OSCE

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Bullets flew over the heads of SMM patrol members in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling to a functioning school in Sakhanka and houses in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region, at a compound in Samiilove, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk and at a checkpoint in Popasna.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 170 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (220 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly and westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 23 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (53 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded west-north-west and north of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and adjacent to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Small arms fired near the SMM in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

While monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, an SMM patrol, positioned on the village’s western edge, heard about five shots of small-arms fire about 200m west-north-west, followed by the sound of bullets flying over their heads and hitting a tree about 5-10m south-east. (See SMM Spot Report 26 February 2019.) The Mission members took cover on the ground and then inside the vehicles. The SMM saw Luhansk Water Company employees, who had been conducting the repair works, take cover as well (see below SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure). Shortly before this incident, the SMM had heard about 30 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west-north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as 18 undetermined explosions and about 15 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Damage caused by shelling to school in Sakhanka

In the yard of a functioning school at 3 Vartazarovoi Street in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed two fresh craters and damage to school properties, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-south-westerly direction. About 2m from the first crater (10m south of the school building), the Mission saw a hole in a water pipeline used for heating, assessed as caused by shrapnel. About 10m north-east of the second crater, the Mission saw a west-facing entrance door of the school building dislodged from its doorframe. A man, who said that he was a resident of the village, told the SMM that between 08:00 and 08:30 on 25 February, while in the neighbourhood of the school, he had heard explosions and then seen the abovementioned damage at the school. He added that there had been no pupils present at the time of shelling as the school had been closed for the holidays. In front of the school, the SMM observed fresh tracks of undetermined vehicles on a road leading west into a field. (About 1.5km west of the school, the Mission had previously observed positions of the armed formation.)

Damage caused by shelling to houses in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi

In Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), on 24 February, the SMM saw a shattered south-facing window of an inhabited two-storey house at 2 Vysoka Street and fresh damage (multiple holes) to the south-facing side of the roof of a single-storey inhabited house at 4 Vysoka Street. The Mission observed five fresh craters nearby, three of which were less than 15m south of the houses, assessed as caused by rounds of undetermined weapons fired from a south-easterly direction. A resident of the former house told the SMM that at around 05:30 on 24 February, while at home, his house had been damaged by shelling (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 26 February 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 25 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the early hours of 26 February, the camera recorded four projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 26 February, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a previously observed tailfin of a mortar (possibly 82mm) round on the ground 1-1.5m west of the road and about 270m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (see SMM Daily Report 27 December 2018).

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

26 February:

The SMM saw:

• a towed howitzer (type unknown) being transported by a truck moving north near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) moving south near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a tank (T-64) near Novoselivka (99km north of Donetsk).

26 February

The SMM saw:

• 32 tanks (T-64) stationary at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk);
• seven IFVs (two BMP-2, one BMP-1 and the remainder BMP variants) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two IFVs near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

25 February

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

-           two armoured personnel carriers (BTR variant) in Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk) about 20m from the nearest house.

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• 16 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Recent impact craters

On 25 February, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least seven fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by mortar (120mm) rounds, in and near Vodiane. Two of them were spotted near destroyed houses and the remainder near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of the village. About 3km east of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and about 1.3km south-east of the aforementioned positions, the UAV spotted at least 50 fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by probable mortar (82mm or 120mm) rounds, near positions of the armed formations.

Presence of mines

On 24 February, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 40 previously observed anti-tank mines (undetermined mines) laid across on road M03 between Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk)(see SMM Daily Report 21 June 2018).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to water pipelines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water pipeline near Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. Following the occurrence of ceasefire violations in the area (see above), representatives of the Luhansk Water Company told the SMM that repairs and assessments of water pipelines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka had been suspended.

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw 25 cars (three with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as 17 with “DPR” plates and one with plates marked with a green-and-white striped flag and the letters “ABH”) entering Ukraine. The Mission also saw eight cars (five with Russian Federation and two with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw eight cars (two with Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and ten cars (three with Russian Federation, two with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian license plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about ten minutes, the SMM saw three cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine and four cars (three with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing “orders” not to allow the Mission to enter the area without written permission.
• Three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a compound on the eastern edge of Samiilove (non-government-controlled, 89km south of Donetsk).
• Four armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint towards the town or west, citing “ongoing special forces operation”. The Mission saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in all directions.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T0405, citing orders from his commander.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments

• An SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as jamming, while flying over areas north and north-east of Donetsk region.[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, at Oktiabr mine and in Svitlodarsk were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

VIENNA, 27 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today said he is concerned about the detention of several journalists and bloggers who were covering rallies in the cities of Almaty, Zhanaozen and Uralsk in Kazakhstan.

“I am concerned about the practice of short detentions of journalists and bloggers, which hinders them in pursuing their professional duties,” Désir said. “Informing the public about social protests and issues of public interest is an important role of journalists - they should not be punished for doing their work.”

On 27 February, blogger Ashat Bersalimov was detained in Almaty; journalist Saniya Toiken of Radio Free Europe’s Azattyq service, and camera operator Sanat Nurbekov were detained and questioned for several hours in Zhanaozen; while blogger Askar Shiygumarov was detained in Uralsk after leaving his house.

Désir noted that the practice of arbitrary detentions of journalists has recently become more frequent in the country, and conveyed his concerns to the authorities.

Toiken was also briefly detained on 12 February while covering a protest in Astana. Several journalists were briefly detained in Almaty in mid-December.

