OSCE

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 26 and 27 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 27 and 28 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A 26-year-old man was injured by gunfire in Chermalyk.
• Small-arms fire was directed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicles on two occasions near Azov.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations and saw fresh craters inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw fresh craters, mines and unexploded ordnance between Talakivka and Pikuzy.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Bezimenne, at two heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, as well as at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 26 and 27 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), in areas east and east-south-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) and south-south-east, south-west and west of Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

On the evening and night of 26-27 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 28 projectiles in flight and eight explosions (one assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon, one as an airburst, and six undetermined) at an assessed range of 0.1-1km south and south-south-west. It also recorded a fire about 800-900m south at the junction of road M-04 and road H-20.

Between the evenings of 27 and 28 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 26 and 27 April, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however a similar number of explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk) and in areas north-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 27 and 28 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Man injured by gunfire in Chermalyk

On 28 April, at a hospital in government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM saw a man (26 years old) with his right leg wounded and bandaged below the knee. The man told the SMM that on the morning of 26 April, in Chermalyk, he had suddenly felt a bullet hit his right lower leg while walking in civilian clothing from Myra street towards a fenced-in Ukrainian Armed Forces compound to request permission to visit a nearby cemetery in the village. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the man had been admitted on 26 April with fractures and tissue damage to his right leg caused by a bullet.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicle on two occasions near Azov

On 27 April, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Azov to locate an SMM mid-range UAV which had been lost in the area on 25 April (see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2019), the SMM heard 12 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 600m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 650m south-west of the patrol. About an hour later, while conducting a second mini-UAV flight from the same location, the SMM heard 15 bursts and ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 600m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 500m south of its location. On both occasions, the SMM safely landed the UAV.*

Aggressive behaviour directed at SMM by members of the armed formations in Pikuzy

On 27 April, while stationary near a shop in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), a civilian car with two men, (30-40 years old) inside, one with military-style clothing, drove towards the SMM rapidly from the road, stopping about 10cm from the front of an SMM vehicle. Upon exiting their vehicle, one of the two men told the driver of the same SMM vehicle in Russian “guard my vehicle” in a loud and aggressive tone, before entering the shop. The men returned shortly to their cars and drove away rapidly.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 26 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 13 projectiles in flight and an illumination flare at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), and a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area (within 5km of its periphery). On 27 April, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw two fresh craters on the road, about 600m east of the checkpoint of the armed formations. It also saw a tailfin of a mortar round inside one of the craters and another near the other crater. The SMM assessed that both craters were caused by mortar rounds fired from a north-westerly direction. About 20m south of the craters, the SMM saw five other fresh craters in a field about 20-100m south of the road. The SMM was unable to assess the weapon used or direction of fire.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), on 27 and 28 April, the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

26 April

An SMM mini-UAV again spotted two probable surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) less than 50m from residential houses on the northern outskirts of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27. April

The SMM saw six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a compound near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

26 April

The SMM saw a tank (T-64) on a truck west of Paraskoviivka (31km south-west of Donetsk).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

28 April

The SMM noted that one site was abandoned and that a total of 23 tanks (nine T-64 and 14 T-72) and nine mortars (2B-14 Podnos, 82mm) continued to be missing.   

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

26 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk); and
• a steel turret near previously observed positions and trenches north of Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

The SMM saw an armoured combat vehicle (BMP variant or MT-LB variant) in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters, mines and unexploded ordnance between Talakivka and Pikuzy

On 26 April, about 4km east of Talakivka, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines (probable TM-62M) laid out in a single row across a road leading to Pikuzy, as well as again spotted a total of 166 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid across the road and into a field north of the same road (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 5 February 2019). About 650m south-east of the latter mines, the same UAV spotted two fresh craters about 10m south of the same road, each with a tail boom of a rocket-propelled-grenade (RPG) (PG series) inside, assessed as caused by RPG rounds fired from a westerly direction. About 150m east of the craters, the UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines (TM-62M) across the road, one of which was assessed as having a damaged fuse, as well as a tail boom of an RPG in the middle of the same road, about 10m east of the mines.

Long queues for civilians at checkpoints

On the morning of 26 April, at the checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka, the SMM saw a higher than usual number of vehicles queuing in a 3km long line to travel towards government-controlled areas. In the afternoon, at the same location, the SMM saw about 130 vehicles queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 120 vehicles and about 400 pedestrians queuing to enter non-government-controlled areas. In the morning at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 500 pedestrians waiting to exit government-controlled areas. In the afternoon, the SMM saw about 100 vehicles (including two full buses) and about 100 pedestrians queuing to exit government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 27 April, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). On 27 and 28 April, the SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

On 28 April, positioned at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw five pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 28 April, positioned at the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw at least 100 stationary railway cars, but could not determine the contents.

On 28 April, positioned at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (three with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates) and one bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 12 cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), one bus with Ukrainian licence plates and five covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 27 and 28 April, at a checkpoint about 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing security concerns for SMM members.
• On 28 April, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 28 April, at two heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, members of the armed formations denied the SMM access.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 27 April, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 12 bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely (see above).
• On 27 April, while conducting a second mini-UAV flight near Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 15 bursts and ten shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely. The SMM immediately left the area (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek supported a training course entitled “Women, peace and security: trends and development perspectives”. The event was organized by the Kyrgyz Association of Women in the Security Sector (KAWSS) on 25 April 2019 in Bishkek.

