OSCE

424379 Communication and Media Relations Section

An advanced train-the-trainer course on the identification of potential foreign terrorists fighters (FTFs) at the borders was organized Transnational Threats Department’s Border Security and Management Unit with support of the Government of Turkey for six newly selected border officers from Greece, Kyrgyzstan, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey, from 24 to 29 June 2019 in Istanbul.                                            

The training programme covered international legal frameworks, travel documents security, effective use of Interpol databases, advance passenger information, risk analysis and management in the identification and interviewing of potential foreign terrorist fighters at borders in compliance with the international human rights standards as well as training techniques and methodologies. The training was combined with a one-day roundtable on the development of a Visual Arts Training Tool on the identification of FTFs at the borders.

The importance of applying risk analysis models to identify potential foreign terrorist fighters at the borders was discussed, as were background, trends and current cases. The participants also engaged in practical exercises on the detection of forged documents and impostors and in interactive exercises for understanding behavioural indicators of foreign terrorist fighters and also refining teaching and presenting techniques.

Mobile Training Team members from Georgia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and experts from INTERPOL, the OSCE Transnational Threat Department’s Border Security and Management Unit (BSMU), Austria and the United States delivered presentations and shared their knowledge and expertise in the identification of foreign terrorist fighters at the borders and teaching techniques.

The participants also visited the premises of the newly opened Istanbul International Airport, where they had the opportunity to gain on-site and hands-on experience regarding border controls and travel document security, including new electronic systems and were familiarized with recent cases of FTFs detected at the airport.

The OSCE Mobile Training Team was established by the BSMU in 2016. The current Mobile Team consists of 17 operational border and counter-terrorism experts from OSCE participating States.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• The SMM continued to monitor activities related to the disengagement process at Stanytsia Luhanska. Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the Mission saw that the most forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces remained empty; it saw two men in military-type clothing present at the most forward position of the armed formations. The SMM also continued to observe representatives of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine conducting demining activities, as well as members of the armed formations dismantling parts of facilities next to their checkpoint.
• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 28 and 29 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 29 and 30 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured due to shelling in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district and observed fresh craters there.
• The SMM saw damage caused by small-arms fire to a residential building in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as aimed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying over the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• Restrictions to the SMM’s access continued in the disengagement areas. Its freedom of movement was also denied near non-government-controlled Veselohorivka and Oleksandrivske.*

Disengagement in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM continued to monitor activities related to the disengagement process at Stanytsia Luhanska. On 29 and 30 June, the SMM saw inside the forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps at the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) (which was still present) two men in military-type clothing, who were wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them in both Russian and English languages, and no presence of military-type hardware.[1] 

On 29 June, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw that some sheds and a few concrete blocks next to the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were being removed from the area with two vehicles (one truck with a crane and another truck with a trailer). At the checkpoint, the SMM noted throughout the day a constant flow of people travelling in both directions through the processing booths, where it saw personnel in civilian clothing checking the documents of those crossing. In the same area, the SMM also saw approximately ten men in military-style clothing, who were wearing the same aforementioned blue armbands.  On 30 June, the SMM noted that the situation remained unchanged.

On 29 June, positioned next to the Prince Ihor Monument about 250m south-east of the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM saw, near the three previously observed processing booths in the parking lot about 50m south of the monument, another crane carrying three additional booths to the same area (see SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM continued monitoring the installation works of the new containers until about 16:00. On 30 June, the SMM noted that installation works did not continue. 

On both 29 and 30 June, the SMM continued to observe that the former most forward position, as well as the queuing shelter of Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 700m north of the wooden ramp (see SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019 and SMM Spot Report 30 June 2019), remained empty of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel or hardware.

On 29 June, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a demining team of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine, comprised of nine people and three vehicles (one ambulance and two trucks), conducting demining activities up to 5m next to both sides of the road. The SMM also saw SES members of the team collecting pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and remnants of ammunition, including a tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, about 20m east of the road and placing them by the side of the road. Two representatives of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that on 29 June, demining activities aimed at clearing the section of the road leading from the northern edge of the disengagement area to the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On 30 June, the SMM noted that no demining activities took place inside the disengagement area; on 29 and 30 June, the SMM noted no continuation of the dismantling works at the abovementioned most forward position.

On 30 June, in addition to its enhanced presence inside the disengagement area, the SMM was able to monitor the situation with two of its vehicles, which drove on the road from the northern edge of the area until the edge of the northern wooden ramp.

On 29 June, the SMM received a note verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine notifying that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had completed disengagement in the agreed disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska. On 30 June, the SMM received a letter from the armed formations in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region notifying that they had completed disengagement in the agreed disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (see SMM Spot Report 30 June 2019).

Ceasefire violations[2]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 28 and 29 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 430), compared with the previous reporting period (about 460 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and at northerly and north-westerly directions of non-government-controlled Donetsk city.

Between the evenings of 29 and 30 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 140), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and westerly directions of Svitlodarsk and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 28 and 29 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including five explosions compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

Between the evenings of 29 and 30 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (one explosion inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk)), compared with the previous 24 hours. 

