OSCE

SKOPJE, 6 May 2019 – The second round of North Macedonia’s presidential election was calm and well run. However, shortfalls in the legal framework continued to be a concern, international observers concluded in a preliminary statement published today.

The observation mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

“This election cycle has now been brought to a successful conclusion, with voters freely able to choose between distinct choices,” said Sereine Mauborgne, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission. “Yesterday’s increased voter turnout shows determination by the population to unite and address the challenges facing this country. It is now up to the political leadership to hear this message and undertake real reform that will replace the legal patchwork requiring constant political agreements with a coherent and sustainable electoral law.”

Some 1.8 million voters were eligible to cast their ballot in 3,396 polling stations across the country. The election authorities carried out preparations for the second round professionally and impartially and generally enjoyed public confidence. However, the fact that citizens whose identification documents had expired were excluded from voting needs to be addressed. In addition, while the turnout requirement of 40% was met on this occasion, it does create the potential for repeat elections, a concern that ODIHR has previously voiced.

The campaign took place in a calm environment. All participants were able to campaign without hindrance and fundamental freedoms were respected. State officials appeared to continue differentiating clearly between their official and political activities. Further, both candidates reached out to different ethnic communities.

“The voting for the second round of the presidential election was well organized and voters, as in the first round, were able to make their choice freely. But an election is not limited to voting day. The PACE delegation considers that some recurrent problems in the electoral process remain unaddressed, in particular, the need to reform the electoral code and, in general, the political system, to re-engage citizens and to ensure their active participation, regardless of ethnic origin. In addition, it is crucial to strengthen the transparency and control of election campaign funding. The issue of EU and NATO membership should not be allowed to obscure recurrent problems in the electoral process,” said Marie-Christine Dalloz, Head of the PACE delegation. “The Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice Commission are ready to assist the authorities of North Macedonia in implementing the necessary reforms.”

As in the first round of the election, however, the international observers expressed serious concerns over the legal framework. While the law does allow for democratic elections, the regulatory gaps already evident on issues such as campaigning, media advertising, campaign finance and voter registration remain unaddressed. This further highlights the importance of legislative reform, which was already emphasised in the preliminary conclusions following the first round.

“Election day was well prepared, and passed calmly and peacefully,” said Corien Jonker of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). “But democracy is not just about election day. Political will is needed to ensure that genuinely inclusive legal reforms are followed by a consistent implementation that builds and keeps citizens’ trust.”

The international election observation mission for the second round comprises some 170 observers from 32 countries, including 156 long- and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 11 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, and 5 from PACE.

For further information, please contact:

Andreas Baker, OSCE PA: +389 70636321 or +45 601 08126, andreas@oscepa.dk

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR: +389 728 07826 or +48 609 522 266, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE Secretariat: +389 706 36302 or +33 6 50 68 76 55, Chemavon.Chahbazian@coe.int

LEINSWEILER, 6 May 2019 – Bringing together parliamentarians, scholars, OSCE officials, business leaders, and representatives of other regional organizations, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s fifth Leinsweiler seminar this weekend explored lessons learned from European history on the power of economics as an instrument of conflict prevention and rehabilitation – or as a source of conflict.

Taking place on 4-5 May in the state of Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany, the Leinsweiler seminar addressed topics such as “Post-War Conflict Rehabilitation and Prevention Through Economic Co-operation” and “Customs Regimes, Economic Integration and Co-operation Between Different Integration Processes.”

OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (Georgia) and Treasurer Doris Barnett (Germany) opened the seminar on Saturday noting that European stability is rooted in economic ties, which is a lesson that was learned through the painful experiences of the 20th century. Tsereteli noted that the venue of the meeting is a powerful reminder of how economic competition has fueled conflicts, but how economic co-operation has helped forged peace.

“While coal and steel production was a major obstacle to French-German reconciliation in the first half of the 20th century, it also provided the foundation for a united Europe by inspiring the European Coal and Steel Community,” Tsereteli said. “By meeting in Leinsweiler this weekend, let’s remember that with time and dedicated efforts to educate and to recall the lessons of history, durable peace can be re-established, even in the most unstable regions of the OSCE.”

Barnett, who heads the German Delegation to the OSCE PA, recalled the motivation for establishing strong economic foundations for co-operation. “After the horrors of the Second World War, Europeans were determined to secure lasting peace,” she said. “The European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community began to unite European countries economically and politically as of 1950.”

She noted that the International Rhine Commission developed a dynamic approach to return to economic activity of the Rhine corridor after World War Two.

Tsereteli and Barnett underlined that the aim of the Leinsweiler seminars is to promote dialogue between OSCE participating States at a time where entrenched positions and nationalist rhetoric, as well as unilateral actions which run contrary to the founding principles of the OSCE, have threatened to undermine trust and the ability to find common ground.

