OSCE

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

VIENNA, 4 July 2019 – The disengagement of forces and hardware near Stanytsia Luhanska, recently facilitated and monitored by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine is a commendable step towards wider disengagement along the contact line, the SMM’s Chief Monitor Ambassador Yaşar Halit Çevik said in his first address to the OSCE Permanent Council today in Vienna.

Describing recent events in the disengagement area as “a very important development,” the Chief Monitor said it “is now important to consolidate what has been achieved and maintain momentum.”

“Along the contact line the situation remains tense and volatile. To stabilize the security situation and ensure the protection of civilians, the full withdrawal of heavy weapons, and mine action are essential,” he said. “In the absence of such steps civilians will continue to be killed and injured.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• A man was killed by an explosive device in Horlivka.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and damage due to shelling to buildings in Khreshchatytske and Pikuzy and a fresh crater in Maiorove.
• Small-arms fire as assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Debaltseve.
• The SMM saw deminers and the dismantling of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission recorded projectiles in flight inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in the disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its freedom of movement was also denied in non-government-controlled Maiorove.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 384), compared with the previous reporting period (about 125 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at: southerly directions and north-westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), including 71 explosions assessed as impacts of automated grenade launcher rounds; westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), including 169 undetermined explosions; and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol). Positioned in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw an explosion, assessed as an impact at a distance of 650m west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (eight), compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Man killed by an explosive device in Horlivka

On 19 June, senior staff at a morgue in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that the morgue had received the body of a man (in his thirties) with his right hand traumatically amputated and severe injuries to his head, all as a result of the explosion of an unknown explosive device. On the same day, the SMM separately spoke to six residents of Horlivka (three men and three women, mixed ages) who told the SMM that they had heard that the man had been near a pond in the northern part of Horlivka on 15 June when an unknown explosive device had detonated and that they had witnessed the funeral procession and ceremony.

Fresh damage to buildings in Khreshchatytske and Pikuzy due to shelling and impacts in Maiorove

At a power station on Oktiabrska Street in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 86km south of Donetsk), about 8m south of the south-facing fence, the SMM saw a fresh crater assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction. The SMM also saw marks and scratches to the above-mentioned fence and to a transformer box inside of the station, along with more than ten severed power lines. At three residential houses on Oktiabrska Street about 60m south and south-west of the crater, the SMM saw marks and scratches from shrapnel on outer walls. Two workers at the power station (men in their forties) told the SMM that they had been at the station on 1 July when they heard and saw an explosion. They added that power lines had been severed in the explosion and that they had already begun repairs.

At an inhabited house at 18 Cherniakhova Street in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a hole on the north-north-east facing part of the roof, that the surrounding roof was blown off and the wooden beams and ceiling below were broken, assessed as caused by the impact of a 120mm mortar round. About 18m east of the house, the SMM saw that the roof of a wooden shed had been destroyed, assessed as caused by the impact of a 120mm mortar round. The SMM saw five additional craters in the yard of the house – two about 50m north-north-east of the house, one about 15m north-east, one about 25m east, and one about 20m east-south-east – assessed as caused by the impact of 120mm mortar rounds, as well as broken branches on surrounding bushes and trees in easterly directions of the house and marks and scratches on a fence about 25m east of the house, all assessed as shrapnel damage. The SMM assessed that all of the above damage was fresh and that the mortar rounds had been fired from westerly directions.

About 250m west of the above-mentioned house, at the former village administration building at 27/2 Akhmatovoi Street in the south-western part of Pikuzy, the SMM saw a hole in a west-south-west facing wall, assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a west-south-westerly direction. On the same wall, the SMM saw a shattered window and shrapnel marks and scratches and that a metal grate that had previously covered the window was damaged and lying on the ground. It assessed the damage as caused by the impact of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fired from a westerly direction. The SMM also saw a hole in the wall and scorch marks about 4m above the ground on the building’s north-north-west facing wall, assessed as caused by an RPG fired from the west. The SMM assessed that all of the above damage was fresh.

While following up on reports of shelling in Maiorove (formerly Krasnyi Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 57km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a freshly burnt military-type truck in the central part of the village. It assessed that the truck had been struck by a round of an undetermined weapon. About 10m north of the truck, in an asphalt road the SMM saw a fresh crater, guarded by three armed members of the armed formations who did not allow the SMM to approach it. Two others told the SMM to leave the area.* A man in his sixties, who introduced himself as a resident of Maiorove, told the SMM that he had heard shelling in the area in the early morning of 30 June.

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Debaltseve

While conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of about 850m north-north-east of the patrol, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which was also flying about 850m north-north-east. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 2 July, inside the disengagement area and north of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw eight members of the State Emergency Services (SES) demining team near a shelter of a humanitarian organization along with two vehicles belonging to the SES. The Mission also saw a crane and a truck enter the disengagement area and subsequently begin dismantling the concrete blocks of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On one occasion in the morning, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge, the SMM saw around 1000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas through eight processing booths and around 200 people queuing to exit through 12 processing booths.

On the same day, inside the disengagement area at a checkpoint of the armed formations just south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations and, at the former forward position of the armed formations, at least seven members of the armed formations, all wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them.

On 3 July, inside the disengagement area and north of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw four Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) [2] near the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In the morning, at a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw six members of the armed formations wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them. At the same location, in the afternoon, the SMM saw six members of the armed formations in civilian clothing checking civilians’ documents, and also saw six members of the armed formations in military-style clothing wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them. In the evening, the SMM saw two white non-SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) flying above the disengagement area.

On the same day, about 1km south-south-east of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area, the SMM saw six previously observed processing booths and a metal container about 50m south of the Prince Ihor Monument. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that the facilities would be part of a new checkpoint. On 2 July, seven people (five women, two men, mixed ages) separately told the Mission that they were concerned that, without transportation from the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge to the Prince Ihor Monument, people would have to walk longer and uphill to reach the new checkpoint of the armed formations.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening of 2 July, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 3 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

3 July

The SMM saw eight tanks (T-64) near Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

2 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• a new position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not seen in imagery from 1 April 2019) near Novotoshkivske; and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) about 50m north of the northern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.

