OSCE

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 24 and 25 May, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 25 and 26 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines for the first time near government-controlled Luhanske.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at border crossing points outside government control near Sievernyi and Izvaryne, and at a checkpoint in non-government-controlled Novoazovsk.* 
• The SMM monitored a gathering in front of a church in Tovtry, Chernivtsi region.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 24 and 25 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (185 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

On the night of 24 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded, amongst other ceasefire violations, two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 100-400m north-north-west.

Between the evenings of 25 and 26 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however more explosions (about 50), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 24 and 25 May, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (60), compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 25 and 26 May, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (nine), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west-north-west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day of 25 May, positioned at two locations on the eastern edge of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-7km south (which it was unable to assess as either inside or outside the disengagement area) and 13 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the early morning hours of 26 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed distance of 2-4km east-south-east within 5km of the periphery of the disengagement area. During the day on 26 May, positioned in Pervomaisk, the SMM recorded seven undetermined explosions and about 100 bursts at an assessed range of 2-3km west-north-west within 5km of the periphery of the disengagement area.

On 25 and 26 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

24 May

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

24 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk).

25 May

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• An IFV (BMP-2) parked 5m from residential houses near Sofiivka; and
• 18 IFVs (three BMP-2, ten BMP-1 and five BMP variant) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

Presence of anti-tank mines, some seen for the first time

On 24 May, about 5km south-east of Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 24 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows extending 30m on each side of road M-03 (not seen in previous imagery from 27 September 2018) and again 15 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows across road M-03, as well as 37 anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 800m further south laid out in three rows across the same road. The same SMM UAV spotted again 20 anti-tank mines (TM-62) across the same road about 3km north-west of Lohvynove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk) and 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 600m further south-east.

On the same day, about 2km east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the western lane of road H-21, as well as again 42 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across the same road about 200m south-east of the bridge in Shchastia.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 25 May, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna.

On 25 and 26 May, the Mission also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 25 May, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw no cross-border traffic. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 26 May, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 14 pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 26 May, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw eight pedestrians entering Ukraine and eight pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On 26 May, while at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about an hour, the SMM saw a pedestrian entering Ukraine, and 15 cars (one with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, one with Ukrainian licence plates attached to the car and “DPR” plates visible on its dashboard, as well as six with “DPR” plates) and ten trucks (eight covered cargo, one flatbed and one cooler, all with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

Gathering in front of church in Tovtry, Chernivtsi region

On 23 May, in Tovtry, Chernivtsi region, the SMM saw 15 people (ten women, five men, 30-70 years old) gathered in the yard of the Dormition of the Mother of God church. A participant told the SMM that they were members of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and that they were present there to prevent members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) from entering the church. Two OCU representatives added that on 19 May a physical confrontation between OCU and UOC supporters had taken place around the Tovtry church (for related observations, see SMM Daily Report 24 May 2019).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 25 May, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 25 May, at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Kuznetsy (non-government-controlled, 89km south-east of Donetsk), citing an “ongoing special police operation in the area”.
• On 26 May, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 24 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over non-government-controlled areas of southern Luhansk region.[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

SDGs SDGs:  7 - Affordable and clean energy

BRATISLAVA, 27 May 2019 – Sustainable energy is indispensable for growth, prosperity and security in the OSCE region. Participants of the 2nd Preparatory Meeting of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum (EEF) today in Bratislava called for stronger inter-institutional co-operation and an inclusive dialogue among all relevant stakeholders, focused on economic progress and security. They stressed that energy co-operation, good governance and connectivity in the digital era are key prerequisites for a successful energy transition. 

Addressing the opening of the meeting, Slovak State Secretary for Foreign and European Affairs František Ružička said that Slovakia has long advocated for a stronger OSCE focus on the protection of critical energy infrastructure against natural disasters and man-made challenges. “As the 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, we are promoting an exchange of experiences and knowledge as a means to prevent incidents and effectively deal with crisis situations when they do occur.”

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger said that two critical challenges have helped the OSCE define its engagement in the field of energy co-operation: reducing the environmental footprint of energy usage, production and transport and protecting critical energy networks. “Risks are on the rise and many OSCE participating States have suffered blackouts and other disruptions on a significant scale. Improving the resilience of critical infrastructure is a must,” he said. 

Representatives of 57 participating States, international organizations, the business and academic communities and civil society discussed needs and priorities and how to raise awareness and stimulate political will in dealing with economic, environmental and security-related challenges.

Oľga Algayerová, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), said that in order to ensure effective planning and implementation, environmental governance must be improved. “UNECE’s key multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Aarhus, Espoo and Water Conventions, our work in water management, industrial safety and public participation in environmental decision-making and our close co-operation with the OSCE in this field are making a difference. What truly matters is that the collective outcome delivers the needed result: the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Dialogue and co-operation on energy issues and environment must strengthen for benefit of all.”    