Also addressing the opening was Amb. Katarina Žáková, Deputy Permanent Representative from the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, who spoke about the importance of effective multilateralism. She stressed that the Slovak Chairmanship is seeking to build dialogue to find solutions to the conflicts affecting the OSCE area, including by addressing the economic consequences for the populations.

Bringing together some 20 Members of Parliament from 10 countries, the Leinsweiler seminar also included the participation of OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella and the OSCE PA’s Special Representative in Vienna Amb. Andreas Nothelle, as well as representatives from the governmental side of the OSCE, including Amb. Vuk Zugic, the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, and Amb. Kairat Sarybay, Chair of the OSCE’s Economic and Environmental Committee. Other participants included leading academics, representatives of regional organizations and of the private sector.

In discussions, participants raised issues such as connectivity and energy security. In several sessions, the resilience of transborder economic co-operation after certain conflicts, or even during the Cold War, was presented as an encouraging signal to the populations most affected by current conflicts.

Previous Leinsweiler seminars have been held in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. The seminars are dedicated to promoting parliamentary contributions to OSCE efforts in addressing conflicts. They are hosted by the Delegation of Germany to the OSCE PA and supported by the German Foreign Ministry.

Photos from the Leinsweiler seminar are available on Flickr.

NUR-SULTAN, 6 May 2019 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission deployed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 9 June early presidential election in Kazakhstan, the mission will hold a press conference in Nur-Sultan on Wednesday.

Urszula Gacek, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities. The mission's deployment follows an invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The ODIHR election observation mission and the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 11:00, Wednesday, 8 May, in Conference hall “Garden 1&2”, Hotel Hilton Garden Inn, Kabanbay Batyr Avenue 15. 010000, Nur-Sultan.

For further information, please contact Kira Kalinina, Media Analyst with the election observation mission, at +7 701 6436097 or at kira.kalinina@odihr.kz.

or

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile), or at katya.andrusz@odihr.pl.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 
• The SMM saw fresh small-arms fire damage to a residential house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.  
• The SMM recorded an explosion inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas. 
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses, as well as to enable demining activities at cemeteries in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.It alsocontinued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.* 

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 250), compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recordedin areas west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), in areas north-north-west, north-west and south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas north, south-west and west of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

In Luhansk city, the SMM observed a gathering of about 2,500 people at an event of the armed formations where it heard about 15 explosions and 260 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as simulation pyrotechnics and blank shots.

Fresh small-arms fire damage to the window of a house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

At 18 Lizy Chaikinoi Street in the western part Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two holes (1.5cm and 3.5cm in diameter, respectively) in a plastic window frame in the west-facing wall of a two-storey residential house. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by small-arms fire. According to the owner of the house (man in his forties), the damage had occurred on 2 May. (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 22 April 2019.) 

Loss of SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

While positioned 4km west of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and flying an SMM mini-UAV about 300m south-south-west, the UAV encountered GPS signal interference. The SMM lost control of the mini-UAV and was not able to return it.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 2 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as eight projectiles and a muzzle flash assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

During the day on 3 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

30 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

1 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four tanks (T-64) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk).

2 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a towed mortar (2B16 Nona-K, 120mm), with its barrel removed, on the south-eastern outskirts of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

3 May

The SMM saw four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Pryvillia (81km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

3 May 

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Zolote.

Non-government-controlled areas

30 April 

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a new trench (not seen in imagery from 22 February 2019) running 100m north from a recently constructed bunker near Stepove (27km west of Luhansk).

1 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) about 35m from civilian houses in Novoselivka.

2 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), three anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on three APCs (MT-LB M) as well as eight APCs (MT-LB) in Pervomaisk.

3 May 

The SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) and two APCs (BTR-80) in Luhansk city.

Mine hazard signs in Debaltseve

On 3 May, the SMM observed for the first time a mine hazard sign with “Mines” written in Russian on Chervonoarmiiska Streetin the western outskirts of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 1 May 2019).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) as well as damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of demining activities in and around cemeteries

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities reportedly carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in and around cemeteries in government-controlled areas near Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk). 

Border areas outside government control

Positioned at the border crossing point near Novoazovsk (101km south-east of Donetsk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw two cars with Russian Federation licence plates entering Ukraine, as well as five cars (four with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two pedestrians (a woman and a man, both in their forties) exiting Ukraine.

In Donetsk City people apply for passports of the Russian Federation 

In non-government-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM observed about 70 people (mixed gender and ages) in front of a building at Khodakovskoho Street No.10 in order to submit applications for passports of the Russian Federation. A man and a woman (in their thirties) told the Mission that once their papers would be examined and approved, they would be asked to make a payment of about 1,200 Russian Roubles at a financial institution in Donetsk. The SMM saw several representatives of the media in front of the building. It also saw a senior member of the armed formations give an interview saying that applicants were required to submit a birth certificate, eight photographs as well as a “passport” issued by the armed formations."