3 July

The SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

02 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• new trenches (totalling 30m in length) about 1km north-north-west of Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk), (not seen in imagery from 1 April 2019);
• an APC (MT-LB) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk); and
• a member of the armed formations firing a rifle at an SMM mini-UAV flying in Zernove (70km south of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 3 July 2019).

On 3 July, the Mission saw fortification works at the existing positions of the armed formations north of road T-1303, about 5km south-south-west of Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk).

Unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne

On road T-0504 about 2km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and about 100m west-north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations, while accompanied by a member of the armed formations, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as an RPG round.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and to a water intake near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Positioned near the DFS and about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south-west shortly after a bus of workers departed the DFS, assessed as near the bus.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 30 cars (three with Ukrainian, 13 with Russian Federation, one with Belarusian, and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as 11 with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates), 81 covered cargo trucks (32 with Ukrainian, four with Russian Federation, and 22 with Belarusian licence plates, as well as 20 with “DPR” and three with “LPR” plates), four fuel trucks with Russian Federation licence plates, one bus with “DPR” plates, and 15 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 58 cars (six with Ukrainian, 27 with Russian Federation, and one with German licence plates, as well as 24 with “DPR” plates), seven covered cargo trucks (two with “DPR” plates and five with plates not visible), a bus with “DPR” plates and three pedestrians (two women in their 40’s and a child) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw one pedestrian (a man in his forties) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• While following up on reports of shelling in Maiorove (formerly Krasnyi Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 57km south-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from approaching a crater, citing orders from their superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, an armed member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after 30 minutes of waiting on the first occasion and about 40 minutes of waiting on the second occasion.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four bursts of small-arms fire about 850m north-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
• Two SMM UAVs (a mini- and a mid-range) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 21km south of Donetsk).[6]
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, on five occasions while flying over Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Svitlodarsk and at Oktiabr mine were non-operational during the reporting period.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine. 

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

VIENNA, 4 July 2019 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today called on participating States to implement the Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, as he presented his biannual report to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna.

“In the last seven months, I made over 240 interventions in 41 OSCE participating States. It is appalling that two journalists, Vadim Komarov and Lyra Mckee, were killed, and that there were a further 92 attacks and threats, including one bombing, three shootings, and seven arson attacks against journalists” said Désir. “Journalists are targets but it is freedom of opinion and the right of citizens to be informed that are attacked. Fundamentally, what is under assault is the role of the media in democracy.”

The Representative also highlighted the number of imprisoned journalists in the OSCE region, noting: “I raised 121 individual cases of detention and imprisonment of journalists and media workers. This is an alarming situation, which has to be urgently addressed. No journalist should be imprisoned because of their reporting, investigation or critical opinion.”

“I will continue to work relentlessly for the release of all concerned journalists across the OSCE region,” said Désir, recalling the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, which urges “the immediate and unconditional release of all journalists who have been arbitrarily arrested or detained, taken hostage or who have become victims of enforced disappearance.”

Challenges to online freedom of expression and digital technologies were also raised in the Representative’s report. “Freedom of expression requires a digital infrastructure that is robust, universal and accessible to all. Participating States should not disrupt or shut down internet or telecommunications networks,” stated Désir. “Social media companies have responsibilities in the fight against unlawful content and hate speech, but we cannot put them in charge of deleting or blocking unpleasant content in general and in control of our fundamental human rights. We need laws that tackle illegal content but preserve freedom of expression, and stronger international cooperation to ensure inter-operability and efficiency in Internet regulation” he added. "All actors, States, internet companies and civil society must be included in this co-operation".

The Representative concluded by reiterating the need to end impunity for attacks against journalists, and that the OSCE, with its comprehensive security approach, is crucial for finding solutions that protect human rights and provide security.

The Representative’s full report is available here: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/424907

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

LUXEMBOURG, 4 July 2019 – The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s 28th Annual Session opened today with calls for strengthening multilateral institutions to protect democracy, promote security and advance sustainable development. Nearly 300 parliamentarians from across North America, Europe and Central Asia have gathered in Luxembourg for the five-day meeting, being held under the theme “Advancing Sustainable Development to Promote Security: The Role of Parliaments.”

Speaking today at the opening plenary session, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) noted that more than 40 years ago, the OSCE’s founding document, the Helsinki Final Act, called for enhancing the role of the United Nations in strengthening international peace and in promoting solutions to international problems. He pointed out that the UN’s landmark Sustainable Development Goals hold particular relevance for the Luxembourg meeting.

“The goals, which you all know very well, are founded on five pillars: people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnerships. All five of these priorities are at the core of our Organization’s major activities. The OSCE is contributing but we have to do more. We can use the potential of our 57 participating States, our partners and our field missions to keep the development goals high on the agenda,” he said.

Tsereteli regretted however that too many governments set aside their responsibilities, noting that multilateralism is being undermined and international agreements violated with impunity. As many global challenges grow more entrenched, new threats emerge, he pointed out, highlighting the current tensions with Iran and climate change. “We cannot afford to ignore climate change,” he said. “Time is running out.”

In his welcoming remarks, Fernand Etgen, President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg, noted that in times of climate change, energy issues and scarcity of natural resources, sustainable development has become a key factor to promote security. “Our aim is not to ‘securitize’ sustainable development,” he stressed. “But we want to put forward the idea that we can avoid conflicts in the future if we take our sustainable development goals seriously.”

He noted that since these challenges are transnational in nature, international security organizations like the OSCE must step up. “There is a need to raise awareness and, as a parliament, we will take this unique opportunity of the OSCE PA meeting in Luxembourg to do so over the next days,” he said.

