OSCE

417227 Željka Šulc

The first debating competition among universities from across Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was organized by the OSCE Mission to BiH, in co-operation with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the Students’ Union of the Dzemal Bijedic University of Mostar, the Gorgija Debating Club of the University of Zenica. The event was held at the Faculty of Law of the Dzemal Bijedic University from 12 to 14 April 2019 in Mostar.

The competition gathered debating clubs of five public universities from Tuzla, Banja Luka, Zenica, and Mostar.

Over the course of two days, students debated various topics, including combating discrimination, the freedom of assembly, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the quality of higher education in the country.

The final debate was held between the debating clubs of Universities of Tuzla and Banja Luka on the question whether it is possible to eradicate corruption in BiH’s society, with the University of Tuzla as the affirmation side winning first place. The University of “Dzemal Bijedic” Mostar won third place.

The competition aimed at encouraging academic debate and the exchange of arguments among students and young people in general on the issues that are of crucial importance for the advancement of BiH’s society and which highlight the significance of respecting human rights and rule of law.

The OSCE Mission to BiH will continue to support activities aimed at encouraging young people as future leaders to actively engage in social and political processes and in this way contribute to the progress of the country.

The debating competition was supported by the Ministry of Culture and Sports of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

417221 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Judicial Academy of the Czech Republic have agreed to co-operate in enhancing the ability of prosecutors to recognize and prosecute hate crimes in the country, ODIHR and Czech officials announced on 15 April 2019.

“Prosecutors play a key role in addressing hate crimes, as they bring hate crime cases before national courts and make sure that the fact a crime is based on bias is reflected adequately in indictments,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “In so doing, they ultimately build the confidence of hate crime victims towards the justice system. ODIHR’s Prosecutors and Hate Crimes Training (PAHCT) programme will help build prosecutors’ skills to face this challenge.”

Pavel Zeman, the Czech Republic's Prosecutor General, said: “The Czech criminal justice system has a crucial role in countering the general rise of intolerance, one of the main challenges facing us today. Effective prosecution makes perpetrators of hate crimes understand that their actions will never be tolerated in a society based on the values of dignity of each individual and equality of all.”

PAHCT was created in 2014 and has been implemented in four OSCE participating States, so far, with a number of others in discussions to follow suit. The training is fully tailored to the local needs. It is based on a cascade model, which involves the delivery of a train-the-trainer session and consequent training of a pre-defined target group of prosecutors. The agreement to implement the programme in the Czech Republic follows an awareness-raising seminar co-organized by ODIHR and the country’s Government Agent for Human Rights in December 2018.

417215 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe conducted a two-day training course for 28 young men and women, youth representatives of seven registered political parties of Tajikistan, on 12 and 13 April 2019 in Dushanbe.

The participants learned about the significance of gender equality for a secure society, as well as the role of youth in promoting gender equality within their respective parties. The interactive training sessions included group work, role plays and presentations developed by young people themselves.

“The participants had an opportunity to learn key principles of gender equality and its importance to a secure society that functions well for everyone,” said Robert Heuer, Head of the Human Dimension Department of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.  “The Government of Tajikistan has adopted a number of laws and strategies for the advancement of women in politics and society, and this course is complementary to that framework.”

As a result of this course, the most engaged youth representatives were invited to join the OSCE-established network of “Gender Champions” in Tajikistan. The OSCE continuously works with the network and its enlargement, engaging new members from political parties and civil society.

417230 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe donated computer equipment to the Training Centre of the Committee of Emergency Situation and Civil Defence of Tajikistan on 12 April 2019 in Dushanbe.

The donated equipment includes 20 desktop and notebook computers, ten LED monitors, three laser printers and a multimedia projector.

The Committee will use this equipment to collect data in the field, which will allow producing of GIS-maps and advanced analysis. This contributes to better preparedness and response of Tajik authorities in case of emergencies.

“Our Office would like to further strengthen co-operation with the Committee on disaster risk prevention,” said Filippo Crivellaro, Head of the Economic and Environmental Department at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Rustam Nazarzoda, Head of the Committee of Emergency Situation and Civil Defense, thanked the OSCE for its support in enhancing the capacity of Committee’s training centre and expressed interest in future collaboration with the Office.

The donation was made at the request of the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence of Tajikistan.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a woman injured due to shelling in Staromykhailivka on 8 April and the death of a member of State Emergency Services near Maiorsk on 9 April.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from shelling in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and fresh impact craters near populated areas in Orlivka.
• Shots were fired close to the Mission near a compound of the armed formations in Smile on 11 April.
• The SMM recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas near Zernove, Michurine, Smile and Starolaspa.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line. It heard ceasefire violations while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipe near Kruta Balka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The Mission was also denied access at two heavy weapons holding areas in non-government areas of Donetsk region, at a compound near Smile and near Izvaryne close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 315 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 500 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south and south-west of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), west and north of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk) and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (23), compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, were recorded in areas north-east, east and south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and south-south-west of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk).

Shots fired close to the SMM near a compound of the armed formations in Smile

On 11 April, positioned outside of a locked compound of the armed formations in Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a tank (T-72) inside the compound. While speaking with a member of the armed formations who told the SMM that it could not access the compound, the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire at a distance of approximately 20m. The Mission left the area.

Woman injured due to shelling in Staromykhailivka

On 11 April at a traumatology hospital in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled), the Mission saw a woman (in her eighties) lying in bed. She told the Mission that on the morning of 8 April she had been working in the garden of her summer kitchen on Artema Street in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) (a settlement located less than 2km from the contact line) when she had heard explosions. She added she had felt something hit her and seen that her right arm was injured as she was running back to the summer kitchen to take cover there. Medical staff at the traumatology hospital told the SMM that the woman had been transferred from a hospital in Staromykhailivka on 8 April with a fractured left leg and shrapnel injuries to the left leg and left arm.

Death of a member of State Emergency Services

The SMM followed up on the death of a member of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine after the detonation of an explosive device near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) (two other members of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine suffered injuries from the same detonation, see SMM Daily Report 10 April 2019). Medical staff at the morgue in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) told the Mission over the phone that the body of the man (in his thirties) with injuries from a mine explosion had been brought to the morgue on 9 April.

