OSCE

PODGORICA, 8 May 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák, today in Podgorica, called Montenegro a success story for democratic transformation and Euro-Atlantic integration, and a role model for the region. “In the last two decades, Montenegro has made huge progress in consolidating peace and stability,” Lajčák said.

During his stay in Montenegro, the first South-Eastern European country he has visited since taking office in January, Chairperson Lajčák underlined the wide range of challenges the region is facing, ranging from deep-rooted grievances and the ongoing process of reconciliation, to the need to strengthen rule of law and freedom of the media.

“Other phenomena, such as illegal migration flows and violent extremism, continue to pose a threat to the country and the region. These challenges endanger the region’s aspirations and the stability of other participating States.” At the same time, he pointed to the value of the OSCE in this regard, as an organization which strives for regional approaches to regional challenges.

Emphasizing the strong and very practice-oriented Montenegrin-OSCE partnership, in particular on reforming the electoral system, building a free, resilient and professional media landscape, promoting security sector governance and reform, and strengthening regional youth co-operation in collaboration with RYCO, in his meetings with President Milo Đukanović, Prime Minister Duško Marković, Minister of Foreign Affairs Srdjan Darmanović, and Speaker of the Parliament Ivan Brajović, Minister Lajčák referred to the achievements made. “In the region, the OSCE has come a long way from assisting in the establishment of key democratic institutions to helping to build their functionality and strengthening their relationship with citizens,” he said.

Lajčák stressed that listening to critical voices is key in a maturing democracy. “Differences should be debated in parliament by all representatives, including the opposition. Boycotting cuts off any chance of dialogue - and therefore any chance of finding common ground. The only way to achieve progress is through dialogue.”

The Chairperson also met with representatives of civil society, key actors in reforming Montenegro and important partners of the OSCE Mission, and took the opportunity to show what Slovakia’s OSCE slogan “for people, dialogue and stability” means in action, delivering a bio-microscopic slit lamp to the hospital Klinički Centar and announcing Slovakia’s support for the reconstruction work of the Tanasije Petrović Grammar School in Pljevlja.

While in Montenegro, Minister Lajčák was awarded the honorary title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Montenegro as an acknowledgement of his contribution to the transformation of the country.

418982 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A three-day capacity-building course on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism (VERLT) took place in the town of Guliston from 2 to 4 May 2019. The training course served as the final phase of equipping public council members with relevant knowledge and skills to address and integrate aspects of preventing and countering VERLT into community policing efforts.

The course brought together 20 members of Regional Public Councils on Police Reform, more than half of them women. It was aimed at consolidating the theoretical knowledge that the public council members gained during the basic courses held in February and March 2019. The trainees learned how to develop communication strategies in the context of preventing and countering VERLT and discussed the national legal framework and practice. Promoting gender mainstreaming and mobilizing youth to tackle VERLT-related challenges were also part of the training.

Navruz Odinaev, a member of the Public Council operating at the Interior Ministry Headquarters said: “This advanced course will enable me to devise concrete projects on preventing and countering VERLT by identifying and managing respective risks, integrating gender mainstreaming, as well as by engaging young people in different initiatives.” 

Farosatmoh Gayurova, a member of the Khorog Public Council on Police Reform, said that she wants to apply her knowledge in preventing violent extremism and terrorist radicalization among young people and women.

During the course, the public council members developed various initiatives targeted at addressing and eradicating the root causes of VERLT at grassroots level. The initiatives are intended for integration into the annual action plans of Public Councils and practical implementation, subject to consent by the senior management of Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry.

Public Councils on Police Reform are advisory bodies to the Interior Ministry that function at the regional level, and are comprised of civil society activists. They help to develop and strengthen links between citizens and police by promoting community policing.

NUR-SULTAN, 8 May 2019 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today formally opened an election observation mission (EOM) for the 9 June early presidential election in Kazakhstan. The mission’s deployment follows an invitation from the country’s authorities.

The mission is led by Ambassador Urszula Gacek and consists of a core team of 11 experts based in Nur-Sultan. ODIHR has requested OSCE participating States to second 24 long-term observers and 300 short-term observers. The long-term observers will be deployed throughout the country in multinational teams of two from 14 May 2019, while the short-term observers will arrive a few days before the election.

The mission will assess the election’s compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. Observers will closely monitor voter registration, candidate registration, campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant government bodies, election-related legislation and its implementation, and the resolution of election-related disputes. The mission will also monitor media coverage of the campaign.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives of state authorities, political parties, civil society, the media, and the international community.

On election day itself, the ODIHR EOM will join efforts with the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results.

The mission will publish an interim report in the course of its work. The day after the election, a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions will be issued at a press conference. ODIHR will issue a final report on the observation approximately two months after the end of the election process.

The ODIHR election observation mission and the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

For further information, please visit www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/418187 or contact Kira Kalinina, Media Analyst, at +7 701 6436097 (Nur-Sultan mobile), or at kira.kalinina@odihr.kz

or

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile), or at katya.andrusz@odihr.pl.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man died after a metal object exploded in Velyka Novosilka.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• It continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Kozatske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 70 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at easterly directions of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and in areas south-south-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

A man died in Velyka Novoselivka after a metal object exploded

In Velyka Novosilka (government-controlled, 74km west of Donetsk) the head of the police station told the SMM that a man (in his thirties) had died on 4 May after a metal object he had found exploded as he had been trying to disassemble it at his house. He added that the man collected scrap metal. At the hospital in Velyka Novosilka the head of the intensive care unit told the SMM that the man had been brought to the hospital on 4 May with fatal trauma injuries to his head, hands and legs consistent with explosion wounds. At 43 Ohorodnyi Lane, where the deceased man reportedly lived, the SMM observed a funeral procession.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned near the disengagement areas near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

6 May

The SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) in Starobilsk (85km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable mortar (120mm) and three tanks (probable T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

6 May

The SMM saw three MLRS (9P138 Grad-1, 122mm), three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (three D-20, 152mm and three D-30 Lyagushka,122mm), three towed mortars (120mm), six tanks (three T-64 and three T-72) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira, 100mm) in the centre of Donetsk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

6 May

The SMM saw:

    -  six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near the train station in Rubizhne          (84km north-west of Luhansk); and

    - five surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) near the train station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

4 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in a field east of Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) in Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk).

