OSCE

414107 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Advancing the freedom of religion or belief for all was at the centre of discussion at roundtable events held in Sarajevo and Banja Luka on 12 and 13 March 2019, respectively. The events were organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Representatives of state, cantonal and municipal authorities, together with the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, religious communities, civil society organizations and media professionals, participated in the discussions.

“It is very encouraging to see the commitment of so many actors in Sarajevo and Banja Luka to working together to ensure everyone’s right to freedom of religion or belief in these two municipalities,” said Kishan Manocha, ODIHR Senior Adviser on Freedom of Religion or Belief. “It is our sincere hope that the roundtable discussions are only a starting point and that systematic and sustained action will follow.”

The events are part of the ODIHR project “Advancing freedom of religion or belief for all at the local level in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and follow training workshops on freedom of religion or belief for representatives of public authorities, religious communities and civil society conducted by ODIHR in Sarajevo and Banja Luka in February 2019. The project aims to equip relevant actors with the knowledge and skills to address challenges related to the freedom of religion or belief in these municipalities in a collaborative, results-oriented and gender-sensitive manner.  

During the event, the participants developed initial roadmaps and plans for advancing the freedom of religion or belief for all in Sarajevo and Banja Luka over the next year. They also discussed means to implement the planned activities, as well as their monitoring and evaluation.

“Promoting freedom of religion or belief is an essential aspect of the OSCE Mission’s mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” said Fermin Cordoba, Head of the Mission’s Human Dimension Department. “Moving forward, we hope to expand our work in this area to involve as diverse a network as possible, including minority religious communities, civil society organizations, academics and state authorities.”

The ODIHR project will conclude at the end of March with a training event on freedom of religion or belief for youth and students in Sarajevo.

414038 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry held on 12 March 2019 in Dushanbe a roundtable discussion with high-level representatives of the international donor community to raise funds for the successful implementation of police reform in Tajikistan.

The meeting also served to take stock of the steps already undertaken in the reform process and upcoming priorities.

Tajikistan’s Interior Minister, Colonel-General Ramazon Rahimzoda, Acting Officer in Charge of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe Gerrit Zach, senior-ranking officials from Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry, representatives of embassies and international organizations in Tajikistan, as well chairpersons of the Public Councils on Police Reform participated at the meeting.

“Priorities of the reform include new police uniforms, as Tajikistan is the only country in which police still wears the old USSR uniforms,” said Minister of Interior Colonel-General Rahimzoda. “Another important point is the finalization of an electronic crime registry. International support will be needed to implement these reform plans.”

"The Tajik government is in the driving seat for a successful implementation of the 2014-2020 Police Reform Programme, but joint efforts are key,” said Zach. “The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, as the main international partner of Tajikistan in the field of police reform, will continue to work with the Ministry of the Interior and international donors to establish a modern police force, including decentralization and bringing the police closer to the citizens.”

413996 Marina Živaljević

The role of media monitoring and regulation, media coverage and the role and impact of social network platforms during elections was the focus of an OSCE Chairmanship-supported presentation by Slovak media expert Rastislav Kužel in the Montenegrin Parliament on 12 March 2019 in Podgorica.

Addressing Members of Parliament and media representatives, Kužel drew on his rich international experience to explain how media monitoring is crucial to ensuring good quality journalism during an election, enabling citizens to make informed choices. “Monitoring is recommended by the OSCE and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),” he said.

Kužel also stressed the need for a strong and independent media regulator: “The media regulator has to ensure that media reports are in line with the existing law.”

In her welcoming speech, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, said that free and fair media are the backbone of every democracy. “The media should make an additional effort to give citizens a clear and impartial picture of the society in which they live. This is particularly important in electoral processes because all actors deserve fair coverage and equitable media access to ensure full and effective representation of citizens’ views and interests,” she said.

The President of the Parliament, Ivan Brajović, said that media provide political actors with an opportunity to present themselves and their programmes during election campaigns, to open a debate on issues that allows citizens to decide whom to give their trust. “The parliamentary majority continues to be ready to improve electoral legislation and the overall electoral environment, implementing recommendations of international observation missions,” said Brajović.

The Ambassador of Slovakia, which holds the 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, to Montenegro, Roman Hloben, said that the media, together with social networks, are the strongest communication weapons and significantly influence the decision-making of citizens and their everyday life. “The social responsibility of all of us is to create order in the media world, so that not just anyone can write whatever they want when they want, without credible sources,” Hloben said. “At the same time, media independence must be preserved,” he added.

The presentation was a part of the Mission’s and OSCE/ODHIR’s continuing support to the Montenegrin authorities in implementing OSCE/ODIHR recommendations stemming from the 2016 and 2018 elections.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• More ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours, were recorded by the SMM.
• The SMM observed fresh damage from small-arms fire to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and fresh impact craters near populated areas in Zolote-4/Rodina.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations and observed fresh impact craters inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its access was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas, including at checkpoints near Zaichenko and Kreminets and in Izvaryne, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 145 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (50 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations (including 105 explosions) were recorded at westerly and northerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-easterly and westerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 110 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (11 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and south-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh small-arms fire damage to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed four holes (all 2cm in diameter) in the panes of four partially shattered west-facing windows of a functioning school on Myru Street: one on the first floor, two on the second floor and one on the third floor of the building. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and as caused by small-arms fire. It also observed several bullets at the site. The director (woman, in her fifties) told the Mission that on the morning of 11 March, the night guard had told her that the school had sustained damage during the night (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 February 2019).

