OSCE

VIENNA, 25 March 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today reiterated his call for Ukrainian authorities to allow foreign journalists to pursue their professional activities unimpeded. His call followed a denial of entry to Marc Innaro, the Moscow correspondent of the Italian Public Service Broadcaster (RAI), and his colleague, who is a camera operator.

According to reports, on 24 March, the crew was denied entry to Ukraine by the State Border Service of Ukraine at an airport in Kyiv. Reportedly, the journalists planned to cover the upcoming elections and film several interviews, including with President Petro Poroshenko.

“I am concerned by the denial of entry to RAI journalist Marc Innaro to Ukraine” Désir said.

“Marc Innaro, like other foreign journalists, came to Ukraine to cover the presidential election. I recall that OSCE participating States are committed to facilitating the entry of journalists from other participating States when the purpose is to engage in journalism activities. I call on the authorities to abstain from creating obstacles preventing journalists from entering the country in this important time. Such obstructions may impede the free flow of information and are an obstacle to freedom of the media,” the Representative added.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

Challenges and positive practices that could facilitate the participation of persons with disabilities in political parties were the focus of a meeting in Tbilisi on 25 March 2019.

The event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the Coalition for Independent Living in Georgia, the Eastern European Centre for Multiparty Democracy (EECMD), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

“Everyone benefits from full and effective inclusion of persons with disabilities in political and public life,” said Anete Erdmane, Associate Democratic Governance Officer at ODIHR. “Political parties have a key role in ensuring that persons with disabilities can contribute to decision-making in their communities on an equal footing with others.”

More than 50 members of political parties, parliamentarians, politicians with disabilities, representatives of political party support organizations and disabled people’s organizations, and disability rights activists (25 men and 25 women) participated in the event.

"Persons with disabilities may be some of the most motivated voters in Georgia as the country's social and economic development has an instant and direct influence on their ability to enjoy life,” said Giorgi Dzneladze, the Chairperson of the Coalition for Independent Living. “The level of their participation is an indicator of democracy in any country. And let us not forget that they constitute almost one-fourth of Georgia's electorate.”

The discussion focused on raising awareness about the under-representation of persons with disabilities in political life, including different political party structures. The participants noted the benefits of more inclusive political parties and shared their views on possible steps for improvement, in line with the relevant OSCE commitments and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The side event was organized as part of the ODIHR project “Our Right to Participate – Promoting the Participation of Persons with Disabilities in Political and Public Life.”

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Elections experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) met with electoral stakeholders in Tbilisi on 21 and 22 March 2019 to present the ODIHR final report on last year’s presidential election in Georgia.

The report’s findings and recommendations were presented to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Election Commission, among other officials, as well as to the Chairperson of the Parliament. ODIHR experts also presented the report at an election-related conference organized by the Council of Europe and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which gathered 60 participants from relevant state authorities and civil society. 

“We consider the commitment at the highest political levels to discuss ODIHR's recommendations an indication of the importance placed on improving the electoral process,” said Ambassador Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, who headed the ODIHR Election Observation Mission for the election. “This is an opportune moment for adopting an inclusive approach to enhancing electoral legislation and practice in Georgia, and ODIHR continues to stand ready to support such efforts.”Discussions focused on the report’s recommendations to review the electoral legislation, ensure a clear separation between party and state during election campaigning and improve regulations to prevent and respond to hate speech during the campaign. The experts also highlighted the recommendation to establish an effective and timely mechanism for addressing complaints before an impartial and competent authority.

Other recommendations discussed included aligning the number of commission members at each level to the actual need, introducing expedited deadlines to address campaign finance violations and publishing all decisions and legal opinions of the media regulator, as well as ensuring that voters cast their ballot free of fear of retribution.All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to following up on ODIHR's election assessments and recommendations.

415082 Kunduz Rysbek

Representatives of the security sector of Kyrgyzstan concluded a five-day training course on “Violent Extremism and Radicalization leading to Terrorism as a Threat to National Security” on 22 March 2019, in Bishkek.

The event was organized with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and in partnership with the State Commission on Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Participants included employees of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Kyrgyz Republic, the State Committee for Defence, the State Border Service, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the State Service for Execution of Punishments.  The training course aimed to enhance their knowledge of current Kyrgyzstan state policies in the religious sphere, of the causes and conditions of radicalization and features of extremist ideology prevention.

The knowledge and skills gained through the training course will contribute to increased professionalism among Kyrgyz security sector staff involved in the implementation of nationwide policy documents on countering terrorism, extremism and preventing radicalization.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed damage to functioning schools in Holmivskyi and Donetsk city.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission observed long queues of people, up to 1,500, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas and elsewhere, including near non-government-controlled Zaichenko.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however more explosions (about 275), compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-westerly and north-easterly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly and north-easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) (including 122 explosions), as well as at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 380 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 700 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded north and north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) (230 explosions), as well as in and near the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Damage to functioning schools in Donetsk City and Holmivskyi

In the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of the city centre) at 1 Samarska Street, the SMM saw a fresh impact (15cm hole) 30cm above ground in the north-west facing side of a functioning school building, assessed as having been caused by heavy-machine-gun fire. School staff told the SMM that shooting had occurred on 21 March in the early morning, and that pupils had been in attendance at the time, but refused to answer any further questions without permission from senior members of the armed formations.

