OSCE

422699 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Forty psychologists and social workers from NGOs and shelters specialized in counselling victims of domestic violence participated in two OSCE-supported workshops in Tiraspol from 3 to 5 June and in Ribnita from 6 to 8 June 2019. They learned about best practices in assisting women in managing trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Slightly more than three-quarters of women in Moldova think that violence against women is very common in the country, says the recent OSCE-led Survey on Well Being and Safety of Women, which covers seven OSCE participating States. Prevention and combating domestic violence is also among the issues discussed at Human Rights and Social Protection Working Groups within the Transdniestrian settlement process.

During the two workshops, which brought together a mixed group of professionals from the left-bank cities as well as the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, the trainer organized role plays and offered individual coaching sessions on supervising victims of domestic violence during the recovery stage, in particular, techniques of exercising self-control and avoiding dependant relationships. The participants also discussed ways to overcome professional burnout. 

“The trainer built a rapport with us and was sensitive to our learning needs. She taught us how to understand and share one another’s feelings, which is a very important technique in working with our beneficiaries,” said Olga Purakhina, the Director of the NGO Vialex in Ribnita and a co-organizer of the workshop.

In previous years, the Mission has trained around 110 shelter staff from both banks, namely psychologists and social assistants from Chisinau, Comrat, Drochia, Causeni, Ribnita and Tiraspol. Participants in the workshops demonstrated a high interest in continuing to share experiences and maintain dialogue on how to fight this phenomenon, which prompted the Mission to organize more training opportunities.

The activity is in line with the 2004 OSCE Action Plan for promoting gender equality, which states that the “OSCE structures will continue to assist participating States in developing programmes and activities aimed at the prevention of all forms of gender-based violence”.

An exhibition with students’ artworks on the topic of corruption opened at Jordan Misja Fine Arts School in Tirana on 10 June 2019. The exhibition showcased 30 of the best works out of 70 that the school’s students created as part of a competition organized by the OSCE Presence in Albania. Through this exhibition, the Presence aims to raise awareness of the topic of corruption by fostering discussion and reflection among the students and the public.

The Presence recognizes art as a powerful tool for raising awareness, reflecting and reacting to different issues. Over the past two years, it has organized similar art contests with the Academy of Arts on the topics of violent extremism, dealing with the past and environmental crime. 

“Corruption is something that you are confronted with already at a young age, so we felt we should do the art contest this time with even younger young artists,” said Head of Presence Ambassador Bernd Borchardt as he opened the exhibition. “Corruption is one of the central focus points of our work at the OSCE Presence. We see with regret that Albania, over the past two years, degraded in this field. The Transparency International Index saw a drop for Albania since 2016. We know that this year more efforts have been made by the police, by inspections, by the prosecution to bring people to book, but we feel that this is an issue that needs a multifaceted approach. And one of these facets is dealing with corruption through art.”

A professional jury awarded the first prize to Erlind Fusha, the second prize to Denajda Hajdari, and runner-up prizes to Adelajda Roçi and Eljon Alushi.

The exhibition can be viewed by members of the public at the Jordan Misja Fine Arts School in Tirana until 17 June 2019.

422558 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

OSCE concludes training seminars on legal regulation of media on the internet in Kazakhstan

An OSCE-supported seminar on the mechanisms for the legal regulation and digital security of media on the internet took place on 10 June 2019 in Taldykorgan, Kazakhstan. The event was co-organized with the NGO Legal Media Centre.

Some 20 journalists and bloggers were familiarized with the national and international media framework, including practical and legislative aspects of media regulation on the internet. The event included sessions on access to information, restrictions on freedom of expression, protection of personal data and working with different digital sources of information and fact-checking. The protection of civil rights in the media field was also discussed. Together with national experts, the participants examined court cases on hate speech, and instruments of working with the open government database.

The seminar was a follow-up to similar events held in Pavlodar and Aktobe earlier this year.

The event is a part of the Office’s activities aimed at promoting media freedom and freedom of expression in line with OSCE principles and commitments.

Note that the deadline for media registrations has been extended to 25 June. Please see further details below.

VIENNA, 11 June 2019 – Foreign ministers from all over the OSCE region will gather in Slovakia’s Tatras Mountains on Tuesday, 9 July 2019 to discuss the future of the OSCE’s work in a changing multilateral landscape.

Placing great importance on real, interactive dialogue, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovak Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák will convene ministers to engage interactively on issues of pressing concern under the theme, From past action to future prevention: the OSCE´s niche in fostering stability in Europe and beyond.

The gathering, one of the most important events on the agenda of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, will cover all three of its priorities for 2019, namely conflict prevention and resolution, providing for a safer future, and effective multilateralism. It will allow ministers to reflect on best practices and lessons learned over the past four decades of regional multilateral co-operation on issues of security. The discussion will encourage all participants to look ahead at the changing nature of security threats and to consider the future role and relevance of the OSCE as a regional security actor for conflict prevention within the European security architecture.