Fresh impact craters near populated areas in Zolote-4/Rodina

On 8 March, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two fresh impact craters (not visible in imagery from 5 March 2019), assessed as caused by probable 120mm mortar rounds, about 150m south-east of the closest residential houses in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and about 300m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 10 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded nine projectiles and a burst, all at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 11 March, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-6km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and six projectiles at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 10 March, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (type undetermined) just west of a railway bridge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as an earthen ramp extending across two railway tracks for the first time, about 40m south-south-west of the aforementioned bridge. The same UAV spotted eight fresh impact craters (around Ukrainian Armed Forces positions) about 60m west of road T1316, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, as well as 34 previously observed anti-tank mines, of which one was assessed as having shifted as a result of the aforementioned impacts. About 250m north of the disengagement area, the UAV spotted 13 fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, across trenches in a field about 100m west of the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 11 March, the SMM saw that six anti-tank mines (probable TM-62), previously observed laid out across a ditch extending across the road 60m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, had been removed (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 March 2019).

During the day on 11 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard five bursts of small-arms fire 2km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Non-government-controlled-areas

10 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a residential area in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

11 March

The SMM saw four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled-areas

9 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 24 tanks (T-64), about 2,000 crates of ammunition (125mm rounds) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled-areas

5 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 25 tanks (type undetermined) and 11 pieces of self-propelled and 20 pieces of towed artillery or mortars in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 21 February 2019).

6 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 19 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 21 February 2019).

10 March

An SMM-mini UAV spotted:

• 21 tanks (11 T-64 and 10 T-72), six anti-tank guns (MT-12), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 15 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Myrne (see above) and
• 22 tanks (T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (see above).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

11 March

The SMM noted that seven mortars (four 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three PM-38, 120mm) and 54 tanks (T-64) were again missing.

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

11 March

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

7 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Popasna.

10 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk) and
• a probable IFV (BMP-variant) near Zolote.

Non-government-controlled areas

9 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

10 March:

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-2) and a communication truck with two antennas (R-161-A2M) near Debaltseve and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Sentianivka (44km west of Luhansk).

On 9 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 17 fresh impact craters assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher rounds on both sides of road T0504, about 280m from the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 March 2019).

Presence of mines and new mine hazard signs

The SMM again observed at least six anti-tank mines (TM-62) fixed on a wooden plank on the southern side of road T0504, about 60m east of the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna.

In the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of the city centre), about 20m north of Dunaievskoho Street, the SMM saw for the first time a wooden plank (with the word “Mines” written in Russian) on attached to a wooden stick in the ground.

In Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission observed for the first time two decayed wooden boards (without inscriptions) attached to two sticks about 25m west of a road on the western edge of the village and at a distance of about 100m from each other, assessed as improvised mine hazard signs. It observed that parts of the field between the road and the mine hazard signs were cultivated, while other parts of the same field, west of the mine hazard signs, were uncultivated.

SMM facilitation of operation of civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds reportedly related to water payments across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Border areas outside government control*

While at the border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south of Luhansk), the SMM saw one car (with Russian Federation licence plates) and 12 pedestrians (six men and six women) entering Ukraine, as well as 20 pedestrians (mixed genders) leaving Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour, the Mission observed five men and four women entering Ukraine, as well as five men and a woman exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations requested that the SMM leave the area, citing restrictions on the SMM’s presence near the border crossing point.
• At a checkpoint near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, claiming that only local residents were allowed to use the road.
• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing risks to “the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

413960 Communication and Media Relations Section

Some 20 representatives of Ukrainian government ministries and agencies and the donor community participated in a high-level meeting in Kyiv on 12 March 2019 to review progress in co-operation and joint efforts between the OSCE and relevant Ukrainian authorities in combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives (WAE) in the country and across its borders.

The OSCE last year conducted a needs assessment to establish the baseline for providing technical assistance and institutional support to develop capacities of Ukrainian authorities in their efforts to combat the trafficking of WAE in a holistic way. The OSCE is already working to enhance capacities of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in this field, while Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior and the national customs agency have confirmed their readiness to co-operate with the OSCE to address the challenges in combating the trafficking of WAE.

Serhiy Honcharenko, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, said that Ukraine needs support in tackling different aspects of the trafficking of WAE because of the ongoing armed conflict. He said that the problem needs to be addressed both within the country and at its borders. “It is important not only to focus on the consequences of WAE trafficking, but also on its prevention, and addressing the full life cycle of WAE from manufacturing and import through to disposal,” he said.  

Marcel Pesko, Ambassador, Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, highlighted that no country is immune against threats posed by, and accumulation of WAE. “It is important for Ukraine to have one common strategic approach to tackling these problems,” he added.

Rasa Ostrauskaite, the OSCE Secretariat’s Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats, said: “It is re-ensuring to see that Ukrainian authorities recognize and share the understanding of the challenges posed by WAE trafficking. The OSCE stands ready to assist the national authorities of Ukraine in tackling the challenges and threats stemming from illicit WAE trafficking”.