A man injured and fresh craters in Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district

On 29 June, at 65 Kosarieva Street, in a residential part of the Trudivski area of non-government-controlled Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district, the SMM saw a fresh crater (about 1m in diameter) in the ground about 20m east of a six-storey apartment building. The SMM also saw 13 shattered east-facing window panes of the aforementioned building. About 200m east, at 84 Kosarieva Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater (1m in diameter) about 5m west of a two-storey house, as well as shrapnel damage to the west-facing façade and west-facing part of the roof of the house; 12 windows had been covered with wooden panels. The SMM assessed both craters as caused by (82mm) mortar rounds, but could not assess the direction of fire. 

On 30 June, at a hospital in Donetsk city, the SMM saw a man (aged 39) with several injuries to his face, right shoulder and abdomen. Medical staff told the SMM that the man had been admitted to the hospital on the morning of 28 June with injuries caused by glass fragments in his face and body. The man told the SMM that he was a resident at 84 Kosarieva Street in Donetsk city (see above). He added that at about 04:15 on 28 June, he had heard three loud explosions, followed by a fourth one which had exploded very close to his house. The man also told the SMM that immediately following the last explosion, one of the windows had been shattered due to the blast wave, and glass shards and fragments had injured him.

Residential building hit by small-arms fire in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 30 June, the SMM saw a hole (approximately 4cm in diameter) in the outer pane of a west-facing window on the ground floor of a four-storey house at 7 Voikova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). It also saw a (7.62mm) bullet stuck between the outer and inner panes of the same window. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a (7.62mm) bullet. Two men (aged 60-70), who introduced themselves as residents of the house, told the SMM that the house had been hit by small-arms fire at about 02:00 on 30 June.  

Small-arms fire aimed at an SMM mini-UAV flying over the Zolote disengagement area

During the day on 29 June, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM conducted a mini-UAV flight over the area. While its UAV was flying over an area between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations, about 250m south-east of the railway bridge and about 1-2km north-north-west of the SMM’s position, the SMM heard at least five bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV. Immediately after the bursts, the SMM lost control of its UAV. The SMM assessed that small-arms fire had probably hit the UAV, which went down. The SMM left the area and was unable to recover its UAV.*

Other disengagement areas[3]

During the evening of 28 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km east-south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area), two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (unable to be assessed whether inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km east and 5-6km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery). During the day on 29 June, positioned about 3km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five bursts and a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-west and north-north-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area (see above).

During the same day, positioned about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 21 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km west, all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery. During the day on 30 June, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 29 and 30 June, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

28 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Vyskryva (76km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report of 29 June 2019 and below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

28 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured combat vehicles and two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel aiming a rifle and firing at an SMM mini-UAV near Vyskryva (see SMM Daily Report of 29 June 2019), and
• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk).

29 and 30 June

The SMM saw an IFV near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

28 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a military-type position, comprised of a bunker made of logs and sandbags, as well as a previously observed 25m-long trench running east to west from the aforementioned position south-west of Molodizhne.

29 June

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (type undetermined) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

29 and 30 June

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Pervomaisk.

30 June

The SMM saw an automated jamming system (R-378A) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 30 June, the SMM saw that a previously reported anti-personnel mine (MON-90) next to road T-0504 between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and those of the armed formations about 2.5km south-south-west of Molodizhne was no longer present.   

SMM facilitation of operations of civilian infrastructure

On 29 and 30 June, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk). On 30 June, the Mission continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 29 June, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence places, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (five with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates and a bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 29 June, at a checkpoint on the eastern outskirts of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage eastward to Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “an ongoing operation in the area”.
• On 30 June, at a checkpoint about 500m east of Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delayed:

• On 30 June, at a checkpoint in Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after approximately 30 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On 29 June, while flying over areas near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) in search of the lost SMM long-range UAV (which had not yet been located, see also SMM Spot Report 28 June 2019), an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming on four instances. [6]
• While flying over areas near Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 30km north-east of Mariupol) in search of the lost SMM long-range UAV, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming on four instances on 29 June and on three instances on 30 June. [7]
• On 29 June, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). In addition, while conducting the flight, the SMM heard shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it was unable to recover.
• On 30 June, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).
• On two occasions on 30 June, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming while flying over areas near Zhytenko (non-government-controlled, 70km east of Donetsk).

[1] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[2] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Svitlodarsk and at Oktiabr mine were non-operational for half of the reporting period.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

[7] ibid.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Following Estonia’s parliamentary elections on 3 March 2019, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has published its final conclusions. The election was run in a professional and efficient manner, with widespread public confidence in most stages of the process. Nevertheless, the work of the election administration, the implementation of internet voting, and the participation of national minorities in the electoral process, could benefit from further improvement.

Key recommendations include:

• Further review the provisions on the appointment of voting district committees by municipal councils and related legal redress mechanisms.

• Increase efforts to assist people with disabilities to participate in the voting process by improving the accessibility of polling stations, developing accessible information materials and tools, and improving digital tools and online applications.

• As internet voting continues to grow in popularity, technological specifications for the internet voting system should be listed in detail and the auditing system strengthened.

• Also with regard to internet voting, risk-mitigating strategies and a review of the potential effets of cyber-attack allegations against the internet voting infrastructure are needed.

• While Estonia has recently made efforts to promote the participation of national minorities in public and political life, there is a need to further increase the naturalization rate among people of so-called undetermined citizenship, with a view to granting them full voting rights.

ODIHR deployed an Election Expert Team (EET) on 19 February 2019 to observe the parliamentary elections. The EET focused on election administration, internet voting, and the participation of national minorities in the election. All 57 countries across the OSCE region have formally committed to follow up promptly on ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations.

