OSCE

426155 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Following Slovakia’s presidential election on 16 and 30 March 2019, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has published its final report summing up the election observation.

The election was competitive, pluralistic and respected fundamental freedoms. It was conducted in a professional manner, and the election administration enjoyed a high degree of public confidence. Nevertheless, the complaints and appeals mechanisms and the powers of the State Commission for Elections and the Control of Political Parties Funding (SEC), which has a mandate related both to the administration of elections and to party finance oversight, remained under-regulated or vague. At the same time, intolerant rhetoric in a number of online outlets played a substantial role in campaign discourse.

Key recommendations include:

• strengthening the administrative and financial capacity of the State Election Commission to ensure its full independence;

• promoting the independence and impartiality of the campaign finance oversight by entrusting the competence in campaign finance control to an independent institution;

• decriminalizing defamation and introducing a reasonable ceiling for damages in civil libel cases;

• ensuring the long-term pluralism of the media by strengthening the public broadcaster through adequate financing, while enhancing its independence through transparent management appointment mechanisms.

ODIHR deployed an Election Assessment Mission (EAM) on 6 March 2019 to observe the presidential election. The EAM focused on administration of election, legal framework, candidate and voter registration, conduct of the campaign and the media environment, oversight of campaign finance, and the electoral dispute resolution. All 57 countries across the OSCE region have formally committed to follow up promptly on ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations.

VIENNA, 20 July 2019 – On the third anniversary of the murder of journalist Pavel Sheremet in Ukraine, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today reiterated his call on the Ukrainian authorities to step up their efforts in ending impunity for attacks on and murders of journalists.

“Three years on, Pavel Sheremet’s murder remains unsolved and continues to exert a chilling effect on freedom of expression, media freedom and safety of journalists,” Désir said. “The Ukrainian authorities have a duty to ensure that his murder, as well as all other attacks on and killings of journalists, are prosecuted and that the perpetrators and masterminds behind these crimes are brought to justice. Impunity for such crimes is unacceptable and breeds further violence.”

Sheremet, a journalist with Radio Vesti and the Ukrainskaya Pravda online media outlet, was killed in a car explosion on 20 July 2016 in Kyiv. He worked as a journalist in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia during his career.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

VIENNA, 19 July 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed today the court decision in Turkey handing down prison sentences to seven people over the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink.

Hrant Dink, the founder and Editor-in-Chief of the Armenian-Turkish language weekly Agos Magazine, was shot dead in front of his office in Istanbul on 19 January 2007. Twelve years after his murder, a Turkish court announced verdicts against nine defendants, whose case files were previously separated to prevent a possible violation of the statute of limitations.

“The court decision convicting seven people in relation to the murder of the prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, is a positive step forward, but more needs to be done. I remain hopeful that all others involved in this murder will face justice,” Désir said.

The court ruled that the murder was an ‘organized crime’, and sentenced Erhan Tuncel to 99 years and six months in prison for his connection to Dink’s murder and being a member of an armed group. Yasin Hayal, who was previously sentenced to life for instigating the murder, received seven years and six months in prison for forming and leading an armed group. The assassin, Ogün Samast, who was previously sentenced to 22 years and ten months, received another two years and six months in prison for membership of an armed group.

Ersin Yolcu and Ahmet Iskender each received jail terms of just under two years for their role in the murder, while Tuncay Uzundal and Zeynel Abidin Yavuz were sentenced to more than ten years in prison. Two defendants were acquitted.

“After twelve years, Hrant’s family, friends and fellow journalists deserve to know the full truth behind this heinous killing. It is therefore of utmost importance that the Turkish authorities identify and bring the masterminds of Dink’s murder to justice,” Désir said.

The Representative will continue to monitor developments as the trials of further suspects continue.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured by a mine explosion in Pryvitne.
• It saw damage to a residential house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM continued to observe demining activities by the State Emergency Services of Ukraine and the operation of a shuttle bus service.
• The Mission saw weapons in violations of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw long queues at checkpoints of the armed formations along the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region near Zaichenko and Novolaspa.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (40), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and south-south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 30), compared with the previous reporting period (about 250 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at east-south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), at easterly and east-north-easterly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and at easterly directions of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), the latter assessed as live-fire training exercises inside the security zone.

A man was injured by a mine explosion in Pryvitne

On 15 July, at the Luhansk Regional Hospital in Luhansk city (non-government-controlled), the SMM saw a man (69 years old) with his left foot missing and his right leg covered in bandages. He told the Mission that he had been fishing on the bank of the Siverskyi Donets River near Pryvitne (non-government-controlled, 11km north of Luhansk) on 11 July when he stepped on a mine laid on a path beside the river and it exploded. The man added that he crawled to a different location where he had mobile phone coverage and called a relative for help. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the man had been admitted with injuries from a mine explosion on 11 July.

Fresh damage to a residential house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 17 July, at a one-storey house at 1/7 Dundycha Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM accompanied by a member of the armed formations, saw a hole (32cm x 96cm) in the outer west-facing wooden fence and small fragments assessed as from a grenade lying on the ground and adjacent to the fence. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh but could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019).

Fresh craters near Molodizhne

On road T-0504 about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and about 100m from a checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM saw eight fresh craters in a field within an 80m radius of the T-junction leading north to Molodizhne: five assessed as caused by (82mm) mortar rounds, two as caused by (122mm) artillery rounds and one as caused by a round of a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7), all fired from a westerly direction (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 13 July 2019)[2].

On 16 July, at the abovementioned T-junction, the SMM saw that a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (120mm mortar tailfin) observed on 15 July was no longer present and that the previously reported crater had been filled with soil (see SMM Daily Report 17 July 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 17 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw two members of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine conducting demining activities in a field about 150m east of the road and about 200m south-east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP). The SMM again saw a bus transporting people from an area about 250m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP to the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and back. The SMM saw that the bus was equipped with a manual wheelchair ramp to transport persons with disabilities.

The SMM saw up to seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them: three south of the wooden ramps of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and four near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge[3].

Other disengagement areas[4]

On 17 July, while in Zolote, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-6km south-south-west, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area.

On the evening of 16 July, while in Popasna, the SMM heard about 40 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and an undetermined explosion, all at an assessed range of 5-7km east-south-east, all assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the evening and night of 16-17 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 30 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km east and east-north-east, all assessed as outside of the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On 17 July, while in Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 20 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km west, all assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 17 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[5]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

17 July

The SMM saw:

• 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Popasna and
• six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

17 July

The SMM saw 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

14 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 11 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 July 2019).

17 July

The SMM saw seven tanks (T-64) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[6]

At heavy weapons holding areas in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region.

17 July

The SMM saw that 15 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 44 self-propelled howitzers (23 2S3 and 21 2S1) and nine tanks (T-72) continued to be missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region.