At 13 Shkilnyi Avenue in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a 1cm hole and several cracks in the second-floor window on the northern side of a functioning school. As the SMM was not allowed to enter the school, it could not assess the type of weapon or the direction of fire. School staff told the Mission that the damage had been caused by a bullet in the late afternoon of 20 March and that there had been no pupils in the school at the time. The school staff member added that, according to instructions received from senior members of the armed formations, they were neither allowed to let the SMM enter the school nor to talk to the SMM.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the evening of 21 March, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded 11 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.7-2km north-west, all assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as 22 impact explosions at an assessed range of 1.5-3km north-west (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned at several locations near the Zolote disengagement area during the day of 23 March, the SMM heard 74 undetermined explosions, as well as 20 shots of small arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

22 March

The SMM saw two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas

21 March

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a tank (T-64) near Lutuhyne (20km south-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) and five mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[3]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

22 March

The SMM noted that six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), one towed howitzer (2A65 MSTA-B, 152mm) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11, Sani, 120mm) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

21 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

22 March

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (Kozak) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 March

The SMM saw:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant) in Boikivske (67km south-east of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Donetsk City

The SMM observed, for the first time, two pieces of UXO, assessed as MLRS (BM-21) rockets, partially hidden in shrubbery in soft ground on the northern side of Stratonavtiv Street in a residential area in non-government-controlled Kyivskyi district of Donetsk city, 25m apart from each other. The Mission did not observe any fencing or mine hazard signs near the UXO.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the high voltage Mykhailivka-Almazna power line near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints

At the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw around 450 people queuing to exit and around 1,000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. A Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer told the SMM that the increase was due to the fact that some people believed that the entry-exit checkpoint would be closed for ten days starting from 25 March. He said that he was not aware of any such plans. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed around 500 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and around 150 people queuing in the opposite direction. At the same checkpoint, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that the increase in people was due to the fact that some people believed that the exit-entry checkpoint would be closed on 25 March.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 22 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of armed formations again denied the SMM passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the past 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined.

Other impediments:

• At a school in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of city centre) school staff told the SMM that it needed prior permission from senior members of the armed formations to talk to the school staff (see above).
• At a school in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) school staff told the SMM that, according to instructions received from senior members of the armed formations, the staff were neither allowed to let the SMM enter the school nor to talk to the SMM (see above).

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that three such sites continued to be abandoned.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations and saw military hardware, fresh craters, unmanned aerial vehicles and mines seen for the first time inside the Zolote disengagement area; it also saw military hardware inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas, in Voznesenivka, close to the border with the Russian Federation, and elsewhere near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Staropetrivske.*  

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 190), compared with the previous reporting period (about 560 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 700 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 290 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded north-north-east of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), north of Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), north-east and east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-north-west of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

 

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned inside the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to power lines allegedly damaged by shelling on the evening of 20 March, the SMM saw 22 fresh craters, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds, near damaged power lines about 50m north of the road and adjacent to trenches of the armed formations. Within 25 minutes, the SMM saw a black unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (probable mini-UAV) overhead on two occasions, one time circling the repairs site and again flying from south to north over the repairs site.    

On 20 March, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) 600m south of its northern edge and about 1km east of its western edge, and again spotted four IFVs (three BMP-1 and a BMP-2), all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 20 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) inside the Zolote disengagement area, ten metres south of its northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge. The same UAV again spotted 34 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) about 150m south-west of the aforementioned 20 anti-tank mines and 80m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge. The same day, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 130 anti-tank mines (see SMM Daily Report 21 March 2019 and SMM Daily Report 11 April 2018).

On the evening of 20 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same evening, positioned in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 15 undetermined explosions 8-10km east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). The next morning, positioned at the same location, the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 10-12km north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).  

On the morning of 21 March, positioned about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and about 15 bursts of undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 5-7km north-east (all assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area). In the afternoon of the same day, at the same location, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and about 25 bursts of undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the morning of 21 March, positioned about 1.5km north-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate, the SMM heard about 80 undetermined explosions and 170 bursts of undetermined weapons, all at an assessed range of 5-7km north-north-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). On the same morning, positioned in three areas around the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 135 ceasefire violations (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 20 March, two cameras in areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded 12 undetermined explosions (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 21 March, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), and saw an IFV (BMP variant), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, inside the disengagement area, about 900m south-west of Petrivske near the eastern edge of the disengagement area[3].

Heavy smoke observed in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

Positioned south of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) while following up on allegations of shelling on the morning of 20 March, the SMM saw heavy smoke in the Maryivka area, a northern neighbourhood of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. Due to security restrictions, the SMM was unable to access the site for further assessment. A resident of the area (woman, about 45 years old) told the SMM that she had heard explosions and gunfire on the evening, night and morning of 20-21 March. On the morning of 21 March, positioned in five locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard more than five hundred ceasefire violations in the area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (see Disengagement areas).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

21 March

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) moving west in the north-western outskirts of Avdiivka (17 km north of Donetsk) and
• two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) near Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) and
• two MLRS (BM-21) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk).

21 March

The SMM saw 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

20 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• four tanks (T-72) near Lozuvatske (35km north-west of Donetsk) and
• five tanks (type undetermined) near Tymofiievka (39km north-west of Donetsk).

Weapons storage sites

At a heavy weapons permnanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

21 March

The SMM noted the presence of all weapons observed previously.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

20 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km north-west of Luhansk);
• four IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote; and
• five IFVs (four BMP-1 and a BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) inside the Zolote disengagement area (see Disengagement areas).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four IFVs (BMP-1) about 2km north-east of Zolote-4/Rodina.