Xavier Bettel, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, spoke about the rule of law as part of the essence of what it means to be European. He emphasized the importance of human rights and the need for parliamentarians to promote respect for diversity within all of their countries. “Together we must take this work further,” Prime Minister Bettel said. “I should do this in my role and you should as well. Peace is always like a fertile sapling that we will lose if we don’t take care of it. Let us never forget our history and learn from our many mistakes.”

As one of the founding members of the Assembly when it was established 28 years ago, Congressman Steny Hoyer of the United States spoke about the need to strengthen multilateral institutions to protect democracy and the importance of legislators in leading the effort to demonstrate democracies’ ability to deliver a better life for their citizens.

“The success of this Assembly – and, indeed, the success of democracy – will depend not on what we did in 1991 but on what you will do today and in the years ahead,” Congressman Hoyer said. “It will depend on whether elected representatives deliver for the people and prove that representative institutions work. Or whether ‘government by, of, and for the people’ will transform into ‘government by, of, and for’ the powerful few.”

The best way to combat anti-democratic forces both from within and from without is to show that democracy works and to restore faith in electoral government, he said.

After the opening speeches, the plenary took up consideration of two supplementary items: The Role of Civil Society – Individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations – in Realizing the Aims and Aspirations of the OSCE, principally sponsored by Alcee Hastings (United States) and The Role of National Parliaments in Preventing and Combating Corruption in the OSCE Area, principally sponsored by Margareta Cederfelt (Sweden) and Irene Charalambides (Cyprus).

Following several days of intense debate and committee work, the Annual Session will culminate in the adoption on 8 July of the Luxembourg Declaration, containing recommendations to governments and the international community in the fields of political affairs, security, economics, environment, human rights and humanitarian questions.

The Annual Session also includes numerous bilateral meetings and side events, reports on recent OSCE election observation missions, and elections of Assembly officers, including the OSCE PA President, Vice-Presidents and committee officers.

This morning, the Assembly’s Standing Committee met and re-elected OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella for a five-year term starting in January 2021. The Standing Committee also allocated 15 supplementary items to be debated in plenaries and general committees.

For the live stream and for more information on the Annual Session, please click here.

LETNICË/LETNICA, 4 July 2019 - A two-week youth restauration and documentation camp, organized by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo for 17 students of architecture and other related fields, will conclude tomorrow in Letnicë/Letnica (Viti/Vitina municipality).

The aim of the camp was to increase skills and awareness of youth on values of cultural heritage sites and the need for their protection, preservation and socio-economic utilization. Students, under the guidance of various field experts, were engaged in documenting sites for the purpose of drafting a development plan for the multi-ethnic village of Letnicë/Letnica and in cultural heritage restoration techniques through practical restoration works at the heritage site of the Mill of Frok Dokić.

The Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Ambassador Jan Braathu; Kujtim Gashi, Minister of Culture Youth and Sports and Ambassador Marija Kapitanović, Embassy of Republic of Croatia in Kosovo will deliver opening remarks.

Media are cordially invited to cover the event tomorrow, 05 July 2019, at the Mill of Frok Dokić, Letnicë/Letnica village, Viti/Vitina municipality, starting from 12:00hrs.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported anti-corruption summer school programme began on 7 July 2019 with a launch event in Nur-Sultan.

The event is the first in a series of 18 seminars that will last for one month and cover Kazakhstan’s major cities, including Kokshetau , Petropavlovsk, Kostanay, Aktobe, Uralsk, Atyrau, Aktau, Kyzyl-Orda, Turkestan, Shymkent, Taraz, Almaty, Taldykorgan, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Semey, Pavlodar and Karaganda.

The launch in Kazakhstan’s capital was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in partnership with Transparency International Kazakhstan and the Anti-Corruption Agency.

Some 65 representatives of civil society, media, academia and government organizations focused on practical examples of effective anti-corruption practices and international experiences in combating corruption. They also discussed Kazakhstan’s anti-corruption legislation, the civil sector’s role in promoting transparency and accountability, as well as the application of anti-corruption standards in business operations.

The anti-corruption summer school is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance by focusing on anti-corruption activities in Kazakhstan.

LUXEMBOURG, 4 July 2019 – The OSCE PA Standing Committee, convened in Luxembourg for the 2019 Annual Session, voted this morning by an overwhelming majority (45 in favour, 2 against) for the reappointment of incumbent Secretary General Roberto Montella for a second five-year term in office. The mandate begins on 1 January 2021 and expires 31 December 2025.

Thanking the Heads of Delegation for their support, the Secretary General underlined: "I am privileged and honoured to continue to serve in this position. I will do my utmost to meet the expectations of our parliamentarians and strengthen the added value of the parliamentary dimension of the OSCE, to the ultimate benefit of the people of our 57 participating States."

This decision follows the unanimous recommendation made by the OSCE PA Bureau last April. Please find the link to SG Montella's curriculum vitae and activities here.

424823 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Together with the OSCE Gender Section, the OSCE Mission to Moldova presented the results for Moldova of the OSCE-led Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women, at a launch event on 4 July 2019. The event was organized in co-ordination with the Moldovan Ministry of Health, Labour and Social Protection.

The Survey was conducted by the OSCE in 2018 with the goal of providing comparable data on different forms of violence women experience in the course of their lives. It is the first time that such a representative survey was conducted in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe and that women in the region were asked systematically about their experiences of violence in non-conflict and conflict settings.

In Moldova, a representative sample of 1,802 women aged 18 to 74 from rural and urban areas were interviewed about their experiences of violence and the consequences these have had for their lives.

The results for Moldova show that three in four women (76 per cent) think that violence against women (VAW) is common in Moldova. According to the report, VAW remains underreported to police and other organizations because of a lack of trust in institutions among women and a lack of specialized services for survivors of violence. The survey revealed that the underreporting and lack of trust, as well as the prevalence of VAW, are caused by social norms and attitudes that reinforce gender inequality. According to the survey, one third (33 per cent) of women personally know someone subjected to domestic violence among their family and friends, and the same percentage within their local neighbourhood. Two in five women (40 per cent) say that they have experienced physical or sexual violence since the age of 15 by a partner or non-partner.

