OSCE

419966 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, jointly with the Parliament of Tajikistan, conducted a conference devoted to the International Day of Families on 15 May 2019.

The conference explored gender inequality issues in Tajikistan, implementation mechanisms of the law on prevention of violence in the family and best practices for dealing with domestic violence cases, as well as protection and support to the victims and survivors of violence in the family.

The event brought together representatives of parliament, law enforcement agencies, including gender-sensitive police units, gender experts, as well as civil society and international organizations working on the promotion of gender equality and combating violence in the family.

Rajabzoda Ravshan Muhitdin, Deputy Chairperson of the Committee on Social, Family and Health Issues in the parliament said: “If we want to see positive changes in the family relations, we should start breaking the gender stereotypes within our own families.”

“This conference gave us an opportunity to have an open dialogue and constructive discussions on existing gender inequality issues in the country, which negatively impacts the families,” said Alla Kuvatova, an independent gender expert.

TASHKENT, 20 May 2019 – Kicking off his tour of three Central Asian countries at its very heart, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, today opened the new OSCE premises in Uzbekistan.

Calling it “not just an office, but a hub of partnership,” the Chairperson underlined the benefits of enhanced regional and international co-operation: “Often, we are working towards the same goals – and we can actually get there faster, if we do it in tandem.” And he thanked Uzbekistan for calling for more from the OSCE, in times when multilateral organizations are often put into question.

Acknowledging Uzbekistan’s role in regional stability and its continuous support to Afghanistan, Lajčák handed over a Slovak Aid donation to the Termez Center for Education in Afghanistan after his meeting with Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov and Deputy-Speaker of the Senate Sadiq Safoev.

“Education is a simple but powerful tool that gives us the chance to create the future we want. It helps us to accumulate knowledge, to change mindsets, to re-think attitudes and to alter behavior. By training young Afghans with the skills they need, the country can thrive economically. And if we are serious about building a safe future, our young people are key,“ the Chairperson stressed.

He added that the Termez Center embodies the spirit of regional co-operation. ”It opens the door to unlimited possibilities. It helps them to dream and to bridge the gap between the reality Afghanistan faces today and the modern, stable and prosperous future it chooses to create,” he continued.

Speaking about the OSCE’s 24 year-long presence on the ground, Lajčák emphasized the solid Uzbek-OSCE partnership and close collaboration led by an annual Roadmap spanning all three dimensions of comprehensive security. The Uzbekistan-OSCE co-operation covers a wide range of issue areas from combatting transnational threats, supporting Uzbekistan’s reform agenda and strengthening good governance, to promoting green economy and building business integrity standards.

He particularly commended the joint initiatives to promote the empowerment of women and the support to female entrepreneurs. And he stressed that “the OSCE and the Slovak Chairmanship stand ready to support Uzbekistan in consolidating stability, and furthering reform efforts.”

The Chairperson-in-Office also met with representatives of civil society.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 17 and 18 May, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 18 and 19 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Explosions occur close to the SMM near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed damage caused by small-arms fire in residential houses in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and fresh craters in Pervomaisk.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Staromykhailivka, Verkhnoshyrokivske and Donetsk city, as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area.*
• In several cities in Ukraine, the SMM observed protests regarding the investigation into the death of activist Kateryna Handziuk.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 17 and 18 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 18 and 19 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 170 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk, at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 17 and 18 May, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 670 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including all the explosions, were recorded in areas south and south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-north-east of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 18 and 19 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 40), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna and in areas south-east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Explosions close to SMM near Zolote disengagement area

On 19 May, positioned 400m north of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed distance of 100m east-south-east, shortly after hearing eight explosions at an assessed distance of 2-3km east. The SMM was unable to assess the weapon used or whether the explosions were impacts or outgoing fire; it immediately left the area.

Fresh damage to residential houses in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 17 May, at 12 Voikova Street in the south-western part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two holes in two west-facing windows in the third-floor apartment of a residential building. The owner (a woman in her forties) told the Mission that she had been in her apartment during the night of 17 May when it had been hit. In the same building, the SMM observed a hole in a west-facing window of a second-floor apartment. A resident (a man in his sixties) told the SMM that shooting had occurred in the early morning hours of 14 May, while he and his wife had been at home. In both cases, the SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. At 13 Voikova Street, about 120m east of the aforementioned building, the SMM observed a hole in the south-facing wall of a second-floor apartment, assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. A resident (a man in his sixties) said that he had heard shooting in the late evening on 16 May, when he had been at home with his family.

On 18 May, at 5 Lizy Chaikinoi Street, also in the south-western part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM saw a hole (6cm in diameter) in a west-facing first-floor window of a two-storey residential building. It assessed the damage to have been caused by small arms. The owners of the apartment (a man and a woman in their fifties) told the SMM that shooting had occurred during the night on 4 May, while they were in their apartment. At 18 Lizy Chaikinoi Street, about 120m east of the aforementioned building, the SMM saw a hole (8cm in diameter) in a north-facing window of a second-floor apartment, assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. The owner of the apartment (a woman in her sixties) told the SMM that the shooting had occurred in the evening of 14 May, while she had been hiding in a shelter in the same building. The SMM observed that positions of the armed formations were located 300m from the aforementioned residential houses (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 17 April 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the night of 17-18 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), as well as two projectiles at an assessed range of 1-3km east-north-east (assessed as within its 5km periphery). During the same night, while on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 240 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire assessed as within 5km periphery of the Zolote disengagement area.

During the day of 18 May, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a power substation, the SMM heard three bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1-2km north-north-west (assessed as within the 5km periphery of the disengagement area), despite security guarantees having been provided that the ceasefire would be adhered to.