5 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an APC (Saxon) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-1) near Lobacheve.

Mine hazard signs near Stepove

The SMM observed for the first time two red mine hazard signs with the words “Stop.Mine” written in Russian on wooden posts on the northern edge of road T-1303 about 2.2km north of Stepove (non-government-controlled, 27km west of Luhansk).

Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints

The SMM observed at least 50 people (mixed gender, in their sixties to eighties) with canes struggling to climb the wooden ramps of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska when crossing the contact line. Three pedestrians (in their forties) told the Mission that it had taken them about 60 to 90 minutes to cross the contact line between the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. At different entry-exit checkpoints interlocutors told the SMM that they are informed about the new electronic permits, which do not have an expiry date. Some added that they had already applied for these new permits.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), as well as damaged houses in Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Positioned near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM observed de-miners from the State Emergency Service drive towards the DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol). A second armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that it was not allowed to proceed because a unit of the armed formations was located immediately east of the checkpoint. He added that only civilians listed as living in Porokhnia were allowed to travel east past this checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that no demining activities had taken place. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

VIENNA, 7 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, called on the authorities to reinstate access to numerous web resources, including online media, social platforms and Google services, in Tajikistan.

“I appeal to the authorities to provide citizens with full and unrestricted access to the online news media, both national and international, as well as social platforms and search engines,” Désir said. “There can be no freedom of expression and freedom of information without an unhindered access to the internet.”

According to reports, for the last ten days most social media and messenger applications, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, Viber, and Telegram, have been intermittently blocked, while access to internet browsers also remains intermittent. Asia Plus, Avesta, and the Ozodi websites are among some of the publications that remain unavailable.

The Representative has frequently raised the issue of internet blocking in Central Asia and throughout the OSCE region.

418997 Communication and Media Relations Section

Representatives of Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy, the country’s Office of the Prosecutor General, the police and the State Service for Labour Issues visited the OSCE Secretariat and the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior on 7 and 8 May 2019 as part of an OSCE capacity-building project that aims to combat human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants.

The visit was organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department (SPMU).

On 7 May, the delegation met with the representatives of SPMU, the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and INTERPOL. They discussed the role and responsibilities of Labour Inspectorates and the need to provide specialized training in the interviewing of victims. The discussions also explored how to strengthen bilateral co-operation with other OSCE participating States to improve the exchange of information and better address transnational cases of human trafficking.

On 8 May, the delegation visited the Central Service for Combating Alien Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings of the Austrian Interior Ministry to learn about the Austrian institutional framework for combating human trafficking as well as about a special hotline run by the Ministry.

The project is supported with financial contributions from Austria, France, Norway, Slovakia and Switzerland.

VIENNA, 7 May 2019 – Participants in a two-day Vienna-based conference entitled Commitment – Data – Action! underlined the importance of comparable data for improving policies and measures to prevent violence against women and girls (VAWG).

The conference, which concluded today, was organized in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Development Program, UNICEF and UN Women and took an in-depth look at the OSCE-led Survey on Violence against Women, Well-being and Safety of Women. The survey was conducted in the spring and summer of 2018 in seven OSCE participating States. 15,179 women between the ages of 18 and 74 were interviewed about their experiences of violence in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova and Ukraine. The survey also covered Kosovo.

The OSCE Survey was based on the methodology used by the EU-wide survey on violence against women conducted by the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency in 2014. The collected data provides much-needed information on the current situation in OSCE participating States in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and will support the development of new approaches to protect and support women and girls.

The OSCE Secretary General, Thomas Greminger, said: “The survey results are a call for action. The OSCE commitments on preventing and combating violence against women are clear and numerous entry points for action exist. The survey findings can help us to take up the challenge in a more targeted and systematic way. That’s why this survey is very important to us.”

The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Gender, Melanne Verveer, stressed that States have a responsibility to make every effort to prevent violence against women, protect the survivors and prosecute the perpetrators. “Violence against women requires laws against it that are implemented, enforced and resourced. It needs policies and practices that work and are shared; monitoring that ensures accountability.”

Hilde Hardeman, the Director and Head of the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, underlined that eliminating violence against women and girls is at the core of the values of the European Union: “Violence against women and girls is a grave violation of human rights. What is more, such violence can also be a driver for conflict within societies. By gathering information on the scope of gender-based violence, we have provided the basis for addressing this fundamental problem. We now need to act together to end violence against women and girls once and for all”.

As its main conclusion, the survey called for enhanced efforts to implement legislation and to improve action plans addressing violence against women and girls. It found that violence is experienced by women from all parts of society, regardless of economic or social status. However, certain groups of women, such as younger women, those who are economically dependent or those who have children, are at higher risk. Gender-based violence can result in severe physical and psychological pain for the survivors, who in the vast majority of cases do not report incidents. Many women are not aware of the help that is available to them after they have experienced violence or are silenced by deeply-rooted attitudes that act as barriers to seeking help.

Four parallel working groups – on economic empowerment of women, on the provision of services and a multi-sectoral approach to violence against women and girls, on engaging men and boys in combating it, and on data collection and SMART national action plans – allowed for in-depth discussions on these topics.

