OSCE

BRATISLAVA/COPENHAGEN/VIENNA, 28 June 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) George Tsereteli and OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella regret the continuing political tension in Albania and have made the following statement:

“The OSCE has been closely monitoring events and has repeatedly urged all relevant actors to engage in constructive politics, respect the country’s democratic processes, and exhibit restraint. Now, more than ever, it is imperative that Albanian actors work together to break the current impasse, engage in dialogue without preconditions, and ensure that the conduct of elections this Sunday is peaceful. We urge all stakeholders to uphold the rule of law, respect the constitutional roles of the respective democratic institutions and fundamental rights, and avoid violence; both the perpetrators and instigators of violent acts should be held legally accountable. We also call on law enforcement institutions to use proportionate measures.

While acknowledging the right of Albanians to peaceful means of protest, the OSCE firmly condemns the recent violent attacks targeting the bodies in charge of organizing elections in municipalities across Albania, damaging schools and voting materials. All political and administrative controversies must be settled in accordance with the rule of law and legal processes. Any attempt to derail the democratic process through violent action stalls the progress of Albania and stains the country’s international reputation. Any election-related legal infringements, including vote buying, abuse of public resources, and exertion of election-related pressure on public sector employees, should result in appropriate legal consequences.

Given the country’s progress in key areas in recent years, exemplified by unanimous approval by all 56 other participating States of Albania’s bid to chair the OSCE in 2020, we are convinced that Albania will be able to make progress if a mature sense of responsibility regarding the country’s progress and reputation are fostered domestically.

As always, the OSCE stands ready - as a supporter and friend - to work with national institutions towards advancing the country’s priorities, ultimately in the interest of all Albania’s citizens. After 30 June, the OSCE will be strongly advocating for reinvigorated efforts towards reform in the country, including with respect to the judiciary, according to the demands and aspirations of Albania’s people.” 

VIENNA, 28 June 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, paid tribute today to the killed journalists of the media outlet the Capital Gazette on the first anniversary of the horrific shooting in Maryland, USA.

On 28 June 2018, a man opened fire inside the newspaper’s headquarters, killing five people, including four journalists and one staff member. The shooter was later apprehended and currently faces trial, with the next court hearing due to take place in November.

Veteran 59-year-old editor Robert Hiaasen, 61-year-old page editor Gerald Fischman, 65-year-old editor Wendi Winters, 55-year-old staff writer John McNamara, and 34-year-old sales assistant Rebecca Smith were killed in the attack.

“One year on, we must not forget the five of the Capital Gazette. They were killed as journalists, because of their work to inform the public,” stated Désir. “This is a reminder of the level of threats against the press which must be protected more than ever as a cornerstone of democracy.”

The Representative also recalled the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, adopted last December, stating that “the adoption of this important Decision shows that safety of journalists cannot be taken for granted in the OSCE region. This crime is an example of why more must be done to ensure journalists can work in a safe environment. Freedom of the media is a key pillar of democracy and a piece of that pillar crumbles with every killing of a journalist.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. She provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more atwww.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom. 

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Twenty-four female leaders from the border security and management sector graduated from a staff course at the OSCE Border Management Staff College (BMSC) on 27 June 2019 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. It was the sixth course designed and delivered specifically for female leaders by the College since its inception a decade ago.

This four-week capacity building course for mid and senior level officials of diverse agencies involved in all aspects of border security and management follows a curriculum designed to respond to the needs of the OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation as they strive to meet their commitments to ensure open yet secure borders in the region, as embodied in numerous OSCE decisions, as well as in other regional and universal instruments.

The College is committed to promoting and applying gender equality by focusing on female border management and security officials. Staff courses for women leaders have a distinct added value in supporting the empowerment of women working in the respective field.

Jonathan Holland, Director of the BMSC, said: “We put on this all-female course, specifically to redress the imbalance in gender in the border security profession. At the moment it’s a largely male-dominated profession.”

Holland further stated that today, many countries are taking steps to amend this issue and the effect of a more gender-balanced approach to border security can be observed at the College with the increase of the number of female participants over the past six years.

Representatives of customs, border, drug control, financial police and training institutes from 16 different countries – Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Tajikistan, Tunisia and Ukraine – participated in the BMSC staff course.

Aleksandra Jędryka, a graduate of the course, noted that the content of the course was very diverse and she could find something relevant to her job in every topic covered: “The eclectic approach of the course is its greatest asset. Everybody can learn more about the topic of their interest, while at the same time receiving information on related good practices utilized by other agencies in a multitude of different countries”.

Topics covered during the course included the promotion of border security and management in the OSCE area, border security and management models, elements of border control and co-operation, as well as gender, economic, environmental and human aspects of border security. In-class activities were complemented by two study visits to Tajik border crossing points on the borders with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.

A roundtable discussion on countering trafficking in human beings in the context of border security and management was conducted in the framework of the course. The event brought together subject area experts, representatives of diplomatic missions and international organizations, and participants of the staff course.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• The Mission observed the beginning of the disengagement process at the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from gunfire to a civilian house in Dokuchaievsk and to a pig farm near Novoluhanske.
• It saw anti-tank mines near Petrivske, some for the first time.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure, including to water pipelines and powerlines. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*

Disengagement in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

At 12:00 on 26 June, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw the launch of white flares by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and members of the armed formations, from their most forward positions respectively north and south of the wooden ramps on the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, reportedly signaling the readiness to disengage. At 12:02 and 12:14, respectively, the SMM saw one green flare fired by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and one fired by the armed formations from their most forward positions, signaling the beginning of disengagement.

At 12:10, the SMM saw 14 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in a vehicle (UAZ variant), leaving their positions inside the disengagement area and driving north outside of the area. From 12:15 to 15:00, the SMM observed 12 members of the armed formations, as well as a truck and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), withdrawing from the disengagement area and relocating close to the Prince Ihor Monument, south-east of the disengagement area.

During the same day, at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw that, from 11:45 to 12:20, the crossing of civilian pedestrians through the EECP had been suspended and that 200-300 people were waiting to cross. Crossing resumed at 12:20, when the SMM observed a steady flow of civilians crossing in both directions.   

