OSCE

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Peredove.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and observed military hardware inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• It observed electronic jamming systems in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka.
• The SMM saw for the first time mines and unexploded ordnance near government-controlled Marinka and Krymske and near non-government-controlled Kruta Balka, Ilovaisk, Hirne and Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Zaichenko and government-controlled Peredove, as well as near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, areas close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 145 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), in areas south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas west and south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (ten) compared with the previous 24 hours (about 35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

While conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight in areas north-east of Peredove (government-controlled, 68km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard four single shots of small-arms fire about 1.5km south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM recovered the UAV safely.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 17 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day of 18 March, positioned at various locations north and south of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions and 67 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 18 March, positioned near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 60 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south. A few minutes later, the SMM observed a grey, boomerang-shaped UAV (with a wing-span of about 40cm) flying at a height of about 60m in a northerly direction towards the Zolote disengagement area. A member of the armed formations present in the area told the SMM that the small-arms fire (see above) had been directed at the UAV.

On 17 March, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) inside the disengagement area near Zolote, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, on road T-1316, about 900m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge. On the same day, the same UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm), assessed as belonging to the armed formations, and at least 20 ammunition crates inside the disengagement area, about 100m north of its southern edge and about 800m west of its eastern edge.

During the day of 18 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), as well as an undetermined explosion and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire 1km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

16 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

14 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 14 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and

• an anti-tank gun (MT-12) near Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk).

17 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted six tanks (probable T-64) and a probable self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

14 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 11 tanks (T-64), including one with its barrel missing, in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 25 tanks (T-64), including one with its barrel missing, nine towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

11 March

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

16 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk);
• three ACVs near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (a BMP variant and a BMP-1) near Verkhnotoretske and
• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) and several dozen ammunition crates nearby near Myrne (63km south of Donetsk).

17 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

18 March

The SMM saw:

-    an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);

• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM variant) near Muratove; and
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk)

Non-government-controlled areas

14 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 12 ACVs in a training area north of Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

16 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an automatic jamming system (R-330Zh, Zhitel) on a KamAZ-4310 and a radio-electronic jamming complex (Tirada-2) near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (60km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an 8m trench extension (not seen in imagery from 29 November 2018) and an automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17/30 Plamya, 30mm) in fighting position, as well as about five ammunition crates, near Vasylivka (20km north of Donetsk).

17 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1) in Luhansk city.

Presence of mines and unexploded ordnance

On 15 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time eight anti-tank mines laid in a single row across a road next to a trench, as well as an anti-tank mine (probable TM-62M) 100m south-east of the aforementioned mines, also on a road next to a trench, all on the northern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). It also again spotted 33 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62M) laid in two rows across the same road. About 150m further north-east, the same UAV spotted for the first time 12 probable anti-tank mines laid in two rows in close proximity to a gas pipeline in an overgrown field.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 90 anti-tank mines laid in three rows across 120m in a field, 300m west of civilian houses on the western outskirt of Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15m south-west of the city centre). 

On 16 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across a road about 200m from civilian houses on the northern outskirts of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 18 November 2018).

On 17 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least 50 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid in two partially completed rows running north to south for approximately 200m near Ukrainian Armed Forces positions, south-west of Krymske (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk).

On 18 March, in Ilovaisk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw for the first time two metal objects assessed as probable projectiles from a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS, Grad-type, 122mm) protruding from the road surface near 57 and 85 Shevchenka Street, about 70m from the nearest building. At 171 Shevchenka Street, the Mission again saw a previously observed unexploded ordnance.

The SMM saw that fields south of Hirne (non-government-controlled, 56km east of Donetsk), where it had previously observed demining activity, were cultivated.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the water supply network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

Border areas outside government control

Positioned at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a car (with Ukrainian licence plates) and two trucks (with Belarusian licence plates) entering Ukraine, and four trucks (all with “LPR” plates) and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine. After five minutes a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Positioned at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw no cross-border traffic. After five minutes a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:[4]

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area and not to approach the border crossing point closer than 200m.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk) a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations requested that the SMM share their planned route before proceeding. The SMM refused and was only allowed to pass through the checkpoint after 40 minutes.

Other impediments:

• The SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire while flying a mini-UAV near Peredove (government-controlled, 68km south-west of Donetsk), assessed as aimed at the UAV (see above).
• On 17 March, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying along the contact line in the south of Donetsk region.[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

[4] The sentence on a denial of access to a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region in SMM Daily Report 16 March 2019 should have read: A member of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a compound in Luhansk city, citing “security” reasons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

VIENNA, 19 March 2019 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today said that new laws introduced in Russia impose excessive restrictions on speech and information on the Internet, and could further limit media freedom in the country.

A set of laws on “disrespect” to the state and the spread of “fake news” passed by the Federal Assembly were yesterday enacted into law by President Vladimir Putin.

According to the first law, the dissemination of deliberately untrue information through the media or online can result in fines of up to 1.5 million roubles (approximately 20,500 euros) and the blocking of the information resource if it does not “immediately” delete this information at the request of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor).

