OSCE

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

KYIV, 23 April 2019 – Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Ertugrul Apakan today paid tribute to SMM medic Joseph Stone, who was tragically killed two years ago when an SMM armoured vehicle was struck by an explosion, most likely caused by an anti-tank mine in a non-government controlled area near Pryshyb in Luhansk region. “We will not forget our dear colleague Joseph Stone who lost his life in helping to bring about peace in eastern Ukraine,” he said.

Pointing out that over 56 civilians have been killed and 158 injured from mines and unexploded ordnance since Joseph Stone died two years ago, Ambassador Apakan called for full compliance with commitments made to remove mines and to stop laying new ones. “Only then, when people in eastern Ukraine are free of this scourge, will there be a fitting and lasting legacy for Joseph Stone and all the other innocent victims,” he said.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 19 and 20 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 20 and 21 April, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• An 11-year-old girl was injured by shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka on 14 April.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Kamianka.
• The SMM observed a weapon in a government-controlled area in violation of withdrawal lines.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s access was also restricted near Zaichenko.*
• The SMM observed a calm security situation in several regions of Ukraine during the second round of the Presidential Elections.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fever explosions (about 25), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and   in areas east and east-north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 20 and 21 April, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk, in areas south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and at southerly and northerly directions of Hnutove.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and south and east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Between the evenings of 20 and 21 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 50) compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna.

Girl injured in shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 20 April, a woman (in her thirties) told the SMM that on 14 April at about 19:30 she had heard a loud explosion near her house at 9 Lizy Chaikinoi Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) and that, after rushing to the living room and taking her 11-year-old daughter to safety, she had seen blood coming from the girl’s ear. She said that she had called an ambulance, which transported the girl to a hospital in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). According to the woman, on 15 April, her daughter was taken to a hospital in Luhansk city which had the necessary equipment to examine the girl (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 17 April 2019). On 15 April, the head doctor at the hospital in Pervomaisk had confirmed to the SMM that an 11-year-old girl from Zolote-5/Mykhailivka had been admitted to the hospital on 14 April with an injury to her ear. On 16 April, a man (in his fifties) living on the first floor of the house at 9 Lizy Chaikinoi Street told the SMM that a girl living on the ground floor had suffered an injury to her ear as a result of shelling on 14 April. The SMM observed positions of the armed formations at a distance of 300m from the house.

Small-arms fire aimed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Kamianka

During the day on 20 April, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.5-2km east-south-east of the patrol’s position, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 2km north-east of the patrol. The SMM landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 20 April, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km east-north-east (assessed as outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area). Positioned at two different locations near the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire (about 20 assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area and about 20 unable to assess whether inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). In the evening of 20 April, positioned in Popasna, the SMM heard about 45 undetermined explosions and four bursts of small-arms fire (unable to assesses whether inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

On 21 April, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and near the Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

On 19 April an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

19April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) near Ozarianivka.

20 April

The SMM saw:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-type), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) as well as an APC (Saxon) in Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) in Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol); and
• an APC (BTR-70) in Stanytsia Luhanska.

On 21 April the SMM saw three IFVs (BTR-60) in Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 April

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) near a former school in Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); and
• a military-type vehicle with a long barrel near Novyi (54km west of Luhansk).

Unexploded ordnance

On 20 April, the SMM saw for the first time a round of a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) stuck in soft ground 3m south-west of the road at the western edge of Pisky.

On 20 April, while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), the Mission observed three men (in their thirties), two wearing helmets and protective body armour and one wearing clothes marked with “MChS”, examining the soft ground of a pedestrian walkway with metal detectors at a distance of about 15m from workers conducting the repair works (see below).

On the same day, the SMM observed for the first time two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Spartak: one in Chapaieva Street, about 4m north of a residential house, and one in Zhovtneva Street, at a distance of 400m south-east of the aforementioned one, both assessed as probable projectiles from a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS, Grad-type, 122mm).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 20 April, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Spartak. On 20 and 21 April, the SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

On 20 April, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates), a van (with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian entering Ukraine. During the same time, it saw 12 cars (one with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation licence plates and eight with “DPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw eight cars (five with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates), one open truck carrying wood (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw eight cars (two with Ukrainian, four  with Russian Federation licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), six covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian, one with Belarusian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and one bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

Also on the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw one pedestrian entering Ukraine and three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

The SMM observed a calm security situation in several regions of Ukraine during second round of the Presidential Elections

On 21 April, on the occasion of the second round of the Presidential Elections in Ukraine, the SMM observed a calm security situation in Kyiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Kamianske, Vinnytsia and Chernivtsi, as well as government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The Mission also observed calm situations at entry-exit checkpoints in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 20 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 20 April, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), one armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 20 April, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM safely landed the UAV and immediately left the area (see above).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. Between the evenings of 19 and 20 April, the SMM cameras in Stanytsia Luhanska and at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SKOPJE, 22 April 2019 – Sunday’s presidential election in North Macedonia was well run and fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression were respected, and election day was peaceful, orderly and transparent. However, wide-reaching electoral reform is still very much needed, international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today.

“This peaceful, generally well-run election demonstrated that the political will can be found to hold democratic elections,” said Sereine Mauborgne, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “This constructive approach must be maintained through the second round and beyond. I sincerely hope that following these elections real effort will be made to enact a coherent electoral law and finally address the long existing challenges.”