By 15:00, the SMM observed no presence of Ukrainian Armed Personnel and members of the armed formations or hardware at their most forward positions.

During the day, on four occasions, the SMM saw two unidentified unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), one black and one white delta-shaped, flying over the disengagement area.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 240 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), and in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), including 40 explosions.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 30), compared with the previous reporting period (17 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage to a house in Dokuchaievsk and to a pig farm near Novoluhanske

At 44 Myru Street, in a residential area on the eastern edge of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a 2x2cm impact hole on the west-facing part of the roof of a single-storey house, an impact hole (3cm in diameter) and shrapnel damage (fragmented pieces of wood and torn wallpaper) to a west-facing door frame and wall, as well as splinters from the door frame and shrapnel on the floor inside the house. The SMM also saw two shattered south-facing window panes. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a round from an undetermined weapon fired from a north-westerly direction. A man and a woman (aged 70-80), who introduced themselves as residents of the house, told the SMM that they had been in the garden of the house on the afternoon of 25 June when they heard three explosions.

On 25 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a hole (not seen in imagery from 5 June 2019) in the roof of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union’s pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as caused by small-arms fire (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report of 7 June 2019). About 1km east of the farm, the same UAV spotted 16 fresh craters in a field, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds (the SMM was unable to assess the direction of fire).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 25 June, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted four Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and a camouflage net stretching across the road forming an approximate 2m wide strip with distinct cylindrical shaped discs underneath. The net corresponded to a location where the SMM had previously observed anti-tank mines laid across the road.    

During the night and early morning hours of 26 June, while in Popasna, the SMM heard 15 explosions, and about 100 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-6km east-south-east, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the day of 26 June, positioned 1km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion and seven bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area.     

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

25 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk). 

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), a probable IFV (BMP variant) and two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) in Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

26 June

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk) and
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw a helicopter (MI-8/17 variant) flying in a west-north-west direction at an altitude of 100-200m about 6km north-east of Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Petrivske and Shchastia

On 25 June, about 170m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time  two anti-tank mines (TM-62) next to 35 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out on a road between Bohdanivka and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).

On 26 June, the SMM saw four men (aged 20-50) in civilian clothing, carrying seven anti-tank mines (TM-62) and two shovels on the northern edge of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), leaving a white truck with civilian licence plates and moving east-north-east on foot.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to powerlines near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partizan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). During the repair works to powerlines near Betmanove, the SMM heard and saw ceasefire violations, assessed as approximately 500m from the repair works site. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 26 June, at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after 40 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On 25 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over government-controlled areas near Pervomaiske (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk) and Staromykhailivka (non-government controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), assessed as due to jamming. The same UAV also experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Zoria (government-controlled, 40km north-west of Donetsk), assessed as due to probable jamming.[5]     

For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions. 

Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan

More than 30 women MPs from North Macedonia and South-Eastern Europe enhanced their knowledge on gender-sensitive parliaments and use of public funding for gender equality during the OSCE-supported event that ended on 27 June 2019 in Skopje.

The two-day conference provided networking opportunities for the women MPs to increase regional co-operation. The event was organized by the Women Parliamentarians’ Club of the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia, and supported by the OSCE Mission to Skopje and the OSCE/ODIHR with financial support from the Austrian Development Cooperation.

During the conference, the OSCE-led survey on violence against women in South-Eastern Europe was also presented.

In his address, Head of OSCE Mission to Skopje Clemens Koja underlined the essential role of the political commitment of women MPs to advancing gender equality in parliament.

“These efforts are essential to protect and promote the human rights of women, as well as the overall security and prosperity of societies,” he said.

As host of the event, the President of the Women Parliamentarians’ Club, Gjylymser Kasapi, stressed the unifying effect of the focus on gender issues, saying, “I am particularly proud that women parliamentarians are working together on the issues that unite us regardless of our ethnic or political backgrounds.”

Vice President of the Assembly of North Macedonia Frosina Tashevska-Remenski highlighted the need to achieve international standards in the equal participation of women and men in both political and public life. “Achieving the sustainable development goal on gender equality by 2030 still requires more work from us to create the necessary cultural and social conditions,” she said.

Tiina Kukkamaa-Bah, the Chief of the Democratic Governance and Gender Unit at ODIHR in Warsaw, spoke to participants about the importance of gender mainstreaming as a key strategy for achieving gender equality. She noted that parliaments in the region still remained gendered in their policies and practices, disadvantaging women in their political engagement, and stressed the need to focus on how institutions facilitate change rather than only on formal standards such as the proportion of women represented in parliaments.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

At 12:00 on 26 June, the SMM observed the beginning of the disengagement process at the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.

The Mission saw the launch of flares by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations, signaling both sides’ readiness to disengage. Subsequently, the SMM saw members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and members of the armed formations leaving their most forward positions and exiting the disengagement area, together with their weapons. The Mission also saw other members of the armed formations with their weapons, including an anti-aircraft gun, exiting the disengagement area west of the Prince Ihor monument.

On 27 June, the SMM observed deminers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the State Emergency Service as well as deminers of the armed formations conducting demining activities inside the disengagement area. It also saw members of the armed formations with weapons and other hardware exiting the area west of the Prince Ihor monument. In addition, the Mission again noted that the most forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations were empty of armed personnel, weapons and hardware. Two other positions of the armed formations on top of a hill south and south-west of the bridge were also seen by the SMM to be empty of personnel or hardware.

The Mission will continue to monitor the situation. More detailed information can be found in SMM Daily Reports.

VIENNA, 27 June 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today called upon the authorities of Tajikistan to investigate reports that a journalist’s family members were intimidated and to reconsider the withdrawal of press accreditation for a Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) correspondent in Dushanbe.

Reportedly family members of the journalist Humayra Bakhtiyar were intimidated by officials, in order to put pressure on her to return to Tajikistan. Bakhtiyar left Tajikistan in 2016, following several years of pressure from the security services and currently lives in Europe.

“I am worried by reports from Tajikistan about pressure on Humayra’s family. Humayra is a courageous journalist and has been a regular participant in the work of my Office on safety of female journalists. Journalists and their family members must be free from intimidation and reprisals for pursuing their work,” Désir said, “I call on the authorities to fully investigate these reports and ensure the safety of Humayra and her family.”