“As part of its mandate, the OSCE Mission to Moldova facilitates the effective observance of international obligations and commitments, including in the field of gender and security, which should be in place for a comprehensive and sustainable settlement process,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch. “The OSCE Mission together with other OSCE institutions will continue to support the efforts of the Moldovan institutions to implement legislation and improve action plans based on the evidence provided in the Survey in order to address all forms of violence experienced by women and girls.”

The OSCE recognizes violence against women and girls as both a threat to individuals and broader security concern. Since 2004, the OSCE participating States have adopted three Ministerial Council decisions on preventing and combating violence against women, including most recently in December 2018 in Milan. The latest decision recognizes that inequality is a root cause of violence against women and calls for measures to address it, including through awareness-raising and capacity-building initiatives.

“The research conducted by the OSCE is essential for raising awareness with policy- and lawmakers, but also the general public, law enforcement agencies and many other stakeholders,” said Serani Siegel, OSCE Project Manager. “Attitudes, norms, and beliefs that justify violence against women need to be tackled at their root, as they continue to perpetuate this grave human rights violation. This survey provides the information needed to take action.”

The survey was conducted in seven OSCE participating States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova and Ukraine. The research was also conducted in Kosovo. Overall, more than 15,000 women were asked about different forms of violence they have experienced over the course of their lives.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• A woman was injured in Donetsk city and two men were injured in Vesele and near Pervomaisk from shelling and gunfire.
• The SMM saw damage to houses due to shelling in Khreshchatytske and Zolote-4/Rodina.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as aimed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle in Zernove.
• The SMM continued to monitor activities related to disengagement at Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM saw again the presence of anti-tank mines near the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in the disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its freedom of movement was also denied near non-government-controlled Staropetrivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 125), compared with the previous reporting period (about 330 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at westerly directions of Horlivka (government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), including 54 explosions.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk) and south-west of Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk).

A woman injured in Donetsk city and two men injured in Vesele and near Pervomaisk

On 2 July, in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw a woman (60-70 years old) with bandage on her left wrist. She told the SMM that she had sustained a cut to her wrist by glass debris, when the windows of her house were shattered by explosions in the early morning hours of 28 June. (See SMM Daily Report 1 July 2019 for observed damage to houses in the area). On 1 July, at a local ambulance sub-station in Donetsk city, medical staff refused to provide the SMM with any information on the case.*

The SMM followed up on reports of injuries sustained by a man (53 years old) in Vesele (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre). At a hospital in Donetsk city, the SMM saw a small scab on the man’s right upper arm. The man told the Mission that he was outside his parents’ house at Naberezhna Street in Vesele when he saw three explosions about 10-12m from his location and was injured in his right arm and left leg by two shrapnel pieces. Medical staff told SMM that the man sustained shrapnel injuries to his right arm and left leg and visited the hospital on 27 June to change his bandages, but refused to provide further information, citing instructions from those in control.*

The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured by small-arms fire while driving a scooter north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) on 24 June. On 25 June, medical staff at a hospital in Pervomaisk told the Mission that a man (18 years old) had been admitted late in the evening on 24 June with a bullet wound in his abdomen. On 2 July in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the parents of the man showed the Mission the scooter with a bullet hole in its metal fairing.

Fresh damage to houses due to shelling in Khreshchatytske and Zolote-4/Rodina

On 1 July, the SMM followed up on reports of shelling in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol). In a residential area, at 5 Oktiabrska Street, the SMM saw two shattered west-facing windows of an inhabited house and, 3m west of it, a barn with a collapsed roof and two shattered west-facing windows. An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying over the area on the same day spotted two fresh craters, at distances of 20m and 75m north of the house, as well as four fresh craters in a field about 170m north-east of the house and 50m south of a military-type vehicle storage facility. The SMM assessed all craters and damage as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction. 

Approximately 100m north-west of the abovementioned house, at a one-storey inhabited house at 2 Kosmodemianskoi Street, the SMM saw burn marks on the west-facing and north-facing walls, a shattered west-facing window and two shattered north-facing windows. About 10m north from the house, the SMM saw a completely burned wooden outbuilding with debris on the ground nearby. About 45m north-north-east, at 6 Kosmodemianskoi Street, the SMM observed a completely destroyed summer kitchen, with bricks and wooden panels on the ground. About 1m south of it, the SMM saw a shattered south-facing window and a collapsed corrugated asbestos roof of a wooden shed. The SMM also saw a mortar fuse in the middle of the debris of the wooden shed. The SMM assessed the impact and damage at both addresses as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.

Approximately 20m east of a gas station in Khreshchatytske the SMM saw a crater (1.5m in diameter) in the middle of the road, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction. Approximately 500m north-east of the gas station, at 10 Lenina Street, the SMM saw a broken west-facing window of a one-storey inhabited house. Inside the house, the SMM saw a hole (about 1.2m in diameter) in the wooden floor and a tailfin and unexploded 120mm mortar round, fired from the westerly direction.

On 2 July, the SMM followed up on reports of shelling in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). In a residential area at 1 Persha Vilna Street, the SMM observed a hole on the roof of a one-storey inhabited house, above the south-facing wall, partially broken roof and a shattered glass on a two-pane west-facing window. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or the direction of fire. The deputy head of the village administration told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning on 27 June.