The Representative recalled that the “Special Report on Handling of the Media during Political Demonstrations: Observations and Recommendations” published by his Office, states that “law-enforcement officials have a constitutional responsibility not to prevent or obstruct the work of journalists during public demonstrations, and journalists have a right to expect fair and restrained treatment by the police.”  

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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412652 Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day training course for fifteen Tajik experts and practitioners aimed at strengthening the capacity of Tajikistan to counter terrorist financing was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department and the OSCE Programme in Dushanbe, in co-operation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Global Programme against Money Laundering, from 25 to 27 February 2019.

The training course, held in Dushanbe, was led by international experts from the OSCE and UNODC. The training participants work in the headquarters of the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Financial Monitoring Department of the National Bank of Tajikistan, the Ministry of the Interior, and the State Committee for National Security of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The participants learned how improving inter-agency co-operation can help to disrupt terrorist financing. Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, the course included sessions on tackling financial intelligence and strategic analysis. The participants were familiarized with specific instruments and techniques that will help to significantly improve their effectiveness in countering terrorist financing.

The course aims to assist Tajikistan in countering terrorist financing in line with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments.

The training course is part of a comprehensive multi-annual OSCE-UNODC capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

On the morning of 26 February, an SMM patrol consisting of six members and two armoured vehicles was positioned on the western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), about 500m east of the eastern edge of the Zolote disengagement area. The patrol was monitoring the security situation in the area to enable repair works to water pipes in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. Three patrol members were standing next to the vehicles and the others were inside them. Six employees of the Luhansk Water Company were conducting the repair works about 100m west-north-west of the SMM’s position.

Despite security guarantees having been provided, at 12:18, the SMM patrol members who were standing next to their vehicles heard about five shots of small-arms fire approximately 200m west-north-west, followed by the sound of bullets flying about 10m over their heads; subsequently, they heard and saw the bullets hitting at least one tree about 5-10m south-east of the SMM’s position. The three SMM patrol members took cover on the ground and then inside their vehicles and saw the Luhansk Water Company employees taking cover behind a tractor. At 12:20 the SMM patrol and the Luhansk Water Company employees departed the area. No injuries or damage to property were reported. The SMM patrol returned safely to its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled 50km west of Luhansk).

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

 OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

 OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                        

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 9,124 to 8,760 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 6 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

 Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 59 this week (compared to eight last week); 32 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 27 into Ukraine (46 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, two families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (307 compared to 327 observed during the previous week). There were 160 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 147 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Stakhanov - Kyiv and Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 739 to 665 (194 at the Gukovo BCP and 471 at the Donetsk BCP); 341 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 324 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” (sometimes “DPR”) plates.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 49 (compared to 59 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 264 to 203: of the total number of trucks scanned, 110 trucks (54 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 93 trucks (46 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 170 to 133 vehicles; 66 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 67 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on nine occasions, compared to four last week; the OTs assessed that five trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and four to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

 Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

On 19 February at 09:47, the OT observed an ambulance that arrived at Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle drove behind the main building and was not visible to the OT. At 09:58 the same day, the ambulance left the BCP towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 22 January 2019 to 26 February 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                      

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer ceasefire violations and Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Staromykhailivka, at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as well as in government-controlled Taramchuk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (220), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 275 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south and west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), at westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and again in areas south-east, south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 53 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 300 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 24 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 25 February, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard seven undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[3]

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

The SMM saw:

24 February

• a surface-to-air-missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three tanks (T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk) and
• three mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled

25 February

The SMM saw:

• a tank (type undetermined) at a train station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) and

• a surface-to-air-missile system (9K33) near Zoria (22km north-east of Mariupol).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

24 February

The SMM noted that:

• nine howitzers (seven 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and two D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

25 February

The SMM noted previously observed weapons.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• five armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (61km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• seven IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

On 23 February, in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man wearing green camouflage clothing standing in front of a green sport utility vehicle with Russian Federation licence plates, apparently recording the SMM with a hand-held camera.

Recent impact craters

On 23 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 recent craters, assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, in a wooded area (non-government-controlled), about 500m south of the Zolote disengagement area.

On 24 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted fresh damage to a house (part of its roof destroyed), assessed as caused by an artillery or mortar round, within a residential area of government-controlled Zolote. The same UAV spotted also 14 fresh craters, assessed as impacts of artillery or mortar rounds, in a nearby field (one of the craters was 2m from a house).

New mine hazard signs

The Mission saw for the first time two mine hazard signs with a “skull and crossbones” and “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian placed on the south-western edge of a local road about 4km north-east from Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk). About 300m south of that location, the Mission saw for the first time a sign advising in Ukrainian how to act in case of spotting an explosive object.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to water transmission lines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border area outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with "LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), three buses (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 14 pedestrians (12 men and two women, 25-40 years old) exiting Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw five cars (two with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage on two occasions, after the Mission refused to show its patrol plan. Both times they cited “demining activities in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “military movements in the area”.
• At a checkpoint in Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing demining operations”.
• The SMM was unable to visit a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The site was locked and no personnel were present.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras at Oktiabr mine and in Svitlodarsk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 22 and 23 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Two persons were killed and one person was injured in a mine explosion near a checkpoint close to the contact line in Donetsk region.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by shelling in Oleksandrivka.
• It saw weapons in violation on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.
• It was also restricted near Zaichenko, Petrivske and Verkhnoshyrokivske, at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region,  at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region as well as  near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, areas near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 22 and 23 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 35 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east, south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 275 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of the central railway station in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) and at southerly and south-westerly directions of Chermalyk.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 22 and 23 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-east and north-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations (including all explosions) were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled 69km west of Luhansk).