During the day on 19 May, positioned 3km north-east of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions at an assessed range of 1-3km north-north-west (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area), as well as five shots of heavy-machine-gun fire (assessed as within its 5km periphery). Positioned at five different locations near the Zolote disengagement area during the evening of 18 May and day of 19 May, the SMM recorded 36 undetermined explosions, 75 bursts and 25 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire (assessed as within 5km periphery of the Zolote disengagement area).

On 19 May, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-6km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery).

On 18 and 19 May, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed calm situations.[3]

Fresh craters in Pervomaisk and damage to a military-type compound nearby

On 17 May, the SMM observed six fresh craters 30-140m south-east of a military-type compound in the south-eastern outskirts of Pervomaisk. It saw two additional fresh craters in a road north of the same compound, as well as shrapnel damage to a concrete fence and two pillars located 10m north of the two craters. The Mission also observed a broken window on the second floor of the north-west facing wall of a building located inside the compound. It assessed that all the craters and damage had been caused by rounds of undetermined weapons fired from a north-north-westerly direction. Five members of the armed formations and workers of a local electricity company repairing power lines allegedly damaged during the shelling were present when the SMM conducted the impact site assessment.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

17 May

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk);
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk); and
• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and two trans-loaders near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk).

18 May

The SMM saw a probable self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

18 May

The SMM saw:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk); and
• eight towed howitzers (D-30) near Mykhailivka (74km south of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area in Donetsk region

18 May

The SMM noted that:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were present and
• 35 MLRS (BM-21) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) continued to be missing.

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk region

16 May

The SMM noted that 15 mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and 17 towed howitzers (D-30) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

18 May

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

17 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) near Kurdiumivka (54km north of Donetsk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk)
• three IFVs (two BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Zolote;
• three IFVs (BMP variants) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP variants) near Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMD-2) and an APC (MT-LB) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

18 May

The SMM saw:

• three IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (Varta) near Popasna;
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk).

19 May

The SMM saw three IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

17 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 12 APCs (11 MT-LB and one BTR-80) and three anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2) in a compound near Pervomaisk (see above section on fresh craters in Pervomaisk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

19 May

The SMM saw a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Pervomaisk.

Demining activities near Myrne and mine signs near Mykolaivka Druha

On 18 May, the Mission saw for the first time a red mine hazard sign with the words “Danger, Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian about 4m north of a road about 1.5km north of Mykolaivka Druha (government-controlled, 55km north of Donetsk).

On 19 May, the SMM saw six members of an international demining organisation conducting demining activities in a field south of road T-0512 about 5km south-west of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to the power lines near “Zolote-4/Rodina” (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) (see above).

The Mission also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 18 May, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw 14 cars (one with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as six with “DPR“ plates) and one truck with covered cargo (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a bus (with “DPR“ plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 12 cars (two with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR“ plates), eight trucks with covered cargo (three with Ukrainian licence plates and five with “DPR“ plates) as well as a bus (with “DPR“ plates) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw several cars (with Ukrainian and Russian Federation licence plates as well as “DPR” plates), a truck with covered cargo and a bus (both with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw several cars (with Ukrainian and Russian Federation licence plates as well as “DPR” plates), 12 trucks with covered cargo (ten with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM observed protests regarding the investigation into the death of activist Kateryna Handziuk

On 18 May in Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering by about 80 people (mixed gender, mostly young) in front of the presidential administration, demanding that the investigation into the death of anti-corruption activist Kateryna Handziuk be intensified and protesting against what they said was a purported unwillingness of the authorities to prosecute her attackers. Over 30 police officers provided security for the gathering, which passed without incident. The SMM observed similar peaceful gatherings of between 12 and 50 people (mixed gender and ages) in Kherson, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Dnipro, Odessa and Lviv.

The SMM continued monitoring in Ivano-Frankivsk.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 14 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 18 May, two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access into a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region, citing the absence of permission from their commander.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 19 May, at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations requested to see a patrol plan. The SMM declined and was allowed to proceed only after 30 minutes.

Conditional access:

• On 17 May, at a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only upon escort by a member of the armed formations.
• On 17 May, at a checkpoint in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre) an armed member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only upon escort by a member of the armed formations.

Other impediments:

• During the night of 17-18 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including areas close to the contact line.[6]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska  was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro wishes to congratulate the citizens of Montenegro on the occasion of their Independence Day.

On 21 May 2006, Montenegro gained its independence in a peaceful and democratic process through a referendum. Today, 13 years later, Montenegro is recognized as a stable democracy actively promoting regional co-operation and good-neighbourly relations.

OSCE and Montenegro have forged a strong and very practice-oriented partnership, in particular on reforming the electoral system, building a free, resilient and professional media landscape, promoting security sector governance and reform, and strengthening regional youth co-operation in collaboration with the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO).

The Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, said: “Montenegro has made significant progress in consolidating peace and stability, and thanks to the close partnership with the government, institutions, civil society and other stakeholders, the OSCE is well positioned to continue to support Montenegro in meeting their long-term strategic goals in line with OSCE commitments and principles.”

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Election experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) were in Serbia from 14 to 17 May 2019 to meet government officials and international organization representatives as well as civil society, for the first in a series of visits across the region under the auspices of the  Support to Elections in the Western Balkans project.

In-depth discussions were held with senior officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Public Administration and Local Self-Government, the Electoral Commission, the parliamentary Committee on Constitutional and Legislative Issues, the public broadcaster and the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media, as well as representatives of civil society and the international community, including the delegation of the European Union. The visit was organized with support from the OSCE Mission to Serbia.

ODIHR support for the development of training materials for lower election commissions, the use of its expertise in improving the tabulation of election results, and a joint event to discuss electoral participation of people with disabilities were among the areas of co-operation discussed. ODIHR will also work with the state authority for electronic media on addressing recommendations made after the adoption of a new media strategy, and reiterated its willingness to assist the parliament by reviewing the recently adopted law on the central registry. 

