OSCE

CHISINAU, 17 May 2019 - The OSCE Mission to Moldova completed today donation of 16 sets of computer and recreational equipment to eight Moldovan-administered Latin-script schools and eight Transdniestria-administered schools to contribute to the quality of education for children.  The measure is part of the Mission’s confidence-building efforts and a means of promoting the holistic development of students.

The visit was also a good opportunity to obtain a first-hand account of the implementation of the Protocol Decision on ensuring the functioning of Moldovan Latin-script schools signed by Chisinau and Tiraspol in November 2017 in the framework of the Transdniestrian settlement process.

The positive impact of the agreement on the day-to-day functioning of schools was confirmed in the course of meetings with the administration of the eight Latin-script schools. Starting from the 2018 academic year, the schools operate with symbolic rental fees and reduced utility rates. The funds saved through the reduced fees have been used by the school administrations to improve the educational environment. Importantly, the agreement allowed for a simplified delivery of goods to these schools and made it possible to ensure the free movement of teachers and students via checkpoints to their place of work and study. All these pragmatic solutions were developed in the course of intense Working Group meetings conducted in 2018 with the active participation of the two Chief Negotiators in the Transdniestrian settlement process.

“The implementation of the agreement on the Latin-script schools has led to more certainty for these schools and over 1,500 students,” said Claus Neukirch, Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. “The Sides recognize that they must uphold the right to education. This gives me confidence that they will work constructively to find pragmatic solutions for the benefit of pupils also on other issues which have not been covered by that agreement. This includes the question of the return of the building to the Latin-script school in Ribnita.” 

The agreement on ensuring the functioning of Moldovan Latin-script schools is part of the “Berlin-plus” package of eight issues, which Chisinau and Tiraspol have been working on since 2016. In addition to the improved situation of the Latin-script schools, the two Sides have reached major progress in the apostilization of Transdniestrian university diplomas. To date, this mechanism has enabled over 220 students from Transdniestria to pursue their educational aspirations abroad.

419930 Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

A three-day training course aimed at further strengthening the capacity of Albania to counter terrorist financing was organized from 15 to 17 May 2019, in Tirana. Twenty-two participants (including five women) from the General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering (GDPML) (Albanian Financial Intelligence Unit), the State Intelligence Service (SHISH), the Albanian State Police, the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecution Office for Serious Crimes completed the course.

The course was organized jointly by the OSCE Presence in Albania, the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).

It was designed to strengthen Albania’s compliance with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments. It was led by OSCE and UNODC international experts together with five local government officials who were previously trained by the OSCE and the UNODC in a train-the-trainer setting.

The course emphasized the key role of inter-agency co-operation in disrupting terrorist financing.  Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, it included sessions on financial intelligence, introduction to financial analysis, and vulnerability and network analysis. More than half of the course was devoted to practical work where participants learned and practiced how to apply a range of analytical techniques to realistic scenarios, including how to use financial investigations to better assess the threat posed by a terrorist group. 

The course was organized with the financial support of the OSCE Presence in Albania and the United States of America. This was the second course in the series of six courses that form part of a comprehensive multi-annual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in South-Eastern Europe. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Small arms were fired 100m west of the SMM’s position near non-government-controlled Molodizhne.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Vrubivka and Vasiukivka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted near non-government-controlled Zaichenko in southern Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), where about 50 undetermined explosions and about 50 explosions assessed as impacts were recorded, and in areas south and west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east and north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

On the afternoon of 16 May, positioned near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 30 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 300-500m east and ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 100m west. The Mission heard a sound consistent with that of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and saw that three armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint 100m west of the SMM’s position were pointing their weapons in the air in a westerly direction. The SMM did not operate UAVs in the area at the time.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned at two locations near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

15 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

16 May

The SMM saw two stationary multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in Vasiukivka (82 km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

15 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) and three trans-loaders (TEL 9A39) at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a tank (T-64) near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk);
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) and two trans-loaders (9T217B) near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk); and
• six self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and three 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) east of Maloianisol (35km north-west of Mariupol).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

16 May

The SMM noted that 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

15 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants) near Vrubivka and
• an 80m-long new trench system (not seen in imagery from November 2018) running from south-west to north-east in a field south of Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk), about 2km east of positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol) and
• three IFVs (probable BMP-1) near Novoselivka Druha (36km north-east of Mariupol).

16 May

The SMM saw:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted atop a military truck in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an unidentified UAV (assessed as a quadcopter type) landing about 600m south-west of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). Nearby the Mission saw a silver pickup truck and five people, one of whom was operating the aircraft.

Non-government-controlled areas

15 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP variants) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk).

Mines near Bila Kamianka and unexploded ordnance in Debaltseve

On 15 May, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted in total 26 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid across a road and in fields on either side of that road about 150-200m west of Bila Kamianka, all assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The same UAV also again spotted four anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid across the same road in a single row, about 2km west of the afore-mentioned mines, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The SMM saw an object with fins embedded in the ground in a yard about 30m from a house on Telmana Street in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission assessed it as not new and a probable MLRS rocket (undetermined type).