About 150 women working in the Kyrgyz security sector and other government agencies participated in the training course. The ending of this eight-day extensive training event was marked by a roundtable discussion, which was attended by 30 officials, most of them female, from the Ministry of the Interior, the State Service on the Execution of Punishment, the State Border Service and staff of Armed Forces and National Guard.

National and international experts gave lectures on human rights, rule of law, security sector reform and gender equality. The international experts also shared their knowledge about international standards and good practices in implementing security sector reforms through the prism of gender approach, as well as prevention of crime and violence against children and women.

The acquired knowledge and skills will serve as a catalyst for promoting the role of women in the security sector and the important contribution they make to enhancing comprehensive security.

The training is in line with the recently adopted National Action Plan and relevant strategic documents, as well as the OSCE commitments related to gender aspects of security.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission continued to observe hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and damaged houses in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM was also restricted in Shevchenko, at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Bezimenne and near Dovzhanske, a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period. Most ceasefire violations were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 25 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four projectiles in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 26 April, positioned at four locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire (unable to assess whether inside or outside the area) and six undetermined explosions (assessed as outside the area, within 5km from its periphery).

Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 shots from undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 4-5km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). [3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

26 April

The SMM saw:

• two tanks (T-64) on flatbed trucks in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk) on road H20 heading south and
• a tank (T-64) loaded on a transport vehicle near Dmytrivka (55km south-west of Donetsk) on road H20 heading west.  

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

On 21 April, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a probable armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol).

26 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk),
• an APC (BTR variant) about 3km north-west of Stanytsia Luhanska, and
• an unidentified unmanned aerial vehicle flying in circles at approximately 50m above the ground and descending about 1km south-east of the SMM’s position near Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk).  

Demining activities near Myrne and removal of unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne

On 26 April, on road T-0512, about 5km east of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), two demining team members of an international non-governmental organization told the SMM that the demining team had removed three anti-tank mines next to the road. About 300m west, the SMM saw two additional members of the same organization conducting demining activities in a field south of the road (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019). 

The SMM noted that the two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), previously observed embedded in the tarmac of a road leading from Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk) to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, had been removed (see SMM Daily Report of 24 April 2019).

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge

At 12:20, at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 500 people queuing to exit and about 40 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. About two hours later, the SMM saw about 600 people queuing to exit and about 20 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. In the parking lot near the checkpoint, a woman and a man (aged 50-60) told the SMM that it took them a total of two hours to travel from non-government- to government-controlled areas. Medical staff present at the EECP told the SMM that on 25 April a total of 120 people received treatment after they had felt unwell (30 of them lost consciousness) due to the high temperatures.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and to a water pipeline between Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

Positioned at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 14 cars (five with Ukrainian and seven with Russian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates), one covered cargo truck with “DPR” plates and eight pedestrians (three women and four men aged 30-50 and a child) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 17 cars (one with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), two buses (both with about 40 passengers on board and “DPR” plates) and three covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.  

At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three cars (two with Russian Federation and one with “LPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. It also saw five cars (three with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, a member of the armed formations asked the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), four members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing security concerns for SMM members.
• In Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk) two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled) after the SMM refused to show the patrol plan.  
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, a member of the armed formations asked the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a representative of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined. The SMM did not consider safe to proceed.

Conditional:

• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only accompanied by a member of the armed formation.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was partially operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle was lost in Donetsk region.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The SMM again saw mines near Novoluhanske and a mine hazard sign for the first time near Petrivske.
• The Mission continued to observe hardships faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Zaichenko, as well as on roadways in Pervomaisk and near Korsun.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at east-south-easterly and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). More than two-thirds of ceasefire violations were recorded south-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 25 April, positioned at four locations near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons and 23 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

SMM loses mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle near the contact line in Donetsk region

At 11:21 while flying in an area near Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) encountered signal interference assessed as jamming.[4] At 11:22, the SMM, which was flying the UAV remotely from a location near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), lost control of the UAV. An SMM mini-UAV flying in the vicinity of Lebedynske shortly afterwards also experienced signal interference. The SMM is making efforts to locate the mid-range UAV.*

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

On 24 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four tanks (one T-64 and three undetermined) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 25 April 2019).

On 25 April, the SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), seven multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 16 April 2019 and SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019.)

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

On 25 April, the SMM saw 25 tanks (T-64) at a railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

18 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 13 tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 4 April 2019);
• 23 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 16 April 2019); and
• 21 tanks, 15 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (type undetermined) and six self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 5 April 2019).

On 25 April, the SMM saw six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and seven tanks (T-72) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

On 25 April, the SMM noted that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one towed howitzer (D-30) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

On 24 April, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-3) about 350m west of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk).

25 April

The SMM saw:

• three IFVs (BMP variants) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and
• five members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces launching a large white fixed-wing UAV (about 3m long and 2m wide) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 12 IFVs (BMP-1) near Sukhodil (21km west of Luhansk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk).

On 25 April, the SMM saw three IFVs (BMP-1) on the south-eastern outskirts of Luhansk city.

Presence of mines near Novoluhanske and mine hazard signs near Petrivske and Syhnalne

On 24 April, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted ten anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road about 500m south-west of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske about 200m north of residential areas of Dolomitne (non-government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

On the same day, about 600m west of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 40km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a white improvised mine hazard sign on a stick in the ground with “Attention! Mines!” written in Russian outside a compound.

On 25 April, on the north-western edge of Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM again saw a red mine hazard sign with “Stop! Mines!” written in Russian attached to a chain blocking the road leading to a compound.