Participants noted that energy transition has the potential to provide great opportunities in terms of economic growth and sustainable development, but also brings new challenges and exposes energy networks to new vulnerabilities. “No country can meet these challenges alone,” said the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, Vuk Žugić. “Our pathways may differ depending on national circumstances, but it is still important that we keep an open dialogue and support each other in understanding the key areas where joint efforts are required to foster our global energy security.”  

The Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental activities is currently working on two key projects: one on promoting green ports and connectivity in the Caspian Sea, and one aimed at the creation of a virtual training platform which will allow the OSCE to broaden the scope of action of its capacity building courses. 

On 28 May, EEF participants will visit a hydroelectric power station on the Danube River and the Slovak Interior Ministry will provide a presentation on crisis management. 

420971 Communication and Media Relations Section

More than 140 criminal justice practitioners and representatives of the OSCE participating States, OSCE Partners for Co-operation and international organizations explored how to effectively counter cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime at a conference in Vienna on 24 May organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the 2019 Slovak OSCE Chairmanship and the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior.

The conference, Crime in the Digital Age, was the concluding activity of the OSCE’s flagship regional capacity-building project for criminal justice practitioners combating cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime in South-Eastern Europe.

The panelists highlighted the achievements, challenges and lessons learned from implementing the two-year project in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. They also discussed broader topics related to criminal justice responses to the growing role of digital technologies in conducting or facilitating criminal activities, key elements of effective capacity building in this field and future trends such as the development of artificial intelligence.

The effective retention of digital evidence, adapting legislative frameworks to match the latest technological innovations, and reducing the knowledge gap among many criminal justice practitioners in this field were some of the key issues raised.

“Ensuring that the criminal justice institutions are capable of responding not only to today’s security threats and challenges but also to those of tomorrow is one of the key requirements for the sound and effective functioning of the security sector as well as the public’s trust and confidence in the ability of state institutions to protect citizens’ rights and uphold the rule of law,” said Katarina Zakova, Deputy Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the OSCE.

Erhard Friessnik, head of the Austrian Cybercrime-Competence-Centre C4, underlined that cybercrime can only be effectively addressed through strengthening international co-operation and building strong partnerships between criminal justice institutions, the international community, the private sector and civil society.

The OSCE's regional capacity-building project on combating cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime in South-Eastern Europe began in the summer of 2017 and will conclude in July. It has been supported by Germany, Italy, Slovakia and the United States of America.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.
• The SMM’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*

___________________________________________________________________________

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (185), compared with the previous reporting period (about 240 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (five), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-westerly directions of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 23 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded about 50 projectiles in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 24 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

23 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 1km west of Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 17 pieces of towed artillery (types undetermined) and eight pieces of self-propelled artillery (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). In the same training area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 59 armoured combat vehicles[4] (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 16 May 2019);
• 50 tanks in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 April 2019); and
• 20 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019).

22 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and 11 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

23 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 21 tanks (11 T-64 and  ten T-72), eight mortars (2B11 Sani,120mm), as well as six probable surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Myrne (see above).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

23 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier near residential buildings in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) and
• three infantry fighting vehicles (two BMP-1 and BMP-2) in Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk).

24 May

Positioned near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the northern edge of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw a dark-coloured UAV flying at an altitude of about 300m.

Mine hazard sign in Makariv Yar

The SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign (a red square with written “Stop, mines” in Russian language) in a field next to a road about 4km south-west of Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, non-government-controlled, 28km east of Luhansk). 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Despite security guarantees having been provided that a localized ceasefire would be adhered to, the SMM heard ceasefire violations close to the DFS (see table below) and left the area.

SMM facilitated and monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the conflict

The SMM facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region. A representative of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a representative of those in control in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region separately told the SMM that about 60 persons (including three women) had been transferred.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 23 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

VIENNA, 25 May 2019 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today strongly denounced the shooting of journalist Hakan Denizli in Turkey. Denizli, founder of the local daily Egemen, was shot in the leg after two persons opened fire while he was leaving his home in Adana.

He was immediately hospitalized and his health condition is stable. He had reportedly been threatened and attacked in the past. An official police investigation has been launched.

“I condemn this appalling attack that could have had deadly consequences. I am relieved that Denizli will recover, but it is important that no effort is spared in finding and bringing to justice the perpetrators of this horrendous crime as soon as possible. Impunity for attacks against journalists is unacceptable,” Désir said.

