OSCE

VIENNA, 15 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today welcomed the restored access to multiple internet-based media in Uzbekistan, after more than ten years of intermittent blocking.

Désir also welcomed the fact that the Agency of Information and Mass Communications, under the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Uzbekistan, has investigated the matter, and expressed their willingness to constructively communicate with the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.

“I welcome the unblocking of media and information websites in Uzbekistan, including Asia Terra, Uzmetronom, Fergana Agency, Eurasia.net, Centre 1, Deutsche Welle, Voice of America and BBC and their Uzbek-language services, as well as sites of human rights organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights Watch, which I previously raised with the authorities. I hope that the website of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) will also be unblocked soon and I will continue my exchange with the authorities on the issue,” Désir said. “I encourage Uzbekistan in furthering the reform of the media sector towards an open, free and diverse media landscape.”

The Representative on Freedom of the Media has frequently raised the issue of internet blocking in the OSCE region. Désir insists that the authorities need to ensure unrestricted access to the internet and the free flow of information at all times.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

419741 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

The security needs of Jewish communities were the focus of an awareness raising event held in Chisinau on 15 May 2019. It was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Jewish Community of Moldova.

Attended by more than 50 law-enforcement officials and Jewish community representatives, the event was an opportunity to discuss the extent of anti-Semitism in Moldova. The participants exchanged views on how anti-semitism is manifested and methods to strengthen co-operation between local law enforcement bodies and Jewish communities to combat the phenomenon more effectively.

“The Mission commends the Moldovan authorities for their efforts to build an inclusive and tolerant society. Inclusivity is an important precondition for advancing the Transdniestrian settlement process,” said Claus Neukirch, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. 

"Ultimately, governments are responsible for making sure that Jewish communities are safe. Today’s event is an opportunity to discuss how government officials and law enforcement can confront the specific challenges posed by anti-Semitism, in close co-operation with local communities," said Project Manager at ODIHR Ilan Cohn.

To help Moldova in turning its OSCE commitments on combating anti-Semitism into action, the OSCE Mission to Moldova has followed a comprehensive approach that includes awareness raising, training for justice sector professionals, and improvements to the legal framework. Mainstreaming tolerance and inclusiveness in school education also plays an important role. Building on its previous efforts, the Mission will conduct a series of training workshops this year for law enforcement officials on the investigation of bias-motivated crimes.

The workshop was organized as part of ODIHR’s Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism project. The event was an opportunity to discuss the implementation of ODIHR's practical guide Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crime and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities.

419639

The Fourth Central Asian Internet Governance Forum is taking place on 15 and 16 May 2019 in Tashkent. The event aims to provide a platform to discuss Internet governance policies in Central Asian countries.

The Forum is the first of its kind in Uzbekistan and is organized by the Ministry for Development of Information Technologies and Communications of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the OSCE Project Co-Ordinator in Uzbekistan with the support of ICANN, Internet Society, RIPE NCC, Facebook, Kaspersky Lab, IGFSA, Uztelecom and the Inha University in Tashkent.

High-level government officials and representatives from the private sector, civil society, academia, experts and international organizations will engage in discussions and share best practices on how to address issues related to cybersecurity, Internet freedom and regulation, access to the Internet as well as global and national approaches to Internet governance.

Two working groups will be engaged in discussions of separate thematic issues to formulate policy and practical recommendations for the Central Asian countries to use cyberspace in addressing the physical or geographical restrictions. This would help countries in the region to benefit from the Internet for economic, social and societal purposes.

Within the thematic areas, special attention will be paid to making cyberspace more open, interoperable, secure, and reliable and offer concrete tools and mechanisms that will help to improve communication within countries in Central Asia.

The Fourth Central Asian Internet Governance Forum is organized in response to the 2017 Ministerial Council Decision on enhancing OSCE efforts to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies.

419633 OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan conducted a third in a series of anti-trafficking training courses for investigators and operative agents from Tashkent, Tashkent region and Syrdarya, from 13 to 17 May 2019 in Tashkent.

The course examined new forms and methods of recruitment of potential victims of human trafficking, exploring in detail the criminal methodologies used by traffickers. The training course took an innovative approach by exploring the nexus between human trafficking and terrorism, pull and push factors that make potential victims vulnerable to exploitation, including the displacement from conflict zones as opportunities for traffickers and organized crime.

The unique course, developed by the United Kingdom Specialist Policing Consultancy, compared the elements of human trafficking to the methods of modern terrorist groups. It showed a clear link between the methods some terrorist groups use to recruit, transport, coerce and exploit men, women, boys and girls into committing terrorist acts and those used by human traffickers. In addition, it also explored if investigators could use human trafficking laws to combat or disrupt terrorist activities.

Particular attention was given to gender aspects of human trafficking and terrorism and the importance of women in policing.

In his opening speech, OSCE Senior Project Officer Juergen Becker said: “Since trafficking is a common challenge transcending national boundaries, I hope that this training course will help to promote a gender sensitive and human rights approach to every victim of human trafficking.”  

Bernie Gravett, the UK Specialist Policing Consultancy Director, said: “I cannot stress the importance enough of sharing knowledge and experience between law enforcement officers in the UK and Uzbekistan. During my time as a police officer investigating international organized crime, the biggest challenge was working together across international borders and legal systems. The growth of human trafficking and the challenges faced in combating modern terrorist groups require us to share experience, build partnerships and gain an understanding of individual methods of working with the aim of combating crime and protecting all our citizens.”                                                                                                               

The training course is part of a longstanding commitment of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan to assist the country in combating trafficking in human beings.

Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan OSCE-led Survey on Violence Against Women: North Macedonia - Results Report OSCE-led Survey on Violence Against Women - Main Report

The OSCE Mission to Skopje and the OSCE Gender Section presented on 15 May 2019 in Skopje a survey that shows that violence against women in North Macedonia is often underreported and that some forms of physical and sexual violence are widespread in the country.  The research finds there is a particular need for more support and targeted action to help women from minority groups and from rural areas.