Demining activities near Myrne and Nikishyne

On 25 April, on road T-0512 about 4.5km south-east of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw 11 members of an international demining organization conducting demining activities. The SMM also saw four persons conducting demining activities in an area of a field marked with red and white tape approximately 400m west of the road leading from Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk) to Ridkodub (non-government-controlled, 61km north-east of Donetsk).

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw an elderly man (in his eighties) being loaded into an ambulance by medical personnel. Ambulance personnel told the SMM that the man had had a heart attack while queuing to enter non-government-controlled areas.

At 12:30, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 400 people queuing to exit and about 1,200 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. In the parking lot near the checkpoint, two women and two men (all 45-65 years old) told the SMM that it took them three to four hours to travel from non-government-controlled areas to government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) (for previous repair works, see SMM Daily Report 29 December 2018), to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to a water pipeline near Popasna. The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS).

The SMM was informed by personnel at the Donbass Fuel Energy Company (DTEK) that repair works to power lines near Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km east of Donetsk) were completed on 24 April, restoring power to approximately 2,000 civilians.

SMM monitored and facilitated the distribution of humanitarian aid in Katerynivka

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of coal by an international humanitarian organization in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 23 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 24 April, on a side road in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations prevented the Mission from proceeding further, citing “demining activities in the area”.
• On road M-04 near Korsun (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding further.
• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from “superiors”. While present, the SMM saw civilian cars passing through the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• An SMM mid-range UAV encountered signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying in a region near Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol). (See above.)
• An SMM mini-UAV encountered signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).[6] (See above.)

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

SUMMARY

On 26 April at 06:45 (Moscow time), the observer team (OT) at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP) observed three vehicles with the inscription “Russian Emergency Situations Ministry” crossing the border from the Russian Federation to Ukraine.

DETAIL

The vehicles arrived from the Russian Federation and bore the inscription “Russian Emergency Situations Ministry”. The make of the vehicles were as follows:  one “Gazel” and two “Kamaz”. Both of the Kamaz trucks bore the additional inscription “Mountain Rescue” written in Russian.

After administrative procedures – without opening the tarpaulins of the trucks – all three vehicles crossed the BCP in the queue that is intended for travelers from Ukraine to the Russian Federation and left for Ukraine. The vehicles had blue emergency lights on. The OT noticed six people (two people in each vehicle) inside the vehicles and the vehicles’ licence plates indicated their registration in the Rostov District of the Russian Federation.

418316 Liana Khorovytska Andrii Dziubenko

Forty-eight officers of Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service and State Fiscal Service were trained to identify toxic chemicals and respond to emergency situations at border crossings in a series of two intensive four-day sessions in the Orshanets Training Center, the Cherkasy Region.

The workshops for personnel working at border crossings were organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine and concluded on 26 April 2019. The sessions were conducted jointly with trainers representing both Services.

The training sessions covered principles of detection and identification of chemicals and dual use goods during inspection, algorithms of personnel action and interagency co-ordination and emergency response. Twelve trainees from each agency will be selected to become trainers for their colleagues in the future. 

“Effective control of cross-boundary movement of chemicals is highly important to address potential threats to the health and lives of those people who work at the border, and those who can be affected after hazardous chemicals enter the country,” said Henrik Villadsen, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine. “We expect this training programme to be incorporated into the standard training of the agencies”. 

Additionally, the Co-ordinator provided 25 sets of personal protection equipment, detection kits, decontamination equipment and simulators of hazardous chemicals to cover training needs of border personnel.

This assistance is part of a project implemented by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in partnership with the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine. The project is funded by the European Union and the United States of America.

VIENNA, 26 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today called for the release of the former journalists of the newspaper Cumhuriyet, after they were returned to prison yesterday.

“I am appalled by this decision which is a terrible setback and confirms the continuous harassment against Cumhuriyet journalists in Turkey. This is particularly disturbing after several Cumhuriyet journalists were released from detention in the past months and the trial demonstrated that the accusation of terrorism against the journalists was groundless. This criminal prosecution against media professionals for holding independent or critical views leads to the weakening of media freedom and grave restriction of freedom of expression in the country,” Désir said.

Cumhuriyet’s cartoonist, Musa Kart, and other former employees of the newspaper, including Önder Çelik, Mustafa Kemal Güngör, Hakan Karasınır, Güray Öz and Emre İper, were sent back to prison to serve the remainder of their jail sentences, having already spent some time in pre-trial detention. Their prison sentences are between three and four years.

According to media reports, prominent journalist Kadri Gürsel and lawyer Bülent Utku are not among the journalists returned to jail.

“I once again urge the Turkish authorities to stop treating journalism as a criminal activity and journalists as terrorists. These prison sentences against former Cumhuriyet journalists need to be immediately overturned and the journalists released from jail,” Désir stressed.

The Representative expressed his readiness to assist Turkey in revising and changing parts of its legislation, especially the anti-terror law that is widely used to imprison journalists in the country.

The Representative’s previous statement on the Cumhuriyet trial are available at: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/411830;  https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/378883; https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/375619; https://www.osce.org/fom/219021

418256 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

A five-day OSCE-supported train-the-trainer course on the detection of forged travel documents and identification techniques for 21 border service officers concluded in Almaty, Kazakhstan on 26 April 2019.

Experts from the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior developed a tailored programme for Kazakhstan’s officers of the National Security Committee’s Border Service. Participants learned about paper production processes, security features introduced into paper, security inks and different printing technologies. Experts presented some 200 samples of real and forged travel documents and discussed how to identify a number of security features in these documents.

