OSCE

KYIV, 3 June 2019 – Margareta Kiener Nellen and Kyriakos Hadjiyianni, the Chair and Rapporteur of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s human rights committee, respectively, today wrapped up a five-day mission to Ukraine, which included visits to the contact line in the east of the country, a centre for internally displaced persons, and medical facilities. Following the visit, which was supported by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), the PA delegation stressed that renewed conflict resolution efforts, freedom of movement for civilians, and concrete humanitarian measures are urgently needed in Ukraine.

Meeting with human rights organizations in the region, including the NGO Proliska and the Norwegian Refugee Council, Kiener Nellen and Hadjiyianni discussed the international community’s efforts to provide assistance to conflict-affected populations in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In addition to discussions with government and parliamentary officials in Kyiv, they also met with the new Chief Monitor of the SMM Ambassador Yasar Halit Cevik, ICRC Head of Delegation Florence Gillette, and Head of UNHR Monitoring Mission in Ukraine Fiona Frazer.

When visiting the Stanytsia Luhanska Entry-Exit Checkpoint (EECP) in the east of the country, the issue of freedom of movement for the civilian population was under scrutiny since a precarious pedestrian bridge is the only passage along the contact line in the entire Luhansk region. They witnessed the long queue of people waiting to cross, the heavily mined surroundings, as well as the unbearable conditions for the elderly and the disabled persons. They experienced the exhausting walk between the parking lots on both sides, which is exposed to the sun and heat with little shade, and saw people trespassing into mined-marked terrain in search of a few minutes of rest under the shade of nearby trees.

“Repairs at the bridge at the Stanytsia Luhanska EECP and the opening of additional points of passage such as the Schastye bridge near Luhansk or the Zolotoye EECP in the Donetsk region are urgently needed. If the sides respect the human rights of the population, these very concrete steps must be implemented rapidly. With the hottest months of the year still ahead of us, immediate action must be taken to stop the human drama of further deaths and de facto torture at this crossing point,” said Kiener Nellen, who serves as Switzerland’s Head of Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

Hadjiyianni, a member of parliament from Cyprus, called for the protection and maintenance of critical infrastructure such as water filtration facilities and power plants for the survival of the Donbas region. Often adjacent to military positions, this infrastructure is threatened by shelling and the workers ensuring the much-needed repairs are under threat. In mid-April, five employees were wounded in an attack on the Donetsk water filtration plant.“Such violations of international humanitarian law must stop. A durable ceasefire is the precondition to improving the quality of life for people and a safe environment necessary for ensuring the dignity of the living conditions in the region. Life in a heavily militarized environment is already generating immense physical and psychological damage to the populations in the conflict affected areas,” he said.

The PA delegation met in Kyiv with Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Lyudmyla Denisova, Vice-Chair of the OSCE PA Second Committee and Head of the Ukrainian Delegation to the OSCE PA Artur Gerasymov, and Borys Tarasyuk, a member of parliament and former Foreign Minister. Discussions with Ukrainian officials focused on human rights and humanitarian aspects of the conflict and prospects for bringing it to a close. Kiener Nellen and Hadjiyianni stressed the importance of fully implementing the Minsk Agreements and to pursue a political resolution of the five-year old conflict.

The issue of mines also featured prominently during the visit. Ukraine is one of the most severely mine-affected places in the world, with the most recorded anti-vehicle mine incidents for three years in a row and the third globally for overall casualties, behind only Afghanistan and Syria. It is estimated by national authorities that about 7,000 sq. km. in the government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast in eastern Ukraine are contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war.

This week’s mission in Ukraine is the eighth time PA officials have visited the country since January 2018. Kiener Nellen and Hadjiyianni visited Ukraine in December 2018 for a humanitarian-focused mission and the PA observed both rounds of this year’s presidential election.

President George Tsereteli led two delegations to the country last year and Special Representative on Gender Issues Hedy Fry visited last July.

The findings of this mission will be presented during the 28th Annual Session in Luxembourg. Photos are available on Flickr.

BRATISLAVA, 3 June 2019 – OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) spoke today at the Spring Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, calling on both organizations to reinforce their partnership to achieve a safe and secure Europe without divisions.

In his address, Tsereteli underlined that challenges to the European security architecture – including the continued occupation of Georgia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine – call for greater transatlantic and pan-European co-operation.

“The conflicts that you see as being on NATO’s border are at the very heart of the OSCE, both in terms of geography and membership,” said President Tsereteli. “Georgia and Ukraine are integral parts of our organization. Their sufferings and concerns are at the center of our discussions, and their aspiration to join NATO is a sovereign right which should be respected and supported.”

President Tsereteli highlighted the OSCE PA’s engagement in Ukraine and called on NATO parliamentarians to help alleviate the humanitarian situation on the ground.

“As we continuously strive to increase the political will to end conflicts, I appeal to you today to continue to use your influence to more actively engage in peacemaking and normalize people’s life,” said President Tsereteli. “Because while turmoil may only be on NATO’s doorstep, action is necessary to prevent further insecurity spillovers and escalation.”

Despite disagreements with Russian representatives over certain issues, the President emphasized the need for the OSCE PA to remain an inclusive forum, noting that “dialogue must continue to take place as a complement to deterrence.”

“Parliamentarians must continue to extend their hands, be a voice of de-escalation, and offer concrete solutions,” added President Tsereteli.

The address was also an opportunity to outline some of the OSCE PA’s work in the lead up to its Luxembourg Annual Session, including in the field of migration, countering terrorism, as well as efforts to reinforce partnerships in Central Asia.