By choosing the High Tatras as the location for the Informal Ministerial, the Chairmanship aims to create an informal, relaxed atmosphere, conducive to an ideas-based dialogue.

Media representatives are invited to cover the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office receiving participating ministers at 09:00 on Tuesday, 9 July at the Grand Hotel Kempinski, High Tatras, the opening of the main plenary, as well as the family photo.

A press conference by Chairperson Lajčák will take place later that day, at 15:00 in the press briefing room of the Grand Hotel Kempinski, High Tatras. The press conference will be held in English.

A Media centre will be located at the nearby Hotel Solisko from 16:30 to 18:30 on Monday, 8 July and from 08:00 to 19:00 on Tuesday, 9 July.

Media representatives wishing to attend are required to register at https://media.mzv.sk by 25 June. Accreditation badges will be available for collection from the Media centre at the Hotel Solisko.

The practice of convening informal ministerial meetings is relatively novel, and has been taken up by only a handful of former OSCE Chairpersons-in-Office. The broad aim of these meetings has been to foster informal, high-level dialogue among ministers on issues of relevance to the formal, annual Ministerial Council later in the year and the broader work of the OSCE.  

Updates and the latest news from the Slovak Chairmanship can be followed via www.osce.org/cio and the Twitter account @Slovakia_OSCE.

For any further information or requests, please refer to the following contact points:

Slovak media contact point: Róbert Zoľák, Media Advisor at Slovakia’s Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs, robert.zolak@mzv.sk

International media contact point: Katharina Kandt, Senior Advisor at Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, katharina.kandt@mzv.sk

Bratislava/Nicosia, 10 June 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák expressed his concern today regarding the latest developments in Albania, which may deepen the political crisis further and bring the functioning of the state institutions to a standstill.

The Chairperson-in-Office called on political leaders to demonstrate restraint and respect for the legislation in force as well as for the constitutional roles of the respective democratic institutions. He emphasized his expectation that the leaders will act in accordance with democratic principles and respect the right of citizens to vote for their representatives within the time limits set by the Albanian legal framework. He also expressed his belief that Albania is capable to deal with the situation on its own, within its constitutional and legal framework and will find a solution that will enable the country to focus on challenges that citizens of Albania consider important.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 7 and 8 June the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 8 and 9 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Small-arms were fired near SMM patrol members near Molodizhne.
• A man was injured while riding a bicycle near the contact line.
• The SMM saw damage from shelling to a residential house in the Petrovskyi District of Donetsk city.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, as well as observed impacts inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska and military-type presence inside the disengagement area near Petrivske.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted at checkpoints near Novoazovsk and Zaichenko, in Donetsk city, at a heavy weapons holding area and in areas near the border with the Russian Federation, all in non-government-controlled areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 7 and 8 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 140), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions).The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), southerly and south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), as well as easterly and north-westerly directions of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 8 and 9 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 100), compared with the previous 24 hours. Almost half of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk, at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk and at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 7 and 8 June, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 230), compared with the previous reporting period (16 explosions). Nearly all the ceasefire violations, including almost all explosions, were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 8 and 9 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 480), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly and north-easterly directions of Popasna.

Bullets near SMM patrol in area of Molodizhne

On 9 June, positioned near a checkpoint of the armed formations near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard small-arms fire at an assessed range of 200m south and then heard at least three bullets coming from a westerly direction pass 5m above patrol members’ heads. It returned safely to its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Spot Report 9 June 2019).

Man injured while riding a bicycle near the contact line

The SMM confirmed reports of a man (in his forties) who was injured on 24 February while riding a bicycle from Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) towards a checkpoint of the armed formations near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). On 8 June in Oleksandrivka, the SMM saw a man (in his forties) with scars on his abdomen and his right arm in a metal cast. He told the SMM that on 24 February, while cycling on side paths between Marinka and Oleksandrivka, a bullet had hit his back and exited through his abdomen, also wounding his right arm. Previously, on 27 February, medical staff at Hospital No.14 in Donetsk had told the SMM that on 24 February a 48-year old man had been brought to the hospital with a gunshot wound caused by a bullet entering his upper body from the back and exiting it at the front, additionally injuring his hand.

Fresh damage to residential house in Petrovskyi District of Donetsk city

In the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi District in Donetsk city, at 14 Amudarinska Street, the SMM observed three fresh holes (between 3.5 and 7cm in diameter) in the south-west facing wall of an inhabited residential one-storey house, as well as a fresh grey-coloured scorch mark (about 15cm in diameter) on the concrete below the wall. The SMM assessed the damage was fresh and had been caused by an explosive projectile fired from a south-westerly direction. The owner (woman in her thirties) of the house told the SMM that she had been at home when her house had been damaged on 7 June. She added that her house had been damaged several times already since the start of the conflict.