Demining activities in Myrna Dolyna and mine sign near Fedorivka

The SMM saw eight people with metal detectors wearing protective gear bearing the logo of an international organization in a field 200m south-west and north-east of road P66 near Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission saw for the first time a mine hazard sign (a wooden rectangular-shaped plate with the word “mines” written in white Russian letters) on the southern side of a local road about 3km east of Fedorivka (non-government controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) as well as to water pipelines near Zolote and between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna.

The Mission also facilitated the operation of the DFS. The SMM again recorded ceasefire violations in areas near the station (see above and the ceasefire violations table).

Border areas not under government control

On 16 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw a car with Armenian licence plates and two buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine, as well as nine cars (four with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), 45 covered-cargo trucks (22 with Ukrainian, nine with Belarusian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and ten with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 14 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities” in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the night between 15 and 16 May, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas along the contact line in Donetsk region.[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

419969 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

Trial monitoring principles, ways to mainstream gender and diversity in trial monitoring activities, follow-up steps and the training of monitors were the key topics of an annual meeting on trial monitoring in the OSCE region, which took place in Sarajevo from 14 to 16 May 2019.

The event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

“Trial monitoring practitioners have told us how much they appreciate the opportunity this annual event has given them for more than 15 years now to exchange views and experiences,” said Karine Simonsen, Rule of Law Officer at ODIHR. “We are continuously exploring different ways of supporting both civil society and colleagues from OSCE field operations in this area, and we are therefore focusing specifically this year on building participants’ skills, alongside strengthening their understanding of fair trial standards.”

Lillian Langford, Head of the Rule of Law Section at the OSCE Mission to BiH, said: “Effective trial monitoring demonstrates whether a country’s judicial system ensures equality before the law, due process guarantees, justice for victims of crime and efficient use of resources. The OSCE and its partners possess a wealth of experience in this area. Only recently the Mission scaled up its monitoring of corruption cases, issuing reports that target clear deficiencies in the work of courts and prosecutors’ offices in tackling this phenomenon. Backed up by empirical trial monitoring data, we and our partners are able to support efforts to address the roots of this problem.”

The event attracted 39 participants (21 men and 18 women) from around the region; 13 NGOs and nine OSCE field operations were represented. During working sessions, participants shared experiences, good practices and challenges they face. A more detailed description of the topics can be found in the ODIHR reference manual on trial monitoring.

ERGNETI, 16 May 2019 - On 16 May 2019, the 93rd Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting took place in Ergneti. Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative for the South Caucasus of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, co-facilitated a meeting held in a business-like atmosphere.  

Høeg provided a summary of the events which occurred since the last IPRM meeting on 22 March. This included the general security situation, hotline activations and detention cases. The security situation along the administrative boundary line (ABL) was assessed as relatively stable.

The case of the tragic death of Archil Tatunashvili was discussed. Participants were encouraged to co-operate and provide full access and disclosure of all available information.

Challenges related to ‘borderization’ and restrictions to the freedom of movement were also on the agenda. Ambassador Michalka and Høeg encouraged actions that would facilitate a normal life for the local populations living along the ABL. 

The importance of early notification via the hotline on planned activities by security actors close to the ABL that could fuel instability, was once again stressed.

All participants reconfirmed their commitment to the IPRM as an essential platform to strengthen security on the ground and to address the needs of the conflict-affected population from a humanitarian perspective.

The next meeting will take place on a date to be agreed by all IPRM participants.

VIENNA, 16 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, shared a legal review with the Minister of Information Society and Administration of North Macedonia, Damjan Mancevski, on the latest amendments to the Law on Audio and Audio-visual Media Services.

The Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media had commissioned Katrin Nyman Metcalf, a renowned international expert in communications law, to conduct the analysis.

“I welcome the adoption of the amended law. I very much appreciate the co-operation we established with the Government of North Macedonia during the different stages of its development. The law is now in general accordance with European and international standards on audio-visual media. It contains numerous positive elements, such as provisions to strengthen the diversity of representation in various media regulatory bodies, and to ensure that the interests of different ethnic groups are taken into consideration,” Désir said.

“The analysis offers recommendations related to several provisions that still need to be addressed. These include issues related to the banning of public advertising or public funding for advertising and the difficulty in implementing the system by which broadcasters can receive a reduced licence fee if they broadcast Macedonian content.”

The Representative emphasized the expert’s suggestion that each concern can be addressed in the form of new legal amendments, or through sub-legal acts where appropriate.

“I trust that the legal review and the recommendations provided therein will be taken into account, which would ensure that the legislation complies with OSCE media freedom commitments and international standards,” Désir concluded.

The Law was adopted by the parliament on 28 December 2018 and entered into force on 8 January 2019.

The full text of the legal review is available here.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM heard outgoing fire close to its position near the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Bila Kamianka.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• It spotted anti-tank mines for the first time between Krasnohorivka and Staromykhailivka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to, and the operation of, critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Bezimenne in southern Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 190), compared with the previous reporting period (about 310 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and southerly, westerly and northerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

During the evening of 14 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) again recorded ceasefire violations in its vicinity, including two undetermined explosions and 44 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.5-1.5km south, south-south-west and south-south-east (for similar observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 May 2019). During the day on 15 May, positioned in Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard and saw 90 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 150-200m south-south-east, assessed as live-fire training exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-easterly, south-westerly and westerly directions of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

While on the northern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard and saw two explosions, assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, at an assessed range of 1-2km south.