Yesterday, President Tsereteli met with NATO PA President Madeleine Moon (MP, United Kingdom) and NATO PA Secretary General David Hobbs for talks that focused on the conflict in Ukraine and opportunities for the NATO PA and the OSCE PA to deepen their relationship. In light of the OSCE PA’s upcoming Autumn Meeting in Marrakesh this October, President Tsereteli discussed ways for the two parliamentary assemblies to work together to tackle security challenges in the Mediterranean region.

421607 Communication and Media Relations Section

A specialized training course on appropriate and effective responses to gender-based violence for Romanian police and prosecutors, organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department/Strategic Police Matters Unit, was held from 27 to 31 May 2019 in Poiana Brasov, Romania.

The course is the second of a series of three national specialized training courses, held in the framework of the regional project “Effective Criminal Justice Strategies and Practices to Combat Gender-based Violence in Eastern Europe”, which is financially supported by the European Commission and the Governments of Germany and Austria. The project is currently being implemented in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

Delivered by trainers who have previously completed the regional train-the-trainers course held in March under the same project, the training aimed to enable first responder police officers and prosecutors to better meet the needs of victims of gender-based violence. The focus was on consolidating the participants’ knowledge of and skills in noticing the signs and signals of violence and referring them to specialized support services. Particular attention was paid to the recent changes in the Romanian law on the prevention of and fight against domestic violence and to the practical application of the new provisions, especially in regard to temporary protection orders.

Built on a victim- and rights-centred approach, the course touched upon the need of improving the attitude and behaviour of criminal justice practitioners towards victims of gender-based violence and perpetrators, to avoid secondary victimization.

The four-day course was followed by a one-day workshop, in which the participants were joined by judges and social workers.

Complementary to the course, the one-day workshop highlighted the importance of a co-ordinated and integrated approach when fighting gender-based violence. The workshop strengthened the participants’ understanding of how improving multidisciplinary co-operation and interaction with regard to gender-based violence cases can contribute to better meeting the needs of victims. It highlighted best practices that could significantly improve the ability to counter gender-based violence crimes.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• A man sustained shrapnel injuries in Donetskyi.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by gunfire to civilian properties in Vesele.
• The SMM observed for the first time anti-tank mines near Krasnohorivka and Staromykhailivka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as to enable the recovery and transfer of the body of deceased Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 280 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at easterly directions of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), as well as at south-westerly and westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas around the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

A man sustained shrapnel injuries in Donetskyi

On 31 May, at a hospital in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a man (aged 40-45) with a wound to his left leg. The man told the SMM that on 29 May he had been inside his house at 41 Parkhomenka Street in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) when he had heard an explosion in his yard. Medical staff told the SMM that the man had been admitted to the hospital on the morning of 30 May with shrapnel wounds to his left leg and back.

Civilian properties sustained damage caused by gunfire in Vesele

On 31 May, at 49 Vilnyi Lane in Vesele (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk), in the yard of a one-storey house, the SMM saw that the northern- and eastern-facing side of the asbestos roof of a garage had been destroyed. It also saw a scratch (15cm in width and 1cm in depth) and scorch marks to the north-facing façade of the garage and a crater (approximately 15cm in diameter) in a concrete patio next to the garage, as well as remnants of ammunition, including a copper command wire. The SMM assessed the aforementioned damage as fresh and caused by a round from an anti-tank guided missile system (9M113 Konkurs) fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw a man (aged 63), who introduced himself as a resident of the aforementioned house, with bandages to his left leg, left arm and back. The man told the SMM that he had sustained injuries following an explosion in his yard on the evening of 30 May.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 30-31 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), a projectile at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to be assessed inside or outside the area), as well as about 30 projectiles at an assessed range of 1-4km east and east-south-east (assessed as outside the area but within its 5km periphery).

During the day on 31 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

31 May

The SMM saw an anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) near the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

30 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) and two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant), three ACVs, five IFVs (four BMP variant and one BMP-2), as well as an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a trench digger (PZM-2) near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

31 May

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) north of the Zolote disengagement area; and
• an IFV (type undetermined) 2km east of Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

30 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP variant) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an APC (MT-LB) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters near Kalynove and explosions near Vodiane and Lebedynske

On 30 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted about 100 craters, all assessed as fresh and caused by (82mm and 120mm) mortar and (122mm) artillery rounds, of which 60 were assessed as fired from a north-westerly direction, on the western and south-western edge of Kalynove, about 150m from the closest residential houses.

The same day, an SMM mini-UAV recorded an explosion, assessed as the impact of a (82mm) mortar round  about 1.5km east of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol) and another explosion, assessed as the impact of a (82mm) mortar round about 2km north-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol).

Mines near Krasnohorivka, Staromykhailivka and Vesela Hora and unexploded ordnance in Spartak

On 29 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a total of 245 anti-tank mines in fields about 2-3km west of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 600m east of the aforementioned mines, the same UAV spotted for the first time 20 anti-tank mines in fields about 2km north-east of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the armed formations. On 30 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted again four anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across road H21 near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).

On 31 May, the SMM saw for the first time three pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as not recent and as rounds of multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), all within 15-20m from the nearest residential building in Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), to water pipelines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable preparatory works for the construction of a new power line near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk.

The SMM also facilitated the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of recovery and transfer of human remains across the contact line

On 29 May, the SMM facilitated and monitored the recovery of the body of deceased Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel from an area near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk). On 31 May, the SMM facilitated and monitored the transfer of the body from non-government- to government-controlled areas through the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Convoy carrying humanitarian aid travelled to non-government-controlled areas

At the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a convoy of humanitarian aid consisting of two cars and 22 trucks travelling from government- to non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, reportedly carrying material for water purification and medical equipment.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 31 May, on four occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over non-government-controlled areas near Zernove (33km south of Donetsk), Vasylivka (47km south of Donetsk) and Rozdolne (46km south-east of Donetsk).[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

VIENNA, 31 May 2019 – The Informal Working Group on Scales of Contribution under the leadership of Lukáš Parízek, Slovak State Secretary and Special Representative for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, today discussed new opportunities to finding a durable solution to the question of OSCE scales of contribution.