Disengagement areas[2]                

On the evening and night of 8-9 June, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Between the evenings of 7 and 9 June, positioned in five locations near the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM recorded about 320 undetermined explosions and 270 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

During the night of 7 to 8 June, while near the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM recorded an undetermined explosion, assessed as outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. In the early morning hours of 8 June, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion, assessed as within the 5km periphery of the disengagement area.

On the evening of 8 June, the SMM heard a sound, assessed as caused by the propeller-engine of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), flying over Stanytsia Luhanska for seven minutes.

On 9 June, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed seven fresh holes (1-9cm in diameter, 7cm-2m above ground): six in a south-facing military barrier of a Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position, and one in the south-facing side of a wooden log at its observation post. The SMM assessed all holes as caused by small-arms fire from a southerly direction.

During the day on 8 June, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a military-type truck and a man in military-type clothing drive into the disengagement area and unload material.[3]

During the day on 9 June, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM heard four shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km south-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled area of Donetsk region

8 June

The SMM noted that three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and 34 mortars (21 2B11 Sani, 120mm; 12 M120-15 Molot, 120mm; and a BM-37, 82mm) remained missing.

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

9 June

The SMM noted that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), ten anti-tank guns (MT-12) and nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

7 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

-    an armoured combat vehicle and two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near           Troitske (30km north of Donetsk), and

-    an IFV (BMP variant) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

8 June

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and

9 June

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

8 June

The SMM saw

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk); and
• a surveillance radar system (PSNR-9 Kredo-M1) on the western edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 May 2019).

9 June

The SMM saw a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Markyne (94km south of Donetsk).

New mine hazard signs near Hannivka

On 9 June, it observed for the first time two mine hazard signs 2km north-east of Hannivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk): one located about 15m east of the road the other about 40m east of the road, the first with the words “Danger Zone” and the other with the words “Mines” written on it, all in Russian. 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 8 June, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna.

On 8 and 9 June, the SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Hardship faced by civilians at entry-exit checkpoints

On 9 June, the SMM observed at least 200 cars waiting in line at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) to travel to government-controlled areas. A man and a woman (in their fifties) told the SMM that they had been waiting at the checkpoint for more than ten hours to travel to government-controlled areas. Three members of the armed formations at the checkpoint told the SMM that a new “regulation”, allowing only six cars to enter the checkpoint every 30 minutes, had been introduced a few days ago.

Border areas outside government control

On 8 June, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two pedestrians (females, in their twenties) entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 9 June, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 56 pedestrians (31 men,  23 women and two children) exiting Ukraine. After about 20 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 9 June, while at the pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw nine pedestrians entering Ukraine and four pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine.

On 9 June, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 14 cars (three with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) with about 30 and 40 passengers on board, respectively, entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 26 cars (eight with Ukrainian and 12 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates), seven covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) with 40 and 30 passengers on board respectively, as well as two pedestrians (women in their thirties) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 8 June, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 9 June, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 9 June, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, claiming that the SMM needed “special permission in order to visit the site”.
• On 9 June, on two occasions, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing security risks.
• On 9 June, at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south towards Novoazovsk and east to the border with the Russian Federation, citing orders from their commanders.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• On 8 June, at a checkpoint in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre) an armed member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only upon escort by a member of the armed formations.

Other impediments:

• On 8 June, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Zaporozhets (non-government-controlled, 71km south of Donetsk). [6]
• On 8 June, on three occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

What:

• A news conference by the ODIHR observers to the early parliamentary elections in Ukraine.
• An introduction to the role of the mission in the elections and its planned activities.
• The news conference is open to all and no accreditation is required to enter, but only questions from journalists will be taken.

Who:

• Ambassador Albert Jónsson, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission

When:

• 15.00 on 11 June 2019

Where:

• Regency Ballroom, Hyatt Regency Kyiv, 5 Alla Tarasova Street, Kyiv

NB The election observation mission, the office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine operate independently and under separate mandates.

For more details, contact:

Francesca Boggeri, Media Analyst with the Election Observation Mission: +380 67 164 45 76, Francesca.boggeri@odihr.org.ua  

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR: +48 609 522 266, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

NUR-SULTAN, 10 June 2019 – While there was potential for Kazakhstan’s early presidential election to become a force for political change, a lack of regard for fundamental rights, including detentions of peaceful protestors, and widespread voting irregularities on election day, showed scant respect for democratic standards, international observers concluded in a preliminary statement published today.

The observation mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA).

