OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 11,202 to 11,670 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 36 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was nine this week compared to five last week: none of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and nine into Ukraine (44 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, 14 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when 15 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting week, the number of buses remained on the same level as the previous reporting period (420 buses like during the previous week). There were 213 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 207 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 851 trucks (807 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (267 at the Gukovo BCP and 584 at the Donetsk BCP); 455 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 396 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and Armenia and some with “LPR” plates.                                                                                            

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 46 (compared to 52 during the   previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP significantly increased from 99 to 176: of the total number of trucks scanned, 89 trucks (51 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 87 trucks (49 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 182 to 129 vehicles; 66 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 63 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 26 occasions; the OTs assessed that 16 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and ten to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. A car with Georgian licence plates was also observed.

On 13 June at 16:45, an ambulance entered the Gukovo BCP from the Russian Federation and parked in front of the main building. Three paramedics were observed moving from the vehicle. Later on, due to the heavy traffic conditions, the OT could not observe in which direction and when the ambulance left the BCP.

On 16 June at 01:57, the OT observed one police vehicle that arrived at Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The police vehicle stopped outside the main building and was partly visible to the OT. At 02:17 the same day, the police vehicle left the BCP towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 14 May 2019 to 18 June 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1]                      Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2]                      Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                              

Kunduz Rysbek

Some 30 young community activists from all seven provinces of Kyrgyzstan participated in an intensive three-day training workshop on the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT). The event concluded on 18 June 2019 in Issyk-Kul, northern Kyrgyzstan.

The training sessions were delivered by three prominent experts of the Interior Ministry’s  Service for Countering Extremism and Illegal Migration with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek. They raised the participants’ awareness on the relevant legal framework, key terms and concepts, principles of tolerance and diversity, online prevention of violent extremism as well as possible driving factors of and ways to prevent VERLT.

“The training course is a great platform to bring together young leaders of Kyrgyzstan, to enhance their knowledge of VERLT and combine their efforts in peacebuilding and stability, both in Kyrgyzstan and across the region,” noted Sergei Sizov, the Police Co-operation Officer in the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

Throughout the workshop, the participants were fully engaged in interactive group and individual work, including presentations, discussions, case studies, practical exercises as well as artistic performances. As a result, the young community leaders were able to draft their own initiatives on countering instances of VERLT at the community level.

Additionally, the workshop provided the participants with an opportunity to network during curricular and extracurricular activities. They expressed commitment to maintaining sustainable contacts with one another, thus creating a platform for further dialogue and strengthened co-operation in areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 14 and 15 June the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 15 and 16 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Five civilians from one family were injured and their house damaged from shelling in Marinka; the SMM also saw damage from shelling to a house in Donetsk city and small-arms fire damage to a residential building in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.  
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• Small-arms fire in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Prymorske.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• The SMM saw long queues at checkpoints along the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its freedom of movement was also denied at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk and at a weapons storage site, both in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 14 and 15 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 50), compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas in southern Donetsk region along the contact line north-east of Mariupol.

Between the evenings of 15 and 16 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 25), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded south-west and west-north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas east-north-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 14 and 15 June, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period (about 270 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 15 and 16 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 50), compared with the previous 24 hours. Over half of ceasefire violations and explosions were recorded in areas south-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Civilians injured and damage to a house caused by shelling in Marinka

On 15 June, at a one-storey house at 292 Shevchenka Street in a residential area on the south-eastern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) less than 1km from the contact line, the SMM saw a man (61 years old) with injuries to his right arm and chest. He told the SMM that he had heard several explosions while inside his house in the early morning hours of 14 June, and had attempted to move his family to a nearby shelter when he saw a bright light and lost consciousness. Outside the house, the SMM saw a 2.5m hole in the south-facing wall, three shattered west-facing windows, as well as debris on the ground. Inside, the SMM saw a living room with destroyed furniture, a partially destroyed interior wall, and debris on the ground. The SMM assessed that all damage was fresh and had been caused by artillery rounds, but was unable to assess the type of weapon or direction of fire. At a summer kitchen about 5m south of the house on the same property, the SMM saw a west-facing wall completely destroyed, as well a shattered east-facing window, dislodged ceiling materials and debris inside on the ground. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a shockwave created from the shelling.

At a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk), on 16 June, the SMM saw the wife (56 years old) of the abovementioned man with cuts and bruises to her right hand and leg. She said that in the early morning hours of 14 June, while inside her house, she had heard an explosion, saw a bright light and smoke, then lost consciousness. Shortly after, the woman told the SMM she had regained consciousness and had seen all four of her family members being pulled from the rubble of her house with injuries. On 16 June, medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the woman had sustained bruises from debris and shrapnel injuries to both of her legs and hands, and that the man had sustained bruises from debris and shrapnel wounds to both his hands and legs. Medical staff also said that the woman’s granddaughter (nine years old), daughter (30 years old) and father-in-law (86 years old) had sustained injuries, including bruises and shrapnel wounds as a result of the incident.  

Damage caused by shelling to a residential property in Donetsk city

On 14 June, at a one-storey house at 7 Ananchenka Street in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw about 20 holes, 2-20mm in diameter and assessed as fresh, on a wall and wooden window frames, and one cracked window, with shattered glass surrounding the frames, all facing east. About 5m north-east of the house, the SMM saw a shattered south-facing window of a summer kitchen. About 4m south of the summer kitchen and about 5m west of the house, the SMM saw a tree with broken branches assessed as an impact site. A resident of the house (woman, 40-50 years old) told the SMM that her neighbour had phoned her at her work to tell her that an explosion had occurred in the early morning hours of 14 June. The SMM assessed that all abovementioned damage was caused by a round from an automatic grenade launcher fired from a north-westerly direction. (The house is located about 1.5km east of the contact line and about 2.5km north-east of the abovementioned damaged house in Marinka.)   

Damage due to gunfire to a residential building in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 16 June, in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government controlled, 58 km west of Luhansk), at 2 Voikova Street, the SMM saw two holes, about 10cm in diameter and assessed as fresh, on a west-facing window of a fourth floor apartment in a four-storey building. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by heavy-machine-gun fire. A neighbour in the building (woman, 65 years old) said that she had heard gunfire on 13 June. The building is located less than 1km east of the contact line and the edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Prymorske

On 15 June, positioned about 1km west of Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire about 2km south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 2km south-west of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 14-15 June, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard three explosions (one assessed as an outgoing round and two as undetermined) and 12 shots, at an assessed range of 1-5km south, south-east and south-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of the area’s periphery. On the morning of 15 June, positioned in two locations inside and near the disengagement area, the SMM heard five explosions (three assessed as outgoing rounds and the remainder undetermined), assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of the area’s periphery. 