Representatives of the donor community from Germany, France, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and the European Union commended the willingness of Ukrainian authorities to co-operate and engage in project activities combating illicit WAE trafficking, and expressed their readiness to support these efforts. 

The meeting was organized with the support of Germany, France, Poland and Slovakia and was chaired by the OSCE Secretariat.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                   

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 8,813 to 8,661 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 43 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 21 this week like the previous week: twelve of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and nine into Ukraine (71 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and nine were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when nine families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and two into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (330 compared to 328 observed during the previous week). There were 167 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 163 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the route “Stakhanov–Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a significant decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 782 to 611 (202 at the Gukovo BCP and 409 at the Donetsk BCP); 327 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 284 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 45 (compared to 35 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP slightly increased from 246 to 247: of the total number of trucks scanned, 139 trucks (56 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 108 trucks (44 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 116 to 124 vehicles; 64 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 60 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 23 occasions, compared to nine last week; the OTs assessed that eleven trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and ten to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with German and Lithuanian licence plates.

On 9 March at 06:10, a police minivan from the Russian Federation arrived at Donetsk BCP and drove behind the main building. At 06:20, the van returned to the Russian Federation with an additional person on board, a male in civilian clothes seated in the rear of the vehicle.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 5 February 2019 to 12 March 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

413897 Communication and Media Relations Section

On the occasion of International Women’s Day, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger presented to participating States a report that gives a detailed picture of the physical, sexual and psychological violence suffered by women and girls in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe in the past decades. The presentation was held on 8 March 2019 in Vienna.

“Violence against women and girls is a human rights violation that has wide-reaching consequences: it not only threatens the security and safety of its victims, but also influences the communities and societies they live in,” said Greminger.

The report presents the results of a survey undertaken in 2018 in seven OSCE participating States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova and Ukraine. The survey also covered Kosovo. More than, 15,000 women aged 18 to 74 were interviewed for the report.

The OSCE Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women was designed to provide high-quality data to increase understanding of women’s experience of violence in conflict and non-conflict situations. In addition to a quantitative view, it also provides a unique qualitative insight into the prevalence and consequences of violence against women, and into persistent norms and attitudes in the region that tend to perpetrate this violence.

The survey was based on the methodology used by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) for its report Violence against women: an EU-wide survey, published in 2014. Joanne Goodey, Head of the Freedoms and Justice Department at FRA, provided insight into overall trends in the EU and the surveyed countries in Eastern Europe and South Eastern Europe: “With this OSCE-led survey, we have the largest dataset globally on violence against women, and now we have to harness the power of data to enact change.”

Rosa Logar, Director of the Domestic Violence Intervention Centre in Vienna and member of the Council of Europe GREVIO Committee, which monitors the implementation of the Istanbul Convention, stressed how important it is to recognize the economic costs of violence against women to society: “Prevention of violence occurring in the first place is the best investment a State can make.”

The project manager of the OSCE survey, Serani Siegel, presented the main findings of the report. The survey reveals that 70 per cent of the women interviewed have experienced some form of violence, and 45 per cent have experienced at least one form of sexual harassment, since the age of 15. Twenty-one per cent of the women interviewed experienced physical, sexual or psychological violence during childhood (up to the age of 15).

This project was funded by the European Union and also supported by the UN Population Fund, UN Women and UNICEF as well as by the governments of Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, the United States and Sweden. A copy of the report can be downloaded at www.osce.org/VAWsurvey.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 8 and 9 March, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and significantly fewer in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh shrapnel damage in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and fresh impact craters near Popasna.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area. It observed for the first time anti-tank mines on a road in the southern part of the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its access was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas, including at checkpoints near Novolaspa and Novoazovsk and at a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region.*
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a gathering and later saw a car partially covered with soot.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 8 and 9 March, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 185 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and south-westerly directions of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). During the day on 9 March, positioned in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and about 40 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed distance of 1km south of the nearest civilian house in the village (for recent observations of damage caused by shelling in Pikuzy, see SMM Daily Report 4 March 2019).

Between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 50 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-westerly and north-westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 8 and 9 March, the SMM recorded significantly fewer ceasefire violations (about 70 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 930 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded on the morning of 9 March in an area between Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), near the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations (see below Fresh impact craters observed near Popasna).

Between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 11 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh shrapnel damage in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

At 34 Poshtova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), on 9 March, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the north-north-east-facing side of a one-storey inhabited house and to an adjacent north-north-east-facing metal fence. About 4-5m north of the house, the Mission observed a fresh impact crater. The SMM was not able to assess the type of weapon used or the direction of fire. A resident of the house told the SMM that at around 19:00 on 7 March, while at home with his wife, he had heard a loud explosion nearby.

Fresh impact craters observed near Popasna

On 9 March, the SMM observed five to six fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds, in a field about 50m from the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (about 1.5km west of the nearest civilian house). The SMM heard over 60 undetermined explosions in the area earlier that day (see above).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 7 March, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near the road bridge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 9 March, the SMM observed for the first time six anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in a ditch extending across road T-1316, about 60m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area (for similar observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 28 February 2019).

During the day on 9 March, positioned about 1.5km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[3] Shortly thereafter, the Mission observed two military vehicles – one IFV (BMP variant) and the other undetermined – near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the disengagement area, about 550m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1.3km west of its eastern edge.