“This election represented an important moment for Kazakhstan’s society as this was the first time that the long-serving first president was not competing. While there were seven candidates, including for the first time a woman, the election showed that there is a need for genuine democratic consolidation and significant political, social and legal reforms,” said George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission. “The new President and authorities should seize this opportunity, strengthen trust in the institutions and meet the people’s expectations. The OSCE is ready to co-operate closely on this with Kazakhstan to move forward.”

Almost 12 million voters were registered to cast their ballot in nearly 10,000 polling stations across the country. Electoral preparations were efficient, and there was a record number of candidates, one of whom was a woman. However, while the number of candidates ostensibly offered political variety, there was little critical campaigning. The election took place in a political environment dominated by the ruling party and that limited critical voices. At the same time, irregularities on election day and a disregard of formal procedures meant that an honest count could not be guaranteed.

The election law provides a technical basis for the conduct of elections. However, restrictions to the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of assembly and association, and the right to participation in political life, together with serious shortcomings in the legislative framework, hampered the conduct of democratic elections. The majority of priority recommendations made following previous elections remain unaddressed.

In the same way, while freedom of expression and the right of access to information are guaranteed in the constitution, they are curtailed by the law. Access to websites and social networks was frequently blocked, further curbing the possibility of public discussion. The extensive media coverage of the current president and support for his candidacy by his predecessor did not provide a level playing field for all candidates. This limited voters’ ability to make an informed choice.

"Electoral preparations were efficiently administered, and voting generally proceeded in an orderly manner inside polling stations,” said Margareta Kiener Nellen, Head of the OSCE PA delegation. “However, massive arrests of peaceful demonstrators in the streets, including journalists, violate the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of assembly and expression."

International observers were informed by numerous public sector employees and students that officials had instructed them to attend campaign events and vote for the current president. Such activities blurred the line between party and state and raised concerns about voters’ ability to cast their vote freely.

“While the number of candidates appeared to offer political variety, Kazakhstan’s early presidential election lacked genuine pluralism,” said Urszula Gacek, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission. “Of still greater concern were the restrictions to freedom of assembly and political expression before and during the campaign, with peaceful protesters subject to fines and arrests. This does not live up to the commitment made by Kazakhstan more than two decades ago to uphold democratic principles.”

The international election observation mission for the early presidential election was comprised of 339 observers from 40 countries, including 290 ODIHR-deployed experts, long-term, and short-term observers, and 49 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA.

For further information, please contact:

Anna Di Domenico, OSCE PA +7 775 1353269 or + 45 60 10 83 80, anna.didomenico@oscepa.dkKatya Andrusz, ODIHR +7 701 6436153 or +48 609 522 266, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

In the afternoon of 9 June, an SMM patrol consisting of six members and two armoured vehicles was positioned about 45m east of a checkpoint of the armed formations about 1.2km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), to monitor the security situation. At 14:34, two members of the armed formations approached the SMM, briefly spoke to three SMM patrol members who were outside the vehicles and returned to the checkpoint.

At 14:36, the three patrol members who were standing next to the vehicles heard small-arms fire at an assessed range of 200m south and then heard at least three bullets passing about 5m above them from a westerly direction.

The SMM returned safely to its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

VIENNA, 10 June 2019 - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák called today on all political forces in the Republic of Moldova to overcome the current political crisis through dialogue, acting on the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and the respect for democratic principles and the rule of law.

“The OSCE Chairmanship is following the political crisis in the Republic of Moldova with great concern. The citizens of the Republic of Moldova need a political solution to the current crisis and stability to ensure the European path of the country,” Lajčák said. “Peaceful dialogue, democracy and rule of law are key for preventing tensions from escalating,” he added. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded an undetermined explosion inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near residential houses in Chernenko.
• The Mission saw mines near Pisky, Lozove, and Travneve, some for the first time, and unexploded ordnance in Pikuzy and near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM saw people apply for passports of the Russian Federation in Antratsyt and Dokuchaievsk.
• It monitored the announcement of a court verdict regarding the attack of Kateryna Handziuk.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted in non-government-controlled southern Donetsk region at a checkpoint near Shevchenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including explosions, were recorded at southerly and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), southerly and south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), and easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (16), compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). Nearly all the ceasefire violations, including explosions, were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

While in Popasna on the morning of 7 June, the SMM recorded ten bursts, four shots, and one undetermined explosion outside of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) but within 5km of its periphery.

At 22:47 on 7 June (outside the reporting period), the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded one undetermined explosion at a range of 1-2km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 7 June, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas6 June

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) less than 50m from residential houses on the northern outskirts of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

5 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

6 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne.

7 June

The SMM saw twenty tanks (T-72) at the railway station in Rubizhne.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

6 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk);
• two ACVs (type undetermined) near Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk); and
• an ACV near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Chernenko.