In the 2018 OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists the States recognized that the work of journalists can put them, and their family members, at risk of violence, as well as of intimidation and harassment.

In a separate case on 26 June, RFE/RL reported about the withdrawal of accreditation of their correspondent in Dushanbe, Barotali Nazarov (pen name: Barot Yusufi), allegedly due to his critical reporting. According to the RFE/RL management, four other correspondents’ accreditations are still pending.

“It is of great concern that a journalist working for a critical outlet is denied press accreditation. Accreditation should not serve as a tool to control content or restrict the flow of information,” said Désir, “I call on the authorities to reinstate Barotali Nazarov’s accreditation and to issue accreditation to his colleagues at RFE/RL.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media previously intervened on behalf of the RFE/RL staff in Tajikistan in 2016, by welcoming the decision to reinstate their accreditation.  https://www.osce.org/fom/286486

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

424184 Kunduz Rysbek

To commemorate the UN International Day in Support of Victims of Torture on 26 June, the Coalition against Torture (CAT), with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, held a series of events in the cities of Bishkek and Osh.

Starting on 22 June, the CAT organized a marathon in the main square of Osh to draw public attention to victims of torture and ill-treatment as well as to support a healthy lifestyle in Kyrgyzstan.

In Bishkek, the sixth annual mini-football tournament was held with the participation of 16 teams, including teams of the Office of the National Parliament, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General's Office, the State Service for Execution of Punishment, media institutions as well as the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek. Organizers and participants acknowledged the need for joint efforts in addressing torture.

A “Press Café” with a number of former victims of torture was organized in Bishkek on 25 June. They shared their stories, talked about the impact their traumatic experience had on their lives, and what mechanisms they use to deal with them today.

The CAT consists of 19 civil society organizations and representatives that have joined efforts to combat torture in all its forms in Kyrgyzstan since 2007. It monitors detention centres, provides legal expertise to victims of ill-treatment, and assists in rehabilitation processes.

KYIV, 26 June 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press:

“I sincerely welcome the start of the process of the disengagement of forces and hardware at Stanytsia Luhanska.

Let me express my deep appreciation to the sides for having taken the necessary decisions for this important development. I urge them to take all the efforts for completing this process successfully.

My profound gratitude also goes to the staff of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and personally to the Chief Monitor, Ambassador Yaşar Halit Çevik, as well as his deputy, Mark Etherington, for their active involvement in the disengagement process.

I hope that the successful implementation of this operation at Stanytsia Luhanska will serve as a catalyst for further steps towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the east of Ukraine, and, in particular, a recommitment to a robust, sustainable and permanent ceasefire.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer Luhansk region.
• Small arms were fired in the vicinity of the SMM, and other civilians, in Donetsk city and of an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Zolote.
• The SMM followed up on a boy injured from the detonation of unexploded ordnance in Holmivskyi.
• The Mission saw fresh craters near Vodiane and Molodizhne, and again saw the presence of mines near Vodiane, Travneve, Holmivskyi and Nyzhnie Lozove.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines in Luhansk region and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewere.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 240), compared with the previous reporting period (about 300 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), while a high number of the explosions occurred near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

On the evening of 24 June, the SMM camera at the DFS recorded, among other ceasefire violations, two explosions at an assessed range of 500-800m south.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (17), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in the vicinity of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Boy injured from detonation of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Holmivskyi

In Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), medical staff at hospital told the SMM that a 17 year-old boy with missing fingers on his left hand and shrapnel injuries to both legs had been admitted to the hospital on 9 June. In Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), a man (40 years old), who introduced himself as the boy’s uncle, told the SMM that on 9 June the boy had been injured when a round of ammunition that he found and brought home exploded.

Small-arms fire in the vicinity of the SMM in Donetsk city and of an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zolote

Positioned near a bus station in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), six SMM patrol members heard the whistling sound of a ricochet 50m above them, immediately followed by the sound of a shot of small-arms fire, at an unknown distance west. The SMM members were inside the armoured patrol vehicles with open doors during the incident. Some civilians were also present at the bus stop. The SMM immediately left the area.*

During the day on 25 June, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote, the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 500m north, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 500m north of the SMM. The SMM landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 25 June, positioned at three locations near Zolote, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions, 25 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and seven shots of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

On 25 June, the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) in Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

24 June

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk) and
• an ACV near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk).

25 June

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured personal carrier (BTR-60) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Fresh craters near Vodiane and Molodizhne, and again presence of mines

On 24 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 13 fresh craters assessed as impacts of 122mm artillery rounds fired from a south-easterly direction, as well as 17 fresh craters assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds (direction unable to be assessed) about 1.5km east of Vodiane, near previously observed forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 500m south-east of the abovementioned craters, the same UAV spotted at least 54 recent craters assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds and about 160 recent craters assessed as impacts of rounds from automatic grenade launchers (AGS-17, 30mm) (direction unable to be assessed), near previously observed forward positions of the armed formations.

On 24 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted six fresh craters (not seen in imagery from 2 June 2019) near road T-0504, about 3km west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), assessed as caused by rounds from rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, as well as RPG tailfins in three of the aforementioned craters and an RPG tailfin next to one of the remaining craters. About 1km further east-south-east, the same UAV again spotted a mortar tailfin embedded in the asphalt of road T-0504, as well as about 30 fresh craters (not seen in imagery from 2 June 2019) in fields south of road T-0504 near the forward positions of the armed formations.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 20 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid across road T-0519 north of Vodiane. On 24 June, a long-range SMM UAV again spotted about 30 anti-tank mines south-west of Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as 13 anti-tank mines north-east of Holmivskyi, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The same UAV again spotted seven anti-tank mines about 2.5km west of Nyzhnie Lozove (non-government controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and near Pervomaisk.

The SMM also facilitated the operation of the DFS and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM monitors security situation south-east of Kherson region

On 25 June, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 24 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas near the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• On 25 June, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the UAV. The Mission landed the UAV and left the area (see above).
• On 25 June, on three occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).
• On 25 June, positioned in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard the sound of a ricochet assessed as 50m above the patrol, followed by the sound of a shot of small-arms fire, at an unknown distance west of its position. The Mission left the area (see above).  