Some 1.8 million voters were eligible to cast their ballot in 3,396 polling stations across the country. However, the automatic exclusion of voters based on expired identification documents created an unreasonable barrier that affected some 11,000 citizens. While improvements in the accuracy of the voter register were noted, discrepancies between state databases and diverse data formats need to be addressed.

“Yesterday’s election was well organised and voters who participated in the election were able to make their choice freely,” said Marie-Christine Dalloz, head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). “The delegation regrets that the turnout was low for a presidential election. A mature functioning of the political system and a reform of the electoral law would re-engage citizens and ensure their active participation in the election of their head of state. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission are ready to assist the authorities of North Macedonia in implementing the reforms.”

The campaign took place in a calm and peaceful environment, in which all participants were able to campaign without hindrance and fundamental freedoms were respected. State officials worked to maintain a clear distinction between their official and political activities, and to avoid using state resources in the campaign.

“We were pleased to see a campaign that addressed substantive concerns, with candidates engaging in debate on their visions for the future of North Macedonia,” said Reinhold Lopatka, head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) Delegation. “All three candidates clearly advocated for further European integration; whatever future the people here may choose, democratic elections will be crucial. The clear efforts made by state officials to avoid mixing political and official activities are an important development, helping to level the playing field for candidates.”

The election administration carried out its work impartially and enjoyed the confidence of the majority of stakeholders. However, the transparency and efficiency of the State Election Commission was hindered by technical malfunctions of its information and communication systems, raising doubts over IT security.

ODIHR’s media monitoring found that the public broadcaster provided impartial coverage and the media overall presented diverse information on the candidates and the political parties supporting them, enabling voters to make an informed choice. Both public and other media broadcasters covered the campaign and were mostly neutral in their reporting, while online and print media sometimes lacked balance in their coverage.

Concerns continue over the legal framework. While the law does allow for democratic elections, the electoral code is not tailored to the requirements of a presidential contest. The absence of explicit campaign rules for candidates resulted in parts of the campaign being carried out on the basis of cross-party agreements that did not provide equal opportunities to all candidates.

“The election was smoothly run, and shows just how much can be achieved when there is genuine political will,” said Corien Jonker, Head of the election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). “I hope that both the national authorities and political parties will continue to work in this spirit. The electoral reforms ODIHR has previously recommended need to be completed, with a focus on the transparency and accountability of campaign finance.”

It was the lack of uniform reporting of candidate expenditure, regulation of third-party campaigning, and reporting by political parties supporting candidates that reduced both the transparency of campaign finance and the effectiveness of oversight.

The international election observation mission comprises some 240 observers from 38 countries, including 189 long- and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 40 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, and 12 from PACE.

For further information, please contact:

Andreas Baker, OSCE PA +389 70636321 or +45 601 08126, andreas@oscepa.dk
Katya Andrusz, ODIHR, +389 728 07826 or +48 725 880 257, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl
Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE Secretariat  +389 706 36302 or +33 6 50 68 76 55, Chemavon.Chahbazian@coe.int

KYIV, 22 April 2019 – The presidential election in Ukraine was competitive and held with respect for fundamental freedoms, the international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today. The orderly transfer of power should offer the opportunity for strengthening democratic institutions and their accountability, although the campaign for both rounds lacked genuine discussion of issues of public concern, the statement says.

The media landscape and campaign coverage reflected the dominance of economic interests in public and political life, the observers said. The run-off was well-organized, despite operational challenges and a limited timeframe. The legal framework still contains shortcomings, and there was little will to resolve electoral complaints in a way that would guarantee effective remedy. Election day was assessed positively by the observers and, despite a few procedural problems, there was a marked improvement in the conduct of the counting and tabulation over the first round, the statement says. The incumbent conceded defeat shortly after the polls closed.

“The democratic and orderly transfer of power we witnessed yesterday is a great achievement by the Ukrainian people and paves the way for renewed efforts to advance necessary reforms to address burning issues and provide good governance. I thank my colleagues from different international institutions for their readiness to support this process,” said George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “The authorities now have to seize the opportunity the citizens have offered them to provide the economic and security conditions in which to realize their aspirations.”

The election took place in the context of ongoing armed conflict and other hostilities in the east of the country and the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation. As a consequence, the election could not be organized in Crimea and certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are controlled by illegal armed groups.

“The Ukrainian people demonstrated very clearly yesterday their commitment to securing change through the democratic process,” said Angela Smith, Head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. “Every effort should be made to facilitate in the future the voting rights of those Ukrainian citizens whose ability to cast their vote was seriously compromised by excessive administrative requirements.”

Doris Barnett, Head of the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, said: “I am pleased that free elections are becoming the norm in Ukraine and that the people are making use of their right to vote. This election demonstrates that democracy in Ukraine has become more stable. I trust that the new political dynamics in the country can fulfill the high expectations of the voters. Now the country needs to focus on further economic development.”

Rebecca Harms, Head of the delegation from the European Parliament, said: “I would like to congratulate the citizens of Ukraine for their deep commitment to democracy, demonstrated in competitive elections in which they had a free choice. We also welcome the statesmanship demonstrated by the incumbent in accepting the democratic choice of Ukrainians on election night, even after the heated campaign. I sincerely regret that many Ukrainians could not vote because Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and the aggression continues in Eastern Ukraine. The European Parliament encourages and supports the incoming president in continuing, and even strengthening reform efforts, mainly in fighting corruption and poverty.”