On 15 June, positioned at six locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM recorded about 70 ceasefire violations assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of the area’s periphery. During the day on 16 June, positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km north-north-west, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area. Positioned in four locations near the Zolote disengagement area on the evening and night of 15-16 June and during the day on 16 June, the SMM recorded about 60 ceasefire violations assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of the area’s periphery.

On 16 June, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines:

Government-controlled areas

15 June

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Yasnobrodivka (25km north-west of Donetsk).

Weapons permanent storage sites

16 June

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

The SMM noted that ten tanks (five T-72 and five T-64) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

14 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol).

15 June

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

16 June

The SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (probable ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

16 June

The SMM saw:

• a freshly dug trench east of road H-20 near a checkpoint of the armed formations in Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk).  

Unexploded ordnance in Popasna and near Verkhnoshyrokivske

On 14 June, at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna, on road T-0504 used regularly by the SMM, the Mission again saw two tailfins in the middle of the road, assessed as from rounds of a rocket propelled grenade launcher: one between the checkpoint’s concrete barricades and the other about 15m south-east of the barricades. 

On 16 June, about 60m south-east from the abovementioned tailfins, the SMM saw for the first time a tailfin, assessed as from a 82mm mortar round, embedded in a crater in the south-western side of the road.

On 15 June, in the area between the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and the checkpoint of the armed formations in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw for the first time a tailfin, assessed as part of a 120mm mortar, stuck in the middle of a road regularly used by civilians to cross the contact line. The tailfin was covered in branches and located about 450m west of the nearest position of the armed formations. The SMM assessed that it had been fired from a north-westerly direction.

Long queues at entry-exit checkpoints

On the morning of 15 June, at the government-controlled entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw about 400 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 350 people queuing to exit. In the afternoon, at the same location, about 20 people, many of them traders, told the SMM that they had been queuing for the past 48 hours. They expressed frustration with what they said were more stringent EECP procedures and slow processing times, adding that the hot weather and long wait times had spoiled food products they had been carrying. For most of the afternoon of 15 June, the SMM observed that only two entry and two exit processing booths out of twenty were functioning.

On the morning of 16 June, at the checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 300 cars queuing to travel to government-controlled areas and about 70 cars queuing to travel to non-government-controlled areas. In a group and separately, 18 people (men and women, between 30-60 years old) at the checkpoint told the SMM they had concerns related to what they said were long wait times and the introduction of a “regulation” by the armed formations on 1 June that restricted the number of cars permitted to enter the checkpoint to six cars in each direction every 30 minutes. Some people said that they had been forced to spend the night at the checkpoint of the armed formations waiting to travel to government-controlled areas, and others told the SMM that they had started queuing as early as 03:30 that morning. While present for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw that 12 vehicles were being processed at a time, six from each side (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 10 June 2019).

On the same day, at the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka, the SMM saw about 50 cars queuing to enter non-government-controlled areas, as well as about 200 cars queuing to enter government-controlled areas. While present, the SMM saw that 12 vehicles were being processed at a time, six on each side. A member of the armed formations at the checkpoint told the SMM that the new vehicle restriction “regulation” had been in place for two weeks. Five people (men, 50-80 years old) told the SMM that they had been queuing since 04:30 that morning to travel towards government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 15 June, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna.

On 15 and 16 June, the SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 3.5km north-east of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage north towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing that “the security situation has deteriorated”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after about 30 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• During the day on 15 June, on two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol).[5]
• On 15 June, while conducting the abovementioned mini-UAV flight west of Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire about 2km south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
• On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

VIENNA, 17 June 2019 – On 24 June, the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship will launch a photo exhibition titled Women, Peace and the OSCE.

The exhibition showcases the work done by women across the OSCE region to promote peace and stability and to prevent conflict. It is comprised of entries to an Instagram photo competition organized by the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship. The competition took place from April to May 2019 and participants from OSCE participating States submitted photos showing how women across the region mobilize efforts for building peace. Photos displayed in the exhibition also reflect the important work being done by OSCE missions on the ground to advance Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Opening remarks will be delivered by: OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Miroslav Lajčák; the Baroness of Upholland and Former High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton; and Former Austrian President and Co-Chair of the Ban Ki-moon Centre for Global Citizens, Heinz Fischer.

The opening of the exhibition coincides with the opening of the ASRC, the OSCE’s annual flagship event on security, which is planned for 25 July 2019 (pending a decision by the OSCE Permanent Council). 

Media representatives are invited to cover the exhibition, beginning at 17.00 at Palais Ferstel, Strauchgasse 4, 1010 Vienna.

Media representatives wishing to attend are asked to register via email to press@osce.org by 18.00, Friday, 21 June 2019.

Updates and the latest news from the Slovak Chairmanship can be followed via www.osce.org/cio and the Twitter account @Slovakia_OSCE.

For any further information or requests, please refer to the following contact points:

Slovak media contact point: Róbert Zoľák, Media Advisor at Slovakia’s Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs, robert.zolak@mzv.sk.

International media contact point: Katharina Kandt, Senior Advisor at Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, katharina.kandt@mzv.sk.

VIENNA, 17 June 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today welcomed the release from custody of journalist Igor Rudnikov, the editor and founder of the Kaliningrad-based Noviye Kolyosa newspaper, and called on the authorities in the Russian Federation to drop all charges and fully acquit the journalist.

On 17 June the Moskovsky District Court of Saint Petersburg ruled to change Rudnikov’s charges from extortion to arbitrariness and sentenced him to 550 hours of community service. However, the journalist was released in the courtroom on account of the period of 20 months spent in pre-trial detention. In addition, the decision on the seizure of his property was repealed.

“I call on the authorities to drop all charges and fully acquit the journalist. The release of Igor Rudnikov, after his lengthy arrest, is a relief, he should never have been arrested in the first place and forced to spend 20 months in pre-trial detention,” Désir said.