Practical exercises allowed the participants to work with banknotes of more than a dozen countries from around the world. Experts provided them with illuminated magnifiers, USB-digital microscopes and a Docubox device to allow the border control officers to apply their acquired skills. In addition to learning best practices in document verification, the future instructors were given guidance on how to best teach these concepts to others. The seminar will be supplemented by two additional one-week courses to complete the trainers’ preparation.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in co-operation with the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programme of the United States Embassy in Nur-Sultan, Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC), and the Border Guard Service under the National Security Committee. The training course was supported by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Travel Document Security Programme.

418202 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

An OSCE-supported two-day roundtable discussion on the development of renewable energy sector in Turkmenistan took place in Ashgabat from 25 to 26 April 2019.

The event brought together 25 officials from the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection, the Mejlis (parliament), the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Academy of Science and the State Committee on Statistics of Turkmenistan. Professors from the Mary Turkmen State Energy Institute and representatives of other relevant institutions and nature protection public organizations also participated in the discussion. The aim was to discuss with national stakeholders different scenarios of renewable energy development, which could be further incorporated into the National Strategy on Renewables.

The event was organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat in co-operation with the USAID Turkmenistan Country Office.   

Opening the roundtable discussion, Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, referred to the 2013 Ministerial Council decision on improving the environmental footprint of energy-related activities, which called on the OSCE participating States to pursue energy diversification “with a focus on renewable energy and energy efficiency, when developing their respective national energy policies”.

“By adopting the National Programme for Energy Saving 2018-2024 and joining the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Turkmenistan reaffirmed its commitment to promoting the development of renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency”, said Drozd. “The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat is ready to provide expert advice to further support the development of the National Strategy on Renewables.”

The roundtable discussion was facilitated by international experts from Kazakhstan. They shared efficient strategies and policies in the area of renewable energy and elaborated on the legal, institutional and financial aspects of renewable energy development. They highlighted the role of high technologies for the efficient production and distribution of renewable energy.

The roundtable participants reviewed draft scenarios of renewable energy development from the perspective of the Government’s priorities. They also discussed their subsequent integration into the National Strategy on Renewables.

On 26 April, the Centre also organized a lecture on best practices of efficient energy production and consumption at the International University of Oil and Gas of Turkmenistan (IUOG). The lecture was attended by instructors and students of the IUOG and was broadcast at the Mary Turkmen State Energy Institute and the Turkmen State Institute of Transport and Communication by means of a video teleconference.

418178 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

The first in a series of four OSCE-supported training seminars for representatives of the government, civil society and judiciary on human rights protection mechanisms concluded in Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl Region on 26 April 2019.

Some 536 representatives of the Taraz, Merke and Asa administrations of the region, as well as judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officers and members of civil society participated in the four-day seminar. They were familiarized with the international human rights commitments of Kazakhstan and the role of national and international human rights institutions in the protection of human rights and freedoms. The participants learned about new developments in labour legislation that have major implications for employees, as well as about the right to access information by lawful means.

The seminar was organized by the Human Rights Commission under the President of Kazakhstan and the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in co-operation with the Zhambyl Regional administration. The event was part of the Office’s long-term efforts to support national human rights institutions in promoting fundamental freedoms and international human rights in Kazakhstan.

BRATISLAVA, 25 April 2018 - It was with deep concern that the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship received the news about the decree signed by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, on simplifying the procedure of granting Russian citizenship to Ukrainians residing in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. 

The Slovak Chairmanship believes that this unilateral measure could undermine the efforts for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in and around Ukraine, and calls for adherence to the OSCE principles and commitments by all its participating States.The Chairmanship invites all sides to refrain from unilateral steps and to jointly continue searching for ways how to fully implement the Minsk agreements.

Additionally, the Chairmanship reiterates its call for a sustainable, full and permanent ceasefire and its firm support for the work of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, which plays an essential role in reducing tensions on the ground, and in fostering peace, stability and security.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations and saw fresh craters near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The Mission saw mines near Vesela Hora and Novoselivka, unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and mine hazard signs near Novohryhorivka, Horlivka and Chermalyk, some for the first time.
• The Mission saw the body of a deceased man at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk and continued to observe hardships faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at checkpoints of the armed formations in Kreminets, as well as in southern Donetsk region near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Oleksandrivske, Novoazovsk and Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 160 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol). On the evening and night of 23-24 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded in total 59 ceasefire violations, including nine undetermined explosions and 33 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south, south-south-east and south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), at westerly directions of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (see also Disengagement areas section). Positioned near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and at two locations in Popasna on the afternoon of 24 April, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions (including two at an assessed range of 600-800m) and about 320 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire assessed as in the vicinity of road T-0504, and was unable to cross the contact line using this road as a result.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 24 April, positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), near Molodizhne and at two locations in Pervomaisk, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and about 640 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and cannon (30mm) fire within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

On 23 April, the SMM observed impact craters close to the disengagement area near Zolote. An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 17 fresh impact craters on both sides of a local road leading from Molodizhne to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, about 2.5km north-east of Molodizhne and about 100m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 24 April 2019). The same UAV spotted 20 fresh impact craters about 550m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge and 1.9km west of its eastern edge, about 250m from houses in Pervomaisk, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds. It also spotted a previously observed position with one recoilless gun (SPG-9) and three members of armed formations present about 100m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge and about 1km north-east of Molodizhne.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

18 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019).