Outgoing fire close to SMM near DFS

On the morning of 15 May, an SMM patrol was positioned on road H20 about 2km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and about 3.5km north-west of the DFS to monitor the security situation. Despite security guarantees that a localized ceasefire would be adhered to, the SMM heard three explosions assessed as rounds of outgoing fire of undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 100-300m west of its position. The SMM immediately left the area. There were no injuries to the SMM and its property was undamaged. (See SMM Spot Report 15 May 2019).

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Bila Kamianka

On 15 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight about 3km east of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire 2.5-3km east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 2.7km east of its position over an area near Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk). The SMM safely landed the UAV.*

Disengagement areas[2]

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence, on 13 May, of an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) and two probable ACVs near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 160m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), as well as seven craters assessed as caused by impacts of undetermined weapons about 120m west of its western edge. On the morning of 15 May, positioned 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-2km north, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area.

During the same day, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw an explosion, assessed as the impact of a round of an undetermined weapon, at an assessed distance of 1km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

14 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk);
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and four towed howitzers (D-30) in Bile (22km west of Luhansk); and
• six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) near residential houses in Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

14 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 towed howitzers (2A65) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

15 May

The SMM saw four surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) at a railway station in Rubizhne.

Non-government-controlled areas

14 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 21 tanks (probable T-64), six towed mortars (type undetermined, 120mm calibre) and seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above);
• five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), two pieces of towed artillery (types undetermined) and 12 tanks (T-72, one missing its barrel) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk);
• 29 tanks (one T-72 and 28 typed undetermined) in Bile;
• 20 tanks (15 T-72 and five undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 12 towed mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (see above);
• 20 tanks (types undetermined) at a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 18 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi (54km south-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV again spotted three tanks (T-72) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

15 May

The SMM saw three tanks (T-72) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[3]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

15 May

The SMM noted that 15 towed howitzers (D-30), 21 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) were present, and that 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and nine tanks (T-72) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

15 May

The SMM noted that 33 tanks (six T-72 and 27 T-64), a towed howitzer (D-44, 85mm), two anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) and 17 mortars (12 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm, three 2B14 Podnos, 82mm and two BM-37) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

13 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of an ACV and two probable ACVs near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the vicinity of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above).

15 May

The SMM saw, on two occasions, an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

14 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a probable ACV near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• 21 IFVs (BMP-1) and three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (two BTR-70 and an MT-LB) in a compound near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk); and
• an APC in Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV near Kalynove.

Mines seen for the first time between Krasnohorivka and Staromykhailivka

On 13 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 15 anti-tank mines across a road east of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) leading to non-government-controlled areas. About 700m east of the aforementioned mines, the same UAV spotted for the first time 55 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows extending 50m across the northern and southern sides of the same road and into adjacent fields. About 1km east of the latter mines, the same UAV spotted for the first time 20 anti-tank mines laid out in three rows extending 15m across the northern and southern sides of the same road and into adjacent fields in the western outskirts of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk).

On 14 May, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid across road T-0519 on the western outskirts of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

Around 2km west of Krynychne (non-government-controlled, 45km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time a red metal mine hazard sign with “Stop Mine” written in Russian language attached to a wooden post in a field about 1m south of a local road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to water pipelines near Zolote and between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and heard explosions near its position (see above). It also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and positioned in the vicinity of the pumping station during the day it heard ceasefire violations.

Border areas not under government control

On 13 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw eight cars (five with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks and a bus (all with Russian Federation licence plates) and 20 pedestrians entering Ukraine, as well as three cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates) and 31 trucks (30 with covered cargo and one tanker; 19 with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 15 May, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 20 cars (three with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Polish licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) and nine pedestrians entering Ukraine, as well as 24 cars (two with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as 12 with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates) and four buses (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

People apply for passports of the Russian Federation in Luhansk and Donetsk regions

In non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, the SMM again observed about 60 people (mixed gender and ages) in a queue in front of a building in Antratsyt (55km south-west of Luhansk). Several people waiting told the SMM that they had been queuing to submit applications for passports of the Russian Federation.

In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed a queue of ten people inside a building in Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) who told the SMM that they were waiting to submit applications for passports of the Russian Federation. The SMM saw an information board outside the aforementioned building as well as handouts explaining the procedures to submit applications for “DPR” “passports” and passports of the Russian Federation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 14 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), five members of the armed formations (two of them armed) again prevented the SMM from proceeding further west, citing “military operations in the area”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 15 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight over an area near Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

419861 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

The OSCE Mission to Moldova concluded its second training programme for state institutions dealing with the protection of the rights of national minorities and the consolidation of inter-ethnic relations in the country on 16 May 2019. The two-day course focused on the participation of national minorities in public life and built on the positive outcomes of last year’s induction course on human rights and national minorities, which was attended by the same group of participants.