The second law imposes a penalty of up to 300,000 roubles (approximately 4,100 euros) or up to 15 days’ detention for the online dissemination, in an insulting way, of expression that disrespects society, the state, official symbols, the Constitution, and public bodies.

“These laws allow for broader restrictions and the censorship of online journalism and online speech. The definitions of allegedly offensive content are vaguely worded and will impact freedom of expression,” said Désir. “Once again I express to the authorities of the Russian Federation my concerns over the adoption of laws that grant additional powers to government regulatory bodies to restrict online speech.”

The Representative has previously expressed concern about the draft laws in a statement (see: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/406775)

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 8,661 to 9,601 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 103 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 19 this week compared to 21 last week: eight of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and eleven into Ukraine (84 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, eight families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and nine into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (336 compared to 330 observed during the previous week). There were 175 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 161 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: “Stakhanov–Kyiv”, “Rovenky–Kyiv” and “Kyiv”.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a significant increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 611 to 707 (271 at the Gukovo BCP and 436 at the Donetsk BCP); 382 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 325 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 57 (compared to 45 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 247 to 205: of the total number of trucks scanned, 132 trucks (64 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 73 trucks (36 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from124 to 155 vehicles; 70 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 85 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 17 occasions, compared to 21 last week; the OTs assessed that fourteen trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and three to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

On 14 March at 18:55, a minivan with white on black licence plates, with the inscription “Police” and with blue flashing lights, arrived at Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation and drove behind the main building.  At 19:10, the van returned towards the Russian Federation. Because of the van’s curtains, the OT was unable to see the number of persons inside the minivan or notice any other details.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 12 February to 19 March 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

Banja Luka, 19 March 2019 - On the occasion of World Social Work Day, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the Association of Social Workers of Republika Srpska supported the Union of Social Work Students and the Faculty of Political Sciences of the Banja Luka University in holding an event today in Banja Luka entitled “Promoting the importance of human relationships”.

The Head of the OSCE Field Office in Banja Luka, Dmitry Iordanidi, emphasized the important role of social workers in the community. “Bosnia and Herzegovina is in need of qualified social workers and a social protection system that ensures social stability by providing the most vulnerable members of the society with access to the services necessary for the attainment of adequate standards of living,” he said.

The event, which gathered 200 participants, focused on the role of social workers, with a special emphasis on their needs and challenges, on methods of assistance, supervision and sharing of best practices. The event also included the announcement of a special report of the Institution of the Human Rights Ombudsman of BiH.

“For our citizens to get the best quality service, it is important that we invest in human resources, in those employed in social protection institutions and the non-governmental sector active in providing social welfare. Furthermore, it is important to provide them with a better and high-quality education,” said Sandra Dobrijević Šipka, Vice President of the Republika Srpska Association of Social Workers.

Whereas in previous years the focus was on external causes for the low status accorded to social workers, attention was given this year to their self-representation and the elimination of their degradation in the BiH society, Tamara Gaćanović, the Chairperson of the Union of Social Work Students, said.

“A major challenge social workers face is suffering burnout and exhaustion due to the issues they face on a daily basis, such as fighting for the lives of their beneficiaries,” said Gaćanović.

The OSCE Mission to BiH works continuously to enhance the capacity of social protection professionals to improve the reach and effectiveness of their services and advocate for needed policy changes.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 15 and 16 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 16 and 17 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed fresh damage caused by gunfire to  residential buildings in Yasynuvata and Sakhanka.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. It saw military personnel inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in non-government-controlled Zaichenko and near Izvaryne, close to the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a public gathering organized by National Corps.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 15 and 16 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 160 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) (including four explosions assessed as impacts 200-500m from the SMM camera) and at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 16 and 17 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (about 50), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk, at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk and in areas east-north-east of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 15 and 16 March, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded west-south-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk) and inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Between the evenings of 16 and 17 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and in areas near the Zolote disengagement area.

Damage to residential buildings in Yasynuvata and Sakhanka

At 22 Hoholia Street in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) on 16 March, the SMM saw a fresh impact on a west-north-west facing wall of a ground floor apartment in a residential building, as well as shrapnel damage, all assessed as caused by a 7.62mm bullet. Two residents in the building (man, 30-40 years old and woman, 60-70 years old) separately told the SMM that they had heard shooting at about 22:00 on 14 March.    

On 17 March, at 2b Konstytutsii Street in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a 2-3cm hole in the west-facing door and a 5cm hole in the west-facing door frame of the house, assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel. The SMM was not able to determine the type of weapon or calibre. A resident of the house, a woman (50-60 years old), told the SMM that she had heard small-arms fire during the night of 16-17 March and a loud explosion at about 09:00 on 17 March.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 15 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded ten projectiles in flight from north to south at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the morning of 16 March, positioned on the southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km west-north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same morning, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and 18 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, at an assessed range of 2-5km south-south-east and south (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion and two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.8km-1km south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).  