Mine explosion kills two civilians, injures another near checkpoint close to the contact line in Donetsk region

On 23 February, the SMM saw the burning wreckage of an overturned mini-van on the soft ground of a median strip between the lanes of road H-20, south of the forward position of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report 25 February 2019). The Mission also saw a fresh crater in the median strip, assessed as caused by an explosive device (probably an anti-tank mine) detonated by the vehicle. Following up on reports of three civilians involved in the incident, on 24 February, the director of the morgue in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the bodies of a man (aged 34) and of a woman (aged 85) had been brought to the morgue on the afternoon of 23 February. He added that the two individuals had died from severe injuries caused by a mine explosion. In Shakhtarsk (non-government controlled, 50km east of Donetsk), a man (aged 59) told the SMM that on 23 February, he had been travelling with his mother and a driver in the abovementioned van and that an explosion had occurred after the vehicle entered the abovementioned median strip south of the forward position of the armed formations near Olenivka. He had scratches and bruises on his cheeks, as well as a bandage covering his head.

Fresh damage caused by shelling to a residential house in Oleksandrivka

On 22 February, at 339 Horkoho Street in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a shattered outer window pane on the east-facing side of a single-storey house, as well as a fresh hole (7cm in width) in the west-facing side of a shed (about 3m east from the house) and 20 fresh shrapnel holes (2-6cm in width) on the surface of a concrete yard (about 4m east of the same house).

The SMM assessed the damage to the shed as caused by a round of a weapon (30mm calibre) fired from a south-westerly direction and the damage to the yard and the window of the house as caused by shrapnel from the abovementioned round. The owners of the house (a man and a woman, aged 50-60) told the SMM that in the morning of 19 February, the woman had been alone in the house when she had heard an explosion in their yard. They said that they had found a piece of shrapnel (with several holes in it) in the yard and that members of the armed formations had come that same day and had cleared the yard. 

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 23 February, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.5-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area) and a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.5-2km east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area. Positioned about 1.3km north-north-east of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-8km south and south-west and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). Positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement near Zolote, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day of 24 February, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar round and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area), as well as 21 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On 23 and 24 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled

22 February

The SMM saw:

• eight multiple launch rocket systems  (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Nykanorivka (86km north of Donetsk).  

24 February

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in the yard of a house being used by military personnel near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) stationary near railway tracks on the north-eastern edge of Olhynka (40km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled

22 February

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• five towed howitzers (undetermined variants) near Yasnodolsk (41km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled

22 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• ten tanks (T-72) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observation, see SMM Daily Report of 21 February 2019).

Government-controlled

24 February

The SMM saw:

• ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) loaded on tractor trailers at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

22 February

The SMM noted that:

• 25 tanks (T-64) and  ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present (for the first time) and
• 102 self-propelled howitzers (62 2S1 and 40 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 86 tanks (T-64) (of which 31 were missing for the first time)), 67 mortars  (54 2B11 Sani, 120mm (of which three were missing for the first time), 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm), 21 MLRS (BM-21), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), nine towed howitzers (six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and three D-44, 85mm), six towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

22 February

The SMM noted that:

•  13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Non-government-controlled

22 February

The SMM saw:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) in Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a military truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top and an IFV (BMP-2) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled

23 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (undetermined variant) moving west near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk ( 45km north-east of Donetsk);
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) at a military-type compound in Luhansk city.

24 February

The SMM saw:

• two military personnel holding two mini-UAVs and one holding a control panel for a mini-UAV near Popasna.

Presence of mines and demining activities

On 24 February, about 500m north-north east of the northern edge of Petrivske, the SMM saw for the first time six anti-vehicle and directional mines (three assessed as MON-200 and three assessed as TM-83) laid about 10m of each other in a field about 12m east of road CO51532.

On 24 February, the SMM saw about 50 new mine hazard signs (red with skulls and crossbones reading “Stop Mines” in Russian) laid out over an area of 700m in a field 200m north-east of a road leading to the northern edge of Sartana (government-controlled 15km north-east of Mariupol). About 100m north from the aforementioned signs, the SMM saw seven members of a non-governmental organization dressed in blue uniforms conducting demining activities (using mine detectors and marking clearance areas) in the same field.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 23 February, the Mission monitored the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and on 23 and 24 February, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside of government control

On 24 February, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 15 covered cargo trucks (14 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a vehicle (with Ukrainian licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine, as well as two covered cargo trucks (with Belarusian licence plates) and two pedestrians (women, aged 30-40) entering Ukraine. After seven minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw one pedestrian (woman, aged 40) exiting Ukraine. After two minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 15 cars (with Russian Federation licence plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates), two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), two mini-buses (with Russian Federation licence plates) and two milk tankers (with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 44 cars (11 with Ukrainian, 25 with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates and six with “DPR” plates),  25 covered cargo trucks (17 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates),  two open cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates)  and a tanker truck with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 23 February, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Petrivske, citing the presence of “a sniper” in the area and lack of permission from superiors.
• On 23 February, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security concerns”.
• On 23 February, at a heavy weapon holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk, the SMM was denied access by an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces citing lack of permission from superiors.
• On 24 February, at a border crossing near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), an unarmed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 24 February, at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), an unarmed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 24 February, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan.
• On 24 February, the SMM was unable to enter a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region because the gate was locked. A civilian guard at the site told the SMM that the site had been closed and it should return on another day.

Conditional access:

• On 23 February, at a checkpoint of the armed formation on road T0513 near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting its trailer.