Some 25 staff of the Agency for Inter-ethnic Relations, the Ombudsman’s office and the Council for Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination and Ensuring Equality attended the programme. Led by international expert Professor Frederick John Packer from the University of Ottawa, the training programme introduced the group to the principle and value of inclusion in a diverse society upon which effective participation manifests itself in policy, law, programmes and practices.

During the training course, the participants gained hands-on experience of mapping the challenges for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities, while the professor introduced affirmative measures necessary to achieve equality, in particular in governance and decision-making, and discussed their practical application.

“Learning about best international practices on the participation of ethnic minorities in public life is key to multiethnic states. We are glad the OSCE Mission enables Moldovan institutions responsible for the protection of national minorities' rights to jointly identify the ways to improve participation of minority groups in public life,” said Vera Petuhov, Deputy General Director, Interethnic Relations Bureau of the Republic of Moldova.

The event coincided with the 20th anniversary of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life and offered an opportunity to discuss the implementation of the recommendations developed by the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities in the Moldovan context.

In line with its mandate, the Mission builds the capacities of state institutions involved in implementing the National Strategy for Consolidation of Inter-ethnic Relations for 2017‒2027. Last year, the Mission facilitated the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding among the three human rights institutions to strengthen their co-operation, exchange of information, joint research and mutual support. Respect for the rights of national minorities in a society is a litmus test of tolerance and inclusivity, which are in turn important enabling factors for the Transdniestrian settlement process.

VIENNA, 16 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, strongly condemned today the physical attacks against journalists that took place in Turkey over the past week.

On 15 May, journalist İdris Özyol was beaten by an unidentified group of people in front of the office of his newspaper, Akdeniz Yeni Yüzyıl, in Antalya. He was immediately taken to the local hospital. According to media reports, Özyol previously received threats from a local politician, as a result of his journalistic work. 

“I am deeply concerned about the safety of journalists in Turkey. This is the second physical attack in one week, which is a clear signal that media professionals need stronger protection. Public condemnation at the highest level is crucial and would send a strong message that assaults against journalists will not be tolerated,” Désir said.

The Representative also recalled the attack last weekend against the journalist Yavuz Selim Demirağ of the Yeniçağ newspaper, who sustained serious injuries after being attacked in Ankara. Police detained six suspects who were conditionally released, reportedly on the grounds that "the state of health of the victim was not life-threatening".

“This negative trend needs to be reversed. I call on the authorities to swiftly investigate all attacks against journalists and bring those responsible to justice. Journalists need to be safe in order to do their jobs and inform citizens on issues of public interest. Impunity for attacks on members of the media is unacceptable,” Désir said.

Désir recalled the OSCE Ministerial Decision on Safety of Journalists, which calls on “political leaders, public officials and/or authorities to refrain from intimidating, threatening or condoning – and to unequivocally condemn – violence against journalists, in order to reduce the risks or threats that journalists may face and avoid undermining trust in the credibility of journalists as well as respect for the importance of independent journalism”.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

On the morning of 15 May, an SMM patrol consisting of five members and two armoured vehicles was positioned on road H20 about 2km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and about 3.5km north-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) to monitor the security situation. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination was also present. Members of the Ukraine State Emergency Service de-mining team were present about 50m south of the SMM patrol’s location.

Despite security guarantees having been provided that a localized ceasefire would be adhered to, at 08:52, SMM patrol members, three of whom were standing next to their vehicles and two inside their vehicles, heard an explosion, assessed as a round of outgoing fire of an undetermined weapon at an assessed range of 100-300m west of their position. A few seconds later, while inside their vehicles, SMM patrol members heard two additional explosions, assessed as rounds of outgoing fire of an undetermined weapon at the same assessed range and direction. The SMM immediately left the area and saw that the de-mining team also left the area. There were no injuries to the SMM or damage to its property.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Pervomaiske.
• The Mission saw fresh damage to civilian properties from small-arms fire and shelling in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and Dokuchaievsk.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• Anti-tank mines were spotted by the Mission for the first time near Prychepylivka and Vodiane.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske in Donetsk region, as well as at a heavy weapon holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (76 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded at north-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). During the night of 14 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 19 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.5km to 1.5km south and south-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including ten explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions). All of the ceasefire violations we recorded at north-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), northerly and north-westerly directions of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and at westerly directions of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Pervomaiske

On 14 May, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Pervomaiske (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard six bursts and about 45 shots of small-arms fire about 1.7km south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.8km south-east of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Fresh damage to civilian properties caused by small-arms fire in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and shelling in Dokuchaievsk

On 13 May, the SMM saw damage from small-arms fire to four civilian properties in the south-western part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. At 1 Voikova Street, the SMM saw two holes in a second floor north-facing window of a two-storey house, a hole in a second floor north-facing balcony and two holes in a north-facing first floor window frame. A resident of the house (male, 75 years old) told the SMM that he had heard small-arms fire in the evening of 13 May.