“The issue of the expired OSCE Scales of Contributions is a long-overdue and polarizing topic. The Slovak OSCE Chairmanship took up this file with modesty, but also determination, from the very beginning,” noted State Secretary Parízek when chairing the meeting today.

As Chair of the Informal Working Group, he used today’s meeting to present Slovakia’s latest vision, which seeks to provide the Organization with a more constructive, but also innovative, approach with respect to its long-term financial stability.

He went on to stress that, since the beginning of the year, the Slovak 2019 OSCE Chairmanship has not spared any effort in finding lasting solutions to challenges diverting the attention from the core business of the OSCE – ensuring security in Europe and beyond - and threatening the very functioning of the Organization. “The proposed reform is not ideal as the world is not ideal. And it never will be. We are here to find a compromise,” concluded State Secretary Parízek.

Already during the high-level meeting on sustainable reform of the OSCE’s scales of contributions in Bratislava on 5 April, Slovakia demonstrated its commitment to ensuring the long-term functioning of the Organization by trying to solve issues that go beyond its one-year Chairmanship to foster political understanding and trust among the participating States and prevent possible future stalemates. This includes a clear framework for discussions and a focus on the political momentum needed for a sustainable solution.

Today, participating States once again reaffirmed their commitment to engaging in the Slovak-led process, and working to find compromise on a way forward for the Organization in 2020 and beyond.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from shelling to civilian properties in non-government-controlled Sentianivka.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Pervomaisk.
• The Mission observed trench extensions in and near the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at checkpoints near non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including about 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). About half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas around the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Damage from shelling to civilian properties in Sentianivka

On 29 May, the SMM saw damage to six houses in Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), three of them on the northern side of Shevchenka Street and three on the street’s southern side.

On the street’s northern side, at No. 18A, the SMM saw two shattered west-facing window panes of a summer kitchen located about 2m north of an inhabited one-storey house as well as impact marks on the west-facing walls of the summer kitchen and of the house. In a field about 50m north of the house, the Mission saw two craters. It assessed them as fresh; however, it could not determine the type of weapon or the direction of fire. At No. 18B, the SMM saw two shattered east-facing window panes of an inhabited one-storey house. At No. 14, it saw two impact marks as well as seven shattered outer panes of two windows on the south-facing brick wall of an inhabited one-storey house.

About 2m south of the house at 16 Shevchenko Street, the SMM saw a destroyed concrete base of a wooden electric pole. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by shelling; however, it could not determine the weapon used or the direction of fire.

On the street’s southern side, at No. 5, the Mission saw two holes in a north-facing metal gate about 3m west of an inhabited one-storey house. At No. 7, it saw two impact marks in a north-facing concrete fence about 5m west of an inhabited one-storey house. At No. 9, the SMM saw two cracked north-facing window panes of an inhabited one-storey house.

The Mission assessed all the above-mentioned damage to houses as fresh and caused by shrapnel. A man and a woman (in their thirties/forties) who introduced themselves as residents of the street told the Mission that they had heard shelling early in the morning on the same day.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Pervomaisk

While conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard 20 bursts of small-arms fire about 800m east-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 200m north-east of its position. The SMM landed the UAV safely and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 29 and 30 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 23 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east. During the day on 30 May, positioned on the eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard 17 undetermined explosions and 15 shots of small-arms fire. All the above-mentioned ceasefire violations were assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery. 

On 27 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed that a previously reported trench, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, that protruded through the northern edge of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 350m west of the area’s eastern edge (see SMM Daily Report 18 September 2018) had been extended by about 13m inside the area. The imagery also revealed an 18m extension of a trench inside the disengagement area, near previously reported positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018).

Outside the Petrivske disengagement area, about 0.8-1.6km east of its eastern edge, the imagery revealed extensions, about 30m and 40m in length respectively, of two previously reported trenches (see SMM Daily Report 22 May 2019), which were assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

During the day on 30 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

29 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a tank (T-64) in a compound in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

30 May

The SMM noted that 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

30 May

The SMM saw 31 tanks (T-64) and noted that 80 tanks (T-64), 26 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and six 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) and six towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

29 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk) and
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a fresh crater, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round, in a field about 200m south of positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Troitske.

30 May

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Mines near Marinka and Olenivka

On 25 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 60 anti-tank mines laid in a field running in a south-easterly direction south of road H15 about 400m east of the most forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). In the same field, the UAV also spotted ten previously observed anti-tank mines (seen in imagery from 30 March 2018).

On 27 May, on the north-western outskirts of Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), on the northern edge of a road leading west to Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time ten anti-tank mines. About 200m west of this location, the same UAV spotted for the first time 25 anti-tank mines laid on the same road, in addition to three anti-tank mines spotted by an SMM mini-UAV on 28 May 2019.