The candidates did not conduct large-scale campaign rallies between the rounds, and campaigning was predominantly conducted on television, in online media and social networks, and through billboards and posters. Increased tensions between the two sides were reflected in massive and systematic negative campaigning and harsh mutual accusations, the statement says. There was a marked difference in the character of the conventional campaign of the incumbent, Petro Poroshenko, and that of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, which was conducted to a large extent by proxies and put little emphasis on his campaign platform.

Overall, the private television channels monitored provided imbalanced and biased coverage. The public broadcaster divided its prime-time news coverage equally between the two contestants. Zelenskyi largely avoided participating in campaign-related programming and coverage.

The misuse of state resources, both at the national and local levels, continued during the second round, the observers said. There remain a number of ongoing investigations into alleged vote-buying by Poroshenko’s campaign.

Despite time constraints, the Central Election Commission (CEC) handled preparations efficiently and met legal deadlines. The election laws regulate some but not all aspects of a second round, and the remaining gaps were not addressed by the CEC. It continued to hold regular open sessions, but also went on holding preliminary meetings before the sessions, which decreased transparency, the statement says.

“The run-off was organized well, but there is still a need to enhance the electoral legislation and practice,” said Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. “A genuine political debate and concrete steps to further improve elections will strengthen accountability of democratic institutions.”

Voter lists were updated to reflect changes between the rounds, and voters had a brief window to check their data online and to request corrections. Those who needed to temporarily change their place of voting had to submit new requests, even if they had already done so for the first round. This represents an unnecessary burden, especially for internally displaced persons, voters abroad and persons with disabilities, the observers said.

The CEC received seven complaints during the second-round period, all of which were denied consideration on technical grounds. All 11 cases lodged against the CEC and candidates in administrative court between the rounds were ruled inadmissible or dismissed, depriving complainants of access to effective remedy and undermining the transparency of the dispute resolution process. 

All candidates eliminated in the first round submitted their final campaign finance reports by the legal deadline, and the two run-off candidates submitted their interim finance reports. No violations have been identified on the basis of these interim reports, and the official analyses of all final reports will be published at a later date. Both second-round campaigns were partly financed from sources other than the candidates’ legal campaign fund accounts.

For further information, contact:

Anna Di Domenico, OSCE PA, +380 98 046 62 21 or +45 60 10 83 80, anna.didomenico@oscepa.dk
Thomas Rymer, ODIHR, +380 67 339 62 93 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl
Bogdan Torcatoriu, PACE, +380 96 429 48 91 or +33 6 50 39 29 40, bogdan.torcatoriu@coe.int
Doichin Cholakov, EP, +380 97 918 38 35 or +32 477 85 45 78, doichin.cholakov@europarl.europa.eu

417986 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported seminar on the mechanisms for the legal regulation and digital security of media on the internet took place on 19 April 2019 in Pavlodar, Kazakhstan.

Some 20 journalists and bloggers were familiarized with the national and international media framework, including practical and legislative aspects of media regulation on the Internet. The event included sessions on access to information, restrictions on freedom of expression, protection of personal data, work with different digital sources of information and fact-checking, and the protection of civil rights in the media field. Together with national experts, the participants examined court cases on hate speech, and instruments of working with the open government database.

The seminar was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan and the NGO Legal Media Centre. Future seminars will be held in Aktobe in May 2019 and Taldykurgan in June 2019.

The event is a part of the Office’s activities aimed at promoting media freedom and freedom of expression in line with OSCE principles and commitments.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city.
• In Donetsk region, an SMM long-range UAV crashed and an SMM mini-UAV sustained damage from gunfire.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Markyne, as well as in Novoazovsk and Dovzhanske, areas near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and north, north-west and west of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) north-east, east-south-east and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle crashes near contact line in Donetsk region

At 01:26, 19 April, while near Vuhledar (government-controlled, 48km south-west of Donetsk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) encountered dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming.[2] This interference continued until 02:35, when, while attempting to navigate the UAV to its ground control station near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM lost control of the UAV. The SMM assesses that it crashed at 02:36, in an area west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and north-east of Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk). It is premature to draw conclusions about the causes of the incident. The SMM is making urgent efforts to locate the UAV.*

Fresh damage from shelling to residential houses in Donetsk city

In a residential neighbourhood in north-western Donetsk city, at 35 Bohatyrska Street, the SMM saw fresh damage to the east-facing wall of a two-storey house, with most of the tiles broken and dislodged on an area of the wall, as well as a broken window covered in plywood. The Mission also saw fresh damage to the east-facing side of the roof above the damaged wall, with the metal roof bent upwards, as well as a shattered south-west-facing window in an outdoor toilet. About 0.5m east of the house, the SMM saw a fresh crater close to the damaged wall. A caretaker of the house (woman, 30-40 years old) told the SMM that the resident of the house was not present at the time of shelling.

About 15m east of the abovementioned house, at 13 Zoolohichna Street, the SMM saw two west-facing shattered windows covered with plastic sheeting on a two-storey house. Next to the house, the SMM saw an impact mark to a metal bathtub and pieces of shrapnel around the yard. A resident of the house (woman, about 90 years old) told the SMM that she had been inside the house with her daughter (50-60 years old) on the evening of 17 April when she had heard a loud sound. The SMM assessed that the damage at both houses was caused by shelling from a northerly direction, but could not assess the type of weapon used.