The survey is the first of its kind conducted in South-Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe. It gives a detailed picture of the physical, sexual and psychological violence suffered by women and girls in North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova and Ukraine. The survey also covered Kosovo.

It aims to provide solid evidence for informed decision-making and advocacy at different levels to reduce violence against women, as well as to improve services for women who have experienced violence.

“Gender based violence remains one of the most widespread and persistent human rights violations globally that affects the lives of women and girls across countries and regions. It threatens the security and safety of all. For us at the OSCE, this structural violence is not only a violation of human rights of women and girls but also a security issue,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, Clemens Koja.

Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, who hosted the presentation of the findings, said: “Looking through the OSCE report, one aspect worries me. Only two per cent of the surveyed women who have experienced violence from their current partners reported to the police the most serious incident they have experienced. Violence against women is unacceptable and we need to address this urgently. Our government is committed to the systematic improvement of gender equality and elimination of all forms of violence against women.”

Amarsanaa Darisuren, the OSCE Senior Adviser on Gender Issues, said that no matter the geographic location, level of prosperity or size of the population, violence against women is pervasive in all countries of the world. “There is still a large knowledge gap when it comes to violence against women, and robust and reliable data is needed. This survey provides the information needed to take action. It is now time to take concrete steps to prevent violence against women and girls.” she said.

The Report for North Macedonia can be found online here.

The Main Results Report of the Survey can be found online here. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 11,274 to 10,963 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 1,101 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 18 this week compared to 14 last week: eleven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and seven into Ukraine (89 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when two families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (358 compared to 382 observed during the previous week). There were 181 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 177 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv and Stahanov–Kharkiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 579 trucks (527 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (155 at the Gukovo BCP and 424 at the Donetsk BCP); 320 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 259 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates. In addition, during the reporting week,  trucks with Armenian and Georgian licence plates were also observed.                                            

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 50 (compared to 57 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 137 to 133: of the total number of trucks scanned, 55 trucks (39 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 87 trucks (61 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 113 to 82 vehicles; 53 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 29 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 24 occasions; the OTs assessed that 15 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, cars with licence plates from Armenia, Georgia and Lithuania were also noted.

On 8 May, the OTs at both BCPs observed a helicopter, flying along the border within Russian Federation airspace on three separate occasions.

A helicopter Mi-8 was first noted at 08:42 at the Donetsk BCP, flying from the north in an easterly direction. Later on the same day at 14:38, the OT at the Gukovo BCP observed the same type of aircraft flying from the north, which made a circle above the BCP area and left in a northerly direction. On the same day, at 14:57, a Mi-8 helicopter arrived at the Donetsk BCP from a south-easterly direction, flew over the BCP at a height of approximately 100-150m and continued to fly in a northerly direction.

On all occasions, the helicopters were white with blue and grey stripes painted on the underside and flew only inside the airspace of the Russian Federation.

On 12 May at 20:16, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed two police cars entering the BCP area from the Russian Federation which parked in front of the border checking area. In the meantime, another police car was observed parked outside the BCP area with its flashing lights on.

At 23:17 the same day a group of four cars consisting of three black SUVs and one white SUV with the inscription "militia" (in Russian) arrived from Ukraine. All the vehicles had “Republic of South Ossetia (RSO)” plates and quickly underwent border control procedures. At 23:30 the four vehicles crossed into the Russian Federation escorted by the police cars which had arrived three hours earlier.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 9 April 2019 to 14 May 2019, please see the attachment here. 

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw damage to civilian properties from shelling in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted near non-government-controlled Zaichenko, as well as at a non-government-controlled border crossing point near Izvaryne.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 76 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north-east and east of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk) and in areas south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 300 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and west-north-west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east, south-east and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 12 May, the SMM saw damage from shelling to several civilian properties in the north-eastern part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), most of which was assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.

At 1 Pervomaiska Street, the Mission saw a fresh crater (about 1m in diameter) about 3m west of an inhabited one-storey house. The SMM saw two shattered window panes, one shattered window frame and shrapnel damage to the wall on the house’s west-north-west-facing side and two shattered window panes on its south-facing side. It saw shards of glass scattered on the ground beneath the broken windows. The SMM also observed that a section of a wooden fence about 1m east of the crater had been destroyed and that there were at least 50 holes in the remaining parts of the fence.

At the intersection of Pervomaiska and Poshtova Street, around 30m north of the above-mentioned house, the SMM saw an impact (10cm in diameter) and burned grass 1-3m south of it. About 5m south-east of the crater the Mission saw holes in a gas pipeline, in a concrete pylon of an electrical line and in a tree. It also saw a 10cm hole in the front hood of a civilian car parked around 15m south of the crater. The SMM observed seven workers conducting repair works to the damaged pipeline.

In a yard at 9 Poshtova Street, about 20m south-south-east of an inhabited one-storey house, the SMM saw another fresh crater (about 1m in diameter) and a shattered window on the south-facing wall of a wooden shed standing about 20m north-north-west of the crater, as well as partially ripped off bark on three nearby trees.

At 10 Poshtova Street, around 20m south-south-west of an inhabited one-story house, the SMM saw another fresh crater (about 1m in diameter). The Mission saw a broken south-west-facing window covered with plastic sheeting and at least 40 holes in the south-west-facing wall of the house.

Three people (a man in his thirties, a man in his fifties and a woman in her eighties) who introduced themselves as residents of the above-mentioned properties told the Mission that they had been at home in the evening on 11 May when they had heard sounds of shelling nearby.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 13 May, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire 100-200m north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 100m north-east of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On 11 May, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near residential houses, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 May 2019).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska, one of which probable) in Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a field about 700m from the nearest residential houses in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.

13 May

The SMM saw:

• 19 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk);
• two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) on road T0504 in Irmino (54km west of Luhansk); and
• an MLRS (BM-21) on road T0504 in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

13 May

The SMM saw four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) loaded on rail cars at a train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

13 May

The SMM noted that three MLRS (BM-21) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 May

The SMM saw that the site was abandoned and noted that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

11 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (an MT-LB-M with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted atop and two MT-LB) and three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), and
• 16 IFVs (BMP-1) in Bila Hora (see above).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three ACVs in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).