“We have discussed many areas for improvement in Serbia since the start of this project in 2017, and we believe more could have been achieved,” said Lusine Badalyan, Senior Election Adviser with the ODIHR Elections Department. “These visits across the Western Balkans provide a much-needed opportunity to discuss the active engagement of the authorities in the electoral reform process.”

This week’s visit was the first of six to be carried out in the course of the three-year project. The project is funded by the European Union and the Austrian Development Agency.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to promptly following up on ODIHR election assessments and recommendations, while ODIHR has consistently supported the effective follow-up of recommendations. The project Support to Elections in the Western Balkans builds upon this work.

419960 Marina Živaljević

The importance of introducing gender-responsive budgeting into the state budget was the topic of an OSCE-supported workshop for nine members of parliament and seven state officials from the Ministry of Finance and the State Statistical Office (MONSTAT), on 14 May 2019 in Podgorica.

The workshop was organized by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the Parliamentary Committee on Gender Equality, with which the Mission works closely on the implementation of the Action Plan for a Gender Sensitive Parliament.

Gender Expert Maria Risteska led an examination of international good practices in applying gender responsive budgeting, followed by a practical discussion identifying entry points for introducing gender-responsive budgeting into the budget cycle.

It was agreed that gender-responsive budgeting is an important tool to improve the transparency, accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the management of public expenditure and provides for a more equitable distribution of public finances for women and men. “The budget must deliver equally for women and men in Montenegro,” said MP Nada Drobnjak, Chair of the Committee for Gender Equality.

Risteska also met with senior government officials who discussed piloting gender-responsive budgeting within a segment of the 2020 state budget.

Risteska, together with the Mission colleagues and Biljana Pejović, Head of the Gender Department within the Ministry of Minority and Human Rights, held a meeting in Kolašin on 15 May with officials from that municipality on further steps the municipality could take to implement gender-responsive budgeting in the 2020 budget.

The Mission will continue to work with the parliament, the government and municipalities in developing an approach to implementing gender-responsive budgeting. “This systematic approach will allow us to introduce a gender perspective in all phases of policymaking and budgeting from planning to adoption, execution and audit,” said Lia Magnaguagno, OSCE Democratization Programme Manager.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A two-day high-level conference on “International and Regional Co-operation on Countering Terrorism and Its Financing through Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime” concluded in Dushanbe on 17 May 2019. The Government of Tajikistan organized the event in close co-operation with the OSCE, the United Nations, and the European Union.

The objective of the conference was to discuss the complex inter-connection between terrorism and transnational organized crime, such as illicit trade in natural resources, cultural artefacts, weapons and trafficking in human beings. The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe supported the host country with relevant organizational modalities and the development of a conceptual framework for the conference.

Foreign ministers of Central Asian participating States and Afghanistan, as well as high-level delegations from other countries, including representatives of regional and international organisations, and diplomatic missions accredited in Tajikistan, participated in the event.

The participants were presented with a consolidated list of recommendations on strengthening regional co-operation in countering terrorist financing and organized crime that resulted from discussions at the High-Level Regional Conference on Countering Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime held in Ashgabat last month. With this list, the OSCE will contribute to global discussions co-ordinated by the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) that will culminate in a UN summit in 2020.

The conference concluded with a declaration emphasizing that “illicit drug trafficking continues to pose one of the major threats to international peace and security and undermine sustainable development, human rights and the rule of law”. It calls upon “all States to promote and strengthen international co-operation in accordance with all their obligations under international law”.

Opening the conference, the President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, stated that his country will “continue to work with relevant international organizations, including the United Nations and the OSCE, to effectively respond to these threats.”

In his video statement the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, emphasized that greater multilateral co-operation is needed: “Government agencies, the private sector and civil society have to work together. Public-private-partnerships are essential to prevent and suppress terrorist financing.“

The Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, Vladimir Voronkov, referred to the previously adopted Joint Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism as the “first regional initiative of its kind in the world”. He emphasized that the OSCE and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are allies and partners in countering the financing of terrorism.

The Director of the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre, Marcel Peṧko, underlined that Tajikistan, with its strategic location, is a factor of stability in Central Asia. He noted that the vast and uneasy border it shares with Afghanistan demands closer attention from the international community: "Approaches to address these challenges should include all actors, including government, civil society and private sector, to be effective and sustainable".

In addition to its work on countering and preventing violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, the OSCE also continues to offer its assistance to Tajikistan in strengthening international legal co-operation in terrorism cases, countering the financing of terrorism and the abuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Protecting critical energy infrastructure, as well as safeguarding human rights in counter-terrorism investigations is also a part of such co-operation.

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A woman was injured from shelling in Oleksandrivka.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted near government-controlled Bohdanivka and near non-government-controlled Zaichenko, Bezimenne and Novoazovsk, all in southern Donetsk region.*
• The Mission saw an LGBTIQ rights gathering and counter-gathering in Chernivtsi.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), in areas south of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas south-east of Donetsk city centre.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 670), compared with the previous reporting period (30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including about 600 explosions, were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Woman injured from shelling in Oleksandrivka

At a hospital in Donetsk city, the SMM saw a woman (53 years old) with her abdominal area bandaged. She told the SMM that while in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) on 13 April, she had heard shelling at about 05:00 and had sought shelter in a neighbour’s basement. As she was walking back to her house at about 07:00, she said she had heard whistling and other noise, and then had collapsed after feeling a sharp pain in her stomach. The woman said that she had then crawled back to her house and had been transported towards the hospital in a military-type truck, adding that an ambulance could not visit due to sniper fire concerns. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the woman had been admitted on 13 April with shrapnel wounds to her stomach and left side of her body caused by shelling. At a school in Oleksandrivka, the woman’s neighbour (60-70 years old) told the SMM that she had met the woman on the street just moments before the incident.    