23 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a mortar (probable 2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and a probable anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Stavky (30km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four tanks north of Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019);
• three mortars (82mm) about 1km north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk); and
• a probable mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) about 1km south-west of Molodizhne and two probable tanks (T-72) about 1.5km west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 6 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

24 April

The SMM saw a tank (T-64) loaded on a flatbed transporter near Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas18 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 19 tanks in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019);
• eight tanks in a training area near Miusynsk (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 April 2019); and
• 22 tanks, four surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) as well as 66 armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[4] in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 3 April 2019).

Other weapons observed:

On 18 April, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 16 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and 15 pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka. On the same day, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 12 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk.[5]

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[6]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

24 April

The SMM saw that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

24 April

The SMM noted that eight tanks (three T-64 and five T-72) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

22 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• again an aircraft communications automatic jamming station (R-934B) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk); and
• two ACVs and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Novoselivka.

24 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Semyhiria (58km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

23. April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• five IFVs (BMP-1) and an ACV near Sentianivka; and
• an APC (MT-LBM) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate.

24 April

The SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) towed by a truck near Kypuche (formerly Artemivsk, 46km west of Luhansk).

On 24 April, positioned about 1km north of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw a black and white mini-UAV flying at an altitude of about 80-100m, about 50m north-north-west of the SMM’s position, flying from a north-north-westerly direction, before hovering near the SMM patrol. The SMM left the area.

Presence of mines near Vesela Hora and Novoselivka, unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and mine hazard signs near Novohryhorivka, Horlivka and Chermalyk

On 22 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time 14 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) laid out in two rows across road H-21 near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and two anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the western side of the same road about 120m north-west of the aforementioned mines. The same UAV again spotted at least 44 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) on the same road and in a field close to the latter two anti-tank mines.

On 23 April, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 30 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) laid out in two rows running from north to south for about 70m in a field and another 150 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) laid out in two rows running from north to south for about 420m, all about 3km east of Troitske (government-controlled, 30km north of Donetsk). The same UAV again spotted about 600 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) running from north to south for about 500m, about 3.5km east of Novoselivka (government-controlled, 31km north of Donetsk) and again about 500 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) laid out in three rows running from north to south about 4km north-east of Novoselivka. 

On 24 April, on the southern edge of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a 122mm rocket from an MLRS (BM-21) embedded in the asphalt on the northern side of road M-03 about 200m east-south-east of a bridge above railway tracks, which is used daily by civilians and the SMM.

On the north-western edge of Novohryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time an improvised mine hazard sign, with “passage forbidden mines” written in Russian, attached to a wooden gate across a road leading to Nyzhnie Lozove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk).

About 650m south-east of a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), on the south-eastern side of road T-0513, the SMM again saw a white improvised mine hazard sign with “mines” written in Russian, attached to a wooden stick in the ground.

On the eastern edge of Chermalyk, the SMM again saw a red mine hazard sign, with “Stop Mines” in Ukrainian, attached to a rope extended across a road leading to a cemetery.

Demining activities in Myrna Dolyna

The Mission again saw six people in protective gear bearing the logo of an international organization in a field 50m west of a local road in Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk).

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw the body of a deceased man covered with a blanket and lying on the ground behind containers. Medical staff from an international organization told the Mission that the man was 81 years old and had died of natural causes while waiting at the checkpoint. A couple (in their forties), who introduced themselves as neighbours of the man, said that he was a resident of a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and had collapsed while waiting to travel to government-controlled areas to collect his pension.

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), a representative of an international organization told the SMM that a 35-year-old man had died from natural causes at a bus stop nearby after travelling across the contact line. (These two cases would respectively be the eighteenth and nineteenth cases of civilians dying of natural causes at checkpoints along the contact line recorded by the Mission since the beginning of the year.)

At 12:30, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 500 people queuing to exit and about 200 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. Two women and a man (all about 50 years old) told the SMM that they had been queueing for three hours to exit government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km east of Donetsk) and Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

SMM monitoring and facilitating the distribution of coal in Travneve

The Mission continued to monitor and facilitate adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of coal by an international humanitarian organization in Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of government control

Positioned at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw a woman entering Ukraine and a woman with a toddler exiting Ukraine.

Positioned at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 34 cars (nine with Ukrainian and 12 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 13 with “DPR” plates), three minivans (with “DPR” plates), 76 covered cargo trucks (33 with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and 19 with Belarusian licence plates, as well as 17 with “DPR” plates), and ten tanker trucks (four labelled as flammable, all with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formations north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding south towards Novoazovsk and east towards the border with the Russian Federation, citing “orders from his superior”.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the eastern edge of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding further.
• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing small-arms fire in the area and the security of the SMM”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint towards Sakhanka and Pikuzy.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that no demining activities had taken place between the checkpoint and the bridge.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM for about 20 minutes before allowing the Mission to proceed through the checkpoint into non-government-controlled areas.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting its trailer.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6]  The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[7] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

417866 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe donated 25 computers and a printer to the Judicial Training Centre of Tajikistan’s Supreme Court to enhance the quality of training conducted for judges and prosecutors. The handover ceremony took place on 19 April 2019 in Dushanbe.

The OSCE has a long-standing relation of co-operation with the Supreme Court for building the capacity of the judiciary to uphold OSCE commitments. Joint areas of work include issues related to juvenile justice, media freedom, presumption of innocence, torture prevention, and a wide range of international standards of human rights protection.