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

424115 Kunduz Rysbek

A capacity building workshop for Central Asian states entitled “Strengthening National, Sub-Regional and International Capacities to Prepare for and Respond to Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons” in the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was conducted from 26 to 27 June 2019 in Bishkek. The workshop was organized by UNODA’s Implementation Support Unit of the BWC in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the Ministry of Economy of Kyrgyzstan.

The event brought together 45 national delegates representing public health, security and governmental sectors of the four Central Asian states that are parties to the BWC - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan - to explore operationalization of assistance between state parties in the framework of the Convention. Experts from UNODA, the OSCE, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, as well as Russia and Belarus took part in the workshop.

Opening the workshop, inspector of the Department of Defense, Law Enforcement and Emergency Situations of the Government Office of the Kyrgyz Republic, Amangeldi Bakirov stressed that “addressing the preparedness and response issues to a deliberate use of biological weapons is of particular relevance to the Central Asian region, given the complex security situation and the need to strengthen national capacities and sub-regional co-operation of the Central Asian state parties to BWC.”

Speaking about the OSCE's ongoing support to authorities of Kyrgyzstan in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, Ambassador Pierre von Arx, added: “With the assistance of the OSCE, Kyrgyzstan has developed two voluntary National Action Plans on the implementation of the Resolution. The first Action Plan has been successfully implemented, and the second one is currently under implementation.” Von Arx noted that one of the main provisions of the Kyrgyz 1540 National Action Plan is related to the effective and comprehensive implementation of the BWC. 

During the active learning session of the workshop participants worked on a set of specific questions relevant to various preparedness elements for deliberate use of biological weapons in four thematic breakout groups: disease outbreak surveillance and epidemiology, education and awareness raising, cross-sectoral co-operation, as well as regional and international collaboration.

During the table-top exercise, the participants were encouraged to reflect upon decision-making mechanisms and procedures as well as conditions and circumstances that would lead to a nationwide emergency and measures that would be taken in such cases.

The workshop was also a platform for discussions, in which participants formulated recommendations that will feed into discussions at the BWC Meeting of Experts on Assistance, Response and Preparedness scheduled for 6 and 7 August 2019 in Geneva, Switzerland.

WARSAW, 26 June 2019 – Eradicating all forms of torture and putting survivors’ rights at the centre of focus must become a priority of countries across the OSCE region, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) said on today’s International Day in Support of Victims of Torture.

“Torture destroys the dignity of the individual, leaving many with a sense of guilt and social isolation that remains throughout their lifetime,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “But far too often, perpetrators are not held accountable and victims of torture remain unacknowledged. In giving survivors of torture a voice and ensuring their access to redress and full rehabilitation, we go a step towards restoring their dignity.”

More than 70 years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in blatant violation of international practice, many states still resort to torture as a measure to combat terrorism and other crimes.

“Too many countries are paying lip service to the prohibition of torture, while practising it themselves,” said Gísladóttir. “A system of fear, intimidation and repression has no place in a democratic society, and torture or any other form of ill-treatment can therefore never be considered collateral damage or a necessary evil.  They are and remain quite simply a violation of human rights.”

ODIHR works closely with its partners to strengthen efforts in eradicating torture and ill-treatment. To this end, ODIHR has co-operated over the past year with countries from across the OSCE region as well as with international and regional institutions and civil society organizations, including support for independent monitoring in prisons and other places of detention. The Guidance Document on the Nelson Mandela Rules: Implementing the United Nations Revised Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners , published by ODIHR together with Penal Reform International, and the UNCAT Implementation Tool on Providing Rehabilitation to Victims of Torture and other Ill-Treatment, drafted in co-operation with the Convention against Torture Initiative, are practical tools to support the fight against torture and ill-treatment.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

KYIV, 26 June 2019 – The Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, Yaşar Halit Çevik, welcomed the willingness expressed at a recent meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group to disengage from the agreed area at Stanytsia Luhanska, and reiterated the Mission’s full readiness to monitor the disengagement process.

Additional SMM patrols have been dispatched to the area of Stanytsia Luhanska, where they are observing the security and humanitarian situation, and stand ready to monitor and verify the disengagement process on both sides of the contact line. The Mission is also conducting remote observation with cameras and unmanned aerial vehicles.

“It is my strong hope that today the sides will live up to their own commitment and remove forces and hardware from Stanytsia Luhanska,” the Chief Monitor said. “The OSCE SMM is doing its part in monitoring the process; now the sides must do theirs, and take the necessary measures to make disengagement durable and sustainable.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

VIENNA 24 June 2019 – The OSCE has the framework, the platform and the tools needed to address today’s complex security challenges. What is needed to make effective use of those tools are political will, seeking new opportunities for dialogue and new ways of communicating and negotiating, all keynote speakers agreed at today’s opening session of the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC). 

High-level representatives of the OSCE participating States, Partners for Co-operation and partnering organizations convened in Vienna today for the start of three days of wide-ranging discussions on current security threats and challenges in their region and the OSCE’s role in addressing them. Established by a Ministerial Council Decision in Porto in 2002 (MC(10).DEC/3), theASRC is hosted by Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship under the motto “For People, Dialogue and Stability.”

During this year’s ASRC, participants will discuss ensuring security and stability in the OSCE region in light of developments regarding Ukraine; the OSCE Structured Dialogue; effective multilateral approaches to early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation; building security and confidence in conflict and crisis situations in the OSCE area; conventional arms control and security-building measures; and current and future trends regarding transnational threats in the OSCE region and beyond.

In his opening address, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Miroslav Lajčák stressed that the OSCE and its participating States have a full toolbox of mechanisms, fora and processes at their disposal to find solutions to current and future security challenges and conflicts: “We do not, necessarily, need to create new structures or mechanisms. Instead, what we need is the political will to better use the tools we have.  Progress does not come, simply, from creating new initiatives. In fact, that is often the easy part. The harder thing to do is to implement, and to effectively work within existing frameworks and commitments. To find opportunities for dialogue. To try new ways of communicating and negotiating. And to take on different perspectives and viewpoints.”