During the day on 17 March, positioned at two different locations in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 40 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) as well as about 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and an undetermined explosion (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 16 March, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots (two of small-arms fire and two assessed as rounds of 30mm cannon) at an assessed range of 2.5-5km south-south-west and south-west (assessed as inside the Petrivske disengagement area), and 16 shots (eight of small-arms fire and eight assessed as rounds of 30mm cannon) at an assessed range of 1-4km south, south-south-west and west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3] On the same day, the SMM also observed at least six Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in positions inside the Petrivske disengagement area, in an area about 600m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and about 2.5km east of its western edge.

On the evening of 15 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard one shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 16 and 17 March, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and on 17 March near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

16 March

The SMM saw

• six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a compound in Rivnopil (65km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

15 March

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted three tanks (T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

16 March

The SMM again saw eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

16 March

The SMM saw:

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near the railway station in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk) and
• 14 MLRS (BM-21) loaded on flatbed wagons and 14 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

15 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three probable armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) near Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk).

16 March

The SMM saw two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Valuiske (20km north-east of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

15 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk)
• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP-1) near Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk); and
• four IFVs (BMP variant) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Lobacheve.

Presence of mines and new mine hazard signs

On 15 March, the SMM saw for the first time three mine hazard signs, red with “Mine” written in Cyrillic in yellow letters, 3m outside of a compound of the armed formations in the north-western outskirts of Luhansk city. On 17 March, the SMM saw for the first time a rectangular yellow mine hazard sign with “Danger Mines” in white letters in Russian and Ukrainian on the south side of road T-0512 near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk). Behind the sign, the SMM saw at least seven fresh craters assessed as caused by rounds of 82mm mortars.

On 17 March, the SMM again observed six anti-tank mines (TM-62) fixed on a wooden plank on the southern side of road T-0504, about 60m east of the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

On the same day, the SMM noted that a previously observed piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the middle of an asphalted road near Orlivske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) was no longer present. (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 16 March 2019).

SMM facilitation of operation of civilian infrastructure

On 16 and 17 March, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints

At the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw no pedestrians or vehicles present. A member of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine told the SMM that the checkpoint was closed all day as some office containers were removed or replaced, adding that it would re-open on 18 March.

Border areas outside government control

On 16 March, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 28 cars (13 with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, one with Latvian and one with Georgian licence plates, and seven with “LPR” plates) and 15 covered cargo trucks (ten with Ukrainian licence plates, four with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates) and six pedestrians (four men and two women, 25-55 years old) queuing to exit Ukraine. After seven minutes a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes, the SMM saw 14 pedestrians (nine men and five women, 25-55 years old) entering Ukraine and a man (30-45 years old) exiting Ukraine.

On 17 March, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians (three men and a woman, 30-60 years old) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw two cars with Ukrainian licence plates, two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and one half-full bus with Russian Federation licence plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 49 cars (two with Ukrainian, 21 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates and 25 with “DPR” plates), 40 covered cargo trucks (31 with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates) and one full bus with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.

Gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv, on 16 March, the SMM monitored a public gathering by National Corps at Independence Square. The Mission saw about 3,000-3,500 people (70 per cent men and 30 per cent women, 14-70 years old), some of whom were expressing opposition to the government and alleged corruption amongst officials. The SMM saw about 100 law enforcement officers present on Independence Square. The protestors marched from the square to the building of the Presidential Administration at 11 Bankova Street where the SMM observed 200 National Guard officers present. The SMM saw an additional 60 National Guard officers and about 200 police officers in front of the National Bank at 11 Instytutska Street, in the area between the bank and the building of the Presidential Administration. The SMM saw protestors throwing soft toys at the National Guard officers outside the Presidential Administration building. No further incidents were observed.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 16 March, an armed member of the armed formations at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “ongoing shelling” in the area.
• On 16 March, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing instructions to restrict the Mission’s access.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 16 and 17 March, at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations refused the SMM passage, demanding the SMM share their planned route before proceeding. On both occasions the SMM refused and were allowed to pass through the checkpoint after about 45 minutes and 20 minutes respectively.
• On 17 March, at a checkpoint in Heivka (government-controlled, 27km north-west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier refused to allow the SMM to pass, requesting a “password”. After about 20 minutes, the SMM was allowed to proceed through the checkpoint.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational. Between the evenings of 15 and 16 March, foggy weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of most SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

VIENNA, 18 March 2019 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern regarding the incident that took place last Saturday in the building of the national public service broadcaster RTS.

“Debate on the pluralism and independence of public service broadcasters is a necessity. The role of the public service broadcasters in providing quality and objective information to all citizens with no political interference is indispensable in democratic processes,” Désir said. “But, I am concerned about the forcible entry into the building of the public service broadcaster in Serbia. Disagreement with editorial policy should not be addressed through intimidation and pressures against journalists,” said the Representative. 

On 16 March, a group of people entered the RTS premises, demanding more objective reporting on the current political situation in the country. The Representative also noted that the entrance to the building of RTV Kraljevo was temporarily blocked last night by the group of protestors

Désir urged all sides to act with restraint without violence and to open an inclusive debate on the future of the public service broadcaster. “RTS is an important part of new media reform efforts and all stakeholders must be involved in this important process,” Désir said. 