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

On 10 March, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

9 March

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) moving north in Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk) and
• nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 March

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) east of Zaichenko with multiple  fresh marks from tracked vehicles (types mostly undetermined) nearby, including those assessed as tracks of an MT-LB-based chassis, running in both directions along a road leading to Roza (36km north-east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 March

The SMM saw:

• three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) near Novoaidar.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

9 March

The SMM noted that:

• four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present for the first time and
• 31 self-propelled howitzers (28 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and three 2S1), 22 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and two self-propelled mortars (2S9) were again missing.

10 March

The SMM noted that:

• four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were present for the first time and
• two MLRS (BM-21) were missing for the first time.

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

10 March

The SMM noted that:

• 13 MLRS (BM-21) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

7 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Popasna.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an ACV (type undetermined) near Lebedynske (16km east of Mariupol).

9 March

The SMM saw:

-  two IFVs (BMD variants) in the yard of a former school building in Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

10 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and five IFVs (three BMP-2 and two undetermined variants) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a military truck (KamAZ-4310) moving south on a road on the western edge of Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

8 March                                      

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and a probable APC (MT-LB) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

10 March

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) and
• two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) and one APC (BTR-80) near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 8 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 40 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field about 50m south-west of road H-21, west of Vesela Hora.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 9 March, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to damaged power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. On 9 and 10 March, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 9 March, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw seven cars (three with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 25 cars (13 with Russian Federation, five with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, and six “DPR” plates), 13 covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The following day, while at the same border crossing point for 30 minutes, the SMM saw 13 cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 13 cars (eight with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates, and four “DPR” plates) and a bus (with Russian Federation plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 9 March, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians (two men and two women, aged 20-30) entering Ukraine and two pedestrians (a man and a woman in their sixties) exiting Ukraine.

On 10 March, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for 30 minutes, the SMM observed no cross-border traffic.

Gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv, on 9 March, the SMM monitored a pre-announced gathering by National Corps at Independence Square. The Mission saw about 600-700 people (mostly young men), some of whom were holding flags of National Corps, and heard them expressing opposition to the government. Later in the day, the SMM followed up on reports that smoke grenades had been thrown in front of the presidential administration building. The SMM saw that the side of a car parked in front of the building was partially covered with soot, assessed as caused by a smoke grenade. The Mission observed about 40-50 police officers present in the area. It did not observe further incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 8 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 9 March, an armed member of the armed formations at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk) denied the SMM access to the village.
• On 10 March, the SMM was unable to visit a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The site was locked and no personnel were present.
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM access to the town, citing “ongoing special police operation”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• On 9 March, at a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to pass only upon being escorted by a car of the armed formations during its patrol of the settlement.

Delay:

• On 9 March, at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). After about 40 minutes, he allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

BRATISLAVA, 11 March 2019 – More than 300 high-level participants including political representatives, national counter-terrorism co-ordinators and experts from the OSCE’s participating States and Partners for Co-operation, as well as representatives from international and sub-regional organizations, academics and civil society will meet in Bratislava on 25 and 26 March for the annual OSCE-wide Counter-Terrorism Conference. Media representatives are invited to cover the conference’s opening and closing sessions.

During the two-day conference participants will take stock of efforts to prevent and counter terrorism as well as violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) in the OSCE area.

The conference’s sessions will explore:

• Advances in international co-operation in countering terrorism and the implementation of good practices in preventing VERLT in the OSCE area
• Platforms that support co-operation and co-ordination between governments and civil society
• Programmes and approaches that help identify, divert and support individuals at risk of radicalization to terrorist violence, such as referral mechanisms and pre-criminal interventions
• Prison-based and non-custodial programmes to rehabilitate and reintegrate terrorist offenders while ensuring due prosecution of their criminal actions

The conference is organized by Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship with the support of the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, in close co-operation with other OSCE executive structures, within their respective mandates.

The opening session from 09:30 to 10:45 on 25 March will be moderated by Katarína Žáková, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Slovak Delegation to the OSCE, and include (subject to last-minute changes):

• Lukáš Parízek, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic
• Paul Bekkers, Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General
• Michèle Coninsx, Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED)

Keynote speeches will be delivered by:

• Dragan Mektić, Minister of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Oleg Syromolotov, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
• Oleg Kravchenko, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus
• Dragan Pejanović, State Secretary, Ministry of the Interior of Montenegro
• Chris Harnisch, Deputy Co-ordinator for Countering Violent Extremism, State Department, United States
• John Gatt-Rutter, Head of the Counter-Terrorism Division, European External Action Service (EEAS)

A representative of Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship will deliver closing remarks on 26 March from 16:30 to 17:00, along with: 

• Rasa Ostrauskaite, OSCE Co-ordinator of Transnational Threats Activities
• Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office on Counter-Terrorism

Media representatives wishing to attend the opening and/or closing sessions must register by 15 March 2019 by sending an e-mail to eva.masanova@mzv.sk and shiv.sharma@osce.org to obtain the registration form.

The conference will be held at the Hotel Saffron, Radlinského street 27, Bratislava.

SKOPJE, 12 March 2019 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) formally opened today an election observation mission for the 21 April presidential election in North Macedonia. The mission’s deployment follows an invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The mission is led by Corien Jonker and consists of a core team of 11 experts based in Skopje and 18 long-term observers, who will be deployed throughout the country in multinational teams of two from 20 March. In addition, ODIHR will request that OSCE participating States provide 250 short-term observers, who will arrive several days before the election.