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 3 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined. The SMM did not consider safe to proceed.

Delays:

• At a checkpoint approximately 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after about 20 and 40 minutes respectively.

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018. 

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM saw for the first time at least 100 anti-tank mines near government-controlled Pyshchevyk.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses, as well as to enable demining activities at cemeteries in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also denied access at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region near the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Odessa, the SMM monitored three gatherings to commemorate those who lost their lives during the events of 2 May 2014.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 180), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), in areas west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about ten), compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). Most ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), including eight explosions of mortar rounds.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 1 and 2 May, while in Popasna, the SMM heard three explosions (two assessed as mortar rounds and one undetermined) as well as ten shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 5-12km east. The SMM was unable to assess whether all the aforementioned ceasefire violations were inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). While at the same location, the SMM also heard about 100 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

During the day on 2 May, positioned inside the disengagement area close to Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]  

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

1 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10) near Chernenko (21km north-east of Mariupol).

2 May

The SMM saw:

• three probable anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) on the northern outskirts of Paraskoviivka (75km north of Donetsk) (for previous observations in this area, see SMM Daily Report 4 April 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

2 May

The SMM saw:

• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten towed howitzers (five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), seven tanks (one T-72 and the remainder of undetermined type), six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

2 May

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) about 2km north of Pryovrazhne (83km south of Donetsk).

Other weapons observed:

The SMM saw three towed mortars or howitzers (type undetermined) in Paraskoviivka.[4]

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

1 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) near Chernenko.

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• seven armoured combat vehicles near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

2 May

The SMM saw:

• six infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) in Luhansk city;
• a surveillance radar system (PSNR-8 Kredo-M1) on the western edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk); and
• a trench digger near Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk).  

Automatic jamming station and electronic warfare system

On 2 May, the SMM saw an automated jamming station (R-378A) and an electronic warfare system (type undetermined) in Bakhchovyk (government-controlled, 59km south of Donetsk).

Fresh impact craters near Hnutove, Pikuzy and Verkhnoshyrokivske

On 1 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time eight fresh craters, assessed as probable impacts of (82mm) mortar rounds in a field about 3km east of Hnutove. The same UAV also spotted 30 fresh craters, assessed as impacts of (82mm and 120mm) mortar rounds in a field about 3km north of Pikuzy (non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On 2 May, the SMM saw a fresh crater approximately 20m north of a road leading to Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) about 1.5km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) (this road is used by civilians on a daily basis to cross the contact line).

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs

On 1 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 100 anti-tank mines in a field about 2.5km south of Pyshchevyk.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of demining activities

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities reportedly carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in and around cemeteries in government-controlled areas near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), the Vilnyi area east of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk) and Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Border areas outside government control

Positioned at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six cars (four with Ukrainian, one with German and one with Belarusian licence plates) and two pedestrians (a man and a woman aged 50-65) entering Ukraine. The SMM saw nine cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates) and a pedestrian (a woman, aged 40-50) exiting Ukraine. After a few minutes, two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Positioned at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 23 cars (two with Ukrainian and ten with Russian licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates and one with “LPR” plates), a truck (no cargo and with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus with approximately 20 people on board and “DPR” plates and 11 pedestrians (mixed age and gender) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 21 cars (one with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and three pedestrians (two women and one man aged 30-40) entering Ukraine. 

Positioned at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM observed no vehicular or pedestrian traffic in either direction.

Commemoration events for those who lost their lives during the events of 2 May 2014

On 2 May, at Kulykove Pole Square in Odessa, the SMM saw about 600 people (mixed age and gender) attending a ceremony to commemorate those who lost their lives during the events of 2 May 2014. During the commemoration, which lasted about one hour, the SMM saw groups of participants, including young men known to the SMM as belonging to, among others, the “Right Sector” movement, shouting at each other on two occasions. On both occasions, police intervened to separate the groups. Overall, about 1,000 police officers, including ones in anti-riot gear, were securing the event.

On the same day, the SMM saw about 200 people (mixed gender, aged 20-50) gathered near Soborna Square in Odessa to commemorate the death of two activists during the events of 2 May 2014. Some participants were wearing insignias of movements such as the “Right Sector” and Svoboda. About 120 police officers secured the gathering, which dispersed peacefully.