Small-arms fire assessed as aimed at SMM mini-UAV

While conducting a mini-UAV flight in Zernove (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 bursts and shots of small arms fire at an assessed distance of about 700m north-north-west of the patrol, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which was also flying 700m north-north-west. The SMM landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area.*

On 1 July, in Khreshchatytske, while flying in the vicinity of houses damaged by shelling (see above), an SMM mini-UAV spotted a member of the armed formations with his rifle assessed as aiming at the UAV. (See SMM Daily Report 2 July 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM continued to monitor activities related to disengagement at Stanytsia Luhanska. On 2 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw 20 members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces accompanied by the commander of the Joint Forces Operation and two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), walk to the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and back towards the northern edge of the disengagement area.[2]

On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed a light blue, dark blue and red flag at the former forward position of the armed formations and another at the checkpoint of the armed formations. At and near both abovementioned locations, the SMM also saw seven men in military-style clothing, who were wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them.

Other disengagement areas[3]

During the day on 2 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

1 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

2 July

The SMM saw nine self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) in Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

1 July

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) just north of the northern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.

2 July

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) near Valentynivka (35km north of Donetsk) and
• two trenches being dug on the western edge of Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

1 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) in Khreshchatytske (see above).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Petrivske disengagement area, and mine-hazard signs

On 1 July, about 170m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske, an SMM mini-UAV spotted again 39 anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 2 July, 1km north-east of Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw tall wooden panels with green plastic sheets in front of sandbags, bearing red signs with “Careful, demining” written in Ukrainian.

On the same day, the SMM saw for the first time a red mine hazard sign on a wooden stick with “Stop mines” in Ukrainian and Russian outside a house in a residential area in Semyhiria (government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) and a wooden mine hazard sign with “Danger. Mines” in Russian in a field on the southern outskirts of Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk)

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

People apply for “LPR passports” in Alchevsk

In Alchevsk (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 45 people (mixed genders, 18-70 years old) queuing outside of a building. Two women (both about 50 years old) in the queue told the SMM that they had been queuing to apply for “LPR passports” and planned to apply for the Russian Federation passports.

SMM monitors security situation south-east of Kherson region

On 30 June and 1 July, the Mission observed calm situations at the crossing points between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson), Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• While driving about 1.5km north of Staropetrivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Korsun (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), citing “an ongoing training in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• Medical staff at a hospital in Donetsk city refused to provide the SMM information about a civilian casualty (see above) without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• Medical staff at an ambulance sub-station in Donetsk city refused to provide information on a civilian casualty (see above).
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), Zernove (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk)  and Pervomaiske (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Svitlodarsk and at Oktiabr mine were non-operational during the reporting period.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine. 

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions. 

LUXEMBOURG, 3 July 2019 – Ilkka Kanerva (MP, Finland), who has been nominated to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission for the 21 July early parliamentary elections in Ukraine, today expressed regret that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe will no longer be able to observe these elections following recent developments.

The Ukrainian Speaker of Parliament has signed a letter of disinvitation stating that he was forced to do so “taking into account the situation around the reinstatement of Russia’s parliamentary delegation at the PACE without significant progress in the implementation by Russia of seven PACE resolutions.”

“We have a long history of working closely with our colleagues from the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, who are valued and competent partners within our International Election Observation Missions,” Kanerva said. “I regret this situation – we had planned on co-operating closely with the PACE observer delegation as we have in the past, and would have welcomed their input to our findings and conclusions. While this is an unfortunate development impacting this particular observer mission, we look forward to continuing our joint work in the future.”

GENEVA, Switzerland, 3 July 2019 - The 48th round of the Geneva International Discussions (GID) took place today.

The discussions were held in a business-like atmosphere against the backdrop of recent developments on the ground.

The Co-Chairs welcomed the participants’ commitment to the Discussions and reiterated their call for a result-oriented approach in order to achieve concrete progress on the core issues. However, they regretted the crossing restrictions imposed on 27 June at the Abkhaz administrative boundary line. They called for these restrictions to be lifted without delay. It was noted that these measures have negatively affected freedom of movement, especially of persons in need of medical assistance and students travelling to take exams.

In Working Group I, the overall security situation was described as relatively calm and stable. The value of Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) and hotlines was highlighted. In this context, the need to resume the suspended meetings of the Gali IPRM was once again stressed. The functioning of the Ergneti IPRM was positively mentioned.

In Working Group II, the participants reviewed the humanitarian situation on the ground, in particular the impact of the crossing restrictions. They also discussed missing persons and agreed on the need to make progress on all cases. The participants furthermore exchanged views on documentation, public health, education and environmental challenges. While the participants agreed on the importance of the issue of internally displaced persons/refugees, it could not be addressed in substance due to a walkout by some participants. In this regard, the Co-Chairs regretted the disruption of the round and call on participants to constructively engage on all agenda items.

The participants agreed to hold the next GID round on 8-9 October 2019.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

The best practices in waste and landfill management technologies based on the example of two resort areas, Shchuchinsk-Borovskaya and Bayanaul, were the focus of an OSCE-supported roundtable discussion held in Nur-Sultan on 2 July 2019.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in partnership with the International Centre for Green Technologies and Investment.

Some 60 government, municipal, hospitality industry and civil society representatives attended the event. The participants identified the main challenges in the area of collecting and processing organic and solid waste. The Office facilitated the participation of international and national experts who presented an analysis of current waste management practices in Kazakhstan as well as recommendations based on best OSCE participating States’ practices.

The event is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-term efforts to promote the green economy and sustainable development principles in the host country.

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The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan is conducting a first in a series of new training courses for members of the Women`s Committee Central Apparatus and its regional representations. Thirty representatives of the Women’s Committee, from Tashkent city and the regions of Tashkent and Syrdarya are participating in the course from 2 to 4 July 2019 in Tashkent.

The course covers topics including improving advocacy and leadership skills; increasing the knowledge of international norms and standards in the field of the protection of women's rights and the protection of socially vulnerable groups of women.

The course was opened by Elmira Bositkhanova, Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan and a Chairperson of Women’s Committee. “The OSCE commitments are fully in line with the priorities of Women’s Committees, including strengthening women’s managerial roles in increasing the role of women in society,” she said.