Mine signs near Novohnativka, Starohnativka and Luhanske

The Mission saw for the first time: a mine hazard sign (a red plate with “Danger mines!” in Ukrainian and English) next to a local road leading to an agricultural compound about 1.5km north-east of Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk); an improvised mine hazard sign affixed to a tree at a junction of local roads about 3.5km north-west of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk); and a warning board and an improvised mine hazard sign (“Stop mines!” in Ukrainian and “Danger Mines” in English) next to a local road about 3km east of Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM saw 53 cars (19 with Ukrainian, 11 with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as 21 with “DPR” and one with “Abkhaz” plates), 25 covered-cargo trucks (18 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates), two buses with Russian Federation licence plates and 37 pedestrians (mixed ages, including four children) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 44 cars (ten with Ukrainian, 24 with Russian Federation and three with Lithuanian licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates), seven covered-cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates), six buses (two with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates) and eight pedestrians (mixed ages, including four children) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians entering Ukraine and a pedestrian exiting Ukraine.

Arson attack at an Alfa-Bank branch in Lviv

The Mission continued to follow up on an arson attack at a branch of Alfa-Bank bank in Lviv (see SMM Daily Report 30 May 2019). On 30 May, the SMM saw that the interior of the bank was extensively damaged by fire: interior walls were covered in soot and scorch marks and almost all of the ceiling panels were lying shattered on the floor. The SMM saw workers conducting repair works inside.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM, allowing it to proceed only after about 80 minutes.

Other impediments:

• On 30 May, on four occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that one site was abandoned

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

ALMATY, Kazakhstan, 31 May 2019 – The 10th Annual Central Asian Forum on Internet Development concluded in Almaty today. The Forum was held with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in co-operation with the International Centre for Journalism MediaNet and the Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung in Kazakhstan.

The theme of the Forum was “Digital Literacy: Competence, Security, Consumption.” Participants discussed the role of the state, media, and society in the development of the information environment, the influence of the Internet on public life, media and information literacy, fact-checking and freedom of expression in Central Asia. The issues of cyber security and protection of personal data, counteracting disinformation, deep-fakes, hate speech, and violent extremism were also considered.

Some 200 participants took part in the two-day event, including government officials, civil society representatives, media-related non-governmental organizations, professional associations, the diplomatic corps, experts, lawyers and journalists from all Central Asian countries, Belarus, the Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, Singapore,  and Ukraine, as well as a representative from the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.

Diana Digol, Deputy Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan said: “The Internet creates new opportunities for media development and facilitates rapid delivery of information to the public, including through social networks. However, it is also the source of substantial challenges and even threats to freedom of expression and freedom of speech. With this in mind, it is critical to building capacity on the mechanisms of legal regulation of media on the Internet.”

Thomas Helm, the Resident Representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Kazakhstan, said: “One of the biggest challenges of the digital age is to let all people participate in it. Good digital communication is not a playground for a few but is one of the core competencies of our time. The fight against digital poverty, therefore, needs to be an integral part of a good media policy.”

The Forum was part of the Office’s work in promoting freedom of expression and freedom of media in Kazakhstan and the Central Asia region.

421382 Željka Šulc

A training course on the latest trends in the use of information and communication technology (ICT) to fight trafficking in human beings concluded on 31 May 2019 in Doboj, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The course was organized by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in co-operation with the Entity Judicial and Prosecutorial Training Centres (JPTCs), the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

More than 20 prosecutors and judges from across Bosnia and Herzegovina took part in the event. The aim of the course was to increase the participants’ practical and theoretical knowledge of the variety and sophistication of ICT tools so that they are better equipped to combat trafficking in human beings. The prosecutors also discussed how to better co-ordinate between their offices and courts to ensure that ICT-facilitated human trafficking offences are understood and prosecuted effectively.  

The training workshop focused on the use of technology to recruit, control and exploit victims of human trafficking, special techniques in online investigations, using evidence from the internet; and the use of digital forensics tools to track proceeds of crime on the internet. 

The Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH, Ambassador Bruce G. Berton, emphasized the OSCE’s commitment to helping the country’s efforts in prosecuting and preventing the crime of human trafficking via the use of modern technology: “ICT is becoming a dominant topic among anti-trafficking partners. The misuse of technology by traffickers has a strong potential to increase the recruitment of victims and their exploitation. Therefore, improving the knowledge of anti-trafficking practitioners in this field is invaluable.”

“Today’s training is of particular relevance as it focuses on the use of ICT, which enables organized crime groups to commit crimes transnationally,” said Branko Peric, Judge of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations Regional Attaché, Katie Bay, stated that her organization was proud to join forces with the OSCE Mission to BiH, the Judicial and Prosecutorial Training Centres and the IOM to educate and shed light on the significant issue of trafficking in human beings:  “Criminals continue to take advantage of their fellow citizens by using more sophisticated forms of information and communication technology to avoid detection and to conduct abusive practices. Given that, law enforcement and other government entities must also learn to combat these threats online throughout the cyber world.  By sharing best practices, trends and investigative techniques, our organizations stand a better chance to combat offences involving the trafficking in human beings and to make all of our communities safer and a better place to live.”

Global co-operation in combating THB, tracking the money in trafficking cases and overlapping investigation in trafficking were also discussed. The increased challenges require an effective response, which implies more training for staff in criminal justice systems and for prosecutors in order to ensure a proactive approach in addressing these types of crimes.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported two-day training seminar on modern methods of identifying, suppressing and investigating corruption offences concluded on 31 May 2019 in Nur-Sultan.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in partnership with the National Anti-corruption Bureau under the Civil Service Affairs and Anti-Corruption Agency.

Some 40 representatives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau attended the event and focused on the use of modern tools to identify corruption offences. The invited national and international experts covered topics such as analytical intelligence and forecasting, the use of internet resources, monitoring tools and corruption risk factors.

A special section was dedicated to the identification of corruption risks during procurement. An OSCE-sponsored expert from Ukraine provided an overview of procurement practices in Ukraine and identified differences between these and the procurement administration in Kazakhstan.