In November 2017 Rudnikov was detained by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) on allegations of extorting money from a high-level law enforcement official in the Kaliningrad region. The editorial office of the newspaper was searched. Some reports stated that Rudnikov was beaten by law enforcers at the time of his detention, and spent time in hospital with a broken arm and cerebral trauma.

The journalist and his newspaper are well-known for their investigative journalism that is critical of local authorities. His detention was extended several times.

“I hope that Igor Rudnikov and his colleagues from Noviye Kolyosa will be able to continue their journalistic work without pressure and intimidation in the future,” Désir said. “No journalist in the Russian Federation, and elsewhere in the OSCE region, should be targeted in retaliation for their work.”

The Representative has previously expressed concern about the arrest Igor Rudnikov and the fate of the Novye Kolesa newspaper (see: https://twitter.com/OSCE_RFoM/status/982191136373587969 and https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/410726; https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/402110).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

423278 Marina Živaljević

To raise awareness of the effect and consequences of gender-based violence and early marriages, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, in partnership with the NGO Centre for Roma Initiatives, and supported by the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations and International Organizations in Vienna, organized a three one-day training courses for 48 professionals from police, prosecution, education and social welfare in Nikšić, Podgorica and Berane on 27 May, 3 and 10 June 2019.

Real-life stories about women who were subjected to early marriages were presented, triggering a productive discussion. The discussion topics included the historical practice of young women marrying before the age of 16 and the growing realization of the many negative aspects of early marriages, which, in some circumstances, can be characterized as trafficking in human beings.

According to the 2012 to 2016 National Strategy for Improving the Position of Roma and Egyptians in Montenegro, among 850 Roma women who were then interviewed, 90% were married before their 16th birthday.

The current project is a continuation of an extra-budgetary project, funded by the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations and International Organizations in Vienna and based on recommendations resulting from a mapping analysis conducted by the Mission in six Montenegrin municipalities, in particular those where Roma and Egyptian communities are settled. It is designed to raise awareness about early marriages and domestic violence among vulnerable groups.

423272

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro, in partnership with the Montenegrin Ministry for Human and Minority Rights and the Department for Gender Equality, organized three training modules for gender equality focal points from seven Montenegrin municipalities to enhance their skills as trainers on gender equality in Podgorica.

These municipal gender focal points now have the necessary skills to promote gender equality principles through organizing activities and events in their respective municipalities.

The three module training courses focused on presentation and advocacy skills in relation to gender equality.

Module 1, held from 27 to 29 May, was dedicated to adult learning techniques, training design and developing a training agenda.

Module 2, held on 6 and 7 June, examined the necessary preconditions for a successful workshop.

During the final module, held on 13 and 14 June, the participants presented their newly acquired skills while receiving guidance and feedback from the experts.

“This training series enabled me to enhance my self-confidence,” said gender focal point Almasa Rizvanović from Bijelo Polje.

“Many participants demonstrated enhanced knowledge of gender equality and now have the skills necessary to facilitate and evaluate gender equality workshops,” concluded trainers Slavica Striković and Aleksandra Crvenica.

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro will continue supporting the work of designated municipal gender equality focal points as an effective way of promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment at the municipal level.

SARAJEVO, 17 June 2019 – The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), with the support of the European Union (EU), presented today in Sarajevo a spot report War Crimes Management at the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The spot report examines results achieved by the BiH Prosecutor’s Office in tackling war crimes cases and identifies the challenges that remain for ensuring that such cases are processed efficiently. It also provides a set of recommendations which, if implemented, will address these challenges in an effective manner.

By analysing examples of concrete cases which illustrate the deterioration in the quality of investigation and prosecution of war crimes cases, the report sets out three key areas of concern with regard to the investigation and prosecution of war crimes cases by the BiH Prosecutor’s Office.

“The pace of solving war crimes cases has recently been slowing down,” stated Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, Head of the EU Delegation to BiH and EU Special Representative in BiH. “The report notes that the focus has not been solely on the most complex cases which, in accordance with the 2008 National War Crimes Strategy should have been a priority. As also noted by the European Commission Analytical Report accompanying the Opinion on BiH's application for EU membership, the OSCE report highlights an alarmingly low conviction rate at the BiH level compared to Entities.”

The Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH, Bruce G. Berton, urged relevant actors to implement without delay the recommendations set out in the report in order to improve the overall process of war crimes processing. “I call upon all relevant institutions, most notably the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of BiH, the BiH Prosecutor’s Office, and the Court of BiH to seriously consider this report, and the ramifications of the current practice concerning war crimes case processing on victims, as well as on the legacy of the BiH judiciary,” he said.

The analysis and recommendations presented in this report on the processing of war crimes cases by the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH are based on the findings of the OSCE Mission to BiH’s Trial Monitoring Programme and the Mission’s implementation of the War Crimes Monitoring Project financed by the European Union.

Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek organized a five-day training seminar for 20 customs officers from all regions of Kyrgyzstan introducing them to effective ways of tracking illicit drug trafficking, cybercrime, and legalization of criminal proceeds. The event was held at the Regional Training Centre of the World Customs Organization in Kyrgyzstan and concluded on 14 June 2019 in Bishkek.

With the aim to facilitate the implementation of the law “On Countering the Financing of Terrorist Activities and the Legalization (Laundering) of Criminal Incomes” adopted in August 2018, the Programme Office undertook the initiative to assist the State Customs Service (SCS), which bears certain obligations under the new law.

The seminar aims to increase the capacities of customs officers through learning about cutting-edge systems of investigation and prevention of illicit transactions and cybercrime, and legalization of criminal proceeds, which will improve their co-ordination with other law enforcement bodies.

The training is the first of five training courses planned by the Programme Office for 2019. The future workshops will involve customs officers in the cities of Batken, Jalal-Abad and Osh.

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek has been assisting the State Customs Service in strengthening its capacity to facilitate cross-border trade, tackle trafficking of illicit goods, and modernize technological capacity since 2009. As a result of this long-term partnership, the SCS Training Centre was granted the status of a regional centre in 2018 by the World Customs Organization, which expanded its outreach internationally and upgraded the quality of its training programmes.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A five-day training course aimed at further strengthening the capacity of Kazakhstan to counter terrorist financing was organized in Burabay, Kazakhstan, from 11 to 15 June 2019. The training seminar was delivered to participants from the capital and from the country’s Akmola, Aktobe and Karaganda regions.