Lajčák pointed to the necessity for diplomats to be mindful of the realities on the ground, in particular the human consequences of various conflicts: “In the face of real, human suffering, a lack of dialogue is unjustifiable”.

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office acknowledged the uncertainty caused by the continuously evolving terrorist and extremist threats, the rapidly changing ways and means of warfare - from hybrid threats to cyber-attacks and the complex danger that environmental threats pose to our societies. Lajčák expressed however the conviction that we are more equipped than ever to deal with these threats: “We have better data, research and technology. We have stronger field presences and communication tools. We have broadened our understanding of security - realizing, for example, that the participation of women is not just an option, but a necessity. And, that the voices of young people help us to better understand the path ahead of us. We are also doing more to reach out and partner with other regional and multilateral organizations. So, we have built on the Helsinki Final Act - layer upon layer. And, we have ended up with an Organization that is more comprehensive now than it has ever been.”

Lajčák concluded by reminding participants that some of the most fundamental elements of the OSCE, its principles and commitments, might hold the key to combating current and future threats: “Our openness to dialogue. Our belief that, even in a non-likeminded group, there is a way to find consensus. I cannot think of a better opportunity than the ASRC to recommit to our founding core values, for a safer future for all,” said the Chairperson-in-Office.

In his keynote address, Co-Chair of the Ban Ki-Moon Centre and Former President of Austria Heinz Fischer focused on the importance of multilateralism at a time when the “weaknesses of democracy and the fear of decline have gained momentum” and “European Parliament elections have clearly displayed the rise of nationalist movements and its threat to international co-operation and rule of law.”

“In times like these, multilateralism is more important than ever,” stressed Fischer. “We must seek dialogue with people from conflict-affected areas. We must hear the viewpoints of the people who are not satisfied with our democracy, and who elect, for instance, far right parties. We must work on a pluralistic and liberal democracy. Communication and co-operation are the key for building a secure and peaceful world for all.”

Former European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Rt Hon. Baroness Catherine Ashton underlined the need for true political leadership in searching for new ways and new opportunities to find solutions to the complex security challenges of our time, as well as to the importance of including women in this process.  “What is needed is true leadership from both men and women,” she said.

“Engaging women is essential, not least because their lives are often most affected by conflict or chaos. But they are part of the solution; it’s impossible to get to a solution that is lasting without them. And they should be participants in the resolution of conflict or in conflict prevention - not as an opportunity given to them, but as a right that they should take,” said Ashton.

Agreeing with Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák that the OSCE has the toolkit it needs to be able to help support communities and people through times of crisis, Ashton also highlighted the need for a collaborative approach in solving the most pressing global challenges.

“Most of all, we need collaboration. There is no issue that any nation faces that can be resolved alone.  And, the way that we resolve those issues is to bring together nations in organizations like this to sit, to talk and to find answers. Not to simply restate old positions, or to sit back and believe that solutions will come because others will act, but to be actively engaged in finding the answers,” she concluded.

Secretary General Thomas Greminger reminded ASRC participants that the OSCE is grounded in a vision of security that is comprehensive, indivisible, and co-operative. “States should not enhance their own security at the expense of others. And they are best served by confronting shared threats together,” he said.

Greminger suggested concrete steps to reduce risks and tensions, and to rebuild trust and confidence:  increasing military-to-military contacts; preventing and managing military incidents better through bilateral incident-prevention agreements; enhancing military predictability and reducing risks through greater transparency; and improving  implementation of the Vienna Document to enhance transparency, predictability and stability.

Greminger added that “security is also affected by rapid technological change, which offers numerous benefits, but also creates new vulnerabilities. I hope that eventually the OSCE might become a platform for meaningful dialogue on technology and security – to exchange best practices and enhance co-operative approaches. Creating a framework to encourage responsible uses of artificial intelligence would reduce its risks and increase its benefits to security for people across our region.”

The OSCE Secretary General expressed the belief that the complexity and diversity of the challenges we face today call for fresh ideas and new approaches, and stressed the need to engage a wider range of stakeholders, including youth and Track II actors.

“Getting stuck in old patterns of thinking and interaction poses a risk in itself. But first we must rebuild trust. We must try harder to understand each other’s perspectives – and each other’s fears. We must also work harder to defend and protect the principles upholding our security order,” concluded Greminger.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• A girl was injured by shelling in Horlivka.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including in training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines near Krasnohorivka and Vodiane, some for the first time.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its freedom of movement was also restricted on a road near non-government-controlled Staropetrivske and at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Novoazovsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 300), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 90). Almost half of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 60), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 55). Almost all ceasefire violations, including explosions, were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

A girl was injured by shelling in Horlivka

Following up on reports of a girl injured by shelling in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), on 24 June a medical professional in Horlivka told the SMM that a 14 year-old girl had been treated for injuries to her left shin caused by a shell fragment that penetrated the skin on 22 June. A relative of the girl told the SMM that she had seen her running back to her home in the north-western part of Horlivka because of shelling on the evening of 22 June but had not witnessed the incident. Due to security concerns, the SMM was unable to visit the site of the incident.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 21 June, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted atop a military truck near residential houses, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On the evening of 23 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an illumination flare at an assessed distance of 2.5-3.5km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. During the day on 24 June, while in Popasna, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

During the morning of 24 June, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw four armed members of the armed formations, five light-machine-guns, and a heavy-machine-gun about 100m south of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska Bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). At 12:00, an armed member of the armed formations fired a flare, reportedly indicating the willingness of the armed formations to disengage.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines:

Government-controlled areas

22 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Hnutove (20km north of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 June

Aerial imagery made available to the SMM revealed the presence of three multiple launch rocket systems in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (see below).

22 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two mortars (2B11) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk);
• 12 towed howitzers (D-30), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk);
• seven self-propelled howitzers (four 2S1 and three probable 2S1) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk); and
• ten tanks and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) west of Zernove (70km south of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

On 22 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five tanks near Yablunivka (49km north of Donetsk).