The Representative also condemned the physical attack against the Editor-in-Chief of the Güney Haberci news website, Ergin Çevik, which took place on 20 May in Antalya. Earlier this month, journalists İdris Özyol and Yavuz Selim Demirağ were also victims of physical assaults. (The Representative’s previous statement is available here).

“I am seriously concerned that this is the fourth safety related incident against journalists in Turkey in only two weeks. The authorities need to do their utmost to ensure safe working conditions for all media professionals. Public condemnation is also a crucial element that serves as a preventive measure for the future. This worrying trend needs to be urgently addressed and reversed,” Désir concluded.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Mariupol, Volnovakha and near Khrustalnyi.
• The Mission observed ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission continued to observe hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

• In Chernivtsi, the Mission saw a gathering in relation to the change of religious affiliations of local churches.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 240), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). Over two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and at easterly and southerly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 22-23 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an illumination flare and eight projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east and south (all assessed as inside the disengagement area), two projectiles at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area) and about 50 projectiles at an assessed range of 1-2km at directions ranging from east to south-south-east (assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery). During the day on 23 May, positioned in three locations near the disengagement area, the SMM heard about 25 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire and seven explosions (one assessed as an outgoing round of a mortar and the remainder undetermined), all assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.  

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations. [3]

Hardship for civilians at the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk

A representative of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that on a nightly basis up to nine people stayed in their tent at the EECP. Inside the tent, the SMM saw a woman and her ten-year-old son, who, according to the representative, had been unable to cross for the previous three days due to lack of proper documentation. The representative added that a man had stayed the previous two weeks in the tent, unable to return to his home in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), as he did not possess a passport. The SMM saw that newly installed lavatories near the tent remained locked. A member of the State Border Guard Service at the EECP told the SMM that nine new lavatories at the EECP had not yet been connected to water pipes.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

23 May

The SMM saw:

• an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and three towed howitzers (one D-20, 152mm, one 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and one D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk), and
• an anti-tank gun (MT-12) in Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

23 May

The SMM saw 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

23 May

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Zaliznianske (79km north of Donetsk).

Heavy weapons permanent storage site

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

23 May

The SMM saw that one towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B,152mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

22 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) in Chermalyk.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB Blade) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

23 May

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), and
• an IFV (BMP-1) north of the disengagement area near Zolote.

Demining activities near Myrna Dolyna

The SMM saw 16 people with metal detectors wearing protective gear bearing the logo of an international organization conducting de-mining activities along the western side of road P-66, about 2.5km south-east of Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water pumping station near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk),  a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, as well as to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of  Donetsk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour and a half, the SMM saw 21 cars (four with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and nine with “DPR” plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates, each carrying about 35 passengers) and about 35 pedestrians entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 18 cars (two with Ukrainian, ten with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates), five covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and about 25 pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw no pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

SMM observed a calm situation south of Kherson region

On 21 May, the SMM observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

Gathering of members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Chernivtsi

On Kobylianskoi Street in Chernivtsi, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 650 people (mixed ages and genders), including about 100 priests belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), in protest against decisions to recognize changes in affiliation of churches in Chernivtsi region from the UOC to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. From there, they walked north and west to the building of the Regional State Administration, where one of the organizers addressed the participants. About 30 police officers, including ten in riot gear, secured the gathering, which dispersed peacefully (for similar observations see SMM Daily Report 22 May 2019). 

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 23 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM, allowing it to proceed only after about 30 minutes, citing the need for “confirmation from their superiors”.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Forty young people from all over the Western Balkans gathered on 23 May 2019 in Tirana to participate in the Youth Trail 2019.

The third edition of the Youth Trail, a flagship youth-centred event, is organized by the OSCE Presence in Albania, with the support of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), Tirana Municipality, and the German Government. For five days, the young people will get to know each other, explore Tirana, and debate about the future of democracy, security, peace and co-operation in the region.

Addressing the Youth Trail opening ceremony, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania Bernd Borchardt spoke about the importance of stepping up efforts to promote regional co-operation, and of youth as actors of change in the Western Balkans. “Over the three years, 2,000 people have shown interest in joining the Youth Trail and 100 participated. I hope that this Youth Trail will transmit to all of you what a participant of the first edition said: that he understood that young people from the region have much more things that unite them than separate them,” Borchardt said.

“Reconciliation, overcoming the difficult legacy of the past in our region is possible if there are contacts not only between governments, but also between societies, and you are doing this in a wonderful manner,” said Deputy Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Sokol Dedja.

In the next days, the Youth Trail participants will engage in a lively programme of exchange that includes sessions on topics ranging from democratic participation, gender equality, climate change, and anti-corruption to dealing with the past, regional co-operation, OSCE values, intercultural learning, and promotion of cultural heritage.  