Fresh damage from shelling in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets

On 12 April at 2 Nyzhno Dachna Street in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the Mission saw that all window panes on the north- east-, and west-facing walls of an inhabited house were shattered and that shards of glass were scattered on the ground. It observed shrapnel damage to the wooden frames of the windows as well as to the north- and west-facing wall. The SMM saw that five south- and west-facing windows of a summer kitchen located about 2m north of the house were broken and observed shrapnel damage to its south- and west-facing walls, as well as to the top part of a root cellar that is attached to the kitchen’s east side. West of the house, it observed a shed whose windows and roof were destroyed. The Mission saw at least 15 holes in the ground (5-20cm in diameter), most of them in the area between the house and the summer kitchen. It also observed that branches on the south-eastern side of a tree growing west of the shed were broken and that parts of the bark had been torn off. The SMM assessed all damage as fresh and caused by a mortar round fired from a south-south-easterly direction which impacted in the upper branches of the tree. A man and a woman (in their seventies) who introduced themselves as the residents of the property told the SMM that the damage had been caused during shelling on the morning of 11 April when they were at the property.

Fresh impact craters in Orlivka

The SMM saw five fresh impact craters in fields near populated areas in Orlivka (government-controlled, 22km north-west of Donetsk). The closest crater was located about 40m from an inhabited house. The Mission assessed that three craters, one of which contained an unexploded projectile, were probably caused by artillery rounds coming from a north-easterly direction; two craters also as probably caused by artillery rounds but the direction of fire could not be determined.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 11 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 12 April, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-west (it was unable to assess whether they occurred inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission heard and saw 16 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-7km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed on 10 April the presence of two new trench extensions (not seen in imagery from 25 March 2019) totalling about 160 meters, about 1.2km south of Petrivske and about 950m east and 1.5km east-north-east, respectively, of the eastern edge of the Petrivske disengagement area.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

11 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Zernove (70km south of Donetsk);
• nine tanks (probable T-72) near Michurine (61km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014; and
• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk).

The SMM saw a tank (T-72) inside a compound in Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

11 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (types undetermined), two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and nine self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

11 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted ten tanks (T-72) in a training are near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Weapons permanent storage sites[4]

At permanent storage sites in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

12 April

The SMM noted that 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Non-government-controlled areas

9 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 11 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (types undetermined) in a training area near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

11 April 

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two ACVs (types undetermined) in a compound in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol);
• nine infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in a training area near Zernove and five ACVs (types undetermined) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), all in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014; and
• four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and an IFV (BMD variant) in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled areas

11 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

12 April

The SMM saw

• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);

• two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk); and
• seven IFVs (four BMP-1 and three BMP variants) and an APC (MT-LB-S) in Popasna.

The Mission saw an unidentified UAV flying at a height of around 100m above its position approximately 2.7km west of Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk).

Demining activities

The SMM saw five people in civilian clothing, each holding a mine detector, in a field about 300m west of road P66, about 2km east-south-east of Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to power lines in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and to water conduits near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).

During the monitoring of adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipe near Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), a representative of Voda Donbassa water company told the Mission over the phone that the works had to be cancelled due to shelling in the area. The SMM was not able to follow up due to security considerations. Positioned near Kruta Balka, the Mission heard 21 undetermined explosions as well as shots and burst of small-arms fire in the area (for all ceasefire violations recorded in the area, see the attached table).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates) and two covered cargo  trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 44 cars (22 with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation, one with Lithuanian and one with Belarusian licence plates, and six with “LPR” plates), 25 covered cargo trucks (nine with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, four with Belarusian and one with Uzbek licence plates, and five with “LPR” plates) and 35 pedestrians waiting in a queue to exit Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven pedestrians entering Ukraine and 11 pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On 11 April, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw a car with “DPR” plates, a tanker truck with Ukrainian licence plates, a covered cargo truck with “DPR” plates, a bus with “DPR” plates and seven pedestrians entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 21 cars (three with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and ten with “DPR” plates), 20 covered cargo trucks (ten with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation, two with Georgian and two Lithuanian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian exiting Ukraine.

On 11 April, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the Mission did not see any cross-border traffic.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 11 April, at a compound of the armed formations in Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations refused to let the SMM enter, stating that he did not have the authority to grant access (see above).
• Members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to two heavy weapons holding areas in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing “lack of permission.”
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he was not aware of any demining activities having taken place in the past 24 hours.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations stopped the SMM on two occasions. They allowed it to pass through the checkpoint respectively after about 20 and 50 minutes.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass only upon being escorted by a car of the armed formations during its patrol of the settlement.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 10-11 April, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as jamming, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.[6]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The last sentence in the weapons permanent storage sites section of SMM Daily Report 12 April 2019 should have read “The SMM noted that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one towed howitzer (D-30) were missing.”

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw gunfire damage and a crater at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government controlled areas.
• It saw unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and the Donetsk Filtration Station and mines in Trokhizbenka.
• The SMM saw mine hazard signs in Krasnyi Lyman and Pryshyb and demining activities in Volnovakha.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a checkpoint near Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 500), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and areas south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), both of which are in the vicinity of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 260), compared with the previous reporting period (about 380 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded in easterly, north-easterly, and south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Gunfire damage and a crater at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 10 April, at School No.4 located at 4 Myru Street in the south-eastern outskirts of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), about 1.3km east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a large (35x35cm) hole in a west-facing window of a one-storey school building assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel and a crater in a yard 35m west of it (direction of fire and type of weapon could not be assessed). It also saw a smaller hole in a third-floor west-facing window of a three-storey school building located 5-7m east assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. An employee (female, 45 years old) of the school told the SMM that classes had been in session when she had heard shelling in the morning of 9 April and that pupils and staff took cover in the school shelter until the afternoon. When the SMM was present on 10 April, classes had resumed. The school was previously damaged by small-arms fire on 17 January 2019 (see SMM Daily Report 22 January 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned about 3km south-west of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard 16 explosions and 12 bursts of small-arms fire (unable to be assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as three undetermined explosions and seven shots of small-arms fire all originating 1-2km south-west which were assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned about 3km north of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 106 shots of small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. [3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

9 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three tanks (type undetermined) north of Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

9 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a probable tank (type undetermined) east-north-east of Svobodne, in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (see above).