17 July

The SMM noted that 51 tanks (24 T-72 and 27 T-64), one towed howitzer (D-44, 85mm), two anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) and 50 mortars (12 M120-15 Molot, 120mm, 13 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm, nine KBA-48M, 82mm, seven 2B11 Sani, 120mm, six BM-37, 82mm and three 2B14 Podnos, 82mm) remained missing.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.

17 July

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

16 July

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BTR-4) in Pionerske (14km east of Mariupol).

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) at the Stanytsia Luhanska EECP.

17 July

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

In the morning of 17 July, while in Popasna, the SMM saw a mini-UAV flying 5-30m over the SMM forward patrol base and at a 20-25m distance from its outer gate. Two hours later, positioned in the southern outskirts of Popasna, the SMM again saw a mini-UAV flying 300-500m over the SMM’s position (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 9 July 2019).

Long queues at checkpoints in Donetsk region

At the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 30 cars queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas, as well as about 200 cars queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas.

At a checkpoint of the armed formations on highway H-15 in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 50 cars and five buses queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas, as well as about 220 cars and nine buses queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines in Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk) as well as demining and repairs to water pipelines near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and between Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 15 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from his superior”.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west into the village, citing “SMM’s safety”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed again after about 20 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On three occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference assessed as probably caused by jamming while flying over areas near Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol)[8].

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Avdiivka and Donetsk Filtration Station were non-operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] In the SMM Daily Report of 17 July 2019, it was written, “On 16 July, at a residential house at 7 Pervomaiska Street in the central part of Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw two craters (about 1.5m in diameter)… assessed as fresh and caused by artillery rounds…” The correct size was 15cm and they were assessed as caused by unexploded artillery rounds.

[3] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[4]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[5] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[6] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[7] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[8] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

425948 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe trained some 320 representatives of local governments, teachers, parents from migrant families and people whose relatives have travelled to conflict zones as foreign terrorist fighters as part of a whole-of-society approach to tackling violent extremism and terrorist radicalization among youth in Tajikistan. The training courses were conducted in 12 districts of the Sughd and Khatlon regions from 24 June to 18 July 2019.

The training courses engaged a wide range of actors with the aim of preventing the spread of violent extremism at the grassroots level. The courses enhanced the capacity of local educators to integrate international good practices into their teaching curricula and sensitized parents on how to detect the first signs of radicalization among young family members.

“The training has equipped me with fundamental knowledge regarding various push, pull, individual, and contextual factors that are conducive to violent extremism and terrorist radicalization,” said Alisher Nosirov, a representative of the local government administration (khukumat) of the Khatlon region. Nosirov added he was confident that he could apply the new knowledge and skills while devising local initiatives to prevent violent extremism among young people.

SARAJEVO, 18 July 2019 – A workshop on identifying victims of human trafficking in migration flows concluded today in Sarajevo.  Organized jointly by the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB) and the OSCE’s field operations in South-Eastern Europe, the workshop focused on implementing the OSCE’s uniform guidelines to identify victims of human trafficking.

More than 40 practitioners from six countries of the region participated in the workshop, which focused on how the guidelines could be adapted to national legislation and operations in South-Eastern Europe.

“Our needs assessment report highlighted a clear opportunity for a uniform identification procedure that could be shared and used by all front-line responders,” said Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. “The goal is to improve the identification of victims in migration flows.  These guidelines are a practical tool to help countries build their capacity and are the product of numerous consultations with national stakeholders carried out by our Office last year. It is now time for implementation across the region.”

Workshop participants included practitioners who interact daily with people on the move along the Western Balkan migration route, including representatives of law enforcement, migration agencies, public social services, civil society, and international organizations.

 “The workshop was very useful and timely for us in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since in the last year and a half we have been facing massive and mixed migration flows throughout the country among which we are sure there is a lot of exploitation of migrants and trafficking,” said Samir Rizvo, State Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings of the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  

BRATISLAVA, 18 July 2019 - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák welcomed the new recommitment to an unlimited ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, starting from 21 July at 00 hrs. 01 min. (Kyiv time), as agreed at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group held in Minsk on 17 July.

Chairperson Lajčák stressed that this development constitutes an urgently needed and significant step, particularly considering the rising number of civilian casualties along the contact line reported by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM). Noting the importance of ensuring the sustainability of the ceasefire in order to avoid the failures of previous recommitments, the Chairperson-in-Office underlined that maintaining the ceasefire is as crucial as the recommitment itself. “A meaningful ceasefire needs to be permanent and irreversible. I urge all sides to live up to their commitments, and finally establish a comprehensive, sustainable and unlimited ceasefire, which can open the door for the peaceful resolution of the conflict,” Lajčák said.

Lajčák noted that this recommitment builds on the positive developments in the recent process of disengagement of forces and hardware from Stanytsia Luhanska, which has been facilitated and monitored by the SMM, as well as in concrete plans to finally repair the bridge –a crucial daily crossing point for thousands of people in the Luhansk region and badly damaged by the conflict. “I particularly welcome the common understanding reached by the sides yesterday in Minsk regarding the need to start repair work on the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska. These repairs are urgent; they need to happen without delay. The people on the ground have suffered for too long already. And, we need to use this momentum to take even more positive steps forward,” he stressed.

ERGNETI, 18 July 2019 - The 94th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting was held today in Ergneti. Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative for the South Caucasus of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, co-facilitated the meeting.

Høeg provided an overview of events since the last IPRM meeting on 16 May 2019. He noted that the overall security situation had remained relatively calm and stable but also highlighted developments related to detentions, explosions and ‘borderization’. While highlighting the good co-operation on the use of the EUMM managed Hotline, Høeg continued to stress the importance to all participants of continuing to use this mechanism when dealing with sensitive issues, thus increasing transparency.

Discussions ensued on the continuing erection of obstacles and barriers along the administrative boundary Lline (ABL). The co-facilitators stressed the negative impact of ‘borderization’ on the lives of people on both sides of the ABL, and concerning detentions called for a humanitarian approach. Participants furthermore discussed alleged airspace violations and other security-related issues.

The case of the tragic death of Archil Tatunashvili was once again addressed.

Høeg and Ambassador Michalka urged all participants to continue using the Hotline and to increase early and timely exchange of information on activities by security actors from both sides of the ABL.

The next meeting is scheduled for 29 August 2019.

BISHKEK, 18 July 2019 – The 21st Central Asia Media Conference organized by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, concluded today in Bishkek.

During the two-day conference, journalists and representatives from the media and NGOs, together with international experts and state representatives from Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, discussed issues and challenges arising in the context of new media technologies in Central Asia. Topics included the conditions for establishing an open and secure internet, media for minorities and self-regulation.