On 24 June, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

16 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 22 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

20 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 18 tanks, 18 pieces of towed artillery, and nine pieces of self-propelled artillery in a training area near Myrne (see above) and
• 33 tanks in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

22 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• eight tanks in a training area near Ternove (see above);
• 13 tanks in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk); and
• 22 tanks and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

21 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) near a checkpoint about 350m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote.

22 June

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk).

24 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 June

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 33km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two APCs (MT-LB) near Zorynsk (54km south-west of Luhansk).

23 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an APC (type undetermined) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) and
• a new 45-metre-long trench system, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, running along the eastern side of a road near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk), as well as impact craters nearby (see below) (not seen in imagery from 2 June 2019).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Krasnohorivka and Vodiane, some for the first time, and anti-personnel mine and impact craters near Molodizhne

On 21 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time three anti-tank mines laid across a road about 2.5km east of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and, about 1km west of the aforementioned mines, again spotted 55 anti-tank mines in fields on either side of the same road, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 

On 22 June, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 20 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in a single row across road T0519 about 3km north-west of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk).

On 23 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a previously-reported anti-personnel mine (MON-90) facing the road T-0504 (which is regularly used by the SMM) about 1km east of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern edge of Popasna and about 1km west of a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Pervomaisk, as well as more than 20 impact craters assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds in nearby fields. About 1.1km south-east of the aforementioned craters, the same UAV spotted at least 20 craters assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a northwesterly direction in a field near positions of the armed formations.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw ten cars (two with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation, and one with Polish licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates) and seven pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine as well as 18 cars (five with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation, and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates), one covered cargo truck and two buses with “DPR” plates, and two pedestrians (man and woman in their thirties) exiting Ukraine.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable electrical repair works near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) as well as repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and to a power line near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the recovery of the body of a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On the M-04 road north of Staropetrivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage south to the settlement, saying that the road was “temporarily closed to civilian traffic due to exercises in a nearby shooting range.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed to Novoazovsk only while accompanied by two members of the armed formations.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 22 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over government-controlled Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk) and Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as non-government-controlled Rozdolne (46km south-east of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania

The OSCE Presence in Albania signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with the Prosecution Office of Tirana and the Albanian State Police, respectively, on 24 June 2019 in Tirana.

The MoUs are designed to ensure the implementation of a gap analysis of the co-operation, co-ordination of activities and exchange of information between the Judicial Police and Prosecutors in the process of criminal proceedings.

The gap analysis is a first step in addressing the relationship between two institutions that have a key role to play in the process of judicial response to crime in Albania: the Judicial Police and the Prosecution. It aims at identifying what the problems are with both formal procedures and informal practices at all stages of criminal proceedings. Its outcome will be the drafting of a baseline study and recommendations to help the two security bodies enhance their co-operation in effectively investigating criminal cases, particularly of corruption and organized crime.

The MoUs were signed by the Head of the OSCE Presence, Bernd Borchardt, and by Head of the Tirana Prosecution Office Elizabeta Imeraj and General Director of the Albanian State Police Ardi Veliu, respectively.

“Judicial response represents the essence of justice, but it is as effective as the proceedings that trigger it, and when it comes to criminal law, prosecution and judicial police co-operation are the pillars of success. It becomes therefore crucial to work with these institutions and support them in better reaching their highest potential, towards a consolidated criminal justice system in Albania,” said Borchardt.

The Presence is also expected to sign MoUs with five other Prosecution Offices, where the same gap analysis will be performed. Thus, the Presence will co-operate with the Prosecution Offices of Durrës, Elbasan, Shkodra, Vlora, Fier and their corresponding Regional Police Directorates. The Serious Crimes Prosecution Office, due to its prominent role, is another important partner in the implementation of this gap analysis.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO) and one first responder.[1] The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly decreased from 11,670 to 11,596 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[2].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 216 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 17 this week compared to nine last week: Fifteen of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and two into Ukraine (53 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, 12 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and seven were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when 14 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (422 compared to 420 observed during the previous week). There were 220 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 202 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Luhansk - Kyiv, Luhansk – Yalta, Luhansk – Simferopol and Stakhanov - Kyiv.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 824 trucks (851 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (287 at the Gukovo BCP and 537 at the Donetsk BCP); 430 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 394 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and Armenia and some with “LPR” plates.                                                                                           

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 50 (compared to 46 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 176 to 157: of the total number of trucks scanned, 104 trucks (66 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 53 trucks (34 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[3] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly increased from 129 to 135 vehicles; 63 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 72 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 32 occasions; the OTs assessed that 15 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 17 to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. Cars with Georgian and Polish licence plates were also observed.

On 21 June at 09:45, a black car with a red stripe on its side and inscription "Investigative committee of the Russian Federation" written in Russian entered the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side. The car was escorted by the Russian Federation police vehicle with flashing lights and the person from the black car then headed to the main building. Both vehicles left the BCP in the direction of the Russian Federation at 09:47.

On 22 June at 21:54, the OT observed one police vehicle that arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation and which then drove behind the main building. At 22:10 the same day, the police car drove back towards the Russian Federation

On 22 June at 17:52, an ambulance arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side and parked on the left side of the main building (entry line to the Russian Federation). Two paramedics were observed heading to the main building. At 18:05, the ambulance moved to the right hand side of the main building and was partially visible to the OT. At 18:15, the ambulance with the paramedics returned towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 21 May 2019 to 25 June 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] First responders are OSCE staff or Mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time

[2] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[3] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                              

ALMATY, KAZAKHSTAN, 25 June 2019 – The 13th annual OSCE Central Asian Youth Network (CAYN) seminar began today in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The three-day event, dedicated to the theme “Dialogue. Data. Digital Security”, is organized by the OSCE Programme in Nur-Sultan with support from the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek for some 35 top university students and CAYN alumni from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Mongolia. Representatives of the OSCE, as well as experts from Afghanistan, Ukraine, the United States and Uzbekistan, specialists from the OSCE Secretariat and leading representatives of the private and non-profit sector,  are taking part.

Participants will discuss how dialogue helps to promote security, the use of data in governance and business as well as the future of digital security. Training sessions will enhance participants’ critical thinking skills as they share perspectives on ways to address threats and challenges in the region through international co-operation. The seminar also aims to stimulate creativity and foster friendship among the current and future leaders from the region. They will also explore the role of digitalization in promoting transparency and opportunities for business in the region.