On the evening of 2 May, in Odessa, the SMM saw about 400 men (aged 20-40) wearing insignias of the National Corps and Natsionalni Druzhyny movements, marching from Shevchenko Park to the Hretska Square through the city centre. At the aforementioned square, the SMM saw a total of about 500 people (mixed gender and age) gathered, including some known to the SMM as belonging to State Initiative of Yarosh, among others. About 150 police officers secured the gathering, which ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint approximately 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members (one armed) of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 30 minutes.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras at the Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre), at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) were not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

PODGORICA, 3 May 2019 – Celebrating World Press Freedom Day, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and its media programme partners gathered today in Podgorica to discuss the special role that quality journalism and fact checking can play when facing disinformation.

“Pluralistic and independent media are the core of freedom of the media, but in order to identify and address false and discriminatory information, particularly on social media, quality journalism, ethical behavior, and fact checking must be brought into the equation,” said Head of OSCE Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet.

The event was attended by representatives of Montenegrin media outlets, NGOs dealing with media issues, as well as the Council of Europe and EU Delegation to Montenegro. The topic of the discussion was the special role that quality journalism and fact checking can play when facing disinformation.

“For more positive and forward-looking dialogue in our modern societies, we need to strengthen all reliable sources of information,” said Daviet.

Nataša Ružić, a professor at the University of Montenegro, said that we all live in a time when new techniques and methods of manipulation are emerging at an incredible speed and that the general public is informed about them only when they cause damage and become a serious threat to society.

“In the era of false news and misinformation, media literacy and fact-checking are the only way to get to the truth. However, can we trust unconditionally organizations that carry out information verification? The answer is obvious. In search of information, we can rely primarily on ourselves, developing techniques and skills that will help us to be sceptical when we receive messages sent to us by the media,” said Ružić.

This year's celebration of World Press Freedom Day is inspired by the theme chosen by UNESCO for the occasion: for “Media and Democracy: Journalism and Elections in Times of Disinformation”. The OSCE Mission to Montenegro will continue to support any efforts that allow the media to play a constructive role in the future development of Montenegro.

418706 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe conducted a roundtable discussion on the issue of judicial independence for 30 lawyers, legal scholars, and former judges and prosecutors. The event was held on 30 April 2019 and organized in partnership with the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ).

The discussion focused on the current Tajik system for selecting and appointing judges, and the disciplinary system for judges. ICJ Secretary General Saman Zarifi spoke on international standards aimed at preserving judicial independence, and former judge Justice Martine Comte of France spoke on the French experience and features of the French system that are in place to ensure judicial independence. 

“An independent judiciary is crucial for defending the rule of law and human rights in Tajikistan. We appreciate the openness of so many experienced judges, prosecutors and lawyers in describing the opportunities and challenges facing the legal system here,” said ICJ Secretary General Zarifi. “We will incorporate the findings of these valuable discussions in our upcoming report which will include recommendations about strengthening the independence of the judiciary in Tajikistan.”

Participants shared their knowledge and views on the state of judicial independence in Tajikistan. The report and recommendations will inform future dialogue with relevant Tajik government counterparts and serve as an advocacy tool for civil society in their continued efforts to promote international standards for judicial independence.

BRATISLAVA, 3 May 2019 – On the occasion of World Press Freedom Day the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, visited Bratislava to pay tribute to the investigative journalist, Ján Kuciak, and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová, who were killed in February 2018.

During his visit, Désir visited the editorial offices of Aktuality.sk, where Ján Kuciak worked, and met with the outlet’s deputy chief editor, Jan Petrovič, and the editorial team. He also met with several journalists to discuss media freedom in Slovakia and the OSCE region.

“On World Press Freedom Day, I came to pay tribute to Ján Kuciak and to all journalists who were killed or attacked for doing their work. I remember Daphne Caruana Galizia, Pavel Sheremet, Lyra McKee, among many other journalists killed in recent years. Jan has become, like all of them, a symbol of the dangers faced by investigative journalists. Journalists who investigate crime and corruption are essential for providing the checks and balances that ensure the functioning of our democracies. The quality of our democracies depends on the quality of our information, and on the existence of pluralistic and independent media. It is our responsibility to ensure that all journalists can work in a safe environment and that those who attack journalists are identified and face the full brunt of the law. There must be no impunity,” said Désir.

The Representative recalled the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, adopted last December in Milan, which calls on participating States to “take effective measures to end impunity for crimes committed against journalists, by ensuring accountability as a key element in preventing future attacks.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

Link to previous statements:

https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/411947

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/397850

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/374116

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/373699

418715 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

On 3 May 2019, journalists and media experts from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Afghanistan gathered to celebrate World Press Freedom Day in Dushanbe at the international conference Promoting Mass Media to the Sustainable Development of Peace and Democracy.

Some 130 Tajik and international journalists and high-ranking representatives of the government and the parliament participated in the conference. The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and the Tajik Media Council.