12 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a probable BMP-2) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk).

13 May

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• nine IFVs (a probable BMP-1 parked in the yard of a residential house and eight BMP-variants) in Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) and
• 12 APCs (11 MT-LB and a BTR variant), four armoured recovery vehicles (two BTS-4A and two VT-55), six IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in compounds in Donetsk city’s Leninskyi district (the UAV also spotted hulls of 24 IFVs/APCs and of 23 tanks).

Mines near Pyshchevyk

On 4 and 9 May, in a field about 1km south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), SMM mini-UAVs spotted for the first time about 3,000 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) placed in four rows running from north to south for about 3.5km. The SMM assessed most of these mines as not recent; however, it also noted that some mines had been placed near mines that had previously detonated. Near the mines, the same UAVs spotted about 40 sticks with pieces of red tape attached to them fixed in the ground, as well as two square signs (all assessed as mine hazard signs).

On 11 May, in a field about 1.5km east-south-east of Pyshchevyk and about 15m north of a road to Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time about 120 anti-tank mines (TM-62M) placed in two rows running for about 300m from north to south as well as six red square signs (assessed as mine hazard signs) about 20m of the above-mentioned mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) as well as to a water pipeline between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, reportedly related to water payments.

Border areas outside government control

At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a car with Russian Federation licence plates and a covered cargo truck with “LPR” plates entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour, the Mission saw five pedestrians entering and five pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors”.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• The SMM was unable to access a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as its gate was locked and no guards were present.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 11 May, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its dual GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over areas near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk).
• On 12 May, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its dual GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region near Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk), Ivanivka (78km south of Donetsk) and Vesele (92km south of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

419540

Innovative approaches, good practices and viable models of engaging diverse actors in the integration of migrants at the local level were the focus of the conference Cities, Migration and Integration: Challenges, Responsibilities and Inspiration co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Consortium of Migrant Assisting Organisations, the Association for Integration and Migration, and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, under the patronage of Prague Mayor Zdeněk Hřib, on 14 May 2019 in Prague.

Experts from the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Poland, Germany joined colleagues from the Czech Republic to discuss the role of local government in the process of migrant integration and participate in the launch of ODIHR’s latest publication, the Local Authorities' Migrant Integration Guide. The guide was developed specifically to assist local authorities. It offers an overview of key aspects of migrant integration relevant to local authorities, with the aim of enhancing knowledge of the issues involved and encouraging the development of more targeted policies.

“The successful integration of migrants is key to maximising the strength, vitality and innovation that migrants bring to local communities, thus benefiting society at large,” said Meaghan Fitzgerald, Deputy Head of ODIHR’s Democratization Department. “As much of the migrant integration process occurs at the local level, ODIHR's aim is to bring local authorities and civil society together to build partnerships.”

Other topics discussed at the conference included the use of participatory approaches to ensure the inclusion of migrants in the development of integration policy, multilevel governance aspects of migrant integration, and fostering co-operation between municipalities and employers for the purpose of labour market integration. Participants explored these issues in a series of panel discussions and thematic workshops.

Jan Braat, Senior Policy Advisor on Migration and Integration for the City of Utrecht said: “The conference was a great opportunity to exchange good practices on the integration of migrants and to understand how other municipalities overcome their challenges in specific areas. I was particularly interested to share our experience and hear how other cities plan and develop the evaluation of their integration measures and how they address the challenges faced.”

Bratislava/Copenhagen/Vienna, 13 May 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák,  OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA)  George Tsereteli  and OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella today strongly condemned the use of violence by this weekend‘s protesters in Albania’s capital Tirana, as well as the threats and attempted intimidation directed at the Head of the OSCE’s Presence in Albania and at the Organization in general. They also called on law enforcement officials to show restraint.

The Chairperson-in-Office, the President of the OSCE PA and the OSCE Secretary General stressed that the right to peacefully assemble and protest is a fundamental prerequisite of a democratic state. But strong domestic institutions - including, crucially, an effective parliament -, are cornerstones of democracy and essential for political stability and rule of law. Violence and the intimidation of international organizations’ officials are unacceptable. 

They thanked the Albanian authorities for swiftly protecting the residence of the OSCE Head of Presence and encouraged all sides to show moderation during today’s protests.  “Riots are not a substitute for democratic political engagement. They cut off any chance of dialogue - and therefore any chance of finding common ground. We call on all political leaders and on the citizens of Albania to show responsibility, demonstrate peacefully, and act with restraint.  The OSCE will continue to support the democratic process in Albania”.

“A protraction of the crisis would inevitably hamper Albania’s domestic and foreign strategic priorities. Time has come to devise a domestic platform for dialogue which includes all relevant stakeholders, including all parties, civil society and academia, to overcome differences and work together in Albania's best interest".

Bratislava/Copenhagen/Vienna, 13 May 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák,  OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA)  George Tsereteli  and OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella today strongly condemned the use of violence by this weekend‘s protesters in Albania’s capital Tirana, as well as the threats and attempted intimidation directed at the Head of the OSCE’s Presence in Albania and at the Organization in general. They also called on law enforcement officials to show restraint.

The Chairperson-in-Office, the President of the OSCE PA and the OSCE Secretary General stressed that the right to peacefully assemble and protest is a fundamental prerequisite of a democratic state. But strong domestic institutions - including, crucially, an effective parliament -, are cornerstones of democracy and essential for political stability and rule of law. Violence and the intimidation of international organizations’ officials are unacceptable. 

They thanked the Albanian authorities for swiftly protecting the residence of the OSCE Head of Presence and encouraged all sides to show moderation during today’s protests.  “Riots are not a substitute for democratic political engagement. They cut off any chance of dialogue - and therefore any chance of finding common ground. We call on all political leaders and on the citizens of Albania to show responsibility, demonstrate peacefully, and act with restraint.  The OSCE will continue to support the democratic process in Albania”.