The training seminar is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year effort to promote good governance by focusing on anti-corruption activities in Kazakhstan.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM followed up on reports of two injured civilians (including a child), as well as observed damage from shelling to residential houses in Horlivka and Yasynuvata.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines for the first time near non-government-controlled Sentianivka and Olenivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• In Lviv, the SMM followed up on reports of an arson attack at an Alfa-Bank branch.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Novoazovsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 140), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The highest numbers of ceasefire violations, including one third of the explosions, were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at north-easterly and easterly directions of Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions).

Woman and child injured and damage to residential houses due to shelling in Horlivka

At 13 Pokitko Street in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage and scorch marks to the north-facing outer wall of a single-storey house, as well as a shattered window and a missing window frame covered with a plastic sheet in the same wall. In the living room of the house, the Mission also observed fresh shrapnel damage around the interior of the same window frame and wooden planks in place of the missing window pane, as well as shrapnel damage to the wooden frame of a door which had been removed. Inside the bedroom, the SMM also saw cracks in the panes of a door and a hole in the lower panes. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by the explosion of a round (weapon type undetermined) fired from a northerly direction.

About 5m north-west of the abovementioned house, the SMM saw a north-facing shattered window of a single-storey house and assessed the damage as caused by a round (weapon type undetermined) fired from a northerly direction. The SMM also saw a south-facing shattered window of another single-storey house, about 13m north-east of the first house, but was unable to assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

At the house on 13 Pokitko Street, the SMM saw a woman (aged 30) and a girl (aged 5) with a cut above her left eyebrow. The woman said that the entire family had been at home in the late evening hours of 27 May when they had heard an explosion outside. She said that her mother-in-law had been in the living room at the time of the explosion and had suffered injuries to her head, shoulder and hand, and had been brought to the hospital in Horlivka that same evening, while her daughter, who had inadvertently cut herself with the glass shards from the bedroom door, had been brought to the hospital the following evening as a result of prolonged distress following the event.

At the hospital in Horlivka, medical staff told the SMM that the woman (aged 70) had been admitted to the hospital in the late evening hours of 27 May with a concussion and broken collarbone, as well as shrapnel wounds to her head, left shoulder and hand, and that the girl had been brought to the hospital on the evening of 28 May due to shock.

Fresh damage caused by shelling to a residential house in Yasynuvata

On the north-western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), a part of the town located less than 500m from the forward positions of the armed formations, the SMM saw a hole assessed as fresh in the north-north-west-facing side of the roof (made of asbestos sheets) of a single-storey house at 7 Slovianska Street. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire. The owner of the house (woman, aged 35) told the SMM that she had heard shelling in the evening hours of 28 May.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 28 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two illumination flares at an assessed range of 4-6km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and eight projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east and east (assessed as within its 5km periphery).

During the day of 29 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

27 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk).

29 May

The SMM saw a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) on road H-20 in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed a tank in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk). Aerial imagery also revealed 85 craters (not seen in imagery from 15 May 2019) in fields near the training area, assessed as caused by impacts of undetermined weapons (and the result of probable live-fire exercise).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

29 May

The SMM noted that eight towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were present and that four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were missing for the first time. It also noted that 86 towed howitzers (four 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; 37 2A36; and  45 D-20, 152mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and 16 anti-tank guns (four MT-12 and 12 D-48, 85mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

28 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (probable BMP-2) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk).

27 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) and two probable ACVs near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 160m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote,  as well as two recent craters (not seen in previous imagery from 13 May 2019) assessed as caused by impacts of undetermined weapons about 300m west of its western edge (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 16 May 2019).

29 May

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk) and
• an APC (BTR variant) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four ACVs in a training area near Novoselivka.

28 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 21 APCs (20 MT-LB, including one with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top, and a BTR-80), seven IFVs (six BMP-2 and a BMP-1), an armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2U) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four IFVs (two BMP-1, a BMP-2 and a BMP variant) near Obozne (18km north of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs

On 28 May, about 2km north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 40 anti-tank mines laid across road T1303.

On 29 May, about 1km south-west of a forward position of the armed formations on road H-20 near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time two anti-tank mines (TM-62M) in the median between road lanes (for previous observations, see SMM Spot Report 25 February 2019), as well as a mine hazard sign with “Be careful, mines”. About 20m west-south-west in the median between road lanes, the SMM saw two additional mine hazard signs with “Danger, Mines”, all written in Russian.

On 29 May, the SMM saw that ten previously observed mine hazard signs (one about 15m north of road H-15 near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), five about 3km east of Pobeda (government-controlled, 27km west of Donetsk) and four about 4km north-east of Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk)) had been removed.

About 4.5km north-east of Novomykhailivka, the SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign with “Danger, Mines” written in Ukrainian and English attached to a tree about 8m north of road O0531.

In Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time two signs with “Walking and Driving is Forbidden” written in Ukrainian located about 1m north-west of the road. While at the same location, it saw a civilian car moving on the road and passing the mine hazard signs.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a gas pipeline in Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), as well as in Obozne.

The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Follow up on reports of an arson attack at an Alfa-Bank branch in Lviv

In Lviv on 28 May, the SMM followed up on media reports of an arson attack in the early morning hours of the same day on a branch of Alfa-Bank bank at 13 Halytska Square. The SMM saw that the bank was closed and that one of its windows was covered with canvas. It also saw that two people were cleaning scorch marks on the wall above the same window. According to a police statement, the attack is being investigated as an act of deliberate or intentional destruction of property under Article 194 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily 30 November 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Novoazovsk and east to the border with the Russian Federation, citing “an ongoing operation in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 28-29 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying along the contact line over government and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk region. [6]
• On 29 May, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference on two occasions, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk ).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that three such sites were abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

421280 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Practitioners and experts from OSCE field operations, civil society and international organizations discussed gender-specific challenges to the enjoyment of the right to freedom of movement in the OSCE area during an expert meeting in Warsaw on 30 May 2019. The meeting was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

The aim of the event was to examine these challenges and to recommend areas where ODIHR can support participating States in developing gender-sensitive policies to facilitate freedom of movement in the OSCE area.  