21 March

• the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded an armoured recovery vehicle (possible BREM) and an IFV (BMP-2) about 150m south-south-east of the camera and
• the SMM camera in Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) recorded an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) on road H-20.

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk) and
• Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers digging trenches near a checkpoint near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three IFVs (BMP-2) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) as well as approximately 100 ammunition crates nearby near Sukhodil (21km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top in Katerynivka (former Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• six IFVs (four BMP-1 and two BMP variant) and a probable armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk).

21 March

The SMM saw:

• a black UAV (probable mini-UAV) inside the Zolote disengagement area on two occasions (see above) and
• an IFV (BMP variant) inside the Petrivske disengagement area (see above).

Mines seen near Orikhove and Vesela Hora

On 20 March, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 82 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows in a field south of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk).

The same day, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least ten anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the western lane of dual-lane road H-21 leading to the Shchastia bridge, about 2km north-east of Vesela Hora. About 500m south-east of the aforementioned anti-tank mines, it also saw four anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the western lane of the same road and large potholes present in the eastern lane. On the same day, the same UAV again spotted at least 40 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field 50m south-west of the aforementioned four anti-tank mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines in Horlivka, to power lines in Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk) damaged from reported shelling on 17 March and to power lines inside the Zolote disengagement area between Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and the southern edge of the disengagement area.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three cars with Ukrainian licence plates and one pedestrian entering Ukraine, and two cars (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw at least 100 wagons stationary; however, the contents were not visible. After about five minutes, two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

SMM monitored the security situation south-east of Kherson

On 20 March, the Mission observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea and between Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (see SMM Daily Report 6 March 2019).

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• While at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing that the visit was not agreed upon with their superiors.
• While at a border crossing point in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• While at a checkpoint north of Staropetrivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations refused the SMM passage, citing lack of “safety and security” related to a live-fire exercise in the area. While present, the SMM heard and saw ceasefire violations nearby assessed as live-fire training in the security zone, in violation also of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone as described in the Addendum to the Package of Measures (see table).
• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), four armed members of the armed formations demanded the SMM show their patrol plan and then refused to allow the Mission to pass through the checkpoint when it did not comply.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational. Due to heavy fog, the SMM camera in Zolote experienced reduced visibility during this reporting period.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

ERGNETI, 22 March 2019 - On 22 March 2019, the 92nd meeting under the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) was held in Ergneti. The gathering was conducted in an open and constructive atmosphere.

Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative for the South Caucasus of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, co-facilitated the proceedings.

Høeg provided an overview of events since the last IPRM meeting on 8 February 2019 and stated that the overall security situation had remained relatively stable. He highlighted concerns over recent developments related to activities along the administrative boundary line and urged all participants to continue using the EUMM managed hotline to prevent incidents and exchange information.

The co-facilitators noted the reopening of controlled crossing points on 15 March and encouraged participants to take into account the humanitarian perspective on freedom of movement for the conflict-affected population. The co-facilitators recalled the statement of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions on the matter.

The case of Archil Tatunashvili and David Basharuli's tragic death were again discussed.

The use of irrigation systems by local communities and co-operation in wildfire prevention were explored.

The next IPRM meeting will take place on 16 May 2019.

415016 Communication and Media Relations Section

The Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department held meetings with North Macedonia’s Minister of Interior Oliver Spasovski and his Task Force on the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Public Key Directory (ICAO PKD), from 21 to 22 March 2019 in Skopje.

This country visit aimed at facilitating North Macedonia’s participation in ICAO PKD – a secure and cost-effective central repository for exchanging the public keys of ePassports and allowing for their fast and safe authentication at the borders.

“North Macedonia is now in the accession process with NATO and moving towards EU membership. Improving its border security will increase the country’s credibility and move it one step closer to EU,” said Dennis Cosgrove, Head of the OSCE Border Security and Management Unit. He highlighted the regional approach of the PKD initiative: “If all countries from the region join, the benefits of the PKD system will increase for all.” 

Maria-Esther Hernandez Crespo, Deputy Chair of the ICAO PKD Board, emphasized that the PKD system helps all nations to work together in combating passport fraud and contributing to domestic and international security.

Minister Spasovski thanked the OSCE for facilitating the process of joining ICAO PKD for North Macedonia. He noted that this is the right time for PKD implementation in the region, considering the challenges South-East Europe faces, and stressed that improving border security is the main priority for his country.  

OSCE officials also met with the members of the Task Force on ICAO PKD and discussed step by step guidelines on technical and administrative requirements for joining the PKD, as well as the OSCE’s support during the entire process. The Task Force consists of representatives from the Civil Affairs Department, the Information Technology and Security Sector, and the Border Police and Migration Departments of the Interior Ministry.

This was the fourth country visit on ICAO PKD to the Western Balkans as a follow-up activity to the first OSCE Regional Workshop for South-East Europe on ICAO PKD, which was organized in Montenegro, in November last year. At the workshop, representatives of North Macedonia presented an overview of its ePassport system and together with recommendations from experts drafted a road map on how to join the ICAO PKD.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed military presence in the Petrivske disengagement area and again saw anti-tank mines and military presence in the Zolote disengagement area.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions including repairs to the wooden ramps in the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Zaichenko, Donetsk region.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 560 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly, southerly and westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), including explosions assessed as outgoing and impacts of mortar rounds.