The mission will assess the election for its compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. Observers will closely monitor voter and candidate registration, campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant government bodies, election-related legislation and its implementation, and the resolution of election-related disputes. As part of the observation, the mission will also monitor the media coverage of the campaign.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives of state authorities, political parties, civil society, the media and the international community.

On election day, observers will monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results. For election day, the ODIHR election observation mission will join efforts with delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

The mission will publish an interim report in the course of its work. The day after the election, a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions will be issued at a press conference. ODIHR will issue a final report on the observation approximately two months after the end of the election process.

The ODIHR election observation mission and the OSCE Mission to Skopje operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

For further information, please visit page osce.org/odihr/elections/north-macedonia/413765 or contact Ivan Godarsky, Media Analyst, at +389 72 443 647 (Skopje mobile), or at ivan.godarsky@odihr.mk

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile), or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

SKOPJE, 11 March 2019 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission deployed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 21 April presidential election in North Macedonia, the mission will hold a press conference in Skopje on Tuesday.

Corien Jonker, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities. The mission's deployment follows an invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The ODIHR election observation mission and the OSCE Mission to Skopje operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Tuesday, 12 March, in Congress Ballroom 2 of the Aleksandar Palace Hotel, Prohor Pcinjski, Skopje.

For further information, please contact Ivan Godarsky, Media Analyst with the election observation mission, at +389 72 443647 or at Ivan.Godarsky@odihr.mk.  

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile), or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period.
• Following the beginning of a recommitment to the ceasefire coinciding with International Women’s Day at 00:01 on 8 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the hours before midnight.
• A man lost both lower limbs and suffered an eye injury due to an incident with unexploded ordnance in Makiivka.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement area and elsewhere. Its access was also restricted near non-government-controlled Zaichenko.*
• In Kyiv, Kharkiv, Uzhhorod and Mariupol the SMM observed events on the occasion of International Women’s Day.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 185 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (680 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), while the majority of explosions were recorded in areas south-south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas west-south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

About 35 per cent of the ceasefire violations (about 380), including 56 explosions, were recorded after the beginning of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 8 March.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 930 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, all explosions, were recorded in areas south, east and west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), in areas west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) and in areas east of Luhansk city.

About three per cent of the ceasefire violations (about 30), including seven explosions, were recorded after the beginning of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 8 March.

Following the beginning of the recommitment to the ceasefire, the SMM recorded in total around 400 ceasefire violations (including 63 explosions) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Man loses both legs and suffers eye injury due to incident with unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Makiivka

The SMM followed up on reports of a man who had suffered injuries in an incident with UXO in Makiivka (non-government-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk). On 8 March, at a hospital in Makiivka, the Mission saw a man (in his thirties) with both lower limbs amputated below the knees and his left eye half-closed. He told the Mission that on 19 February he had picked up a round-shaped metal object in the street while walking to his garage in Zaslonova Street in Makiivka. At his garage, he said, he had accidentally dropped the object and could not remember anything that had happened afterwards. Medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that the man had been admitted on 19 February with blast injuries to both lower limbs necessitating amputations, as well as an eye injury.  

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 7 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined burst at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the day of 8 March, positioned on the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard six bursts and two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-4km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-8km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Also on the 8 March, positioned near the disengagement areas close to Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

8 March

The SMM saw:

• at least seven tanks (type undetermined) parked in a compound on the northern edge of Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, SMM Daily Report of 8 March 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

8 March

The SMM noted that:

• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (three 9K33 Osa and one 9K35 Strela-10) were again missing.

Indications of military presence inside the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

8 March

The SMM saw:

-  an armoured personnel carrier (APC) ( BTR-60) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Demining activities and presence of mine hazard signs

The SMM observed 18 people dressed in protective clothing and equipped with sticks and other equipment carrying out demining activities in a field adjacent to a road  between Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) and Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol).

In Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed, for the first time, a mine hazard sign (with the word “Mine” written in Russian), attached to a stick placed in soft ground 25m south of the road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to damaged power lines at the Zolote-5/Mykhailivka power station (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk). A representative of the electricity company carrying out the repairs told the SMM that repairs had been successfully completed.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Events on the occasion of International Women’s Day

On 8 March, the SMM observed events on the occasion of International Women’s Day in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Uzhhorod (182km west of Ivano-Frankivsk) and Mariupol (a similar gathering was observed in Odessa on 7 March).

In Kyiv, the Mission saw about 1,100 young people (mostly women) gather at Mykhailivska Square and march through the city centre, and heard them expressing, among other things, support for women’s rights and opposition to violence against women. At the square, the SMM saw about 350 law enforcement officers in riot gear separating the gathering from a second group of 150-200 young people (mostly men) heard expressing opposition to the march. The SMM saw three young men, belonging to the group opposing the march, detained by the police. Police officers told the Mission that another group of the men was being questioned at a police station because they had damaged equipment belonging to march participants. The SMM did not observe further incidents.