SMM mini-UAV sustains damage from gunfire

While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the south-eastern edge of Kurdiumivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 700m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 700m south-west of the SMM’s position at an altitude of about 150m. The Mission landed the UAV and observed that one UAV propeller blade had sustained damage, assessed to be caused by a bullet from a rifle. The SMM left the area.*

Disengagement areas[3]

On 18 April an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) north of the railway bridge and west of road T1316 inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On the same day, the same UAV again spotted three anti-tank mines (probable TM-62), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, west of road T1316 (the nearest of which was located 10m west of the road), as well as at least 30 anti-tank mines (types undetermined) west of road T1316 and at least 41 anti-tank mines (types undetermined), assessed as belonging to the armed formations, east of the same road laid in three rows (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 17 November 2018). The UAV spotted for the first time a red, triangular mine hazard sign on the western side of the same road about 70m south-east of the aforementioned 41 anti-tank mines.

During the day on 19 April, positioned about 600m south of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact and four bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-3km north and north-north-west, as well as two undetermined explosions and about 50 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 700m-800m north and east-north-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km north-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

On 18 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 19 tanks (types undetermined) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

18. April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted ten tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

19 April

The SMM saw that one of the sites was abandoned and that six towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm), 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 80 tanks (T-64) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

18. April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a mobile radar system (ST-68UM, Tin Shield) near Petrivske (61km south-west of Donetsk).

19. April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kyrylivka (26km north-east of Mariupol); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

18 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four ACVs near Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk);
• nine infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) near Boikivske, in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014;
• two APCs (MT-LB) and an ACV near Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk);
• two probable ACVs (types undetermined) near Kozatske (86km south of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP variants) near Khreshchatytske (86km south of Donetsk;
• three IFVs (BMP variants) as well as an APC (MT-LB) in  Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk); and
• two box-bodied utility trucks used for communications equipment near Bezimenne.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• seven IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Lobacheve; and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Luhansk city.

Unexploded ordnance and mine hazard signs seen for the first time

The SMM saw for the first time an anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) embedded in a field about 5m south of the road and about 1.3km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) on the road between Verkhnoshyrokivske and Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

At the southern entrance of Chernenko (government-controlled, 21km north-east of Mariupol), in a field 20m east of the road, the SMM saw a mine hazard sign for the first time,  with “Stop, Mines! Danger, Mines” written in Russian, attached to a wooden plank. On the road between Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol) and the junction for road T-0519, the SMM saw a mine hazard sign for the first time, with “The Area is Not Safe/Stop Mines” written in Ukrainian, attached to a tree about 2m north of the road.

Increased traffic at Hnutove entry-exit checkpoint

The SMM saw traffic higher than usual passing through the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), following recent upgrades on the government-controlled side, including new booths, overhead structures and fresh tarmac (see SMM Daily Report 16 April 2019). The Mission saw about 100 cars and about 45 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas, and no traffic or pedestrians queuing to exit government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to a water pipeline near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two covered cargo trucks with “LPR” plates and six pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* 

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 28 cars (five with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and three with Georgian licence plates 13 with “DPR” plates), two buses (with “DPR” plates, about 45-50 passengers each), nine covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and four pedestrians entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 30 cars (six with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates and 17 with “DPR” plates) and two buses (with “DPR” plates, 55-60 passengers each) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and three trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and five covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk), the SMM saw no pedestrians or traffic entering or exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding south towards Novoazovsk, north towards Huselshchykove (non-government-controlled, 95km south-east of Donetsk) and east towards the border with the Russian Federation, citing “security reasons”.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from continuing west towards Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), citing an “ongoing live-fire exercise” at a nearby training area. 
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC told the Mission that mines on the road south of the bridge had not been cleared.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) an armed member of the armed formations stopped the SMM for about 20 minutes before allowing the SMM to proceed through the checkpoint into non-government-controlled areas.  

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the south-eastern edge of Kurdiumivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 700m south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The UAV Mission landed the UAV and observed that the UAV had sustained damage, assessed to be caused by a bullet. The SMM left the area. (see above)
• On the evening and night of 18-19 April, an SMM long range-UAV encountered dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.[6] (see above)

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4]  The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

At 2045 hrs, 18 April, the SMM launched a long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight over government- and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region. At 0126 hrs, 19 April, while near Vuhledar (government-controlled, 48km south-west of Donetsk), the UAV encountered dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming.[1] 

This interference continued until 0235 hrs, when, while attempting to navigate the UAV to its ground control station near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM lost control of the UAV. 

SMM assesses that it crashed at 0236 hrs, in an area west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and north-east of Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk).

It is premature to draw conclusions about the causes of the incident. The area of the presumed crash site is near the contact line and considered heavily mined, making SMM access difficult. During the day on 19 April, weather conditions prevented a medium-range UAV flight. The SMM is making urgent efforts to locate its long-range UAV, and will report relevant findings.

[1] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

SKOPJE, 19 April 2019 – The international observers for the presidential election in North Macedonia will hold a news conference to present their preliminary post-election statement on Monday 22 April, in Skopje.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

Sereine Mauborgne, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission will deliver the statement followed by Marie-Christine Dalloz, Head of the PACE delegation, Reinhold Lopatka, Head of the OSCE PA delegation, and Corien Jonker, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission. They will subsequently be available to take questions from the media.

The international election observation mission comprises some 240 observers from 38 countries, including 189 long- and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 39 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, and 12 from PACE.

You are invited to attend the news conference at 15:00 on Monday 22 April, which will take place in the Platinum Conference Room at the Double Tree by Hilton Hotel, Bulevar ASNOM 17, Skopje. NB While the news conference is open to all and no registration or accreditation is required to enter, only questions from journalists will be taken.

The press conference will be livestreamed at: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr and www.oscepa.org.