7 June

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Pyshchevyk; and
• a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (ZSU-23-4 Shilka) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 June

The SMM saw a surveillance radar system (PSNR-9 Kredo-M1) on the western edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 3 May 2019).

Presence of mines near Pisky, Lozove and Travneve and unexploded ordnance in Pikuzy and near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk

On 6 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 90 anti-tank mines laid across a road leading from Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk) to Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk) as well as in an adjacent field, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 1km south of the aforementioned mines, the same UAV spotted for the first time 98 anti-tank mines laid on the same road, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 30 anti-tank mines laid across a road on the southern edge of Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

On 6 June, the SMM again saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round, embedded in the middle of an asphalt road used daily by civilians between the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

On 7 June, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of UXO assessed as an unexploded RPG-7 grenade embedded in an asphalt courtyard in front of the House of Culture in the centre of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). 

People apply for passports in Antratsyt and Dokuchaievsk

On 6 June, in Antratsyt (non-government-controlled, 55km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 50 people (mixed ages and genders) queuing outside of a building on Pushkina Street. A woman (about 50 years old) managing the queue told the SMM that people were queuing to apply for passports of the Russian Federation and “LPR passports.”

On 7 June, in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw four people (two women in their thirties and forties, two men in their thirties and sixties) queuing outside of a building at 19 Nezalezhnosti Ukrainy Street. They all told the SMM that they were submitting applications for “DPR passports” so they can apply for Russian Federation passports in the future.

Court verdict regarding the attack of Kateryna Handziuk

The SMM monitored the announcement of a court verdict at the District Court in Pokrovske (103km south-east of Dnipro) in the case of five defendants accused of attacking Kateryna Handziuk, a Kherson city council official and civil society activist who died on 4 November 2018. She had suffered severe injuries in a 31 July 2018 acid attack (see SMM Daily Report of 5 November 2018). The judge accepted a previously-agreed plea bargain under which the defendants pled guilty to part two of article 121 (intentional grave bodily harm, committed in a way that has a special torment or committed by a group of persons) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, taking into account article 69 (mitigating circumstances). The judge then sentenced the defendants to prison for sentences ranging from 3 to 6.5 years.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westward towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), citing sniper activity in the area and orders from his superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On two occasions, SMM mini- and mid-range UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 21km south of Donetsk).
• On two occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

VIENNA, 7 June 2019 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed serious concern regarding the detention of the investigative journalist, Ivan Golunov, in Moscow.

On 6 June, Golunov, an investigative journalist with the Meduza news website, was detained on suspicion of “illegal production or sale of drugs”, after the police searched him and allegedly found drugs in his bag and apartment. The journalist denies all the accusations. He also reported being beaten by law enforcement officials during his detention. If convicted, Golunov can face up to 20 years in jail. The Meduza editorial office links Golunov's detention with his professional activity, and reports that the journalist had received several threats in recent months.

“Golunov is a brilliant Russian journalist known for his investigation of corruption and criminal activities, including by public officials,” Désir said. “Media, and investigative journalists in particular, play an important watchdog role in a society. Under no circumstances should media workers who investigate corruption or wrongdoing be targeted in retaliation for their work.”

The Representative also expressed his concern about the detention of several people, among them other journalists who took part in protests in Moscow after the detention of Golunov. 

“I call on the authorities to conduct a thorough and transparent investigation into this case and to release Golonov,” said the Representative.

He also noted reactions by numerous prominent journalists, media and human rights organizations about this case. 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

Vienna, 7 June 2019 - On 17 and 18 June 2019, Bratislava will become a hub for cyber experts from government, international and regional organizations, think tanks, civil society and the private sector, who will gather at the 2019 OSCE-wide conference on Cyber/ICT Security to discuss the current trends and future challenges.

The two-day event provides a unique platform for discussions among experts on cyber/ICT security at global, regional and national level coming from across the OSCE region – spanning multilateral cyber diplomacy, global advancements through regional efforts, inclusion as a driver of regional cyber security, the impact of Artificial Intelligence on cyber/ICT security, and challenges in protecting critical infrastructure protection.

Speakers include high-level representatives of government and multilateral institutions.

Media are invited to cover the opening segment, which will feature keynote speakers Microsoft Vice-President for EU Government Affairs John Frank, Vice President, UNIDIR Deputy Director  Kerstin Vignard, and  Melissa Hathaway, President of Hathaway Global Strategies LLC, on 17 June from 09:00 to 10:30 at River Park Hotel in Bratislava.