In Kharkiv, the Mission observed two peaceful public gatherings: around 100 participants belonging to the first gathering (mostly women) expressed support for “female solidarity”, while participants of the second one (around 30, mostly men) held up banners opposing ideas propagated by the first group. The Mission saw around 200 police officers present and did not observe any incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 8 March 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security concerns”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

MOSCOW/PARIS/WASHINGTON DC, 09 March 2019 – In their March 1 statement, the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stephane Visconti of France and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) welcomed the commitment of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to meet soon under the auspices of the Co-Chairs.  The Co-Chairs, working closely with the two foreign ministers, have been making preparations for this important leaders’ meeting, which will be the first direct contact between the two leaders conducted under Co-Chair auspices.

The Co-Chairs underline the importance of maintaining an environment conducive to productive discussions and continue to assess positively the recent lack of casualties on the front lines.  The Co-Chairs also welcome some initial steps being taken in the region to prepare the populations for peace and encourage the sides to intensify such efforts.  At the same time, the Co-Chairs reiterate the critical importance of reducing tensions and minimizing inflammatory rhetoric.  In this context, the Co-Chairs urge the sides to refrain from statements and actions suggesting significant changes to the situation on the ground, prejudging the outcome of or setting conditions for future talks, demanding unilateral changes to the format without agreement of the other party, or indicating readiness to renew active hostilities.

With reference to some contradictory recent public statements on the substance of the Minsk Group process, the Co-Chairs reiterate that a fair and lasting settlement must be based on the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, including in particular the non-use or threat of force, territorial integrity, and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples.  It also should embrace additional elements as proposed by the Presidents of the Co-Chair countries in 2009-2012, including: return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance; a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.

The Co-Chairs stress their view that these principles and elements must be the foundation of any fair and lasting settlement to the conflict and should be conceived as an integrated whole.  Any attempt to put some principles or elements over others would make it impossible to achieve a balanced solution. 

The Co-Chairs are prepared to meet with the leaders and foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan at any time, and call on the leaders to resume negotiations in good faith at the earliest opportunity.  Continuous and direct dialogue between Baku and Yerevan conducted under the auspices of the Co-Chairs remains an essential element in building confidence and advancing the peace process.  The Co-Chairs will also continue to discuss, as appropriate, relevant issues with the interested parties directly affected by the conflict, recognizing that their views and concerns must be taken into account for any negotiated solution to succeed. 

The Co-Chairs stress that they remain fully committed, in accordance with their mandate, to helping the sides find a peaceful solution to the conflict.  The Co-Chairs also express their full support for the impartial and critical monitoring work undertaken by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and his team.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• It saw fresh damage to a residential house in Shchastia.
• The Mission saw multiple launch rocket systems in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• It observed the presence of mines and explosive remnants of war in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and near non-government-controlled Bezimenne and Dovzhanske, an area near the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Kyiv, the SMM saw posters in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation demanding the release of sailors following the incidents at sea, near the Kerch Strait.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 680 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 160 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including one-third of the explosions, were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at south-westerly and north-westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas south-east and west-south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 190 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at northerly and southerly directions of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Damage related to gunfire in a residential area in Shchastia

The SMM followed up on reports about damage in a residential area in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). At 8 Haharina Street, the SMM observed a fresh hole (2.5cm in width) on the south-east-facing wall of a two-storey residential house assessed as from a bullet (12.7mm) from a heavy-machine-gun. A man (aged 50-55) who introduced himself as a neighbour of the owner of the affected house said that there had been heavy-machine-gun fire in the late morning hours of 6 March.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 6 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 11 projectiles in flight and a burst at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as three projectiles at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east and east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the day of 7 March, positioned 1.5km west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km north-north-east and south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds at an assessed range of 1-5km north and east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and 30 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 500m north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the day of 7 March, positioned near the disengagement areas close to Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled-areas

6 March

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) (and 16  rockets (220mm) on the ground next to one MLRS) and five probable (MLRS) (BM-27) near Virivka (81km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled-areas

5 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• seven MLRS (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 23 February 2019).

7 March:

The SMM saw:

• eight stationary MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a compound about 2km south-west of Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 21 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

7 March

The SMM saw:

• four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see  SMM Daily Report 21 February 2019);
• ten tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk); (for previous observations, see  SMM Daily Report 21 February 2019);
• two tanks (type undetermined), a piece of self-propelled artillery or mortar and 12 pieces of towed artillery or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk ; and
• 27 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (15km south-east of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 21 February 2019).

7 March

The SMM saw:

• at least seven tanks (type undetermined) parked in a compound on the northern edge of Khrustalnyi and
•  a tank (type undetermined) being transported on road H-21 near Lutuhyne (20km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

7 March

The SMM noted that:

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present for the first time and
• 33 self-propelled howitzers (22 S1 and 11 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and 30 towed howitzers (24 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and six D-20, 152mm) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

28 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

- an IFV (BMP variant) about 200m north of the Petrivske disengagement area, near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

6 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP variant) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk) and

• a probable armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

Presence of mines and unexploded ordnance

On 6 March, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 47 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out on a road (and adjacent field) between Bohdanivka and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 170m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske. About 200m from the abovementioned mines, the same UAV again spotted an additional 25 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out across the same road.

On 7 March, about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM again saw two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as 152mm artillery rounds, lying four meters north of a local road.