“We are glad to contribute to the improvement of the training environment, which will allow for research and access to legal information. It will also help to improve the conduct of training seminars and enhance web-based learning opportunities for judges and prosecutors,” said Robert Heuer, Head of the Human Dimension Department of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

The Director of the Judicial Training Centre, Soleh Zavkizoda, thanked the OSCE for the support and said: “The donated equipment will improve the capacity of the Judicial Training Centre. We co-operate with the OSCE in a constructive manner in all areas that are in line with the OSCE commitments.”

The donation was made at the request of the Judicial Training Centre. The OSCE supports the Government of Tajikistan in the implementation of Recommendations of the Universal Periodic Review Procedure for 2017-2020 and the National Action Plan on Juvenile Justice System Reform 2017-2021.

417995 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe SDGs SDGs:  8 - Decent work and economic growth

A study visit to Armenia for Tajik state officials was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe from 15 to 19 April 2019. The aim of the study visit was to provide the officials with the opportunity to learn about innovative strategies for economic growth.

A group of six representatives from the Executive Office of the President of Tajikistan, the Ministry of Industry and New Technologies, the State Committee of Investment and the State Property Management, the Administration of Dushanbe city and the Sifat Innotech Invest Company took part in the visit.

The study tour began with visits to Synergy International, Microsoft Armenia, Microsoft Innovation Center, Tumo, Synopsis and technological centres along with the Enterprise Incubator Foundation. The delegations shared their respective experience and used the opportunity to inform each other on steps currently being taken to promote a comprehensive policy-oriented approach towards digitalization of economy in both countries.

The Tajik delegation had meetings and onsite visits in Yerevan as well as to technological centres in Gyumri and Vanadzor. The delegation familiarized itself with the benefits of digital platforms and their utilization, which are widening opportunities of infrastructure development.

“Familiarization with the digital infrastructure in Armenia was a unique experience for us, where we learned the strategy and tactics of transforming the economy into a digital format,” noted Manizha Muhammad, Director of Sifat Innotech Invest Company. “As a representative of the private sector, which is involved in the development of the digital transformation of Tajikistan, our company plays a leading role in developing software for ministries and departments of the country. Moreover, this study visit served as a platform for co-operation with the representatives of state institutions of our country with whom we will work in the future to digitize the economy.”

The visit was a good opportunity for establishing collaboration with Armenian IT campuses, centers for creative technologies and techno parks, in order to learn about innovated strategies. The members of the Tajik delegation also took note of the role of education in the field of information technologies taking place in Armenia for youth.

MINSK, 24 April 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 24 April 2019:

“First, I would like to congratulate the citizens of Ukraine on the recent presidential elections. They were held in accordance with the international standards and requirements.

I welcome the statement of President-elect Volodymyr Zelensky, saying that "we will act in any case in the ‘Normandy format’ and we will continue the Minsk process."

Let me also make a personal comment. I highly praise the very accurate work of public opinion surveyors in Ukraine throughout the election campaign.

I would also like to remind here that two years ago in the Luhansk region, an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission member, Joseph Stone, died as a result of the explosion of the Mission’s vehicle. I fully support the efforts of Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, SMM Chief Monitor, to ensure that such incidents will never happen again.

The SMM in Ukraine is the largest mission in the history of the OSCE. I call on the sides to do their utmost to ensure the safety of the personnel and assets of the SMM and to maintain the necessary conditions for the Mission’s unhindered activities in accordance with its mandate.

In this regard, I wish to note that on 18 April 2019 a long-range unmanned aerial vehicle of the SMM OSCE crashed near the contact line in the Donetsk region as a result of jamming. This is the third case over nearly one year.

Unmanned aerial vehicles are sophisticated and expensive equipment financed from the budget of the Mission’s participating states, that is, by the taxpayers of these countries.

I also want to note some positive trends. On 21April 2019, sixty detainees not related to the conflict were transferred from certain areas of the Luhansk region to continue serving their sentence in the government-controlled areas of Ukraine.

In the Security Working Group, the discussion focused on the sides’ recommitment to ceasefire on the occasion of the forthcoming Easter festivities. However, the participants could not reach consensus on the text of a joint statement.

The Humanitarian Working Group continued its discussions on the exchange of detainees and the conditions of their detention.

The Economic Working Group, with the participation of Florence Gillette, the newly appointed Head of the ICRC Delegation to Ukraine, addressed in particular burning issues of water supply, including major repairs of the Petrovsky water pipeline in the Luhansk region.

The Political Working Group discussed current topical questions.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to a house in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and to two sheds in government-controlled Chermalyk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and pieces of unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne.
• The Mission continued efforts to locate its long-range UAV that crashed near the contact line in Donetsk region on 19 April.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Zaichenko and near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), at easterly, southerly and westerly directions of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk). On the evening and night of 22-23 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded in total 73 ceasefire violations, including nine undetermined explosions and 24 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.3-1km south and south-west.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-east, west-south-west and north-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) (see also the disengagement areas section).

 

Fresh damage to civilian properties in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to civilian properties in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

At 46 Naberezhna Street in Chermalyk, about 300m west from the contact line, the Mission saw several fresh marks on the south-east-facing brick wall of a shed located about 15m south of an inhabited one-storey house. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire or shrapnel; however, it could not determine the direction of fire. Next to the above-mentioned shed, the SMM also saw burned remnants of another wooden shed. The Mission could not determine the cause of damage. A man (in his fifties), who introduced himself as the owner of the property, told the SMM that on the evening of 22 April, while he had been at the house, he had heard explosions and small-arms fire in the area and that afterwards he had seen that the wooden shed was on fire.