“A protraction of the crisis would inevitably hamper Albania’s domestic and foreign strategic priorities. Time has come to devise a domestic platform for dialogue which includes all relevant stakeholders, including all parties, civil society and academia, to overcome differences and work together in Albania's best interest".

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 10 and 11 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 11 and 12 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and damage to houses caused by gunfire in residential areas of Dokuchaievsk, Pikuzy and Kalynove.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities and repairs to critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas near Oleksandrivske, Zaichenko and Novoazovsk, as well as near Voznesenivka, at a border crossing point close to the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Kyiv and Kharkiv, the SMM monitored gatherings of mothers of deceased and missing soldiers.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 200), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-west, west and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 11 and 12 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 190), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east, south and south-south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), and in areas south and south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), including about 140 explosions assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 2-4km south of the DFS.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 725 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 11 and 12 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), including over 260 explosions of artillery rounds, and in areas north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters and damage to houses caused by gunfire in residential areas of Dokuchaievsk, Pikuzy and Kalynove

On 11 May, in the western outskirts of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) at 7 Telmana Street, the SMM saw a hole in the west-facing side of the roof of a one-storey house and, beneath the roof, another corresponding hole in the west-facing outer wall of the same house. The SMM assessed the impacts as fresh and caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a north-westerly direction. A resident (a man, aged 40-50) of the house told the SMM that he had been inside the house when shelling had occurred in the area at around 18:15 on 9 May.

On 11 May, at 43 Akhmatovoi Street, on the north-eastern edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to the west-facing outer wall, consisting of innumerable holes, and to a west-facing metal door of a one-storey house, as well as a shattered west-facing window. It also saw that the edge of the west-facing side of the roof of the same house had been destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by the explosion of rounds of a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fired from a westerly direction. A resident of the house (a woman, aged 70-80) told the SMM that she had been inside the house with her sister when she had heard explosions in the area at around 17:00 on 7 May.

On 11 May, in the eastern outskirts of Kalynove, the SMM saw four fresh craters along a 50m-long section of a road running parallel to the north-north-eastern edge of a cemetery. The SMM saw an additional fresh crater about 50m south-west, inside the grounds of the cemetery, and saw that two gravestones next to the crater had sustained shrapnel damage. The SMM assessed all the aforementioned damage as fresh and caused by rounds of weapons with a calibre of at least 120mm (it could not assess the direction of fire).

About 100m east of the cemetery, the SMM saw that the panes of two west-facing windows of a barn located 25m from a one-storey house at 3 Klubna Street were missing and covered with plastic sheets, and that glass shards were scattered on the ground beneath them. A resident of the house (a woman aged 50-60) told the SMM that she had been inside her apartment when shelling had occurred in the area on the morning of 10 May.

At 4 Klubna Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-facing metal fence 1m north of a one-storey house. At 5 Klubna Street, it saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-facing slate fence about 1m north of a one-storey house, as well as four shattered panes in two windows (two north-facing panes and two west-facing panes). At 6 Klubna Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a south-facing metal gate about 3m south of a one-storey house.

About 100m north-north-east of the latter house, the SMM saw a fresh crater on the side of a road and, about 20m south-east, another fresh crater in a field, as well as shrapnel damage to trees near it. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by rounds of weapons with a calibre of at least 120mm (it could not assess the direction of fire). About 90m east of the craters, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a west-facing metal fence about 1m west of a one-storey house at 2 Kuibysheva Street. At 8 Kuibysheva Street, the SMM saw the shattered pane of a south-facing window and glass shards scattered on the ground beneath it.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 11 May, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 40 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west; it could not assess if they were inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). During the evening of 11 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight and a muzzle flash at an assessed range of 2-5km east-south-east and south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). The same camera also recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery).

During the day on 12 May, positioned on the southern edge of Zolote, the SMM recorded ten undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). The same day, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and 12 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-4km north, north-north-east and north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery).

On 11 and 12 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 May

The SMM saw:

• a stationary surface-to-air missile system (9K33, Osa) in Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk) and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) heading south-west on road M03, about 5km east of Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

12 May

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) about 3km south-south-east of Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) about 1km south-west of Vedenske (90km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and that 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM-mini UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) within a residential area of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

10, 11 and 12 May

The SMM saw an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and five IFVs (two BMP-1 and three BMP variants) in a compound on the eastern outskirts of Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a 50m-long trench network system in a field about 3km north-north-west of Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 5 April 2018).

11 May

The SMM saw:

• a military-type truck (Ural) with a mast-mounted cellular phone jamming system atop on the south-western outskirts of Horlivka (simultaneously, the SMM lost its connection to the Vodafone telecommunication network for about two hours, until it reached a different location about 2km east) and
• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Presence of unexploded ordnance

On 12 May, accompanied by an armed member of the armed formations, the SMM saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a 120mm mortar round, embedded in the asphalt in the middle of the carriageway of road T0519 close to Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), about 200m north of the nearest houses.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, as well as to enable demining activities by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in fields near Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 11 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour and 20 minutes, the SMM saw 59 cars (six with Ukrainian and 35 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 18 with “DPR” plates), 27 covered cargo trucks (23 with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and 11 pedestrians (mixed ages and gender) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw 16 cars (eight with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates and about 50 passengers on board entering Ukraine.

On 12 May, while at the same border crossing point for about one hour and ten minutes, the SMM saw 78 cars (14 with Ukrainian and 39 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 25 with “DPR” plates) and 30 covered cargo trucks (21 with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as eight with “DPR” plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw eight cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), a bus with “DPR” plates and about 50 passengers on board and seven pedestrians (mixed age and gender) entering Ukraine.

On 11 May, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw three pedestrians (a man and a woman aged 20-30 with a child) entering Ukraine and one pedestrian (a woman aged 50-60) exiting Ukraine. On 12 May, while at the same border crossing point for about 40 minutes, the SMM did not observe any cross-border traffic.