Media representatives are requested to confirm their attendance by 13 June 2019 at robert.zolak@mzv.sk and zuzana.kostalikova@mzv.sk.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed damage to roofs of Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm buildings near Novoluhanske and fresh craters in a residential area of Pikuzy.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission observed for the first time about 280 anti-tank mines near non-government-controlled Staromykhailivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), including in the vicinity of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (50), compared with the previous reporting period (14 explosions). Most ceasefire violations, including most explosions, were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Damage to roofs of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske

On 5 June, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five impacts in roofs of three buildings (not seen in imagery from 31 May 2019) of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). Four impacts were assessed as caused by rounds of an automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17 VOG-25) and one was assessed as caused by a round of an 82mm mortar (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019).

Two fresh craters in residential area of Pikuzy

At Peremohy Street in the southern part of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), accompanied by a member of the armed formations, the SMM observed two fresh craters about 25m and 20m, respectively, north-east of two uninhabited single-storey houses. The SMM also observed pieces of aluminium about 3m south and south-west respectively of the craters, assessed as parts of rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7). The SMM assessed both craters to have been caused by rounds of rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG-7) from a west-south-westerly direction. A local resident (woman in her sixties) told the SMM that she had heard shelling in the evening of 5 June.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-UAV inside Zolote disengagement area

Positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) while conducting a mini-UAV flight over the disengagement area, the SMM heard 19 bursts of small-arms fire about 1.2km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.2km north-north-west of its position, inside the disengagement area. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 5 June and during the day of 6 June, the SMM recorded eight explosions (one impact and seven undetermined) and 18 bursts and shots of small-arms fire in the 5km periphery of the Zolote disengagement area. Also on 6 June, the SMM recorded 19 bursts of small-arms fire assessed as inside the disengagement area (see above).

During the day on 6 June, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

6 June

The SMM saw 11 tanks (T-72), 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

2 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 12 tanks in a training area near      Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

5 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a compound in Shyroke (34km south-east of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

6 June

The SMM saw:

• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) near Popasna; and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk.

Non-government-controlled areas

5 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 21 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variants), three APCs (two BTR-80 and one MT-LB) and a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

On 6 June, the SMM saw two electronic countermeasure/electronic warfare systems near Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk).

Mines seen for the first time near Staromykhailivka

On 29 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 280 anti-tank mines laid in two rows running for about 700m from east to west in a field about 50m north of a road on the northern outskirts of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), near positions of the armed formations.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna as well as near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), to water infrastructure near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) as well as to power lines between Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).  Positioned near the pumping station, the SMM also facilitated repair works to high voltage power lines between Yasynuvata and Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 5 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government and non-government controlled areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).[5]
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 19 bursts of small-arms fire about 1.2km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
• In a medical facility in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), medical staff refused to speak to the SMM without permission from members of the armed formations.
• In a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) a doctor refused to speak to the SMM, who was following up on reports about four civilian casualties, without written permission from members of the armed formation.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

422432 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Funding models for television in the 21st century was the topic of an OSCE-organized seminar that took place in Ashgabat on 5 and 6 June 2019.

Representatives of Turkmenistan’s State Committee for TV, Radiobroadcasting and Cinematography, the Mejlis (the parliament), the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Office of the Ombudsperson, and the Institute of the State, Law and Democracy and other relevant institutions participated in the event.

The seminar was delivered by international experts from the United Kingdom and Ukraine who presented fundamental principles of public service broadcasting and traditional funding models for state, commercial and public service television.

In her opening message to the participants of the seminar, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat Natalya Drozd said:  “The OSCE participating States are committed to making use of the modern means of communication to promote the free and wide dissemination of information.”

“Transition to new models of TV funding is essential for the further democratization of society and development of market relations, and the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat is ready to provide expert support in this important process.”

Discussions focused on the distinctive features of the media market and the importance of researching audience needs and analysing consumption habits for broadcast and print media. The participants exchanged views on the challenges of technological progress for creativity and competition.

The participants examined funding models such as subscription systems, TV licence fees, microfinancing, digital services tax and hybrid models. The rise of the internet and non-linear media and digital transformation in the media were also addressed.

Upon completion of the seminar, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat organized a roundtable discussion with senior representatives of the State Committee for TV, Radiobroadcasting and Cinematography, the Mejlis, and other relevant institutions. The roundtable discussion presented the outcomes of the seminar on TV funding models and offered a platform for the exchange of views on optimal models of TV funding. The international experts elaborated on the current trends in TV production, stages of the gradual transition to new models of TV funding and advantages of a hybrid model. The roundtable participants stressed the importance of audience research and engagement as well as media literacy and awareness.

What:

• You are invited to a news conference of the international observers to the early presidential election in Kazakhstan.
• The news conference is open to all and no accreditation is required to enter, but only questions from journalists will be taken.