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 16-17 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded nine projectiles in flight and three bursts of undetermined weapons, all at an assessed range of 2-5km east-south-east and south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area), a burst at an assessed range of 3-5km east-south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area), and seven projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-6km east and south (assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery). On 17 May, positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km north (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed calm situations.[3]

Fresh craters between Hirske and Zolote-2/Karbonit

In a field near a bridge south of Hirske (government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed at least six fresh craters around 100m east of road T-1316 and around 300m east of an operational school in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km north-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations n the area see SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

16 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

17 May

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9k33 Osa) in a field west of road M-03 north of Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

15 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

16 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a tank (T-64) and three probable tanks (T-64) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk); and
• two mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) near Vesele (92km south of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

16 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted nine tanks (five probable T-72 and four probable T-64) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

15 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and a probable IFV (BMP variant) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

16 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

17 May

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-1) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk);
• a combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2) at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint south-west of Popasna;
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Yasnobrodivka (25km north-west of Donetsk); 
• three IFVs (BMP-1) in a compound on the eastern outskirts of Popasna; and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) in Odradivka (59km north of Donetsk).

The SMM camera in Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) recorded an ACV (BTR-80) on road H-20 north-east of Berezove.

Non-government-controlled areas

15 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four ACVs in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

16 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV near Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an APC (MT-LB) near Sentianivka; and
• two ACVs about 50m from a residential house in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk).

The SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1), one parked next to a house, north-east of Dachne (47km west of Luhansk).

UAV seen flying in the security zone

The SMM saw an unidentified UAV (assessed as a fixed-wing type) flying from north-east to south-west at an altitude of about 300m, about 2.5km south-east of Patriotychne (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol).

Presence of mines near Nelipivka and Vodiane and a mine hazard sign near Debaltseve

On 15 May, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 300 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows near Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). On 16 May, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted about 20 anti-tank mines laid out in a single row about 3km north-west of Vodiane.

The SMM again saw an improvised mine hazard sign, a wooden sign with “Mines – Driving Prohibited” written in Russian, on the north-eastern edge of road M-03 near Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to water pipelines near Zolote and between Zolote-2/Karbonit, Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and to high voltage power lines near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The Mission also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

People applying for passports of the Russian Federation in Donetsk region

In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed a queue of about 20 people (mixed genders, 20-60 years old) outside a building in the Proletarskyi district of Donetsk city and five people queuing outside a building in Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk). Some of them told the SMM that they had been queuing to submit and finalize applications for passports of the Russian Federation or to apply for a “DPR” “passport”.

LGBTIQ rights gathering and counter-gathering in Chernivtsi

In Chernivtsi, the SMM saw about 15 people (mostly women, 20 to 30 years old) at Theatre Square for an event organized by a non-governmental organization for the “International day of fighting against homophobia, biphobia and transphobia”. About 500 members of the National Police and National Guard were around the group and around the square. On the other side of the square, the SMM saw about 50 people (mostly men, 20-30 years old), some wearing balaclavas, chanting slogans in opposition to the other group. At one point, the SMM saw members of the bigger group spray police with a substance, assessed as probable tear gas, in an attempt to move past the police towards the smaller group. The SMM saw some police with redness in their eyes and on the rest of their faces. The police maintained their position and escorted the smaller group away after about one hour. No further incidents were observed.    

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM entrance to the town, citing an “ongoing special operation in the area”.
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding further west, citing an “ongoing special operation in the area”.
• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing a lack of prior communication to their superiors.  

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint north-west of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier allowed the SMM to pass only after waiting about an hour and a half and contacting their superior officer for permission.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 16 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and non-government-controlled areas of northern Donetsk region, including areas close to the contact line.[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres from the UAV’s position.

CHISINAU, 17 May 2019 - The OSCE Mission to Moldova completed today donation of 16 sets of computer and recreational equipment to eight Moldovan-administered Latin-script schools and eight Transdniestria-administered schools to contribute to the quality of education for children.  The measure is part of the Mission’s confidence-building efforts and a means of promoting the holistic development of students.

The visit was also a good opportunity to obtain a first-hand account of the implementation of the Protocol Decision on ensuring the functioning of Moldovan Latin-script schools signed by Chisinau and Tiraspol in November 2017 in the framework of the Transdniestrian settlement process.

The positive impact of the agreement on the day-to-day functioning of schools was confirmed in the course of meetings with the administration of the eight Latin-script schools. Starting from the 2018 academic year, the schools operate with symbolic rental fees and reduced utility rates. The funds saved through the reduced fees have been used by the school administrations to improve the educational environment. Importantly, the agreement allowed for a simplified delivery of goods to these schools and made it possible to ensure the free movement of teachers and students via checkpoints to their place of work and study. All these pragmatic solutions were developed in the course of intense Working Group meetings conducted in 2018 with the active participation of the two Chief Negotiators in the Transdniestrian settlement process.

“The implementation of the agreement on the Latin-script schools has led to more certainty for these schools and over 1,500 students,” said Claus Neukirch, Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. “The Sides recognize that they must uphold the right to education. This gives me confidence that they will work constructively to find pragmatic solutions for the benefit of pupils also on other issues which have not been covered by that agreement. This includes the question of the return of the building to the Latin-script school in Ribnita.” 

The agreement on ensuring the functioning of Moldovan Latin-script schools is part of the “Berlin-plus” package of eight issues, which Chisinau and Tiraspol have been working on since 2016. In addition to the improved situation of the Latin-script schools, the two Sides have reached major progress in the apostilization of Transdniestrian university diplomas. To date, this mechanism has enabled over 220 students from Transdniestria to pursue their educational aspirations abroad.

419930 Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

A three-day training course aimed at further strengthening the capacity of Albania to counter terrorist financing was organized from 15 to 17 May 2019, in Tirana. Twenty-two participants (including five women) from the General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering (GDPML) (Albanian Financial Intelligence Unit), the State Intelligence Service (SHISH), the Albanian State Police, the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecution Office for Serious Crimes completed the course.