Other impediments:

• On 22 February, in Chystiakove (formerly Torez, non-government controlled, 62km east of Donetsk), the head doctor of the hospital told the SMM to address senior members of the armed formations for a meeting.
• On 23 February, while positioned 1.5km south-west of Sarabash (formerly Komunarivka, non-government-controlled, 30km south of Donetsk), conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM lost control over the UAV due to what the SMM assessed as external interference,  most likely caused by jamming of the control link.[6] The UAV landed about 240m south-east of the SMM in a field marked with mine hazard signs. The SMM was unable to recover the UAV.  
• On 24 February, while positioned on the north-western edge of Makiivka (non-government-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk), while conducting  two mini-UAV flights, the SMM lost control over one of the UAVs due to what the SMM assessed as external interference, most likely caused by jamming of the control link.[7] The SMM was able to regain control over one of the UAVs which landed safely while the other one crash-landed 10m east-south-east of the SMM’s position (and sustained damage to its propeller).  

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

At around 12:40 on 23 February, while moving south past the forward position of the armed formations along the contact line on road H-20 near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), about 200m south of the above-mentioned position of the armed formations, the SMM saw the burning wreckage of an overturned minivan on the soft ground of a median strip between the road lanes. Within a radius of 15m of the wreckage, the Mission saw debris from the vehicle scattered around, including three tyres and two doors, all scorched. The SMM saw a fresh crater in the median strip about 3m from the wreckage as well as three mine hazard signs: one lying on the ground less than 10m from the crater and the other two attached to a post and a barrier nearby. The SMM assessed that the vehicle had detonated an explosive device (probably an anti-tank mine) in the median strip.

On 24 February, the SMM followed up on reports of three civilians involved in the explosion. The head of the morgue in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the bodies of a man (34 years old) and of a woman (85 years old) had been brought to the morgue on the afternoon of 23 February. He said that the two civilians had died from severe injuries caused by a mine explosion.

In Shakhtarsk (non-government controlled, 50km east of Donetsk), a man (59 years old) told the SMM that he had been one of the three people in the aforementioned minivan. He said that on 23 February, he had been returning to non-government-controlled areas with his mother and a driver after having received pensions in government-controlled areas. He added that an explosion had occurred after the vehicle had entered the median strip on road H-20 just south of the armed formations’ forward position. The man had scratches and bruises on his cheeks, as well as a bandage covering his head.

The incident site is located in the area between the forward positions of the armed formations and the Ukrainian Armed Forces (about 4km south-west of the site) near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM had previously seen at least ten freshly dug circular mounds approximately 30-40cm in diameter in the same median strip and mine hazard signs surrounding it (see SMM Daily Report of 2 July 2018). The Novotroitske entry-exit checkpoint near Berezove is one of the five official routes for civilians to cross the contact line.

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Communication and Media Relations Section

The Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department met with Albania’s Interior Minister Sander Lleshaj during a country visit on 21 and 22 February 2019 to facilitate Albania’s participation in the Public Key Directory of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO PKD) – a central repository simplifying and facilitating the fast and secure authentication of electronic passports at borders.

The OSCE representatives also met with Deputy Interior Minister Rovena Voda and General Director of the office for Regulatory and Compliance for Public Order and Security Adriatik Mema.

Dennis Cosgrove, Head of the Border Security and Management Unit outlined what benefits Albania could gain by becoming a member of the ICAO PKD and how the OSCE can support the country in this process.

Florian Foefle, an independent expert in this area, described the technical requirements for the integration of the Albanian National Public Key Infrastructure with the ICAO PKD. 

Minister Lleshaj positively received the initiative and stressed Albania’s interest in improving existing border security systems. He thanked OSCE for its long-standing co-operation with the Albanian Government.

After meeting the Minister, the OSCE delegation also met with the State Police and Civil Registry of Albania and discussed the next steps of joining the ICAO PKD.

The country visit was a follow-up activity to the first OSCE Regional Workshop for South-East Europe on ICAO PKD, which was organized in Montenegro, November last year. At the workshop Albania presented an overview of its e-passport system and together with recommendations from experts drafted a road map on how to join the ICAO PKD.

CHISINAU, 25 February 2019 – Moldova’s 24 February parliamentary elections were competitive and fundamental rights were generally respected, but the campaign took place against the backdrop of disaffection with public institutions and was tainted by allegations of pressure on public employees, strong indications of vote buying and the misuse of state resources, the international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today.

Control and ownership of the media by political actors limited the range of viewpoints presented to voters, the observers said. Most aspects of the elections were administered in a professional and transparent manner, and the observers assessed the voting positively, despite difficulties and confusion caused by the introduction of a new electoral system and the concurrent holding of a referendum, which caused problems in counting procedures.

“This was an active, hard-fought and polarized campaign in generally well-run elections. It is no secret that there is overall disappointment among citizens in political processes and institutions here,” said George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “I call on my newly elected parliamentary colleagues to now deliver on promises, address the problems we identified, and meet the expectations of the people.”

These were the first elections held under the new mixed electoral system, which was adopted without inclusive public debate and consultation. Under the new system, 50 members of parliament are elected through proportional representation from national party lists and 51 in single-member constituencies.

“The changes to the electoral system and the concurrent holding of the referendum clearly led to confusion, both on the part of voters and some polling station workers,” said Rebecca Harms, Head of the European Parliament delegation. “The decision by the Central Election Commission (CEC) that only holders of valid passports could vote abroad came just six weeks before election day, and departed from practice in past elections, where holders of national ID cards could also vote. There were concerns about the motives behind this decision.”