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

Situation analysis at the borders, decision-making processes and implementation of operational plans were the main topics of a three-day training course organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, which was finalized with a graduation ceremony on 15 March 2019 in Dushanbe.

The training was conducted by experienced trainers from the Russian Border Advisory Group.

The course, attended by 25 Tajik border officials, including two female participants, helped to enhance their knowledge on risk analysis, operational planning, evaluation of relevant factors affecting the protection of state borders, as well as the use of technical means in the protection of state borders.

“The Office is helping to build the capacity of Tajik border officials by providing high-quality training courses in a number of key areas,” said Vyacheslav Abramets, Border Management Officer of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe. “The advanced courses, such as operational planning training with the involvement of experienced national and international experts will strengthen the capacity of Tajik Border Troops Officers and the OSCE will continue such efforts in the future."

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.

The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.

The SMM continued to observe hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted at a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and at a checkpoint near Novolaspa.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (72 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol); at southerly and easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), in areas close to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk); and at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), south-west of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

In the early morning hours of 15 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the night of 14-15 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight, at an assessed range of 1-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 15 March, positioned in Zolote and on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and three shots of small-arms fire near the disengagement area.

Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

15 March

The SMM saw:

a tank (T-64) on a flatbed trailer near Polkove (38km north of Mariupol), and

three tanks (T-72) on flatbed trailers near Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

15 March

The SMM saw a tank (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

15 March

The SMM noted that:

four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present and

12 anti-tank guns (D48, 85mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S3, Akatsyia, 152mm) and 113 towed howitzers (45 D-20, 152mm; 56 2A36, Giatsint-B, 152mm; and 12 2A65 MSTA-B 152mm) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

15 March

The SMM noted that 14 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

14 March

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-2 and a BMP variant), five armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR variant) close to residential houses near Troitske, and

two IFVs (BMP-1) near Novoselivka (66km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two APCs (a BTR-60 and a Saxon) near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk).

15 March

The SMM saw:

an APC (Saxon) in Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk),

an IFV (BMP-2) in the western outskirts of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)

an IFV (BMP-2) on a flatbed trailer in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk),

an APC (BTR-80) near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), and

an APC (BTR-70) at a checkpoint near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

On 14 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an electronic warfare system (P-15 1RL13 Flat Face-A) at an airfield near Rozivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

Presence of unexploded ordnance

The SMM saw for the first time four unmarked pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as  multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rounds, imbedded in asphalted roads in populated areas north-west and north-east of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre): the first located approximately 2km north-west of the railway station, approximately 35m from the nearest residential building and 20m from a bus stop; the second about 70m further west; the third about 900m north-east of the railway station and about 60m from the nearest building; and the fourth about 400m further north-east and 10m away from the nearest building.

About 2km north-east of Orlivske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time an explosive remnant of war imbedded in the centre of an asphalted road often used by local residents and the SMM.

About 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that two previously observed pieces of UXO, assessed as 152mm artillery rounds, were no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 15 March 2019). At the same checkpoint, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that the armed formations had removed the UXO on 15 March.

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At 12:00, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a member of the armed formations punching a civilian (male, 40 years old) three times, and then kicking him once while he was down on the ground. After the member of the armed formations walked away from him, two first aiders attended to him and helped him sit on a bench in the nearby shelter.

At the same time, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw around 500 people queuing to exit and around 800 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a deteriorated water supply network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk); power lines in Novozvanivka (government-controlled, 70km west of Luhansk) and in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM also facilitated repairs at the pumping station near Vasylivka, on which about 1.2 million residents rely for their access to water, and to a power line in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and was informed that the repairs at both locations had been concluded. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

A member of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region, citing “security” reasons.

At a checkpoint near Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing “ongoing special operations in the village”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge.

Delay:

At a checkpoint near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers refused to allow the SMM to access the village, citing orders from their commander. The SMM informed the JCCC. After about 30 minutes, they granted the SMM access.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that five such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

BRUSSELS, GENEVA, VIENNA, 15 March 2019 - The Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions welcome the reopening of crossing points on 15 March. However, they also reiterate their conviction that the closure was not justified. They have made this position clear through continuous engagement since the first day of the closure on 12 January, at the Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting on 8 February and during their meetings in Tskhinvali on 12 March. 

The Co-Chairs have taken note of the public health concerns voiced and, for this reason, have referred to the World Health Organization (WHO), which is the competent international body on such issues. The WHO’s position is that closing crossing points offers no public health benefits. Therefore, the Co-Chairs have on numerous occasions restated their firm view that freedom of movement as a basic human right should always be upheld. They have stressed in particular the impact of the closure on people’s lives and have expressed the hope that in any future similar situation both the IPRM and the hotline would be fully used in order to avoid imposing undue hardship on the population.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw damage to a house in Zaitseve.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, including to the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted in non-government-controlled Shymshynivka and at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 72 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including all explosions, were recorded in areas south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 180), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at westerly and south-easterly directions of Shymshynivka (non-government-controlled, 27km south-west of Luhansk) and at southerly and north-westerly directions of Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk) (all ceasefire violations in these areas were assessed as live-fire exercises outside the security zone).