The course was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-sultan, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Global Programme against Money Laundering and in partnership with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (EAG).

The training course was conducted to strengthen Kazakhstan’s compliance with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, especially the recently adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2462 (2019), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments. It was led by international experts together with four local government officials. Prior to the seminar the officials completed the train-the-trainers course provided by the OSCE, UNODC and the EAG.

The seminar emphasized the key role of inter-agency co-operation in investigating and disrupting terrorist financing. Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, it included sessions on the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit and of financial investigation, creating financial profiles, sources of information and suspicious transaction reports, risk of abuse of non-profit organizations for terrorist financing,  new methods of payments, addressing challenges related to Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), seizure and management of exhibits. More than half of the course was devoted to practical work on exercises highlighting specific instruments and techniques that play an important role in countering the financing of terrorism.

Sixteen experts and practitioners from the Committee for Financial Monitoring, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Counter Terrorism Center of the National Security Committee, the Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies under the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the State Revenues Committee participated in the event.

The OSCE organized the course with the financial support of Germany, as part of a comprehensive multi-annual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw damage to a functioning school and to a shop in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, to a house in Dokuchaievsk and to two apartments in a residential building in Yasne.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas.
• The SMM monitored a protest against the lack of running water in Kostiantynivka.
• It spotted military trucks travelling back and forth between a railway station and a warehouse in non-government-controlled Sukhodilsk near the border with the Russian Federation.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in non-government-controlled areas at checkpoints near Verkhnoshyrokivske and in Prymorske and Sosnivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 200), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and at south-easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

On the evening of 13 June, the SMM camera in Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south-east. On the evening and night of 13-14 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two projectiles in flight and four explosions (three assessed as outgoing rounds and one as an impact), all at an assessed range of 200-500m south. No damage to the cameras was recorded.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 270), compared with the previous reporting period (about 310 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including about 250 explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage due to small-arms fire to a functioning school and to a shop in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 13 June, in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), at a four-storey functioning school at Myru Street, the SMM saw damage to three windows on the west-north-west-facing side of the building: a fresh hole in both panes of one third-floor double-glazed window and a corresponding fresh hole in the frame of a door on the opposite side of the corridor; another fresh hole in both panes of a second double-glazed third-floor window and a corresponding hole in the wall plaster on the opposite side of the same corridor; and a fresh hole in one of the panes of a double-glazed second-floor window. The SMM saw shards of glass scattered on the ground below the three damaged windows. It assessed the damage as caused by small-arms fire. The school director (woman, around 50 years old) told the SMM that the damage had occurred in the early hours of 13 June. The nearest positions of the armed formations are located around 700m north of the school.

At a one-storey shop at Pervomaiska Street in the central part of Zolote-5/ Mykhailivka, the SMM saw a bullet embedded in the south-west-facing part of the roof. The shopkeeper (woman, 50 years old) told the SMM she had found the bullet stuck in the roof when she came to work on the morning of 13 June.

Damage due to gunfire to a house in Dokuchaievsk

On 14 June, in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), at 19 Telmana Street, the SMM saw a hole in the south-east-facing side of the roof of a one-storey house. The SMM was unable to assess whether the damage was recent, the weapon type and direction of fire. A resident of the house (woman in her sixties) told the SMM that in the early hours of 13 June she had heard a noise coming from the roof and had found the hole later that morning. The SMM had previously observed damage to a house on the same street on 11 May (see SMM Daily Report 13 May 2019).

Fresh damage due to shelling to two apartments in a residential building in Yasne

On the same day, in Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), at 9 Valova Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater filled with soil 3m west of a two-storey residential building and about 30 holes caused by shrapnel and gravel in the south-west-facing outer wall of the same building. It also saw damage to two apartments in the same building. At the first apartment on the second floor the SMM saw a south-west-facing window with its pane missing and covered over with a brown sheet of paper and a mosquito net, and a corresponding fresh shrapnel hole in the north-west-facing interior wall opposite the window. At the second apartment, on the first floor, the SMM saw two windows with a fresh shrapnel hole in each of them and a third window with its pane missing (all south-west-facing) and multiple fresh holes in a north-west-facing interior wall. A resident of the apartment (woman in her sixties) told the SMM that she had been outside the building on the evening of 9 June with her seven-year-old granddaughter when she heard explosions and had run into the basement to seek shelter. The SMM assessed the damage to both apartments as caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a westerly direction.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 13 June, positioned in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-8km south-west (assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery). On the evening and night of 14-15 June, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded two undetermined explosions 0.5-2km south assessed as inside the disengagement area (one of the undetermined explosions was also recorded by the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge).

On 13 June, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a military-type truck (KamAz) with several boxes assessed as ammunition crates placed next to it on the ground and three members of the armed formations stationary at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). On the same day, positioned on its northern edge, the SMM saw a white civilian car carrying two persons in camouflage clothing drive into the disengagement area.

On the evening of 13 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst of an undetermined weapon at an assessed range of 1-2km east-north-east, assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery. On the evening of 14 June, the same camera recorded an explosion (assessed as an airburst) at an assessed range of 4-6km east-south-east and a projectile at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east, both assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery. On the morning of 14 June, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km south, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the afternoon of the same day, positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 30 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-5km north and north-west, which it was unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

14 June

The SMM saw an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

14 June

The SMM saw two tanks (type undetermined) inside a compound near Petrivske (65km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region[3]

14 June

The SMM noted that 18 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and ten anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

9 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Nevelske.

13 June

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the Zolote disengagement area.

14 June

The SMM saw:

• freshly-dug trench extensions and four Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers digging near a newly-constructed bunker near Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) near the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the Zolote disengagement area; and
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Mine hazard sign near Yasne and demining activities near Myrna Dolyna

On the eastern edge of Yasne, on the south-western side of a local road, the SMM saw for the first time a red-and-white mine hazard sign on a concrete road block with the word “mine” written in Russian language.

The Mission saw seven people carrying out demining activities in a field on the western side of road R-66, around 3km south-east of Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to high voltage power lines in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk). A representative of a power supply company told the SMM that the repairs to the power lines had concluded.