420713 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

An OSCE-organized seminar on media law reforms in the digital age for representatives of Turkmenistan’s parliament, the Mejlis, the Office of the Ombudsperson, relevant ministries, research and educational institutions, as well as Turkmenistan’s print, online and broadcast media took place in Ashgabat on 23 and 24 May 2019.

The seminar addressed a wide range of topics, including digital environment and the media, the internet and protection of personal data, and trends and challenges in the digital age. International experts elaborated on digital rights and freedoms as well as access to government-held information via the internet.

Opening the seminar, Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, pointed to the continued relevance of the recommendations adopted at the 14th Central Asia Media Conference “From traditional to online media: best practices and perspectives”, held in 2012 in Ashgabat.

“The Declaration adopted by the participants of the conference emphasizes the advantages of the internet and states that national legislation should “facilitate openness and transparency of the internet, including online media”, said Drozd. “The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat stands ready to continue its support to the government of Turkmenistan in reforming its media legislation in compliance with international standards and the development of digital technologies.”

The seminar participants exchanged views on how the digital environment and new technologies affect media regulation. They worked in groups to analyze cases related to the freedom of the internet, access to information and regulation of online media and discussed the transformation of the media in the digital environment and the life of newspapers online and offline. Special attention was paid to the funding of print and online media, including advertisement, sponsorship, crowdsourcing and crowdfunding.

The seminar was followed by a roundtable discussion with senior representatives of the Mejlis, key media and institutions involved in the process of media law reforms. The participants of the roundtable discussion exchanged views on the future direction of modernizing national media legislation and implementing media reforms.

VIENNA, 24 May 2019 – Innovative and strategic approaches to countering illicit production of synthetic drugs and promoting rehabilitation measures are the focus of this year’s annual OSCE-wide Conference on Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors, which will take place on 3 and 4 June at the Hofburg Conference Centre, Vienna.

Organized by the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship and the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department, the meeting will bring together experts from OSCE participating States, Partners for Co-operation, international organizations and civil society.

The conference aims at elaborating ways to tackle trafficking in synthetic drugs, including methamphetamines, new psychoactive substances and fentanyl.  It will support governments in implementing the 2012 OSCE Concept on Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors, as well as recommendations of the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session on the world drug problem.

The conference will be opened by Róbert Kirnág, Director of the Department of Political and Security Affairs, Task Force for Slovak 2019 OSCE Chairmanship; Yuri Fedotov, UNODC Executive Director; Stanislav Vassilenko, Kazakhstan’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Thomas Greminger, OSCE Secretary General. The full event agenda is available here (draft version).

Attendance requires advance online registration on the following website: https://polis.osce.org/events/oscedc2019 (direct web link is here). If you experience any problems in registering please contact anastasia.rybachenko@osce.org.

Media representatives are invited to cover the opening session from 10.30 to 11.00 on Monday, 3 June 2019, in the Neuer Saal of the Hofburg Conference Centre. For accreditation, please send an e-mail at press@osce.org by 09:00, Monday 3 June.

Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro held a two-day train-the-trainers workshop for parliamentary staff on communication and presentation skills, which concluded on 24 May 2019 in Podgorica. The event was organized in co-operation with the Department for Human Resources of the parliament.

The aim of the workshop was to strengthen the parliamentary services, which in turn improves the overall capacity of the parliament.

Mirko Mijanović of the parliament’s Department for Human Resources said that the training will contribute to establishing a sustainable system within parliament, whereby staff can transfer specific knowledge among each other.

The parliamentary services represent the institutional memory of the parliament and provide ongoing institutional support to the Members of Parliament. This training course serves as a tool for establishing a pool of trainers who can continue internal training and coaching of staff independently. The need for train-the-trainers workshop was identified on the basis of feedback from participants who took part in OSCE-supported training in previous years.

The Mission has organized train-the-trainers workshop for parliamentary staff on principles of managing change, developing vision statements and project goals, adult learning principles and modern tools to support changes in the working environment. It also worked with the parliamentary staff to address organizational issues and to develop a systematic approach to managing the constantly changing environment within the parliament.

OSLO, 24 May 2019 – Arctic countries need to maintain concerted efforts to safeguard the High North as an area of peaceful co-operation, while all OSCE countries must commit to the protection of the nature and biodiversity of the Arctic, a delegation of OSCE parliamentarians highlighted today in a visit to Oslo.

The PA delegation led by President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) included Vice-President Kari Henriksen (MP, Norway), Economic and Environmental Committee Chair Nilza de Sena (MP, Portugal), and Secretary General Roberto Montella. They met Friday with Storting President Tone Trøen, Minister for Climate and Environment Ola Elvestuen, and Foreign Affairs State Secretary Marianne Hagen.