The course was organized jointly by the OSCE Presence in Albania, the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).

It was designed to strengthen Albania’s compliance with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments. It was led by OSCE and UNODC international experts together with five local government officials who were previously trained by the OSCE and the UNODC in a train-the-trainer setting.

The course emphasized the key role of inter-agency co-operation in disrupting terrorist financing.  Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, it included sessions on financial intelligence, introduction to financial analysis, and vulnerability and network analysis. More than half of the course was devoted to practical work where participants learned and practiced how to apply a range of analytical techniques to realistic scenarios, including how to use financial investigations to better assess the threat posed by a terrorist group. 

The course was organized with the financial support of the OSCE Presence in Albania and the United States of America. This was the second course in the series of six courses that form part of a comprehensive multi-annual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in South-Eastern Europe. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Small arms were fired 100m west of the SMM’s position near non-government-controlled Molodizhne.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Vrubivka and Vasiukivka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted near non-government-controlled Zaichenko in southern Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), where about 50 undetermined explosions and about 50 explosions assessed as impacts were recorded, and in areas south and west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east and north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

On the afternoon of 16 May, positioned near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 30 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 300-500m east and ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 100m west. The Mission heard a sound consistent with that of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and saw that three armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint 100m west of the SMM’s position were pointing their weapons in the air in a westerly direction. The SMM did not operate UAVs in the area at the time.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned at two locations near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

15 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

16 May

The SMM saw two stationary multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in Vasiukivka (82 km north of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

15 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) and three trans-loaders (TEL 9A39) at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a tank (T-64) near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk);
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) and two trans-loaders (9T217B) near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk); and
• six self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and three 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) east of Maloianisol (35km north-west of Mariupol).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

16 May

The SMM noted that 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

15 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants) near Vrubivka and
• an 80m-long new trench system (not seen in imagery from November 2018) running from south-west to north-east in a field south of Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk), about 2km east of positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol) and
• three IFVs (probable BMP-1) near Novoselivka Druha (36km north-east of Mariupol).

16 May

The SMM saw:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted atop a military truck in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an unidentified UAV (assessed as a quadcopter type) landing about 600m south-west of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). Nearby the Mission saw a silver pickup truck and five people, one of whom was operating the aircraft.

Non-government-controlled areas

15 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP variants) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk).

Mines near Bila Kamianka and unexploded ordnance in Debaltseve

On 15 May, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted in total 26 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid across a road and in fields on either side of that road about 150-200m west of Bila Kamianka, all assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The same UAV also again spotted four anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid across the same road in a single row, about 2km west of the afore-mentioned mines, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The SMM saw an object with fins embedded in the ground in a yard about 30m from a house on Telmana Street in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission assessed it as not new and a probable MLRS rocket (undetermined type).

Demining activities in Myrna Dolyna and mine sign near Fedorivka

The SMM saw eight people with metal detectors wearing protective gear bearing the logo of an international organization in a field 200m south-west and north-east of road P66 near Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission saw for the first time a mine hazard sign (a wooden rectangular-shaped plate with the word “mines” written in white Russian letters) on the southern side of a local road about 3km east of Fedorivka (non-government controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) as well as to water pipelines near Zolote and between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna.

The Mission also facilitated the operation of the DFS. The SMM again recorded ceasefire violations in areas near the station (see above and the ceasefire violations table).

Border areas not under government control

On 16 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw a car with Armenian licence plates and two buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine, as well as nine cars (four with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), 45 covered-cargo trucks (22 with Ukrainian, nine with Belarusian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and ten with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 14 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities” in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the night between 15 and 16 May, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas along the contact line in Donetsk region.[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

419969 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

Trial monitoring principles, ways to mainstream gender and diversity in trial monitoring activities, follow-up steps and the training of monitors were the key topics of an annual meeting on trial monitoring in the OSCE region, which took place in Sarajevo from 14 to 16 May 2019.

The event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

“Trial monitoring practitioners have told us how much they appreciate the opportunity this annual event has given them for more than 15 years now to exchange views and experiences,” said Karine Simonsen, Rule of Law Officer at ODIHR. “We are continuously exploring different ways of supporting both civil society and colleagues from OSCE field operations in this area, and we are therefore focusing specifically this year on building participants’ skills, alongside strengthening their understanding of fair trial standards.”

Lillian Langford, Head of the Rule of Law Section at the OSCE Mission to BiH, said: “Effective trial monitoring demonstrates whether a country’s judicial system ensures equality before the law, due process guarantees, justice for victims of crime and efficient use of resources. The OSCE and its partners possess a wealth of experience in this area. Only recently the Mission scaled up its monitoring of corruption cases, issuing reports that target clear deficiencies in the work of courts and prosecutors’ offices in tackling this phenomenon. Backed up by empirical trial monitoring data, we and our partners are able to support efforts to address the roots of this problem.”

The event attracted 39 participants (21 men and 18 women) from around the region; 13 NGOs and nine OSCE field operations were represented. During working sessions, participants shared experiences, good practices and challenges they face. A more detailed description of the topics can be found in the ODIHR reference manual on trial monitoring.

ERGNETI, 16 May 2019 - On 16 May 2019, the 93rd Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting took place in Ergneti. Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative for the South Caucasus of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, co-facilitated a meeting held in a business-like atmosphere.  

Høeg provided a summary of the events which occurred since the last IPRM meeting on 22 March. This included the general security situation, hotline activations and detention cases. The security situation along the administrative boundary line (ABL) was assessed as relatively stable.

The case of the tragic death of Archil Tatunashvili was discussed. Participants were encouraged to co-operate and provide full access and disclosure of all available information.