The right to freedom of movement is well-entrenched in international human rights law. It includes freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state, the right to leave any country and the right to return to one’s country. OSCE commitments to enhance freedom of movement and human contacts date back to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.  These commitments include the facilitation of travel for personal and professional reasons, including family reunification, and access to educational and employment opportunities. Participants brought to the discussion examples of best practices that participating States can apply to make their policies in this area more gender-sensitive.

“Freedom of movement, like all human rights, is a right that should be enjoyed equally, regardless of gender,” said Meaghan Fitzgerald, Deputy Head of ODIHR’s Democratization Department. “It is only by identifying where inequalities may exist in the OSCE region that legislation, policies and behaviours can be changed.”

Participants discussed the need for gender-sensitive policies to ensure equal access to civil registration and identification documents, equal access to visas and to asylum procedures, gender-sensitive policies to end statelessness and to facilitate the freedom of movement of displaced persons and in conflict situations.

“Possessing safe and secure identification documents is a prerequisite to moving freely in today’s world,” said Irina Dincu, Senior Programme Specialist at the International Development Research Centre. “Women in many parts of the world  encounter serious barriers in obtaining these documents, which has an impact not only on their right to freedom of movement, but also on accessing basic services, such as health care, education, pensions, as well as inheriting property. This must change.”

A full report of the meeting and its recommendations will be published on ODIHR’s website.

YEREVAN / BAKU, 30 May 2019 - The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stéphane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America), together with the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Andrzej Kasprzyk, visited the region from 27 to 30 May. 

The Co-Chairs met with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan on 27 May and with President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on 30 May. In both capitals, they held consultations with the respective Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers. On May 28, the Co-Chairs met with the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. In Baku, the Co-Chairs met with the Chairman of the Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh. While in Nagorno-Karabakh, the mediators were briefed on humanitarian issues by the local representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The main purpose of the visit was to assess the evolution of the situation on the line of contact and the international border, and to follow up on the discussions held by the Azerbaijani President and the Armenian Prime Minister in Vienna on 29 March and their respective Foreign Ministers in Moscow on 15 April.

As requested, the Co-Chairs provided proposals for concrete next steps in the settlement process, including on humanitarian and security measures. The Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted the Co-Chairs’ proposal to meet soon under their auspices, and will announce details at the appropriate time.

The Co-Chairs expressed deep concern about recent casualties and called on the parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid escalation.

VIENNA, 30 May 2019 – The OSCE bid farewell to the Chief Monitor of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, at a meeting of the Permanent Council in Vienna today with addresses by OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovakia’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák and OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger.

Speaking about the significance of Ambassador Apakan’s role as the first Chief Monitor of the SMM, Minister Lajčák noted: “Five years ago, he took on the challenge of a lifetime. And he did so without knowing what, exactly, it would entail. We were in unchartered waters. But, Ambassador Apakan steered us through them. And he did so with many achievements along the way.”

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office presented Ambassador Apakan the golden medal of the Slovak Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, the highest recognition of the Slovak Foreign Service.

Noting that today’s meeting could not distract from the fact that people continue to suffer from the crisis in and around Ukraine, Minister Lajčák called on attendees to honour Ambassador Apakan’s legacy as Chief Monitor by simply living it. This, he said, meant “putting people - and the need to end their suffering – first”.

OSCE Secretary General Greminger presented the outgoing Chief Monitor with the OSCE Medal.

“As the Chair of the Permanent Council when Switzerland’s OSCE Chairmanship launched the SMM in 2014, I remember well your arrival in Kyiv,” recalled the Secretary General. “Your leadership was a critical ingredient in the rapid rollout and steady expansion of the largest field operation in the history of the OSCE.”

“The trust you have inspired throughout Ukraine, and among our international partners, created a strong foundation for the SMM to operate effectively. I commend – and am inspired by – your personal commitment to the people of Ukraine, and your devotion to ensuring that our efforts remain focused on helping civilians in conflict-affected areas,” he said.

Apakan thanked the OSCE and the participating States for their continuous support.

“In the most difficult situations, when immediate security or operational responses were needed, I always felt the guidance of the OSCE Chairmanships, the support of the Secretariat, and the attention and care of the participating States,” he said. 

“Every day our monitors interact with the people, every day they speak to civilians at the contact line, crossing entry-exit checkpoints, going about their lives. We speak with those that continue to work for their communities, to maintain connectivity despite divides. We speak with civil society, authorities, and security actors. This ceremony is a celebration of the work of the hundreds of dedicated men and women, international and Ukrainian, that are part of the SMM. I pay tribute to all of them.”

The previous day at an informal meeting of the Permanent Council, Apakan told representatives of the participating States that although much remained to be done to end the crisis, he was hopeful. “I arrived in Ukraine when the streets around Maidan were still a testimony to recent events,” he said. “I leave the country with the hope that a sustainable ceasefire will soon be a reality.”

Apakan, former Undersecretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, will be succeeded as SMM Chief Monitor by Ambassador Yaşar Halit Çevik, also of Turkey.

The SMM, the OSCE’s largest field presence, was established by an OSCE Permanent Council decision on 21 March 2014. It contributes to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security; supporting the implementation of all OSCE principles and commitments; and facilitating dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promote normalization of the situation.