Participants explored how OSCE participating States can use the data provided by the survey to develop policies and strategies for monitoring and reporting as well as for awareness raising and further research. They stressed the need to improve the implementation of national legal frameworks and data collection and provide necessary resources for services. They agreed that a co-ordinated and multi-sectoral response mechanism must be put in place. This would ensure that women and girls are informed about their options and that the police and judiciary are trained in protection and support of survivors. The participants also discussed the need for overarching efforts to change gender stereotypes, biases and prejudices such as awareness-raising campaigns and the mainstreaming of information about gender equality in the education system.

The survey and conference were funded by the European Union’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) as well as the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Women, UNICEF and the OSCE participating States Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, the United States and Sweden.

Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg in their capacity as States parties to the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE (Stockholm Convention), have appointed conciliators, arbitrators and alternates for new mandates of six years to the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.

The mandates of these States parties’ members were approaching expiry. The States parties therefore renewed the mandates of their members or, alternatively, nominated new members. Further States parties are also due to renew the mandates of their members and more nominations are expected in the next three months.

The appointments were made in accordance with Article 3 and 4 of the Stockholm Convention, which was agreed in 1992 and has 34 States parties to date.

The conciliators and arbitrators of the Court will be requested to elect a new Bureau whose term of office will terminate in October 2019. The Bureau consists of a President, a Vice-President and three other members.

The election will take place in a written procedure in line with the provisions of Article 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. The election procedure will start in Summer 2019 with an invitation to the members of the Court to nominate potential candidates for the President of the Court and the membership of the Bureau. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, in its capacity as Depositary State, will collect these nominations.

The following is a list of the conciliators, arbitrators and their alternates appointed by Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg:

Denmark

Conciliators                           

Jonas BERING LIISBERG
State Secretary for Foreign Policy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Peter TAKSØE-JENSEN
Ambassador
 

Arbitrator

Michael BRAAD
Ambassador
Director, Centre for Legal Services, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
                                                

Alternate

Tobias ELLING REHFELD
Ambassador

Germany

Conciliators

Christian TOMUSCHAT
Professor emeritus
Faculty of Law, Humboldt University Berlin
President of the Court (October 2013 to October 2019)

Doris KÖNIG
Justice of the Federal Constitutional Court

Arbitrator

Silja VÖNEKY
Professor of Public International Law, Comparative Law and Ethics of Law
(Co-)Director of the Institute for Public Law
University of Freiburg

Alternate

Christian WALTER
Chair of Public International Law and Public Law
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Hungary

Conciliators

Vanda LAMM
Professor, Institute of Legal Studies
Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Pal SONNEVEND
Vice-Dean, Professor
Faculty of Law, ELTE University of Budapest                                                

Arbitrator

János BRUHÁCS
Professor Emeritus, Professor of International Law
University of Pécs
 

Alternate

László BLUTMAN
Professor, University of Szeged

Italy

Conciliators

Riccardo PISILLO MAZZESCHI
Professor of International Law, University of Siena

Attila TANZI
Professor of International Law, University of Bologna
 

Arbitrator

Maria Chiara MALAGUTI
Professor of International Law
Università Cattolica Sacro Cuore, Milano
                                                 

Alternate

Ida CARACCIOLO
Professor of International Law, University of Napoli

Latvia

Conciliators

Egils LEVITS
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Latvia
Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Communities

Mārtiņš PAPARINSKIS
Reader in Public International Law, University College London                                                

Arbitrator

Inga REINE
Judge at the General Court, Court of Justice of the European Communities

Luxembourg

Conciliator

Michel REIFFERS
Vice-President of the Supreme Court of Luxembourg
Counsellor at the Constitutional Court
 

Arbitrator

Lynn SPIELMANN
Counsellor, Administrative Court, Luxembourg
 

Alternate

Annick EVERLING
Deputy Director, Justices of the Peace

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,895 to 11,274 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 74 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 14 this week compared to 13 last week: four of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and ten into Ukraine. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, two families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and seven into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (382 compared to 368 observed during the previous week). There were 196 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 186 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv and Stahanov – Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 527 trucks (797 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (151 at the Gukovo BCP and 376 at the Donetsk BCP); 290 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 237 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 57 (compared to 73 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 179 to 137: of the total number of trucks scanned, 44 trucks (32 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 93 trucks (68 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 157 to 113 vehicles; 52 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 61 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 24 occasions; the OTs assessed that 15 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, cars with licence plates from Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania and Poland were also noted.

On 6 May, the OTs at both BCPs observed a helicopter, flying along the border within Russian Federation airspace on two separate occasions.

A helicopter Mi-8 was first noted at 14:58 at the Donetsk BCP, flying from the north to an easterly direction. Later on, at 15:17, the OT at the Gukovo BCP observed a helicopter flying from the north, which made a circle above the BCP area and left to an easterly direction. Both helicopters were white with blue and grey stripes painted on the bottom.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 2 April 2019 to 7 May 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 3 and 4 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 4 and 5 May, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from shelling to houses in Dokuchaievsk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Zaitseve.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission recorded small-arms fire and explosions inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw mines, including for the first time, near Krymske, Prychepylivka and Zholobok.
• It saw demining activities near Myrne and mine hazard signs near Berezivka, Bohdanivka and Chermalyk, some of them new.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Katerynivka, as well as to enable the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• In Dnipropetrovsk region, the SMM monitored a court hearing in which a foreign national was sentenced to prison for fighting for the armed formations.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Verkhnoshyrokivske and in Naberezhne, and at a border crossing point near Izvaryne.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 3 and 4 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 130), compared with the previous reporting period (about 250 explosions). Nearly half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-south-westerly and south-easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including an undetermined explosion at an estimated range of 2-3km south-south-east assessed as within 500m of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), north-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 4 and 5 May, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 70), compared with the previous 24 hours. Over three quarters of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), easterly directions of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and southerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 3 and 4 May, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 50), compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 4 and 5 May, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however, more explosions (about 70), compared with the previous 24 hours. All of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-westerly directions of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk), southerly directions of Popasna and north-westerly directions of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters and damage from shelling to houses in Dokuchaievsk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 4 May, about 1.5m south of an uninhabited house at 13 Lesi Ukrainky Street in the south-western part of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round but could not assess the direction of fire. The metal roof and stone walls of the south-western part of the house were collapsed and broken. About 5m south-west of 13 Lesi Ukrainky Street, at an inhabited house at 11 Lesi Ukrainky Street, the SMM saw fresh damage (a hole about 20cm in diameter) in the north-west facing part of the roof of the house, assessed as caused by shrapnel or debris from the explosion.  