The Head of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, John MacGregor, stressed that the OSCE recognizes that equal rights of women and men are essential to foster peace, security, and sustainable development: “Many of the priorities of Uzbekistan’s 2017 – 2021 Action Strategy relate to this sphere. The OSCE recognizes the recent statements of the President of Uzbekistan on advancing women’s issues and congratulates Uzbekistan on recent steps, including the election of Tanzila Narbayeva as a Chairperson of the Senate.”

The course is a part of the OSCE extra-budgetary project Support to Women’s Committee of Uzbekistan, financially supported by the Governments of Finland and Norway. A longstanding commitment of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan is to assist the country in promoting women`s advancement in social, political and economic life within society.  

CHISINAU, 3 July 2019 – Together with the OSCE Gender Section, the Mission to Moldova is launching a local report on the OSCE-led Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women.

The Survey, conducted in 2018, is the first representative survey in the seven countries of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, including the Republic of Moldova. The research was also conducted in Kosovo. The data collected by the OSCE survey is comparable to the data collected by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in its survey on violence against women in 2012. In Moldova, a representative sample of 1,802 women aged 18 to 74 from rural and urban areas were interviewed about their experiences of violence and the consequences these have had in their lives.

Media representatives are invited to the press statements on 4 July at 10:00 at Summit Events Centre, the Red Room, 49/3 Tighina Str., Chișinău.

For more information, please contact the press office of the OSCE Mission to Moldova at +373 22 887844, e-mail: MtMpress@osce.org

For further details of the OSCE report please visit the OSCE website: https://www.osce.org/VAWsurvey/publications

NEW YORK, 2 July 2019 – In a briefing on the counter-terrorism work of parliamentarians before the United Nations Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Makis Voridis and Lisa Chambers spoke about the role played by the Assembly in this field and ways to further the engagement of parliamentarians in countering terrorism.

In his video address, Voridis, the Chair of the OSCE PA’s Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (CCT), noted that as the parliamentary forum of the world’s largest regional security organization, the OSCE PA brings together 323 parliamentarians to build dialogue and exchange best practices in the interest of security.

“While this co-operative dialogue is certainly important, we can and should do more,” Voridis said. “As the directly elected representatives of our citizens, it is our duty to protect our societies from the threats stemming from terrorism and violent extremism.”

Voridis noted that the greatest asset that parliamentarians hold is the power to ensure public scrutiny of governmental action, including by providing oversight on the development and implementation of counter-terrorism policies and legislation, oversight on the work of the security and intelligence agencies, and oversight on budget proposals and expenditures.

“By co-ordinating this incredible power across all our parliaments, the OSCE PA is adding real value,” he said. “We believe that the United Nations should leverage the capacity of our Assembly to make a difference in our region, which spans across three continents from Vancouver to Vladivostok, comprising countries with very different institutions, traditions and cultures.”

Chambers, an Irish parliamentarian and member of the OSCE PA’s CCT, informed the 15 Security Council members about the pioneering work of the PA in this field. “Within the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, we act as a bridge between our constituents and the Organization overall. We do this by building political momentum for the Organization’s efforts through our policymaking, oversight and convening powers,” Chambers said.

Speaking at UN Headquarters in New York, she highlighted that the overall strategic goal of the CCT is to bring a distinct parliamentary contribution to countering terrorism and violent extremism in the OSCE area by determining the most pressing needs, sharing lessons learned, providing focused policy guidance, and promoting the swift implementation of existing counter-terrorism frameworks. As an illustrative example, she drew attention to the recently completed OSCE PA initiative on strengthening border control and information sharing in the context of UNSC resolution 2396.

The closed briefing of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee was entitled “Strengthening the role of parliaments in enhancing Member States’ counter-terrorism efforts” and was intended to facilitate the UN engagement with parliamentary assemblies as well as to identify practical approaches towards ensuring that Member States’ counter-terrorism legislation complies with relevant Security Council resolutions and international standards, codes and best practices.

Participants included UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee Chair Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, Permanent Observer of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM) Qazi Shaukat Fareed, Permanent Observer of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) to the United Nations in New York Patricia A. Torsney, Deputy Executive Director of the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate Weixiong Chen and the Chief of Special Projects and Innovation Division of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism Mauro Miedico.

424526 Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan

The OSCE Mission to Skopje supported a series of bilateral meetings that took place between North Macedonia and Bulgaria, most recently on 28 June 2019, to work out an agreement to set up more streamlined procedures and direct channels of communication to exchange information regarding trafficking cases.

The Mission is currently also supporting ongoing consultations in Ohrid between North Macedonia and Greece aimed at strengthening co-operation between the two countries in countering human trafficking.

“We have to foster stronger partnerships to ensure the rights of all victims, grounded in international law, as well as to bring traffickers and criminal groups to justice,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Clemens Koja. “Building bridges of closer co-operation is a stepping stone and a firm pledge towards our common goal. The Mission continues to promote regional co-operation, in an effort to identify and protect victims of trafficking in human beings and punish traffickers.”

Magdalena Nestorovska, National Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Illegal Migration and leader of the North Macedonia’s negotiation team, said: “The fight against human trafficking, as a form of organized crime, is high on the Government’s political agenda. Regional and cross-border co-operation is crucial in these efforts. North Macedonia has signed bilateral co-operation protocols with some four Western Balkan countries. I am very happy that we are opening a new chapter with our neighbours, Bulgaria and Greece. Their experiences as EU member states will be valuable on our path towards EU integration. And all this could have not happened without our partners and friends at the OSCE.”

VIENNA, 2 July 2019 – Leveraging economic and environmental activities to foster dialogue, build trust and reduce tensions, was the focus of a discussion held in Vienna today amongst OSCE participating States and experts from the field.

The aim of the workshop was to discuss how mechanisms in the OSCE’s economic and environmental dimension can further contribute to enhancing co-operation and confidence building, including in conflict and crisis situations.