The conference was also an opportunity to discuss the most recent media freedom developments across the region.The conference was opened by Désir, together with the Minister of Culture, Information and Tourism of the Kyrgyz Republic, Azamat Zhamankulov, the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nuran Niyazaliev, and the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, Ambassador Pierre von Arx.

“Since our last meeting in Nur-Sultan last year, there have been many developments in media freedom. In some countries we have seen improvements, but journalists still face threats to their safety and restrictions on their activities,” said Désir, “In the past year, I had to intervene with State authorities on different cases of blocking of websites, prosecution of journalists, detentions and fines.”

“At the same time, steps taken by some States show that improvement is indeed possible. This is why we are particularly pleased to have organized this conference in Kyrgyzstan, where in recent years we have seen important progress in the field of media freedom,” said the Representative. “In the face of many challenges linked to digitalization, it is necessary to open the media landscape, and to allow more space for diverse views in the entire region.”

The conference participants also discussed the main challenges to media development and media freedom at a time of digital transformation, including its impact on the financial sustainability of media, moderating online content as well as terrorist propaganda, hate speech and so-called ‘fake news’.

The Representative insisted that any model of national online regulation must adhere to international human rights standards, in particular, those pertaining to freedom of expression.

Concluding the conference, a new set of recommendations were presented by the Representative that provide guidelines for future policies which will support media pluralism, a legal regulatory framework supportive of media freedom, and self-regulation in the new digital environment.

On the occasion of the conference, the Representative also met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, Chingiz Aidarbekov, and Minister Zhamankulov to discuss media freedom in the country as well as future co-operation.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

425987 Andrii Dziubenko

A new web-based course on combating domestic violence, created by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine and the online education platform EdEra, is open for users starting from 18 July 2019. The course for the general public aims at promoting awareness among Ukrainians of what domestic violence is and how it can be dealt with.

Those who complete this educational tool will gain an understanding of the different forms of domestic violence, including physical, sexual, psychological and economic abuse. Texts, lectures and illustrations explain the causes and consequences. Completing the course can be useful for those who already work to combat this crime, but also for domestic violence survivors or people who witness incidents. The course provides a detailed outline of measures that can be taken with available state instruments and non-governmental resources, providing useful tips and advice.

“Even a single experience of violence at home can have long-lasting implications affecting the life of a person. But wider society in the end also pays a lot for not doing enough to prevent abuse, as it then needs to deal with the social, economic and even security costs of the consequences,” said Henrik Villadsen, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine. “In dealing with such complex social issues it is never enough to build an efficient law enforcement response; you have to think about creating a culture where such behaviour is considered inacceptable, and reach out to the widest audience possible.”

The course will be also used for training courses organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator for specific audiences that work in this domain – law enforcers, social workers and psychologists, as well as educators in schools and universities. 

The production of the course was supported by several prominent Ukrainian public opinion leaders, who contributed on a pro bono basis as lecturers and performers: Kateryna Babkyna, writer; Vita Chygryna, blogger and volunteer for the Family Counsellors project led by the Ministry of Justice; Andrii Kulykov, journalist and head of the Commission on Journalism Ethics; Roman Vintoniv also known as Michael Shchur, political satire journalist and ambassador of the ‘HeForShe’ UN Women Solidarity Movement for Gender Equality.

According to the OSCE-led Survey on Violence Against Women conducted in 2018, 7.6% of Ukrainian women interviewed indicated they experienced physical or sexual violence from their intimate partners in the 12 months prior to the survey. Learn more about the survey at: www.osce.org/secretariat/413237

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

MINSK, 18 July 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its working groups in Minsk on 17 July 2019:

“Last Friday, 12 July 2019, the advisers to the Normandy Four leaders met in Paris. According to some representatives of the Russian and Ukrainian sides, further actions in the framework of the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group were discussed.

This meeting gave a significant impetus to today's sessions of the TCG and its Working Groups. I am also convinced that it will have a positive impact on our future work in general.

Before presenting the results of our today’s meetings, I would like to welcome the return of Mr Roman Bessmertnyi, the representative of Ukraine in the Political Working Group.

Now about the results of our work:

Today, the TCG agreed upon and endorsed the Statement on the recommitment to the ceasefire, starting from 21 July 2019 at 00 hrs. 01 min. (Kyiv time).

This is a very important achievement since, according to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, there has recently been an increase in both ceasefire violations and, unfortunately, the number of civilian casualties. This ceasefire is unlimited. The Statement contains a number of measures aimed to ensure the sustainability of the ceasefire.

Today, we not only agreed on the ceasefire, but also came to a common understanding on the repair works and operation of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska:

“In light of the agreement reached by the political advisers of the Normandy format, the Trilateral Contact Group, with the participation of representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, came to a common understanding on the following:

1)  Within ten days, the sides shall inform the Working Group on Humanitarian Issues about their parts of the project to repair the bridge across the Siverskyi Donets river in the disengagement area at Stanytsia Luhanska (hereinafter “the bridge”);

2)  The sides simultaneously launch the repair works of the bridge:

• the Ukrainian side shall restore the collapsed span of the bridge; the CALR shall restore the road surface and the fences;
• immediately before the start of the repair works, the sides shall dismantle the fortifications, synchronously and simultaneously, starting with the construction on the bridge.

3)  The sides undertake not to use the bridge:

• for military purposes;
• for sabotage activities;
• for political activities.

The bridge shall be used by the sides exclusively for civilian purposes.

4)  If one of the sides carries out any works on the bridge, it undertakes to inform the other side or the Trilateral Contact Group, and, if necessary, coordinate its actions with the Trilateral Contact Group.”

Among other issues on the agenda, the Economic Working Group paid particular attention to the financial situation of the "Voda Donbasa" company. With the participation of ICRC experts and representatives, a number of issues related to the preparation for the international audit already agreed by the sides were considered.

The Humanitarian Working Group continued discussions related to the exchange of detainees.