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Profiling and risk assessment for law enforcement and border control officers at aviation checkpoints was the focus of an OSCE-organized practical training course that is taking place from 1 to 5 July 2019.

Led by a team of experts from Kazakhstan, the five-day training course focuses on psychological and behavioural analysis techniques and risk indicators.

The training event is attended by operational level officers from the Ministries of National Security, Internal Affairs, the State Border Service, the State Customs Service, the State Migration Service and the Aviation Security Service of Turkmenistan Airlines. The course addresses profiling history, relevant risk analysis and risk management system and discusses how to develop a risk profile and survey methodology.

“Countering transnational terrorist threats is high on the OSCE agenda and profiling training is essential for law enforcement officials so that they can professionally analyse personal characteristics and  behaviour, especially in extreme or stressful situations, and take necessary measures to prevent potential threats,” said Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat is pleased to launch a series of profiling training courses and make a contribution to the capacity building of law enforcement in this highly demanded sphere,” she said.

The agenda of the training course includes theoretical and practical classes on topics such as speech analysis, face control, psychological and physiological markers of stress as well as operational psycho-diagnostics and factors complicating or affecting profiling. A practical exercise at the aviation checkpoint will enable participants to test their newly gained knowledge and skills.

424400 The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities

The office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has gathered a group of international experts, researchers and professionals in the field of multilingual education to develop tools to support multilingual education in Central Asia.

The Regional Expert School on Multilingual and Multicultural Education for Integration and Sustainable Development is taking place from 1 to 5 July 2019 in Issyk-Kul, Kyrgyzstan.

It is the first time that experts and professionals from Estonia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova and Tajikistan have come together to produce a number of teaching guides and methodological materials to support practitioners providing multilingual education from pre-school to tertiary education levels in Central Asia.

Pierre von Arx, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, and Nadira Jusupbekova, Deputy Minister of Education and Science of Kyrgyzstan, officially opened the school on 1 July.  

The experts will develop a plan to conduct research into the provision of multilingual education in the region, including analysing the current situation and assessing the impact of the initiatives already in operation.

The participants will work together on the production of methodological materials to support enhancements to multilingual education in the region. The expected outcomes will include guides on how to work with communities and parents to ensure the successful rollout of multilingual education in schools, how to set up a multilingual system in pre-schools; university curricula and programmes for teacher training; teaching materials, and an online course on Content and Language Integrated Learning.

The initiative is co-organized by the Ministry of Education and Science of Kyrgyzstan and UNICEF Kyrgyzstan.

The High Commissioner has been implementing the Central Asia Education Programme since 2012. The programme aims to promote multilingual and multicultural education and develop bilateral and multilateral co‑operation in the region to promote the integration of society.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A five-day training course aimed at further strengthening the capacity of Tajikistan to counter terrorist financing was organized from 25 to 29 June 2019 in Khujand, Tajikistan.

Eighteen experts and practitioners from the headquarters of the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Financial Monitoring Department of the National Bank of Tajikistan, the Ministry of the Interior, and the State Committee for National Security of the Republic of Tajikistan participated in the event.

The course was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Global Programme against Money Laundering and in partnership with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (EAG).

The training course was conducted to strengthen Tajikistan’s compliance with international standards, in particular, UN Security Council Resolutions, especially the recently adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2462 (2019), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments.

The seminar emphasized the key role of inter-agency co-operation in investigating and disrupting terrorist financing. Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, it included sessions on the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit and of financial investigation, creating financial profiles, sources of information and suspicious transaction reports, risk of abuse of non-profit organizations for terrorist financing,  new methods of payments, addressing challenges related to foreign terrorist fighters, seizure and management of exhibits.

More than half of the course was devoted to practical work on exercises highlighting specific instruments and techniques that play an important role in countering the financing of terrorism.

The OSCE organized the course with the financial support of Germany, as part of a comprehensive multi-annual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.

 

TIRANA, 1 July 2019 – Albania’s 30 June local elections were held with little regard for the interests of the voters in a climate of political standoff, said observers with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in a preliminary statement of their findings.

The opposition decided not to participate, but the government was determined to hold the elections regardless. Mayoral candidates ran unopposed in 31 of 61 municipalities. In this context, voters often did not have a meaningful choice among political options, the statement concluded.

“While a number of political parties, coalitions and groups of voters fielded candidates, the absence of the major opposition parties from the election considerably limited the choice of candidates for voters,” said Ambassador Audrey Glover, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission. “Initial refusal by the same parties to nominate members of election administration, plus the later politicized interpretation of electoral law, left the country’s election management imbalanced and reduced trust in the elections.”

Political confrontation led to legal uncertainty, and many decisions of the election administration were taken with the political objective of ensuring the conduct of elections. Although local issues were addressed at some small-scale events, the main focus in the campaign was on the non-participation of the main opposition parties and the date of the elections. There were also credible allegations of voters being pressured by both sides, the observers found.

Ambassador Glover continued: “We saw evidence that voters were pressured by all political sides. This, along with polarized media focusing on the political crisis rather than providing impartial information about candidates, kept some voters from making free and informed choices.”

Positively, voting was conducted in a generally peaceful and orderly manner. Over 3.5 million people were registered to vote and an estimated 21 per cent cast their ballots in 5,410 polling stations across the country. In total, 97 mayoral candidates, including 11 women, and 544 candidate lists for local councils, which were all gender balanced in accordance with electoral law, were registered in the 61 municipalities.