The SMM facilitated the operation of the DFS and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 36 cars (seven with Ukrainian, ten with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as 17 with “DPR” plates), ten trucks (seven with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates; two loaded with wood logs, one open and empty, and the remainder covered cargo), two buses with “DPR” plates and 17 pedestrians entering Ukraine. It also saw 39 cars (ten with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 15 with “DPR” plates), four trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates, all covered cargo), two buses with “DPR” plates, and 24 pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM observed no cross-border traffic.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM saw 19 cars (five with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates), two buses with “DPR” plates, two trucks (one with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates; both covered cargo), and 13 pedestrians entering Ukraine. It also saw 28 cars (two with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 12 with “DPR” plates), three buses with “DPR” plates, a truck with Ukrainian licence plates (covered cargo), and three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

Protest against lack of running water in Kostiantynivka

On the eastern edge of Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 30 people (mixed genders, 20-70 years old) blocking vehicular traffic on road T-0504. One of the participants told the SMM that they were residents of Kostiantynivka and neighbouring villages protesting against the lack of running water in these areas. The SMM saw seven police officers wearing uniforms and flak jackets, as well as two police vehicles. In Kostiantynivka, two women told the SMM that residents of their neighbourhood had been without water supply for seven days.

Military trucks spotted travelling back and forth between a railway station and a warehouse in Sukhodilsk near the border with the Russian Federation

In Sukhodilsk (non-government controlled, 38km south-east of Luhansk), about 10km west of the border, between 01:01 and 02:42 on the morning of 14 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted several military trucks travelling back and forth for two and a half hour between the main railway station, from which the tracks extend westwards towards Molodohvardiisk (non-government-controlled, 35km south-east of Luhansk) and eastwards to the border with the Russian Federation south-east of Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), and a warehouse south-west of the station.

At the train station in Sukhodilsk, the UAV spotted five military trucks on the station platform, with two trucks backed into train cars in a position to load and unload cargo, and 18 railway box cars present. The UAV also spotted eight military trucks parked at the front and to the east of the main train station building. The same UAV then spotted three of the five military trucks on the station platform leaving the train station and travelling in a south-westerly direction for about 1.3km to a walled compound with a large warehouse located about 220m east of road M-04.

Upon arrival, the three military trucks entered the compound and two trucks were being offloaded into the warehouse. Within the next hour, seven more military trucks entered the compound and were seen moving towards the loading bay. Around the same time, after being unloaded, the two previously mentioned military trucks left the compound and headed back to the railway station in Sukhodilsk, passing five additional military trucks in the vicinity of the compound. Shortly after, the same UAV spotted four military trucks leaving the train station and heading south-west towards the aforementioned warehouse.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage.
• At a mobile checkpoint in Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 76km south of Donetsk), ten armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “an ongoing anti-terrorist operation”.
• At a mobile checkpoint in Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 78km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing “orders from superiors not to let the SMM through the checkpoint”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after about 50 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 13-14 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). [5]
• During the day on 14 June, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk).
• On the same day, on three occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM visited a site previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that the site continued to be abandoned.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

ISTANBUL, 14 June 2019 -Concluding his four-day official visit to Turkey, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today called on the Turkish authorities to urgently address and reverse current media freedom violations and pressure that journalists face. 

During his visit, Désir met with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Faruk Kaymakçı, Deputy Justice Minister Cengiz Öner and the Head of the Parliament Human Rights Committee Hakan Çavuşoğlu. The Representative also met with journalists, lawyers and representatives of civil society and media organisations. 

In his meetings with the authorities, Désir pointed to the many obstacles to media freedom in Turkey, including the dire situation related to journalists in prison, safety and impunity for attacks against journalists, media related laws and the new judicial reform strategy. 

The Representative further stressed that reforming the existing legislation that allows for criminalization of journalistic work is a matter of urgency. A wide array of laws is being used to restrict media freedom and imprison journalists who simply express dissenting voices. Moreover, he pointed to several presidential decrees, issued during the state of emergency, that have become permanent measures and could negatively impact freedom of expression and freedom of the media. He raised the problem of the numerous procedures adopted by a «peace judge» in arrests of journalists and internet censorship, and the difficulties to obtain remedies against abuses. 

“I am aware of the Reform Action Group meetings and I hope that the Judicial Reform Strategy will contribute to bringing the legislation and judicial policy in line with international standards regarding freedom of expression. For media freedom, it is of the utmost importance to ensure the full respect of the independence of the judiciary and to revise several provisions of the Criminal Code, the Internet law and the Anti-terror law affecting the work of the media,” said Désir.  

The Representative offered his Office’s legal support to bring this legislation in line with OSCE commitments and international standards on freedom of expression, noting with concern that access to a significant number of websites, including Wikipedia, is blocked in Turkey. 

During his meeting with the authorities, Désir strongly denounced the practice of detaining journalists for their work and the abuse of pre-trial detention. He also reiterated that journalism should not be equated with terrorism. He recalled several trials and individual cases, including those of former Cumhuriyet employees Kadri Gürsrsel, Pelin Ünker, Erol Önderoğlu, Özgür Gündem, Zaman and Altan brothers and Nazli Ilicak’s trials, regarding which his Office intervened in the past. He stressed that all journalists need to be released from prison and free to exercise their profession. 

“I am appalled by the high number of journalists currently behind bars and prosecuted in Turkey. This doesn’t only hinder the work of media professionals but also prevents the citizens of Turkey from enjoying access to various opinions and to information from pluralistic sources. These practices have a chilling effect and can create self-censorship. It is remarkable that so many courageous independent journalists are continuing their work. It is of the utmost importance that all imprisoned journalists are released and that all charges against them are dropped,” Désir added. 

As for safety and the fight against impunity, Désir praised the engagement of the Turkish authorities in the brutal murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year in Istanbul. «Immediate attention is also needed to resolve all other attacks against journalists in Turkey. I am closely following the ongoing investigations into the recent and alarming physical attacks against journalists Sabahattin Önkibar, Hakan Denizli, Ergin Çevik, İdris Özyol and Yavuz Selim Demirağ,” Désir said, recalling the importance of the Decision on Safety of Journalists adopted by all OSCE participating States last December in Milan.  

