OSCE

VIENNA, 9 April 2018 – How technology can be developed, harmonized and deployed to help combat all forms of human trafficking was the focus of the two-day 2019 OSCE Alliance against Trafficking in Persons Conference, which concluded in Vienna yesterday. More than 400 practitioners from across the OSCE’s 57 participating States and the Partners for Co-operation took part.

Although great progress has been achieved in combating human trafficking over the last two decades, traffickers have unfortunately learned to misuse technology to recruit, control and exploit victims more efficiently and at greater scale, said the conference’s opening speakers.

“The misuse of technology has facilitated a scale of exploitation that seemed impossible only a decade ago,” said Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. “The time has come for a change: we must harness technology as an asset in prevention, protecting victims and prosecuting traffickers.”

The OSCE Alliance Against Trafficking in Persons is a unique global platform that lays the foundation for policy action on emerging issues and trends in trafficking, shedding light on challenges and opportunities across the OSCE region. The meeting highlighted contemporary approaches and promising practices to use technology to support victims and break the vicious cycle of human trafficking.

"Technology played a vital role in my exploitation”, said human trafficking survivor and anti sex-trafficking advocate Melanie Thompson. “It is important that survivors’ voices like mine are included in any discussion on policy on trafficking and sexual exploitation”. 

Princess Eugenie of York echoed this message in her keynote address: “Human trafficking is far more deep-rooted than we could ever imagined. We stand for all the people that cannot stand here today.” 

The United States Ambassador to Combat Human Trafficking at the country’s Department of State John Cotton Richmond said: “There is no magic tech solution to end human trafficking, and innovation should not be overstated. Yet technology, in the right context, can help move us forward.” 

Further opening remarks were made, on behalf of the 2019 Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, by Rudolf Urbanovič, State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior of Slovakia and National Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, and Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), who highlighted the need for collaboration with civil society and the private sector to address human trafficking, which disproportionately harms women and girls.

Over the two days, the conference laid the foundation and policy recommendations for concrete action for participating States across the OSCE region. Technology firms, civil society and international organizations presented applications and tools including facial recognition software and artificial intelligence (AI) to fight trafficking and online exploitation.

"ICT-facilitated trafficking is a grave threat to security in the OSCE region and the human rights of its people. Our task now is to figure out how to overcome these challenges and harness technology as an asset in combating human trafficking," said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger in his closing remarks. "Technology carries great potential for advancing OSCE commitments and implementing the OSCE’s Action Plan to end the trafficking of human beings."

416627 Marina Živaljević

The Slovak 2019 OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized a two-day seminar on cyber/ICT security and use of the Internet for terrorist and organized crime purposes on 3 and 4 April 2019 in Podgorica.

Experts from Slovakia and the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threat Department in Vienna took part in the event. They exchanged experiences and know-how with 32 participants, including seven women, from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Administration, Justice, Army, Agency for National Security, Agency for Personal Data Protection and Police Directorate.

“We all face vast and complex domestic, regional and global cyber security challenges and we all work tirelessly to keep all citizens and businesses safe,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet. “We know that the threat of today will be dwarfed by the threat of tomorrow, and so our responses too must be ever evolving. We need to be aware of that when working on plans for future actions.”

Slovak Ambassador Roman Hlobeň said that cyber threats and attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated and harmful to states. “The attacks on government websites in Montenegro in recent history are still very fresh in our minds,” Hlobeň added.

He said that with changes brought about by the digitalization and continuing globalization of computer networks, cyber/ICT security threats are becoming one of the most serious challenges of the 21st century. “With even more frequent cyber-attacks around the globe, which do not have any border controls or check-points, securing cyberspace is now a critical issue globally, for all governments, businesses, citizens and consumers,” said Hlobeň.

The seminar reflects one of the priorities of the OSCE Slovak Chairmanship to address the negative consequences of rapid technological change and build on existing commitments by promoting dialogue and exchange of expertise on cyber/ICT security.

The seminar also familiarized participants with OSCE cyber/ICT confidence-building measures that aim to reduce tensions and risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies. It further focused on education and early recognition of radicalization and violent extremism which leads to terrorism; the impact of the internet on investigations and intelligence-gathering from a policing point of view; digital forensic evidence; the use of internet for terrorist purposes and how responding to threats on cyber related incidents.

416666 Melanie Thompson, an expert and survivor of human trafficking. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Opportunities and benefits technology provides to governmental institutions, law enforcement agencies, corporations and civil society in identifying victims of human trafficking were the focus of discussion at an event on 9 April 2019 during the 19th Alliance against Trafficking in Persons Conference in Vienna. The panel discussion was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department.

The panel brought together a multi-disciplinary group with representatives of ODIHR, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Children’s Rights, the Spanish National Police, Western Union, Thorn, a non-profit group working to combat  child trafficking, and a trafficking survivor leader.