On the evening of 20 March, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 200-500m east-south-east and about 1.5km south-west of the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk  (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region,the Mission recorded fewerceasefire violations, including about 290 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 890). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north, west and north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 19 March, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM mid-range unmanned  aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and a probable BMP-1), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, each about 250, 500 and 900m south of the  disengagement area’s northern edge.

On 19 March, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 33 anti-tank mines (TM-62), laid in six rows running east to west for about 500m, about 550m north of its southern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge, as well as at least 37 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows from east to west for about 350m, in an area about 700m west of the aforementioned 33 anti-tank mines. On the same day, the same UAV again spotted  at least 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62), laid in two rows running east to west across road T1316 about 1.1km south of its northern edge.

During the day on 20 March, positioned on the western edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and north-east of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 146 ceasefire violations, including 21 undetermined explosions (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the northern edge of Zolote, western edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and west of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire assessed as near the disengagement area.

On 19 March, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 1km east of its western edge and about 1km north of its southern edge as well as three people in camouflaged clothing assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces and a military truck (Ural) near previously reported positions about 700m east of the disengagement area’s western edge and 1.5km north of its southern edge.

During the day on 20 March, positioned 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 54 ceasefire violations, including 52 shots of small-arms fire  assessed as near the disengagement area.[3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation. 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Government-controlled areas

19 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 22 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019).

20 March

The SMM saw three tanks (T-72) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

20 March

The SMM noted that:

• 24 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B,152mm and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) 31 mortars (18 2B11 Sani, 120mm, 12 M-120-15 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37 82mm) and 23 self-propelled howiters (2S1 Gvozidka, 122mm ) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

19 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk);
• three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (probable BMP variants) near Orlivske (82km south of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Pyshchevyk;
• five IFVs (three BMP-2 and two BMP-1) near Chermalyk; and
• three IFVs (BMP-1) near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a 150m eastwards extension to a previously observed trench system near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) (not visible on imagery from 5 March 2019).

20 March

The SMM saw a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) being transported near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

19 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• at least 12 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk).

On 20 March, the SMM observed freshly refurbished and reinforced military trenches around 300m long on both sides of a local road about 2km south of Ohulchansk (25km east of Luhansk). 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the water supply network nearDonetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable an assessment of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and repairs to the power transformer station near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). TheMission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an international organization to replace the broken planks on the floor of the wooden ramps connecting the broken parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

SMM facilitated and monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the conflict

The SMM also facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region. Both a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer and a member of the armed formations told the SMM that 60 persons (including a woman) had been transferred.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

414983 Belarusian criminal justice professionals participate in the discussion during the seminar. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

International rule of law standards for the individualization of criminal responsibility were the topic of a seminar organized on 21 March 2019 in Minsk for participants from across Belarus.

The seminar was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Institute for Re-training and Continuing Education of Judges and Personnel of Prosecutor’s Offices, Courts and Justice Institutions (IRCE) at the Belarusian State University.  It was the fifth in a series of seminars on rule of law issues co-organized as part of the two-year, European Union-funded project “Promoting Democratization and Human Rights in Belarus”.

The training event involved 34 participants (22 men and 12 women), most of them judges. They learned about domestic and international standards and practice related to the individualization of criminal responsibility – the process through which the investigative and prosecution bodies and the court choose the preventive measure or criminal sanction appropriate to the person and their crime – during the pre-trial, trial and sentencing phases.

“Fundamental principles of criminal justice based on the rule of law include applying criminal sanctions that are commensurate to the offence in each individual case and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors and the circumstances of the offence and the alleged offender ,” said Carolyn Hammer, Rule of Law Officer at ODIHR.

IRCE Professor Aliaksandr Barkou said: “The seminar was dedicated to the discussion of a key issue in the practice of sentencing and applying measures of criminal responsibility – that is, the choice of a sanction that would ensure the achievement of objectives of criminal responsibility while respecting the principle of rule of law, justice and humanism. Participants discussed the issues of restricting the use of punishments in the form of deprivation of liberty and pre-trial detention. Particular attention was paid to considering the convicted person’s character, which is either conducive to or, on the contrary, prevents him or her from reform and resocialization.”

In addition to the training of some 200 legal professionals during thematic seminars, the project’s rule of law activities will also include exchange visits on rule of law and other justice-related issues.

414974 Tome Shekerdjiev (l), Project Manager at the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), introduces an ODIHR resource toolkit on building a comprehensive criminal justice response to hate crime to criminal justice and human rights professionals participating in the training session. On the right is Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR First Deputy Director. Warsaw, 20 March 2019. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Innovative methods for researching unreported hate crimes and hate incidents were the focus of a training session for criminal justice and human rights professionals organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 20 and 21 March 2019 in Warsaw.

The event, co-organized by the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland, was a follow–up to the ODIHR project “Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime”.    

“The survey on the nature and scale of unreported hate crimes against members of selected communities that we piloted last year in Poland has demonstrated significant discrepancies between the number of hate crimes included in the official data and the situation on the ground,” said Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR First Deputy Director. “We have prepared a detailed survey methodology, allowing for its replication in other OSCE participating States. At this training session, we will demonstrate and promote the use of this newly developed tool.”

During the training session, experts involved in conducting the original research presented a step-by-step guide on how to design, finance and implement a victimization survey using the respondent-driven sampling technique. The technique relies on respondents’ self-recruitment and allows users to research communities that are hard to reach with traditional sociological survey methods.