Damaged house in Zaitseve

On 13 March, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted damage to the roof of a house in the southern part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) assessed as caused by the impact of a mortar round. The Mission could not determine whether the damage was fresh.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 13-14 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion and two projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 1-4km north-east and east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled-areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (type undetermined) in Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled-areas

13 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) east of Vedenske (35km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five tanks (T-64) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled-areas

14 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted six towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• ten tanks (T-72) at a railway station in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Paraskoviivka (75km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 26 tanks (19 T-72 and seven T-64) and a recently built compound (not visible in imagery from 7 November 2018), in which one of the afore-mentioned tanks, other military-type hardware and about 20 deep unoccupied vehicle revetments were observed,[4] in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 March 2019).

14 March

The SMM saw five tanks (T-72) in firing positions in a training area near Myrne (see ceasefire violations section above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

14 March

The SMM noted that:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were present and
• 35 MLRS (BM-21) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

14 March

The SMM noted the presence of all weapons observed previously.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1), an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Pisky.

13 March

The SMM saw two military tents and six Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers near a functional school in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

14 March

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-80) in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 400m-long trench (not visible in imagery from 27 October 2018) about 3km east of Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three IFVs (BMP-1) and two ACVs in the afore-mentioned training area near Novoselivka (see above) and
• seven IFVs (five BMP-1 and two BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 13 March, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 350 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

On 14 March, about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM again saw two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as 152mm artillery rounds, lying 4m north of a local road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Novoluhanske and near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (both reportedly damaged in shelling); power transformers in Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol); a deteriorated pipeline at the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk); a deteriorated water supply network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk); and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (four with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates) and three women entering Ukraine, as well as 12 cars (two with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates; the SMM could not observe the licence plates of six cars), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates and four men exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the Mission saw a woman and a man exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 15 cars (four with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. While present the Mission also saw 15 cars (three with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine. The SMM again noted an unusually long line of cars, trucks and buses waiting to exit Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• In Shymshynivka (non-government-controlled, 27km south-west of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations denied the Mission access to the south-western part of the settlement. During its presence, the SMM heard ceasefire violations in the area (see above and the ceasefire violation table).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The other military-type hardware and revetments mentioned in this sentence are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Ivana Milatovic, OSCE Mission to Serbia

The OSCE Mission to Serbia handed over IT equipment to the Interior Ministry’s Anti-corruption Department on the occasion of its first anniversary, on 15 March 2019. The donation will contribute to enhancing the technical capacity of the department to conduct efficient and effective investigations of economic crime and corruption.

“The Ministry can be very proud of the level of professionalism and competence of its staff working in the Anti-corruption Department. The IT equipment that we donated today will ensure that this relatively new department is also technically equipped to fulfil its important tasks across Serbia,” said Andrea Orizio, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia. “Systemic changes that the Ministry has introduced in the area of the fight against corruption are the best demonstration of ownership of key reform processes in the country.”

This initiative is part of an OSCE project that aims to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of the Interior’s Criminal Investigations Directorate specifically its Anti-corruption Department, to conduct complex financial investigations, examine fraud and investigate money laundering cases and other forms of serious crime, thereby contributing to the prevention of financial crimes.

This project is being implemented by the OSCE Mission to Serbia with the financial support of the Government of Norway, which has funded a series of specialized courses on various aspects of investigating economic crime and corruption, and with support of the Government of Italy, which funded the IT equipment donated to the Anti-corruption Department.   

The OSCE Mission to Serbia has been working in partnership with the Serbian Ministry of Interior on enhancing police capacities to effectively prevent and combat corruption since 2013.

414221 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

A series of three one-day training seminars and a public discussion on the legislative mechanisms regulating the police’s work in combating domestic violence concluded on 15 March 2019 in Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl Region.

The events were organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) of Kazakhstan and the crisis centre Podrugi (Girlfriends) with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana.

During the series, a total of some 150 community police officers discussed best practices in preventing and addressing domestic violence with the guidance of two national experts. Participants discussed the best way to help victims and protect their rights while engaging civil society as a resource for providing support to victims.

The seminars aim at building the capacity of police inspectors who respond to calls on possible domestic violence cases. They are part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to assist the host country and civil society representatives in preventing and combating domestic violence and in offering professional social services to victims.

414302 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported meeting of the Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas (Intergovernmental Commission) took place on 14 March 2019 in Taraz, Kazakhstan.

Some 50 representatives and experts from governmental entities, hydro-meteorological centres and international organizations from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan discussed water withdrawal limits, the maintenance of hydro-technical facilities and co-operation prospects aimed at sustainable sharing of water resources in the transboundary river basin.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Kazakhstan’s Agriculture Ministry and the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Commission and aimed to involve broad public participation into the management of water resources in the Chu and Talas River basins.