Challenges related to ‘borderization’ and restrictions to the freedom of movement were also on the agenda. Ambassador Michalka and Høeg encouraged actions that would facilitate a normal life for the local populations living along the ABL. 

The importance of early notification via the hotline on planned activities by security actors close to the ABL that could fuel instability, was once again stressed.

All participants reconfirmed their commitment to the IPRM as an essential platform to strengthen security on the ground and to address the needs of the conflict-affected population from a humanitarian perspective.

The next meeting will take place on a date to be agreed by all IPRM participants.

VIENNA, 16 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, shared a legal review with the Minister of Information Society and Administration of North Macedonia, Damjan Mancevski, on the latest amendments to the Law on Audio and Audio-visual Media Services.

The Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media had commissioned Katrin Nyman Metcalf, a renowned international expert in communications law, to conduct the analysis.

“I welcome the adoption of the amended law. I very much appreciate the co-operation we established with the Government of North Macedonia during the different stages of its development. The law is now in general accordance with European and international standards on audio-visual media. It contains numerous positive elements, such as provisions to strengthen the diversity of representation in various media regulatory bodies, and to ensure that the interests of different ethnic groups are taken into consideration,” Désir said.

“The analysis offers recommendations related to several provisions that still need to be addressed. These include issues related to the banning of public advertising or public funding for advertising and the difficulty in implementing the system by which broadcasters can receive a reduced licence fee if they broadcast Macedonian content.”

The Representative emphasized the expert’s suggestion that each concern can be addressed in the form of new legal amendments, or through sub-legal acts where appropriate.

“I trust that the legal review and the recommendations provided therein will be taken into account, which would ensure that the legislation complies with OSCE media freedom commitments and international standards,” Désir concluded.

The Law was adopted by the parliament on 28 December 2018 and entered into force on 8 January 2019.

The full text of the legal review is available here.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM heard outgoing fire close to its position near the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Bila Kamianka.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• It spotted anti-tank mines for the first time between Krasnohorivka and Staromykhailivka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to, and the operation of, critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Bezimenne in southern Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 190), compared with the previous reporting period (about 310 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and southerly, westerly and northerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

During the evening of 14 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) again recorded ceasefire violations in its vicinity, including two undetermined explosions and 44 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.5-1.5km south, south-south-west and south-south-east (for similar observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 May 2019). During the day on 15 May, positioned in Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard and saw 90 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 150-200m south-south-east, assessed as live-fire training exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-easterly, south-westerly and westerly directions of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

While on the northern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard and saw two explosions, assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, at an assessed range of 1-2km south.

Outgoing fire close to SMM near DFS

On the morning of 15 May, an SMM patrol was positioned on road H20 about 2km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and about 3.5km north-west of the DFS to monitor the security situation. Despite security guarantees that a localized ceasefire would be adhered to, the SMM heard three explosions assessed as rounds of outgoing fire of undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 100-300m west of its position. The SMM immediately left the area. There were no injuries to the SMM and its property was undamaged. (See SMM Spot Report 15 May 2019).

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Bila Kamianka

On 15 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight about 3km east of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire 2.5-3km east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 2.7km east of its position over an area near Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk). The SMM safely landed the UAV.*

Disengagement areas[2]

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence, on 13 May, of an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) and two probable ACVs near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 160m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), as well as seven craters assessed as caused by impacts of undetermined weapons about 120m west of its western edge. On the morning of 15 May, positioned 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-2km north, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area.

During the same day, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw an explosion, assessed as the impact of a round of an undetermined weapon, at an assessed distance of 1km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

14 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk);
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and four towed howitzers (D-30) in Bile (22km west of Luhansk); and
• six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) near residential houses in Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

14 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 towed howitzers (2A65) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

15 May

The SMM saw four surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) at a railway station in Rubizhne.

Non-government-controlled areas

14 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 21 tanks (probable T-64), six towed mortars (type undetermined, 120mm calibre) and seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above);
• five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), two pieces of towed artillery (types undetermined) and 12 tanks (T-72, one missing its barrel) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk);
• 29 tanks (one T-72 and 28 typed undetermined) in Bile;
• 20 tanks (15 T-72 and five undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 12 towed mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (see above);
• 20 tanks (types undetermined) at a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 18 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi (54km south-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV again spotted three tanks (T-72) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

15 May

The SMM saw three tanks (T-72) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[3]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

15 May

The SMM noted that 15 towed howitzers (D-30), 21 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) were present, and that 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and nine tanks (T-72) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

15 May

The SMM noted that 33 tanks (six T-72 and 27 T-64), a towed howitzer (D-44, 85mm), two anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) and 17 mortars (12 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm, three 2B14 Podnos, 82mm and two BM-37) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

13 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of an ACV and two probable ACVs near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the vicinity of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above).

15 May

The SMM saw, on two occasions, an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

14 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a probable ACV near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• 21 IFVs (BMP-1) and three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (two BTR-70 and an MT-LB) in a compound near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk); and
• an APC in Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV near Kalynove.

Mines seen for the first time between Krasnohorivka and Staromykhailivka

On 13 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 15 anti-tank mines across a road east of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) leading to non-government-controlled areas. About 700m east of the aforementioned mines, the same UAV spotted for the first time 55 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows extending 50m across the northern and southern sides of the same road and into adjacent fields. About 1km east of the latter mines, the same UAV spotted for the first time 20 anti-tank mines laid out in three rows extending 15m across the northern and southern sides of the same road and into adjacent fields in the western outskirts of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk).

On 14 May, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted four anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid across road T-0519 on the western outskirts of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

Around 2km west of Krynychne (non-government-controlled, 45km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time a red metal mine hazard sign with “Stop Mine” written in Russian language attached to a wooden post in a field about 1m south of a local road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to water pipelines near Zolote and between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and heard explosions near its position (see above). It also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and positioned in the vicinity of the pumping station during the day it heard ceasefire violations.