“Employing this methodology for researching hate crimes against Muslims, Sub-Saharan Africans and Ukrainians in Poland produced information and evidence that we would not have been able to gather otherwise,” said Hanna Machińska, Poland’s Deputy Commissioner for Human Rights. “Thanks to the survey, we not only know the scale of underreporting in Poland, but we have also learned about the reasons victims hesitate to report incidents and how they struggle with the consequences of hate crimes.”

The methodology of mapping unreported hate crimes using respondent-driven sampling is part of ODIHR’s recently launched toolkit on addressing hate crimes. The toolkit includes training packages, methodologies and guidelines on how public institutions and civil society can address hate crimes based on the project experience in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Poland.      

VIENNA/STRASBOURG/WARSAW, 21 March 2019 – Too many people with an ethnic or migrant background are still being held back in the job market. This is despite laws against racial discrimination and for equal opportunities in employment that have been in place for decades, the heads of three European human rights institutions said in a joint statement on today’s International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

Michael O’Flaherty, Director of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Jean-Paul Lehners, Chair of the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), and Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), emphasizedthe need for change to ensure respect for the fundamental human rights everyone should enjoy equally across Europe. They call for enforcing international and national antidiscrimination legislation, including tougher sanctions, and amendments to working practices to promote the diversity Europe needs to remain relevant in today’s global economy.

“Racism in any form is toxic to the creation of a fair, equal and rights respectful society,” said FRA Director O’Flaherty. “We have the laws but too often they fail to deliver. We need to step up our policies and practices to reduce the barriers ethnic minorities face when trying to enjoy their basic right to employment.”

He pointed to a recent FRA minorities’ and migrants’ surveythat underlined the scale of the problem. Almost a third of respondents reported they had been discriminated against when looking for a job. Half of these thought it was because of their skincolouror appearance, while one-third said it was because of their name.

“Access to employment is a key to successful and sustainable inclusion of all people into society,” said ECRI Chair Lehners. “Through the recommendations that ECRI addresses to the Council of Europe member states, we aim to motivate all stakeholders to open up even more to diversity and build an inclusive working culture. Employees will benefit from this through an improved working environment, and employers through better results. At the same time, we are active to prevent new discrimination risks that could arise from the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence.”

ODIHR Director Gísladóttir said: “A person's ethnicity or skincolourare all too often grounds for discrimination, preventing them from having equal access to thelabourmarket and equality in the workplace. Roma and Sinti, the largest ethnic minority in Europe, experience high levels of discrimination when seeking employment, and this is a strong factor contributing to economic, social and political exclusion. Governments must make real efforts to counter discrimination against Roma or any group.” 

Gísladóttir stressed that all OSCE participating States have committed themselves to adopting effective legislation to combat racial and ethnic discrimination in all fields, including employment, and, in its Action Plan to Improve the Situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE area, to creatingspecializedinstitutions and mechanisms to ensure the implementation of such laws. 

Today’s International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination points to a clear need to tackle pervasive racial discrimination in all areas of life. As it is also the International Decade for People of African Descent, we should stamp out the widespread and entrenched prejudice and exclusion that too many black people continue to face simply because of their skincolour, the institution heads said.

With the rise of automated decision-making, policymakers should also be mindful of the risk of built-in biases appearing in computer-based tools used in recruitment or insurance risk assessments, for example. 

Positive measures like diversity audits in workplaces, public sector recruitment drives among minorities andanonymizedrecruiting processes are simple practical measures that can help make a difference.

The United Nations designated 21 March the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1966, in memory of the 69 people killed six years earlier in Sharpeville, South Africa, during a peaceful demonstration to protest the apartheid system.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission followed up on the explosion of a device in Luhansk city.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM spotted for the first time anti-tank mines near government-controlled Novoselivka.
• The Mission continued to observe hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including at a permanent storage site and a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.
• In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports of arson at two stores. 

 

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 75), compared with the previous reporting period (145 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as possible live-fire exercise in violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone, and at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 890 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations and explosions were recorded at southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

 

Explosion of device in Luhansk city

In Luhansk city, in a parking area adjacent to 55 Klubna Street, the SMM saw a crater surrounded by scorch marks and debris on the ground, as well as multiple cracks in the windscreen of a car in the parking area. About 15m from the crater, on the same street, the SMM saw eight shattered windows on the first, second and third floors of two five-storey apartment buildings. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by the explosion of an unknown device placed underneath a car in the abovementioned parking area. Four residents of one of the abovementioned buildings told the SMM that at around 01:00 on the night of 18-19 March, they had heard an explosion in the parking area and later observed damage to two cars at the same location.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 18 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 19 March, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km south and west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.[3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on 19 March, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

19 March

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Roty (66km north-east of Donetsk) and
• an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed by an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 March

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a tank (T-64) about 60m from a residential building in Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) at a training area near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

18 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) close to a probable mortar position next to houses in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

18 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk).

19 March

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) and a tank (type unknown) in Vesele (87km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

19 March

The SMM saw six tanks (type unknown) firing in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

19 March

The SMM noted that:

• 31 tanks (T-64) were present and
• 12 mortars (PM-120/PM-38, 120mm), 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), 26 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and six 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 80 tanks (T-64) remained missing.

At a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

19 March

The SMM noted that the site was empty and seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

19 March

The SMM noted that the site was abandoned and 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

19 March

The SMM noted that the site was abandoned and ten tanks (seven T-64 and three T-72) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

18 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (type undetermined) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) and an APC (BTR-80) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk) and
• an APC (BTR-80) near Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk).