Across the street at 14 Lesi Ukrainky Street, the SMM saw a second fresh crater about 5m north-west of an inhabited house. About 25m north-east of the house, at 16 Lesi Ukrainky street, the SMM saw two shattered north-facing windows of an inhabited house, assessed as caused by shrapnel or a blast wave.

About 25m north-north-west of the previously mentioned house, at 15 Lesi Ukrainky Street, the SMM saw a hole (about 25cm in diameter) in the southern end of the bathroom ceiling and a corresponding hole in a northern wall inside of the same room. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh but could not determine the cause. About 30m north-east of the aforementioned house, at 17 Lesi Ukrainky Street, the SMM saw a 40cm hole in the edge of the south-west-facing part of the roof, as well as two shattered south-facing windows of the house, assessed as caused by a blast wave.

About 40m west-north-west of 17 Lesi Ukrainky Street, at 26 Kotovskoho Street, the SMM saw a third fresh crater about 5m south-west of an uninhabited house, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round, but could not assess the direction of fire. About 2m north-west of the crater, the SMM saw an uprooted tree and a large hole in the south-east facing side of a garage, assessed as caused by shrapnel and a blast wave. Five residents of the damaged houses and neighbouring houses separately told the SMM that they had been at home when shelling had begun on the night of 3 May and that members of the armed formations had cleaned debris from the area of the impacts on 3 May.

On the same day, on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), about 500m east of the western edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two fresh craters assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds originating from a west-south-westerly direction in the yard about 5m east of a two-storey inhabited apartment building at 15 Lizy Chaikinoi Street. The SMM saw two 82mm mortar tailfins, as well as shrapnel in and around the two craters, and seven shattered east-facing windows. About 100m east-south-east of the building, at 8 Lizy Chaikinoi Street, the SMM saw two shattered east-facing windows of another two-storey inhabited apartment building. Three residents (mixed ages and genders) separately told the SMM that they had been at home when shelling had taken place in the early morning of 4 May.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zaitseve

During the day on 4 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zaitseve (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.6km north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.6km north-east of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV.*

Disengagement areas[2]

While in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on the evening of 3 May, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an estimated range of 5-7km south-west. The SMM was unable to assess whether the explosion was inside or outside the disengagement area. Positioned inside the disengagement area on 4 and 5 May, the SMM observed calm situations.

During the day on 4 May, positioned on the northern and eastern edges of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire and 19 explosions (17 undetermined and two assessed as outgoing mortar rounds), all assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) on 4 May, the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]  Positioned north of the disengagement area on 5 May, the SMM heard ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

5 May

The SMM saw a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Dubovo-Vasylivka (73km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

3 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) and
• eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk).

4 May

The SMM saw five tanks (T-72), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten towed howitzers (five D-30 and five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), five MLRS (BM-21), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and two anti-tank missiles (9K111 Fagot, 122mm) in the centre of Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

3 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 12 tanks (T-64), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above); and
• two tanks (T-64), three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), a self-propelled howitzer (2S1), the barrel and turret of a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) being mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and 17 towed howitzers (nine 2A65 and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

3 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted five infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP-2) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk).

5 May

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Zolote (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 4 May 2019), and
• an APC (BTR-70) in Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

3 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) in a field about 3km north-north-east of Zholobok (47km west of Luhansk).

5 May

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) in Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

On 4 May, the SMM saw about 1000 members of the armed formations, most of them armed, rehearsing for a parade, along with an IFV (BMP-2), in the centre of Luhansk city (see above).

Presence of mines near Krymske, Prychepylivka and Zholobok

On 3 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 100 anti-tank mines (T-62) (not seen in imagery from 1 April 2019) laid in three rows from east to west in a field about 5km south-east of Krymske (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk), near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It also again spotted at least 50 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid in two partially completed rows running north-south for approximately 200m near Ukrainian Armed Forces positions south-west of Krymske. The same UAV again spotted about 150 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in three rows from east to west in a field about 2.5km south-east of Prychepylivka. The UAV also spotted for the first time at least 60 anti-tank mines (TM-62) (not seen in imagery from 1 April 2019) laid out in three rows near a road about 3km north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) near positions of the armed formations.

Demining activities near Myrne and mine hazard signs near Berezivka, Bohdanivka and Chermalyk

On 5 May, on road T-0512, about 5km east of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw 11 members of an international demining organization conducting demining activities in a field south of the road (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 April 2019).

On 3 May, about 1.5km east of Berezivka (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign with “Warning! Mines!” in Ukrainian about 30m south of a road leading east to Tarasivka (government-controlled, 43km north-west of Donetsk). On 4 May, about 100m north-west of Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs reading “Attention. Mine.” in Russian on red sign posts about 3m north of a road leading north-west to Krynychne (non-government-controlled, 45km west of Luhansk).