The meetings in the Norwegian capital took place following a field visit to the Arctic region, where PA Members explored the local and global impact of climate change.

“The High North has long been synonymous with peaceful relations between Arctic countries, and it is in everyone’s interest to see these reinforced,” said President Tsereteli. “It is our duty as parliamentarians to leverage our influence in our national parliaments and the international arena to nurture these partnerships, and ensure continued stability in the Arctic region to overcome existential environmental challenges.”

Throughout the week, parliamentarians discussed challenges emerging from Arctic warming, including busier maritime traffic, increased demand for safety and assistance services, and the potential for oil and gas exploration and exploitation.

“With the Arctic Sea expected to become ice-free in the coming decades, we can expect new challenges and new sources of tension. With the possibility of offshore exploration, high risk traffic is also likely to expand in the coming years,” OSCE PA Vice-President Henriksen. “It is therefore vitally important to maintain a high-level of dialogue between our countries to prevent the Arctic from becoming an arena for international competition.”

In meetings, the PA delegation also emphasized the need for all OSCE countries to consider the global effect of polar ice melting and commit more decisively to the protection of the Arctic wildlife and ecosystem.

“Our field visit this week was crucial to reestablish the centrality of environmental issues on the OSCE agenda and reinforce the linkage between climate change and security,” said Nilza de Sena. “The climate crisis is endangering the Arctic ecosystem first, but this is a global challenge that requires global solutions. It is up to all our countries to reduce carbon emissions and decelerate the melting of the Arctic before it is too late.”

In order to support international co-operation and security dialogue in the High North, and alert OSCE parliamentarians to the threat of climate change, President Tsereteli appointed today Torill Eidsheim (MP, Norway) as Special Representative on Arctic Issues.

“Arctic issues are a matter of relevance for all OSCE countries. As a matter of fact, what happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic, but ripples throughout the globe,” said Eldsheim. “Changes that affect us all will inevitably occur; this is why it is crucial to increase our collaborative efforts to prepare for the future.”

Minister Ola Elvestuen, who had served previously as the OSCE PA’s Special Representative on Arctic Issues, welcomed the appointment, noting that the PA offers a unique forum to more closely involve parliamentarians in efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

Eidsheim is expected to report for the first time at the upcoming Luxembourg Annual Session (4-8 July 2019), held this year under the theme “Advancing Sustainable Development to Promote Security: The Role of Parliaments.”

Photos of the visit are available on Flickr.

TIRANA, 24 May 2019 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today formally opened an election observation mission for the 30 June local elections in Albania. The mission’s deployment follows an official invitation from the country’s authorities.

The mission is led by Ambassador Audrey Glover and consists of a core team of 13 election experts, based in Tirana, and 18 long-term observers to be deployed in teams of two across the country. In addition, ODIHR will request that OSCE participating States provide 250 short-term observers to monitor proceedings on election day.

The mission will observe the elections for their compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. Observers will closely monitor the voter registration process, campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant governmental bodies, election-related legislation and its implementation, and the resolution of election-related disputes. The mission will also monitor the media coverage of the campaign.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives of state authorities, of the election administration and political parties, as well as with individual candidates. It will also meet with representatives of civil society, the media and the international community.

On election day, observers will monitor the opening of voting centres, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results. For election day, the ODIHR election observation mission will join efforts with a delegation from the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities.

A statement of preliminary findings and conclusions will be issued on the day after the elections. A final report on the observation of the entire electoral process will be published approximately two months after the completion of the electoral process.

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission and the OSCE Presence in Albania operate separately under their respective mandates.

For further information please visit https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/417425 or contact Egor Tilpunov, Media Analyst of the EOM, on +355 68 9900045 or at yegor.tilpunov@odihr.al

Or

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson, on +48 609 522 266 (mobile) or at katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure and to allow for the transfer of a body across the contact line.
• The Mission observed for the first time anti-tank mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka.
• A man died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Novoazovsk, Kozatske and Oleksandrivske in Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 45 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), and at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 12 tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019);
• 11 tanks, seven self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 12 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk (see above); and
• 23 tanks and three surface-to-air missile systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). In the same training area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 72 armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[4] (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 April 2019).

Other weapons observed[5]

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and five pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

21 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an ACV and two armoured personnel carriers (Kozak-2) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).

22 May

The SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP variants) and eight ACVs near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

21 May

The SMM saw three anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) in Luhansk city.

Presence of mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka

On 21 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 120 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two parallel rows running north to south in a field with previously observed mines about 1.5km south-east of Pyshchevyk.

On 22 May, 3km south of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 50km north of Donetsk) and about 20m east of road T-0516, the SMM observed for the first time two square red mine hazard signs, as well as a square yellow sign with the words “Restricted (Closed) Area. No Entry” written in Ukrainian.