On 12 May, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven cars (four with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates and two additional cars whose licence plates were not visible) and four pedestrians (a woman aged 30-40 and three men aged 16-20) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (four with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Polish licence plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates, and 57 pedestrians (mixed age and gender) exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

SMM monitored gatherings of mothers of deceased and missing soldiers

On the occasion of annual commemorative events organized by the mothers of deceased and missing Ukrainian soldiers, coinciding with International Mother’s Day, the SMM monitored gatherings of about 250 people (mostly women aged 50-70) in Kharkiv on 11 May and about 300 people (mostly women aged 50-80) in Kyiv on 12 May.   

Resumption of long-range UAV flights

On 11 May, the SMM resumed its long-range UAV flights, which had not been conducted since 19 April, after an SMM long-range UAV crashed in an area near the contact line in Donetsk region (see SMM Spot Report of 19 April 2019).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 12 May, at a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors”.
• On 12 May, on two occasions at a checkpoint on road E58 in the northern outskirts of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol) and southward to Novoazovsk, citing “orders from their superiors”.  
• On 12 May, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint near Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), citing “orders from superiors”.
• On 12 May, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that “it had seen enough” and asked it to leave the area immediately.
• On 12 May, a member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka (see above).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delayed:

• On 12 May at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 18 minutes of waiting.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

CHISINAU, 13 May 2019 – The Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, today welcomed the decision of the Transdniestrian leadership to retract decree No.18 related to the village of Varnita.

“I welcome this decision, which will allow the Sides to maintain the trust and confidence built over the past years in the settlement process. The Varnita case should be made an example of good co-operation and freedom of movement for the benefit of the population,” Neukirch said. “A constructive discussion on various issues related to the treatment of inhabitants in this Chisinau-controlled village who have strong links to Transdniestria would be highly beneficial for the advancement of the settlement process.”

He underlined that the OSCE’s 57 participating States, at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Milan last December, had once again confirmed their commitment to a comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders with a special status for Transdniestria that fully guarantees the human, political, economic and social rights of its population.

“It is of paramount importance for the Sides to stay on the course of pragmatic solutions and constructive interaction as has been recently demonstrated also by the Moldovan Side in the case of Moldova Steel Works in Transdniestria (MMZ),” Neukirch added.

419399 Communication and Media Relations Section

The Netherlands chaired its first meeting of the OSCE Structured Dialogue with representatives of capitals on 6 and 7 May 2019, bringing together political and military representatives from across the OSCE region to Vienna for a combined session of the Informal Working Group (IWG) of the Structured Dialogue in Capital Format and an Expert-Level Workshop. The discussions were chaired by Ambassador Jeroen Boender, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the OSCE.

In his opening statement, Boender underlined the importance of the Structured Dialogue in the current security situation. “The Structured Dialogue is what we, as participating States, put into the process collectively,” he emphasized, adding he hoped that OSCE participating States would genuinely listen to each other’s perceptions, to hear what the other sides are saying and clearly articulate their own views.

Ambassador Radomir Boháč, the Chairperson of the Permanent Council under Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, said that the Structured Dialogue is a “long-term endeavour without predetermined outcomes.”

On the first day, keynote speakers Tom Middendorp, former Chief of Defence from the Netherlands, Mikaël Griffon, Head of Department for Arms Control and OSCE in the French Foreign Ministry, and Zohir Saidzoda, Deputy Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, focused on transparency, risk reduction and incident prevention, as well as on countering terrorism.

The second day of the meeting took place in the format of the Fourth Expert-Level Workshop. Keynote speakers Anna Tyszkiewicz, Deputy Director of the Department of Security Policy in the Polish Foreign Ministry, Colonel Bryan Haderlie from the United States of America, Vice-Admiral (ret.) Alexey Mezenin from Russia, and General Peter Braunstein from Germany kicked off discussions on the topics: Addressing implementation, or how to make best use of existing instruments; Enhancing predictability and confidence for certain military activities; Preventing and managing incidents; and, finally, Early warning and creating a less risk-prone environment: managing military activities that could cause incidents – “best practices”.

Following the meetings, Boender concluded that although there are divergent narratives, there are also possibilities for practical small steps to enhance confidence and trust. “Many felt that voluntary measures provide a strong utility for transparency, although they cannot replace mandatory measures and full implementation of the existing framework,” he said.

The OSCE Structured Dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security was initiated by OSCE foreign ministers in their Declaration on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the OSCE Arms Control Framework at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Hamburg in December 2016. Addressing these challenges, the participating States aim to strengthen dialogue on how to overcome existing divergences, find common ground and reverse the negative trends in the European security architecture. The OSCE Structured Dialogue complements the ongoing work of the OSCE on wider issues of co-operation in the politico-military field. 

The next combined session of the IWG is to be held in September and will build upon the outcomes of these discussions. The Netherlands has been appointed IWG chair by the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship. Previous IWG chairmanships were held by Germany (2017) and Belgium (2018).

DUSHANBE, 13 May 2019 – Ambassador Valeriu Chiveri of the Republic of Moldova assumed his duties today as the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

“I will invest all my efforts into ensuring that the Office’s work can positively contribute to the lives of Tajik citizens throughout the country,” said Chiveri. “The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe is one of the Organization’s largest field operations. It supports Tajikistan in improving border security, eradicating the threat from landmines and explosive hazards, raising economic prosperity and promoting respect for human rights. There is a lot the OSCE can offer to the country, and I look forward to working with the government and civil society representatives to maximise the impact of our assistance.”