11 April

The SMM saw three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1, Gvozdika 122mm) and four tanks (T-72) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

10 April

The SMM noted that:

• 52 tanks (T-64), 22 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona, 120mm) remained missing and
• eight self-propelled mortars (2S9) were present and six tanks (T-72) were present for the first time.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

10 April

The SMM noted that four mortars (one 2B9 Voloshka, 82mm and three BM-37, 82mm) remained missing. It also noted weapons present for the first time.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

11 April

The SMM noted that nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and eight towed howitzers (D-30) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

10 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

11 April

The SMM saw:

• a trench digger (type unidentified) in the yard of a civilian house along with freshly-dug trenches extending 70m towards a checkpoint near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and three unidentified) and an armoured ambulance (MT-LB-S) near Popasna (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 April 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 April

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four IFVs (BMP variants) near Kozatske (86km south of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (see above).

Presence of mines in Trokhizbenka and unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and the Donetsk Filtration Station

On 10 April, the SMM again saw ten anti-tank mines (TM-62) on road 1315 about 50m north-west of a destroyed bridge in Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as rockets from a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (probable BM-21, Grad 122mm), and several other objects, assessed as remnants of BM-21 rockets, lying on the ground on both sides of road M03 on the north-western edge of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM assessed that the UXOs are not recent.

On 11 April, the SMM saw again three pieces of UXO assessed as rockets from an MLRS (probable BM-21) embedded in roads in the vicinity of the DFS. Two rockets were embedded in road H-20 about 160-230m south-west of the DFS and one rocket was embedded in road M-04 about 900m south-south-east of the DFS. About 70m north-east of the previous observations, embedded in a sandy surface between lanes of road M-04, the SMM saw an unexploded high-explosive anti-tank warhead (HEAT).

Mine hazard signs in Krasnyi Lyman and Pryshyb and demining activities in Volnovakha

For the first time, the SMM saw seven red square signs with “MINES” written in Russian, assessed as mine hazard signs. One sign was next to a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and the other six were located on both sides of road T-13-15 near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the south-eastern outskirts of Pryshyb (non-government-controlled, 34km north-west of Luhansk).

Near Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw four members of an international demining organization conducting demining and UXO-clearing activities near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water conduits near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, to a water pipeline near Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), and to power lines near Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), and Khoroshe (non-government-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated repairs to power lines near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and was told by senior personnel that the repairs have been completed, providing electricity to about 1,300 civilians. The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two different occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons

COPENHAGEN, 12 April 2019 – The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is deploying nearly 50 observers, including 31 parliamentarians, to North Macedonia next week for the 21 April presidential election. The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office has appointed French parliamentarian Sereine Mauborgne as Special Co-ordinator to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission. Austrian parliamentarian Reinhold Lopatka will lead the OSCE PA’s delegation of observers. 

“This election presents an opportunity for voters to give direction on what they see as the future and long-term goals of North Macedonia,” Mauborgne said. “I hope to observe a competitive election and a constructive campaign, in line with international standards.”

Lopatka said: “North Macedonia has the opportunity with this election to demonstrate a clear commitment to democratic processes. I expect the authorities and electoral contestants to seize this opportunity and to ensure a well-run election that meets international expectations.”

Mauborgne serves as Head of the French Delegation to the OSCE PA and Lopatka serves as Deputy Head of the Austrian Delegation to the OSCE PA. They will deliver the post-election statement of preliminary findings and conclusions at a press conference in Skopje on 22 April.

For the 21 April presidential election, the OSCE PA will work closely with observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

This will be the ninth election the OSCE PA has observed in the country since 1994.

For previous assessments of North Macedonian elections, please click here.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day training course aimed at further strengthening the capacity of Albania to counter terrorist financing was organized from 10 to 12 April 2019, in Tirana.

The training seminar was delivered to Albanian experts and practitioners from the General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering (GDPML) (Albanian Financial Intelligence Unit), the State Intelligence Service (SHISH), the Albanian State Police, the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecution Office for Serious Crimes. Thirty-four participants attended the course, of which seventeen trainees and five local trainers. Seven trainees and local trainers were women. The course was attended by thirteen female participants.

The course was organized jointly by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, the OSCE Presence in Albania, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Global Programme against Money Laundering, and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and hosted by the Security Academy of Albania.

The training course was conducted to strengthen Albania’s compliance with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments. It was led by OSCE, UNODC and Western Union international experts together with five local government officials who were previously trained by the OSCE and the UNODC in a train-the-trainer setting.

The course emphasized the key role of inter-agency co-operation in disrupting terrorist financing.  Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, it included sessions on national, regional and transnational threats, sources of information, money flows. More than half of the course was devoted to practical work on exercises and actual case studies, highlighting specific instruments and techniques that play an important role in countering the financing of terrorism.

The course was organized as part of a comprehensive multiannual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in in South-Eastern Europe. 

417140 Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek supported the bringing together of more than 80 representatives of religious organizations and communities of Kyrgyzstan for a tree-planting event in the capital on 6 April 2019. Some 100 trees were planted during the event, which aimed at enhancing inter-confessional dialogue, promoting inter-religious tolerance and raising public awareness about the denominations represented in the country.

The event was jointly organized with the State Committee for Religious Affairs in partnership with the Bishkek Mayor’s Office and with the support of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) in Kyrgyzstan.

This is the first of several public events to be held under the auspices of the Inter-Confessional Council of Kyrgyzstan. The Council was established in 2018 with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek. It brings together representatives of 17 religious organizations from across the country, and its main goal is to strengthen interfaith dialogue, foster the principles of respect for various beliefs, build tolerance, as well as work towards the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism.

417131

Some 70 experts and practitioners involved in multilingual education shared their experiences at a conference on “Multilingual education in the OSCE region: experiences and perspectives for Moldova” on 11 April 2019 in Chisinau. The conference was organized by the office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research of Moldova.

The participants included representatives of regional education authorities and people working to develop educational content across Moldova; representatives of national minority communities; and international experts from Estonia, Georgia, Italy, the Netherlands, North Macedonia and Spain.

Opening the conference, Moldova’s Minister of Education, Culture and Research Monica Babuc said: “Creating the necessary conditions for a balanced approach to enable national minorities to learn the Romanian language and their mother tongue is one of the priorities of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research. In this regard, multilingual education brings added value to all citizens and is a tool to enhance mutual understanding and tolerance.“

The participants shared their experiences of multilingual education, both in Moldova and across the OSCE region, and discussed recommendations for the future of multilingual education in Moldova.