Welcoming the positive spirit of the meeting of the advisors to the Normandy Four leaders, the Political Working Group took forward its exchanges on issues related to the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

MINSK, 17 July 2019 -The Trilateral Contact Group, with the participation of representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, acknowledging the positive impact of the practice of recommitment to ceasefire, stressing the importance of ensuring peace and calm for the population, and also guided by earlier agreements and obligations of the sides:

- re-affirm its full commitment to a comprehensive, sustainable and unlimited cease-fire starting from 21 July 2019 at 00 hrs. 01 min. (Kyiv time);

- underline herewith the importance of issuance of, and compliance with, the respective ceasefire orders, about which shall be made public announcements by the sides’ higher commandment; the effective use of disciplinary measures in case of ceasefire violations and report about them of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission; refusal of forward movements as well as reconnaissance-subversive activities; no firing, including sniper fire; ban on the placement of heavy weapons in and around populated areas, in particular near objects of civilian infrastructure, including schools, kindergartens, hospitals and other public premises;

- re-assert their joint and firm commitment to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements;

- undertake to ensure safe and secure access for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission throughout Ukraine in accordance with its mandate for monitoring and verification, including by using its technical means.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man from Chermalyk died from shrapnel injuries.
• The SMM saw fresh damage caused by gunfire to civilian properties in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and Marinka, and craters caused by shelling near residential houses in Khreshchatytske.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM continued to observe demining activities and the operation of a shuttle bus service.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines and a wire obstacle on the road inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region; specifically, it saw mortars near Sentianivka and multiple launch rocket systems in a training area near Miusynsk.
• The SMM saw for the first time unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne and in Sentianivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line, including to water pipelines near government-controlled Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and to a phenol sludge reservoir near government-controlled Novhorodske.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region near Zaichenko and Novoazovsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). About half of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), west of Donetsk city centre (non-government-controlled), and easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 250), compared with the previous reporting period (about 205 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man from Chermalyk dies due to shrapnel injuries

On 12 July, a resident of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) told the SMM that on the evening of 11 July, he had gone to see one of his neighbours at 63 Kalmiuska Street after hearing shelling in the area. The man added that, when he had arrived at his neighbour’s house, he saw medical staff carrying his neighbour into an ambulance. On 15 July, medical staff at a morgue in Mariupol told the SMM that the body of a resident (man, aged 49) of 63 Kalmiuska Street in Chermalyk had been brought in with fatal shrapnel injuries to his head, legs and torso.

At 63 Kalmiuska Street, the SMM saw a shed with a piece of wall missing as well as bricks and debris on the ground. About 5m from the shed, in a single-storey house, the SMM saw six shattered windows and shrapnel marks on the window frames and a wall, as well as wooden planks lying on the ground below the windows. The SMM also saw a blood stain on the ground in the entry way to the house (next to the aforementioned wall). The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or the direction of fire.

Fresh damage from small-arms fire to an apartment in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and residential properties in Dokuchaievsk

On 15 July, at a two-storey apartment building at 18 Lizy Chaikinoi Street in the south-western part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a hole in a west-north-west-facing window of a second floor apartment, assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms fire.

On 16 July, inside a ground-floor apartment of a five-storey building at 89 Tsentralna Street in the north-western part of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in a south-west-facing window and a corresponding hole in a wall adjacent to the window, assessed as fresh and caused by heavy-machine-gun fire.

About 130m south-south-east from 89 Tsentralna Street, in an apartment on the ground floor of a five-storey building at 93 Tsentralna Street, the SMM saw a hole in a south-west-facing window, assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms-fire. About 400m south-west of the latter building, in a top-floor apartment of a five-storey building at 86 Lenina Street, the SMM saw a hole in a south-facing window, assessed as fresh and caused by heavy-machine-gun fire.

About 440m south-east from 86 Lenina Street, at 20 Sverdlova Street, the SMM saw a hole (30cm x 20cm) in a south-facing metal fence, assessed as fresh and caused by a round of an automatic grenade launcher fired from a southerly direction. Five residents of the above-mentioned properties (mixed ages and genders) separately told the SMM that they had been at their homes on the evening of 14 July when they heard shooting (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 16 July 2019).

Fresh damage from shelling to apartments in Marinka

On 15 July, at 48 Shevchenka Street in the central part of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in a metal fence about 5m from a residential house and a scratch in an asphalt driveway about 1.5m north-east from the hole, all assessed as fresh and caused by a projectile (weapon type unknown) fired from a north-easterly direction. A resident of the house (a woman in her sixties) told the SMM that she had been at home on the evening of 11 July when she heard an explosion.

On 16 July, about 450m south-west of 48 Shevchenka Street, at a two-storey building at 12 Zavodska Street, the SMM saw damage to three apartments. At a ground-floor apartment, the SMM saw two shrapnel holes in an outer north-facing wall, assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel. A resident of the apartment (a man in his sixties) told the SMM that he had been at home on the evening of 11 July when he heard an explosion. At another ground floor apartment, the SMM saw a shattered north-facing window and a hole (15cm in diameter) on the north-facing wall of a second-floor apartment above it. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by an airburst (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 16 July 2019).

Craters caused by shelling near houses in Khreshchatytske

On 16 July, at a residential house at 7 Pervomaiska Street in the central part of Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw two craters (about 1.5m in diameter) in the garden of the house – one about 2m and one about 8m east of the house – assessed as fresh and caused by artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction. A resident of the house (a man in his sixties) told the SMM that he had been at home on the morning of 8 July when he heard a whistling sound.

About 260m north, at 19 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw a crater (2m in diameter and about 2m deep) about 3m east of the south-east-facing wall of a residential house, assessed as recent and caused by an artillery round fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw that a metal gate with shrapnel holes had partially collapsed into the crater, and saw that there was shrapnel on the ground near the crater (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 10 July 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 15 July, inside the disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a tractor moving concrete blocks off the road and onto the shoulder about 750m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP).

On 16 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw five people in dark blue clothing assessed as State Emergengy Service (SES) personnel operating mine detectors in a field between 10m and 150m east of the road about 500m south of the EECP. On the same day, the SMM again saw a bus transporting people from an area about 250m south of the EECP to the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and back. It also saw five members of SES and two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) [2] cutting cable barriers from the sides of the road 50m north of the wooden ramps on the broken part of the bridge. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that the roadsides were being cleared to make room for the bus to turn around.

Between the former forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps and their checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM saw also four members of the armed formations wearing “JCCC” armbands.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 13 July, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted two anti-tank mines (TM-62) located at the edge of road T-1316 and a camouflage net stretching across the road with at least eight distinct cylindrical shaped discs underneath, assessed as probable anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted a spool wire stretched across road T-1316 about 250m north of the armed formations’ checkpoint on the southern edge of the disengagement area.

On the evening of 15 July, while in Popasna, the SMM recorded about 240 undetermined explosions, about 70 bursts and about 90 shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 5-7km east-south-east, all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the evening and night of 15-16 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 19 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-5km east and east-north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

On 16 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

On 14 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 20 June 2019).

On 15 July, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

On 14 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 13 tanks, 12 towed howitzers or mortars (types undetermined) and four surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

13 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1), including two under a tarpaulin, and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 400m north of the disengagement area near Zolote.

15 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an APC (BTR-80) near the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 9 July 2019);
• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) on the south-eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska; and
• three APCs (MT-LB) near Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an ACV under a camouflage net near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

16 July

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

14 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two APCs (a BTR-80 and a MT-LB), two command and communications vehicles (a R-142N mounted on a Gaz-66 truck and a type undetermined mounted on a Zil-131 truck) and a radio relay station (R-419A mounted on a Zil-131 truck) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk);
• an APC (MT-LB) in Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk);
• a combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2), two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) and four APCs (BTR-60, BTR-70, BTR-80 and MT-LB) in Luhansk city; and
• an APC (BTR-80) under a camouflage net in Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk).