Ambassador Chiveri has over 24 years of diplomatic experience. Previously he served as Moldova’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration as well as Ambassador to Austria. He also has a long association with the OSCE, having served as his country’s Permanent Representative to the Organization, as well as in field postings to Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Ambassador Chiveri holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the National School of Political and Administrative Studies in Romania. He is fluent in Romanian, English and Russian. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

• The Mission saw fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw the body of a deceased man at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure as well as to enable demining in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed events commemorating Victory Day in Odessa, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Uzhhorod.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Shevchenko, as well as at a checkpoint near Siedove, close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 450 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 725 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). About 90 per cent of them, including about 630 explosions of outgoing artillery and mortar rounds as well as impacts of artillery rounds, were recorded in areas east, south and south-west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and areas west and west-south-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

 

Fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 8 May, at 4 Myru Street, on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed damage to a functioning school building. It saw two partially shattered first-floor windows in two of the building’s north-north-east-facing walls, one of which also had a hole in the remaining glass; one first-floor north-north-east-facing window with a hole in the glass; two first-floor west-north-west-facing windows with holes in the glass; and a second-floor west-north-west-facing window with a hole in the glass as well as a hole in the wall plaster inside of the window pane. All of the damage was assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel or small-arms fire. A school representative (woman in her forties) told the Mission that the damage had been discovered on the morning of 8 May and that no one had been present at the school at the time. The same school has sustained damage nine times since December 2018 (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 17 April 2019).

Fresh crater in Troitske

On 9 May, the SMM saw a crater on the south-eastern side of Lermontova Street in Troitske, about 160m south-east of a recently damaged school building on Kvitkova Street (see SMM Daily Report 10 May 2019). The Mission assessed the crater as recent and probably caused by an 82mm round fired from a south-easterly direction. The director of the school and a resident of Troitske (a woman in her fifties) separately told the SMM that there had been shelling in the area on the morning of 6 May. The director added that there had been classes at the school at the time when shelling had occurred.

Man died at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka

On 10 May at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw the body of a deceased man covered with a blanket. Earlier that day, at the same place the Mission had seen paramedics attending to a man (in his sixties) lying on the ground. An officer of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service told the SMM that the man had fallen unconscious soon after he had stepped of out the car in which he and his wife had been travelling to non-government-controlled areas.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 9 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km south, two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east, an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km east and two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3] 

 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted eight multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Nykanorivka (86km north of Donetsk).  

10 May

The SMM saw four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152 mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

The SMM saw:

• four tanks (T-72) on flatbed trailers heading west in Luhansk city and
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

The SMM saw four tanks (T-72) south of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that:

• eight towed howitzers (2A65, Msta-B, 152 mm) and 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and
• 69 towed howitzers (2A65) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that 24 tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) remained missing.

At a permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that eight tanks (T-72), four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) remained missing.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

On 10 May, the SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

9 May

The SMM saw:

• five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and two BMP variants), an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB S) in Popasna;
• an IFV (BMP variant) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP variant) in Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

10 May

The SMM saw four trucks assessed as electronic warfare systems (R-330U or R-330T) south-west of Pyshchevyk.

Non-government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (probable BMP) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time three trenches, each 3m long, (not seen in imagery from 5 March 2019) west of road M03 about 4km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

9 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a concrete bunker under construction in a field about 4.5km south of Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) and a recently improved trench system (about 100m long) about 1km east of the bunker. The UAV also spotted five recently dug 5m-long trenches in a field about 1.5km north-east of Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

10 May

The SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) in Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk).

UAV seen flying in the security zone

The SMM saw an unidentified UAV (assessed as a fixed-wing type) flying in a north-westerly direction at an altitude of about 200-300m about 2km south of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol). 

Mine hazard signs

The Mission saw for the first time two mine hazard signs (red squares with “ Stop Mines” written in Russian) about 500m west-north-west of the intersection of roads T1315 and T1303, about 3km north of Stepove (non-government-controlled, 27km west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to facilitate demining activities by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in fields near Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

Celebrations marking Victory Day

On 9 May, the SMM monitored two gatherings commemorating Victory Day at the Alley of Glory and at the Unknown Sailor Monument in Odessa. The Mission saw several hundred people (mixed genders and ages), among them about 25 people displaying the insignia of the Right Sector and Street Front, and about 40 law enforcement officers. It observed some verbal exchanges between the participants and minor scuffles between a few participants and police officers. The SMM also monitored peaceful gatherings commemorating Victory Day in Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Uzhhorod which were attended by 200-1,000 people (mixed genders and ages) (for observations from other cities, see SMM Daily Report 10 May 2019).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 10 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage after it refused to show its patrol plan.
• At a checkpoint in Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint near Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, six armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing exercises in the area.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the JCCC told the SMM by phone that there was no information on demining activities in the area. The SMM did not consider safe to proceed.

Delayed:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, about an hour after the SMM was denied passage (see above), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 30 minutes of waiting.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

CHISINAU, 11 May 2019 – Concluding his meetings today, the OSCE Special Representative for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, Franco Frattini, urged the Sides to step up efforts to maintain the positive dynamic in the settlement process for the benefit of people on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River.

“Chisinau and Tiraspol were very successful in their step-by-step approach over the past two years. Today I have encouraged both Sides to continue this path in the spirit of dialogue and mutual co-operation regardless of internal political processes. The settlement process is an expectation of people on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River and deserves all the resources to keep it on track at all levels,” said Frattini.

During the first trip to the Republic of Moldova in 2019 as the Special Representative of the Slovak Chairmanship, Frattini met with the Co-ordinator of the Moldovan Governing Coalition Vlad Plahotniuc and chief negotiator Cristina Lesnic; the Transdniestrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky and chief negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev.

In his discussions, Frattini hailed the Sides for their leadership and dedication to achieving a significant breakthrough in the settlement process over the past years. In 2017 and 2018, the two Sides conducted over 100 expert working group meetings, where they found practical solutions for issues that had not been addressed in decades. These solutions have improved the day-to-day life of students, teachers, farmers and entrepreneurs on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River, he said.

“I have been reassured by the Sides that they will  maintain the rigorous pace of negotiations and intensify their efforts at the level of expert working groups and chief negotiators to close the outstanding priorities from the ‘Berlin-plus package’ and beyond. It is important not to lose the momentum”, Frattini noted.

“The settlement process is high on the agenda of the OSCE Slovak Chairmanship, which in co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Moldova will continue supporting the Sides in achieving a sustainable and peaceful settlement based on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova with a special status for Transdniestria,” he added.  