HCNM Director Christophe Kamp highlighted the concepts and good practices in multilingual education that the office of the High Commissioner and its partners have identified, tested and promoted over the past 25 years in the OSCE region.

“This conference offers an opportunity to engage in an open and critical discussion about the manner in which these multilingual education models and approaches can be applied and further developed in practice in Moldova,” he said.

International experts presented a variety of multilingual education models that can be adapted to accommodate diversity in different regional contexts.

The High Commissioner’s office emphasizes the need to strike a balance between preserving and developing the languages of minorities and creating opportunities to learn the State language in all multi-ethnic states so that all citizens can be fully engaged in public life, feel that they belong to their socisety and realize their full potential.

The conference was an opportunity for the High Commissioner’s office to deepen its co-operation with the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research, based on the understanding that multilingual education can offer solutions for the integration of diverse societies.

VIENNA, 11 April 2019 – The benefits and potential of biometric technology in countering terrorism, and how to responsibly use and share collected biometric data, are being explored at a two-day conference which launched today in Vienna. More than 200 decision-makers, policy-makers, experts in biometrics and private sector representatives from the OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation are taking part.

The ID@Borders and Future of Travel Conference is organized jointly by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department and the Biometrics Institute.

The conference is designed to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017), a milestone decision in the international efforts to detect and prevent the movement of Foreign Terrorist Fighters. The Resolution decided that States shall develop and implement systems to collect biometric data (such as fingerprints, photographs and facial recognition) in order to responsibly and properly identify terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters, and develop watch lists or databases of known and suspected terrorists.

The Resolution also calls upon international and regional organizations like the OSCE to provide technical assistance, resources, and capacity-building to States in order to implement such systems.

“The goal of the conference is to help the OSCE participating States to implement Resolution 2396: Preventing the movement of terrorists, building capacities where needed, and encouraging good practices in information sharing,” said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger. “The Biometrics Institute and the OSCE are a good match. The Institute brings its subject-matter expertise and network of biometrics professionals, while the OSCE is an inter-governmental organization with 57 States. We use politically-binding decisions to implement UN Resolutions, and have the local expertise to build capacity on the ground.”

Lukáš Parízek, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic and Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, stressed: “Part of our role, as the OSCE Chairmanship, is to promote dialogue and co-operation where it is most needed. In order for border security to be most effective and efficient, we need real information sharing. That’s where this conference can make a difference. It is bringing together countries, which are already using advanced biometric technology, with those who are in the development phase.”

Isabelle Moeller, Chief Executive of the Biometrics Institute, said: “The Institute’s mission is to promote the responsible and ethical use of biometrics in an international and independent forum. We are a multi-stakeholder community from around the world, not only of government agencies but also suppliers, and other user sectors such as aviation and travel as well as academics, privacy advocates and regulators. Over the past 17 years we have closely engaged with many countries on border management discussions and good practices. Finding like-minded partners who can help support our outreach was why we partnered with the OSCE for this conference.”

Ahead of the conference, experts from the OSCE and the Biometrics Institute conducted a half-day specialized training course for representatives and experts of States not yet using biometric technology.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh damage caused by probable mortar or automatic grenade launcher rounds to residential houses in Pervomaisk.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• It observed that the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka had re-opened following its closure on 6 April.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a compound in Luhansk city and at a checkpoint near Yasynuvata.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period (about 310 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north of Donetsk city and in areas south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 380), compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage to residential houses in Pervomaisk

On 9 April, at 59 Luhova Street on the northern outskirts of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), about 1km south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three shattered north-facing windows and a 1m by 0.5m hole in the north-facing side of the roof of a one storey house, as well as marks on a fence about 3m north of the house. About 5m east of the house, in the same compound, the SMM saw two shattered west-facing windows in another one-storey house. The SMM assessed that all damage was fresh and caused by rounds from a probable 82mm mortar or automatic grenade launcher; however, it could not assess the direction of fire. A resident of the house (man, 70 years old) told the SMM that he had heard shelling on the morning of 9 April.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 9 April and during the day on 10 April, in two locations close to the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM recorded nine projectiles and four undetermined explosions, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

Positioned about 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed distance of 5km south-west, unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area.

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

10 April

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in the north-western outskirts of Komyshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

9 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) about 20m from a residential house near Kalynivka (55km north-east of Donetsk);
• two multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk); and
• two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vynohradne (34km east of Donetsk).

10 April

The SMM saw six MLRS (BM-21 Grad) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the former Luhansk airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 10 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted five tanks (type undetermined) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (probable 9K37) near Dachenske (49km north-west of Donetsk).

10 April

The SMM saw:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (a 9K37 and a S-300) near Lisne (20km north-west of Mariupol) and

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) in a compound in Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk).

9 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 15 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk) and
• ten tanks in a training area near Pokrovka.

10 April

The SMM saw seven tanks (type undetermined) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at the former Luhansk airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019); 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

8 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (one BMP-1 and two probable BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

10 April

The SMM saw:

• five APCs (BTR-70) in Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk);
• five IFVs (three BMP-1 and two BMP variants) in the eastern outskirts of Popasna;
• an IFV (BMP-2) south-east of Valuiske (20km north-east of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-80) in Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of ten probable military-type armoured vehicles (type unidentified) in a training area near Novoselivka (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 March 2019).

8 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-70) and an armoured communication vehicle (R-145) on an APC (MT-LB) chassis near Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk).

9 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

10 April

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A) in Luhansk city, and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

Re-opening of the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka

The SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) had re-opened on 10 April after its closure on 6 April following the wounding of two men (a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer and a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier) by gunfire at the EECP (see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019). The Mission saw lower than usual amounts of traffic at the EECP, with 20 civilian vehicles and about 100 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and fewer than ten vehicles queuing to exit government-controlled areas. At the checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) on the same day, the SMM saw 200-250 civilian vehicles and 50-60 pedestrians queuing to exit non-government-controlled areas and about 20 vehicles queuing to enter non-government-controlled areas.

Mines near Shchastia and unexploded ordnance spotted near Uzhivka

On 8 April, south of the bridge in Shchastia, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) across road H-21, south of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019).

In Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that a previously observed tailfin of a 120mm mortar bomb protruding from the asphalt on the edge of the road was still present.