On 5 May, in a forested part of Bobrove (government-controlled, 56km north-west of Luhansk) bordering the Siverskyi Donets River, the SMM saw that previously-observed mine hazard signs on the south-western side of the road leading to Borivske (government-controlled, 65km north-west of Luhansk) were no longer present. A local resident (male, 65 years old) told the SMM that the signs had been removed after a military unit formerly stationed in the area had left.

On the same day, on the eastern edge of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that a previously-observed red mine hazard sign with “Stop Mines” written in Ukrainian and attached to a rope extended across a road leading to a cemetery was still present.

SMM facilitation of demining activities and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

On 4 May, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities reportedly carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in and around cemeteries in government-controlled areas near Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) (for previous activities, see SMM Daily Report 4 May 2019). On 4 and 5 May, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of government control

On 5 May, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six cars (five with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates, and ten pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. After a few minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 25 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine, as well as 33 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine.

Brazilian national sentenced to prison for fighting for the armed formations

On 3 May, the SMM attended the final trial hearing of Rafael Lusvarghi, a Brazilian national, versus the State at Pavlohrad city district court of the Dnepropetrovsk region. Mr. Lusvarghi was found guilty under article 258-3, part 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (participation in terrorist organizations) and under article 260, part 2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (participation in illegal military units). Mr. Lusvarghi pleaded guilty to the charges of participating in illegal military units but denied the terrorist charges. The court sentenced him to 13 years in prison.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 5 May, in the northern part of Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the centre of the village.
• On 5 May, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Delay:

• On 5 May, at a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), four armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM for 20 minutes before allowing it to proceed east toward government-controlled areas.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 4 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zaitseve (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM safely landed the UAV (see above).
• On 5 May, the SMM followed up on reports of an injured woman at Hospital No.9 in Donetsk city. A doctor at the hospital told the Mission that he was ordered by a superior not to provide the SMM with information about the case.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

VIENNA, 6 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today called for an effective investigation into the attempted murder of journalist Vadim Komarov in Cherkasy, Ukraine.

“I condemn this very violent attack against journalist Vadim Komarov in Cherkazy that has left him in a coma and barely alive. This is an attempted murder against a local investigative journalist known for his reporting on corruption. This targeted attack is particularly alarming and cannot remain unpunished. The investigation was promptly initiated and I call on the authorities to do their utmost to fully investigate the crime,” Désir stressed.

Local journalist and blogger Vadim Komarov, known for his investigative reports on corruption, was attacked in the morning of 4 May in the centre of the city of Cherkasy. He was hit on the head several times and is still in coma after a neurosurgical operation in a local hospital.

“I hope Vadim Komarov will fully recover soon and that he and his colleagues will be protected from violence and intimidation,” the Representative said.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

397628 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presented a spot report on the implementation of the National War Crimes Processing Strategy and its 2018 draft revisions on 6 May 2019 at the Cantonal Court in Bihac.

The report, Observations on the National War Crimes Processing Strategy and its 2018 Draft Revisions, including its relation to the Rules of the Road Category A cases, reviews the progress achieved by the BiH judiciary since the introduction of the National War Crimes Processing Strategy in 2008 and identifies challenges and obstacles to its implementation that the revised strategy aims to address. 

The OSCE Mission to BiH urged the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the revisions to the Strategy without further delay.

“The proposed revised National War Crimes Processing Strategy enhances the criminal and political framework for the work of relevant institutions,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Bruce G. Berton.

Burton explained that the revised strategy brings at least three major advantages. Firstly, it allows for a greater flow of legally less complex cases from state to entity and Brcko District levels, enabling in turn the BiH Prosecutor’s Office to focus its resources on the most complex war crimes cases – which is its primary duty. Secondly, the revised Strategy provides for a more prominent role of the Supervisory Body in charge of implementing the Strategy and for grounds for holding judicial authorities accountable for acting in contravention of the aim and purpose of the Strategy. Finally, it provides for strengthening the normative framework for property claims in litigations.

“Those are the reasons why the Mission invites the Council of Ministers to adopt this revised Strategy without further delay,” said Berton. 

The revised National War Crimes Processing Strategy addresses the challenges that remain in ensuring that pending cases are processed efficiently. It will help secure justice for war crimes victims and will support the country as it moves forward towards reconciliation and lasting peace.  

SKOPJE, 6 May 2019 – The second round of North Macedonia’s presidential election was calm and well run. However, shortfalls in the legal framework continued to be a concern, international observers concluded in a preliminary statement published today.

The observation mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

“This election cycle has now been brought to a successful conclusion, with voters freely able to choose between distinct choices,” said Sereine Mauborgne, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission. “Yesterday’s increased voter turnout shows determination by the population to unite and address the challenges facing this country. It is now up to the political leadership to hear this message and undertake real reform that will replace the legal patchwork requiring constant political agreements with a coherent and sustainable electoral law.”

Some 1.8 million voters were eligible to cast their ballot in 3,396 polling stations across the country. The election authorities carried out preparations for the second round professionally and impartially and generally enjoyed public confidence. However, the fact that citizens whose identification documents had expired were excluded from voting needs to be addressed. In addition, while the turnout requirement of 40% was met on this occasion, it does create the potential for repeat elections, a concern that ODIHR has previously voiced.

The campaign took place in a calm environment. All participants were able to campaign without hindrance and fundamental freedoms were respected. State officials appeared to continue differentiating clearly between their official and political activities. Further, both candidates reached out to different ethnic communities.