Since 2016, Chisinau and Tiraspol have signed agreements on six out of the eight priority issues included in the so-called “Berlin-plus package”. To date, the two Sides have reached major achievements on five of the signed agreements, including on apostilization of educational documents issued in Transdniestria, the functioning of the Latin-script schools, the use of farmlands in Dubasari district, the opening of the Gura Bicului – Bychok bridge and on the mechanism for the participation of vehicles from Transdniestria in international road traffic.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• It recorded ceasefire violations and military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including some used as part of military-style parades in Donetsk and Luhansk cities.  
• It observed fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Troitske and residential property in Zolote-4/Rodina.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka, in the area of which it recorded about 125 explosions.
• The Mission observed events in several regions of Ukraine commemorating Victory Day and Remembrance and Reconciliation Day.
• It observed military-style parades in non-government-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk cities.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske and a border crossing point near Dovzhanske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 450 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 115 explosions). More than three fifths of ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including about 125 explosions near the Pumping Station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period  (about 135 explosions). Over four fifths of ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Troitske and to residential property in Zolote-4/Rodina

On 8 May, on the northern edge of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) at a functioning school on Kvitkova Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in a second-floor south-facing window of a school building, assessed as caused by small-arms fire. The SMM also saw a fresh crater in a field, approximately 120m south-east of the school, along with nearby footprints and signs of digging, but was unable to assess the type of weapon or direction of fire. A local resident (male, 30 years old) told the SMM that he had been present in the area when he had heard shelling on the morning of 6 May.

On the same day, at 52 1-a Vilna Street on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a crater assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round (unable to determine the direction of fire) on the side of a road about 5-7m west of the front gate of an uninhabited house. The SMM also saw the tailfin of an 82mm mortar round embedded in the ground about 4-6m east of the crater. About 5m west of the previously mentioned house, at 53 1-a Vilna Street, the SMM saw fresh holes in and scratches on the roof of a one-storey summer kitchen located 1m east of the main house. The SMM also saw over 50 holes in the east-facing gate of the house, in two north-facing doors and in two north-facing window frames, all assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel. A resident (male, 40 years old) told the SMM that he had been at home when he had heard an explosion in the yard on the evening of 7 May.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) on 9 May, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 800m-1km north-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On 8 May, inside the Zolote disengagement area near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) as well as a person assessed as a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier.

While in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on the evening of 8 May, the SMM heard six shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area and within 5km of its periphery).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) during the day, the SMM heard nine shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 1-3km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area and within 5km of its periphery).[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas  

9 May

The SMM saw:

• nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk) and
• four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) near Butkivka (95km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 May

The SMM saw:

• seven tanks (one T-34, three T-64 and three T-72), three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1), three MLRS (BM-21), three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six towed howitzers (three D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and three 2A65 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Donetsk city (see below);
• six tanks (one T-34 and five T-72), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), five MLRS (BM-21), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and ten towed howitzers (five D-30 and five 2A65) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Luhansk city (see below);
• a tank (T-64), as part of an event commemorating Victory Day, about 80m from the SMM forward patrol base in Horlivka; and
• a tank (T-64) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 May

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 29 tanks (type undetermined) (as well as 11 impacts of undetermined weapons assessed as the result of recent training activities) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 25 April 2019) and
• 22 tanks (type undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers or mortars (type undetermined) and 12 towed howitzers or mortars (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

9 May

The SMM noted that:

• three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were present, and
• two self-propelled mortars (2S9), 31 self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and 28 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 22 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and 33 MLRS (BM-27) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

9 May

The SMM noted that this site was abandoned and that 15 mortars (11 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and four BM-37, 82mm) and 30 tanks (T-64) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

9 May

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 May

The SMM saw:

• three APCs (BTR-80), six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP-2) and two anti-aircraft guns  (ZU-23, 23mm) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Donetsk city;
• five APCs (BTR-80) and two IFVs (BMP-2) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Luhansk city; and
• an APC (BTR-80), an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), as part of an event commemorating Victory Day, about 80m from the SMM forward patrol base in Horlivka.

UAV seen flying in the security zone

On 8 May, about 2km north-west of Troitske, the SMM saw a grey fixed-wing unidentified mini-UAV flying about 400m north of the patrol’s position at an altitude of 200-300m for about 20 minutes.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka on 8 May and an assessment of the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) on 9 May. The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka.

The SMM observed celebrations marking Victory Day and Remembrance and Reconciliation Day

On 9 May, the SMM observed events in several regions of Ukraine commemorating Victory Day and Remembrance and Reconciliation Day. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a religious ceremony organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church at the Monument to the Unknown Soldier in the Park of Eternal Glory, which was attended by about 300 people (mixed genders, ages 40-70). It also saw about 3,000 people (mixed genders and ages) singing traditional songs commemorating the end of the war and marching to the aforementioned monument to lay flowers. The SMM also observed the presence of about 200 people (mixed genders and ages), some wearing the insignia of C14 (‘Sich’), along the route of the marching event, as well as at the abovementioned Monument to the Unknown Solider, where about 40 people sang patriotic songs and displayed banners with photos of various Ukrainian leaders, Ukrainian flags and flags of various political parties. At the aforementioned monument, the SMM also observed that more than 1,000 law enforcement officers were keeping the two groups separated as some people from both groups engaged in verbal altercations.

In Kherson, the SMM monitored a commemoration event with at least 5,000 people (mixed genders and ages) marching through the city centre from Heroes Square to the Park of Glory. The SMM saw that some of the marchers were holding photos of those who had served in World War II and banners of a political party.

On 8 May, the SMM monitored events marking Remembrance and Reconciliation Day in Kherson, Lviv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv, and saw local and regional elected officials and groups of local residents laying flowers at various monuments and cemeteries in remembrance of World War II victims. The SMM observed calm situations at all the events.

Military-style parades in Donetsk and Luhansk cities

The SMM observed military-style parades in non-government controlled Donetsk city and Luhansk city. In Luhansk city, the SMM observed a parade of about 1,500 members of the armed formations in ten formations, most of them armed, as well as weapons and military vehicles (see weapons in violation above), being watched by about 7,000 onlookers. Senior members of the armed formations gave speeches, and many people were seen carrying photos of World War II participants.