Who:

Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions:

• George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission

Followed by statements from:

• Margareta Kiener Nellen, Head of the OSCE PA delegation
• Urszula Gacek, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission

When:

5. 15.00 on 10 June 2019

Where:

5.  Ritz Carlton Hotel, 16 Dostyk Street, Nur-Sultan
5.  If you cannot attend in person, follow the livestream on: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr and www.oscepa.org

The international election observation is a joint mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). The observation mission totals 339 observers from 40 countries, including 290 ODIHR-deployed experts, long-term, and short-term observers, and 49 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA.

For more details, contact:

Anna Di Domenico, OSCE PA +7 775 1353269 or + 45 60 10 83 80, anna.didomenico@oscepa.dkKatya Andrusz, ODIHR +7 701 6436153 or +48 609 522 266, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

422423 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

National human rights institutions (NHRIs) are uniquely placed to monitor the economic and social rights policies of their states and evaluate the allocation of resources to ensure effective protection of these rights, said participants in the annual NHRI Academy, which took place in Venice from 3 to 7 June 2019.

The capacity-building event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI). It enabled 26 NHRI representatives from across the OSCE region (21 women and 5 men) to develop their knowledge and skills in monitoring economic and social rights and communicating effectively about their work.

“Social and economic rights are at the basis of everyday life of people in the OSCE region. Effective protection of these rights ensures that every citizen has access to adequate housing, education and work,” said Marc Van Gool, ODIHR Human Rights Adviser. “By monitoring the situation in this area and communicating their findings at the domestic and international levels, NHRIs contribute to the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security, which recognizes that conflicts may arise not only from political and military threats, but also from economic tensions, environmental degradation, social insecurity and violations of individuals’ rights.”

Nina Pániková, ENNHRI Human Rights Officer, said: “NHRIs are in a position to advise the state on the human rights impact of economic and social policies and empower individuals to claim their rights. European NHRIs, as ENNHRI members, have been asking us to strengthen their capacities to work in this area and have chosen economic and social rights as a collective priority in our current strategic plan. This NHRI Academy is one of several activities we’ve planned in 2019 to support NHRIs in this area.”

As part of the training, the participants improved their knowledge of the United Nations Paris Principles, which set out the main criteria for effective and independent NHRIs, as well as their understanding of ways to frame key messages for different target audiences and to mainstream gender into the work of NHRIs. The participants also developed action plans for their respective institutions.

“This training gives me an opportunity to come up with new ideas for my daily work,” said Beka Javakhadze, Senior Specialist at the Public Defender’s Office of Georgia. “You hear about different experiences and learn how to make your work more comprehensible, more credible, and also more interesting. It is also a wonderful opportunity to get familiar with experts who do a huge amount of work in the area of economic and social rights, with their studies and research, which also helps you develop new initiatives.”

The NHRI Academy was organized with support from the Global Campus of Human Rights.

422408 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Sixty-two district prosecutors and judges from first instance and appellate courts upgraded their skills in investigating and prosecuting cyber-crimes involving children at two OSCE-supported workshops organized jointly with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) from 4 to 7 June 2019 in Vadul-lui-Voda, Moldova.

The psychological profile of a child victim of online abuse as well as the impact of abuse on the child’s testimony was the focus of the training sessions. “It is very important for a prosecutor and a judge who examines a child abuse case to recognize factors that may interfere with the child’s ability to participate as a witness in court,” says psychologist Tatiana Buianina, who led the workshop.

The trainer outlined child interviewing techniques, which an interviewer needs to follow to obtain a credible testimony and, at the same time, protect the child from the risk of secondary victimization. “The interviewing techniques presented during the training session helped to understand better the complexity of such cases and their impact on the child’s short- and long-term development,” said Ala Rotaru, the Balti Court of Appeal judge. 

Particular attention was given to familiarizing prosecutors and judges with local and international best practices of investigating and prosecuting online child abuse and child pornography as well as data collection and exchange between national and regional legal professionals. The participants also learned how to differentiate types of abuse and manipulation children are exposed to in the virtual space.

“Additional knowledge about the specifics of child online behaviour is in high demand among practitioners due to the growing number of cases of online child abuse in Moldova,” said Boris Talpa, judge and NIJ training co-ordinator.

The workshops are part of the Mission’s Human Rights Programme which contributes to the implementation of the OSCE Mission to Moldova’s mandate to “provide advice and expertise on human and minority rights [and] democratic transformation”.  It further contributes to the implementation in Moldova of the 2003 OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings. Moreover, protection of children against online abuse and exploitation has been included in agenda of the Working Group on Human Rights for the year 2019.

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Horticulture, greenhouse management, use of information technologies in farming and forming and managing co-operatives in the farming sector were the focus of a five-day training and study trip organized by the  Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan for ten Uzbek women farmers to the Netherlands, from 3 to 7 June 2019.

The farmers visited the World Horti Centre in Naaldwijk, where they were introduced to advanced technologies in horticulture management and greenhouse technologies.