Border areas not under government control

On 13 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw eight cars (five with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks and a bus (all with Russian Federation licence plates) and 20 pedestrians entering Ukraine, as well as three cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates) and 31 trucks (30 with covered cargo and one tanker; 19 with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 15 May, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 20 cars (three with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Polish licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) and nine pedestrians entering Ukraine, as well as 24 cars (two with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as 12 with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates) and four buses (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

People apply for passports of the Russian Federation in Luhansk and Donetsk regions

In non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, the SMM again observed about 60 people (mixed gender and ages) in a queue in front of a building in Antratsyt (55km south-west of Luhansk). Several people waiting told the SMM that they had been queuing to submit applications for passports of the Russian Federation.

In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed a queue of ten people inside a building in Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) who told the SMM that they were waiting to submit applications for passports of the Russian Federation. The SMM saw an information board outside the aforementioned building as well as handouts explaining the procedures to submit applications for “DPR” “passports” and passports of the Russian Federation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 14 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), five members of the armed formations (two of them armed) again prevented the SMM from proceeding further west, citing “military operations in the area”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 15 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight over an area near Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

419861 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

The OSCE Mission to Moldova concluded its second training programme for state institutions dealing with the protection of the rights of national minorities and the consolidation of inter-ethnic relations in the country on 16 May 2019. The two-day course focused on the participation of national minorities in public life and built on the positive outcomes of last year’s induction course on human rights and national minorities, which was attended by the same group of participants.

Some 25 staff of the Agency for Inter-ethnic Relations, the Ombudsman’s office and the Council for Preventing and Eliminating Discrimination and Ensuring Equality attended the programme. Led by international expert Professor Frederick John Packer from the University of Ottawa, the training programme introduced the group to the principle and value of inclusion in a diverse society upon which effective participation manifests itself in policy, law, programmes and practices.

During the training course, the participants gained hands-on experience of mapping the challenges for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities, while the professor introduced affirmative measures necessary to achieve equality, in particular in governance and decision-making, and discussed their practical application.

“Learning about best international practices on the participation of ethnic minorities in public life is key to multiethnic states. We are glad the OSCE Mission enables Moldovan institutions responsible for the protection of national minorities' rights to jointly identify the ways to improve participation of minority groups in public life,” said Vera Petuhov, Deputy General Director, Interethnic Relations Bureau of the Republic of Moldova.

The event coincided with the 20th anniversary of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life and offered an opportunity to discuss the implementation of the recommendations developed by the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities in the Moldovan context.

In line with its mandate, the Mission builds the capacities of state institutions involved in implementing the National Strategy for Consolidation of Inter-ethnic Relations for 2017‒2027. Last year, the Mission facilitated the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding among the three human rights institutions to strengthen their co-operation, exchange of information, joint research and mutual support. Respect for the rights of national minorities in a society is a litmus test of tolerance and inclusivity, which are in turn important enabling factors for the Transdniestrian settlement process.

VIENNA, 16 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, strongly condemned today the physical attacks against journalists that took place in Turkey over the past week.

On 15 May, journalist İdris Özyol was beaten by an unidentified group of people in front of the office of his newspaper, Akdeniz Yeni Yüzyıl, in Antalya. He was immediately taken to the local hospital. According to media reports, Özyol previously received threats from a local politician, as a result of his journalistic work. 

“I am deeply concerned about the safety of journalists in Turkey. This is the second physical attack in one week, which is a clear signal that media professionals need stronger protection. Public condemnation at the highest level is crucial and would send a strong message that assaults against journalists will not be tolerated,” Désir said.

The Representative also recalled the attack last weekend against the journalist Yavuz Selim Demirağ of the Yeniçağ newspaper, who sustained serious injuries after being attacked in Ankara. Police detained six suspects who were conditionally released, reportedly on the grounds that "the state of health of the victim was not life-threatening".

“This negative trend needs to be reversed. I call on the authorities to swiftly investigate all attacks against journalists and bring those responsible to justice. Journalists need to be safe in order to do their jobs and inform citizens on issues of public interest. Impunity for attacks on members of the media is unacceptable,” Désir said.

Désir recalled the OSCE Ministerial Decision on Safety of Journalists, which calls on “political leaders, public officials and/or authorities to refrain from intimidating, threatening or condoning – and to unequivocally condemn – violence against journalists, in order to reduce the risks or threats that journalists may face and avoid undermining trust in the credibility of journalists as well as respect for the importance of independent journalism”.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

On the morning of 15 May, an SMM patrol consisting of five members and two armoured vehicles was positioned on road H20 about 2km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and about 3.5km north-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) to monitor the security situation. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination was also present. Members of the Ukraine State Emergency Service de-mining team were present about 50m south of the SMM patrol’s location.

Despite security guarantees having been provided that a localized ceasefire would be adhered to, at 08:52, SMM patrol members, three of whom were standing next to their vehicles and two inside their vehicles, heard an explosion, assessed as a round of outgoing fire of an undetermined weapon at an assessed range of 100-300m west of their position. A few seconds later, while inside their vehicles, SMM patrol members heard two additional explosions, assessed as rounds of outgoing fire of an undetermined weapon at the same assessed range and direction. The SMM immediately left the area and saw that the de-mining team also left the area. There were no injuries to the SMM or damage to its property.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Pervomaiske.
• The Mission saw fresh damage to civilian properties from small-arms fire and shelling in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and Dokuchaievsk.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• Anti-tank mines were spotted by the Mission for the first time near Prychepylivka and Vodiane.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske in Donetsk region, as well as at a heavy weapon holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (76 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded at north-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). During the night of 14 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 19 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.5km to 1.5km south and south-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including ten explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions). All of the ceasefire violations we recorded at north-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), northerly and north-westerly directions of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and at westerly directions of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Pervomaiske

On 14 May, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Pervomaiske (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard six bursts and about 45 shots of small-arms fire about 1.7km south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.8km south-east of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Fresh damage to civilian properties caused by small-arms fire in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and shelling in Dokuchaievsk

On 13 May, the SMM saw damage from small-arms fire to four civilian properties in the south-western part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. At 1 Voikova Street, the SMM saw two holes in a second floor north-facing window of a two-storey house, a hole in a second floor north-facing balcony and two holes in a north-facing first floor window frame. A resident of the house (male, 75 years old) told the SMM that he had heard small-arms fire in the evening of 13 May.