15 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two ACVs under a camouflage net near Sentianivka.

Anti-tank mines near Shchastia and unexploded ordnance (UXO) near Molodizhne and near Sentianivka

On 13 July, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, laid in three rows across road H-21 south of the bridge in Shchastia. The same UAV also spotted at least 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62), assessed as belonging to the armed formations, laid in two rows across the western lane of the same road.

On 15 July, on road T-0504, which is regularly used by the SMM, about 100m east of a checkpoint of the armed formations near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a fresh crater (20cm in diameter) in the asphalt, as well as concrete debris around the crater and a 120mm mortar tailfin embedded inside. On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a piece of UXO, assessed as a rocket from a MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a ditch about 60m west of road T-1317 leading to Sentianivka.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to a phenol sludge reservoir near Novhorodske, as well as to a water pipeline near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). Additionally, the Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to support demining activities near the EECP near Maiorsk. The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM monitors security situation south-east of Kherson region

On 15 July, the SMM observed calm situations at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea, and along the Sea of Azov coast.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 15 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At the checkpoint at the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards, citing “an ongoing anti-terrorist operation.”
• At the intersection of roads E-58 and T-0508 north-east of Novoazovsk, two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage southwards, citing “training activities.”
• At a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing the unavailability of radio communication to receive permission from their superiors.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formation denied the SMM passage, citing “restrictions” from his superior.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 15 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk), Illinivka (government-controlled, 56km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk)[6].  
• On 16 July, on two occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference assessed as probably caused by jamming while flying over areas near Solodke (government-controlled, 33km south-west of Donetsk).

 

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

COPENHAGEN, 17 July 2019 – Some 60 observers from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, including 42 parliamentarians from 20 countries, are deploying to Ukraine this week for the 21 July parliamentary elections. Finnish parliamentarian Ilkka Kanerva will serve as Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, following an appointment by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak.

OSCE PA President George Tsereteli has appointed French parliamentarian Sereine Mauborgne to serve as Head of the OSCE PA’s observer mission.

“Following an important presidential election earlier this year, Ukraine has another opportunity with these parliamentary elections to demonstrate its commitment to democratic development and reform,” said Kanerva. “I hope to continue our good co-operation with Ukrainian authorities and to observe a dynamic, competitive election.”

Kanerva has led a number of observer missions in the past, including to the first round of last spring’s presidential election in Ukraine. As Special Co-ordinator, Kanerva will deliver the joint statement of preliminary findings and conclusions at a press conference in Kyiv on 22 July.

“These parliamentary elections are important not only for Ukraine but also for the whole of the OSCE region,” said Mauborgne. “I hope to see peaceful and competitive elections that ultimately help deliver stability, security and progress for the Ukrainian people.”

An experienced election observer, Mauborgne recently led the OSCE PA’s delegation of observers for the 21 April presidential election in North Macedonia.

For the 21 July Ukrainian elections, the OSCE PA will work closely with observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Parliament.

On 3 July, Kanerva expressed regret that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is not able to observe these elections following recent developments.

This is the 16th time that the PA has observed electoral processes in Ukraine since 1994. For previous OSCE assessments of Ukrainian elections, please click here.

VIENNA, 17 July 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed today’s court decision to acquit two journalists and a human rights defender in Turkey.

The trial of Reporters Without Borders’ Turkey representative Erol Önderoğlu, freelance journalist Ahmet Nesin, and head of the Turkey Human Rights Foundation Şebnem Korur Fincancı concluded today at the Çağlayan courthouse, with the Istanbul 13 High Criminal Court ruling in favour of their acquittal. The charges brought against them included engaging in terrorist propaganda and supporting criminal activity, following their participation in a solidarity campaign for the Kurdish media outlet, Özgür Gündem, which was closed in August 2016 through the Statutory Decree No. 675 issued under the state of emergency.

“I am relieved at today’s acquittal of Erol Önderoğlu, Ahmet Nesin and Şebnem Korur Fincancı. I welcome this decision after almost three years. This is a long-awaited ruling, which comes at a crucial time for all journalists in Turkey. I hope that this positive news will reflect on other similar cases of prosecuted journalists and those currently behind bars in the country,” Désir said.

The Representative recalled that Önderoğlu is one of his Office’s most trusted international experts, who is well known for his strong dedication to professional journalism and fighting for journalists’ rights in Turkey.

“It’s very important that Erol’s tireless work and sacrifice for other colleagues is recognized, and that he will be allowed to continue his important work without any hindrance,” Désir said.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage caused by gunfire to civilian properties in Dokuchaievsk and Marinka.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM continued to observe demining activities; it also observed that a shuttle bus service had been introduced to transport people from an area south of the entry-exit checkpoint to the broken section of the bridge and in opposite direction.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line, including to water pipelines in government-controlled Artema and power lines in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints near Zaichenko, Bezimenne and Novoazovsk, all in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 40 explosions). The highest number of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 205 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage to civilian properties caused by small-arms fire in Dokuchaievsk

Inside an apartment on the fourth floor of a five-storey building at 91 Tsentralna Street in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in a south-facing window, a corresponding hole in the edge of a wall next to the window and two corresponding holes on both sides of a nearby refrigerator. The SMM assessed all the damage as fresh and caused by a bullet (the SMM could not assess the type of weapon used). A resident (a woman, aged 37) of the apartment told the SMM that she had been inside it with her husband and their three children on the evening of 13 July, when she had seen a bullet penetrating one of the windows.

In the same neighbourhood, inside an apartment on the second floor of a five-storey building at 9 Vatutina Street, the SMM saw a shattered north-west-facing window and five holes in the opposite wall. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by rounds from heavy machine-gun. A resident (a woman, aged 64) of the apartment told the SMM that she had been inside it when she had heard the window break on the evening of 14 July.

On a glass-framed balcony of an apartment on the first floor of a five-storey building at 11 Vatutina Street, the SMM saw a hole in a north-east-facing outer window, another hole in an inner window of the same balcony, as well as a fresh hole in a wall opposite the latter window. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a round from heavy machine-gun. A resident (a woman, aged 60) of the apartment told the SMM that she had been present inside it when she had heard the sound of glass breaking at around 18:30 on 13 July.

Inside an apartment on the fourth floor of a five-storey house at 13 Vatutina Street, the SMM saw a hole in a plastic windowsill under a south-facing window, assessed as fresh and caused by a round from heavy-machine-gun.