“Whatever profession you may choose, the Central Asian Youth Network is here to help you in your professional development and to promote co-operation across Central Asia as a means to promote security in the region and beyond,” said the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, György Szabó.

Samuel Goda, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Youth and Security, discussed engagement for a safer, better and more secure future together with youth and the importance of engaging young people in decision-making processes. He highlighted the OSCE initiative Perspectives 2030, which brings together young women and men passionate about international relations and inspired by OSCE principles and commitments in order to develop a vision of security and co-operation in Europe, Eurasia and North America. 

The seminar will be followed by a two-day training workshop focused on increasing communications between different communities, as well as on career and professional opportunities in the technology sector for young people.

The event is part of the Office’s efforts to enhance young people’s understanding of contemporary security threats and challenges and to explain the OSCE’s role in addressing them.

423980 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Anti-corruption screening of national regulatory acts and identifying corruption risk factors were the focus of a five-day training course, which concluded on 21 June 2019 in Dushanbe.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe for the members of the OSCE-established Coalition on Transparency and Anti-corruption, and it brought together 17 representatives of civil society in Tajikistan.

The training course allowed the participants to enhance their knowledge on international anti-corruption standards, networks and assessments, anti-corruption screening of draft regulatory acts and corruption risk factors. They also learned about the role of civil society in planning and evaluating the national anti-corruption strategy, and discussed the Coalition’s own strategy and action plan.  

“Civil society organizations in Tajikistan have a great potential to monitor national anti-corruption legislation, which can boost transparency in the country. They can contribute to the drafting of Tajikistan’s next anti-corruption strategy, and build a sound human rights-based approach to corruption prevention in their society,” said OSCE expert Cristina Tarna.

The Coalition of Civil Society Organizations of Tajikistan on Transparency and Anti-corruption was established in April 2019.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 21 and 22 June the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 22 and 23 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Two men were injured by shrapnel in Horlivka and Vesele, and a woman was injured and a house damaged by gunfire in Chermalyk.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from gunfire to a residential house in Pikuzy.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as aimed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle on two occasions near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and Pervomaisk, including in the vicinity of a patrol.
• The SMM saw an anti-personnel mine, tailfins from exploded mortar rounds and remnants of exploded grenades between Popasna and Pervomaisk, some for the first time.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• The SMM continued to follow up on hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line. It saw the body of a man who reportedly died of natural causes while queuing at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
• The Mission saw people apply for “LPR passports” in Kadiivka to be able to later apply for Russian Federation passports.
• The SMM monitored the Kyiv Pride 2019 march in Kyiv.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its freedom of movement was also restricted at checkpoints of the armed formations near Zaichenko, Yuzhna Lomuvatka and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region between the evenings of 21 and 22 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 30), compared with the previous reporting period (about 380 explosions).The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north of Komuna (non-government-controlled, 56km north-east of Donetsk) and at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

On the evening of 21 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a muzzle flash and a projectile in flight, both at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south and south-south-west.

Between the evenings of 22 and 23 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 90), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk, east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north of Mariupol) and at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

During the day on 23 June, positioned in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 50 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 700m north-west.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 21 and 22 June, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (165 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 22 and 23 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 55), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations and explosions were again recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Popasna.

Man injured by shrapnel in Horlivka

On 6 June at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), a man (33 years old) with a bandage on the back of his left shoulder told the SMM that on the evening of 5 June he had been in front of his house in the Shakhta Gagarina settlement of Horlivka when he heard a whistling sound and felt a sharp pain in his shoulder. Medical staff at the hospital refused to provide the SMM with information on the man’s injury (see SMM Daily Report 7 June 2019). On 19 June, at a different clinic in Horlivka, medical staff told the SMM that the man had been transferred from the aforementioned hospital on 10 June and that he had sustained a shrapnel wound in the area of his left shoulder.

Man injured by shrapnel in Vesele

On 22 June at a hospital in the Kyivskyi district of Donetsk city, a man (61 years old) with a bandage on his abdomen told the SMM that on 21 June he had been collecting vegetables with his partner in his garden at 7 Naberezhna Street in Vesele (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) when he heard an explosion about 15-50m away and then felt something warm hitting him in the abdomen. The garden is located about 700m south of the closest positions of the armed formations. Medical staff at the hospital said that the man had been admitted on 21 June with a shrapnel wound to his abdomen.

Woman injured and house damaged by gunfire in Chermalyk

On 21 June at a hospital in Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), a woman (in her fifties) with a bandage on her left collarbone told the SMM that on the evening of 20 June she had been standing near the north-east-facing entrance door of her house at 25 Kalmiuska Street in the south-western part of Chermalyk when she heard a loud noise and immediately felt pain and saw blood streaming down from her left collarbone. At the same hospital, medical staff told the SMM that the woman had been admitted in the early hours of 21 June with a wound to her collarbone.

On 22 June at 25 Kalmiuska Street, while accompanied by two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, the SMM saw seven holes in four shattered south-east-facing windows of a one-storey house, five holes in the north-east-facing side of a shed 5m south-west of the first house and three holes in an east-facing metal fence 5m from the shed. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by shrapnel from anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) rounds fired from an easterly direction. A resident of the house (man in his fifties) told the SMM that gunfire had occurred on the evening of 20 June while he was at home with his wife, who had been wounded as a result. For recent observations in this settlement, see SMM Daily Report 22 June 2019.

Damage from gunfire to a residential house in Pikuzy

On 23 June in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), at 50 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in the south-west-facing side of a one-storey house and observed the metal jacket of a 12.7mm incendiary bullet, a detonated fuse and a steel core penetrator on the ground below the hole. It also observed trees with broken branches and bunches of blown away leaves, 6-8m from the house. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by 12.7mm incendiary bullets. A resident of the house (woman in her sixties) told the SMM that on the night of 22-23 June she had heard loud noises and seen bright flashes from inside the house.