Man died of natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka

The SMM followed up on information from an officer of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine about a man (in his seventies) who had died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) on 22 May. A member of staff at a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the man’s body had been brought to the hospital’s morgue on the same day.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline near Zolote. It also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitated and monitored transfer of body from government-controlled areas to non-government-controlled areas

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the transfer of a body of a member of the armed formations from government-controlled to non-government-controlled area in Luhansk region.

People apply for Russian Federation passports in Luhansk region

In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM observed 32 people (mixed gender, 20-65 years old) standing outside a building. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that they had been standing in line to apply for “LPR” “passports”, “necessary for obtaining a passport of the Russian Federation”, and also that another 15 people (mixed gender, 30-65 years old), which the SMM observed near the same building, had been applying for Russian Federation passports.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 20 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Novoazovsk or east to the border with the Russian Federation.
• At a checkpoint east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing firing exercises at a nearby training range”.
• In Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage east towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure and to allow for the transfer of a body across the contact line.
• The Mission observed for the first time anti-tank mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka.
• A man died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Novoazovsk, Kozatske and Oleksandrivske in Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 45 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), and at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 12 tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019);
• 11 tanks, seven self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 12 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk (see above); and
• 23 tanks and three surface-to-air missile systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). In the same training area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 72 armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[4] (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 April 2019).

Other weapons observed[5]

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and five pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

21 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an ACV and two armoured personnel carriers (Kozak-2) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).

22 May

The SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP variants) and eight ACVs near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

21 May

The SMM saw three anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) in Luhansk city.

Presence of mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka

On 21 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 120 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two parallel rows running north to south in a field with previously observed mines about 1.5km south-east of Pyshchevyk.

On 22 May, 3km south of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 50km north of Donetsk) and about 20m east of road T-0516, the SMM observed for the first time two square red mine hazard signs, as well as a square yellow sign with the words “Restricted (Closed) Area. No Entry” written in Ukrainian.

Man died of natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka

The SMM followed up on information from an officer of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine about a man (in his seventies) who had died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) on 22 May. A member of staff at a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the man’s body had been brought to the hospital’s morgue on the same day.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline near Zolote. It also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitated and monitored transfer of body from government-controlled areas to non-government-controlled areas

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the transfer of a body of a member of the armed formations from government-controlled to non-government-controlled area in Luhansk region.

People apply for Russian Federation passports in Luhansk region

In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM observed 32 people (mixed gender, 20-65 years old) standing outside a building. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that they had been standing in line to apply for “LPR” “passports”, “necessary for obtaining a passport of the Russian Federation”, and also that another 15 people (mixed gender, 30-65 years old), which the SMM observed near the same building, had been applying for Russian Federation passports.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 20 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Novoazovsk or east to the border with the Russian Federation.
• At a checkpoint east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing firing exercises at a nearby training range”.
• In Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage east towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

420644 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Gender, Diversity and Justice: Overview and Recommendations

Promoting change in policies, attitudes and training curricula to achieve higher representation of women and members of minorities in justice sector institutions was the focus of an event in Vienna on 23 May 2019, during which the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) launched its paper Gender, diversity and justice.

The event took place on the margins of the 28th session of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. The discussion highlighted that, while States and authorities keep making commitments on gender equality and non-discrimination, women and minorities are still under-represented in legal professions. Even in countries where women judges are strong in numbers, barriers to workplace equality and career advancement prevail. Women are still a small minority in functions such as court presidents or judges of supreme or constitutional courts. In prosecution services, too, women are under-represented and rarely rise to senior positions.

“Raising this topic is not due to a fixation on numbers, but to emphasize that the under-representation of certain groups among judges and prosecutors has a negative impact on access to justice,” said Meaghan Fitzgerald, Deputy Head of the ODIHR Democratization Department. “We hope that this work will support participating States in building justice systems which are more inclusive.”

A needs assessment study conducted by ODIHR shows that society has greater trust in justice systems where the justice sector workforce is visibly more diverse. Diversity also makes judges and prosecutors more sensitive to different considerations for different groups, allowing them to overcome their implicit biases and unconscious stereotyping.

“The work of the International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ) is the embodiment of the ODIHR study. Our members know first-hand the unique insights they bring to adjudicating cases, especially those involving discrimination and violence against specific groups within society,” said Shawna Wilson, Executive Director of the IAWJ, who presented the work of the association, stressing the positive role that national associations of women judges can play.

ODIHR and the IAWJ used the gathering to discuss their future co-operation to support women judges, both to achieve gender parity in justice systems and to promote gender-sensitive decision-making.