In the eastern outskirts of Popasna, the SMM saw that four of the previously observed five anti-tank mines (TM-62) south of road T0504 had been destroyed by probable ground fire and that the remaining anti-tank mine was without a fuse as a result of probable ground fire.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); to power lines near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) and near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk); as well as to water pipelines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) and near Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a compound where the SMM observed ACVs in Luhansk city, citing safety concerns.
• Two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) refused to let the SMM travel on road M-04 past the turn to Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), citing “orders from their superior”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 9-10 April, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as jamming, while flying over non-government-controlled Yelyzaveto-Mykolaivka (45km south-east of Donetsk),  Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk), Berehove (38km south-east of Donetsk) and Olhynske (55km south-east of Donetsk). [4]
• On 10 April, while following up on a civilian casualty, medical staff at a hospital in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) again refused to provide the SMM with information or allow the SMM to speak with the alleged civilian patient, citing the need for written permission from those in control.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the BiH Ministry of Defence organized a visit to the new ammunition testing laboratory in a Technical Workshop for Repair and Destruction of Ammunition (TROM Doboj) on 11 April 2019 in Doboj.

The laboratory was opened within the project for the Safety Upgrade of Ammunition and Weapons Storage Sites in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SAFE-UP), being implemented by the OSCE Mission to BiH.

Representatives of donor countries which financed the project, the BiH Armed Forces, EUFOR and NATO Headquarters had an opportunity to observe first-hand the application of the latest technology in examining the chemical stability of ammunition.

“Less than a year ago, in July 2018, the SAFE-UP Project provided for the establishment of a laboratory for chemical and thermal analysis of ammunition,” said Alexander Chuplygin, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH. “This significant achievement will help our BiH partners in the safe-keeping of ammunition, contributing to the safety of both the civilian population and military personnel.”

The SAFE-UP Project aims to improve safety and security at prospective weapons and ammunition storage sites in BiH. It is financed by 14 donor countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina as a host country: Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Switzerland and Turkey.

The OSCE Mission to BiH will continue to provide assistance in ensuring the sustainability of the Laboratory through training and equipment. The Mission will also continue the partnership with the BiH Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces to support their efforts in implementing the set of important strategic documents and plans.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Two members of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine injured and one reportedly dead after the detonation of an explosive device near Maiorsk.
• The SMM observed damage from mortar rounds to residential houses in Trokhizbenka and damage from gunfire to residential houses in Pikuzy.
• It recorded ceasefire violations and military presence inside the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas, as well as mines seen for the first time in the Petrivske disengagement area. 
• The SMM observed long queues of civilians at a checkpoint near Olenivka and saw that the entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove had re-opened.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM observed, for the first time, mines and unexploded ordnance near Krasnohorivka and Debaltseve.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and demining activities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. In addition, the Mission was denied access near non-government-controlled Shevchenko, Hryhorivka and Novoazovsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 460 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), north-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly and easterly directions of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period  (about 150 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Two members of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine injured and one reportedly dead after the detonation of an explosive device near Maiorsk

At the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) on road T-0513, the SMM saw two ambulances, two men (aged 20-30) in State Emergency Services of Ukraine uniforms lying on stretchers  and with injuries to their faces and upper limbs. The SMM also saw six Ukrainian Armed Forces members (four men and two women), including three with Red Cross insignia, standing next to the injured men. The SMM saw the soldiers provide first aid to both injured men prior to putting them in the ambulances. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that a third deminer had died after the detonation of an explosive device during demining activities that all three were conducting between Maiorsk and Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk). At the hospital in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, government-controlled, 67km north of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that two men (aged 20-30) had been admitted with injuries caused by an explosion and that one of them had lost both eyes and needed a surgery on his right arm.

Fresh damage from mortar rounds to residential houses in Trokhizbenka

On 8 April, on the western edge of Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk), at 152 Donetska Street, the SMM saw four shattered windows and fresh scratches in their wooden frames, as well as fresh marks assessed as shrapnel damage in the south-facing wall of a barn located about 33m north of a single-storey house and about 600m from a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 1m further north, the SMM saw a hole in the roof of a second barn. At 154 Donetska Street, about 55m north-east of another single-storey house, the SMM saw a fresh crater and scorch marks within a 15m radius of the crater, as well as scorched tree branches on the nearby ground. About 32m north of the same house, the SMM saw a hole (assessed as fresh damage) in the west side of the roof of a barn. At 156 Donetska Street, the SMM saw 10-15 holes in the east- and north-facing walls of a single-storey house (all assessed as fresh shrapnel damage).

At 166 Donetska Street (about 100m west of the previous house), in a field about 40m north of an abandoned single-storey house, the SMM saw a fresh crater with scorch marks around it. At 168 Donetska Street, the SMM saw five freshly shattered windows in the west-, north- and south-facing walls) of a single-storey house as well as a fresh crater about 5m west of the same house. At 237 Donetska Street (about 5m north of the previous house), the SMM saw a hole in the west-facing side of the roof of a single-storey house, assessed as fresh shrapnel damage, as well as a fresh crater about 75m west-south-west of the same house (and 12m south of a local road).

The SMM assessed all the craters and damage to residential houses as caused by mortar rounds fired from a south-south-easterly direction. Four residents of the above-mentioned street (three women and a man, aged 50-60) separately told the SMM that they had been in their houses with their families when shelling had occurred in the evening of 6 April. 

Fresh damage from gunfire to residential houses in Pikuzy

On the north-western edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk), at 26 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw the freshly burned interiors of a summer house,  a freshly burned and shattered north-facing window (with glass shards on the ground) and a burned and collapsed roof connecting the summer house to a main single-storey house. The SMM could not assess the cause of the damage. In the centre of Pikuzy, at 7 Peremohy Street, the SMM saw a hole in the tin roof of a barn located about 5m south-east of a house as well as scattered tin plates on the same roof. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by heavy-machine-gun fire from a north-westerly direction. At both locations, the owners of the houses (men, aged 60-70) said that shelling had occurred in the late morning hours of 5 April.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 8 April, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1), one north of the railway tracks and west of road T-316, with four people wearing camouflaged clothing assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in the vicinity, and the other two 550m and 750m north-east, respectively, of the abovementioned IFV and south of the railways tracks. The same UAV again spotted at least 12 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in two rows across road T-1316, about 200m south of the railway tracks. All IFVs and mines were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In the early morning of 9 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 14 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. The same day, positioned in five locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as 39 undetermined explosions and 69 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 8 April, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 200 anti-tank mines (TM-62) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), laid out in two rows running from north to south for about 300m, about 700m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1km east of its western edge. The UAV also again spotted 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows across the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 170m north of the disengagement area. On the northern side of the road, the UAV spotted 22 anti-tank mines (TM-62) as well as at least 150 anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the south side of the road which run from north to south in one row for about 500m and extend about 300m into the disengagement area. About 150m west of the aforementioned 11 anti-tank mines, the UAV also again spotted about 25 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in four rows across the road. (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 14 March 2018).