Contact: Lauren Baranowska, ODIHR Public Affairs, on +355 68 9900074 or +48 695 916 998 (mobile) or at lauren.baranowska@odihr.pl

424475 Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro supported a four-day capacity building meeting of the Regional Youth Co-operation Office (RYCO) Local Branch Officers (LBOs) that was held from 24 to 27 June in Žabljak.

The meeting was a team building and planning activity aimed at strengthening of the LBOs for implementation of the 2019 action plan throughout the RYCO contracting parties. The working meeting included topics such as monitoring and evaluation in 2018/2019 with an emphasis on the lessons learned, open calls in 2019, update and planning of specific activities within the RYCO projects supported by other donors. Co-operation and communication with partner organization, LBO annual budgets and individual LBO registration process was also discussed.

Apart from the LBOs, the meeting was attended by Ɖuro Blanuša, the RYCO Secretary General, and staff members from the RYCO Headquarters based in Tirana.

This activity is a part of the overall assistance that the Mission provides to the Montenegrin RYCO Local Branch Office in the area of capacity building and visibility.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

On 29 June, the SMM received a Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine notifying that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had completed disengagement in the agreed disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

On 30 June, the SMM received a letter from the armed formations in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region notifying that they had completed disengagement in the agreed disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

On 26 June, the Mission had observed the beginning of the disengagement process with Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and members of the armed formations leaving their most forward positions, together with their weapons, and exiting the disengagement area. See SMM Spot Report 27 June 2019.

In the following days it observed that Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations had vacated other positions inside the disengagement area. It also noted the Ukrainian Armed Forces begin dismantling their forward fortifications and conducting demining work; and the armed formations dismantling a shed and removing some concrete blocks inside the disengagement area, as well as beginning establishment of new crossing infrastructure outside the disengagement area. See SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019, SMM Daily Report 28 June 2019 and SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019 for further information.

The situation is calm and stable. The SMM will continue to actively monitor and report on the situation.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission observed demining activities and removal of concrete blocks and other objects inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a woman injured due to shelling in Oleksandrivka.
• It saw damage caused by gunfire to and near civilian houses and a church in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and Pikuzy.
• An SMM long-range UAV was lost in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• The Mission saw weapons in violations of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area in Luhansk region.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its freedom of movement was also denied near Novoazovsk and Kozatske, and in areas near the border with the Russian Federation, all in non-government-controlled areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 460), compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-easterly directions of the SMM camera at Oktiabr Mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at northerly and westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including no explosions compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions).

Disengagement in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 28 June, from 06:30 to 16:00, positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw members of the armed formations with three trucks dismantling a wooden roof of a shed and removing two containers and a tyre wall. From 09:50 to 11:10, the Mission also observed five members of the armed formations and people in civilian clothing removing eight concrete blocks all located about 17m south-west of the checkpoint.

At about 17:45, positioned next to the Prince Ihor Monument about 250m south-east of the south-eastern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw that three new containers and 20 concrete blocks had been placed about 50m south-south-west of the monument. It also observed three workers connecting electrical cables to the containers. Senior members of the armed formations told the SMM that these facilities will be used to check civilians traveling towards government-controlled areas.

On the morning of the same day, the SMM observed that the queuing shelter, inside the disengagement area, about 700m north of the wooden ramp at the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge was empty of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel or hardware. From 10:30 to 15:00, the SMM observed demining teams composed of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and representatives of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine conducting demining activities at a distance of up to 5m on both sides of the road that leads from the entry-exit checkpoint to the wooden ramp.

At around 16:00, the SMM saw personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and SES representatives with a truck and a tractor removing concrete blocks, tyres and logs near a bunker at the most forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (about 300m north-north-west from the wooden ramp at the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge) and removing camouflage netting from the same bunker. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) had also been removed from the bunker.

At about 11:15, the head of the Ukrainian delegation in the Trilateral Contact Group and SMM members walked to the wooden ramp at the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. At 14:00, the SMM saw that positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the railway bridge, inside the disengagement area, were empty of personnel or hardware.

Throughout the day, the SMM saw few people queuing to enter and exit government-controlled areas at both the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, and subsequently crossing the bridge. (For recent observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019 and SMM Daily Report 28 June 2019).

A woman injured due to shelling in Oleksandrivka

On 28 June, the SMM followed up on reports of a woman (aged 70) injured due to shelling in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). At a hospital in the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw the woman with blood-stained bandages on her legs, head, arms, chest and stomach. On 18 June, medical staff had told the SMM that the woman had been admitted to the hospital with shrapnel injuries. The woman told the SMM that she was at her house at 10 Hoholia Street in Oleksandrivka on the evening of 14 June when shelling had occurred. She also told the SMM that two pieces of shrapnel still needed to be removed from her body.