A house sustained fresh damage caused by gunfire in Marinka

In Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in a north-facing façade of a one-storey building at 3 Nova Street and another hole in the east-facing wooden wall of a shed 2-3m north-east of the house. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by (30mm) rounds.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 12 July, inside the disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted for the first time a CCTV camera (not seen in imagery from 30 June 2019) near former positions of the armed formations, about 950m east of its western edge and 600m north of its southern edge. On 14 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a metallic triangular-framed mast with a camera installed atop (not seen in imagery from 14 June 2019), about 340m north-west of the former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the railway bridge about 650m east-north-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On 15 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM observed seven members of the State Emergency Services (SES) conducting demining activities around 20-70m east of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM observed for the first time areas cordoned off with red and white tape tied to wooden poles in a field about 50-100m east of the road, around 170m south of the area’s northern edge.

The SMM also observed a bus transporting people from an area about 250m south of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) to the broken section of the bridge (for an approximate distance of 700m). The SMM saw that the bus had an average of 50 people on board and that it left about every 20-30min, returning with an approximately similar number of passengers on board. The driver of the bus told the SMM that the newly introduced shuttle bus service provided free-of-charge transportation for all starting from 15 July. He also said that the bus had a capacity of 21 seats and 32 additional standing places and that there was no fixed time schedule for departures and arrivals (it left when all seats and standing places had been filled). The SMM also noted that many people were still walking towards government-controlled areas and in the opposite direction.

On the same day, between the former forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps and their checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM saw up to six members of the armed formations wearing “JCCC” armbands.[2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night of 14-15 July, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), 18 projectiles at an assessed range of 1-4km south-east and south-south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the area), as well as an undermined explosion and 17 projectiles at an assessed range of 1-4km east-north-east, south-south-west and south-west (all assessed as outside the area but within 5km of its periphery).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

13 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk).

14 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

14 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

14 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) near Perevalsk.

15 July

The SMM saw two tanks (T-72) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

15 July

The SMM could not verify all weapons previously declared as withdrawn which were present at the site.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

13 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems (ZU-234, 23mm) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol) and
• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Druzhba (75km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk);
• three IFVs (BMP-1) near Novoselivka Druha (see above); and
• an IFV (type unidentified) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

15 July

The SMM saw:

• an IFV parked beside a house in a residential area, less than 150m from a school in Popasna;
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk);
• three APCs (BTR-80) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk); and
• a man wearing camouflaged clothing operating a device and landing a UAV (quadcopter, grey colour) near the vehicle on road T-0504 on the eastern edge of Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

13 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted fresh damage, assessed as caused by a (120mm) mortar round to a recently built position assessed as belonging to the armed formations west of Molodizhne (63km west of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 7 July 2019).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and three probable APCs (BTR variants) near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol); and
• two IFVs (BMP-2) and three APCs (two BTR-80 and one MT-LB) near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

Presence of mine hazard signs near Novomykhailivka and demining activities in Slavne

The SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs (red squares with “Danger mines” in both Ukrainian and English) about 3km north-east of Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk), approximately 3m east of road O-0531. On 13 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a tailfin from an exploded (120mm) mortar round, stuck in the middle of road T-0504 about 1.5km west of Molodizhne. The SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces demining team conducting demining activities in fields east and south of Slavne (government-controlled 26km south-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, as well as to power lines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 15 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westwards.
• At a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).
• At the checkpoint at the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed denied the SMM passage southwards, citing an “ongoing antiterrorist operation in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 13-14 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming while flying over areas in government-and non-government-controlled areas of northern and southern Donetsk region.[5]
• On the evening and night of 14-15 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed caused by jamming, while flying over Pleshchiivka (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk) and Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).[6]
• On 15 July, SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference assessed as probably caused by jamming while flying over areas near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 21km south of Donetsk) on two occasions, and near Solodke (government-controlled, 33km south-west of Donetsk) on one occasion.
• On 15 July, an SMM mid-range UAV experienced signal interference assessed as probably caused by jamming while flying over an area near Solodke (government-controlled, 33km south-west of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

[6] ibid.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 12,022 to 12,511 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 164 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 22 this week compared to 14 last week: eight of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 14 into Ukraine (64 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, 12 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and 10 were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (451 compared to 442 observed during the previous week). There were 235 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 216 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Luhansk – Simferopol and Luhansk-Yalta.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 1001 trucks (876 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (586 at the Gukovo BCP and 415 at the Donetsk BCP); 628 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 373 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates. During the reporting week the OT noticed a significant increase of trucks traffic at the Gukovo BCP.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 60 (compared to 49 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP significantly decreased from 118 to 68: of the total number of trucks scanned, 50 trucks (74 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 18 trucks (26 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 155 to 130 vehicles; 61 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 69 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 34 occasions; the OTs assessed that 21 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 13 to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. Cars with Lithuanian, Polish, Belarusian and Georgian license plates were also observed.

During the reporting period, the OTs at the Donetsk BCP observed ambulances on three distinct occasions. On 10 July at 11:30, an ambulance arrived at the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked in front of the main building. At 11:45, the ambulance returned towards the Russian Federation. On 12 July at 20:37, an ambulance entered the BCP area from the Russian Federation. At 21:23, the medical crew accompanied a civilian to the ambulance and crossed back into the Russian Federation together. On 13 July at 10:07, an ambulance arrived from the Russian Federation and parked in front of the main building. At 10:24, the ambulance returned towards the Russian Federation.

On 11 July at 06:15, one cargo minivan with the inscription (in Russian) “LDPR” and with logo (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) crossed the border from the Russian Federation into Ukraine. At 18:13 on the same day, the vehicle returned back into the Russian Federation.

On 12 July at 13:12, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a military M-17 helicopter which flew over the Donetsk BCP inside the airspace of the Russian Federation. The aircraft came from the north and continued flying in an easterly direction.

On 16 July at 07:02, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a police vehicle entering the BCP control area from the Russian Federation. The vehicle parked near to the main building. At 07:11 the vehicle returned back into the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 18 June 2019 to 16 July 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                              

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 12 and 13 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 13 and 14 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours.
• A man was injured by shrapnel in Horlivka and another man was injured by a bullet in Dokuchaievsk.
• The SMM saw damage from shelling to and near civilian properties, including a school, in Lukove and to a day-clinic in Khreshchatytske, as well as from small-arms fire to a residential building in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw members of the State Emergency Service conducting demining activities.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission spotted a train exiting Ukraine near non-government-controlled Vyselky and a truck near non-government-controlled Manych, in the vicinity of the border with the Russian Federation.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at two hospitals in non-government-controlled Horlivka and Donetsk city and at a checkpoint near Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 12 and 13 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (180), compared with the previous reporting period (about 215 explosions). Nearly half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), in areas south-south-east and south-south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 13 and 14 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 40), compared with the previous 24 hours. More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk and at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 12 and 13 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 75), compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions). Nearly half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-north-east and east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in areas north of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 13 and 14 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours. More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Man injured by bullet in Dokuchaievsk

On 14 July, the SMM followed up on reports of a man (aged 46) injured by a bullet in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). At a hospital in Dokuchaievsk, a doctor told the SMM that the man had been admitted and treated for a bullet wound to his right thigh in the afternoon of 13 July and later was transferred to a hospital in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled). At the latter hospital, medical staff told the SMM that the man had been admitted on 13 July and that he had lost a lot of blood. On 14 July, the man told the SMM that in the afternoon of 13 July he had been in his balcony (on the third floor) at 3 Vatutina Street in Dokuchaievsk when he was hit by a bullet in his right thigh.