During his visit, the Representative met with some very courageous and prominent journalists and media freedom defenders, including Erol Önderoğlu from RSF, Kadri Gürsel, Pelin Ünker, Fatih Polat, Sibel Hürtaş, Faruk Bildirici, Çiğdem Toker, Alican Uludağ, Erdal Güven, Işin Eliçin, Andrew Finkel, Gürkan Özturan, Gonca Tokyol from various media and platforms Cunhuriyet, Sözcü, Evrensel, Arti TV, Diken, Medyascope, bianet, dokuz8haber, T24, P24, Press House of Ankara, as well as lawyers Yaman Akdeniz, Kerem Altiparmak and Veysel Ok. 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw damage from shelling to two residential properties and fresh craters in Nova Marivka, as well as damage to a house in Travneve and craters near a gas pipeline near Novoluhanske.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations and observed an extended trench inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system in violation of withdrawal lines in Khreshchatytske.
• It saw pieces of unexploded ordnance for the first time in Popasna and Hruzko-Lomivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however, a similar number of explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol and at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 310), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations, including about 290 explosions, were recorded in areas east-south-east and north-north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage to residential properties in Nova Marivka

On 12 June, at a one-storey house at 20 Tsentralna Street in Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw that part of a concrete outer west-facing wall had collapsed, slates were completely missing from the west-facing side of the roof and a west-facing door had been dislodged. About 10m north of the house, the SMM saw a shed with only its outer south-facing wall and doorway intact, and its outer north-facing wall partially intact, with the rest of the shed and its roof completely destroyed, and debris on the ground. The SMM saw a fuse, assessed as from a 122mm or 152mm artillery round, near the shed. The SMM assessed that all abovementioned damage was fresh and caused by rounds of an undetermined weapon. A resident of the house (woman, 40-50 years old) told the SMM that while inside her house, she had heard three explosions nearby on the evening and night of 8-9 June. 

About 50m west of the house, in the south-facing outer wall of a one storey house at 22 Tsentralna Street, the SMM saw about 25 fresh shrapnel holes, three shattered windows and concrete dislodged from around one window frame, as well as cement roof panels missing from the roof on the same side. The SMM saw a partially collapsed west-facing outer wall of the house and an inner west-facing wall with about ten shrapnel holes, as well as cement roof sheeting missing from the roof on the same side. The SMM saw a fresh crater about 2m in diameter and 1m in depth, about 3m south of the house, and assessed the crater and all abovementioned damage as caused by a round of an undetermined weapon. About 20m south-east of the latter house, the SMM saw a fresh crater, 2.5m in diameter and 1.1m in depth, in a field about 5m north of a road, assessed to have been caused by an artillery round (122mm or 152mm). The SMM assessed damage and craters at all above locations were caused by fire from a south-westerly direction.

While attempting to follow up on reports of the abovementioned damage, the SMM observed a previously reported fallen tree partially blocking the road to Nova Marivka, with a white board with “Stop! Mines” written on it in Russian, which forced the SMM to take an alternate route.

Damage to a house in Travneve

On 12 June, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted roof slates missing on the north-western corner of a roof and dislodged window lintels on a north-facing wall of an uninhabited two-storey house at 2 Tsentralna Street in Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) (not seen on imagery from 16 April 2019). The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a probable mortar round.

Craters near Novoluhanske

On 12 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two craters in a field, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a south-easterly direction, about 140m west of an elevated gas pipeline close to the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

Disengagement areas[2]

In the early morning hours of 13 June, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight, at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, and two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east, which were unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area.

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed on 11 June a 5m-long extension of a trench running from east to west inside the Zolote disengagement area, west of road T1316 and next to the railway bridge close to previously observed positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The same imagery revealed new material, assessed as probable sandbags and equipment used to build a defensive position, about 500m east of the area’s western edge and about 430m north of its southern edge, close to previously observed positions of the armed formations. The imagery also revealed two craters about 250m west of road T1316 and about 700m north of the area’s southern edge (all were not seen in imagery from 27 May 2019.)

During the day on 13 June, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

12 June

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 86km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

13 June

The SMM saw:

• a tank (T-72) near Illinka (37km west of Donetsk) and
• a tank (T-64) near Dachenske (49km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 June

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted 13 tanks (nine T-72, three T-64 and one T-55) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 25 May 2019).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

12 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMD variants and one BMD-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (Saxon) in Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an APC (BTR-80) near Pyshchevyk; and
• an APC (BTR-80) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• a trench digger fastened to a military truck near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

13 June

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 June

The SMM saw:

• two APCs (BTR-60) on the north-western outskirts of Luhansk city and
• an IFV (BMP-1) in Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk). 

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Popasna, Hruzko-Lomivka and Ilovaisk

At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna, on a road used regularly by the SMM, the Mission saw two tailfins for the first time in the middle of the road, assessed as from rounds of a rocket propelled grenade launcher: one between the checkpoint’s concrete barricades, along with cartridge cases from grenade launchers and small-arms nearby, and the other about 15m south-east of the barricades. 

North-east of Hruzko-Lomivka (non-government-controlled, 25km south-east of Donetsk), on the eastern edge of the road, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of UXO, assessed as a  projectile from a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm), embedded in the ground.

In Ilovaisk, (non-government-controlled, 30km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw that a previously observed projectile from an MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) had been removed from the sidewalk. Also in Ilovaisk the SMM saw that two previously observed pieces of UXO, assessed as probable projectiles from an MLRS rocket (Grad-type, 122mm), embedded in the eastern and western edges of a road on the southern outskirts of the city are still present.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and to high voltage power lines in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 13 June, an SMM mid-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).[5]
• On the evening and night of 12-13 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government and non-government controlled areas of Donetsk region.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

Bratislava, 14 June 2019 - Following a meeting with President Zelensky on 13 June, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák calls on the international community to support the Ukrainian President's constructive steps towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis in and around Ukraine. He also offers the full support of the Slovak Chairmanship in this endeavour.

In view of the strong mandate given to President Zelensky through his unambiguous electoral victory, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák and President Zelensky discussed a comprehensive set of actions proposed by the President and aimed at uniting the country for the benefit of all its citizens. Lajčák and the Ukrainian President also discussed concrete steps to ease the tensions in and around Ukraine, which would send a clear signal of readiness to seek a peaceful solution of the crisis. These include measures such as the overall improvement of living conditions on both sides along the line of contact, the urgent repair of the bridge in Stanytsa Luhanska, military disengagement and steps towards an exchange of detainees. Both agreed on the absolute necessity of a cessation of hostilities, the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements.