The Chu and Talas rivers represent crucial sources of water for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan utilized for agriculture, fish farming, hydroelectric power and domestic needs.  An agreement between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan regulating the operation of water facilities on the transboundary Chu and Talas rivers was signed in 2000. Both countries agreed to share costs for the facilities on a pro rata basis in accordance with the water volume received by each country. The joint Intergovernmental Commission, which was established in 2006 and meets twice a year, aims to discuss the ongoing water-sharing schedule and operation of hydro-technical facilities in line with the 2000 Agreement.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to support transboundary dialogue by involving the representatives of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  It is in line with the decision of the Maastricht’s Ministerial Council on the OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension that underlines the importance of water diplomacy in the regional context.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near Novoselivka, Shyroka Balka, as well as in an area between Marinka and Oleksandrivka. 
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted in Verkhnoshyrokivske and at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas north, south-south-west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, however more explosions (110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-north-west of Kirovsk (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 12-13 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-5km in directions ranging from east-north-east to east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same camera recorded six projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).   

During the day on 13 March, positioned in three locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 75 ceasefire violations assessed as near the disengagement area. Positioned south of Zolote-5/Mykhailivika (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) on the same day, the SMM also heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 45 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Damage to roof and an impact crater near Novoluhanske

On 12 March, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted damage to the roof of a building, assessed as caused by artillery or mortar impacts, in the north-western part of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Luhansk). The same UAV also spotted a crater next to a power pylon 200m north of the aforementioned building, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round (all observations not seen in imagery from 16 February 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), a probable anti-tank gun (MT-12) and two mortars (probable120mm) in a field near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk), as well as at least 40 ammunition crates next to the mortar.

13 March

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) on a road near Vedenske (33km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 19 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13. March

The SMM noted that:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) and 12 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present and
• four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 47 towed howitzers (35 2A65, 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), 20 anti-tank guns (MT-12), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and four towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that 33 tanks (T-72) three mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.

At permanent storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that:

• 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64) remained missing.  

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) close to residential houses in Vodiane.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), fitted onto an armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55), in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a small bunker and a trench about 30m from a residential house in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets.

13 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Sentianivka and
• an APC (BTR-80) and a trench digger (PMZ-3) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs  

On 12 March, a mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 92 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows running north to south for at least 200m in a field about 4km north-east of Novoselivka and 38 anti-tank mines laid in three rows about 2km south of the aforementioned mines. The same UAV also for the first time spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a single line along a treeline near Shyroka Balka.

On the same day, a mid-range UAV spotted 300 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a line of 500m near Vodiane and 50 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 1km north of the aforementioned mines (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 13 February 2019) .

On 13 March, the SMM saw an anti-tank mine (TM-62) for the first time about 20m south of road H-15 between the forward position of the armed formations near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), close to previously observed mines. In the vicinity of the aforementioned checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM saw for the first time four anti-tank mines (TM-62M) about 15m north of road H-15 close to previously observed mines (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 5 March 2019).

About 5m north of a road from Marinka to Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a rectangular mine hazard sign for the first time with yellow and red colour and inscriptions that included “Warning! Access (passage) to this territory is dangerous” in Ukrainian. On the southern outskirts of Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), 5m north-west of the road, the SMM saw for the first time a square shaped mine hazard sign, red and yellow in colour with a skull and crossbones and “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian. About 15-20m north of road T-0509 near Zhukova Balka (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time two square shaped mine hazard signs, red and white in colour with “Danger Mines” written in Russian and English, attached to a wire fence about 250m apart.

In Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that a previously observed mine hazard sign had been removed, now leaving an area east of Slavne confirmed by the SMM as hazardous without markings indicating the presence of mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and inspections to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk) and repairs to an electric transformer near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. While present the SMM also saw 28 cars (seven with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates and 11 with “DPR” plates) and 55 trucks (52 covered cargo and three tanker trucks) (24 with Ukrainian, 13 with Belarusian, seven with Russian Federation and two with Lithuanian licence plates and nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM noted an unusually long 2km line of trucks waiting to exit Ukraine. Two drivers in the line told the SMM that they had already been waiting 14-18 hours to exit.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors”. The SMM was therefore unable to reach Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol). The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing the checkpoint without restrictions in both directions.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access, citing the need for permission from senior members of the armed formations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near Novoselivka, Shyroka Balka, as well as in an area between Marinka and Oleksandrivka. 
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted in Verkhnoshyrokivske and at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas north, south-south-west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, however more explosions (110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-north-west of Kirovsk (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 12-13 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-5km in directions ranging from east-north-east to east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same camera recorded six projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).   

During the day on 13 March, positioned in three locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 75 ceasefire violations assessed as near the disengagement area. Positioned south of Zolote-5/Mykhailivika (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) on the same day, the SMM also heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 45 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Damage to roof and an impact crater near Novoluhanske

On 12 March, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted damage to the roof of a building, assessed as caused by artillery or mortar impacts, in the north-western part of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Luhansk). The same UAV also spotted a crater next to a power pylon 200m north of the aforementioned building, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round (all observations not seen in imagery from 16 February 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), a probable anti-tank gun (MT-12) and two mortars (probable120mm) in a field near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk), as well as at least 40 ammunition crates next to the mortar.