ODIHR organized the side event in co-operation with the Permanent Mission of Norway to the International Organizations in Vienna and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its role as the secretariat of the Global Judicial Integrity Network.

420617 Communication and Media Relations Section

The democratic control of armed and security forces in the context of the eastern Mediterranean region was the focus of a seminar organized by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and Cyprus from 20 to 24 May 2019 in Larnaca. The discussion brought together more than 60 participants from OSCE participating States and the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation. The participants included senior officers from the armed forces, senior government officials, and representatives of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, academia and civil society.

As well as the democratic control of the armed and security forces, participants explored parliamentary oversight and respect for international humanitarian and human rights law for armed forces personnel, and regional security challenges.

Participants also shared experiences and best practices in applying the inter- and intra-state level commitments and principles enshrined in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, a landmark document adopted in 1994 detailing the governance of the security sector and the role of armed and security forces in democratic societies.

“Cyprus has decisively embarked on implementing its vision of creating a web of co-operation in the Eastern Mediterranean transforming the region into a model of prosperity, stability, and peace,” said Nikos Christodoulides, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, as he opened the event.

Ambassador Idibek Kalandar, Chairperson of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and Permanent Representative of Tajikistan to the OSCE, said: “We are convinced that the rebuilding of the spirit of comprehensiveness, transparency and co-operation among all participating States is crucial for our common future in the West and in the East.”

Marcel Peško, Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, recalled that “the Code of Conduct is a visionary document. This seminar creates an opportunity to engage in forward-looking dialogue and to build trust in the OSCE region including with the Partners for Co-operation”.

The Code of Conduct contains key principles and commitments for the 57 OSCE participating States related to security relations between States and to the control of all armed and security forces within a State.

The seminar was held in line with an FSC decision according to which the OSCE Secretariat is requested to organize at least one specialized seminar or workshop annually in order to facilitate better implementation and promote awareness of the Code of Conduct and support outreach in its regard. 

The seminar was co-hosted by the OSCE and Cyprus, with donor support provided by Germany, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic.

SARAJEVO, 23 May 2019 – A two-day training course on the role of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the context of regional and international security, which gathered some 40 participants from seven countries of South-Eastern Europe started today in Sarajevo. The training course is jointly organized by the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the OSCE Transnational Threats Department and the OSCE Mission to BiH.

Over the course of two days, security experts will explore ways in which international cyber/ICT policy tools can be used to mitigate the impact of major cyber incidents and improve the resilience of national ICT systems. It will also be an opportunity to exchange information and experience in the application of practical measures for enhancing regional cyber/ICT security.

A particular focus will be placed on the role of the OSCE cyber/ICT confidence-building measures (CBMs), which were jointly agreed upon and adopted by the OSCE participating States to improve security in cyberspace and prevent unnecessary inter-state tensions stemming from the use of ICTs. These CBMs offer concrete tools and mechanisms to reduce the risks of misperceptions, misunderstandings and conflict stemming from the use of ICTs in inter-state relations.

“In a digitalizing world, a potent cyber-attack could cripple an entire country more rapidly and systemically than any other threat,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH, Ambassador Bruce G. Berton. “It is a threat that requires our greater engagement, creative new solutions and, most importantly, improved co-ordination. Developing countries such as BiH are distinctly vulnerable to consequences of cyber-attacks due to the fragility of critical infrastructure, nascent economies, insufficiently aware citizens and users, and institutional inability for an effective response.” 

The OSCE Cyber Security Officer, Szilvia Toth, also underlined the need for international co-operation on cyber/ICT security, stating that “we must also recognize that risks stemming from cyberspace are global - every State is only as secure as its neighbour, and every region is only as secure as other regions.”

The training course in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fifth such regional training course organized across the OSCE area, with the aim of enhancing capacities and building confidence in cyberspace, while taking into account unique regional circumstances, best practices and approaches to cyber/ICT security.

TIRANA, 23 May 2019 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission deployed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 30 June local elections in Albania, the mission will hold a press conference in Tirana on Friday, 24 May.

Ambassador Audrey Glover, the Head of the ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities. The press conference will also provide an opportunity for questions from journalists.

The ODIHR election observation mission will partner with a delegation from the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities for observation and the release of a preliminary statement of findings and conclusions on the day after the elections.

The mission's deployment follows an invitation from the Albanian government.

The ODIHR election observation mission and the OSCE Presence in Albania operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 12:00, Friday, 24 May, in the Antigonea 1 Room of the Rogner Hotel, Bulevardi “Dëshmorët e Kombit” 9, Tirana. 