“The voting for the second round of the presidential election was well organized and voters, as in the first round, were able to make their choice freely. But an election is not limited to voting day. The PACE delegation considers that some recurrent problems in the electoral process remain unaddressed, in particular, the need to reform the electoral code and, in general, the political system, to re-engage citizens and to ensure their active participation, regardless of ethnic origin. In addition, it is crucial to strengthen the transparency and control of election campaign funding. The issue of EU and NATO membership should not be allowed to obscure recurrent problems in the electoral process,” said Marie-Christine Dalloz, Head of the PACE delegation. “The Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice Commission are ready to assist the authorities of North Macedonia in implementing the necessary reforms.”

As in the first round of the election, however, the international observers expressed serious concerns over the legal framework. While the law does allow for democratic elections, the regulatory gaps already evident on issues such as campaigning, media advertising, campaign finance and voter registration remain unaddressed. This further highlights the importance of legislative reform, which was already emphasised in the preliminary conclusions following the first round.

“Election day was well prepared, and passed calmly and peacefully,” said Corien Jonker of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). “But democracy is not just about election day. Political will is needed to ensure that genuinely inclusive legal reforms are followed by a consistent implementation that builds and keeps citizens’ trust.”

The international election observation mission for the second round comprises some 170 observers from 32 countries, including 156 long- and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 11 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, and 5 from PACE.

For further information, please contact:

Andreas Baker, OSCE PA: +389 70636321 or +45 601 08126, andreas@oscepa.dk

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR: +389 728 07826 or +48 609 522 266, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE Secretariat: +389 706 36302 or +33 6 50 68 76 55, Chemavon.Chahbazian@coe.int

LEINSWEILER, 6 May 2019 – Bringing together parliamentarians, scholars, OSCE officials, business leaders, and representatives of other regional organizations, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s fifth Leinsweiler seminar this weekend explored lessons learned from European history on the power of economics as an instrument of conflict prevention and rehabilitation – or as a source of conflict.

Taking place on 4-5 May in the state of Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany, the Leinsweiler seminar addressed topics such as “Post-War Conflict Rehabilitation and Prevention Through Economic Co-operation” and “Customs Regimes, Economic Integration and Co-operation Between Different Integration Processes.”

OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (Georgia) and Treasurer Doris Barnett (Germany) opened the seminar on Saturday noting that European stability is rooted in economic ties, which is a lesson that was learned through the painful experiences of the 20th century. Tsereteli noted that the venue of the meeting is a powerful reminder of how economic competition has fueled conflicts, but how economic co-operation has helped forged peace.

“While coal and steel production was a major obstacle to French-German reconciliation in the first half of the 20th century, it also provided the foundation for a united Europe by inspiring the European Coal and Steel Community,” Tsereteli said. “By meeting in Leinsweiler this weekend, let’s remember that with time and dedicated efforts to educate and to recall the lessons of history, durable peace can be re-established, even in the most unstable regions of the OSCE.”

Barnett, who heads the German Delegation to the OSCE PA, recalled the motivation for establishing strong economic foundations for co-operation. “After the horrors of the Second World War, Europeans were determined to secure lasting peace,” she said. “The European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community began to unite European countries economically and politically as of 1950.”

She noted that the International Rhine Commission developed a dynamic approach to return to economic activity of the Rhine corridor after World War Two.

Tsereteli and Barnett underlined that the aim of the Leinsweiler seminars is to promote dialogue between OSCE participating States at a time where entrenched positions and nationalist rhetoric, as well as unilateral actions which run contrary to the founding principles of the OSCE, have threatened to undermine trust and the ability to find common ground.

Also addressing the opening was Amb. Katarina Žáková, Deputy Permanent Representative from the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, who spoke about the importance of effective multilateralism. She stressed that the Slovak Chairmanship is seeking to build dialogue to find solutions to the conflicts affecting the OSCE area, including by addressing the economic consequences for the populations.

Bringing together some 20 Members of Parliament from 10 countries, the Leinsweiler seminar also included the participation of OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella and the OSCE PA’s Special Representative in Vienna Amb. Andreas Nothelle, as well as representatives from the governmental side of the OSCE, including Amb. Vuk Zugic, the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, and Amb. Kairat Sarybay, Chair of the OSCE’s Economic and Environmental Committee. Other participants included leading academics, representatives of regional organizations and of the private sector.

In discussions, participants raised issues such as connectivity and energy security. In several sessions, the resilience of transborder economic co-operation after certain conflicts, or even during the Cold War, was presented as an encouraging signal to the populations most affected by current conflicts.

Previous Leinsweiler seminars have been held in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. The seminars are dedicated to promoting parliamentary contributions to OSCE efforts in addressing conflicts. They are hosted by the Delegation of Germany to the OSCE PA and supported by the German Foreign Ministry.

Photos from the Leinsweiler seminar are available on Flickr.

NUR-SULTAN, 6 May 2019 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission deployed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 9 June early presidential election in Kazakhstan, the mission will hold a press conference in Nur-Sultan on Wednesday.

Urszula Gacek, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities. The mission's deployment follows an invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The ODIHR election observation mission and the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 11:00, Wednesday, 8 May, in Conference hall “Garden 1&2”, Hotel Hilton Garden Inn, Kabanbay Batyr Avenue 15. 010000, Nur-Sultan.

For further information, please contact Kira Kalinina, Media Analyst with the election observation mission, at +7 701 6436097 or at kira.kalinina@odihr.kz.

or

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile), or at katya.andrusz@odihr.pl.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 
• The SMM saw fresh small-arms fire damage to a residential house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.  
• The SMM recorded an explosion inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas. 
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses, as well as to enable demining activities at cemeteries in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.It alsocontinued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.* 

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 250), compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recordedin areas west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), in areas north-north-west, north-west and south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas north, south-west and west of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

In Luhansk city, the SMM observed a gathering of about 2,500 people at an event of the armed formations where it heard about 15 explosions and 260 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as simulation pyrotechnics and blank shots.