At 8 Voikova Street, inside an apartment on the third-floor of a four-storey house, the SMM saw a bullet hole in a north-facing windowsill, a dent in a refrigerator door adjacent to the windowsill, and a hole in the wall opposite the window, all assessed as recent and caused by a single bullet. It also saw two shattered north-facing windows and another north-facing window with a bullet hole, all assessed as recent and caused by small-arms fire. The SMM saw a 7.62mm bullet on the balcony floor. A resident (male, 35 years old) told the SMM that he had heard shooting on 11 May.

About 300m north of 8 Voikova Street, at 9 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw three fresh bullet holes in a north-facing window and two west-facing windows on the ground floor of a two-storey house. Two residents of the house (women, aged 60-70) told the SMM that they heard shooting in the afternoon of 11 May.

At 10 Dundycha Street, the SMM saw a partially shattered north-facing first-floor window of a two-storey house as well as two bullet holes in the wall above the window, but could not assess if the damage was recent. Three residents (female, 50-60 years old) told the SMM that they had heard shooting on the afternoon of 11 May.

On 14 May, on the southern outskirts of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a garden about 10m north-east of an uninhabited house, assessed as caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a south-westerly direction. About 10m north-east of the crater, at 26 Haharina Street, the Mission saw a shattered east-facing window of a shed located near an inhabited house. A resident of the house (a woman, aged 60) told the SMM that she had been outside of the house with her husband on the afternoon of 12 May when she had heard a loud explosion.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 5 May, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 40 anti-tank mines inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 500m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area and about 100m east of road T-1316.

On the evening of 13 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and three projectiles at an assessed range of 2-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area and within 5km of its periphery).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

14 May

The SMM saw 18 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) near the train station in Dobropillia (75km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

13 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Stupochky (60km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted eight surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

14 May

The SMM saw:

• at least 13 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (type undetermined) at the train station in Rubizhne* and
• two towed howitzers (2A65) about 800m south-east of the train station in Rubizhne.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

13 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2), an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in a residential area near Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk); and
• an ACV near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two probable IFVs (BMP variant) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three ACVs near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

14 May

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) in Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an APC (MT-LB-M) in Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two ACVs near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

Presence of mines, unexploded ordnance and a mine hazard sign

On 12 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about 700 anti-tank mines (about 150 of which had previously been seen), laid out in three 800m-long rows running from east to west in a field about 2.5km south-east of Prychepylivka (government-controlled, 50km north-west of Luhansk).

On 13 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 20 anti-tank mines laid out in a single row about 3km north-west of Vodiane (government-controlled, 15km north-west of Donetsk) and again spotted 22 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows in a field about 3km north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in three rows of 12 across road H-21 near Shchastia.

On 14 May, the SMM again saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as the tailfin of an 120mm mortar, in the middle of T-0513 road, which is regularly used by civilians and the SMM, and about 80m south of the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

On 14 May, on the north-western outskirts of Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a wooden board with “Careful, Mines” written in Ukrainian in a field about 1.5m north of a road leading from Mykolaivka to Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to a water pipeline between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 14 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Five members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage on two occasions, citing a lack of permission granted from their superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that no demining activities had taken place. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to the railway station in Rubizhne (government-controlled, 84km north-west of Luhansk). After the SMM informed the JCCC and waited 30 minutes, access was granted.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 13-14 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas of northern Donetsk region, including areas close to the contact line.[4]
• On 14 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Pervomaiske (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard six bursts and about 45 shots of small-arms fire about 1.7km south-south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
• In non-government-controlled Luhansk city and Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), two interlocutors refused to answer the SMM’s questions about facilities used to house IDPs and directed the SMM to obtain additional permissions from those in control.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

VIENNA, 15 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, published today a legal review of the Montenegrin Electronic Media Law, upon request by the Ministry of Culture.

The Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media commissioned an expert analysis prepared by Professor Dr Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin, a well-known media expert in Montenegro and the wider region. The current law was analysed and compared with OSCE commitments, the EU Directive on Audio-visual Media Services and Council of Europe recommendations.

“These joint efforts with the Ministry of Culture are crucial for the promotion and support of freedom of the media in Montenegro. It is of utmost importance that the legislative framework is in line with the highest international standards,” Désir said.

With regard to the Public Broadcasters, the analysis argues that public broadcasting services need both structural and editorial independence, as well as freedom from political interference, in order to function effectively. Among other things, the review recommends that the establishment of the local broadcasters should fall under the responsibility of the Agency of Electronic Media (AEM).

Special emphasis is placed on the licencing process, in particular, the criteria for providing licenses, which should be clearly set out in the law.

The analysis underlines that the supervisory role regarding the Electronic Media Law should be given exclusively to the AEM, which would ensure more efficient supervision of the implementation of the law.

The analysis also highlights that the law contains mechanisms preventing conflicts of interest among the AEM Council members. However, it raises a concern about the fact that the new Law on Public Administration links the AEM to the Government.

“It is necessary that the process of amending the law is inclusive and widely debated with all relevant national and international media stakeholders. My Office will continue providing further assistance and support to the authorities in this endeavour,” the Representative concluded.

The comprehensive review can be accessed here.