Presenting a series of proposed confidence-building measures, Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák stressed the commitment of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship to helping to improve conditions for people affected by the conflict in eastern Ukraine and to focusing on addressing their humanitarian situation.

While in Kyiv, the OSCE Chair also congratulated the former president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, on his appointment as Ukraine´s representative to the Trilateral Contact Group and expressed his support to his work.

423098 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported four-day regional training seminar on the practical implementation of the Vienna Document 2011 and the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures concluded on 14 June 2019 in Nur-Sultan. Some 30 military officers from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia took part in the event.

Military and civilian experts from Belarus, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre shared their expertise. The participants discussed developments in the field of confidence- and security-building measures, which are the focus of the Vienna Document, as well as its implementation aspects, such as inspection procedures, experience exchange and the demonstration of weapons and equipment systems.

The seminar included theoretical exercises and a simulated inspection visit to the 610th air base near the city of Karagandy. The participants carried out an evaluation in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Document on compliance and verification, and produced an internal report.

The Vienna Document was adopted by all OSCE participating States and obliges them to share information on their armed forces and military activities. It also contains provisions on compliance and verification, such as conducting and hosting inspections and evaluations, as well as on risk reduction, military contacts and co-operation, and prior notification of certain military activities.

The OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan organized the event in co-operation with Kazakhstan's Defence Ministry and with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

The OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan has been organizing seminars on the Vienna Document in Kazakhstan since 2006. The seminar is part of the Programme Office's long-standing efforts to promote OSCE confidence- and security-building measures and regional security.

423074 Communication and Media Relations Section

A four-day specialized training course on appropriate and effective responses to gender-based violence for Bulgarian criminal justice practitioners was held from 10 to 14 June 2019, in Plovdiv, Bulgaria.

The course for police and prosecutors was organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department and is the third of a series of three national specialized training courses held as part of the regional project Effective Criminal Justice Strategies and Practices to Combat Gender-based Violence in Eastern Europe. The project is currently being implemented in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and is financially supported by the European Commission through the Rights, Equality and Citizenship programme and the Governments of Germany and Austria.

Delivered by trainers who have previously completed the regional training-of-trainers course held in March under the same project, the training aimed at consolidating the skills and knowledge of first responder police officers and prosecutors to better meet the needs of victims of gender-based violence. This included recognizing the signs and signals of violence and referring them to specialized support services.

The course also explored how to adapt the attitude and behaviour of criminal justice practitioners towards victims and perpetrators of gender-based violence, to avoid secondary victimization.

Built on a victim- and rights-centred approach, the course promoted the EU legislation on the wide protection of victims of violence, and focused on localized scenarios based on real-life cases.

Following the course was a one-day workshop where judges and social workers joined the police officers and prosecutors. The workshop highlighted the importance of a co-ordinated and integrated approach when fighting gender-based violence cases. Participants strengthened their understanding of how improving co-operation across different agencies and interaction on gender-based violence cases can contribute to better meeting the needs of victims. They also discussed best practices that could significantly improve efforts to counter gender-based violence-related crimes.

422960 Communication and Media Relations Section

Members of the OSCE Mediterranean Points of Contact Network on border security and management completed an intensive and interactive four-day training course on Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems on 14 June 2019 in Bari, Italy.

The course was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in close co-operation with Italy’s Guardia di Finanza, a law enforcement agency under the authority of the country’s Minister of Economy and Finance.

The training was conducted by representatives of INTERPOL, the International Organisation for Migration, the United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism, commercial service providers as well as relevant experts on passenger data from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with staff from the OSCE’s Border Security and Management Unit.

The participants, represented by border and customs services of Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, were familiarized with current trends challenges as well as the international legal framework related to foreign terrorist fighters in the Mediterranean region.

In-depth presentations focused on both the API and PNR systems and participants completed practical exercises in developing a roadmap for setting up an API system for preventing the movement of foreign terrorist fighters. They discussed the national security and data protection issues that need to be taken into account when implementing such a system.

An API system is an electronic system through which biographic data from a traveller’s passport and flight details are collected by airlines and transmitted to the relevant entities such as border control agencies before departure or arrival.

The highlight of the training was a study visit to the Guardia di Finanza’s air unit in Bari where participants were introduced to Italy’s maritime human rights compliant border protection system. “This study visit provided the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation with the possibility to learn how Guardia di Finanza’s agents actually ensure border security with particular reference to maritime border protection in the Mediterranean", said Lt.Col. Michele Vidoni, Head of International Relations unit within the 2nd Dept. of GdF’s Headquarters, and stressed that GdF and the OSCE will continue and strengthen their co-operation “with the purpose to fight against transnational crimes on the international level".

This training course was the sixth activity of a multi-year OSCE initiative aimed at strengthening co-operation mechanisms between the border security and management agencies of the OSCE participating States and the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation. The OSCE Mediterranean Points of Contact Network on border security and management was established in 2017.

KYIV, 13 June 2019 – Visiting Ukraine for the second time since taking over the OSCE Chairmanship, Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other members of the Ukrainian leadership to explore steps towards a peaceful political solution to the crisis in and around Ukraine as well as to discuss ways to ease human suffering on the ground.

Chairperson Lajčák congratulated President Zelensky on his sweeping success in the recent elections, remarking that this “sent a very clear message that the Ukrainian people want to see change”. Referring to Zelensky’s pre-election promise to do all he can to bring peace to Ukraine, he said:  Representing the OSCE, I am here to see how we can work together towards this fundamental and urgent goal.”

Meeting also with Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin and the Head of Ukrainian Delegation to the Trilateral Contact Group Leonid Kuchma, Lajčák stressed that any positive development will be only possible with a guaranteed and lasting ceasefire. “We will not be able to move forward while shelling continues,” he said.

Emphasizing the Slovak Chairmanship’s commitment to focus on people, he said: “Since the beginning of our Chairmanship, we have stressed over and over again that we aim to serve people, to make their lives easier, and to give them hope when it seems lost. Therefore, improving the dire humanitarian situation and the living conditions of the people in eastern Ukraine is a top priority for us.”

The upcoming parliamentary elections were also on the agenda: “The Presidential elections were held with respect for fundamental freedoms, and I am confident that all actors in Ukraine are committed to ensuring that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be open, free and fair as well,” Lajčák said.