Man injured by shrapnel in Horlivka

On 13 July, the SMM followed up on reports of a man (aged 44) injured by shrapnel on 6 July. At a hospital in Horlivka (non-government controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the mother of the injured man told the SMM that in the late morning of 6 July, she had been inside her house at 26/2 Yakubova Street, when she heard several explosions and saw that her son, who she said was in the yard, had been injured in his forearm. Medical staff at the hospital in Horlivka told the SMM that the man had been admitted  and was still present, but refused to give further information.

Damage by shelling to and near civilian properties, including a school, in Lukove

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling on 11 July in Lukove (non-government-controlled, 72km south of Donetsk), a settlement located about 5km east of the forward positions of the armed formations at the contact line. At 53 Pervomaiska Street, on 11 July, the SMM saw fresh three craters (with pieces of shrapnel in them): two about 10 and 30m west and the third 10m south-west of a double-storey functioning primary school building. The SMM assessed the craters as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from west-south-westerly and westerly directions. The SMM saw, next to the third crater, an electrical pylon lying on the ground with ruptured electrical wires. It also saw 20 shattered windows (of which some wooden frames were dislodged) and several shrapnel holes in the west-facing wall of the school building. Within a 120m radius of the school building, the SMM saw nine additional craters, on a road as well as in a park (seven assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds and two by 152mm artillery rounds, fired from a westerly direction). About 50m east of the school building, the SMM observed several shrapnel holes and two shattered windows in the north-facing wall of a single-storey house, a burned down wooden shed about 10m north of the house, and several missing asbestos panels on a roof of a farm building (about 10m east of the shed).

About 120m west of the school building, the SMM saw a piece of a metal fence on the ground and shrapnel damage to other parts of the fence. It assessed the damage as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. About 20 further west, in a car parking area, the SMM saw two craters assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction. The SMM also saw a destroyed concrete barrier next to one of the craters, as well as multiple shrapnel holes in a metal container and a car with multiple holes in its sides and blast damage to its front. About 50m west of the craters, the SMM saw that all the west-facing windows of a disused factory building were shattered (with some of the wooden frames dislodged), that a large piece of the top corner of the west-facing wall was missing and that parts of the metal plates of the roof had collapsed. The SMM also saw that the roof of a secondary adjacent building had collapsed and that a piece of its west-facing wall and five windows were shattered (with some wooden frames partially missing). The SMM assessed the damage as caused by the impact of two to three 122mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction.

About 100m west of the disused factory, at 60 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the ground next to a fence (of which some brick poles and metal structures were bent and partially destroyed) north of a single-storey house. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction.  About 50m north-east of the house, at 59 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw three fresh craters in a vegetable garden north of an inhabited single-storey house, assessed as caused by 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds (one assessed as fired from a westerly direction while for the others the SMM could not assess the direction of fire). The SMM also saw three shattered west-facing windows in the same house as well as a collapsed roof of a concrete garage (about 20m west) while its west- and south-facing walls had large cracks. The SMM assessed the damage to the garage as caused by a 122mm artillery round which had impacted the roof (but could not assess the direction of fire).

Within 70m of the previous house, the SMM saw three fresh craters, two in the middle of an asphalted road and the other north of a single-storey house at 54 Pervomaiska Street (as well as shrapnel holes in a north-facing wall of the house). About 20m north, at 55 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw that a piece of a west-facing wall and asbestos panels in the roof of an inhabited single-storey house were missing and shrapnel holes in the south-west facing wall of a garage and in the rear of a parked car. The SMM assessed all the above mentioned damage as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly direction. A man who introduced himself as the owner of the house at 55 Pervomaiska Street said that he had been in the basement when shelling had occurred in the morning of 11 July.

Damage by shrapnel at a day-time clinic in Khreshchatytske  

On 13 July, at Radianska Street in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw several shrapnel holes assessed as recent in three south-facing windows of a day-time clinic. The SMM previously reported damage assessed as caused by shelling in the area on 8 July (for more details, see SMM Daily Report 10 July 2019).

Damage from small-arms fire to a residential house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 12 July, at 13 Myru Street,  the SMM saw a bullet hole assessed as fresh in a cardboard covering a west-facing window of a third floor apartment in a five-storey residential building. Inside the apartment, the SMM also saw fresh scarring on a shelf and cracks on a computer screen. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a small-arms round (5.45mm). A resident (woman, aged 59) told the SMM that on the evening of 11 July she was sleeping with her granddaughter in the bedroom while her husband was using the computer (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 7 July 2019).

Damage by anti-tank guided missile to a building in Yasynuvata

On 13 July, at 122a Lenina Boulevard in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) led by two members of the armed formations, the SMM saw an impact crater in the concrete road about 4m north of a four-storey building of the armed formations, about 2.5km east of the forward positions of the armed formations. The SMM saw about 30 north-facing windows (on several floors) that were either shattered or had broken glass, some damaged tiles located above the side-entrance on the north-eastern corner of the building, as well as shrapnel damage to the north-facing wall. The SMM assessed the damage was caused by an anti-tank guided missile fired from a westerly direction. A man who presented himself as a resident of the neighbourhood said that an impact had occurred in the evening of 12 July.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 12 July, inside the disengagement area, north of the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed members of the State Emergency Services (SES) carrying out demining activities in a field about 250m south-south-east of the entry-exit checkpoint and 100m east of the road. It also saw six Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel cutting branches and trees in a field 50m west of the same road. On 13 July, the SMM saw five SES personnel conducting demining activities on the eastern edge of the disengagement area.

On 13 and 14 July, between the former forward position of the armed formations and their checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM saw up to four members of the armed formations wearing “JCCC” armbands.[2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening of 12 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During day on 13 July, positioned in four different locations near Zolote, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 110 shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the evening of the same day, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east and south-south-west (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area) as well as ten projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east and east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 14 July, positioned near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-4km north-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard three shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 13 and 14 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

12 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (see below) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019) and
• a tank (probable T-72) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 2 July 2019).

13 July

The SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

12 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• seven tanks (T-72) in a training area near Ternove (see above) and
• ten tanks (probable T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 25 June 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

13 July

The SMM noted that nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

13 July

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

The SMM noted that eight tanks (three T-64 and five T-72) remained missing.