19 March

The SMM saw two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 86km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 and
• two ACVs (type undetermined) in Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near a checkpoint of the armed formations near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

Mines seen for the first time near Novoselivka

On 18 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least 900 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in three rows running from north to south over 2.7km, south of 92 recently observed anti-tank mines in a field about 3.5km east of Novoselivka, and about 2km further south, 41 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out over three rows from north to south close to previously observed mines (see SMM Daily Report 14 March 2019).   

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At 11:30, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw around 150 people queuing to exit and around 550 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. Staff at a medical aid facility told the SMM that on the morning of 18 March, an 86-year-old woman from Luhansk city had passed away at the facility after having lost consciousness while queuing to exit government-controlled areas.

At 09:30, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw around 450 people queuing to enter and around 60 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas. At 12:10, the SMM observed the body of a deceased elderly woman being transferred into a mortuary vehicle.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the water supply network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable an assessment of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 13 cars (six with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates”) entering Ukraine, and 15 cars (eight with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), five trucks (three covered cargo and two open trailer with no visible cargo) (three with Ukrainian licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates”) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 19 cars (six with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates), six trucks (five covered cargo and one fuel tanker) (three with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and eight pedestrians entering Ukraine, and 41 cars (eight with Ukrainian, 18 with Russian Federation and three with Belarusian licence plates, and  12 with “DPR” plates), a minivan (with “DPR” plates) and 32 trucks (30 covered cargo, one fuel tanker and one open trailer) (14 with Ukrainian, 13 with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

SMM observed a calm situation south-east of Kherson

On 17 and 18 March, the Mission observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (see SMM Daily Report 6 March 2019).

Follow-up on reports of arson at two stores in Kyiv

On 19 March, the SMM followed up on media and police reports of two arson attacks, on 17 and 18 March, on two confectionary stores belonging to the same chain at 49 Obolonskyi Avenue and 29 Khreshchatyk Street in Kyiv. At both locations, the SMM saw scorch marks on stone tiles and window sills, as well as windows that looked as if they had recently been replaced. According to police statements, investigations are ongoing in both cases and one suspect has been detained.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to access a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region as its gate was locked and no guards were present to open it.
• The SMM was unable to access a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region as its gate was locked and no guards were present to open it.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), five members of the armed formations (two of them visibly armed) refused to allow the SMM to pass through the checkpoint, citing “ongoing demining activities”. About 40 minutes later, the same SMM patrol attempted again to pass through the checkpoint and was allowed to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 18 March, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region.[6]
• Staff at a medical station in Klenovyi (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Luhansk) refused to talk to the SMM, saying that “the staff is not supposed to have any contact with the SMM”.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites in government-controlled areas and one in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

VIENNA, 20 March 2019 – Best practice examples of and perspectives on Security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) -  a priority theme for both Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship and the Swiss Chairmanship of the FSC – was discussed at today’s joint meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and the Permanent Council in Vienna.

The meeting, which was organized by both Chairmanships, builds on the OSCE’s long track record in supporting its participating States in this area. Furthermore, SSG/R is highly relevant in strengthening global security and in enabling sustainable development, in particular in the implementation of Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, on peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions.

“Security sector governance and reform is critically important to the maintenance of peace and security and the prevention of conflict,” said Miroslav Jenča, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas, and the Departments for Political & Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations. “The United Nations, with its reformed and reinvigorated Peace and Security pillar, is committed to continuing the joint work and co-ordination with Member States and regional organizations, including the OSCE. Together, we multiply each other’s strengths and can advance the broad prevention and sustaining peace agenda.” 

Following Jenča’s address, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan John MacGregor presented his office’s SSG/R-related work on the ground. He pointed to several positive examples of collaboration adding that OSCE field operations had the potential to do more once there was agreement among participating States on the concept of SSG/R.

“I am confident that having such consensus will allow us to do more in this field and equip us – the field operations – with more arguments in our deliberations with host authorities on the necessity to advance the implementation of the SSG/R concept,” he said. “In addition, it will allow us to attract more financial resources to support the host countries’ SSG/R processes. Finally, it will be easier to agree on a set of guiding principles on how to best provide support to these processes, which could then be used in our daily work.”

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, presenting his report on the OSCE’s approach to SSG/R, added: “An effective and responsive security sector is fundamental to dealing with today's complex and interdependent security challenges. A comprehensive response can only benefit from a well-functioning and well-governed security sector that is gender-responsive and demonstrates respect for human rights.”

His report, the first of its kind developed by the OSCE, provides recommendations to participating States and the OSCE’s executive structures on how to enhance SSG/R in the OSCE region. Among the key recommendations are strengthening SSG/R capacities in all the OSCE’s executive structures so as to meet the demand for support from participating States; better mainstreaming SSG/R into the Organization’s programmatic work; and for all states to engage collectively on developing a common understanding of SSG/R.

“A common understanding of SSG/R builds the fundament to ensure that our support to participating States is provided in the most effective and efficient way,” said Greminger. “With a more strategic approach to SSG/R, we can achieve significant synergies through strong collaboration among our executive structures and departments, and by strengthening our partnerships, above all with the UN but also with other international and regional organizations.”

The OSCE Secretary General’s report, The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform, is available at www.osce.org/secretary-general/414725

MINSK, 20 March 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today concluded a three-day official visit to Minsk. In his discussions with the Belarusian authorities, he called on the government to undertake the reforms necessary for developing a more favourable and pluralistic media environment.