Slavomir Kantor, representative of the 2019 OSCE Slovak Chairmanship, said that there are many examples where co-operation has worked across dividing lines and where the situation has improved as a result of the readiness to address environmental problems jointly, or to harness joint economic opportunities. “The OSCE has been a key enabler in some of these cases, by taking on a mediating role, building capacity and trust on all sides.”

“Economic and environmental issues can be used productively in conflict prevention, conflict management and resolution,” said Secretary General Thomas Greminger. He noted that they can also be useful to avoid escalation and to pave the way for future settlement in an ongoing conflict.

Discussions also focused on reducing disaster risks and environmental risks to watercourses, air pollution, or groundwater resources – hazards that often are not contained by political boundaries. “They bind societies together, for good or bad,” said Greminger. “When thinking about what may constitute the basis for dialogue and reducing tensions, it is often these common transboundary problems that offer the most direct entry points.”

Greminger emphasized that business contacts can also be key in re-establishing connections across boundaries. “If legal ways of doing business can be established, business contacts can be an important driver for diminishing tensions and enabling dialogue.” Attention was also paid to the necessity of enabling the legal framework for doing business in this regard.

The general role of the economic and environmental dimension in the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security was also discussed at length, with many participants agreeing that this, so-called “second dimension”, is essential. Topics such as connectivity and rapidly developing trends such as the digital economy were identified as being particularly useful in building dialogue and trust.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw damage to houses due to shelling in Pikuzy and in Avdiivka.
• Small arms fired in direction of SMM unmanned aerial vehicle in Khreshchatytske.
• The SMM continued to monitor activities related to disengagement at Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violations of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region and in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its freedom of movement was also denied near non-government-controlled Shevchenko, Sosnivske and Tavrycheske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 330), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 140). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at north-westerly and south-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly and southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion).

Damage to residential houses due to shelling in Pikuzy and in Avdiivka

On 1 July, the SMM followed up on reports of shelling in the Kyrpoty area on the eastern edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a completely burnt civilian house with rubble and scorch marks on the remains of brick walls, as well as melted window glass inside of the structure’s remains. In the yard of the aforementioned house, about 3m west of the west-facing wall, the SMM saw a fresh crater (with a fuse from a 122mm artillery shell and shrapnel inside of it), assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. About 5m north of the house, the Mission also saw a collapsed brick structure, assessed as recently damaged by the shelling. Three neighbours (women, aged 30-70) told the SMM that the house was abandoned and that shelling had occurred in the evening of 28 June.

About 60m west from the previously-mentioned house, at a single-storey house also on Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw that the majority of corrugated asbestos panels on the west-facing side of the roof, as well as the supporting wooden structure, had been blown off by what was assessed to be the impact of a 122mm round of an undetermined weapon. Inside of the house, the SMM saw that the inner walls and ceiling had fresh cracks and that three west-facing windows were shattered, all assessed as caused by the impact on the roof. About 10m south of the house, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to trees and bee hives. A 70 year-old man, who introduced himself as the owner of the house, told the SMM that he had been in his house on the evening of 28 June when he had heard an explosion.

About 270m west, on the same street, the SMM saw a fresh impact hole between two shattered west-facing windows of a single-storey house, assessed as caused by a 12.7mm incendiary bullet. The owners of the house (a man and woman, aged 70-80), told the SMM that shooting had occurred in the early morning hours of 30 June, adding that the windows had been shattered by shelling in late March. (For previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 25 March 2019).

On 1 July, in a residential part of the south-eastern outskirts of Avdiivka, at 13 Nakhimova Street, the SMM saw that several corrugated asbestos panels on the west-facing side of the roof of a one-storey house, as well as wooden planks underneath it, had been destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a mortar round fired from an east-south-easterly direction. A resident of the house, a woman in her fifties, told the SMM that that shelling had occurred in the early evening of 30 June when she was in the yard of the house.

About 140m north of the previously-mentioned house, at two residential houses located 10m apart at 1 and 3 Nakhimova Street, the SMM saw three shattered south-facing windows as well as multiple penetrations in the plastic and asbestos fences of both houses. About 50m south-west of the houses, on the western side of Nakhimova Street, the SMM saw burned vegetation, assessed as fresh. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by shrapnel from a round of an undetermined weapon. A resident of one of the houses (woman in her fifties) told the SMM that, in the early evening of 30 June, together with all five members of her family they had to hide in the cellar due to shelling.

Disengagement in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM continued to monitor activities related to disengagement at Stanytsia Luhanska. On 1 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw nine men in military-style clothing, who were wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them in both Russian and English languages, two of them inside the forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps at the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and seven others standing at the parking lot near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM saw no presence of military-type hardware.

At the checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM continued to note throughout the day a constant flow of people travelling in both directions through the processing booths, where it saw personnel in civilian clothing checking documents of those crossing.

The SMM saw the continuation of the installation work of the previously observed six booths and one container at the parking lot about 50m south of the Prince Ihor Monument about 250m south-east of the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to observe that the most forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as the queuing shelter about 700m north of the wooden ramps, inside the disengagement area, remained empty of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel or hardware (see SMM Daily Report 1 July 2019). Inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers refilling public information boxes south of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a demining team of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine, comprised of five people and two vehicles (one armoured personnel carrier and a truck), moving from the EECP up to the forward position and back again. About 10m north of the above mentioned most forward position, the SMM saw an electrician ascend a pole to dismantle a camera.

On 30 June, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV spotted that a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the railway bridge was empty of personnel or hardware.