At 25 Krylova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the Mission saw a hole in a west-facing window of a one-storey inhabited house. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a bullet (calibre undetermined).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 22 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 23 April, positioned 1km north of Kalynove-Borshchuvate, the Mission heard 26 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 4-5km north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

23 April

The SMM saw a towed howitzer (type undetermined) in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

23 April

The SMM saw that 15 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present, and that 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and nine tanks (T-72) continued to be missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 April

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a 100m-long trench (not seen in imagery from 9 January 2019), running from east to west, about 1km south of Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, 40km north-east of Donetsk), reducing the distance between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations from about 290m to 170m; as well as a 20m-long trench running from east to west (not seen in imagery from 28 October 2018) about 300m south of Pivdenne, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) near Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk).

22 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an aircraft communications automatic jamming station (R-934B) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and
• an ACV near Chermalyk.

23 April

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Fresh impact craters and unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne

The Mission saw two fresh craters on both sides of a local road leading from Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, about 2.5km north-east of Molodizhne and about 250m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge. The SMM observed at least ten additional fresh craters in a field 40m south-east of the road and numerous fresh craters in a field 40m north-west of the same road. It assessed the craters as caused by 82mm mortar rounds. On the road, the Mission saw two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) embedded in the tarmac which it assessed as 82mm mortar tailfins.

Presence of mines

On 22 April, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted three rows of at least 36 anti-tank mines across road H-21 about 200m east of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Ongoing recovery efforts of lost SMM long-range UAV

On 21 April, the Mission flew two mid-range UAVs over areas west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and north-east of Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk) where its long-range UAV is assessed to have crashed on 19 April (see SMM Spot Report 19 April 2019). The SMM was unable to locate any debris from the long-range UAV.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the removal of a reported piece of UXO from the yard of a house in Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM monitoring and facilitating the distribution of coal in Travneve

The Mission continued to monitor and facilitate adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of coal disbursements by an international humanitarian organization in Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM monitored security situation south-east of Kherson region

On 21 and 22 April, the Mission observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 23 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “mine clearance activity”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM for about 35 minutes before allowing the Mission to proceed through the checkpoint into non-government-controlled areas.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]  The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported training seminar on the fundamentals of anti-corruption practices and international organizations’ rankings of Kazakhstan concluded on 22 April 2019 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Some 25 representatives of the Almaty-based media representatives took part in the seminar.

The event was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in partnership with the Civil Service Affairs and Anticorruption Agency.

The participants were familiarized with ongoing reforms in the country and the government’s policies to combat corruption. This information was complemented by presentations on the work of international rating agencies that assess Kazakhstan’s anticorruption efforts. The experts reviewed Kazakhstan’s plans to join the group of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member-states and implementation of anti-corruption recommendations under the OECD’s Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plant.

The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan is a sub-regional peer review programme that was launched in 2003 by the OECD. Under the programme, members of the network are reviewed and monitored on a continuous basis for the implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption. For Kazakhstan, the next assessment is due next month.

The training seminar was part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance by focusing on anti-corruption activities in Kazakhstan. It is a follow-up to a similar event for journalists that took place in February 2019 in Nur-Sultan for capital-based media representatives.

Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized a training course to accredit Roma and Egyptian women activists as “confidential persons” who will serve as advocates for victims of domestic violence and early marriages. The three-day event was organized together with the Centre for Roma Initiative and concluded on 20 April 2019 in Podgorica.

The designation of a confidential person is a mechanism under the domestic protection procedure to provide victims of domestic violence with a trained advocate to explain their rights and assist them in dealing with official bodies. Such a person also makes house visits and talks with girls and women in informal settings to build their trust and confidence in institutions, both at the local and national level.

The training programme is accredited by the Agency for Social Welfare and Child Protection of Montenegro. For 10 selected community activists, the 50 euro participation fee was waived.

Sejla Pepic was one of the participants. She works as an education assistant in a primary school in Podgorica, where there are 600 Roma and Egyptian students. Her role is to provide a link between the Roma and Egyptian communities and institutions. “I find this training particularly useful, taking into consideration the size of the community I am interacting with on a daily basis. Focus should be placed on the work with parents and young girls and the importance of education needs to be emphasized. All of this should be accompanied by a clear presentation of legal consequences for those who prevent them from attending school as the common law and unwritten rules are still strongly observed in the Roma and Egyptian communities,” Pepic said.

Another course attendee, Elma Sahman from Bijelo Polje, said: “The reason why I enlisted in this training is to improve my knowledge, to realize my limits, to measure how much I do or do not know. My wish is to provide people in my community with positive examples and to try to transfer my knowledge. The most interesting part of the training was the information about the regulatory framework. Now I know what the law prescribes and what the entitlements of a confidential person are.”

Veljbana Naza works as a mediator in a primary school in Nikšić. “Children need support and motivation so they can continue with their education and are able to take their destiny into their hands. Roma and Egyptians in Montenegro should be informed about which institutions to address and how to prevent and confront domestic violence. Unfortunately, I suffered domestic violence and that is a fact I cannot undo. However, what I can do is to raise my kids and spread the word among other children that violence in any form is simply unacceptable and that they have to stand against it.”