13 March

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) on a road near Vedenske (33km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 19 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13. March

The SMM noted that:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) and 12 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present and
• four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 47 towed howitzers (35 2A65, 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), 20 anti-tank guns (MT-12), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and four towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that 33 tanks (T-72) three mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.

At permanent storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that:

• 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64) remained missing.  

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) close to residential houses in Vodiane.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), fitted onto an armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55), in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a small bunker and a trench about 30m from a residential house in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets.

13 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Sentianivka and
• an APC (BTR-80) and a trench digger (PMZ-3) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs  

On 12 March, a mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 92 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows running north to south for at least 200m in a field about 4km north-east of Novoselivka and 38 anti-tank mines laid in three rows about 2km south of the aforementioned mines. The same UAV also for the first time spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a single line along a treeline near Shyroka Balka.

On the same day, a mid-range UAV spotted 300 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a line of 500m near Vodiane and 50 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 1km north of the aforementioned mines (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 13 February 2019) .

On 13 March, the SMM saw an anti-tank mine (TM-62) for the first time about 20m south of road H-15 between the forward position of the armed formations near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), close to previously observed mines. In the vicinity of the aforementioned checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM saw for the first time four anti-tank mines (TM-62M) about 15m north of road H-15 close to previously observed mines (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 5 March 2019).

About 5m north of a road from Marinka to Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a rectangular mine hazard sign for the first time with yellow and red colour and inscriptions that included “Warning! Access (passage) to this territory is dangerous” in Ukrainian. On the southern outskirts of Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), 5m north-west of the road, the SMM saw for the first time a square shaped mine hazard sign, red and yellow in colour with a skull and crossbones and “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian. About 15-20m north of road T-0509 near Zhukova Balka (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time two square shaped mine hazard signs, red and white in colour with “Danger Mines” written in Russian and English, attached to a wire fence about 250m apart.

In Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that a previously observed mine hazard sign had been removed, now leaving an area east of Slavne confirmed by the SMM as hazardous without markings indicating the presence of mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and inspections to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk) and repairs to an electric transformer near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. While present the SMM also saw 28 cars (seven with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates and 11 with “DPR” plates) and 55 trucks (52 covered cargo and three tanker trucks) (24 with Ukrainian, 13 with Belarusian, seven with Russian Federation and two with Lithuanian licence plates and nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM noted an unusually long 2km line of trucks waiting to exit Ukraine. Two drivers in the line told the SMM that they had already been waiting 14-18 hours to exit.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors”. The SMM was therefore unable to reach Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol). The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing the checkpoint without restrictions in both directions.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access, citing the need for permission from senior members of the armed formations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

A team of election experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) met with electoral stakeholders in Hungary from 12 to 14 March 2019 to present the final report of ODIHR’s limited election observation mission for the  parliamentary elections held in April last year.

The report’s findings and recommendations were presented to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the National Election Office, the National Election Commission, the Ministry of Justice, the parliament’s Legislative Committee, the public broadcaster and the State Audit Office, as well as civil society and private media.

The recommendations focused on further improving the legal framework for elections through an inclusive review process with an emphasis on both the freedoms of expression and association and on access to information. Other measures to support democratic elections discussed during the visit included removing unreasonable restrictions on civil society, decriminalizing defamation and introducing explicit provisions for citizen election observation.

Recommendations from ODIHR’s previous election assessment not yet fully addressed were also discussed, including those on promoting women’s participation in politics and fostering greater transparency in campaign finance.

“We appreciate frank and constructive discussions with a broad range of stakeholders on the recommendations related to the 2018 elections in Hungary,” said Alexander Shlyk, Head of the ODIHR Elections Department. “Based on these discussions, the next steps in our co-operation can be related to improving public consultations regarding electoral laws and other relevant legislation and exploring possible ways to enhance electoral legislation and practice. Hungarian authorities can rely on ODIHR's support and expertise in their efforts to follow up on the recommendations.”

ODIHR experts emphasized the importance of addressing recommendations in the final report and broader reform initiatives well ahead of the next elections. During the meetings, the authorities expressed interest in receiving ODIHR support through expert advice and comparative examples of good practice related to specific electoral issues and, in the longer term, in considering requests for legal reviews of draft legislation.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to following up on ODIHR's election assessments and recommendations.

VIENNA, 14 March 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today welcomed the bringing of criminal charges against Marian K., an alleged instigator of the murder of the Slovak investigative reporter Jan Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnirova. The alleged instigator had previously threatened the reporter.   

“I highly commend the investigation that has led to the bringing of criminal charges against the instigator of this heinous crime. This follows arrests and charges that were raised last year against four other persons who were involved in the murders, including the possible killers,” said Désir,

“Just over one year ago Jan Kuciak was killed for just doing his work as an independent and free journalist. He paid an unacceptable price for investigating corruption at the highest level and his willingness to inform citizens. He has become a symbol for freedom of the Slovak media to tackle crime and the mafia. His murder will not remain unpunished and there can be no impunity for those responsible. That’s why it is so important that they face justice today. I hope that the investigation and subsequent trial will establish all complicity in this horrendous crime.”