At 8 Voikova Street, inside an apartment on the third-floor of a four-storey house, the SMM saw a bullet hole in a north-facing windowsill, a dent in a refrigerator door adjacent to the windowsill, and a hole in the wall opposite the window, all assessed as recent and caused by a single bullet. It also saw two shattered north-facing windows and another north-facing window with a bullet hole, all assessed as recent and caused by small-arms fire. The SMM saw a 7.62mm bullet on the balcony floor. A resident (male, 35 years old) told the SMM that he had heard shooting on 11 May.

About 300m north of 8 Voikova Street, at 9 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw three fresh bullet holes in a north-facing window and two west-facing windows on the ground floor of a two-storey house. Two residents of the house (women, aged 60-70) told the SMM that they heard shooting in the afternoon of 11 May.

At 10 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw a partially shattered north-facing first-floor window of a two-storey house as well as two bullet holes in the wall above the window, but could not assess if the damage was recent. Three residents (female, 50-60 years old) told the SMM that they had heard shooting on the afternoon of 11 May.

On 14 May, on the southern outskirts of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a garden about 10m north-east of an uninhabited house, assessed as caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a south-westerly direction. About 10m north-east of the crater, at 26 Haharina Street, the Mission saw a shattered east-facing window of a shed located near an inhabited house. A resident of the house (a woman, aged 60) told the SMM that she had been outside of the house with her husband on the afternoon of 12 May when she had heard a loud explosion.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 5 May, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 40 anti-tank mines inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 500m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area and about 100m east of road T-1316.

On the evening of 13 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and three projectiles at an assessed range of 2-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area and within 5km of its periphery).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

14 May

The SMM saw 18 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) near the train station in Dobropillia (75km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

13 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Stupochky (60km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted eight surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

14 May

The SMM saw:

• at least 13 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (type undetermined) at the train station in Rubizhne* and
• two towed howitzers (2A65) about 800m south-east of the train station in Rubizhne.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

13 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2), an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in a residential area near Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk); and
• an ACV near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two probable IFVs (BMP variant) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three ACVs near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

14 May

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) in Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an APC (MT-LB-M) in Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two ACVs near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

Presence of mines, unexploded ordnance and a mine hazard sign

On 12 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about 700 anti-tank mines (about 150 of which had previously been seen), laid out in three 800m-long rows running from east to west in a field about 2.5km south-east of Prychepylivka (government-controlled, 50km north-west of Luhansk).

On 13 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 20 anti-tank mines laid out in a single row about 3km north-west of Vodiane (government-controlled, 15km north-west of Donetsk) and again spotted 22 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows in a field about 3km north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in three rows of 12 across road H-21 near Shchastia.

On 14 May, the SMM again saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as the tailfin of an 120mm mortar, in the middle of T-0513 road, which is regularly used by civilians and the SMM, and about 80m south of the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

On 14 May, on the north-western outskirts of Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a wooden board with “Careful, Mines” written in Ukrainian in a field about 1.5m north of a road leading from Mykolaivka to Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to a water pipeline between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 14 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Five members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage on two occasions, citing a lack of permission granted from their superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that no demining activities had taken place. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to the railway station in Rubizhne (government-controlled, 84km north-west of Luhansk). After the SMM informed the JCCC and waited 30 minutes, access was granted.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 13-14 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas of northern Donetsk region, including areas close to the contact line.[4]
• On 14 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Pervomaiske (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard six bursts and about 45 shots of small-arms fire about 1.7km south-south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
• In non-government-controlled Luhansk city and Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), two interlocutors refused to answer the SMM’s questions about facilities used to house IDPs and directed the SMM to obtain additional permissions from those in control.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

VIENNA, 15 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, published today a legal review of the Montenegrin Electronic Media Law, upon request by the Ministry of Culture.

The Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media commissioned an expert analysis prepared by Professor Dr Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin, a well-known media expert in Montenegro and the wider region. The current law was analysed and compared with OSCE commitments, the EU Directive on Audio-visual Media Services and Council of Europe recommendations.

“These joint efforts with the Ministry of Culture are crucial for the promotion and support of freedom of the media in Montenegro. It is of utmost importance that the legislative framework is in line with the highest international standards,” Désir said.

With regard to the Public Broadcasters, the analysis argues that public broadcasting services need both structural and editorial independence, as well as freedom from political interference, in order to function effectively. Among other things, the review recommends that the establishment of the local broadcasters should fall under the responsibility of the Agency of Electronic Media (AEM).

Special emphasis is placed on the licencing process, in particular, the criteria for providing licenses, which should be clearly set out in the law.

The analysis underlines that the supervisory role regarding the Electronic Media Law should be given exclusively to the AEM, which would ensure more efficient supervision of the implementation of the law.

The analysis also highlights that the law contains mechanisms preventing conflicts of interest among the AEM Council members. However, it raises a concern about the fact that the new Law on Public Administration links the AEM to the Government.

“It is necessary that the process of amending the law is inclusive and widely debated with all relevant national and international media stakeholders. My Office will continue providing further assistance and support to the authorities in this endeavour,” the Representative concluded.

The comprehensive review can be accessed here.

VIENNA, 15 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today welcomed the restored access to multiple internet-based media in Uzbekistan, after more than ten years of intermittent blocking.