Damage due to shelling to an inhabited house and a church in Pikuzy

On 27 June, the SMM followed up on reports of shelling in the centre of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). At 32 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a crater (with a fuse tunnel in it) located 12m south of a single-storey house as well as shrapnel marks on a gate, 10m south of the same house, and broken branches and chipped bark on five trees nearby. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction. Within a 10m radius of the same house, the SMM saw four other craters (one near its north-western corner, two near a south-facing wall and one near a west-facing wall of the same house) as well as shrapnel damage to the same west-facing wall and broken branches and chipped bark on five trees nearby. Near the crater close to the west-facing wall, the SMM saw what it assessed as a percussion fuse cap of an automatic grenade launcher projectile. The SMM assessed the four craters as recent and caused by automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS) rounds (30mm) fired from a westerly direction. The owners of the house (woman and man, aged 50-60) told the SMM that they had been at home when they heard explosions in the afternoon of 26 June and in the afternoon of 16 June (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 28 June 2019 and SMM Daily Report 24 June 2019)

About 400m east of the house, the SMM saw five craters all within a 20m radius of a church (one on its north side, two on its south side and two on its west side with fuse tunnels in all of them) as well as shrapnel marks on the north-, south- and west-facing walls of the same church. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.

Fresh damage caused by gunfire to residential buildings in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 27 June, the SMM saw a hole assessed as fresh in a west-facing window and fresh scarring in an inside wall of a two-storey house at 12 Lizy Chaikinoi Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a small-arms round (5.45mm), which had pierced the window and ricocheted off the wall. About 200m east of the house, at 1 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw damage in a west-facing window on the second floor in a two-storey residential building: four holes, one in the left window pane and three overlapping in the partially shattered right window pane, and a damaged window frame. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a round of small arms. Within a 15m radius of the damaged window, the SMM saw several pieces of a plastic window frame lying on the ground. Several residents of the neighbourhood (mixed gender, aged 50-55) told the SMM that the buildings had sustained damage in the evening of 26 June and early morning of 27 June.

On 28 June, at 2 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw two holes in a north-west facing window pane of an apartment on the fourth floor of a residential building. The SMM assessed the damage as recent and caused by small-arms rounds (7.62mm). In the same apartment, the SMM saw a hole in a curtain covering a north-west facing balcony door and scarring in a wooden cabinet opposite the balcony door. The SMM assessed the damage was caused by a small-arms round. The owner (woman, aged 58) said that a bullet had pierced the curtain (while the balcony door was open) in the early morning of 27 June while the other damage had been caused in the evening of 26 May and early morning of 13 June.

SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle lost near contact line in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

In the evening hours of 27 June, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was flying near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 93km south of Donetsk) when it began to rapidly lose power and altitude (after the temperature of the UAV’s engine had reached high levels). The SMM attempted to land the UAV in an area south of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk) but lost communication with it (see SMM Spot Report 28 June 2019).

Small-arms fire in the direction of SMM mini-UAV near Vyskryva

While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Vyskryva (government-controlled, 76km west of Luhansk), the SMM recorded 12 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.4km south-east of the SMM position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.

Other disengagement areas[2]

During the evening of 27 June, while in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire, at an assessed range of 5-7km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

28 June

The SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) near Lyman (91km north of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

27 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa and 9K35 Strela-10) near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 20 June 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

28 June

The SMM noted that:

• 39 MLRS (33 BM-27 and six BM-21 Grad, 122mm) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

27 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk);
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk); and
• two APCs (MT-LB) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk).

The SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) and six military trucks towing five APCs (BTR-70) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Plotyna (28km north-east of Luhansk).

28 June

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Popasna.

On 27 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted five fresh craters in a field about 1km west-north-west of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), assessed as caused by the controlled detonation of UXO (not seen in imagery from 8 April 2019).

On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted at least ten craters (not seen in imagery from 25 May 2019), assessed as caused by 82mm rounds, in a field about 1km north-east of the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city. The SMM was unable to assess the direction of fire. While conducting the mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard shots of small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the UAV (for more information, see SMM Daily Report 28 June 2019).

Presence of unexploded ordnance and mine hazard signs

About 10m north of Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy (see above), the SMM saw for the first time an UXO assessed as an unexploded RPG-7 grenade with one of the four stabilizing (extended) fins missing. At 32 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw for the first time several bullets (7.62mm) of an assault rifle and two intact 12.7mm incendiary bullets on the ground. About 15m south-east of a church in the same settlement, the SMM also saw another 12.7mm unexploded incendiary bullet lying on the ground.

On a road about 500m north of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time a 12.7mm incendiary bullet lying on the ground. The Mission also saw two 12.7mm incendiary bullets lying on a road respectively 500m north and 500m south of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM observed for the first time two mine hazard signs reading “Warning Access “passage” in this territory is dangerous” in Ukrainian, about 2.5km apart from each other on the north-eastern edge of a road between Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk) and a third sign located on the edge of the same road about 1.4km north-west of Mykolaivka.

SMM facilitation of operations of civilian infrastructure

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw eight pedestrians (mixed gender and ages) entering Ukraine as well as seven pedestrians (mixed gender and ages) exiting Ukraine.

While at the pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw 13 pedestrians (mixed gender and ages) entering Ukraine and seven pedestrians (mixed gender and ages) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 30 cars (seven with Ukrainian, 12 with Russian Federation and four with Lithuanian licence plates and seven with “LPR” plates), 11 trucks (six with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates and four with “LPR” plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 15 pedestrians (mixed gender and ages) queuing to exit Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south into the town and south-east towards Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), citing an “ongoing operation” in the area.
• At a checkpoint east of Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage east towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol) citing orders from their superiors.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed to the settlement only while accompanied by a member of the armed formations.