“The annual commemoration of World Press Freedom Day reminds all of us of the importance of freedom of expression for a democratic society. The OSCE takes pride in being the only international security organization which has enshrined freedom of expression and freedom of the media in its comprehensive concept of security,” said Fejzo Numanaj, Acting Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

“Media freedom and access to information feed into the wider development objective of empowering people. Empowerment is a multi-dimensional social and political process that helps people gain control over their own lives. This can only be achieved through access to accurate, fair and unbiased information,” said Numanaj.

During the conference, the participants discussed challenges for media in the era of digitalization and ways to strengthen the economic, legal and ethical basis of the activities of the media as a factor in ensuring their freedom and independence. They also discussed new technologies and trends, their impacts on the freedom of speech and the enhancement of democratic values.

As a result of the conference, the participants developed a list of recommendations addressed to the governments of the Central Asian countries.

During the conference, the Tajik Media Council announced the winners of the Etimod/Trust Award for journalists, which honours the best compliance with the Code of Conduct of Journalists of Tajikistan.

The conference was conducted with the financial support of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, the Open Society Institute - Assistance Foundation in Tajikistan, the embassies of the United Kingdom and the United States of America in the Republic of Tajikistan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Internews Network Tajikistan.

PODGORICA/VIENNA, 3 May 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák announced today that he will visit Montenegro on 7 and 8 May.

Chairperson Lajčák will meet with Speaker of the Parliament Ivan Brajović, Prime Minister Duško Marković, Minister of Foreign Affairs Srđan Darmanović, and representatives of civil society in Montenegro.

Chairperson Lajčak will also be the guest of honour at the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative in Budva.

In addition, the University of Montenegro will award Chairperson Lajčák the honorary title of Doctor Honoris Causa.

On 8 May 2019 at 11:15, media are invited for photo opportunities at the OSCE Mission to Montenegro’s office located at Boulevard Džordža Vašingtona 98/VII, Podgorica, where the Chairperson will present a cheque from the Slovak Government in the amount of 10,000 euros for the renovation of bathrooms in the Grammar School in Pljevlja to Dragan Zuković, Director of the School.

On behalf of his country, Lajčák will also donate a bio-microscopic slit lamp to the Clinical Hospital Centre in Podgorica.

For additional information, media representatives can contact Marina Živaljević, National Public Affairs Officer at the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, at marina.zivaljevic@osce.org or +382 67 626 010.

SKOPJE, 3 May 2019 – The international observers for the presidential election in North Macedonia will hold a news conference to present their preliminary post-election statement following the second round of the election on Monday 6 May, in Skopje.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

Sereine Mauborgne, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission will deliver the statement followed by remarks from Marie-Christine Dalloz, Head of the PACE delegation, and Corien Jonker, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission. They will subsequently be available to take questions from the media.

The international election observation mission comprises some 170 observers from 32 countries, including 156 long- and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 11 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, and 5 from PACE.

You are invited to attend the news conference at 14:00 on Monday 6 May, which will take place in the Platinum Conference Room at the Double Tree by Hilton Hotel, Bulevar ASNOM 17, Skopje. NB While the news conference is open to all and no accreditation is required to enter, only questions from journalists will be taken.

The press conference will be live-streamed on www.facebook.com/osce.odihr and www.oscepa.org.

For further information, please contact:

Andreas Baker, OSCE PA +389 70 636 321 or +45 601 08126, andreas@oscepa.dk

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR +389 72 807 826 or +48 609 522 266, katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

Chemavon Chahbazian, PACE Secretariat +389 70 636 302 or +33 6 50 68 76 55, Chemavon.Chahbazian@coe.int

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw a fresh crater on the side of a road near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near government-controlled Bobrove and at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of non-government-controlled Luhansk city.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Zolote-4/Rodina, Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and Katerynivka, as well as continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also denied access at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Pikuzy.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south, south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). Positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 400-500m south and left the area immediately.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 30 April, the SMM saw a fresh crater outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 300m south of its southern edge on the northern side of a road leading from Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, as well as dirt, gravel and pieces of concrete scattered across the same road. The SMM did not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

On 1 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

On 1 May, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

On 1 May, the SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), seven multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

On 1 May, the SMM saw six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and seven tanks (T-72) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[3]

At two heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

On 1 May, the SMM saw that three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 31 mortars (18 2B11 Sani, 120mm, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (D-30) continued to be missing.

Indications of military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

30 April

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Yashchykove (46km west of Luhansk) and
• two newly dug trenches (one about 160m-long and another about 50m-long) in fields about 2km south-west of Mytkovo-Kachkari (93km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 8 April 2019).

Presence of unexploded ordnance and mine hazard signs

On 30 April, the SMM saw exploded remnants of two of five previously observed anti-tank mines, with their fuses removed, about 10m south of road T-0504 and about 400m south-west of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint told the SMM that they had conducted demining activities in the area on 27 April.