For further information, please contact:

Andreas Baker, OSCE PA +389 70636321 or +45 601 08126 , andreas@oscepa.dk
Katya Andrusz, ODIHR, +389 728 07826 or +48 725 880 257, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl
Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE Secretariat  +389 706 36302 or +33 6 50 68 76 55, Chemavon.Chahbazian@coe.int

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man was injured due to the detonation of an explosive device in Fedorivka.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed long queues of civilians at the Stanytsia Luhanska entry exit-checkpoint.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in non-government-controlled Shevchenko and near Novolaspa and Yasne, as well as near a border crossing point outside of government control in Leonove,  Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period (30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and south and south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (80 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east of Hannivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and the majority of explosions were recorded east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man injured due to the detonation of an explosive device in Fedorivka

The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured on 6 April due to the detonation of an explosive device near Fedorivka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Mariupol). On 18 April, at a hospital in Mariupol, the SMM saw a man (aged 60-70) whose right hand had been amputated just above the wrist (which was covered by a bandage). He told the SMM that the explosion had occurred in the afternoon hours of 6 April as a result of the detonation of a grenade. On 8 April, medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that the man had had surgery on 6 April during which his hand had been amputated. A police representative in Fedorivka also told the SMM that the explosive device had been assessed as a grenade. A man (aged 48) who said he had witnessed the incident said that he had found an unexploded device at an abandoned farm near the village in the afternoon of 6 April. According to the interlocutor, the two men had decided to place the unexploded device into the lake; however, when the unexploded device had not detonated, the device had been removed from the water and at that moment it had exploded.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 7-10km east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). Positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-6km north (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

18 April

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a field off a local road near Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

16 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122 mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city;
• seven MLRS (BM-21) in a compound near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 21 March 2019);
• seven MLRS (BM-21) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019); and
• 15 MLRS (BM-21) close to residential buildings near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019).

17 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four tanks (T-64) north of Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

16 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 11 tanks (T-64), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 12 towed howitzers (D-30) in a training area near Miusynsk;
• six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and eight tanks (T-72) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (see above); and
• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 24 towed howitzers (six D-30, eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

18 April

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

16. April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Pakhalivka (40km west of Luhansk), as well as for the first time a trench about 200m north-east of the IFV extending for about 800m north within a treeline;
• an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) and a probable communications vehicle (type undetermined) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) and three armoured combat vehicles (types undetermined) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (a BTR-80 and an MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Luhansk city.

17 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk);
• 12 IFVs (nine BMP-1 and three probable BMP variants) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) near Dovhe; and
• an APC (BTR-80) and an IFV (BMP variant) in Novoselivka.

Mine hazard signs near Myrne, Krasnohorivka and Vuhlehirsk, as well as demining activities in Myrna Dolyna

On 17 April, the SMM saw for the first time 20 mine hazard signs (with “Stop, Mines” written in Ukrainian) and two other signs (with “Attention, demining operation is ongoing in this area” written in Ukrainian) on the southern edge of road T-0512 about 4.5km east of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol).

The following day, in a field on the eastern edge of road H-20 at the exit for Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 24km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a mine hazard sign (“Careful, mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian) attached to a wire stretched between two bushes.

On the western edge of a local road about 4.5km north-west of Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM again saw a mine hazard sign (with “Stop, Mines” written in Russian).

The Mission saw about 15 people in protective gear bearing the logo of an international organization in a field 50m west of a local road in  Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk)

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to a water pipeline near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

Long queues of civilians at Stanytsia Luhanska entry exit-checkpoint

At 12:35, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 500 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. At 13:30, at the same checkpoint, the SMM saw about 400 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas. At 12: 30, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw around 40 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and around 20 people queuing in the opposite direction.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• While in Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, preventing the Mission from continuing northward.
• On the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entrance to the village, citing ongoing “security operations” in the area.
• On the southern edge of Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (of whom one was armed) prevented the SMM from entering the village, citing “security reasons”.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 6km north of the border crossing point near Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, non-government-controlled, 82km south of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards the border crossing point, citing “the presence of unexploded ordnance” and the need for “prior permission” to visit it.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM for about 90 minutes before allowing it to proceed east through the checkpoint, citing “orders from a superior” and “ongoing demining activities”.

Other impediments:

• On 16 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its dual GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Yesaulivka (non-government-controlled, 61km south of Luhansk) and Myronivskyi (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons

COPENHAGEN, 19 April 2019 – The Chair of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s human rights and humanitarian affairs committee, Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland) today reiterated her full support for efforts aimed at achieving a recommitment to a ceasefire in Ukraine on the occasion of the upcoming Easter festivities.

“Particularly during the Easter holiday period, humanitarian considerations should be first and foremost in the minds of those involved,” said Kiener Nellen. “It is my sincere hope that the efforts of Ambassador Martin Sajdik and Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan to once again get the sides to put down their weapons will be successful and enable those in the region to mark the holidays in peace.”

On 18 April a press statement by the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-In-Office, Ambassador Martin Sajdik, noted that the Trilateral Contact Group and its Working Group on Security Issues discussed several proposals but that no consensus could be found at this stage. 

Kiener Nellen recalled that the Minsk Agreements committed the sides to a long and lasting ceasefire, and reiterated that the people living in the conflict zone have a right to see this ceasefire respected.

KYIV, 19 April 2019 – The international observers for the second round of the presidential election in Ukraine will present their preliminary post-election statement at a news conference on Monday, 22 April, in Kyiv.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament (EP).