COPENHAGEN, 29 May 2019 – Some 50 OSCE parliamentarians from 23 countries will deploy to Kazakhstan for the 9 June early presidential election.

OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) will serve as Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, following an appointment by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak. Tsereteli has led a number of observer missions in the past, including to Ukraine, Moldova, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

“Coming after the unexpected resignation of long-serving President Nursultan Nazarbayev, this election marks a pivotal moment for the people of Kazakhstan,” Tsereteli said. “The conduct of this election is therefore important for voters’ overall confidence in the electoral system.”

Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland) will serve as Head of the OSCE PA observer mission to the election in Kazakhstan.

“The large number of OSCE parliamentarians participating in this election observation mission is a testament to the importance we attach to Kazakhstan’s democratic development,” Kiener Nellen said. “We look forward to observing the election and offering a full and impartial assessment.”

Kiener Nellen serves as the Head of Switzerland’s Delegation to the OSCE PA and is Chair of the OSCE PA’s human rights committee. Last year, she headed the OSCE PA’s delegation of election observers to Azerbaijan.

This is the tenth time the OSCE PA has sent election observation missions to Kazakhstan. The PA’s observation activity in Kazakhstan dates back to 1994. For the 9 June election, the OSCE PA will work closely in Kazakhstan with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Observers will assess the election against commitments contained in the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document and will present their findings at a press conference in Nur-Sultan on 10 June.

For previous OSCE assessments of elections in Kazakhstan, please click here.

CHISINAU, 29 May 2019 – The Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, today welcomed the decision of the Government of the Republic of Moldova to adopt the “Instruction on the certification of civil status facts occurred and recorded in the localities on the left bank of the Dniester and in Bender municipality”.

“By adopting this decision, the Government is safeguarding the human rights of people living in Transdniestria. I highly welcome this important step,” Neukirch said.

The instruction, adopted on 29 May, will simplify the procedure of recognizing and registering marriages, divorces, births, and deaths recorded in Transdniestria. The Head of Mission underlined that the new procedures will help to improve the access of people to education, healthcare and other vital basic services and reminded that the importance of recognizing the legitimacy of legal arrangements, such as civil status facts, has been stressed in several judgements of the European Court of Human Rights.

“Over the past weeks Chisinau and Tiraspol have demonstrated leadership by making decisions that have improved the situation for people on the ground. I am confident this measure will further strengthen the trust and confidence built over the past years in the Transdniestrian settlement process,” Neukirch said.

Issues related to the civil status and documentation of the population are regularly discussed by the Sides in the framework of thematic expert working groups, which remain a viable platform for dialogue in the Transdniestrian settlement process.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, as well as a new trench and position inside the latter.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines for the first time near non-government-controlled Olenivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted twice at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), west and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and east-south-east and south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period (23 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and at easterly and southerly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 27 May, an SMM mini-unmanned-aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted for the first time a trench about 75m in length and a position, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not seen on imagery from 7 March 2019), east of the railway tracks inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and about 250m south of its northern edge. In the early morning hours of 28 May, positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4.5-5km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 27 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 43 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-2.5km south-east, south-south-east and south (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 34 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-2.5km east (assessed as within its 5km periphery).

On 28 May, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

27 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted six tanks (types undetermined) near Lutuhyne (20km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

27 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• nine armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk), and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) near Shumy (41km north of Donetsk).

28 May

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Khriashchuvate (10km south-east of Luhansk).

28 May

The SMM saw an ACV near Naberezhne (77km south of Donetsk).

Presence of mines near Olenivka and unexploded ordnance near Tavrycheske

On 27 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time three anti-tank mines laid in a row across an unpaved road about 1km north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

On 28 May, the SMM again saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a 120mm mortar round, embedded in the asphalt in the middle of the carriageway of road T0519 near Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and a water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk). Due to ceasefire violations in the area, the SMM was unable to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 26 May, the SMM observed a calm situation in coastal areas near Henichesk (178km south-east of Kherson). On 27 May, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 27-28 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying along the contact line over government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. [5]
• On 28 May, an SMM mini-UAV and mid-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying along the contact line over non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

421085 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported meeting on the presentation of expert study on freedom of expression and policies to counter incitement of hatred speech took place on 29 May 2019 in Nur-Sultan.

Some 30 journalists, government officials, lawyers, representatives of civil society, international organizations and diplomatic corps discussed freedom of expression on national, religious, social relations in the fight against violent extremism. National experts from Kazakhstan delivered presentations on finding a balance between freedom of speech and preventing of hate speech, legal aspects of incitement cases and analysing examples of using hatred speech contexts in the media.

It was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, the International Foundation for the Protection of Freedom of Speech Adil Soz, the Netherlands Embassy in Nur-Sultan and the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan.

The event is a part of the Office’s activities aimed at promoting media freedom and freedom of expression in line with OSCE principles and commitments.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from small-arms fire to civilian properties in non-government-controlled Dokuchaievsk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including about half of the explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (23), compared with the previous 24 hours (nine explosions).

Damage from small-arms fire to civilian properties in Dokuchaievsk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

On 27 May, at an apartment located on the ground floor of a multi-storey residential building at 102 Lenina Street in the north-western part of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in the lower part of a south-facing window pane and another hole in the upper part of the window frame. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. At the apartment, a woman (in her sixties) who introduced herself as a relative of the apartment’s owner told the Mission that she had spotted the damage on the evening of 26 May as she walked past the building.