In Donetsk city, the SMM observed a parade of at least 300 members of the armed formations, most of them armed, as well as weapons and military vehicles (see weapons in violation above), being watched by about 5,000-6,000 onlookers (mixed genders and ages). Following the parade, the SMM saw more than 5,000 people marching on Artema Street and holding pictures of World War II participants as well as deceased members of the armed formations.

Border area outside government control

On 9 May, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 14 cars (one with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four with “LPR” plates and two with plates not visible) entering Ukraine, as well as three cars (one with “LPR” plates and two with plates not visible) and two pedestrians (male and female, 65 years old) exiting Ukraine. After about 15 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “security concerns for the SMM.”
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that the SMM did not have the necessary approvals from those in control.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

419243 Communication and Media Relations Section

A four-day specialized training course on appropriate and effective responses to gender-based violence for criminal justice practitioners from Hungary was held from 6 to 10 May 2019, at the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) headquarters in Budapest, Hungary.

The course for police and prosecutors was organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department and is the first of a series of three national specialized training courses held as part of the regional project Effective Criminal Justice Strategies and Practices to Combat Gender-based Violence in Eastern Europe. The project is currently being implemented in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and is financially supported by the European Commission and the government of Austria.

Delivered by trainers who have previously participated in a regional training-of-trainers programme, this course aimed at consolidating the skills and knowledge of first responder police officers and prosecutors to better meet the needs of victims of gender-based violence, including noticing the signs and signals of violence and referring them to specialized support services.

The course also explored how to improve the attitude and behaviour of criminal justice practitioners towards victims and perpetrators of gender-based violence, to avoid secondary victimization.

Built on a victim- and rights-centred approach, the course promoted the EU legislation on the wide protection of victims of violence, and focused on localized scenarios based on real-life cases.

Following the course was a one-day workshop where judges and social workers joined the police officers and prosecutors. The workshop highlighted the importance of a co-ordinated and integrated approach when fighting gender-based violence cases. Participants strengthened their understanding of how improving multi-disciplinary co-operation and interaction on gender-based violence cases can contribute to better meeting the needs of victims. They also discussed best practices that could significantly improve efforts to counter gender-based violence crimes.

419249 Communication and Media Relations Section

A training course jointly organized by the OSCE and UNODA on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation was held for 50 young female professionals from the OSCE’s participating States and Partners for Co-operation from 6 to 10 May 2019 in Vienna. The course was held as part of the OSCE Scholarship for Peace and Security.

The training course aimed to contribute to a deeper understanding among the participants of the key conceptual and analytical issues in conflict prevention and confidence- and security-building with a specific focus on the OSCE. The course also aimed at improving the knowledge of and increasing women’s participation in policy-making, planning and implementation processes in the areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Importantly, the course is designed to build up a network of young professionals and bridge the gap between education, training and career opportunities.

“I was highly motivated to apply my expertise, experience as well as education and insights from the discussions among the participants of this course,” said course participant Lena Strauss from Germany.

Throughout the week, participants learned about the different institutions active in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

They also learnt about emerging technologies, gender perspectives and the relationship between disarmament and development. Issues such as the concept of co-operative and indivisible security, political versus legal commitments, the importance of political will, and the illicit trafficking of weapons, were also discussed. The participants also engaged in debates on gender equality and explored the different impact disarmament and non-proliferation activities have on women and men, as well as the role women play in the field.

Thuy Nguyen, a course participant from Australia, stated: “Looking at the nexus between emerging technologies and international security excites me - we do need women in critical positions, participating in decision-making processes, able to make a big difference in contributing to peace and security.”

The training in Vienna will be followed by an additional five-week online training course, offering further insight into the inter-related areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. This part of the course will continue to take into account a gender perspective in order to deepen the participants’ understanding of practices in international security issues and enable them to spread this understanding among their peers.

The training course in Vienna was supported with financial contributions from the governments of Andorra, Germany and Switzerland.

SARAJEVO, 10 May 2019 - Women’s participation and leadership is not just good for women; it can benefit whole societies. This was the message delivered by Ambassador Melanne Verveer, the Special Representative of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship on Gender, during a three-day visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

At a meeting with staff of the OSCE Mission to BiH in Sarajevo, Verveer praised efforts to mainstream gender across all dimensions of the Mission’s work - from its engagement with security actors and work aimed at preventing violent extremism, to efforts to promote and protect fundamental freedoms and stamp out corruption. “Women must be given the space to contribute what they see, think and hear to decision-making processes. Otherwise, societies cannot get ahead,” she said. “The Mission’s work is, gradually, helping to make this is a reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

Head of the OSCE Mission Bruce G. Berton elaborated on the country’s progress since Verveer’s last visit in 2016. “There have been some bright spots on the horizon, for example the adoption of new laws at the state and entity levels, dealing with issues such as discrimination and domestic violence,” said Berton. “However, these laws have not always been followed up by implementation, with the current political impasse significantly hampering progress,” he added.

During her visit to Sarajevo and Banja Luka, Verveer met with the Minister of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Marina Pendeš, as well as officials of Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska.

Other meetings on her agenda included interactive discussions with civil society representatives from across the country - many of whom focus on reconciliation and peacebuilding, as well as domestic violence - , working lunches with businesswomen and women mayors, meetings with the BiH Gender Agency and gender centres from the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska . She also attended a brainstorming session with multilateral partners operating in BiH, as well as meetings with other ministries and officials at the state and entity level.

Speaking at a public event in Sarajevo, Verveer reflected on her first trip to BiH as a White House official during the conflict. Since then, she noted, the women of BiH have continued to demonstrate their resilience, determination and strength, including through their ability to “cross the lines” and promote reconciliation.

Verveer concluded with a message of unity: “When we start crossing our divides - our ethnic divides, our religious divides, and our divides between men and women - only then can we really move forward.”