Fresh small-arms fire damage to the window of a house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

At 18 Lizy Chaikinoi Street in the western part Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two holes (1.5cm and 3.5cm in diameter, respectively) in a plastic window frame in the west-facing wall of a two-storey residential house. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by small-arms fire. According to the owner of the house (man in his forties), the damage had occurred on 2 May. (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 22 April 2019.) 

Loss of SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

While positioned 4km west of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and flying an SMM mini-UAV about 300m south-south-west, the UAV encountered GPS signal interference. The SMM lost control of the mini-UAV and was not able to return it.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 2 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as eight projectiles and a muzzle flash assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

During the day on 3 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

30 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

1 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four tanks (T-64) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk).

2 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a towed mortar (2B16 Nona-K, 120mm), with its barrel removed, on the south-eastern outskirts of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

3 May

The SMM saw four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Pryvillia (81km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

3 May 

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Zolote.

Non-government-controlled areas

30 April 

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a new trench (not seen in imagery from 22 February 2019) running 100m north from a recently constructed bunker near Stepove (27km west of Luhansk).

1 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) about 35m from civilian houses in Novoselivka.

2 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), three anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on three APCs (MT-LB M) as well as eight APCs (MT-LB) in Pervomaisk.

3 May 

The SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) and two APCs (BTR-80) in Luhansk city.

Mine hazard signs in Debaltseve

On 3 May, the SMM observed for the first time a mine hazard sign with “Mines” written in Russian on Chervonoarmiiska Streetin the western outskirts of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 1 May 2019).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) as well as damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of demining activities in and around cemeteries

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities reportedly carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in and around cemeteries in government-controlled areas near Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk). 

Border areas outside government control

Positioned at the border crossing point near Novoazovsk (101km south-east of Donetsk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw two cars with Russian Federation licence plates entering Ukraine, as well as five cars (four with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two pedestrians (a woman and a man, both in their forties) exiting Ukraine.

In Donetsk City people apply for passports of the Russian Federation 

In non-government-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM observed about 70 people (mixed gender and ages) in front of a building at Khodakovskoho Street No.10 in order to submit applications for passports of the Russian Federation. A man and a woman (in their thirties) told the Mission that once their papers would be examined and approved, they would be asked to make a payment of about 1,200 Russian Roubles at a financial institution in Donetsk. The SMM saw several representatives of the media in front of the building. It also saw a senior member of the armed formations give an interview saying that applicants were required to submit a birth certificate, eight photographs as well as a “passport” issued by the armed formations."

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 3 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined. The SMM did not consider safe to proceed.

Delays:

• At a checkpoint approximately 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after about 20 and 40 minutes respectively.

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018. 

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM saw for the first time at least 100 anti-tank mines near government-controlled Pyshchevyk.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses, as well as to enable demining activities at cemeteries in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also denied access at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region near the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Odessa, the SMM monitored three gatherings to commemorate those who lost their lives during the events of 2 May 2014.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 180), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), in areas west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about ten), compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). Most ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), including eight explosions of mortar rounds.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 1 and 2 May, while in Popasna, the SMM heard three explosions (two assessed as mortar rounds and one undetermined) as well as ten shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 5-12km east. The SMM was unable to assess whether all the aforementioned ceasefire violations were inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). While at the same location, the SMM also heard about 100 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

During the day on 2 May, positioned inside the disengagement area close to Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]  

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

1 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10) near Chernenko (21km north-east of Mariupol).

2 May

The SMM saw:

• three probable anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) on the northern outskirts of Paraskoviivka (75km north of Donetsk) (for previous observations in this area, see SMM Daily Report 4 April 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

2 May

The SMM saw:

• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten towed howitzers (five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), seven tanks (one T-72 and the remainder of undetermined type), six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

2 May

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) about 2km north of Pryovrazhne (83km south of Donetsk).

Other weapons observed:

The SMM saw three towed mortars or howitzers (type undetermined) in Paraskoviivka.[4]

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

1 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) near Chernenko.

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• seven armoured combat vehicles near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

2 May

The SMM saw:

• six infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) in Luhansk city;
• a surveillance radar system (PSNR-8 Kredo-M1) on the western edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk); and
• a trench digger near Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk).  

Automatic jamming station and electronic warfare system

On 2 May, the SMM saw an automated jamming station (R-378A) and an electronic warfare system (type undetermined) in Bakhchovyk (government-controlled, 59km south of Donetsk).

Fresh impact craters near Hnutove, Pikuzy and Verkhnoshyrokivske

On 1 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time eight fresh craters, assessed as probable impacts of (82mm) mortar rounds in a field about 3km east of Hnutove. The same UAV also spotted 30 fresh craters, assessed as impacts of (82mm and 120mm) mortar rounds in a field about 3km north of Pikuzy (non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On 2 May, the SMM saw a fresh crater approximately 20m north of a road leading to Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) about 1.5km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) (this road is used by civilians on a daily basis to cross the contact line).

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs

On 1 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 100 anti-tank mines in a field about 2.5km south of Pyshchevyk.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of demining activities

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities reportedly carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in and around cemeteries in government-controlled areas near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), the Vilnyi area east of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk) and Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Border areas outside government control

Positioned at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six cars (four with Ukrainian, one with German and one with Belarusian licence plates) and two pedestrians (a man and a woman aged 50-65) entering Ukraine. The SMM saw nine cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates) and a pedestrian (a woman, aged 40-50) exiting Ukraine. After a few minutes, two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Positioned at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 23 cars (two with Ukrainian and ten with Russian licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates and one with “LPR” plates), a truck (no cargo and with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus with approximately 20 people on board and “DPR” plates and 11 pedestrians (mixed age and gender) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 21 cars (one with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and three pedestrians (two women and one man aged 30-40) entering Ukraine. 