The same UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) inside the Petrivske disengagement area, about 1.2km east of its western edge and about 1.2km south of its northern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  

On 9 April, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-5km west-south-west, assessed as inside the Petrivske disengagement area. [3]   

On 9 April, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled

9 April

The SMM saw eight towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) at the railway station in Bakhmut (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

8 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 15 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk);
• seven MLRS (BM-21) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk); and
• three self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk). 

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (probable T-64) about 10m from a residential building on the eastern outskirts of Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

9 April

The SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika,122mm), seven MLRS (BM-21) and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

8 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• ten tanks (types undetermined) and three self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above) and
• four tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (see above).

9 April

The SMM saw six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and seven tanks (T-72) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (see above).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

5 April             

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near a residential building on the eastern outskirts of Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

8 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (Saxon) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km north-west of Luhansk).

9 April

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk);
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk); and
• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles  (BRDM-2) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

On 9 April, the SMM saw a green and yellow helicopter (assessed as a MI-2) flying from west to north at an altitude of 600m about 5km east-north-east of Raihorodka.

Situation of civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

On 9 April, the Mission again observed long queues of cars at a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). It saw that the queue of cars waiting to travel to government-controlled areas was about 3km long, and the queue of cars waiting to travel in the opposite direction was about 500m long. On the same day, the SMM saw that the entry-exit checkpoint in Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) had been re-opened for civilian traffic. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019).

Unexploded ordnance seen for the first time near Debaltseve and Verkhnoshyrokivske

On 8 April, the SMM saw for the first time seven pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) assessed as MLRS rockets (six as Grad and one as Uragan, 220mm) protruding from the ground in a field on the eastern side of road M-03, about 3km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

On 9 April, about 1.2km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time a piece of UXO on a local road between Verkhnoshyrokivske and Pyshchevyk used by civilians. In a field about 3m south of the road, the SMM also observed for the first time two grenade launcher rounds (PG-7L): one lying on the ground and the tailfin of the second embedded in the ground.

Presence of mines

On 4 April, about 1km south-east of Krasnohorivka, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time eight anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows across a road between Krasnohorivka and Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 300 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows about 4km west of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol). About 1.5km north-east of Vodiane, the same UAV again spotted nine anti-tank mines laid across a road and again about 50 anti-tank mines laid out in four rows in the fields north and south of the road, as well as again about 90 anti-tank mines laid out in four rows north and south of a dirt track about 200m east of Vodiane. 

On 8 April, near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), about 2.5km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines laid out across the western lane of road H-21 as well as 42 anti-tank mines in a field south of the same road adjacent to the above-mentioned four mines. The same UAV again spotted at least eight anti-tank mines laid out across the same road about 550m north-west of the four mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); to water pipelines near Maiorsk and Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk); to power transmission lines near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) and Staromykhailivka (non-government controlled, 15km west of Donetsk); and to power lines near Holubivka and between Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), as well as to enable demining activities near the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 9 April, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw nine cars (eight with Ukrainian and one with Polish licence plates) and two pedestrians entering Ukraine, as well as 12 cars (four with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 40 minutes, the Mission saw four cars (one with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine, as well as two cars with “DPR” plates and two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.

The SMM observed a calm situation in areas south-east of Kherson

On 7 April, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

Gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv on 9 April, the SMM monitored a pre-announced public gathering by National Corps and Natsionalni Druzhyny (see SMM Daily Report 25 March 2019). The Mission saw about 800 people (mostly young men, aged 18-30), some of them wearing insignia of the above-mentioned groups and carrying banners critical of government officials, gathered at 1 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street. The SMM saw about half of the group start to march towards the headquarters of the State Security Service of Ukraine at 33 Volodymyrska Street while the other half marched towards the Office of the Prosecutor General at 13/15 Riznytska Street, the Ministry of Interior Affairs at 10 Akademika Bohomoltsa Street and the building of the Presidential administration at 11 Bankova Street. At these last three locations, the SMM heard participants expressing views criticial of the government. It observed an overall calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 9 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area and prevented the Mission from continuing westwards.
• On the eastern edge of Hryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing orders “not to let anyone enter” the settlement.
• On the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM on road E-58 and prevented it from continuing westward to Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), citing an “ongoing operation” in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared (see above for observations).

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations stopped the SMM. They allowed it to pass through the checkpoint after about an hour.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

MINSK, 10 April 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 10 April 2019:

“Discussion of the overall security situation and preparation for the announcement of the ceasefire on the occasion of Easter holidays formed the basis of today's activities of the Security Working Group.

As a result, the TCG agreed on the need to declare this ceasefire and agreed to hold an additional videoconference on 18 April 2019 to finalize the details of this ceasefire.

Experience shows that the sides’ political will is essential for an effective and long-lasting ceasefire. When it is the case, it can be easily achieved.

Moreover, the Working Group on Security discussed additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire and humanitarian demining.

The participants of the Economic Working Group expressed their concern over the situation the "Voda Donbasa" company in connection with power supply disruptions early this month.

Once again, I urge the sides to ensure the safety and sustainable operation of the "Voda Donbasa" company and all other vital civilian infrastructure facilities.

The Co-ordinator of the Humanitarian Working Group, Ambassador Toni Frisch, presented the results of his visit to the detention centres in the east of Ukraine on both sides of the contact line as of April 3 to 9. During the visit, he met detainees, their relatives and friends, as well as relatives of missing persons”.

416780 Communication and Media Relations Section

Current trends and challenges in securing and managing borders were highlighted at the two-day 13th Annual Meeting of the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Points Network, which concluded on 10 April 2019 in Bratislava.

The event brought together more than 100 participants from across the OSCE area.

Organized by Slovakia's 2019 OSCE Chair and the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, this year’s meeting focused on crisis management at the borders, combating trafficking in human beings, gender mainstreaming in the security sector and effective cross-border management tools and mechanisms for the 21st century.