“Technology has played a pivotal role in providing easy access to traffickers for the recruitment and exploitation of victims of trafficking. At the same time, today we clearly see that technology can be effectively utilized to identify victims of trafficking and gather evidence to convict traffickers,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director. “All OSCE participating States should both promote and prioritize the use of technology to combat the trafficking of human beings.”

Speakers and participants highlighted that only a small fraction of the estimated 40 million victims of trafficking in human beings have currently been identified. As technology and globalization increasingly connect the world, traffickers’ ability to recruit and exploit their victims, especially children, has also exponentially increased and moved online. The event featured presentations on promising technologies to address these gaps, ranging from artificial intelligence software and tools for intelligence-led financial investigations to web-based training curricula for targeted audiences.

“The SOAR to Health and Wellness (“Stop, Observe, Ask, Respond”) training equips professionals with skills to identify, treat and provide trauma-informed responses to human trafficking,” said Katherine Chon, Director of the Office on Trafficking in Persons at the United States Department of Health and Human Services. “In 2017, we trained 288 participants through SOAR. The following year, we trained 5,078 participants – a seventeen-fold increase, largely attributed to the launch of SOAR Online.”

The SESTA/FOSTA (Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act and Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act) legislation recently passed in the United States was also highlighted at the event.

Mykola Kuleba, Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Children’s Rights, said: “Investment in technology is essential not only in identifying child trafficking victims, but also in preventing this and other forms of exploitation and abuse of children.”

During the conference, ODIHR launched an online survey for stakeholders from across the OSCE region to provide suggestions on improving and strengthening the OSCE participating States’ capacities in combating all forms of trafficking in human beings through a comprehensive human rights-based, gender-sensitive and survivor-centered approach.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

 OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

 OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                       

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 9,562 to 9,304 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 11 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. 

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 19 this week compared to 35 last week: nine of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and ten into Ukraine (all the crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, eight families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and nine were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and eight into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (346 compared to 339 observed during the previous week). There were 176 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 170 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the “irregular” route to “Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a slight increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 854 to 874 (300 at the Gukovo BCP and 574 at the Donetsk BCP); 469 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 405 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.                                                                                           

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 53 (compared to 47 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 109 to 188: of the total number of trucks scanned, 101 trucks (54 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 87 trucks (46 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 156 to 168 vehicles; 82 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 86 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 25 occasions, compared to 30 last week; the OTs assessed that 13 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 12 to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, some cars with Georgian and Lithuanian licence plates and with “Abkhazian” plates were also observed.

On 6 April at 03:16, a funeral services van with Russian Federation licence plates arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Ukrainian side, underwent the border control procedures and crossed into the Russian Federation. The van bore the inscription “Ritual Services” (in Russian).

Later the same day at 16:40, an ambulance with licence plates from the Russian Federation registered in the Rostov Region arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side. The ambulance bore the inscription “urgent medical help” (in Russian). After it parked near the border checking area, two paramedics exited the vehicle and went towards the main building. At 17:00, the ambulance returned towards the Russian Federation.

On 8 April at 16:40, a police vehicle entered the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation and parked behind the main building. At 16:50 on the same day, the vehicle returned towards the Russian Federation. The OT was unable to notice any other details from its position.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 19 February 2019 to 26 March 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

COPENHAGEN, 8 April 2019 – Meeting today in the Danish capital, the elected Bureau of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly heard remarks from Albanian President Ilir Meta related to Albania's upcoming Chairmanship of the OSCE, as well as OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, and Head of the OSCE PA’s Danish Delegation Peter Juel Jensen. Bureau members discussed current international issues and offered feedback on the reports and draft resolutions being prepared for the 28th Annual Session this summer in Luxembourg. 

The Bureau also unanimously endorsed the renewal of the mandate of Roberto Montella for a second five-year term as OSCE PA Secretary General. The Bureau’s proposal will be voted on by the Standing Committee in Luxembourg on 4 July 2019.

In his opening remarks, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) noted the importance of overcoming the political differences that have stood in the way of principled discussions and removing obstacles that continue to delay the OSCE budget from being adopted in a timely fashion.

“We all must work hand-in-hand to push our countries and governments to achieve some tangible progress in a number of challenging areas,” he said. “These include putting an end to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, protecting human rights in conflict zones, protecting journalists, enabling the contributions of civil society, and promoting the participation of more women, youth, and underrepresented peoples in public life.” 

He noted that the work of the OSCE hangs in the balance of budget decisions in Vienna and stressed the importance of resolving political impasses in order to enable OSCE institutions to carry out their mandates. 

President Meta discussed preparations underway in Albania for its assumption of the 2020 OSCE Chairmanship and thanked President Tsereteli and Secretary General Montella for their support of Albania’s work in this field.