On the same day, at a shop located on the ground floor of a four-storey residential building at 4 Myru Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a hole in a north-facing window pane as well as a 7.62mm bullet on the floor. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. A woman (in her fifties) who introduced herself as a shop assistant told the Mission that she had spotted the damage earlier in the morning.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 26 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed distance of 0.5-3km east and south-east, within 5km of the periphery of the disengagement area.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

27 May

The SMM saw:

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and
• four MLRS (BM-21) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

26 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) and a probable surface-to-air missile system (type undetermined) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

25 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Shyroke (34km south-east of Luhansk).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

27 May

The SMM noted that 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), six mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) and 37 tanks (33 T-72 and four T-64) remained missing.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

27 May

The SMM noted that all weapons were present.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

27 May

The SMM saw four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and noted that four MLRS (BM-21), 67 towed howitzers (55 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), 20 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and eight surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) remained missing.

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

27 May

The SMM noted that eight towed howitzers (six 2A65 and two D-30) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

26 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk);
• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Novoselivka Druha (36km north-east of Mariupol); and
• two ACVs in Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time two trenches, totalling 50m, about 3km north-west of Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 5 March 2019).

25 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) in Sosnivske (35km north-east of Mariupol).

26 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 13 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (four BTR variants and nine MT-LB), 22 IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Donetsk city’s Leninskyi district (4km south of Donetsk city centre); and
• two ACVs near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time five 25m-long trenches in a field about 2km north-west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) dug next to existing trenches (seen in imagery from 4 May 2018).

Fresh craters near Sosnivske

On 25 May, in fields north of Sosnivske, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 50 craters (not seen in imagery from 21 April 2019) assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds. Some of these craters were as close as 5-10m from residential areas.

Mines near Veselohorivka, Marinka and Novooleksandrivka

On 24 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 200 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) in six rows running north to south about 3km north-west of Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

On 25 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted again 34 anti-tank mines on the northern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk): 18 were laid out in two rows across a road leading to Donetsk city (non-government-controlled), about 35m south-east of the nearest residential houses; four were laid across the same road about 200m further east-north-east; and 12 (four of which were fixed to a wooden board) laid on a side road located between the above-mentioned two sets of anti-tank mines. About 1.2km east of these mines, in a field north of the above-mentioned road, the UAV spotted 17 anti-tank mines assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 March 2019 and SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019).

The same UAV also spotted for the first time 18 anti-tank mines on the northern side of road H15 next to the most forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 March 2019).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a gas distribution station near Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitated and monitored transfer of body from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the transfer of a body from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 80 minutes, the SMM saw 15 cars (four with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR“ plates), a bus with “DPR” plates and 11 pedestrians entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 20 cars (two with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 with “DPR“ plates), four covered-cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), two buses (with “DPR“ plates) and two pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 60 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (three with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR“ plates), eight covered-cargo trucks (five with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and a bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw six cars (one with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and a bus with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the night between 26 and 27 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying along the contact line over government and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that two sites in government-controlled areas were abandoned

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 10,896 to 10,514 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 45 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 18 this week compared to six last week: thirteen of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and five into Ukraine (50 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, two families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine (like during the previous reporting period).

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (347 compared to 351 observed during the previous week). There were 183 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 164 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 960 trucks (842 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (289 at the Gukovo BCP and 671 at the Donetsk BCP); 478 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 482 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates. In addition, during the reporting week, trucks with Georgian licence plates were also observed.                                                                                           

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 61 (compared to 50 during the   previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 153 to 143: of the total number of trucks scanned, 95 trucks (66 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 48 trucks (34 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly decreased from 137 to 132 vehicles; 73 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 59 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 35 occasions; the OTs assessed that 22 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 13 to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, cars with licence plates from Georgia, Belarus, Armenia and Lithuania were also noted.

On 24 May 2019 at 13:42, the OT observed an ambulance entering the Gukovo BCP area from the Russian Federation and driving behind the main building. At 13:59, the ambulance drove back to the Russian Federation.

On 26 May at 15:06, the OT observed an ambulance entering the Donetsk BCP area from the Russian Federation and driving behind the main building. At 15:29 same day, the vehicle returned towards to the Russian Federation. The OT was unable to notice any other details from its position.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 23 April 2019 to 28 May 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

VIENNA, 28 May 2019 – In the presence of OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovakia’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák, the OSCE will bid farewell to the Chief Monitor of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, at a meeting of the Permanent Council on Thursday, 30 May in Vienna.

OSCE Chair Lajčák will award Apakan the golden medal of the Slovak Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, the highest recognition of the Slovak Foreign Service. OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger will present the outgoing Chief Monitor with the OSCE Medal.

Journalists are invited to cover the speeches and medal ceremony set to begin at 11:30 on 30 May at the Neuer Saal, on the second floor of the Hofburg Conference Centre.

A press conference by Lajčák, Greminger, and Apakan will take place after the Permanent Council, at 12:45 in Room 533, on the fifth floor. The press conference will be held in English.

Journalists wishing to attend are required to send an e-mail confirming their attendance to press@osce.org, no later than tomorrow, 29 May at 18:00.

Apakan, former Undersecretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, served five years as the OSCE’s Chief Monitor of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. He will be succeeded by Ambassador Yaşar Halit Çevik.

The SMM, the OSCE’s largest field presence, was established by an OSCE Permanent Council decision on 21 March 2014. It contributes to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security; supporting the implementation of all OSCE principles and commitments; and facilitating dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promote normalization of the situation.

Updates and the latest news from the Slovak Chairmanship can be followed via www.osce.org/cio and the Twitter account @Slovakia_OSCE.

The OSCE Permanent Council is a decision-making body gathering representatives of all 57 participating States of the Organization and 11 Partners for Co-operation. It convenes weekly in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and make decisions.