Commending the important work of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine in addressing the everyday needs of people for the past 20 years, including more recently the conflict-affected communities, Minister Lajčák announced that the Chairmanship will hand over demining equipment to the Ministry of Defense, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories.

“Mines pose a grave, hidden and silent threat to innocent people. Humanitarian demining, particularly close to critical civilian infrastructure, is therefore essential – and something we want to support,” he said.

The Chairperson also stressed the crucial role played by the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and the need for continuous support from OSCE participating States: “The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is doing a tremendous job in reducing tensions on the ground,” he noted. “The monitors are the eyes and ears of the international community and they directly contribute to the prevention of further escalation. Ensuring the safety of the monitors and unhindered access is key,” he added.

Minister Lajčák reiterated the Chairmanship’s full support to the work of the Trilateral Contact Group, the OSCE Chairperson’s Special Representative, Ambassador Martin Sajdik and the Normandy format, and expressed his hope for renewed positive momentum in finding a peaceful political solution to the crisis, in line with OSCE principles and commitments.

In Kyiv, Lajčák also met with representatives of Ukraine´s civil society. Encouraging them to remain actively engaged, the OSCE Chairperson noted: “For years, Ukraine’s civil society has helped to chart the course of this country’s future.  Your crucial work continues today, even if it is not always in the spotlight. But now more than ever this country needs people like you.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Two men were injured and a tractor destroyed by a mine explosion in a field south of Popasna.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• It saw two international organization convoys transporting humanitarian aid in Pikuzy and Sakhanka and near Olenivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including at checkpoints near non-government-controlled Ternove and Novoazovsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly directions of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 130), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at northerly, easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), as well as in areas north of Pervomaisk (non-government controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).

 

Two men injured and a tractor destroyed by explosion in a field south of Popasna

The SMM followed up on media reports of civilians whose tractor had struck a mine. On 8 June, medical staff at a hospital in Popasna told the Mission that two men had been admitted the day before: one (in his fifties) had suffered shrapnel injuries to his lower limbs, while the second man (in his twenties) had suffered barotrauma and minor injuries to his face and elbow. A police representative in Popasna told the SMM that on 7 June a tractor had hit an object in a field south of Popasna and the subsequent explosion had injured two men.

On 11 June in an agricultural field about 4km south of Popasna, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a fresh crater, assessed as caused by an explosion of an anti-tank mine (probable TM-62), as well as two burned tyres, pieces of burned rubber and blue and white debris, all assessed as fragments of a tractor, all about 4m from the crater. 

Disengagement areas[2]

On the night of 11 June, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the evening and night of 11-12 June, positioned on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard about 110 explosions, including 60 assessed as artillery rounds and their subsequent impacts, and about 160 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun, automatic-grenade-launcher and small-arms fire, all assessed as within 5km of the Zolote disengagement area’s periphery. During the day on 12 June, positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions and 150 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3.5-5km north (all assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).

During the day on 12 June, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

12 June

The SMM saw three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and three towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two probable mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) on the southern outskirts of Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas

11 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 22 tanks (17 T-72 and five T-64), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12) and six towed mortars (2B11) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

12 June

The SMM noted that 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

12 June

The SMM noted that six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

The SMM noted that 26 tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

11 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (BTR-60, R-145BM) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1 or BMP-2) near Popasna.

12 June

The SMM saw:

• an ACV next to a house occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in and near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk), respectively.

 

Non-government-controlled areas

9 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of an ACV at a training area near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

UAVs seen near Obozne and Trokhizbenka

Positioned in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw a white UAV (quadcopter-type) flying about 1-2km west of its location at an assessed altitude of 100-200m in a southerly direction before turning north and then west.

Near Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk), the Mission saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers carrying a large white fixed-wing UAV which they said they were about to launch.

Previously observed piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Pikuzy removed

On 11 June, the SMM saw that a previously observed piece of UXO assessed as an unexploded RPG-7 grenade embedded in the asphalt courtyard in front of the House of Culture in the centre of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) had been removed.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and to high voltage power lines in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

International organization convoys transporting humanitarian aid

On 11 June in Pikuzy and in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a convoy of humanitarian aid, consisting of a truck and two cars, reportedly carrying grains. In the centre of Pikuzy, the Mission saw a queue of about 50-70 people waiting for the aid delivery.

On 12 June, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a convoy of humanitarian aid, consisting of 16 trucks and three cars, travelling from government- to non-government-controlled areas.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Ternove (non-government-controlled, 57km east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing live-fire training exercises”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south towards Novoazovsk, citing “an ongoing antiterrorist operation in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that one such site continues to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A two-day national seminar on a whole-of-society approach to countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT), organized by the OSCE and the Government of Georgia, began on 13 June 2019 in Tbilisi. This is the first seminar of the kind organized by the OSCE in the country. 

The seminar brings together more than 70 participants, including representatives of Georgian state agencies and civil society and experts from Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Ukraine, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, as well as the OSCE Secretariat’s Gender Section and Transnational Threat Department/Action against Terrorism Unit.

The participants will engage in a two-day discussion on the importance of community policing, civil society engagement and trust building between communities and authorities in tackling VERLT-related challenges efficiently.  

In her welcoming remarks the representative of the State Security Service of Georgia, Nana Beridze, stated that in the process of combating terrorism and extremism, the state pays special attention to the prevention-based measures.

“This requires a complex and  multi-stakeholder approach, with active participation of law enforcement and other state agencies, educational institutions and organizations, private sector, civil society, religious and cultural organizations, in order to counter various manifestations of terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization. The National Strategy of Georgia on the Fight Against Terrorism recently adopted by the Government of Georgia, is based on a whole-of-society approach which clearly outlines how the state, international partners, private sector and civil society should operate collectively in order to tackle the threats stemming from terrorist organizations, violent extremist groups and their supporters,” said  Beridze.

The international and Georgian experts will share experiences and good practices in preventing and countering VERLT through inclusive collaboration between the police and local communities. Gender, youth and inter-religious work will be highlighted aiming to explore how Georgia can best involve all stakeholders to prevent and respond to violent extremism across the entire ideological spectrum.

The seminar is the result of ongoing contact between the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE. Georgian authorities voiced interest in an OSCE-supported seminar in connection with the newly drafted Counter-Terrorism Strategy in order to support the country’s government and civil society practitioners in effectively responding to VERLT-related threats in compliance with human rights and the rule of law.