During the visit, Désir met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei; Minister of Information Aliaksandr Karliukevich; and Chair of the Committee on Human Rights, National Relations and Mass Media at the House of Representatives of the National Assembly Andrei Naumovich, to discuss challenges to media freedom and other areas such as the new concept of information security where the OSCE Representative may offer legal expertise and assistance.

Désir also met with representatives of the Belarusian Association of Journalists and the Belarusian Union of Journalists, as well as journalists and media experts. He visited the editorial offices of news agencies Tut.Byand BelaPAN and held talks with journalists affected by the BelTA case, on which the Representative had intervened previously. In particular, he met with the Editor-in-chief of Tut.By, Marina Zolotova, who recently received a high fine. “I am very impressed by the work and the efforts of independent journalists I had the opportunity to meet during my visit.”

“I also praise the open and constructive dialogue with the Ministers on media freedom issues in Belarus,” said Désir following his meetings. 

In his talks with the authorities, the Representative underlined that the current legislation still contains many provisions that restrict the work of media outlets and journalists. They include criminal defamation and insult, which negatively affect media freedom and create a broader “chilling effect” on the right to freedom of expression.

“The authorities should promote laws and regulations that protect the principles of freedom of speech and freedom of the media and facilitate greater media pluralism online and offline,” said Désir. 

The Representative further reiterated his call on the authorities to change the accreditation requirements for journalists, and introduce more effective ways to access information. “This is a long-standing issue which my Office has previously raised with the authorities on several occasions. Accreditation requirements should be reconsidered, so as to improve the working conditions of media actors rather than functioning as a work permit, preventing journalists from doing their work,” Désir said.

“I also encourage the authorities to start effectively de-monopolizing state-owned media outlets and transforming the state broadcaster into a genuine public service media outlet, as well as introducing mechanisms that will foster transparent competition in the market, and equal access of all media to state support and advertising market,” Désir added.

The Representative positively noted the high level of internet penetration in the country and its growing role in fostering new media, which provides an important platform for information and public debate. 

The Representative reiterated his call on the authorities to ensure unrestricted access to the Internet, following the continued blocking of news websites Charter97.org and Belaruspartisan.org.

Désir encouraged the authorities to prioritize freedom of expression and media freedom in any future regulation of online space and to reconsider existing measures that tighten state control of the internet, including the broad possibility to interfere with any information posted online. The Representative noted that it is important to refrain from excessive measures and practices regarding internet intermediaries, imposition of registration requirements and the users’ right to anonymity.

“Restrictions to online content must be narrowly defined and limited to content such as violent extremism, Nazism or racism to avoid a broad and disproportionate impact on freedom of expression,” said Desir, “Blocking powers that the executive authorities have must be overseen by independent judiciary,” he added. 

“My Office will continue the dialogue with the Belarusian authorities, and hope that this co-operation will bring constructive and lasting results that improve the media freedom situation in the country,” Désir said.

Désir expressed the readiness of his Office in providing Belarus with expert recommendations, in line with OSCE media freedom commitments and best practices, and encouraged the authorities to more actively engage civil society in discussions on the reform process.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

414875 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

Promoting gender-sensitive legislation in Albania was the focus of discussion at a workshop in Tirana on 20 March 2019. The event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in co-operation with the OSCE Presence in Albania and the parliament of Albania.

Legislators, parliamentary staff, and international and Albanian gender experts (36 women and 6 men) exchanged knowledge on gender equality in the parliament, focusing on practical steps for introducing gender-sensitive legislation. Event participants further explored ways to institutionalize gender analysis in the Albanian legislative process and parliamentary work more broadly.

“Gender equality in legislation is crucial to ensuring that our laws work for women and men,” said Ajla van Heel, ODIHR Adviser on Gender Equality. “Laws impact the lives of citizens directly and should, therefore, also reflect the needs, interests and priorities of various constituencies, including women and men in all their diversity.”

Ambassador Bernd Borchardt, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania, said: “This workshop is a great opportunity to either learn or simply refresh knowledge about how laws should be drafted so that they produce the same results for all the members of society, on equal grounds for both women and men.”

Vasilika Hysi, Deputy Speaker of the Albanian parliament, said: “We are improving the laws on gender equality, but we aim to make sure that all laws have a gender perspective and have a good effect on women and men in Albania. This is not only a job of women parliamentarians, but of parliament as an institution.”

The workshop was organized as part of the ODIHR project on strengthening inclusive and accountable democratic institutions in the OSCE region and OSCE Presence in Albania’s parliamentary support project.   

“Today’s verdict in the case of Radovan Karadzic is another crucial step toward holding accountable those individuals most responsible for genocide and other atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

First and foremost, our thoughts are with the families of the victims, for whom the pursuit of justice has been long and painful. It is a complex and painful process, but a critically important one.

Holding individuals accountable for their criminal actions, even these many years after the war, is essential to building lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, upholding the rule of law and strengthening international jurisprudence.

In tandem with the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the judicial institutions in BiH continue to strive towards these goals, with hundreds of perpetrators of war crimes prosecuted to date in domestic courts. However, these institutions require support to continue their work on war crimes cases in an independent and impartial manner, free from political attacks or attempts at undue influence.

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to support the judiciary of BiH in its efforts to bring to justice those responsible for atrocity crimes. We strongly urge all citizens in the country and beyond - in particular, political and party leaders, media, local government officials, religious leaders and community activists—to respect today’s verdict and avoid inflammatory, divisive rhetoric.