On the same day, the SMM saw for the first time at least six anti-tank mines (TM-62) fixed on a wooden plank on the southern side of road T0504 about 60m east of the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). About 1.5km south-east, between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations, the SMM saw an object assessed as the tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) on the same road.  About 500m further south-east, the SMM saw a fresh impact crater assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon on the south-western side of the road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border area outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine and three cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. After about six minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to move away from the border crossing point.*

Posters in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation 

In Kyiv, on 6 March in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation at 27 Povitroflotskyi Avenue, the SMM saw 20 posters (not seen on 5 March) affixed on tripods placed in a green area in front of the building. The posters displayed the Ukrainian flag and the coats of arms of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Navy as well as slogans (in English) which demanded the release of the sailors detained following incidents at sea, near the Kerch Strait.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west, citing “security concerns”.
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), two unarmed members of the armed formations told the SMM to move away from the area, citing the need for prior permission from senior members of the armed formations to visit it.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint 5km north-east of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) four armed members of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting its trailer.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

413675 Marina Živaljević

The Montenegrin Ministry of Culture hosted a roundtable discussion on the Draft Law on Amendments to the Law on National Public Broadcaster Radio-Television of Montenegro, on 8 March 2019 in Podgorica. The meeting was organized with the support of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro.

The main objective was to enable the public to participate in a constructive discussion on the proposed amendments and legal solutions, as well as to share the analysis of international media experts.

The head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, said that in today’s time of mass media and rapid flow of information, it is very important to provide the public with accurate and impartial news. “The role of the public service broadcaster is particularly important since it plays a special role in creating public opinion. It is important to note that public service broadcasting should always be a citizens’ service, independent, impartial and professional,” said Daviet.

Aleksandar Bogdanović, Minister of Culture, said that at this stage of the EU integration, Montenegro is legally inheriting and implementing high international standards of freedom and independence of the media. “These standards definitely imply that the Public Radio-Diffusion Service is conceptualized to meet the interests of the wider public, to ensure the implementation and promotion of fundamental human rights and freedom, the pluralism of social and public ideas, and enhances the culture of public dialogue and respect for linguistic diversity,” said Minister Bogdanović.

Aivo Orav, Head of the EU Delegation to Montenegro, said that the legal framework needs to create conditions for transparency, media pluralism and in that sense, it is equally important that the Law on National Public Broadcaster Radio-Television, as well as the Law on Electronic Media, acknowledge recommendations and show clear media strategy. “I am glad that we have been able to co-ordinate with our partners from the Council of Europe and the OSCE and give our recommendations on the amendments to the Law,” said Orav.

Angelo Longo, Head of Operations of the Council of Europe Programme Office in Podgorica, concluding the welcoming speeches, said that as the guardian of the rule of law in Europe, the Council of Europe through its legal system is set to protect the fundamental rights ensured in the European Convention, including the right to freedom of expression: “Without free expression and free media, violations of human rights may remain hidden and genuine democracy is not possible.”

The event was attended by representatives of state institutions, the media community, international organizations and diplomatic missions in Montenegro, as well as representatives of civil society organizations working with the media.

Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) organized a co-ordination meeting on March 6 in Mostar to discuss the process of investigation and court proceedings in cases involving representatives of the migrant population who hold the status of victim or suspect.  The event was held together with the Prosecutor’s Office of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton.

The meeting gathered representatives of judicial institutions, police and security agencies as well as other governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The purpose of the event was to assess the capacity, practice of work and level of co-ordination amongst all relevant state authorities and institutions that hold jurisdiction for migrant issues on the territory of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton. Special consideration was given to the treatment of migrants in accordance with international human rights standards, those already registered as asylum seekers, and those who expressed a wish to claim asylum.

The participants discussed the lack of verified information on the identity of migrants who are involved in judicial proceedings, either as suspects or victims, and ways to overcome challenges faced by the police, the Prosecutor’s Office and the Court. 

This meeting was organized as a follow-up meeting to a previous one held in the Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office Mostar in November 2018, which was attended by representatives from the Office for Foreigners’ Affairs – Field Office Mostar and the Police Administration Mostar.

It was noted that significant progress has been made since then with regard to the level of co-ordination amongst the relevant bodies in charge of dealing with migrants. The participants agreed to continue with regular meetings, as trends indicate an increase in the number of migrants coming to BiH in the springtime. The OSCE Mission to BiH will assist the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to better prepare for the upcoming challenges in this area.

NEW YORK/VIENNA, 8 March 2019 - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák and OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger welcomed the new recommitment to a ceasefire in eastern Ukraine that came into effect today at 00:01 (Kyiv time) and should bring a decrease in violence.

While the renewed truce is a welcome development, a lasting ceasefire is yet to be reached. The Chairperson-in-Office, therefore, reiterated his call for a "sustainable, full and permanent ceasefire" in Ukraine.

"This is now an opportunity to focus on the needs of the women, men and children who have suffered far too long as a result of this conflict. The guarantee of a safe and secure environment is a crucial precondition for any positive development, including improving the dire humanitarian situation. I call on the sides to assume their full responsibilities, especially with regard to people on both sides of the contact line in the conflict-affected area," said the Chairperson-in-Office.

OSCE Secretary General Greminger stressed: “Every week, civilians are killed or injured in eastern Ukraine by shelling, landmines or explosive remnants of war.  Damage to essential infrastructure has reduced access to basic services, and in some cases poses the risk of environmental disaster. After five years of suffering, the people of Ukraine deserve peace, safety and hope for a better future. The sides must do more to ensure the wellbeing of the people they claim to protect, and cease fighting to allow the pursuit for a political solution.”