On 1 May, in Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that a previously observed tailfin of a 120mm mortar round protruding from the asphalt on the edge of the road was still present.

On the same day, on the eastern edge of Chermalyk, the SMM saw that a previously observed red mine hazard sign, with “Stop Mines” written in Ukrainian and “Danger Mines” in English, attached to a rope extended across a road leading to a cemetery, was still present.

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 70 minutes, the SMM saw 36 cars (four with Ukrainian and 29 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), three mini-vans (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates), a bus (with “DPR” plates) and seven pedestrians entering Ukraine. It also saw 27 cars (two with Ukrainian and 16 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as eight with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and three buses (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

SMM facilitation of demining activities

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities reportedly carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in and around cemeteries near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north-east of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one of them armed) prevented the SMM from proceeding further, citing “ongoing heavy shelling in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that anti-tank mines present across the road leading north had not been cleared.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week. Three vehicles of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations crossed into Ukraine on 26 April and returned to the Russian Federation the next day.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,264 to 10,895 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 981 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 13 this week compared to 33 last week: eight of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and five into Ukraine. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and seven were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when four families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead, they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (368 compared to 344 observed during the previous week). There were 185 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 183 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the “irregular” route “Rovenky-Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 797 trucks (922 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at the both BCPs, (239 at the Gukovo BCP and 558 at the Donetsk BCP); 350 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 447 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 77 (compared to 44 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 179 to 133: of the total number of trucks scanned, 87 trucks (65 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 46 trucks (35 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 140 to 157 vehicles; 74 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 83 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 30 occasions; the OTs assessed that fifteen trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and fifteen to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, cars with Polish licence plates were also noted.

On 23 April, the OTs at both BCPs observed a helicopter, type Mi-17, flying along the border within Russian Federation airspace on four separate occasions.

A Mi-17 was first noted at 14:46 at the Gukovo BCP, flying from an eastern to a northern direction at an altitude of around 100m. Later on, at 15:04, the OT at the Donetsk BCP, observed a Mi-17 helicopter flying from an eastern direction at an altitude of around 50m. At 15:10, the helicopter made a turn and flew to the north. At 15:55, the same type aircraft arrived from a northern direction, flew over the Donetsk BCP and continued to fly in a southerly direction.During the same day, at 16:07 a Mi-17 helicopter again flew over the Gukovo BCP coming from the north before heading in an easterly direction.

On 26 April at 06:45, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed three vehicles (a “Gazel” and two “Kamaz” trucks) with the inscription of the Ministry of the Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation crossing the border from the Russian Federation to Ukraine (a Spot Report was issued the same day). On 27 April, the three vehicles crossed back into the Russian Federation at the Donetsk BCP after undergoing ten minutes of border control procedures.

On 28 April at 05:23, an ambulance was observed entering the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. After it parked near the border checking area, a female paramedic left the vehicle and went towards the main building. After around ten minutes, the paramedic came back to the vehicle and the ambulance returned towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 26 March 2019 to 30 April 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe supported the Government of Tajikistan in launching Tajikistan’s Trade Portal on 26 April 2019 in Dushanbe, which helps to intensify and increase access to trade information and comply with the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement.

The launch ceremony brought together 120 representatives from government institutions, the private sector, diplomatic representations and international organizations.

This initiative was implemented by Tajikistan’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, with the technical assistance of the International Trade Centre, UNCTAD the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, UNDP and the OSCE.

“With this initiative, the OSCE continues to support the Government of Tajikistan to increase trade opportunities for inclusive national and regional economic growth and development, and to create an enabling environment for digital innovation aimed at improving transparency and accountability and mitigating security risks,” said Filippo Crivellaro, Head of the Economic and Environmental Department at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Tajikistan’s Trade Portal is an online platform aimed at facilitating trade and investment operations for foreign and domestic representatives of the private sector. The electronic tool allows publishing detailed online information on trade and investment procedures in the country. Procedures are described step-by-step and show all contacts (authorities), forms, requirements, costs, duration, ways of recourse and the legal basis.

Producing a single portal containing all trade regulations and procedures will save businesses time and operational costs, especially for traders and enterprises involved in the import, export and transit sectors.

Tajikistan became a member of the World Trade Organization in March 2013 and has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement in May 2015, which is aimed at facilitating trade by simplification of transport movement procedures, reduction of costs and time for release and clearance of goods in cross-border trade.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw for the first time anti-tank mines near Prychepylivka, unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and a mine hazard sign near Novoselivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also denied access at checkpoints near Novolaspa, Oleksandrivske and Novoazovsk in southern Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (50), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south, south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 30 April, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions, as well as nine bursts and eight shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area, within 5km of its periphery). [3]

On the same day, positioned on the north-western edge of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 13 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-5km west-north-west (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area within 5km of its periphery).