The legal framework generally provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections, and recent amendments partially addressed some previous recommendations by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. These elections demonstrated, however, that important issues remain to be addressed, including the application of provisions against the misuse of state resources, loopholes concerning the use of charities to finance campaigns, and the concentration of media ownership.

Substantial recent amendments to party and campaign finance regulations addressed some previous recommendations, but other key recommendations remain unaddressed, particularly those to enhance the supervision and enforcement of party and campaign finance rules and strengthening sanctions. According to the CEC, it lacks sufficient human resources to monitor campaign finance effectively, and it conducted inquiries only in response to complaints.

Claude Kern, Head of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) delegation, said: “Election day was generally well organized. As demonstrated by the campaign, the new electoral system regrettably confirmed the main concerns raised by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, in particular the lack of effective mechanisms to prevent undue influence by wealthy businesspeople, combined with a poor system of supervision of party and candidate funding, and inadequate penalties.”

The media landscape is diverse, with television as the main source of political information, followed by online media. Media monitoring showed that some national TV channels did not comply with the legal requirement to provide fair, balanced and impartial campaign coverage.

Most technical aspects of the election were managed professionally at all levels, and election commission sessions were open to observers and media. Women were well represented at all levels of the election administration. The lack of clarity over jurisdiction to hear complaints and the CEC’s view that it could not overrule district committee decisions on candidate registration resulted in the denial of the right to an effective remedy in a number of cases. 

“The prominent role that women play in running elections was on display yesterday in polling stations across the country,” said Kari Henriksen, Head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation. “Considering that women are the majority of the population, political leaders must assume their responsibility to step up and effectively translate this into equal political power and representation.”

In an inclusive process, the CEC registered all 14 parties and one bloc that submitted national lists. Of the 632 candidates on national lists, 264 are women, but only 49 were in top 10 positions. There were 325 candidates registered in single member constituencies, of whom 70 are women and 58 ran as independents.

“The elections offered voters a wide choice of political alternatives, the campaign was competitive and fundamental rights were respected, but reports of pressure on public employees, vote-buying and the misuse of state resources have to be addressed to increase public confidence in elections,” said Matyas Eörsi, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission. “We hope the authorities will follow up on the recommendations contained in our final report on these elections to address these issues.”

Citing security considerations, the CEC changed the locations of 31 of 47 polling stations opened for the first time specifically for voters residing in Transniestria. One major contesting party alleged this was a government attempt to reduce the number of votes from Transniestria. The CEC established 123 polling stations in 37 countries for out-of-country voting, an increase from previous elections. The lack of transparency in how these polling stations were allocated contributed to a perception that the decision was made for political reasons.

Candidate, citizen and international observers have broad rights, including the right to attend sessions of all election commissions and to receive results protocols, and contributed to transparency. Citizen observers conducted long-term observation, deployed short-term observers on election day and conducted a parallel vote tabulation.

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR, +373 68 012 098 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Nat Parry, OSCE PA, +373 69 042 291 or +45 60 10 81 77, nat@oscepa.dk

Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE, +373 69 189 927, chemavon.chahbazian@coe.int,

Tim Boden, EP, +373 60 370 226 or +324 98 983 324, timothy.boden@ep.europa.eu

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412349 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana supported a training seminar on conducting and monitoring public hearings as a tool for public participation in environmental decision making on 23 February 2019 in Pavlodar, Kazakhstan.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with Pavlodar’s Aarhus Centre for some 20 environmental NGOs, journalists and students. The training seminar covered the key principles of the Aarhus Convention, environmental rights of Kazakhstan’s citizens and procedures to participate in the public hearings.

Pavlodar’s Aarhus Center is currently engaged in developing an analytical report on monitoring the public hearings. The document will incorporate the results of the six-month public hearings monitoring and a step-by-step checklist of procedures which must be followed prior, during and after the public hearings. The document will also have recommendations and concrete procedural steps on how to address existing challenges to comply with legislative requirements while organizing public hearings.

The event was part of the Programme Office’s multi-year activities to promote good environmental governance and to assist the host country in meeting its commitments under the Aarhus Convention.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of non-government-controlled Holmivskyi.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw multiple launch rocket systems in violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• Its long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted four military jet aircrafts flying over government-controlled Lastochkyne, near the contact line.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region and demining activities in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Styla.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at south-easterly directions of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and at westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas below).

Damage caused by shelling in Holmivskyi

In a residential area of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), on 21 February, the SMM saw four fresh craters within a radius of 100m, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a north-north-easterly direction. The first crater was next to the north-north-eastern side of an inhabited two-storey apartment building at 2 Radianskoi Armii Street. The SMM observed shrapnel damage on the east- and north-facing sides of the building and that its two first-floor windows (one facing east, the other north) were broken. The second crater was about 20m south of an inhabited two-storey apartment building at 5 Radianskoi Armii Street. The SMM saw a broken window and shrapnel damage on the building’s south-facing side. The remaining two craters were observed in the area between the two buildings (about 50m from the buildings). A male resident of the first building told the SMM that at around 23:30 on 18 February, while at home, he had heard a “loud explosion”.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 21-22 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and two projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the late afternoon of 22 February, the camera recorded an explosion assessed as an impact at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the morning of 22 February, positioned south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 90 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

20 February:

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

21 February

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk).