The statement will be delivered by George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, followed by Angela Smith, Head of the PACE delegation, Doris Barnett, Head of the OSCE PA delegation, Rebecca Harms, Head of the EP delegation, and Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission.

The international election observation mission comprises 685 observers from 44 countries, including 629 long- and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 33 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, 19 from PACE and 9 from the EP.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 22 April, in the Regency Ballroom of the Hyatt Regency Kyiv hotel, 5 Alla Tarasova St., Kyiv. NB While the press conference is open to all and no registration or accreditation is needed to enter, we will only be taking questions from journalists.

Livestreaming of the press conference will be available at: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr and www.oscepa.org.

For further information, contact:

Anna Di Domenico, OSCE PA, +380 98 046 62 21 or +45 60 10 83 80, anna.didomenico@oscepa.dk
Thomas Rymer, ODIHR, +380 67 339 62 93 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl
Bogdan Torcatoriu, PACE, +380 96 429 48 91 or +33 6 50 39 29 40, bogdan.torcatoriu@coe.int
Doichin Cholakov, EP, +380 97 918 38 35 or +32 477 85 45 78, doichin.cholakov@europarl.europa.eu

SARAJEVO, 19 April 2019 – The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presented today in Sarajevo its second report on the monitoring of corruption cases before courts in BiH. The report concludes that the judicial response to corruption in BiH is insufficient, particularly with regard to processing of medium and high-level cases.

The report, titled Trial Monitoring of Corruption Cases in BiH: Second Assessment, builds upon the work presented in the first report issued in February 2018. It presents 24 recommendations aimed at improving the judicial response to corruption, based on findings from the monitoring and assessment of 300 cases in courts at all levels of authority across BiH in 2017 and 2018.

The report, inter alia, finds that the performance of the justice system with respect to the productivity of prosecutor’s offices and courts, the capacity of prosecutors and judges in the application of the law and their efficiency in processing cases is affected by serious problems.    

“Changing this situation will require sustained corrective efforts and sincere political commitment,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH, Bruce G. Berton. “Political and judicial leaders must unequivocally recognize that corruption is endemic in BiH and that the fight against this social plague will require the implementation of a coherent and comprehensive strategy, as well as their uncompromised attention for many years to come.”

The United States Ambassador to BiH, Eric Nelson stated: “The citizens of BiH know that corruption is one of the biggest problems afflicting their country. Because of corruption, they cannot get jobs, or start businesses, and their loved ones are leaving. The U.S. is steadfast and remains committed to supporting citizens, law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and political leaders who are ready to fight corruption.”

Slavo Lakić, Prosecutor at the FBiH Prosecutors’ Office and member of the High Judicial and Prosecutors Council of BiH said that the report represents a basis for the improvement of functioning of the judiciary within the existing legal framework. “The recommendations should be thoroughly examined in order to overcome the identified shortcomings in the system and create conditions for efficient and effective fight against corruption.”

The report was developed within the framework of the project “Assessing Needs of Judicial Response to Corruption through Monitoring of Criminal Cases” supported by the United States Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.  

Kunduz Rysbek

A capacity-building training course for staff of the Probation body and Settlement colonies was organized in Osh, Kyrgyzstan by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek from 15 to 19 April 2019 on how to support the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crimes related to extremism and terrorism.

The course aimed at enhancing the participants’ capacity in the development of plans and mechanisms for the social rehabilitation of convicts in these categories, both during their imprisonment and after release.

The course served as platform to discuss key concepts, international agreements and norms, and international experiences in the rehabilitation of inmates and their re-socialization into society.

The course highlighted the importance of the role of the staff of the State Service for the Execution of Punishment under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SSEP) and the probation body as key to providing effective and systematic rehabilitation assistance. 

This course is a key part of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek’s activities in assisting the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic in preventing radicalization in prisons and promoting a rehabilitation system for persons convicted of crimes of an extremist-terrorist nature.

BRATISLAVA, 19 April 2019  - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák today expressed his deep regret that the Trilateral Contact Group and its Working Group on Security Issues were not able to agree yesterday on a recommitment to cease fire in eastern Ukraine on the occasion of the upcoming Easter festivities.

Alarmed by the ceasefire violations, the Chairperson-in-Office stressed the urgent need to not only recommit to a renewed truce, but agree on a sustainable and irreversible ceasefire.

“Every day, people in eastern Ukraine are suffering hardships. It is the duty of the sides to guarantee a safe and secure environment and it is a key precondition for any positive development, including improving the dire humanitarian situation,” Lajčák said.

The Chairperson-in-Office strongly urges the sides to continue their discussions in order to achieve and maintain a recommitment to cease fire.

VIENNA, 19 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today strongly condemned the killing of journalist Lyra McKee in Northern Ireland, in the United Kingdom.

McKee was covering riots in the city of Londonderry when a gunman fired shots towards the police and fatally wounded her. 

The authorities are treating her death as a terrorist incident.

“I am deeply saddened by the death of Lyra McKee in Londonderry. She was doing her job, covering the riots in the city. I strongly condemn this senseless and horrific killing of a journalist,” said Désir. “I welcome the investigation launched by the authorities and hope that those responsible are swiftly identified and brought to justice."

The Representative welcomed the condemnations by political leaders.

“Lyra McKee was a young and passionate journalist and was known for her investigative reporting on the history of political turmoil in Northern Ireland. This is a terrible loss,” he said. “I extend my deepest condolences to the families, friends, and colleagues of Lyra at this difficult time.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

Strengthening the capacity of police crisis negotiators from across Kazakhstan was the focus of a five-day training course held from 15 to 19 April 2019 in Karaganda, Kazakhstan. The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Karaganda.