Désir also welcomed the fact that the Agency of Information and Mass Communications, under the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Uzbekistan, has investigated the matter, and expressed their willingness to constructively communicate with the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.

“I welcome the unblocking of media and information websites in Uzbekistan, including Asia Terra, Uzmetronom, Fergana Agency, Eurasia.net, Centre 1, Deutsche Welle, Voice of America and BBC and their Uzbek-language services, as well as sites of human rights organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights Watch, which I previously raised with the authorities. I hope that the website of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) will also be unblocked soon and I will continue my exchange with the authorities on the issue,” Désir said. “I encourage Uzbekistan in furthering the reform of the media sector towards an open, free and diverse media landscape.”

The Representative on Freedom of the Media has frequently raised the issue of internet blocking in the OSCE region. Désir insists that the authorities need to ensure unrestricted access to the internet and the free flow of information at all times.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

419741 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

The security needs of Jewish communities were the focus of an awareness raising event held in Chisinau on 15 May 2019. It was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Jewish Community of Moldova.

Attended by more than 50 law-enforcement officials and Jewish community representatives, the event was an opportunity to discuss the extent of anti-Semitism in Moldova. The participants exchanged views on how anti-semitism is manifested and methods to strengthen co-operation between local law enforcement bodies and Jewish communities to combat the phenomenon more effectively.

“The Mission commends the Moldovan authorities for their efforts to build an inclusive and tolerant society. Inclusivity is an important precondition for advancing the Transdniestrian settlement process,” said Claus Neukirch, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. 

"Ultimately, governments are responsible for making sure that Jewish communities are safe. Today’s event is an opportunity to discuss how government officials and law enforcement can confront the specific challenges posed by anti-Semitism, in close co-operation with local communities," said Project Manager at ODIHR Ilan Cohn.

To help Moldova in turning its OSCE commitments on combating anti-Semitism into action, the OSCE Mission to Moldova has followed a comprehensive approach that includes awareness raising, training for justice sector professionals, and improvements to the legal framework. Mainstreaming tolerance and inclusiveness in school education also plays an important role. Building on its previous efforts, the Mission will conduct a series of training workshops this year for law enforcement officials on the investigation of bias-motivated crimes.

The workshop was organized as part of ODIHR’s Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism project. The event was an opportunity to discuss the implementation of ODIHR's practical guide Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crime and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities.

419639

The Fourth Central Asian Internet Governance Forum is taking place on 15 and 16 May 2019 in Tashkent. The event aims to provide a platform to discuss Internet governance policies in Central Asian countries.

The Forum is the first of its kind in Uzbekistan and is organized by the Ministry for Development of Information Technologies and Communications of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the OSCE Project Co-Ordinator in Uzbekistan with the support of ICANN, Internet Society, RIPE NCC, Facebook, Kaspersky Lab, IGFSA, Uztelecom and the Inha University in Tashkent.

High-level government officials and representatives from the private sector, civil society, academia, experts and international organizations will engage in discussions and share best practices on how to address issues related to cybersecurity, Internet freedom and regulation, access to the Internet as well as global and national approaches to Internet governance.

Two working groups will be engaged in discussions of separate thematic issues to formulate policy and practical recommendations for the Central Asian countries to use cyberspace in addressing the physical or geographical restrictions. This would help countries in the region to benefit from the Internet for economic, social and societal purposes.

Within the thematic areas, special attention will be paid to making cyberspace more open, interoperable, secure, and reliable and offer concrete tools and mechanisms that will help to improve communication within countries in Central Asia.

The Fourth Central Asian Internet Governance Forum is organized in response to the 2017 Ministerial Council Decision on enhancing OSCE efforts to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies.

419633 OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan conducted a third in a series of anti-trafficking training courses for investigators and operative agents from Tashkent, Tashkent region and Syrdarya, from 13 to 17 May 2019 in Tashkent.

The course examined new forms and methods of recruitment of potential victims of human trafficking, exploring in detail the criminal methodologies used by traffickers. The training course took an innovative approach by exploring the nexus between human trafficking and terrorism, pull and push factors that make potential victims vulnerable to exploitation, including the displacement from conflict zones as opportunities for traffickers and organized crime.

The unique course, developed by the United Kingdom Specialist Policing Consultancy, compared the elements of human trafficking to the methods of modern terrorist groups. It showed a clear link between the methods some terrorist groups use to recruit, transport, coerce and exploit men, women, boys and girls into committing terrorist acts and those used by human traffickers. In addition, it also explored if investigators could use human trafficking laws to combat or disrupt terrorist activities.

Particular attention was given to gender aspects of human trafficking and terrorism and the importance of women in policing.

In his opening speech, OSCE Senior Project Officer Juergen Becker said: “Since trafficking is a common challenge transcending national boundaries, I hope that this training course will help to promote a gender sensitive and human rights approach to every victim of human trafficking.”  

Bernie Gravett, the UK Specialist Policing Consultancy Director, said: “I cannot stress the importance enough of sharing knowledge and experience between law enforcement officers in the UK and Uzbekistan. During my time as a police officer investigating international organized crime, the biggest challenge was working together across international borders and legal systems. The growth of human trafficking and the challenges faced in combating modern terrorist groups require us to share experience, build partnerships and gain an understanding of individual methods of working with the aim of combating crime and protecting all our citizens.”                                                                                                               

The training course is part of a longstanding commitment of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan to assist the country in combating trafficking in human beings.

Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan OSCE-led Survey on Violence Against Women: North Macedonia - Results Report OSCE-led Survey on Violence Against Women - Main Report

The OSCE Mission to Skopje and the OSCE Gender Section presented on 15 May 2019 in Skopje a survey that shows that violence against women in North Macedonia is often underreported and that some forms of physical and sexual violence are widespread in the country.  The research finds there is a particular need for more support and targeted action to help women from minority groups and from rural areas.

The survey is the first of its kind conducted in South-Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe. It gives a detailed picture of the physical, sexual and psychological violence suffered by women and girls in North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova and Ukraine. The survey also covered Kosovo.

It aims to provide solid evidence for informed decision-making and advocacy at different levels to reduce violence against women, as well as to improve services for women who have experienced violence.

“Gender based violence remains one of the most widespread and persistent human rights violations globally that affects the lives of women and girls across countries and regions. It threatens the security and safety of all. For us at the OSCE, this structural violence is not only a violation of human rights of women and girls but also a security issue,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, Clemens Koja.

Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, who hosted the presentation of the findings, said: “Looking through the OSCE report, one aspect worries me. Only two per cent of the surveyed women who have experienced violence from their current partners reported to the police the most serious incident they have experienced. Violence against women is unacceptable and we need to address this urgently. Our government is committed to the systematic improvement of gender equality and elimination of all forms of violence against women.”

Amarsanaa Darisuren, the OSCE Senior Adviser on Gender Issues, said that no matter the geographic location, level of prosperity or size of the population, violence against women is pervasive in all countries of the world. “There is still a large knowledge gap when it comes to violence against women, and robust and reliable data is needed. This survey provides the information needed to take action. It is now time to take concrete steps to prevent violence against women and girls.” she said.

The Report for North Macedonia can be found online here.

The Main Results Report of the Survey can be found online here. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 11,274 to 10,963 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 1,101 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 18 this week compared to 14 last week: eleven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and seven into Ukraine (89 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when two families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (358 compared to 382 observed during the previous week). There were 181 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 177 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv and Stahanov–Kharkiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 579 trucks (527 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (155 at the Gukovo BCP and 424 at the Donetsk BCP); 320 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 259 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates. In addition, during the reporting week,  trucks with Armenian and Georgian licence plates were also observed.                                            

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 50 (compared to 57 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 137 to 133: of the total number of trucks scanned, 55 trucks (39 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 87 trucks (61 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 113 to 82 vehicles; 53 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 29 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 24 occasions; the OTs assessed that 15 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, cars with licence plates from Armenia, Georgia and Lithuania were also noted.

On 8 May, the OTs at both BCPs observed a helicopter, flying along the border within Russian Federation airspace on three separate occasions.

A helicopter Mi-8 was first noted at 08:42 at the Donetsk BCP, flying from the north in an easterly direction. Later on the same day at 14:38, the OT at the Gukovo BCP observed the same type of aircraft flying from the north, which made a circle above the BCP area and left in a northerly direction. On the same day, at 14:57, a Mi-8 helicopter arrived at the Donetsk BCP from a south-easterly direction, flew over the BCP at a height of approximately 100-150m and continued to fly in a northerly direction.

On all occasions, the helicopters were white with blue and grey stripes painted on the underside and flew only inside the airspace of the Russian Federation.

On 12 May at 20:16, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed two police cars entering the BCP area from the Russian Federation which parked in front of the border checking area. In the meantime, another police car was observed parked outside the BCP area with its flashing lights on.

At 23:17 the same day a group of four cars consisting of three black SUVs and one white SUV with the inscription "militia" (in Russian) arrived from Ukraine. All the vehicles had “Republic of South Ossetia (RSO)” plates and quickly underwent border control procedures. At 23:30 the four vehicles crossed into the Russian Federation escorted by the police cars which had arrived three hours earlier.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 9 April 2019 to 14 May 2019, please see the attachment here. 

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw damage to civilian properties from shelling in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted near non-government-controlled Zaichenko, as well as at a non-government-controlled border crossing point near Izvaryne.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 76 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north-east and east of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk) and in areas south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 300 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and west-north-west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east, south-east and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 12 May, the SMM saw damage from shelling to several civilian properties in the north-eastern part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), most of which was assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.

At 1 Pervomaiska Street, the Mission saw a fresh crater (about 1m in diameter) about 3m west of an inhabited one-storey house. The SMM saw two shattered window panes, one shattered window frame and shrapnel damage to the wall on the house’s west-north-west-facing side and two shattered window panes on its south-facing side. It saw shards of glass scattered on the ground beneath the broken windows. The SMM also observed that a section of a wooden fence about 1m east of the crater had been destroyed and that there were at least 50 holes in the remaining parts of the fence.