It is only through the joint investment of all in the process of reconciliation that stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be achieved.”

SARAJEVO, 21 March 2019 – An assessment of the work of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) institutions in combating discrimination, prepared by the OSCE Mission to BiH, was presented today in Sarajevo, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination.

The conference, which concludes tomorrow, gathered more than 100 representatives of the judiciary, legal professionals and representatives of relevant public institutions and civil society organizations from BiH and the region.

“This Report is a part of the OSCE Mission to BiH’s support to the BiH institutions to combat discrimination,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Bruce G. Berton.

As a result of the adoption of the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination and its subsequent amendments, a significant number of discrimination cases have been brought before domestic courts and the Institution of Human Rights Ombudsman of BiH.

“These cases relate to various societal spheres, such as systemic discrimination in education, the workplace, employment opportunities, as well as access to social and health services,” said Berton.

The Report analyses the work of the judiciary, the BiH Ombudsman Institution and the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, as key institutional actors in combating discrimination in BiH. In addition, the Report assesses the progress that has been achieved in applying anti-discrimination legislation over the past ten years.

“We still witness systemic discrimination, especially against the most vulnerable category of people in our country’s population, the returnees,” said Semiha Borovac, BiH Minister for Human Rights and Refugees.

“The fight against discrimination is a direct way to fight for the survival of returnees in their homes and for a society of equal individuals – of all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina on every inch of our territory. We are obliged to make that effort by the BiH Constitution and by the Decision on the constituent status of all citizens throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also by our common goal of membership in the European Union, which is based on the principles of equality,” she added.

The Report identifies the shortcomings which BiH has still to address in its anti-discrimination mechanisms, and offers a set of recommendations for each of the key institutional actors for improvement in this important field.

Ljubinko Mitrovic, Ombudsmen for Human Rights of BiH, welcomed the report as well-intentioned input aimed at improving the work of the Ombudsman Institution, to the satisfaction of citizens whose submissions to the Institution continue to increase. “This report represents a compelling overview of the situation in the Ombudsman Institution, and includes a number of constructive suggestions with the aim of improving our operation.”

414845 Communication and Media Relations Section

Digitalization and simplification of import, export and transit procedures was the focus of a workshop organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) together with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and with the support of the World Customs Organization and the National Centre for Marketing and Price Study of the Foreign Ministry of Belarus from 19 to 21 March in Minsk, Belarus.

The workshop gathered some 30 participants from different government agencies of Belarus, research institutions, and the business sector. They discussed how to find the right approach to developing paperless trade and a single entry point for submission and receipt of trade documents in Belarus, while ensuring ease of use businesses and interoperability with trade partners. Such a single entry point is a key provision in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.

Ambassador Vladimir Serpikov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, Chief Negotiator in the process of accession to the WTO, said: “I am confident that the seminar will make an important contribution with regard to the adaptation of Belarus to key provisions of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, which is an important element in the negotiation process on the country’s accession to the WTO.”

Participants in the three-day workshop learned about and discussed best practices, new developments, and available international standards with regard to paperless trade and development.  Experts from the World Customs Organization, UNCITRAL, the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union of the European Commission, as well as from government agencies of Belarus put a special focus on the technology neutrality and regional and international interoperability of national solutions.

“Paperless trade and development of a single window will ease procedural burdens and make trade procedures more predictable,” said Jonas Grätz, Economic Adviser at the OCEEA. “Even more so if the development of national systems is done on the basis of international standards and in a compatible and if possible co-ordinated approach with the main trading partners.”

The workshop was organized on the basis of the mandate accorded to the OSCE in a decision adopted by the OSCE participating States at the Ministerial Council in Hamburg in 2016. The decision encourages participating States to support full implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.

This activity is part of an OSCE extra-budgetary project on promoting connectivity in the OSCE. It is funded by Germany, Switzerland and Austria. Belarus is one of the beneficiary countries alongside Moldova and Kazakhstan.

KYIV, 20 March 2019 – The “Puzzle Connection” exhibition, with artworks by young people from across Ukraine, including young artists who had to leave their homes because of hostilities in the eastern part of the country, opens to the public at the Kyiv History Museum from 22 March to 7 April 2019. 

The exhibition is an outcome of a project initiated and implemented by the Youth Contact Group, an informal union of young people supported by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to promote various forms of dialogue on burning issues among youth across Ukraine.

It will feature works by Mariya Boychenko, Mariya Bortsova, Denis Yermak, Nastya Mishchuk, Volodymyr Oliynyk and Maryna Tanevska, who produced their paintings and installations in a process of communication and dialogue on issues that are of importance for Ukrainian youngsters nowadays.

The displayed artworks focus on topics including re-socialization, problems of interaction with own self, relatives and wider society and the impact of internal and external limitations on day-to day existence. 

Media representatives are invited to attend the opening of the exhibition that will take place at 18:00 on Monday, 25 March 2019, at 7 Bohdan Khmelnytsky St., Kyiv, Ukraine (Kyiv History Museum).

Henrik Villadsen, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator of Ukraine, representatives of the diplomatic community and the artists participating in the project will attend the event.

Journalists wishing to cover the ceremony are requested to confirm their participation by e-mail to andrii.dziubenko@osce.org , by 14:00 on Monday, 25 April 2019. For additional information please contact Andrii Dziubenko, National Programme Co-ordinator at  +380506767734.