a reported gunfire incident

On 6 April, the SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was closed with no vehicles or pedestrians queuing. A Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a senior member of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (SBGS) at the EECP told the SMM that it had remained closed since 5 April after two men (a SBGS officer and a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier) had been injured by gunfire at the EECP on the same day. A senior staff member at the military hospital in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the two abovementioned men has been admitted to the hospital on 5 April with lower body injuries caused by gunfire. 

With the abovementioned EECP closed in Marinka and the EECP in Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) closed, reportedly for repairs, since 5 April, the SMM on 7 April observed an unusually long line of vehicles (about 400) queuing to exit non-government-controlled areas and many pedestrians waiting for buses at the checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). A number of civilians told the SMM that they had been queueing all day and would likely sleep in their cars at the EECP that evening to be able to pass the checkpoint the next day, while others said they had been waiting there for three days.

Mines near Shchastia and Vesela Hora and mine hazard signs seen for the first time

On 5 April, south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV again saw 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) across road H-21 south of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as 40 anti-tank mines (TM-62) further south-east across the same road leading to the bridge, about 1km north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 22 March 2019).

On 6 April, the SMM noted that a previously observed improvised explosive device and metal trip wire close to a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) had been removed. The same day, in Chermalyk, the SMM noted that a previously observed tail fin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) in a crater near a residential house had been removed.

On the eastern edge of Bakhmut, close to the intersection of road E-40, the SMM saw for the first time two white rectangular signs, assessed as improvised mine hazard signs, with “MINES” written in red in Ukrainian.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 6 April, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power transmission lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). On 6 and 7 April, the SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 7 April, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two cars (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates (with about 40 passengers) and 11 pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area. *

On 7 April, while at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six pedestrians entering Ukraine and a pedestrian exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 7 April, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians entering Ukraine and three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On 7 April, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw ten cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), a full bus with Russian Federation licence plates and about 20 pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 16 cars (six with Russian Federation licence plates and ten with “DPR” plates), a full bus with “DPR” plates and 18 covered cargo trucks (eight with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 7 April, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw two men on bicycles entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 6 April, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing security reasons.
• On 7 April, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 7 April, at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 6 April, in Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces allowed the SMM to enter the railway yard, only after about 40 minutes waiting outside.

Conditional access:

• On 6 April, at a checkpoint in Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), four armed members of armed formations allowed the SMM to pass only by foot and accompanied by a member of the armed formations, citing security concerns in the area.  

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 5-6 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.[7]
• On 5 April, while following up on reports of a civilian casualty, medical staff at a hospital in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) refused to provide the SMM with information, citing the need for written permission from those in control. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The sentence in SMM Daily Report 6 April 2019 “On 4 April an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable tank (T-64) near Vuhlehirsk (government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk)” should have read “near Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk)”. 

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

NUR-SULTAN, 8 April 2019 - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák stressed the importance of regional co-operation in all three dimensions of comprehensive security during his visit today to Nur-Sultan. 

Kicking off his first visit to Central Asia during the Slovak 2019 Chairmanship, Lajčák underlined the strategic importance of the region as the Eurasian border of the OSCE. He commended the region’s governments on their positive dynamic towards more regional co-operation, particularly in combating terrorism, promoting good governance and environmental protection, and in strengthening intra-regional security, including with Afghanistan.

In his meetings with the political leadership in Nur-Sultan, including President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev; Foreign Minister Beibut Atamkulov; and Chairperson of the Senate of the National Assembly, Dariga Nazarbayeva, Lajčák commended Kazakhstan – the first Central Asian country to have chaired the OSCE - on its long-standing history of co-operation with the Organization and its active role both, in Vienna and on the ground. “Kazakhstan is a key partner in and contributor to these dynamics by creating new initiatives on regional security and more opportunities for OSCE engagement,” said Lajčák.

“I would like to thank the government of Kazakhstan for its constructive support of the activities of the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan,” said Lajčák.  “In more than 20 years on the ground, the OSCE and Kazakhstan have achieved a lot together. The Office is active on a wide range of issues, from facilitating trade, furthering water governance and supporting Kazakhstan’s transition to a green economy, through to developing social services for victims of human trafficking and in engaging youth in the regional security dialogue. But there is still room for more and I am looking forward to further co-operation.”

Minister Lajčák saw the Programme Office’s work in action when listening to a group of young leaders from Kazakhstan and alumnae of OSCE youth programmes, such as Central Asian Youth Network and the training for Youth Leaders against Intolerance and Violent Extremism (OSCE LIVE).

Speaking about the work of the Slovak Chairmanship, he said: “we will fail in to respond to the challenges of tomorrow and create a safer future for all, If we do not include youth voices, perspectives and expertise in our brainstorming and in our decision-making processes, we will fail to respond to the challenges of tomorrow and fail to create a safer future for all.”

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office also met with representatives of civil society, underlining their crucial role in society and in the work of organizations, such as the OSCE: “Nothing we do at the OSCE stands a chance at achieving real progress on the ground without the buy-in and participation of civil society. We need them in any step forward across the OSCE region - big or small.”

416516 Communication and Media Relations Section

Ten Afghan law enforcement officers completed a ten-day training course on 5 April 2019, which focused on combating illicit drug trafficking and drug-related crimes.  The course, held at the St. Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation was organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department.

The course developed the knowledge of Afghan trainees and their practical skills in combating the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. It covered planning skills and tools to enhance the participants’ capacity to conduct crime scene investigations and to strengthen their techniques in forensics, such as the use of databases, pertinent equipment and tools, and photography and video recording. They learnt about countering money laundering and drug-related crimes, and identifying their proceeds. The trainees practiced searching residential areas and vehicles, and how to effectively use special equipment.

Deputy Head of the Saint Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Colonel Sergey Triputin said that the Institute is interested in supporting Afghan law enforcement personnel in providing them with up-to-date skills and techniques required for combating the threat of illicit drugs. He called for further co-operation with all interested stakeholders, including the OSCE, in organizing joint training courses for Afghan law enforcement experts.

Guy Vinet, Head of the OSCE’s Strategic Police Matters Unit said that drugs-related crimes should be tackled not only by law enforcement but with help of social, human rights and educational institutions. Welcoming an Afghan female officer, who participated in the training, Vinet called for a greater role of women in policing, including combating illicit drugs. By enhancing the capacity of Afghanistan as an OSCE Partner for Co-operation to tackle the world drug problem, the OSCE assists in enriching the Afghan law enforcement with knowledge to counter drug-related crime and develop co-operation with different actors in this field from the ministries of health, education and others, he said.

The course was organized as part of the Transnational Threats Department’s activities to assists Afghanistan in line with the 2012 OSCE Concept for Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors, as well as the 2007 and 2011 OSCE Ministerial Council decisions on co-operation with Afghanistan.

This activity was supported by the government of the Russian Federation.