This training follows activities implemented by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro with the support of the French Delegation in Vienna between 2015 and 2017. They were designed to raise awareness about early marriages and domestic violence among vulnerable groups, in particular Roma and Egyptian communities. The project is based on recommendations resulting from a mapping analysis conducted by the Mission in six Montenegrin municipalities, in particular those related to Roma and Egyptian communities.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission monitored the transfer of detainees not related to the conflict in Luhansk region.
• The SMM monitored the distribution of coal by an international humanitarian organization in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Zaichenko, Bezimenne and Ozerianivka, as well as Izvaryne, near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 20). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), in areas south-south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and north of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre). On the night of 21-22 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 200-500m from the camera.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 130), compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city

In the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city, at 2 Kantemyrivskyi Avenue, the SMM saw a fresh crater, about 17m south-south-west of the one-storey house, broken branches on trees about 2.5m from the crater and two shell fragments within 7m of the crater. The SMM saw a shattered south-west facing window and an 8cm hole in the south-west facing wall beneath the window of the house. Most of the damage was observed north, north-west, north-east and south-east of the crater. All abovementioned damage was assessed as fresh and caused by shelling, but the SMM was unable to assess the direction of fire or the weapon used. The houses are located about 1km south of a checkpoint of the armed formations.

About 20m south-east of the abovementioned house, the SMM saw about 200 3-5cm holes on the asphalt driveway about 0.5-10m from a one-storey house at 2A Kantemyrivskyi Avenue, as well as a 40cm impact mark on the concrete foundation of a fence about 3m from the house and about 5m from the holes, assessed as caused by shrapnel. A resident of the house (woman, 30-40 years old) told the SMM that she had heard an impact at 05:00 on 21 April while inside her house. The SMM assessed that all the above-mentioned damage was fresh and caused by shelling from a westerly direction, but was unable to assess the weapon used.

About 5m further south-east, at 1A Leitenanta Nikolenka Street, the SMM saw about 150 holes in the west-facing wall, two 10-15cm holes in the concrete frame of a north-facing window and about 20 holes in the north-facing tin roof of a one-storey house, all assessed as caused by shell fragments. A resident of the house (woman, 60-70 years old) told the SMM that she had heard an impact at 05:00 on 21 April while inside her house. The SMM assessed that all the above-mentioned damage was fresh and caused by shelling from a westerly direction, but was unable to assess the weapon used.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 21 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight from east to west, at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 22 April, positioned in four locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 75 undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of small-arms fire near the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned 1km north of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, at an assessed range of 2-5km north (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

22 April

The SMM saw nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 April

The SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

22 April

The SMM saw that three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present and all observed for the first time, and 31 self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and 28 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), two self-propelled mortars (2S9) and 22 anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 April

The SMM saw that seven tanks (T-72) continued to be missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Non-government-controlled areas

20. April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Holubivske.

21 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two ACVs and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) on a truck near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk);
• an APC (MT-LB) and an ACV near Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk); and
• a wheeled excavator with a series of large excavations seen for the first time, including trenches 30m long by 30m wide and vehicle revetments, on the eastern edge of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled areas

20 April

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-variant) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (a BMP-2 and a BMP variant) and a probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in a residential area of Novhorodske.

21. April

The SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

On 22 April, on two occasions, positioned about 80m north of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw a black UAV flying around 800m north-east of its position.

Presence of mines

Close to positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV on 20 April spotted about 60 anti-tank mines laid in two rows running from north to south (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 September 2018).

On 21 April, east of Vesela Hora, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the western lane of road H-21, as well as again about 40 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) in a field about 50m south-west of the same road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline in Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk). Positioned in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), near to the repairs site, the SMM recorded one burst of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 700m-800m north-north-east.

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), power lines in Holubivske and near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol) and Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33 km north-east of Mariupol), as well as assessments of hydraulic structures near Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

SMM monitoring of transfer of detainees not related to the conflict in Luhansk region

The SMM monitored the transfer of detainees not related to the conflict from non-government-controlled to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.

SMM monitoring and facilitating the distribution of coal in Travneve

The SMM monitored and facilitated adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of coal disbursements by an international humanitarian organization in Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two cars with Ukrainian licence plates and one covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw six cars (one with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates and nine pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven pedestrians entering Ukraine and three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors and ongoing shooting in the area”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles passing the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a checkpoint west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM access to proceed further west of the checkpoint, citing “ongoing operations in the area.” While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations in Ozerianivka (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk) a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage east, citing “orders from his commander”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM for about 25 minutes before allowing the SMM to proceed through the checkpoint into non-government-controlled areas.  

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]  The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,134 to 10,264 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 151 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 33 this week compared to 32 last week: 14 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 19 into Ukraine. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, four families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when five families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and five into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed increased in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (344 compared to 324 observed during the previous week). There were 182 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 162 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the “irregular” route “Stakhanov-Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OT observed 922 trucks (874 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at the both BCPs, (346 at the Gukovo BCP and 576 at the Donetsk BCP); 526 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 396 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.                                                                                          

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 44 (compared to 56 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP remains the same 179: of the total number of trucks scanned, 113 trucks (63 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 66 trucks (37 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 140 to 145 vehicles; 74 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 71 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 15 occasions; the OTs assessed that nine trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and six to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

On 20 April at 14.40, an ambulance arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side and underwent border control procedures before leaving towards Ukraine.

On 22 April at 20:39, an ambulance arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side and stopped in front of the main building. It underwent border control procedures for around ten minutes and then left towards Ukraine. The OT was unable to notice any other details.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 19 March 2019 to 23 April 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).