The course was led by national experts from the Academy of the National Security Committee and the Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies under the General Prosecutor’s Office. The experts shared best practices on managing large crowds, non-verbal communication tools and understanding human behaviour.   

The event, organized for 30 police officers from across the country, Karaganda city Police Department and Police Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Karaganda reviewed a number of case studies where they were familiarized with innovative communicative tools used in the negotiation process, and learnt details of recent incidents where negotiators facilitated an effective resolution.

The training is part of the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan’s activities to enhance security, increase accountability, and promote best practices in security at large-scale events.

KYIV, 18 April 2019 – “The Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and its Working Group on Security Issues convened this afternoon and evening in the videoconference format.

In the Working Group on Security Issues, under the co-ordination of Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, the sides discussed several proposals with a view to agree a joint statement of the TCG, with the participation of representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, confirming their recommitment to cease fire on the occasion of the upcoming Easter festivities. Also in the TCG itself, various compromise texts were proposed by the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office with the same view.

Unfortunately, no consensus could be found at this stage. The sides only agreed to continue their discussions during the next regular meeting of the TCG and its Working Groups in Minsk, on 24 April.” 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• A woman was reportedly injured due to shelling in Zaitseve.
• The SMM saw fresh gunfire damage to inhabited houses in Trokhizbenka and Dokuchaievsk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed a weapon in violation of the withdrawal lines near Novoluhanske.
• It saw fresh craters near Novoluhanske, as well as anti-tank mines near Petrivske and Vesela Hora.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions and observed the restoration of the water supply to Dokuchaievsk following the completion of repairs to the Vasylivka water pumping station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted near government-controlled Kamianka and in non-government-controlled areas, including at checkpoints near Bezimenne and Verkhnoshyrokivske and at border crossing points near Izvaryne and Sievernyi.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 310 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas east-north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) as well as in and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Woman injured due to shelling in Zaitseve

On 16 April, a woman (late thirties) in a non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that she had been injured by an explosion in the yard of her house on 8 April while she and her husband were running for cover in the basement. The woman added that, before she had reached shelter, an explosion had occurred nearby that had thrown her against an outside wall of the house and shattered windows, glass from which left cuts on her legs. The woman’s husband and four neighbours told the SMM that there had been shelling in the area on the morning of 8 April. The woman told the SMM that her house was located between positions of the armed formations and of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Shrapnel and gunfire damage to inhabited houses in Trokhizbenka and Dokuchaievsk

On the south-western edge of Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk) at 245 Donetska Street, the SMM saw a broken north-facing window of a house and shrapnel damage to a north-facing iron fence. The SMM saw a crater approximately 35m north of the house, assessed as recent and caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a southerly direction. A resident of the house (male, 80 years old) told the SMM that he had been inside of the house with his wife when shelling took place in the evening of 6 April.

At 241 Donetska Street, the SMM saw a broken west-facing window and shrapnel damage on the west-facing wall of a house and a wooden door of a shed about 25m south. In a garden 30m south of the house, the SMM saw a crater assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-south-easterly direction. Approximately 200m east of the previously mentioned house, at a residential house at 225 Donetska Street, the SMM saw a crater assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-south-easterly direction in a garden approximately 25m south of the house, along with three damaged beehives, shrapnel damage to a chimney and wooden fence on the eastern side of the house, and metal fragments assessed as belonging to an exploded 82mm mortar shell. At 223 Donetska Street, the SMM saw a broken south-facing window and a broken powerline near the southern gate of the house, all assessed as caused by shrapnel. Residents of all three houses told the SMM that shelling had taken place in the evening of 16 April and that Donetska Street was without power due to the damages (for previous reports of shelling on Donetska Street, see SMM Daily Report 10 April 2019).

In southern Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) at 48 Shorsha Street, about 2.5km north-east of the line of contact, the SMM saw a hole in the ceiling of a house’s bathroom and two holes each on its south- and north-facing walls, assessed as caused by an unknown projectile entering through the ceiling and ricocheting off the walls. A resident of the house (female, 50 years old) told the SMM that she had been inside the house with her family when the room had been damaged in the evening of 15 April.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 16 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 27 projectiles (12 at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and 15 at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east), six undetermined explosions (three at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and three at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east) and a muzzle flash at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. On 17 April, while positioned in Zolote, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions and 32 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the evening and night of 16-17 April, while in Popasna, the SMM heard approximately 240 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, 130 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire and automatic grenade launchers, and 51 undetermined explosions, all at an  assessed range of 4-8km east-north-east and all assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines  

Government-controlled areas

16 April

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable mortar (2B14, Podnos 82mm) near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk). (The UAV also spotted fresh craters in the area, see below.)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

16 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) next to residential houses in Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-3E) about 300m west of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske.

17 April

The SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-80) near Shyrokyne (100km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

16 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable ACV (type unknown), a probable IFV (BMP variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

17 April

The SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Kypuche (formerly Artemivsk, 46km west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters near Novoluhanske

On 16 April, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least 15 fresh craters approximately 80m west of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske, assessed as caused by mortar rounds (calibre undetermined).

Mines near Petrivske and Vesela Hora and a mine hazard sign near Novoluhanske

On 12 April, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least 150 probable anti-tank mines buried in two curved lines in a field about 450m north-west of Petrivske and about 300m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Petrivske.