Also on the same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites

Government-controlled areas

On 30 April, the SMM saw eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

On 29 April an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) and an armoured combat vehicle near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk).

30 April

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

On 27 April, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a trench digger and two trench extensions in areas not controlled by the government near the Petrivske disengagement area: a 60m trench about 800m east and a 50m trench about 1.7km east of the eastern edge of the disengagement area (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 28 March 2019).

Presence of mines, unexploded ordnance and mine hazard signs

On 28 April, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 150 anti-tank mines laid out in three rows running from east to west in a field about 2.5km south-east of Prychepylivka (government-controlled, 50km north-west of Luhansk).

On 30 April, the SMM observed for the first time two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (one assessed as a part of an MLRS (BM-21 Grad) rocket, and the other as a probable part of the same type of rocket), both assessed as not recent, on the earth mound surrounding an abandoned bunker west of road M-03 on the western edge of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), about 100m south of an improvised mine hazard sign (for previous observation in the area see SMM Daily Report 29 April 2019).

On the same day, the Mission saw an obstacle with the inscription “mines” in Ukrainian sprayed onto it on the northern side of a road about 1km north-west of Novoselivka (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); it also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 28 and 29 April, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “the SMM’s safety”.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “live-fire exercises in a nearby training area”. While at the checkpoint, the SMM heard three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire from the direction of the training area.
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk) and west to Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), citing an “ongoing operation in the area”. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay/Conditional access:

• At a military compound near Peredove (government-controlled, 68km south-west of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative prevented the SMM from entering, saying that the SMM needed to wait for the commander. After about 30 minutes, the commander allowed the SMM to enter, but demanded that the SMM’s vehicles remain outside (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw unexploded ordnance in Kadiivka and new mine hazard signs near Novoluhanske and Debaltseve.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and at checkpoints of the armed formations near Yasynuvata and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 20 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and nearly half of the explosions were recorded in areas north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). On the evening and night of 28-29 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 38 projectiles in flight, nine undetermined explosions, and three muzzle flashes at a range of 100-800m south and south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded slightly more ceasefire violations, but the same number of explosions (one), compared with the previous 24 hours. All of the ceasefire violations were recorded close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and south-south-west of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 28 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 17 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 4-6km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area (within 5km of its periphery).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019);
• three tanks (T-72) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk); and
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Zbirne (19km south-west of Luhansk).

28 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report of 25 April 2019); and
• a towed howitzer (D-30) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12) near Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk).

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 11 tanks (T-72) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12) in a training area near Shymshynivka (see above).

28 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 18 tanks (T-64), ten towed mortars (120mm) and four surface-to-air-missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above); and
• two tanks (T-64) near Perevalsk.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

29 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Muratove  (51km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-60) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Kalynove.

Unexploded ordnance in Kadiivka and new mine hazard signs near Novoluhanske and Debaltseve

On 29 April, the SMM saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) about 1.5m west of road T-0504 and about 30m north of residential buildings in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), assessed as a 30mm round (of an undetermined weapon).

On 28 April, the SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs on wooden stakes with “Dangerous - Mines” written in Russian and Ukrainian near a former checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 2km north of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) on the east side of a road leading to Semyhiria (government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). On 29 April, the SMM saw for the first time a wooden sign with “Mines – Driving Prohibited” written in Russian, on the north-eastern edge of road M03 near Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 29 April, at a checkpoint in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM passage on a road leading towards Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and the disengagement area near Zolote, citing orders from superiors.
• At a checkpoint north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (one armed) denied the SMM passage on road M-04 past the entrance to a road leading to the Vasylivka pumping station, citing orders from superiors.
• On three occasions at a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, thus preventing it from proceeding eastward, twice citing orders from superiors and once following the SMM’s refusal to show its patrol plan.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

418502 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported workshop on human rights education and awareness-raising among students concluded in Nur-Sultan on 30 April 2019.

The two-day event is the first in a series of four seminars organized by the OSCE Programme Office Nur-Sultan in partnership with the Ombudsman of Kazakhstan and the NGO Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. The event was held at KAZGUU University for some 30 university students, representatives of the Ombudsman’s office and local human rights experts to discuss the international and national mechanisms of human rights protection, related law enforcement practices, and key challenges.

Participants learned from experts about the foundation of human rights concepts and reviewed the practical examples of how to properly ensure and promote citizens’ rights and fundamental freedoms.

A separate session was devoted to activities of National Human Rights Institutions, in particular, the role of the Ombudsman in handling complaints on human rights violations and monitoring closed institutions.

The event will be followed by three workshop sessions in Almaty (South Kazakhstan), Karaganda (Central Kazakhstan) and Ust-Kamenogorsk (East Kazakhstan) during the year. The series is part of the Office’s long-term efforts to promote human rights education in the host country.