22 February

The SMM saw:

• eight stationary MLRS (type undetermined) near Krasna Poliana (73km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 February:

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• three tanks (type undetermined) and 12 pieces of towed artillery (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

22 February

The SMM noted that:

• 12 MLRS (eight BM-27 Uragan, 220mm and four BM-30 Smerch, 300mm), all observed for the first time, were present and
• ten MLRS (six BM-27 and four BM-30), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and nine towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four military jet aircrafts flying over Lastochkyne (19km north-west of Donetsk), from north to south and then turn south-west at an altitude of approximately 3,000 feet.

22 February

The SMM saw:

• four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-1) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk) and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-1) in Krasnohorivka.

Demining activities and mine hazard signs

Near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw four vehicles each with the logo of an international demining organization parked on a road and about 50 persons nearby. The Mission observed some of them conducting demining activities with metal detectors in fields adjacent to the road. (See SMM Daily Report 20 February 2019.)

On the south-western edge of Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a mine hazard sign (red and yellow with the “Stop mines” written in Russian) for the first time 1m north of a road. In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM noted that a previously observed tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) next to a house was no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 22 February 2019).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable inspection and repairs to water wells at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw six cars (three with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) and one covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 18 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (one of them visibly armed) denied the SMM passage, saying that it was not allowed to continue as there was a “compound” near the road ahead.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that there had been no demining in the area.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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Marina Živaljević

Free and independent media are a cornerstone of every democratic society, said Head of OSCE Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet, opening a roundtable discussion on the country’s draft law on media on 22 February 2019 in Podgorica.

The discussion was organized by Montenegro’s Ministry of Culture, with the support of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, the Council of Europe and the European Union Delegation to Montenegro.

“Journalists must be able to work in a safe environment, protected by a legislative framework that protects their rights to report objectively, without fear of repercussions,” said Daviet.

She welcomed Montenegro’s commitment to follow best practices and harmonize its legislation with the European Union’s Acquis. “This process of harmonizing the media law has the full support of the OSCE Mission,” said Daviet.

Minister of Culture Aleksandar Bogdanović said that the Government of Montenegro, in co-operation with the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Commission, began reviewing media legislation aimed at strengthening media regulation as one of the pillars of democracy.

“The Government of Montenegro and the Ministry of Culture advocates the freedom of expression and information as fundamental human rights through the free and independent media guaranteed by law,” said  Bogdanović. “It advocates the protection of journalists, the protection of pluralism and the diversity of media through the establishment of the Fund for the Protection of Pluralism.”

Support to the process of drafting the country’s media law has also been provided by the embassies of Italy, Slovakia, Albania and Romania.

VIENNA, 22 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed serious concern over the sentence handed down to the editor of the Bastainfo.com online platform, Mustafa Hajibeyli, in Baku, Azerbaijan.

Yesterday, the Baku Court on Grave Crimes imposed a five-and-a-half-year conditional sentence on Hajibeyli, with a two-year probation period, on charges of public calls against the state, excess of authority and forgery. Reportedly, the charges relate to allegations that Bastainfo.com disseminated false and illegal information regarding a power outage and attack on the Head of the city of Ganja in 2018, an issue which the Representative raised in his earlier interventions with the authorities.

“This court decision convicting Mustafa Hajibeyli marks a worrying trend for freedom of expression and freedom of the media in Azerbaijan. I call on the authorities to carefully review the case on appeal, and allow the journalist to work unimpeded in full compliance with the OSCE’s media freedom commitments,” Désir said.

The Representative noted reports of various irregularities during the court’s proceedings, including with regard to the grounds and relevance of bringing such grave charges against the editor. 

Désir also reiterated his concern regarding the case of the editor of the online platform Criminalaz.com, Anar Mammadov, who is facing trial on similar charges.

“Any restrictions on the right to freedom of expression should be narrowly applied and in full compliance with the principles of rule of law, necessity and proportionality. Media workers should not be targeted in retaliation for their work,” the Representative concluded.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA, 22 February 2019 – The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s 18th Winter Meeting concluded today in Vienna with lively debates on migration, counter-terrorism, gender issues, and combating corruption. With nearly 300 OSCE parliamentarians in attendance, Chairs of OSCE PA ad hoc committees, Special Representatives, and leaders of recent election observation missions presented reports at today’s closing plenary session.

PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) and Secretary General Roberto Montella held a series of bilateral meetings while in Vienna, including with the U.S. and Russian delegations, as well as the delegations of Albania and Armenia, and the Chairman of the Kazakh Mazhilis Nurlan Nigmatulin. They also met with the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak, and Secretary General Thomas Greminger.

Chaired by Filippo Lombardi (MP, Switzerland), Artur Gerasymov (MP, Ukraine) and Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland), the general committees of the OSCE PA have met over the past two days for discussions on issues such as restrictions on human rights during emergencies; fighting corruption, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; and how to best leverage the tools and mechanisms of the OSCE to resolve protracted conflicts.

Rapporteurs of the general committees presented their ideas and intentions for the reports and draft resolutions they will be preparing for this summer’s Annual Session in Luxembourg. Alan Farrell (MP, Ireland), Rapporteur of the Assembly’s Committee on Political Affairs and Security, stressed the role of parliaments in promoting sustainable development, democratic institutions and security.

“Parliaments have a fundamental role in ensuring governments remain accountable to their citizens, that their actions are transparent, and that all actions which work towards building and developing sustainable peace are both inclusive and people-centered,” Farrell said.

Elona Gjebrea Hoxha (MP, Albania), Rapporteur of the Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment, focused her remarks on economic good governance, the fight against corruption and financing terrorism, connectivity, migration management, food and water security, and climate change.