On 16 April, east of Vesela Hora, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines laid across the western lane of road H21, as well as again at least 36 anti-tank mines in a field about 50m south-west of the same road.

The SMM saw a mine hazard sign with “Be careful, mines” written in Russian near a former checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern side of a road leading from Novoluhanske. Near the checkpoint, the SMM saw two vehicles bearing the logo of an international demining organization and four individuals in uniforms of the same organization.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) and Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the water pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and was told by personnel at the pumping station that it had become fully operational on 17 April following the completion of repair works (see SMM Daily Report 16 April 2019). As a result, the SMM observed that potable water had been restored to Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). (For previous reports of the lack of potable water in the area, see SMM Daily Report 15 April 2019.)

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates), a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates, and eight pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw six pedestrians entering Ukraine and a pedestrian exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw four pedestrians entering Ukraine and five pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to proceed further west of the checkpoint, citing “ongoing special operations.” While present, the SMM saw other civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.
• While driving toward Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), about 2km north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) five members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces stopped the SMM and told the Mission that they could not proceed.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk) three armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM for 18 minutes before allowing it to proceed east through the checkpoint.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons

ST. PETERSBURG, 18 April 2019 – The evolving nature of the threat posed by terrorists and violent extremists requires enhancing co-operation at all levels, including between parliamentarians, said Chair of the OSCE PA’s Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (CCT) Makis Voridis (Greece) at today’s opening plenary session of the International Conference on Counter-Terrorism in St. Petersburg.

“The overall number of terrorist acts has increased worldwide, and the drivers of terrorism are also changing, with factors related to political extremism and disenfranchisement becoming more prominent,” Voridis said. “To ensure an effective approach to the international fight against terrorism and violent extremism, greater involvement of parliamentarians and leveraging their comparative advantages of policy-making and oversight is indispensable.”

The conference, organized by the Interparliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States with the support of the OSCE PA and of several other parliamentary assemblies and UN agencies, included the participation of some 15 parliamentarians from the OSCE PA. In addition to CCT members Voridis and Lisa Chambers (Ireland), the OSCE PA delegation included human rights committee Chair Margareta Kiener Nellen (Switzerland) and economic and environmental committee Rapporteur Elona Gjebrea Hoxha (Albania). 

The conference explored issues such as challenges associated with prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters, the role of international institutions in building a common strategy to counter terrorism and the need to better address terrorism financing. Voridis chaired Session Three on “Preventing Illegal Use of Network Technologies, Mass Media and Social Networks to Spread Extremist Ideas,” which also featured Chambers as a keynote speaker.

“When seeking to prevent radicalization and illegal use of social media and social networks, individual countries cannot work in isolation – we must act as a global community to tackle this universal problem,” Chambers said. “Online platforms do not recognize land borders and so if we want to get ahead, we must come together. We can do this by talking, sharing information and developing international best practice, this is precisely why the CCT was established and why our work has been so effective. We are learning from each other and working together as parliamentarians, using the avenues open to us to direct policy and enact legislation in our own countries.”

Intervening in the session on “Stepping Up Efforts Against the Financing of Terrorism and Extremism,” Kiener Nellen said: “To prevent terrorists from benefiting from transnational organized crime as a source of financing or logistical support, the international community needs to urgently co-ordinate its efforts at the local, national, regional, and international levels.” 

Conference participants concurred that countering terrorism and violent extremism is a common goal and priority for the international community, including for parliamentary institutions. They also confirmed the relevance of the provisions of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006, noting that parliamentarians play a key role by adopting relevant legislation, allocation of budget funds and performing oversight to ensure protection from terrorist violence in line with human rights obligations.

Voridis held bilateral talks on the margins of the conference with Yuri Fedotov of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Sergei Lebedev of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Liliane Maury Pasquier of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, to better co-ordinate efforts in the fight against terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism.

For more information on the work of the CCT, please click here.

417665 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Ivana Milatovic, OSCE Mission to Serbia

Lobbying against corruption was the topic of a training event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Mission to Serbia from 16 to 18 April in Belgrade. The event gathered 52 participants (36 women and 16 men) from the Serbian Anti-Corruption Agency, the Embassy of the United States and civil society organizations.

ODIHR and the OSCE Mission to Serbia have been providing assistance to the Anti-Corruption Agency as authorities in Serbia prepare to implement the law on lobbying, due to enter into force in August 2019. The course was tailored to Serbia’s legal and institutional framework and covered international standards on lobbying and specific lobbying practices, as well as activities related to the drafting of the code of conduct for lobbying participants in Serbia. The lobbyist registration process and the development of a register of lobbyists were also discussed.

“The approval of the law on lobbying is an important step towards enhancing public integrity in Serbia,” said Jacopo Leone, Associate Democratic Governance Officer at ODIHR. “Together with the OSCE Mission to Serbia, ODIHR stands ready to support the Anti-Corruption Agency in implementing the law, so as to achieve higher standards of pluralism, transparency and inclusion in decision-making in Serbia.” 

Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, Ambassador Andrea Orizio, said: “This inception training course is just the beginning of a series of support activities by the OSCE Mission to Serbia in the area of lobbying as a corruption prevention measure. By initiating the adoption of the law on lobbying, Serbia has yet again shown its willingness to assume increased ownership of the reform process.”

Verka Atanaskovic, Assistant Director at the Department on Conflict of Interest and Lobbying Issues of the Serbian Anti-Corruption Agency, added: “We are fully committed to the effective implementation of the newly adopted law on lobbying, and value the support and expertise provided by the OSCE during this induction training.”