418487 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

Strengthening co-operation between police and border guards in the identification and suppression of channels of illegal export, import and transit of victims of human trafficking was the focus of a two-day training seminar, which concluded on 30 April 2019 in Shymkent, Kazakhstan.

The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the United States Embassy in Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan.

Some 20 representatives of the Police departments of the city of Shymkent, the Zhambyl, Kyzylorda and Turkestan regions, as well as officers of the ‘Ontustik’ regional administration of the Border Service of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee,  participated in the training seminar.

They learned about the mechanisms of human trafficking, the specifics of investigation of human trafficking, as well as the international and national anti-trafficking legislation. The curriculum also included techniques for in-depth psychological analysis of a suspect’s verbal and non-verbal behaviour as well as ways to identify specific risk indicators. A number of practical exercises provided the participants with the opportunity to apply their newly acquired knowledge.

The event was part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to support the host country in combating human trafficking and in implementing the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.

418475 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A series of training courses focused on best practices in responding to cases of domestic violence, organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, for deputy heads of the Interior Ministry of Tajikistan concluded on 26 April 2019 in Kulyab city of Khatlon region.

The courses were organized in co-operation with the Interior Ministry’s Departments of Police Reform and Public Order.

A total of 43 participants from the Interior Ministry of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), and the Khatlon and Sughd regions took part in the activities from 10 to 26 April 2019.

The courses were conducted with the use of interactive methods combining presentations, discussions, group work, short videos and role plays.

The participants learned about the forms of violence within the family; the linkage of violence in the family with gender stereotypes and its negative impact on families; international legal obligations to fight domestic violence and international standards of work with aggressors and protection of victims by law enforcement agencies; the psychological aspects of work with aggressors and victims, and the national legal framework to prevent and fight domestic violence.

“The main goal of these training courses was to increase the participants’ knowledge with regard to combating domestic violence,” said expert and psychologist Mahmadullo Davlatov.  “Increased knowledge on the psychological and legal aspects of addressing cases of violence in the family is important for the successful implementation of the Law on prevention of violence in the family in Tajikistan.”

Major General Farhodbek Shodmonzoda, the National Co-ordinator for Police Reform and Mahkam Shukurov, a representative from the Department of Public Order of the Interior Ministry participated in the events and delivered a presentation on existing mechanisms for implementing the law on preventing violence in the family and gender mainstreaming into police reform.

Similar courses were held for regional police officers in Garm, Khujand and Romit in 2018.

MINSK, 29 April 2019 – OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) met today with Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to emphasize the importance of close co-operation between Belarus and the PA, discuss efforts to put an end to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine through the Minsk negotiating process, and address the status of democratic reforms.

“In light of the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine, I am thankful that Belarus has actively engaged with the international community to support mediation efforts and alleviate human suffering,” said President Tsereteli. “These efforts on the international scene must inspire Belarus to also follow through on commitments to democratic reform and ensure that all Belarusian voices are heard.

”The conversation also considered the proposal to convene a summit aimed at strengthening the Helsinki principles and preventing conflicts in the OSCE area. President Lukashenko encouraged such a high-level meeting as a way to break the deadlock in a number of challenging areas for the Organization, recalling that the last OSCE Summit took place in 2010.

In Minsk, President Tsereteli also met with the Chairman of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus, Vladimir Andreichenko, and the Head of the Delegation of Belarus to the OSCE PA, Boleslav Pirshtuk. Talks focused on co-operation between the OSCE PA and the Belarusian parliament, as well as ways to strengthen parliamentary democracy. Tsereteli encouraged his counterparts to make use of OSCE instruments and increase the contributions of civil society to deepen democratic reforms. 

The PA President is scheduled to meet tomorrow with Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei and representatives from opposition parties and civil society to further discuss the need to safeguard fundamental rights and ensure an even playing field ahead of parliamentary elections expected later this year. 

President Tsereteli is taking part in a two-day visit to Belarus, where he is participating in the parliamentary conference of the Silk Road Support Group, hosted by the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus under the theme “Belt and Road: Deepening Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Prosperity.”

In opening the conference, President Tsereteli noted concerns regarding the growing influence of China in the OSCE area and welcomed the opportunity to encourage greater parliamentary oversight over Belt and Road projects.

“As representatives of our citizens, we all have their best interest at heart. It is our ambition to have our populations benefit to the fullest from new projects and investments,” said President Tsereteli. “This requires transforming any initiative to connect our countries more closely into a joint project with co-ownership for all participating States, and to make sure that local workers are hired to multiply the economic benefits of these investments.”

The event includes the participation of high-level members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. It carries on tomorrow with a visit of a Chinese-Belarusian industrial park, located outside of Minsk.