Other impediments:

• Four SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 30km north-east of Mariupol). [6]

 

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site was abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

VIENNA/BRATISLAVA - 29 June 2019 - The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stéphane Visconti of France and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) visited Vienna and Bratislava from 27-28 June to brief the Permanent Representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group countries, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak on the results of the Co-Chairs’ recent visit to the region and their recent consultations with the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers in Moscow and Washington, DC. They also met with Head of the OSCE High-Level Planning Group Colonel Vladimir Minarik. Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk also took part in these meetings.

The Co-Chairs welcomed the simultaneous release of prisoners on 28 June and expressed appreciation for the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross in facilitating this positive first step with regard to detainees.

The Co-Chairs call on the sides to take additional concrete humanitarian measures to further consolidate an atmosphere conducive to peace and favorable to substantive talks as soon as possible.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

KYIV 28 June 2019 - The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press today regarding the conduct of disengagement from the agreed area at Stanytsia Luhanska:

"I thank the sides for this long-awaited and important step on the way towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the east of Ukraine as well as the staff and the leadership of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission for their tremendous contribution to the implementation of this process.

Together with this, let me express special appreciation to the representative of Ukraine in the Trilateral Contact Group, Leonid Danilovych Kuchma, for his invaluable contribution to this process. His personal participation today during the disengagement operation in Stanytsia Luhanska has been an important encouragement to fulfill the obligations.

I hope that, following the letter and the spirit of the Minsk agreements and in the interest of the civilian population, the successful completion of this disengagement operation will be followed by further reciprocal steps, such as the repair of the access to the pedestrian bridge across the river Siverskyi Donets at Stanytsia Luhanska and  the reconfirmation by the sides of their commitment to a robust, sustainable and permanent ceasefire.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw demining activities inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and further withdrawal of forces and hardware.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and damage to houses due to shelling in Pikuzy.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as aimed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicles near Sakhanka and Staromykhailivka.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines near Talakivka and Pikuzy, including some for the first time.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including near non-government-controlled Starolaspa, Shevchenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 190), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), and in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including however more explosions (about 50) compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 26 June, at 19:52, positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a truck (Ural type) drive from a southerly direction to the checkpoint. From 19:58 to 20:15, at the same location, the Mission observed about four members of the armed formations loading boxes and small arms onto the truck.

On 27 June, at about 07:00, positioned at the Prince Ihor Monument about 250m south-east of the south-eastern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM heard four bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

On the morning of the same day, the SMM observed that the queuing shelter, inside the disengagement area, about 700m north of the wooden ramp at the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge was empty of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel or hardware. In the afternoon, the SMM observed demining teams composed of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, representatives of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and members of an international demining organisation conducting demining activities at a distance of up to 15m on both sides of the road that leads from the entry-exit checkpoint to the wooden ramp. At 15:10, a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that all planned demining activities had been completed for the day.

At 10:10, positioned at the Prince Ihor Monument, the SMM saw a demining team composed of four members of the armed formations depart to an area about 500m west of the monument inside the disengagement area, reportedly to conduct demining activities there. At 11:15, senior members of the armed formations told the SMM that demining activities in the area inside the disengagement area west of the Prince Ihor Monument were complete for the day. At 12:15, the SMM saw a truck (Ural type), with six armed members of the armed formations and an automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) on board, drive out of the disengagement area from a westerly direction to a position of the armed formations near the Prince Ihor Monument. In the afternoon, accompanied by senior members of the armed formations, the SMM saw that two positions of the armed formations on top of a hill south and south-west of the bridge were empty of personnel or hardware.

Throughout the day, the SMM saw people queuing to enter and exit government-controlled areas at both the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, and subsequently crossing the bridge. (For recent observations, see SMM Spot Report 27 June 2019 and SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019).

Fresh craters and damage to houses due to shelling in Pikuzy

On 26 June, the SMM followed up on reports of shelling in the centre of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). In the courtyard of a Culture House located on the southern side of the road on Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw four fresh craters about 20-30m from each other, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction. It also observed shrapnel pockmarks on the wall of the two-storey building of the Culture House about 5m south-south-east of one of the craters and numerous trees with their bark stripped within 2-5m of two of the craters, all assessed as caused by shrapnel from the same explosions.

About 15m north-east from one of the craters, at the corner of Akhmatovoi and Cherniakhivskoho Streets, the SMM saw a recent crater (about a couple of days old) on the south-eastern edge of the road, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a westerly direction.

About 30m further south-east, at 2 Cherniakhivskoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in the south-south-east facing side of the roof of a one-storey house. About 70m further south-east, at 3 Cherniakhivskoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in a garden 6m south-south-east of a one-storey house. The SMM assessed the damage at both locations as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.

About 115m further north-east, at 37 Akhmatovoi Street, the Mission saw large branches cut off from a tree and leaves on the ground, as well as a fuse and the tailfin of a self-propelled grenade on the ground below the tree. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a self-propelled grenade fired from a westerly direction. About 9m north-west from the tree, it observed a shattered window and a broken window shutter on the south-east-facing wall of an inhabited house, assessed as caused by the shockwave from the same explosion. A group of four residents of Pikuzy, told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 26 June.

Small-arms fire aimed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)

During the day on 27 June, positioned near Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol) and conducting a mini-UAV flight near Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) , the SMM heard four bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 3.4km east-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 3.4km east-north-east of the patrol, above positions of the armed formations. While flying the UAV back towards the patrol to retrieve it, the SMM heard two more bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 3.2km east-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 3.2km east-north-east of the patrol.