Kuciak and his fiancée were killed at their home in February 2018.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

YEREVAN, 13 March 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovakia’s Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák emphasized the importance of creating perspectives for peace during his visit to Armenia today. He welcomed the commitment to reforms and discussed the ongoing work and next steps in the negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as the OSCE’s longstanding engagement with and in Armenia.

“Armenia is undergoing a series of political and economic reforms. In close co-operation with the Armenian authorities we are ready to deepen our engagement to support their efforts,” Lajčák said, welcoming Armenia’s reform agenda and the implementation of related programmes.

Accompanied by his Personal Representative on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák met with the political leadership in Yerevan, including President Armen Sarkissian; Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan; Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan; the President of the National Assembly Ararat Mirzoyan; as well as representatives of the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lajčák highlighted the importance of maintaining the stable context for contact between the sides and working towards a peaceful and fair solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict respecting all principles, while calling on the sides to avoid hostile rhetoric.

“I welcome the significant decrease in ceasefire violations and reported casualties over the past six months,” the Chairperson-in-Office said. “For peace to take hold, it needs to be accepted and owned by the people. And it requires that our efforts extend beyond politicians. The preparation of populations for peace is an important and complex matter, and deserves our full support.”

Recalling the long-term interest and engagement of the international community, he also expressed his full support for the efforts of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well as for the work of his Personal Representative.

MINSK, 13 March 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 13 March 2019:

“A few days ago, the Security Working Group reached a decision on recommitment to the ceasefire, starting from 8 March 2019.

Although the first days that followed showed a reduction of ceasefire violations by 61% as compared with the beginning of March 2019, I don’t find the results of this ceasefire satisfactory.

In this regard, I once again call on the sides to take all necessary steps to ensure a reliable, sustainable and long-lasting ceasefire.

This was, of course, the key topic of discussion in the Security Working Group today. Demining was also one of the priority issues.

The Humanitarian Working Group considered questions related to the exchange of detainees, as well as necessary improvements to the conditions for crossing the contact line.

The Economic Working Group discussed current issues of water delivery in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the necessary repairs of infrastructure and compliance with the audit schedule of the "Voda Donbasa" company. Another discussion topic was the payment of pensions to the residents of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

On the agenda of the Political Working Group were two non-papers prepared by the Co-ordinator, Ambassador Pierre Morel, dedicated to the discussion of the status quo on the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’ as well as to the topic of amnesty.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Gunfire was directed at two SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles near Pervomaiske and Manuilivka, Donetsk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted in Oleksandrivske and at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, both in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (145 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at directions ranging from north-west to south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), including ones as close as 100-500m from the camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), and at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

On the morning of 12 March, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Pervomaiske (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk) while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight in the area, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 300-500m east of its position. The Mission assessed the fire as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was in the process of landing (about 150m above the SMM’s position). The SMM safely landed the mini-UAV.*

On the same morning, positioned about 4km north-west of Manuilivka (non-government-controlled, 65km east of Donetsk) while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 15 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1km north-west of its position. The Mission assessed the fire as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was flying about 1.7km north-west of the SMM’s position. The SMM recalled and safely landed the mini-UAV. *

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (110 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations (including 57 explosions) were recorded in areas north-north-west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

Between the evenings of 11 and 12 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 19 projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km at easterly and south-easterly directions (assessed as inside the disengagement area). The same camera recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-6km south and six projectiles at an assessed range of 1-4km east and east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area), as well as four projectiles at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east and south-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 12 March, positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-3km north (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Non-government-controlled areas

9 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

12 March

The SMM saw four tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

8 March          

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck about 400m south-east of the disengagement area near Zolote.

12 March

The SMM saw:

-      an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);

-      an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and

-      eight APCs (BTR-80) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

8 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted eight probable APCs (MT-LB) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

11 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a  truck and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) in a residential area  in Novohryhorivka; and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

On 11 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 25 recent impact craters, assessed as caused by  122mm artillery rounds, about 3km west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

An SMM mini-UAV spotted previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62): at least 36 laid out in three rows of 12 across road H-21 near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) (for previous observations, SMM Daily Report 14 March 2018), four laid out across the western lane of the same road near Vesela Hora, about 2km south-west of the aforementioned mines (for previous observations, SMM Daily Report  19 March 2018), and at least 36 laid out in a field adjacent to the previous four (for previous observations, SMM Daily Report of 11 March 2019).    

SMM facilitation of operation of civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw two cars (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with “DPR” plates and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine, as well as 16 cars (six with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and four buses (one with Armenian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On the eastern edge of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing firing exercises” at a nearby training area.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to the border crossing point near Novoazovsk, citing an “ongoing operation” in the area. The SMM was allowed to proceed to Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight in areas east of Pervomaiske (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard heard two shots of small-arms and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 300-500m east of its position and assessed as aimed at the UAV, which landed safely.
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight in areas north-west of Manuilivka (non-government-controlled, 65km east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 bursts of small-arms fire 1km north-west of its position, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which landed safely.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.