Positioned at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM observed no vehicular or pedestrian traffic in either direction.

Commemoration events for those who lost their lives during the events of 2 May 2014

On 2 May, at Kulykove Pole Square in Odessa, the SMM saw about 600 people (mixed age and gender) attending a ceremony to commemorate those who lost their lives during the events of 2 May 2014. During the commemoration, which lasted about one hour, the SMM saw groups of participants, including young men known to the SMM as belonging to, among others, the “Right Sector” movement, shouting at each other on two occasions. On both occasions, police intervened to separate the groups. Overall, about 1,000 police officers, including ones in anti-riot gear, were securing the event.

On the same day, the SMM saw about 200 people (mixed gender, aged 20-50) gathered near Soborna Square in Odessa to commemorate the death of two activists during the events of 2 May 2014. Some participants were wearing insignias of movements such as the “Right Sector” and Svoboda. About 120 police officers secured the gathering, which dispersed peacefully.

On the evening of 2 May, in Odessa, the SMM saw about 400 men (aged 20-40) wearing insignias of the National Corps and Natsionalni Druzhyny movements, marching from Shevchenko Park to the Hretska Square through the city centre. At the aforementioned square, the SMM saw a total of about 500 people (mixed gender and age) gathered, including some known to the SMM as belonging to State Initiative of Yarosh, among others. About 150 police officers secured the gathering, which ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint approximately 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members (one armed) of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 30 minutes.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras at the Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre), at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) were not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

PODGORICA, 3 May 2019 – Celebrating World Press Freedom Day, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and its media programme partners gathered today in Podgorica to discuss the special role that quality journalism and fact checking can play when facing disinformation.

“Pluralistic and independent media are the core of freedom of the media, but in order to identify and address false and discriminatory information, particularly on social media, quality journalism, ethical behavior, and fact checking must be brought into the equation,” said Head of OSCE Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet.

The event was attended by representatives of Montenegrin media outlets, NGOs dealing with media issues, as well as the Council of Europe and EU Delegation to Montenegro. The topic of the discussion was the special role that quality journalism and fact checking can play when facing disinformation.

“For more positive and forward-looking dialogue in our modern societies, we need to strengthen all reliable sources of information,” said Daviet.

Nataša Ružić, a professor at the University of Montenegro, said that we all live in a time when new techniques and methods of manipulation are emerging at an incredible speed and that the general public is informed about them only when they cause damage and become a serious threat to society.

“In the era of false news and misinformation, media literacy and fact-checking are the only way to get to the truth. However, can we trust unconditionally organizations that carry out information verification? The answer is obvious. In search of information, we can rely primarily on ourselves, developing techniques and skills that will help us to be sceptical when we receive messages sent to us by the media,” said Ružić.

This year's celebration of World Press Freedom Day is inspired by the theme chosen by UNESCO for the occasion: for “Media and Democracy: Journalism and Elections in Times of Disinformation”. The OSCE Mission to Montenegro will continue to support any efforts that allow the media to play a constructive role in the future development of Montenegro.

418706 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe conducted a roundtable discussion on the issue of judicial independence for 30 lawyers, legal scholars, and former judges and prosecutors. The event was held on 30 April 2019 and organized in partnership with the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ).

The discussion focused on the current Tajik system for selecting and appointing judges, and the disciplinary system for judges. ICJ Secretary General Saman Zarifi spoke on international standards aimed at preserving judicial independence, and former judge Justice Martine Comte of France spoke on the French experience and features of the French system that are in place to ensure judicial independence. 

“An independent judiciary is crucial for defending the rule of law and human rights in Tajikistan. We appreciate the openness of so many experienced judges, prosecutors and lawyers in describing the opportunities and challenges facing the legal system here,” said ICJ Secretary General Zarifi. “We will incorporate the findings of these valuable discussions in our upcoming report which will include recommendations about strengthening the independence of the judiciary in Tajikistan.”

Participants shared their knowledge and views on the state of judicial independence in Tajikistan. The report and recommendations will inform future dialogue with relevant Tajik government counterparts and serve as an advocacy tool for civil society in their continued efforts to promote international standards for judicial independence.

BRATISLAVA, 3 May 2019 – On the occasion of World Press Freedom Day the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, visited Bratislava to pay tribute to the investigative journalist, Ján Kuciak, and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová, who were killed in February 2018.

During his visit, Désir visited the editorial offices of Aktuality.sk, where Ján Kuciak worked, and met with the outlet’s deputy chief editor, Jan Petrovič, and the editorial team. He also met with several journalists to discuss media freedom in Slovakia and the OSCE region.

“On World Press Freedom Day, I came to pay tribute to Ján Kuciak and to all journalists who were killed or attacked for doing their work. I remember Daphne Caruana Galizia, Pavel Sheremet, Lyra McKee, among many other journalists killed in recent years. Jan has become, like all of them, a symbol of the dangers faced by investigative journalists. Journalists who investigate crime and corruption are essential for providing the checks and balances that ensure the functioning of our democracies. The quality of our democracies depends on the quality of our information, and on the existence of pluralistic and independent media. It is our responsibility to ensure that all journalists can work in a safe environment and that those who attack journalists are identified and face the full brunt of the law. There must be no impunity,” said Désir.

The Representative recalled the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, adopted last December in Milan, which calls on participating States to “take effective measures to end impunity for crimes committed against journalists, by ensuring accountability as a key element in preventing future attacks.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

Link to previous statements:

https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/411947

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/397850

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/374116

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/373699