Small-arms fire aimed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on two occasions, including in the vicinity of a patrol

During the day on 23 June, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 16 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.8-1.5km north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying 1km north-west. Three minutes later, the SMM heard 15 shots and a burst of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of  0.8-1km north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying 500m north-east of the patrol. The SMM landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area. It then conducted a second mini-UAV flight near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 200-300m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, while it was flying about 200m south-east of the patrol, followed four minutes later by two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 200-300m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was at that point flying above the patrol’s location and in the process of landing. The SMM again landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

In the early morning hours of 22 June, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and a shot of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-5km south, assessed as outside of the disengagement area (and within 5km of its periphery). On the evening of 23 June, positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1km south-south-east, assessed as outside of the disengagement area (and within 5km of its periphery).

During the day on 22 June, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-5km south-east, which it was unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

On 22 and 23 June, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3] On 23 June, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines:

Government-controlled areas

21 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Hnutove.

Non-government-controlled areas

23 June

The SMM saw 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 22 June).

Weapons permanent storage sites

23 June

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

22 June

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Stanytsia Luhanska and
• an APC (BTR-80) in Nyzhnia Vilkhova (27km north-east of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four mine layers (PMZ-4) in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

21 June

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol).

Anti-personnel mine, tailfins from exploded mortar rounds and remnants of exploded grenades seen between Popasna and Pervomaisk, some for the first time

On 21 June, on a 150m stretch of road T-0504 (which is used regularly by the SMM), about 1km east of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern edge of Popasna and 1km west of a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Pervomaisk, the SMM saw for the first time a green Bakelite object (15x15x25cm), assessed as an anti-personnel mine (MON-90), on the grass about 1m north of the road. It also again saw a tailfin assessed as from an exploded rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) (laying on the southern soft shoulder of the road), as well as three tailfins assessed as from exploded 82mm mortar rounds (two embedded in the asphalt and one in the road’s southern soft shoulder; two for the first time and one previously observed) and two tailfins assessed as from exploded 120mm mortar rounds (for the first time, both embedded in the asphalt). About 800m further north-west, the SMM again saw another tailfin, assessed as from an exploded rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7), lying on the asphalt of the same road.

On 22 June, the SMM saw for the first time an improvised mine hazard sign (a white wooden board with the words “Beware, mines” written in Russian) in a field on the southern outskirts of Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk).

On 23 June, the Mission saw about 20 people in clothing bearing the logo of an international organization, some of them holding mine detectors, conducting demining activities in a field on the northern side of road T-0512, about 5.5km south-west of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

On 21 June at 06:30, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 550 people queuing to exit and about 600 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. On 22 June at 06:00, at the same entry-exit checkpoint, the SMM saw about 500 people queuing to exit and about 450 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. At 09:00, the SMM saw the body of a deceased man being transported from non-government- to government-controlled areas on a wooden trolley by two men through the entry-exit checkpoint. A representative of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine and two representatives of an international organization separately told the SMM that the 69-year-old man had died of natural causes while waiting in the queue to enter government-controlled areas.

On 22 June, between 14:10 and 14:50 at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw approximately 120 civilian vehicles queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 100 civilian vehicles queuing in the opposite direction. While present, the SMM saw the queue moving only twice, with six vehicles passing through the checkpoint each time. Nine people (four men and five women, 30-90 years-old) told the SMM that they had been waiting for about nine hours (for similar observations, see SMM Daily Report 17 June 2019).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 22 June, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka.

On 22 and 23 June, the SMM facilitated the operation of the DFS and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of government control

On 22 June, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 75 minutes, the SMM saw 24 cars (four with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 13 with “DPR” plates), six covered cargo trucks (four with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates), and 64 pedestrians (24 women, 37 men, 30-70 years old; and three children) entering Ukraine.  It also saw 23 cars (four with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 12 with “DPR” plates), six covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus (plates not visible), and 25 pedestrians (16 women and nine men, 30-70 years old) exiting Ukraine.

On 22 June, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw three pedestrians (two women and one man, 50-60 years old) exiting Ukraine.

On 23 June, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka for about an hour, the SMM saw eight cars (four with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 21 pedestrians (ten women and eight men, 30-70 years old; and three children) entering Ukraine.  It also saw 29 cars (three with Ukrainian and ten with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 16 with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 23 June, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske for about 25 minutes, the SMM observed no cross-border traffic.

People apply for “passports” in Kadiivka

On 21 June in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 30 people (15 women and 15 men, 20-70 years old) queuing outside of a building. Four women (60-70 years old) in the queue told the SMM that they had been applying for “LPR passports” so they could later apply for Russian Federation passports.

SMM monitored Kyiv Pride 2019 march in Kyiv

On 23 June, in Kyiv city centre, the SMM observed the Kyiv Pride 2019 march aimed at promoting human rights with a particular focus on ending discrimination against the lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, trans, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) community. The SMM saw about 5,000-6,000 people (mixed genders and ages, mostly under 30 years old) marching through the city centre, as well as 3000 National Guard, Dialogue Police, and National Police officers, the majority in riot gear, along the route of the march. The SMM also observed about 300 people (mostly men, 15-30 years old), including 20 with their faces covered in balaclavas, gathered at Taras Shevchenko Park chanting slogans critical of the march. At 55 Volodymyrska Street, the SMM saw two men (in their twenties) wearing “Tradition and Order” t-shirts breaking through a line of police officers and attempting to confront participants before being stopped by police officers. The Mission also saw a man in his forties throw two eggs at participants to the march, causing an eye injury to a participant, before being apprehended by a police officer.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 22 June, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing an “order from their superiors to deny passage to everybody except local residents and the fire brigade”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 22 June, at a checkpoint in Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after about 25 minutes of waiting.
• On 22 June, at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after 37 minutes of waiting.

Conditional access:

• On 22 June, at a checkpoint near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after it provided copies of its vehicles’ technical certificates.

Other impediments:

• On 22 June, two SMM UAVs (a mid-range and a mini) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).[5]
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 31 shots and a burst of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.8-1.5km north-west, all assessed as aimed at the UAV. The Mission landed the UAV and left the area (see above).
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots and two bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 200-300m south-east, all assessed as aimed at the UAV. The Mission landed the UAV and left the area (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.