The Chairperson-in-Office and the Secretary General reiterated their continued strong support for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM). “The SMM is doing crucial work in reducing tensions on the ground,” they noted. “OSCE monitors must be granted secure and unimpeded access to fulfil their mandate. We need to further strengthen the important work of the monitors, who directly contribute to the prevention of further escalation.”

VIENNA, 8 March 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today called on the Ukrainian authorities to reverse the entry ban to Ukraine imposed on Christian Wehrschütz, a journalist with the Austrian Public Service Broadcaster (ORF).

“Christian Wehrschütz has been working as the ORF correspondent in Ukraine for many years. The denial of entry to Wehrschütz, like to any other journalist, is very detrimental for the freedom of the media. I call on the authorities to reverse their decision and abstain from creating obstacles to his accessing the country for the legitimate pursuit of professional activities,” Désir said, “I recall that the OSCE participating States committed to facilitate the work of journalists from other participating States and to the free flow of information“.

The entry ban followed the recent denial of an extension of Wehrschütz’s accreditation by the Joint Forces Press Centre in Ukraine on the basis of alleged violations of procedures for entry and exit from temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The journalist denies these allegations. 

Earlier the Representative addressed the problems faced by Wehrschütz with the authorities and asked them to consider easing the travel requirements for media professionals in the areas affected by the ongoing crisis in and around the country. The Representative also expressed concern about the publication of labelling information about Wehrschütz on one of the websites in Ukraine and emphasized that this could put the journalist at risk and jeopardize his safety.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

413693

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Lamberto Zannier visited Latvia from 5 to 8 March 2019, in his first visit to the country in his current capacity, to assess the state of inter-ethnic relations and the integration of society. 

Zannier had a series of meetings in Riga, including with the Prime Minister, and with the representatives of several ministries, the parliament (the Saeima), minority communities and civil society, as well as with teachers and parents.

Zannier also travelled to the south-east of Latvia and visited Daugavpils, a city with a diverse ethnic composition. He met with the municipal administration, minority groups and the education authorities. 

The High Commissioner also visited three schools in Riga and Daugavpils with different languages of instruction.

Issues related to education reform, language policy and citizenship featured in all of the discussions, along with broader matters related to the integration of Latvian society.

Zannier welcomed the President’s initiative to grant automatic citizenship to the newborn children of non-citizens. The High Commissioner urged the government to proceed with the education reform in a way that is consultative and inclusive, and that takes into consideration the opinion of all groups, including members of minorities. More broadly, Zannier encouraged the authorities to keep integration high on the agenda and offered the support of his institution with respect to several facets of this process.

VIENNA, 8 March 2019 – Greater efforts are needed to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls occurring both in private and public life, which prevents them from being full and equal participants in society, said OSCE senior officials on the occasion of International Women’s Day.

Miroslav Lajčák, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia; Thomas Greminger, OSCE Secretary General; and Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), stressed that violence against women and girls is one of the greatest threats to peace and security and continues to be one of the most widespread human rights violations in the world. Not only does it threaten the security and safety of its victims, it also affects the communities and societies they live in.

“Violence against women and girls affects whole societies. Therefore, entire societies must be involved in combatting and eradicating it – from justice institutions and government ministries to civil society. Without violence in their lives women will be able to participate and lead across political, economic and social sectors and this benefits everyone in society. In the context of the OSCE, as an international security organization, this is particularly crucial for the participation of women in peace processes,” stressed Lajčák. Pointing out that this year’s International Women’s Day focuses on innovation, he said: “Women all over the world are coming up with innovative solutions to today’s challenges. We need to break down the barriers they face to make their ideas heard. Ongoing, systemic violence against women is one of such barriers."

According to the findings of the OSCE-conducted survey on the prevalence of violence against women in the OSCE region published this month, some 70 per cent of the more than 15,000 women and girls surveyed disclosed that they have experienced some form of violence since the age of 15. More than 20 per cent of those interviewed said they were subjected to physical or sexual violence by a partner. The survey results provide policymakers with the data and tools to improve national laws and policies to better protect victims.

“We all have the responsibility to openly reject acts of violence and stand by the victims. We must do all we can to change the perception that violence towards women is acceptable,” said OSCE Secretary General Greminger. Referring to the OSCE survey, he said that the study marks “an important step towards eliminating violence against women: it provides the necessary data countries need to formulate appropriate policy responses. We can no longer use the excuse of not knowing enough. We must act now and take concrete steps to prevent violence against women and girls.”

ODIHR Director Gísladóttir stressed that violence against women hinders their equal involvement in all spheres of life, including their political participation: “When women step out of the private sphere, demand their rights and contest patriarchy publicly, they are often exposed to violence in politics. There is a need for improved data on violence against women in public life, including during elections. Our Office can use such data to support participating States in designing more effective prevention and mitigation interventions to remove the stigma associated with such violence and hold perpetrators accountable.”

The OSCE participating States have adopted three Ministerial Council decisions on preventing and combating violence against women, including most recently in December 2018 in Milan. This Ministerial Council decision calls on participating States to take concrete action to address the root causes of violence against women and girls.