Opening the meeting were the Director of the Border and Foreign Police of the Slovak Republic, Ladislav Csémi; Co-ordinator of OSCE Activities to Address Transnational Threats, Rasa Ostrauskaite; and Head of the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, Dennis Cosgrove.

“We live in the era of growing human mobility when women and men, children and elderly people travel and cross borders more frequently than ever before. It is imperative to ensure that border security and management is carried out in ways that are effective, consistent and firm, yet flexible when needed,” said Csémi.

Ostrauskaite said: “To increase security in the OSCE area, it is vital to address the phenomenon of trafficking in human beings, which remains a major concern for the OSCE participating States. We have to promote and ensure gender equality in border services as this will increase its operational effectiveness.”

In discussions with experts from the Slovak Interior Ministry’s Crisis Management Directorate General, the International Organization for Migration, the Refugees Initiative Regional Centre and the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre, the National Focal Points spoke about the level of preparedness for crises in their national services as well as the available mechanisms and tools addressing cross-border crises in the OSCE area.

With experts from Belgium, the OSCE Gender Section and Slovakia’s Interior Ministry, they explored the importance of women in border security, and looked at effective ways to include a gender perspective in border security and management and to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Furthermore, the OSCE’s National Focal Points on Border Security engaged in discussions on possible ways to optimize standard operating procedures to better prevent and combat human trafficking, and were provided with innovative training approaches to combat this crime.

The Focal Points also visited the Academy of the Police Force of Slovakia, where they were introduced to the technical means used by the country’s Border Police.

VIENNA, 10 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, denounced the search conducted on 9 April in the editorial office of the Belsat TV channel in Minsk, Belarus. He called on the authorities to exercise restraint in bringing libel charges against media and journalists, and reiterated his call on the authorities to decriminalize defamation. 

During their search, law enforcement authorities seized data and notebooks after a public official filed a complaint for libel against one of the journalists of the TV channel in January 2019. The complaint relates to inaccurate information that Belsat initially published on 11 July 2018, and which it corrected on 25 July 2018.

“I am alarmed by the search at the Belsat editorial office in Minsk and the seizure of data and notebooks from the journalists,” Désir said. “This obstructs the work of the independent media, and raises concerns about the protection of the journalists’ confidential sources. The media published a correction after a mistake in publication. It is crucial that public officials refrain from bringing criminal charges against journalists, and I call on the authorities to decriminalize defamation in line with international standards.”

In December 2018, the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists called on the participating States to “ensure that defamation laws do not carry excessive sanctions or penalties that could undermine the safety of journalists and/or effectively censor journalists and interfere with their mission of informing the public and, where necessary, to revise and repeal such laws.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce

BISHKEK, 10 April 2019 – Marking the 20th anniversary of OSCE presence in Kyrgyzstan during his visit to Bishkek yesterday, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák emphasized the strong Kyrgyz-OSCE partnership and close collaboration on promoting good governance, strengthening democratic institutions and reforming the electoral system.

Discussing past and future OSCE initiatives, in his meetings with the political leadership in Bishkek, including President Sooronbai Zheenbekov, Foreign Minister Chyngyz Aidarbekov, and Speaker of the Parliament Dastanbek Djumabekov, Minister Lajčák stressed that “the OSCE and the Slovak Chairmanship stand ready to support Kyrgyzstan in consolidating stability, and furthering development and reform efforts.”

Being in Kyrgyzstan a day after visiting Kazakhstan, the Chairperson emphasized that Central Asia is adding to the rich spectrum of perspectives embodied by the 57 OSCE participating States: “You are at the crossroads of ancient civilizations; of different religions, languages and worlds,” he said.

“The OSCE´s direct contribution to the stability of Kyrgyzstan, and the wider region, is vivid and vast. I strongly welcome the work of the OSCE - in establishing the building blocks for peace and stability from the ground up. It is clear that the organization is not here to teach or impose anything. Instead, it is here to listen and learn, to create new platforms for dialogue and exchange, to build capacities,” Minister Lajčák said opening the event on “20 years OSCE presence in Kyrgyzstan, achievements and future prospects”.

The breadth of the Programme Office’s work over the past 20 years is illustrated by activities ranging from working with national actors to counter terrorism and corruption, facilitate cross-border trade, and raise environmental awareness, to promoting participation of women in political life and supporting efforts to improve the access of persons with disabilities to the electoral process.

Highlighting the OSCE Academy, a flagship project on engaging young people in security and stability, Minister Lajčák said: “It is a crucial platform - linking not only universities from across the entire OSCE area, but also young people from this region, including Afghanistan and Mongolia.”

“This is positive in the short-term. It builds new bridges; pools information; fosters understanding. But the real benefits will also be seen in years to come – when the Academy’s alumni continue to interact and indeed lead from within their communities, workplaces and governments,” he added. “It embodies the spirit of Kyrgyzstan-OSCE co-operation.”

Addressing the students, Minister Lajčák said: “The world is finally waking up to the potential of youth; to the fact that young men and women are the change-makers, the peacebuilders, the innovators of both today and tomorrow. I know this is particularly true in Central Asia. But there is still more room for engagement and inclusion.”

Before leaving Kyrgyzstan, the Chairperson-in-Office used the opportunity to listen to the views of civil society representatives, who help to ensure that the work of the OSCE is in line with the realities on the ground. He told the group of people active in different areas that civil society is now part of our multilateral ecosystem. “We know that security is not something that is installed from the top down. Rather, it must be built - block by block - on foundations such as tolerance, pluralism, human rights and democracy. And you here today are the people helping to lay down these building blocks.”

VIENNA, 10 April 2019 – Additional information is now available for the international conference on the safety of journalists organized by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in Vienna on 12 April 2019.

The material includes biographies on key speakers at the event, a backgrounder on the violent attacks or threats of violence experienced by many journalists in the pursuit of their work, and an updated conference agenda. The information kit is available for download here: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/416588. All event information is available here: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/415115.

The conference will bring together many journalists who have experienced violence, or relatives and co-workers of victims of such attacks, including the son of killed Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia and the Chief Editor of Aktuality.sk, where murdered Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak worked. The event will also be attended by international media experts, academics and policymakers from over 30 countries.

Representatives of the media are invited to attend the event from 9:00 to 18:30 on 12 April 2019 in the Neuer Saal of the Hofburg Conference Centre. Please register by sending an email to nicolas.ebnother@osce.org by 12:00 noon, Thursday, 11 April 2019. For interview requests, please contact Alexander Nitzsche at alexander.nitzsche@osce.org.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on facebook.com/osce.rfom. 