On the same day, while conducting another mini-UAV near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 900m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 900m south-east of the patrol. In both cases, the SMM landed the UAVs safely and immediately left the area.

On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a person in a previously reported position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces aiming a rifle at the UAV and firing a burst near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk).*

Other disengagement areas[2]

During the night and early morning hours of 26-27 June, while in Popasna, the SMM heard 45 undetermined explosions and 75 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-7km east and east-south-east. During the day of 27 June, positioned 1.7km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and six shots. All of the above ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Residential houses on fire in Zaitseve

In the early morning hours of 27 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four residential houses burning in the non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM was unable to determine the cause of the fire.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

27 June

The SMM noted that:

• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were present and
• 15 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 44 self-propelled howitzers (23 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and 21 2S1), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and nine tanks (T-72) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

27 June

The SMM noted that 51 tanks (24 T-72 and 27 T-64), a towed howitzer (D-44, 85mm), two anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) and 49 mortars (12 M120-15 Molot, 120mm; seven 2B11 Sani, 120mm; eight KBA-48M, 82mm; 12 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm; three 2B14 Podnos, 82mm; one 2B10, 82mm and six BM-37, 82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

25 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) and five armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (an MT-LBu, two BMP variant and two undetermined) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

27 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-2) 2m from a residential house in Troitske (30km north of Donetsk) and
• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Troitske.

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (Spartan) in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Talakivka and Pikuzy

On 26 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 80 anti-tank mines laid in four rows in a field south of a local road about 5km east of Talakivka (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) and about 2.2km west-north-west of Pikuzy, between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations. About 170m further north-west, the same UAV again spotted 13 anti-tank mines laid in a single row across the same road.

On the same day, the same UAV again spotted 20 anti-tank mines laid in a single row in a field on the western edge of Pikuzy, about 20m south of a road leading to Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk, government-controlled). About 1.5km south-west of the previously-mentioned mines and about 5km south-east of Talakivka, the same UAV again spotted 20 anti-tank mines laid in a single row across the same road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west towards Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), citing “orders form their superiors not to let the SMM through because of ongoing shelling in the area”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.
• In Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), citing the fact that the SMM “did not have a patrol plan with an official stamp”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again only allowed the SMM to proceed after 42 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• While conducting mini-UAV flights near Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), on three occasions, the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the UAV. The Mission landed the UAVs and left the area (see above).
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted a person in a previously reported position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces aiming a rifle at the UAV and firing a burst near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk).
• During the day on 26 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and both government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas of northern Luhansk region.[6]
• During the night on 27 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and non-government-controlled areas of northern Luhansk region.
• Two SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) and the Kyivskyi District of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled).

 

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site was abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

BRATISLAVA, 28 June 2019 - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign and European Affairs Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, met with Minsk Group Co-Chairs Igor Popov of the Russian Federation and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America, acting also on behalf of Minsk Group Co-Chair Stéphane Visconti of France, and with Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk.

Chairperson Lajčák was briefed on the results of the Co-Chairs’ recent consultations, including the meetings between the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, held under the auspices of the Co-Chairs in Moscow on 15 April and Washington, D.C. on 20 June. The Co-Chairs also informed the Slovak Chair of progress on humanitarian issues, including the exchange of prisoners between Armenia and Azerbaijan earlier in the day. 

Lajčák expressed his full support for the Minsk process and the work of the Co-Chairs, and the efforts by the sides to reduce tensions and create an atmosphere conducive to peace and substantive progress in negotiations.

Commenting on the prisoner exchange, the Chairperson-in-Office said “We welcome this humanitarian gesture, which shows how dialogue can bring about positive results for the people affected by conflict.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

On 27 June, the SMM was flying a long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over government- and non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region. At 23:18, while the UAV was flying near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 93km south of Donetsk), on-board systems indicated that the temperature of the UAV engine had reached critically high levels and it began to rapidly lose power and altitude. While attempting a controlled descent in an unpopulated area, at 23:22, the SMM lost contact with the UAV.

The SMM assesses that the UAV was lost shortly after 23:22, in an area south of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk) and about 2km east of the contact line.

It is premature to draw conclusions about the causes of the incident. The SMM is making urgent efforts to locate its long-range UAV, and will report relevant findings.

Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

A group of journalists from both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River took part in a two-day workshop organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova from 27 to 28 June in Chisinau. The workshop aimed to enhance their understanding of the specifics of reporting on diversity and national minorities. Representatives of the Moldovan Ministry of Education, Culture and Research, Bureau for Inter-ethnic Relations and Equality Council joined the event.

During the workshop, the participants learned how through their everyday work journalists can promote inclusive and pluralistic public discussion in multi-ethnic societies. They were also acquainted with the results of a recent media monitoring on hate speech and stereotypes related to national minorities in the Moldovan media. The monitoring was conducted by a Moldovan NGO, the Independent Journalism Centre (IJC). It was commissioned by the OSCE Mission ahead of the workshop. 

“The monitoring showed that reporting on national minority issues by broadcasting and online media is in general ethical. However, reporting is rather superficial and in online comments posted by readers on mass media websites, inflammatory language and hate speech towards minority groups is frequent,” concluded IJC Director Nadine Gogu.

The presentation prompted a discussion about how stereotyping and discriminatory speech can pose a challenge to inter-ethnic peace. They reviewed international and local standards along with good practices in confronting these challenges. The workshop concluded with the development of a set of recommendations for mass media on best practices in facilitating intercultural dialogue in multi-ethnic societies.