“Climate change is now affecting every country on every continent,” she said. “It is disrupting national economies and affecting lives, costing people, communities, and countries dearly today and even more tomorrow.” She urged action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and curb the worst effects of global warming.

Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions Rapporteur Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (MP, Cyprus) noted that 71 years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 44 years after the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, there is a need to reaffirm and update these international commitments.

He focused on growing trends of neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism, the use of states of emergencies to suspend democratic commitments, and the needs of children in areas of military conflict. “Children living in conflict zones around the world continued to suffer extreme violence and serious human rights violations in 2018,” Hadjiyianni regretted. “Schools, students and teachers often become targets. Displacement of children all too often results in separation from their parents.”

He noted that 2019 marks the 30th anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and on this occasion, stressed that protection of children should become a top priority.

In a report to the plenary session today, OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Migration Chair Nahima Lanjri (MP, Belgium) described the committee’s work conducting field visits, promoting discussion on the topic of migration in the OSCE PA, and strengthening co-operation with the OSCE Secretariat, Institutions and relevant international actors.

She focused her remarks on migration-related challenges such as unaccompanied and separated children, access to education for children, and integration of refugees. For a successful international response to migration, she said it is essential to promote a multi-stakeholder approach that includes the engagement of public and private sectors and local governments, as well as implementing the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees on the international level.

Chair Makis Voridis (MP, Greece) reported on the activities of the OSCE PA’s Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (CCT) over the past year, noting that it has been working intensively to provide parliamentary added value to counter-terrorism efforts. He described evolving trends in terrorism and violent extremism, stressing that international terror groups like ISIL and al-Qaeda remain very active in conflict-affected zones.

In addressing the ongoing threat of terrorism, Voridis discussed a number of initiatives, including mechanisms to promote the implementation of international commitments within national parliaments. He highlighted a CCT initiative calling upon all parliaments to inquire with their governments on the status of implementation of international standards on border security and information sharing in the context of the fight against terrorism and the return of foreign terrorist fighters, noting that 16 OSCE PA member parliaments have already responded.

In the Standing Committee meeting on Thursday, heads of delegations agreed that from 1 April onwards OSCE PA election observers will have to submit a declaration on conflicts of interest that they might have regarding electoral stakeholders.

Speeches and reports from the two-day Winter Meeting are available here.

Photos are available for public use on the OSCE PA's Flickr page.

Videos are being posted at the OSCE PA's YouTube channel.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Houses sustained damage caused by gunfire in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area and near the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region and demining activities in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 475 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol); south-east, south and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk); as well as in areas south, west and north of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (about 135 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-west of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas below).

Houses in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka sustained damage caused by gunfire

At 6 Dundycha Street, within a residential area in the south-eastern part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a broken south-facing window pane on the ground floor of a two-storey house and scorch marks to the south-facing side of the same house. It also saw remnants of ammunition, assessed as a tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) 2-4m south of the house. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by the explosion of a rocket propelled grenade (RPG-7) fired from a north-north-westerly direction.

At 4 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw three holes in a north-facing window on the ground floor of a two-storey house. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by rounds of small-arms fire.

At 4 Poshtova Street, within a residential area on the northern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM saw two broken south-eastern-facing windows on the ground floor of a two-storey house. It also saw remnants of ammunition assessed as an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1, 73mm) round about 10m south of the aforementioned windows.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 20 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst at an assessed range of 4-5km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 21 February, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, as well as four shots and about 30 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-west and south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

21 February

The SMM saw:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

• ten tanks (five T-72 and five T-64) and a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 21 February 2019) and
• 20 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk). 

20 February

The SMM saw:

• seven tanks (two T-72 and five T-64) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region[4]

21 February

The SMM noted that:

• eight howitzers (D-30) were present and
• 30 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), seven towed howitzers (D-30) and 24 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

21 February

The SMM noted that:

• six tanks (five T-64 and one T-72) were again missing.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

20 February

The SMM noted that:

• ten towed howitzers (nine D-30 and one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and five MLRS (BM-21) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

20 February

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three IFVs (BMP variants) south-east of Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP variants) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

21 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BREM variant) and six IFVs (BMP-1) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report of 20 February 2019) and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• five armoured recovery vehicles (three BTS-4A and two VT-55), six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP-2), nine APCs (seven MT-LB and two BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in compounds in the Leninskyi district of Donetsk city and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

21 February

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-1) in Luhansk city;
• an IFV (BMP variant) in Hryhorivka (68km south of Donetsk); and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and remnants of ammunition

On 20 February, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 11 anti-tank mines (nine TM-62 and two probable TM-62) laid across road H21 about 70m east of the bridge in Shchastia and six anti-tank mines (four TM-62 and two probable TM-62) laid across the same road 50m west of the bridge (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 9 February 2019). 

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable inspection and repair works to water pipelines of the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and water pipelines in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable demining activities in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw three cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a bus entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 11 covered cargo trucks (four with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw at least 200 stationary empty cargo wagons. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 18 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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SARAJEVO, 22 February 2019 – The Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bruce G. Berton, the President of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) of BiH, Milan Tegeltija, and the Chief Prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH, Gordana Tadić, today signed a Memorandum of Understanding to support the development of a digital archive of all evidence pertaining to war crimes cases in the possession of the BiH Prosecutor’s Office.

Emphasizing the valuable and consistent co-operation with the BiH Prosecutor’s Office and the HJPC, Berton said: “The Memorandum of Understanding, signed within the Project on Improving War Crimes Processing, will allow for the creation of an electronic database containing all evidence available within the BiH Prosecutor’s Office. This digital archive is an important step forward in processing war crimes cases at the state level, and it is one of the recommendations of the 2016 Report by Judge Joana Korner.”