Contact:

Alexander Nitzsche

Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 

Wallnerstrasse 6

1010, Vienna, Austria

Mobile: +43 664 425 4152

alexander.nitzsche@osce.org

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• A man and a woman were injured by an explosive device in Verkhnotoretske.
• The Mission observed fresh damage from small-arms fire to a functioning hospital in Donetsk city.
• The SMM observed fresh craters and unexploded ordnance in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and mines and unexploded ordnance near Dolmitne and Novotroitske.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. In addition, the Mission was denied access at a border crossing point near non-government-controlled Dovzhanske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 460 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 90 explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), south-westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), and northerly directions of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 270 explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-easterly and south-westerly directions of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

A man and a woman were injured by an explosive device in Verkhnotoretske

At a hospital in Toretsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a woman (54 years old) with bandages on her face and head. Medical staff told the SMM that the woman had been admitted on 6 April with shrapnel injuries to her face, eye and skull, and had undergone surgery. The woman told the SMM that on 6 April she had been cleaning graves with her husband in a cemetery in Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) when an unidentified explosive device detonated and wounded her and her husband. In Verkhnotoretske, the SMM spoke with the woman’s husband (mid-50’s) and saw that he had sustained approximately 20 small scratches to his face and hands.

Fresh damage to a functioning hospital in Donetsk city

At Donetsk City Hospital No. 21, located at 12a Kremlovskyi Avenue on the north-western edge of non-government-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM saw a fresh bullet hole in a north-west facing window of the hospital’s laboratory and two fresh marks on the adjacent wall. Hospital staff told the SMM that they had discovered the damage along with one bullet on the floor in the morning of 6 April.

Fresh craters and unexploded ordnance in and near residential areas

About 20m south of Dundycha street in the south-western part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a fresh crater about 50m from the nearest residential houses. The SMM was unable to assess the direction of fire or type of weapon. About 120m south-west of the crater, the SMM saw a tailfin assessed as from a 73mm fragmentation round (probable OG-series grenade) lying horizontal on the ground. Approximately 1.3km east-north-east of the previous observation, near the centre of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM saw a fresh unexploded 73mm round protruding from soft ground approximately 200m from the nearest house.

On 7 April, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 40 fresh craters, assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (120mm) in a field about 4km south-south-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 4 April 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 5 April, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows across road T-1316, about 1.1km south of the area’s northern edge and 1.9km east of its western edge.

Also inside the Zolote disengagement area, near residential areas, the same UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and a modified military truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted in the rear - near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 600m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1.1km east of the area’s western edge. The UAV also spotted two other IFVs (BMP-1), about 950m and 1.3km, respectively, east-north-east of the aforementioned positions (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 3 April 2019).

On the evening and night of 7-8 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion and 24 projectiles, all at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east and south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. The same camera recorded 14 explosions assessed as impacts at a distance of 2-3km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 8 April, positioned at two different locations in Zolote, the SMM heard 23 shots and bursts of small-arms and eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 6 April, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) on a hill approximately 450m north of the disengagement area’s southern edge, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 4 July 2018).

On 8 April, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

6 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) next to the railway tracks near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika,122mm) and five towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

8 April

The SMM saw:

• 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (also spotted by an SMM long-range UAV on 7 April), and
• eight towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) in Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk).

6 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a probable surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk) and
• a probable mortar (type undetermined) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

6 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted six MLRS (BM-21), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1), five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 April 2019).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

7 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-72) and two mortars (a 2B11 Sani, 120mm and a probable 2B11) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

8 April

The SMM saw three tanks (one T-72 and two T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled

7 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two tanks (a T-72 and an undetermined type) near Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk);
• eight tanks (type undetermined) near Vozdvyzhenka (40km north-west of Donetsk); and
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) near Novooleksandrivka (36km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Shyroke (34km south-east of Luhansk);
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasni Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk); and
• seven tanks (T-72) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• 28 tanks (20 T-72, four T-64 and four types undetermined) and three probable mortars (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

8 April

The SMM noted that 20 MLRS (BM-21) remained missing, and that three MLRS (BM-21) were missing for the first time.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

8 April

The SMM noted that four towed howitzers (D-30) and seven tanks (T-72) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) in the southern outskirts of Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) and
• an IFV (BMP-1) about 3km east-north-east of Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and about 50m north of the Zolote disengagement area.

6 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BTR-3E) as well as an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Novoluhanske.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a probable armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) on the south-eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska;
• a probable ACV (type undetermined) and a trench digger (PZM-2) near Voitove  (33km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-variants) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).

7 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-variants) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a counter-fire radar system (AN/TPQ-36) near Lebedynske (99km south of Donetsk).

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

8 April

The SMM saw:

• an (APC) (BTR-70) at a checkpoint near Berezove and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (SNAR-10) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (type undetermined) near Sentianivka.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV  (BMP-1) near Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• 22 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk;
• four IFVs (BMP-2) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk);
• seven IFVs (BMP-1), three APCs (two MT-LB and a MT-LBMA with  an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on top) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near Holubivka; and
• three IFVs (BMP-2) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate.

7 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four ACVs (type undetermined) in Kalmiuske.

8 April

The SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and unexploded ordnance near Dolomitne and Novotroitske

On 6 April, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted ten anti-tank mines (TM-62) across the road about 200m south-west of residential areas of Dolomitne (non-government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

On 8 April, 2.5km south-east of Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) on a road running south-east to Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw a tailfin assessed as from a recoilless-gun (SPG-9 Kopie, 73mm) hanging from a tree approximately 2m from the roadway.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 8 April, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a dam near Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and to power transmission lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), Holubivka and Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM was informed that repair works at Olenivka were successfully completed. The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds reportedly related to water payments across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three cars (one with Russian Federation, one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates) and seven pedestrians (mixed genders) exiting Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 8 April, at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 8 April, while following up on reports of a civilian casualty, medical staff at a hospital in Donetsk city refused to provide the SMM with information or allow the SMM to speak with the alleged civilian patient, citing the need for permission from those in control. 
• On the evening and night of 6-7 April, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over non-government-controlled areas south, south-west, south-east and north of Luhansk, as well as government-controlled areas north of Donetsk.[6]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.