“The training organized by the OSCE is constructive. As a result of this training I have realized that I am fully responsible for the content of the news stories I produce. This approach will ease the burden carried by the editor and will make my news stories more trustworthy,” said Andrei Cojocaru, a journalist from Balti.

This activity was conducted in co-operation with the Moldovan Broadcasting Council. It is part of the Mission’s support to the Moldovan authorities in implementing an action plan for the national Strategy for the Consolidation of Inter-ethnic Relations and advancing policies that make Moldova’s diversity a tangible strength and promote tolerance. These are important preconditions for the success of the Transdniestrian settlement process.

PRISHTINË/PRIŠTINA, 28 June 2019 –The third trade fair for women entrepreneurs from different communities, organized by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, will take place on 1 and 2 July 2019 at the Plateau of Youth Palace in Prishtinë/Priština.

Around 100 businesswomen from all regions throughout Kosovo will participate. The women, who manage small businesses in their respective villages and towns, will sell handmade food and handicrafts and will have the opportunity to increase inter-ethnic co-operation and dialogue and extend their network.

The trade fair will be open to the public on 1 and 2 July, from 10:00 to 20:00, on both days.

The Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Ambassador Jan Braathu; Deputy Minister of Regional Development, Magbule Shkodra; Kosovo Assembly Member Mimoza Kusari-Lila, and the President of the Business Association ‘Avenija”, Gordana Djoric, will deliver opening remarks.  

Media representatives are cordially invited to attend the event on Monday, 1 July 2019, at the Plateau of Youth Palace, starting at 12:00 hrs.

 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

TIRANA, 28 June 2019 – International observers of local elections in Albania will present their preliminary findings and conclusions at a news conference on Monday. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Election Observation Mission has been deployed in Albania since 24 May 2019.

What:

• You are invited to a news conference of the international observers to the local elections in Albania.
• The news conference is open to all and no accreditation is required to enter, but only questions from journalists will be taken.

Who:

Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions:

• Ambassador Audrey Glover, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission

When:

•  15:00 on 1 July 2019

Where:

• Classic Room, 2nd floor, Tirana International Hotel, Scanderbeg Square no. 8, Tirana;
•  If you cannot attend in person, follow the livestream on: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr or https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/albania/417425

The preliminary findings and conclusions presented at the press conference will provide an official assessment of the electoral process for its compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. The election observation mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) totals 174 observers from 33 countries and is the only international observation group on the ground in Albania for the 30 June local elections.

For more details, contact:

Lauren Baranowska, ODIHR Public Affairs, on +355 68 9900074 or +48 695 916 998 (mobile) or at lauren.baranowska@odihr.pl

or

Egor Tilpunov, Media Analyst of the Election Observation Mission, on +355 68 9900045 (mobile) or at egor.tilpunov@odihr.al

VIENNA, 28 June 2019 – A high-level discussion, “Promoting the Role of Women in Addressing Environment and Security Challenges”, featuring the keynote participation of former President of Ireland Mary Robinson, will take place on 5 July 2019 in Vienna. The event was organised by the 2019 OSCE Slovak Chairmanship in co-operation with the OSCE Gender Section and the Office of the Co-ordinator of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities and supported by the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE.

The half-day event will bring together leading practitioners at the national and international levels to reflect on the impact of environmental challenges on women and how to integrate a gender perspective in environmental planning and decision-making.

The debate aims to raise awareness among participating States on links between environment and security through an integrated gender perspective, while providing examples of good practices from the OSCE region and beyond.

The opening session will be addressed by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic, Norbert Kurilla, and OSCE Secretary-General Thomas Greminger.

The discussion on how to promote the role of women in addressing environmental and security challenges will be led by Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, former UN Special Envoy on Climate Change, and founder of the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice, in conversation with Melanne Verveer, Executive Director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, former US Ambassador for Global Women’s Issues, and the Special Representative on Gender of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office.

Journalists are invited to attend the event from 10.00 to 11.00 on Friday, 5 July, at the Hofburg Conference Centre's Neuer Saal.

Media interested in attending the segment should register by e-mailing press@osce.org, by 18:00, Thursday, 4 July. 

Further information and the agenda are available here.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

A five-day OSCE-supported training seminar on the detection of forged travel documents and identification techniques concluded on 28 June 2019 in Aktau, Kazakhstan.

Nineteen coast guard officers of Kazakhstan’s Border Guard Service under the National Security Committee took part in the course. The seminar was led by experts from Austria’s Federal Ministry of the Interior Document Advisors Team and from the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre. The event is aimed to build capacity in ensuring international maritime document security and identifying falsified travel and other regulated documents at sea.

Participants representing Caspian Sea-based units of the coast guard were trained in the processes of security paper production, the use of paper and polymer substrates in document security, conventional printing techniques, photo protection, and secondary verification and required maritime documentation.

The curriculum included practical exercises with confiscated falsified documents and genuine travel documents of a multitude of countries, providing the participants with an opportunity to apply their newly learned skills.

The seminar was organized within the Travel Document Security Programme of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department. It was conducted by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in co-operation with the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office of the United States Embassy in Kazakhstan and the Coast Guard of the Border Guard Service under the National Security Committee.

The activity was part of the Programme Office’s long-term effort to promote the OSCE border security concept in Kazakhstan.