Other disengagement areas[2]

On 29 June, inside the disengagement near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted a long-barrelled weapon near a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and seven anti-tank mines (TM-62) under a camouflaged net across road T-1316, all about 1km south of its northern edge (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019). On the same day, the SMM saw for the first time a concertina wire stretched across the same road about 350m north of the armed formations’ checkpoint on the area’s southern edge. Despite an SMM request, the armed formations refused to remove it. The presence of the wire rendered the road impassable to the Mission due to security considerations.*               

During the evening of 30 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded eight projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2.5-4km south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On 26 June, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of what was assessed as preparations for new defensive positions (not seen in imagery from 9 June 2019) near previously observed trenches of the armed formations, about 10m north of the area’s southern edge and about 100m west of its eastern edge. Imagery from the same day also revealed a trench extension about 30m in length running from east to west, about 700m east of the eastern edge of the Petrivske disengagement area, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.   

On 1 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Small-arms fire assessed as aimed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

While conducting a mini- UAV flight in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of about 100-200m north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 100-200m north-east of the patrol. While flying the UAV back, the SMM heard six additional shots of small-arms fire assessed as at the same distance and direction. The SMM landed the UAV safely and immediately left the area.*

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

29 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya,152mm) about 4km north of Vyskryva (76km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

26 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two multiple launch rocket systems (type undetermined) near Zernove (70km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

27 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 30 May 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

1 July

The SMM saw two tanks (T-72) in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

30 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) with components of a radar system (1S51M3-2) attached near Zhytenko (70km east of Donetsk), in an area where an SMM long-range UAV had gone missing in October 2018 after spotting a surface-to-air missile system and a convoy of trucks on a dirt road near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities (see SMM Daily Report 18 October 2018 and SMM Spot Report 27 October 2018).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

27 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a trench extension of about 67m in length just outside the northern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area (35m south-west of residential house), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

29 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an air search radar system (P-19 1RL134) on a military truck near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

26 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) in a training area near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

27 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM observed the presence of two ACVs in a training area near Novoselivka.

1 July

The SMM saw again an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

Presence of anti-tank mines

On 28 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 15 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows across road M-03 near previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 5km south-east of Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Public gathering outside SMM Mariupol office

In Mariupol, on 1 July, the SMM monitored a gathering of approximately 70 people (men and women, aged 40-65 years old) in front of the Mission’s office. Some participants held signs or banners against the Russian Federation and others expressed concern about a statement from the Joint Forces Operation related to possible disengagement in the Mariupol area. The SMM received a letter from some participants expressing the abovementioned concerns. The gathering ended peacefully. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, again denied the SMM passage westward towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), citing ongoing shelling in the area.
• At a checkpoint east of Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), six members of the armed formations, five visibly armed, denied the SMM passage to Sosnivske, citing orders from those in control.
• At a checkpoint east of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations, two visibly armed, denied the SMM passage to Tavrycheske, citing orders from those in control.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• The SMM was prevented from proceeding northward on road T-1316 inside the Zolote disengagement area due to the presence of a concertina wire stretched across the road about 350m north of the armed formations’ checkpoint on the southern edge of the disengagement area (see above).

Delayed:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed after about 20 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which landed safely and left the area (see above).
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Kulykove (non-government-controlled, 30km north-east of Mariupol). Both above mini-UAV flights were conducted in search of the lost SMM long-range UAV (which has not yet been located, see also SMM Spot Report 28 June 2019).
• On two instances, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Svitlodarsk and at Oktiabr mine were non-operational during the reporting period.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

MINSK, 2 July 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its working groups in Minsk on 2 July 2019:

“Last week we witnessed the process of disengagement of forces and hardware in the agreed zone at Stanytsia Luhanska.

Launched at noon of 26 June 2019, this process has become a welcome and important step.

It is a clear evidence that, if there is will, the agreements reached can be swiftly implemented. This inspires hope and optimism for our future work.

I would like to once again express my gratitude to the sides for their resolute steps. I was especially impressed by the personal presence of Leonid Kuchma at Stanytsia Luhanska in the course of the disengagement.

I also thank the staff of OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and personally Chief Monitor Yaşar Halit Çevik and Deputy Chief Monitor Mark Etherington for the support and follow-up on this process.

At the same time, I am very concerned about recent increase in the number of ceasefire violations. I was shocked by media reports about the death of two military medics near Vodiane yesterday and the injury of two medical volunteers near Marinka today.

Now about our work. The Security working group, of course, concentrated on issues concerning the disengagement of forces and hardware at Stanytsia Luhanska.

As to the so-called "harvest ceasefire", the sides once again confirmed that recommitment was crucial and agreed to continue discussion on the issue at the next meeting.

Among other points on the agenda, the Economic working group paid particular attention to water supply issues in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on both sides of the contact line, specifically, to the financial situation of the ‘Voda Donbasa’ company.

The Humanitarian working group continued discussions related to the exchange of detainees.

The Political working group took forward its exchanges on its well-known agenda, namely the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.”

This report is for the media and the general public.

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO) and one first responder.[1] The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 11,596 to 11,727 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[2].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 75 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 22 this week compared to 17 last week: ten of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and twelve into Ukraine (45 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, four families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when 12 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and seven into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (395 compared to 422 observed during the previous week). There were 199 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 196 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv, Luhansk – Yalta, and Stakhanov - Kyiv.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 802 trucks (824 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (276 at the Gukovo BCP and 526 at the Donetsk BCP); 443 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 359 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Lithuania and Georgia and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 58 (compared to 50 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 157 to 167: of the total number of trucks scanned, 81 trucks (49 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 86 trucks (51 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[3] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 135 to 157 vehicles; 80 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 77 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 26 occasions; the OTs assessed that 14 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 12 to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. Cars with Armenian, Georgian and Polish licence plates were also observed.

On 27 June at 15:07, an ambulance with “LPR” plates with two paramedics on board arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle quickly underwent border control procedures and left towards Ukraine. The flashing lights were turned off.

On 28 June at 12:27, the OT at Donetsk BCP observed a police vehicle arriving from the Russian Federation. The police vehicle stopped on the far side of the main building and was partially visible to the OT. At 12:53 the same day, the police vehicle left towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 28 May 2019 to 2 July 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] First responders are OSCE staff or Mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time

[2] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[3] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).