The World Horti Centre is a knowledge and innovation centre for international greenhouse horticulture. It facilitates innovative collaboration among international businesses in the horticulture and greenhouse sector and provides facilities for research and education in this field for more than 1,200 students.

Netherland’s leading companies presented their know-how on increasing returns and reducing the use of resources in horticulture and greenhouse management, discussing current research as well as its practical applications to the conditions of Uzbekistan. The theoretical training was enriched by field visits to private companies dealing with seed production and greenhouse management.

The farmers also participated in an intensive interactive course on building and managing co-operatives that help farmers to collaborate on all aspects of farming, from procuring loans to the marketing of produce. The Dutch model was adapted to the conditions in Uzbekistan and tailored to the specific needs of women farmers.

The Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan has been active in the field of women’s entrepreneurship since 2007 and is currently supporting the female business community through the extra-budgetary project Support to Managerial Capacity Building of Female Managers, funded by Germany, Norway and the Netherlands.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Windows damaged by small-arms fire in a residential area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The Mission observed for the first time about 160 anti-tank mines near government-controlled Krasnohorivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Hryhorivka, as well as at a checkpoint near Shevchenko and at a permanent storage site, all in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

During the day on 5 June, positioned in Svobodne (non-government-controlled, 73km south of Donetsk), the SMM recorded 12 explosions, assessed as outgoing (120mm) mortar rounds, as well as their subsequent impacts, at an assessed distance of 2km north. The Mission assessed the explosions as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including also fewer explosions (14), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). Most ceasefire violations, including all explosions (of which three were assessed as outgoing artillery rounds), were recorded at south-westerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Windows damaged by small-arms fire in a residential area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 4 June at 8 Dundycha Street, in an area close to the main square of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a hole in a north-facing window pane of a two-storey house. At 10 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw a hole in a north-facing window pane, a hole in a west-facing window pane, as well as a shattered west-facing window of a two-storey house. The SMM assessed the aforementioned damage to both houses as caused by (7.62mm) rounds. Six people (four men and two women, aged 30-65), who introduced themselves to the SMM as residents of the houses at 8 and 10 Dundycha Street, told the SMM that they had heard small-arms fire in the area during the night of 4-5 June.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 4-5 June, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-2.5km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and seven projectiles at an assessed range of 0.5-2km east and south-east (assessed as within 5km of the area’s periphery). During the day on 5 June, positioned about 3km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the night of 4-5 June, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard a burst of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-east (assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery).

During the day on 5 June, positioned on the north-western edge of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-4km east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Petrivske disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

4 June

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 5 June 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

1 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) 80m from a functioning school in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk).

4 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted six tanks (T-72) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

5 June

The SMM saw 22 tanks (T-72) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne.

Non-government-controlled areas

2 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 47 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 May 2019) and
• 22 tanks (types undetermined), 18 pieces of towed artillery (types undetermined) and nine pieces of self-propelled artillery (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 May 2019).

5 June

The SMM saw 21 tanks (T-64 and T-72) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region[4]

5 June

The SMM noted that 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) continued to be missing.*

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

4 June

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMD-2) near Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk).

5 June

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Popasna;
• an IFV (BTR-4) in Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) in Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol); and
• an APC (BTR-80) near Hnutove.

Non-government-controlled areas

4 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five IFVs (three BMP-1 and two BMP-2) and four APCs (three MT-LB and one BTR-80) in Luhansk city.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP variants) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

Presence of mines near Krasnohorivka

On 30 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a total of 160 anti-tank mines (next to 245 previously reported anti-tank mines) in fields about 2.5km west of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), as well as to power lines between Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). While monitoring the repairs in Spartak, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations in the area (it heard and saw an explosion assessed as an impact and heard three undetermined explosions, all at an assessed range of 3-4km west-north-west and north-north-east), despite security guarantees being provided for a localized ceasefire.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk). Positioned at the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), it also monitored the security situation in the area to enable demining activities as part of a preparatory phase for repairs to a damaged pipeline about 500-600m north-west of the station.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 20 cars (four with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 23 cars (seven with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation, as well as seven with “DPR” plates), five covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates, a bus with Russian Federation licence plates and about 30 passengers on board, as well as three pedestrians (all women in their forties) exiting Ukraine.

Convoy carrying humanitarian aid travelled to non-government-controlled areas

At the checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a convoy consisting of two cars and nine trucks transporting humanitarian aid to non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM could not access a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as the gates were closed and no one was present to open it.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol) after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan.
• In Hryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing orders from his superiors not to let the SMM stay in the village without permission. 
• On the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, thus preventing it from visiting a hospital to follow up on a case of an alleged civilian casualty, saying that the SMM could proceed only if accompanied by members of the armed formations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.