For further information, please contact Egor Tilpunov, Media Analyst of the Election Observation Mission, on ++355 68 9900045 (mobile) or at yegor.tilpunov@odihr.al.

or

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson, on +48 725 880 257 (mobile) or at katya.andrusz@odihr.pl.

LONGYEARBYEN, 23 May 2019 – The concrete impact of global warming and the changing nature of the Arctic region are the focus of an OSCE PA visit hosted by the Norwegian parliament this week. In Svalbard, one of the world’s northernmost inhabited areas, OSCE parliamentarians explored new local realities in the High North and considered how climate change poses security risks for the entire OSCE region.

The PA delegation included President George Tsereteli (Georgia), Second Committee Chair Nilza de Sena (Portugal) and Rapporteur Elona Gjebrea Hoxha (Albania), and Secretary General Roberto Montella (Italy). It was joined north of the Arctic Circle by the Delegation of Norway to the OSCE PA.

In a series of seminars and field visits in Tromsø and Svalbard, Members were sensitized to the severe disruptions to the Arctic environment caused by a rise of temperatures in the region.

“The Arctic is warming up twice as fast any other region in the world, and in just one generation we have been able to note critical alterations to the local fauna and flora. Here in Svalbard, we can clearly observe how Arctic livelihoods are being impacted,” said Norwegian Head of Delegation Siv Mossleth.

OSCE parliamentarians also discussed ways to mitigate and adapt to climate change in the High North with local authorities.

“This visit is important for us to better understand the concerns emerging from Norway and other Arctic countries, and we can find inspiration in their close co-operation to promote sustainable development and protect biodiversity,” said President George Tsereteli. “As a forum of 57 countries covering the Northern Hemisphere, the OSCE PA is ideally suited to encourage discussions on these new threats and to promote a deeper involvement of parliamentarians in the fight against climate change.”

The visit illustrated the importance of monitoring variations in the Arctic ecosystem, and of understanding the ripple effect of changes in the Arctic climate.

“The Svalbard archipelago is one of the most sensitive areas to global warming, and the tangible impact on the Arctic environment and ecosystem we witness here causes disruptions at a larger scale in the rest of the world,” said the Chair of the OSCE PA’s economic and environmental committee, Nilza de Sena. “While few live in the Arctic region, the risks associated with climate-related disasters have become a reality for more and more people on the globe. This compels us to act with urgency to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change.”

Throughout the visit, participants were briefed on Arctic exploration, satellite observation, and other environmental research efforts undertaken to understand climate change and its impact on the Arctic region. Experts and scientists underlined the urgency to curb global greenhouse gas emissions in order to limit the effects of climate change.

“Even if drastic measures are taken, it will still take time for the climate to stabilize. But real action is necessary to prevent a complete shift,” said Second Committee Rapporteur Elona Gjebrea Hoxha. “It is therefore crucial to increase the awareness of parliamentarians all across the OSCE region and respond to this challenge before it is too late.”

The visit will inform debates of the OSCE PA’s General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment at the upcoming Luxembourg Annual Session (4-8 July 2019). The PA’s flagship event will be held this year under the theme “Advancing Sustainable Development to Promote Security: The Role of Parliaments.”

“It is important to closely engage parliamentarians to address the effects of climate change,” said Secretary General Roberto Montella. “I expect the discussions we have had this week will reinforce the Parliamentary Assembly’s engagement on Arctic issues, and we stand ready to support greater international co-operation and dialogue to respond to security, economic and environmental concerns in the High North and beyond.”

The visit continues tomorrow in Oslo, where President Tsereteli and his delegation will hold talks with Storting President Tone Trøen, Minister for Climate and Environment Ola Elvestuen, and Foreign Affairs State Secretary Marianne Hagen.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

On 21 and 22 May 2019, representatives of national human rights institutes and ombudspersons from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia and Azerbaijan as well as experts from international organizations and civil society gathered to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Ombudsperson Office in Dushanbe.

The two-day conference was organized by the Office of the Ombudsperson in Tajikistan and supported jointly by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and other international partners.

Ambassador Valeriu Chiveri, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, in his opening remarks highlighted the importance the OSCE gives to the work of ombudspersons across the region and the OSCE’s long-standing co-operation with their Offices. He said: “The OSCE stands ready to support the work of the Office of the Ombudsperson in Tajikistan in the future. We appreciate the constructive co-operation between the Office of the Ombudsperson and civil society here in Tajikistan and are keen to continue supporting the human rights-based dialogue between government institutions, the Office of the Ombudsperson and civil society as a pillar for stability and progress towards human rights protection.”

During the conference, achievements and prospects of the work of ombudspersons in Central Asia were discussed. Recognizing the challenges which still exist, the participants agreed to work closer together and to exchange experiences to improve the work of ombudspersons and national human rights institutes as well as the protection of human rights.