“Activities within this project are crucial for processing war crimes, as every case file contains a large amount of evidence. It is very useful to have a digital evidence database that will enable a more expeditious and efficient overview of evidence, as well as easier sorting of evidence and preparation of highly complex cases. This will significantly facilitate and contribute to a more effective processing of war crimes cases, which is of benefit to all parties involved in the procedure”, emphasized Tadić.

Tegeltija added: “The High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomes and supports any form of co-operation with international organizations aimed at strengthening the rule of law and establishing a functional system that will be of use not only to the judges and prosecutors in their work but also to the general public in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our common goal is for war crimes cases to be finalized within an optimum timeframe, in order to, eventually, leave the heavy burden of war behind us and dedicate ourselves to the establishment of a high-quality judicial system.”

The Project on Improving War Crimes Processing, implemented by the OSCE Mission to BiH, is funded by the Government of the United Kingdom (UK).

British Ambassador to BiH Matthew Field said: “The UK Government is strongly committed to promoting the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The prosecution of individuals responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide is important for securing justice and ensuring a lasting peace. This project is a follow-up to our previous joint work with the OSCE in addressing the challenges that hinder processing of war crimes cases at the state level. That work resulted in a set of recommendations by Judge Korner, and this database is one of them.”

Ambassador Field further pointed out: “The recommendations are still highly significant, in particular the reestablishment of a geographical team structure and the introduction of a mentoring system for new prosecutors. We welcome the Chief Prosecutor’s commitment to implementing these recommendations which will ensure the more efficient prosecution of war crimes and further enhance the capabilities of the Prosecutor’s Office to focus on more complex cases involving high-level perpetrators.”

The OSCE Mission to BiH and the British Embassy in Sarajevo reiterated their commitment to providing continued support judicial institutions in BiH, in order to ensure efficient war crimes processing, thus contributing to the building of a strong, independent and effective judiciary.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

A training seminar for media representatives on the fundamentals of anti-corruption practices was held by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Agency for Civil Service Affairs and Anti-corruption on 21 February 2019 in Astana.

Some 25 representatives of the media were familiarized with ongoing reforms in the country and plans to address challenges to combat corruption. The presentations were complemented by the OSCE-supported instructors from the civil sector who highlighted best international practices to combat corruption and provided an overview of Kazakhstan’s implementation of anti-corruption recommendations under its Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan.

The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan is a sub-regional peer review programme that was launched in 2003 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Under the programme, members of the network are reviewed and monitored on a continuous basis for the implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption. For Kazakhstan, the next assessment  is due next month.

The training seminar was part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance by focusing on anti-corruption activities in Kazakhstan.

SKOPJE, 22 February 2019 – The Prime Minister, the Ministers of the Interior and Justice and the New President of the State Commission for Prevention of Corruption addressed a conference on the role of law enforcement agencies in the struggle against corruption, which was organized by the OSCE Mission in Skopje and the Italian Embassy today.

Clemens Koja, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, said: “Law enforcement agencies are crucial to the effective fight against corruption. So is the integrity of law enforcement agencies for the credibility of that struggle. We at the OSCE stand ready to support the ongoing reforms and the emerging anti-corruption architecture in the country.”

Zoran Zaev, the Prime Minister of North Macedonia said: “Corruption, conflict of interests and nepotism at all levels, are among the most dangerous threats to society and all its citizens. Society, individuals and institutions, especially those that are entitled to combat this phenomenon, should be able to recognize, prevent and punish all forms of corruption.”

The discussion explored how to strengthen the North Macedonia’s fight against corruption and drew on international experiences, which was presented by Raffaele Cantone, the President of the Italian National Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC).

Carlo Romeo, Ambassador of Italy to North Macedonia said that the participation of Cantone confirms Italy’s strong commitment to supporting the Western Balkan countries in their efforts to prevent and combat corruption.

“Anti-corruption related efforts were the focus of special attention throughout Italy’s Chairmanship of the ‘Berlin Process’ in 2017 and specifically its Western Balkan Summit aiming to assist the countries in their efforts towards prospective European integration. This approach was also taken during our OSCE Chairmanship last year by appointing a Special Representative for Anti-Corruption,’ said Romeo.

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CHISINAU, 22 February 2019 – The international observers for the parliamentary elections in Moldova will present their preliminary post-election statement at a news conference on Monday, 25 February, in Chisinau.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament (EP).

The statement will be delivered by George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, followed by Claude Kern, Head of the PACE delegation,

Kari Henriksen, Head of the OSCE PA delegation, Rebecca Harms, Head of the EP delegation, and Matyas Eörsi, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission.

The international election observation mission comprises some 340 observers from 38 countries, including 259 long-term and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 42 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, 25 from PACE and 11 from the EP.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference on Monday, 25 February, at 14:30 in the Raut Ballroom of the Radisson Blu Leogrand Hotel, str. Mitropolit Varlaam 77, Chisinau.

The press conference will be live streamed at: www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/389342 and www.oscepa.org

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR, +373 68 012 098 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Nat Parry, OSCE PA, +373 69 042 291 or +45 60 10 81 77, nat@oscepa.dk

Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE, +373 69 189 927, chemavon.chahbazian@coe.int,

Tim Boden, EP, +373 60 370 226 or +324 98 983 324, timothy.boden@ep.europa.eu

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