At the intersection of Pervomaiska and Poshtova Street, around 30m north of the above-mentioned house, the SMM saw an impact (10cm in diameter) and burned grass 1-3m south of it. About 5m south-east of the crater the Mission saw holes in a gas pipeline, in a concrete pylon of an electrical line and in a tree. It also saw a 10cm hole in the front hood of a civilian car parked around 15m south of the crater. The SMM observed seven workers conducting repair works to the damaged pipeline.

In a yard at 9 Poshtova Street, about 20m south-south-east of an inhabited one-storey house, the SMM saw another fresh crater (about 1m in diameter) and a shattered window on the south-facing wall of a wooden shed standing about 20m north-north-west of the crater, as well as partially ripped off bark on three nearby trees.

At 10 Poshtova Street, around 20m south-south-west of an inhabited one-story house, the SMM saw another fresh crater (about 1m in diameter). The Mission saw a broken south-west-facing window covered with plastic sheeting and at least 40 holes in the south-west-facing wall of the house.

Three people (a man in his thirties, a man in his fifties and a woman in her eighties) who introduced themselves as residents of the above-mentioned properties told the Mission that they had been at home in the evening on 11 May when they had heard sounds of shelling nearby.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 13 May, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire 100-200m north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 100m north-east of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On 11 May, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near residential houses, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 May 2019).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska, one of which probable) in Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a field about 700m from the nearest residential houses in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.

13 May

The SMM saw:

• 19 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk);
• two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) on road T0504 in Irmino (54km west of Luhansk); and
• an MLRS (BM-21) on road T0504 in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

13 May

The SMM saw four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) loaded on rail cars at a train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

13 May

The SMM noted that three MLRS (BM-21) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 May

The SMM saw that the site was abandoned and noted that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

11 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (an MT-LB-M with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted atop and two MT-LB) and three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), and
• 16 IFVs (BMP-1) in Bila Hora (see above).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three ACVs in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).

12 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a probable BMP-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk).

13 May

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• nine IFVs (a probable BMP-1 parked in the yard of a residential house and eight BMP-variants) in Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) and
• 12 APCs (11 MT-LB and a BTR variant), four armoured recovery vehicles (two BTS-4A and two VT-55), six IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in compounds in Donetsk city’s Leninskyi district (the UAV also spotted hulls of 24 IFVs/APCs and of 23 tanks).

Mines near Pyshchevyk

On 4 and 9 May, in a field about 1km south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), SMM mini-UAVs spotted for the first time about 3,000 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) placed in four rows running from north to south for about 3.5km. The SMM assessed most of these mines as not recent; however, it also noted that some mines had been placed near mines that had previously detonated. Near the mines, the same UAVs spotted about 40 sticks with pieces of red tape attached to them fixed in the ground, as well as two square signs (all assessed as mine hazard signs).

On 11 May, in a field about 1.5km east-south-east of Pyshchevyk and about 15m north of a road to Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time about 120 anti-tank mines (TM-62M) placed in two rows running for about 300m from north to south as well as six red square signs (assessed as mine hazard signs) about 20m of the above-mentioned mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) as well as to a water pipeline between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, reportedly related to water payments.

Border areas outside government control

At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a car with Russian Federation licence plates and a covered cargo truck with “LPR” plates entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour, the Mission saw five pedestrians entering and five pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors”.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• The SMM was unable to access a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as its gate was locked and no guards were present.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 11 May, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its dual GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over areas near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk).
• On 12 May, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its dual GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region near Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk), Ivanivka (78km south of Donetsk) and Vesele (92km south of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

419540

Innovative approaches, good practices and viable models of engaging diverse actors in the integration of migrants at the local level were the focus of the conference Cities, Migration and Integration: Challenges, Responsibilities and Inspiration co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Consortium of Migrant Assisting Organisations, the Association for Integration and Migration, and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, under the patronage of Prague Mayor Zdeněk Hřib, on 14 May 2019 in Prague.

Experts from the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Poland, Germany joined colleagues from the Czech Republic to discuss the role of local government in the process of migrant integration and participate in the launch of ODIHR’s latest publication, the Local Authorities' Migrant Integration Guide. The guide was developed specifically to assist local authorities. It offers an overview of key aspects of migrant integration relevant to local authorities, with the aim of enhancing knowledge of the issues involved and encouraging the development of more targeted policies.

“The successful integration of migrants is key to maximising the strength, vitality and innovation that migrants bring to local communities, thus benefiting society at large,” said Meaghan Fitzgerald, Deputy Head of ODIHR’s Democratization Department. “As much of the migrant integration process occurs at the local level, ODIHR's aim is to bring local authorities and civil society together to build partnerships.”

Other topics discussed at the conference included the use of participatory approaches to ensure the inclusion of migrants in the development of integration policy, multilevel governance aspects of migrant integration, and fostering co-operation between municipalities and employers for the purpose of labour market integration. Participants explored these issues in a series of panel discussions and thematic workshops.

Jan Braat, Senior Policy Advisor on Migration and Integration for the City of Utrecht said: “The conference was a great opportunity to exchange good practices on the integration of migrants and to understand how other municipalities overcome their challenges in specific areas. I was particularly interested to share our experience and hear how other cities plan and develop the evaluation of their integration measures and how they address the challenges faced.”