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

13 July

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) (seen also on 14 July);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) near Pylypchatyne (76km north-east of Donetsk); and
• two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) (BTR-70) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk).

14 July

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-60) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk) and
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• seven armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (a BMP variant and the remainder undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (see above);

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an underground bunker being constructed near an existing concrete bunker about 1km south-west of Svitle (11km north of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of the operations of civilian infrastructure

On 13 and 14 July, the SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) 15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). On 13 July, while positioned in Yasynuvata to facilitate the operation of the DFS, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts and saw a column of smoke about 2km south-west of its position and 700m south-west of a bus transporting six DFS workers on road M-04.

Train spotted exiting Ukraine near Vyselky and truck spotted near Manych, both in non-government-controlled areas near the border with the Russian Federation

On the night of 12 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a train (with at least 12 wagons, cargo not visible) facing an easterly direction at the train station in Kvashyne (non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Donetsk). Within a 15-minute span, the same train was spotted moving in a south-easterly direction about 4.5km south-east of Kvashyne and then exiting Ukraine.

On the same night, about 1km east of Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted a truck (with two people in its rear) moving north-east on dirt and asphalt roads towards the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities. The same truck was then spotted in a field about 3.5km east-north-east of Manych and about 200m west of the border.

Other border areas outside government control

On 13 July, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM saw 13 cars (five with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates), 15 covered cargo trucks (12 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw nine cars (one with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), ten covered cargo trucks (nine with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 14 July, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six cars (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” and “LPR” plates) and a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations asked the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, at the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka, the SMM saw a cargo train heading east, but could not determine the number of railway cars and their contents. After a few minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw no pedestrians exiting or entering Ukraine.

Follow up on reports of an attack on the office of a Ukrainian television channel

In Kyiv, on 13 July, the SMM followed up on media reports of an attack against the office of a Ukrainian television channel. At 21-G Dehtiarivska Street, the SMM saw a shattered window, and damage on a concrete walland to the organization’s logo, as well as debris on the ground. The SMM saw about ten law enforcement officers present. Two police representatives told the SMM that at 3:30 that morning the building had been attacked by an individual with a grenade launcher, however no people had been injured or damage recorded inside the building. They added that a criminal investigation had been opened under article 258 (act of terrorism) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

Later the same day, the SMM saw a protest in front of the main building of the Security Service of Ukraine, reportedly against a Ukrainian politician, who, according to some of the participants, was associated with the aforementioned television channel. The SMM saw 50 persons (16-30 years old, 80 per cent men), including some wearing National Corps insignia. It also saw 30 law enforcement officers present.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On one occasion on 13 July and on two occasions on 14 July, at a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “an anti-terrorist” as well as “demining activities”.
• On 14 July, at the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 14 July, at a border crossing point in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 12-13 July, while flying near Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming.[7]
• On the morning of 13 July, the SMM lost control over an SMM mini-UAV which was flying over an area about 2.7km north-east of Luhansk city (non-government-controlled) after it experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.  On 13 July, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km west of Mariupol) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM visited an area previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

VIENNA, 15 July 2019 – Multilateralism and co-operation lie at the core of the OSCE comprehensive concept of security, participants said today at the opening of a two-day OSCE meeting in Vienna.

This meeting, organized by the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), focused on the mutually supporting role between the multilateral system and national human rights institutions, and the resulting benefits to the overall delivery of OSCE human dimension commitments.

Lukáš Parízek, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic and Special Representative for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, said that in our current complex security environment, dominated by transnational challenges which no one country can face alone, multilateral co-operation is needed more than ever, but that, at the same time, multilateralism is in crisis.

“We are witnessing more and more unilateral actions by some. And we are witnessing mistrust in our international and regional organizations,” Parízek said. “Our Slovak Chairmanship has chosen ‘effective multilateralism’ as a top priority. We are convinced that we need effective multilateralism to address the challenges of today and tomorrow.”  

ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, said: “The OSCE has multilateral co-operation written into its DNA, and thus plays a key role in bringing States to the table to resolve issues that affect all of us. Nonetheless, the multilateral order that has brought peace and progress to so many is under attack. From the populists, from the power hungry, but also through sheer neglect, from all those members of the public who do not realize just how much they have to lose if this system disintegrates.”  

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli spoke about the need for broad multilateral diplomacy.

“Many different actors, beyond State governments, have a legitimate voice and we must listen to them if we want to find lasting solutions to the challenges facing us," said Tsereteli. "This in no way diminishes the importance of classic diplomacy among governments. Quite the contrary; an inclusive approach adds strength and legitimacy to international relations that can otherwise appear distant from the real needs of the people we serve. A broad outlook to multilateral diplomacy – involving parliamentarians, civil society, academia and others – is therefore necessary to ensure that we safeguard a strong and principled approach to human rights.”

In his keynote address, Ambassador Bruce G. Berton, Head of OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, told participants that multilateralism works.

"History has shown the benefits of co-operation, and crises have shown the costs of discord.  By working through organizations like OSCE, countries and their citizens should realize that co-operation can enhance both national security as well as common security," said Berton.

The Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting offers a platform to exchange views among OSCE participating States, OSCE institutions, other executive structures and a variety of international organizations, civil society and other stakeholders on the identification of good practices of effective multilateralism, with a view to improving the implementation of OSCE commitments.

Kunduz Rysbek

Thirty young entrepreneurs completed the first-ever four-week ”Mini-MBA” in Business Management, initiated by the Entrepreneurship Support Centre (ESC) in Osh with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, on 12 July 2019.

The course aims at strengthening the capacity of local entrepreneurs, particularly in improving their knowledge and skills in effective business management. As part of the course, participants acquired hands-on experience of tools to boost their sales, optimize costs, use up-to-date technologies, build long-term networks and much more.  

The mini-MBA course included interactive training sessions with well-known experts in strategic and financial management, human resources management, marketing, and sales. Participants acquired not only theoretical knowledge, but also learned to analyze and solve problems using their own business cases. Almost a third of the “Mini-MBA” is focused on theory, while the rest is devoted to case studies and the development of practical and soft skills.

Certificates on the successful completion of the “Mini-MBA” were awarded by the Deputy Minister of Economy, Eldar Abakirov, and the founder of a co-working/art studio Ololo House and the leader of the coaching group, Daniar Amanaliev.

The ESC in Osh was founded in 2017 with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the German Society for International Development (GIZ). Since then, it has provided more than 900 business advisory services for local small- and medium-sized enterprises, including women entrepreneurs and former labour migrants. Based on the positive results of the ESC’s activities in Osh, two additional ESCs were established earlier this year in the cities of Jalal-Abad and Batken, also with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.