It is important that the OSCE remains a forum for dialogue and security, President Meta stressed, highlighting the role of the PA in this regard. “I highly appreciate the increasing role of the Parliamentary Assembly, particularly in election monitoring, which helps to promote democracy, security and confidence within and between participating States,” he said. Meta also welcomed the work of OSCE PA ad hoc committees on migration and countering terrorism.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger discussed ways to make the best use of the unique set of OSCE structures and institutions, including the PA, to tackle current challenges. “The most acute,” he said, “is the crisis in and around Ukraine, as well as broader tensions and the breakdown of trust between Russia and the West. What concerns me is that we face again the risk of military incidents or accidents.”

The Secretary General noted that the OSCE is at its best when it provides a platform for dialogue, a toolbox for solutions, and a place for managing relations peacefully. But to be effective it is necessary to rebuild trust and ensure the Organization is equipped with needed resources, he said. 

In an open discussion with President Meta and Secretary General Greminger, OSCE PA Bureau members raised issues including the challenges related to resolving protracted conflicts and addressing the crisis in and around Ukraine in a way that respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity and places responsibility where it belongs. Members also expressed significant concern about the state of discussions related to financing the OSCE, with delays and differences threatening to halt the important work done by the Organization.

Secretary General Montella noted that the presence of Meta and Greminger at the Bureau meeting underlines the growing relevance of the Parliamentary Assembly and urged the continuation of constructive dialogue within the OSCE. He assured President Meta of the PA’s support to Albania as it assumes the Chairmanship of the OSCE.

Rapporteurs of the OSCE PA’s three general committees presented their ideas and intentions for the reports and draft resolutions they are preparing for the Luxembourg Annual Session. Irish parliamentarian Alan Farrell, the rapporteur of the Committee on Political Affairs and Security, highlighted the importance of multilateral responses to emerging security challenges to advance security, the challenge of protracted conflicts in the OSCE area, and how parliamentarians can promote sustainable development and security.

In her report, Albanian parliamentarian Elona Hoxha Gjebrea, rapporteur of the economic and environmental committee, stressed the unique role of national parliaments in developing legislative proposals with the aim of advancing sustainable development and security. In particular, she said, parliaments have an essential role in addressing climate change, energy security and sustainable energy; preventing and combating corruption, money laundering, and financing of terrorism; and developing effective approaches to migration and environmental governance.

The protection of human rights in conflict areas is one of the OSCE PA’s overarching goals, said Kyriakos Hadjiyianni, a parliamentarian from Cyprus and rapporteur of the Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions. In his report to the Bureau, he stressed that the PA must renew its call for the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in every OSCE country, noting that where respect of human rights is guaranteed, peace can also be safeguarded.

His report touched on several key themes, including human rights as a dimension of foreign policy, the use of states of emergency as temporary suspension of some democratic commitments, children in areas of military conflict, and violence against women.

Bureau members offered comments on the rapporteurs’ draft reports, highlighting a number of areas for strengthening and clarifying language, feedback which the rapporteurs will now take into consideration in finalizing the documents for consideration at the Luxembourg Annual Session.

Other items on the agenda of the Bureau meeting included reports from the Treasurer, Special Representatives and Ad Hoc Committees.

Photos of the OSCE PA Bureau meeting are available for public use on Flickr.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 5 and 6 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 6 and 7 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• It observed the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka following a reported gunfire incident.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. In addition, the Mission was denied access at a checkpoint near Zaichenko and near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, close to the border with the Russian Federation. It faced further restrictions at a railway station in Kostiantynivka and in Nova Marivka and Slovianoserbsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 April, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including explosions (about 280), compared with the previous reporting period (about 440 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and north-north-east, north and west of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre).  

Between the evenings of 6 and 7 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including explosions (about 90), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk, east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 April, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 335 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), south-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and south and south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). On the evening of 5 April, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded 36 explosions assessed as impacts, at an assessed range of 1-3km south-south-west and south-west.

Between the evenings of 6 and 7 April, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including explosions (about 270) compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna and north-east of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 5-6 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded six projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and four projectiles at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). On the same evening and night, in two areas near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM recorded eight projectiles and heard about 15 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area. During the day on 6 April, positioned in three areas near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned in two areas near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 260 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the evening and night of 6-7 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 13 projectiles at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). During the day on 7 April, positioned in two areas near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM recorded 24 explosions (16 undetermined and eight assessed as impacts) and about 100 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 7 April, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 7 April, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:        

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) on the northern outskirts of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk).

7 April

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) loaded on a truck about 2km north-west of Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk); and
• six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being loaded onto train flatbeds, as well as six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) stationary at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 April

The SMM saw:

• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six MLRS (BM-21) and nine towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and four D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two tanks (possible T-72) in Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk); and
• three surface to air missile systems (9K33 Osa) in Kasianivka (81km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk).

6 April

The SMM saw:

• seven tanks (T-72) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (see above); and
• four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk) (seen also on 7 April).

7 April

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk);
• six anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) each mounted on an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variants) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka; and
• two tanks (T-64) south-west of Krasne (65km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a probable tank (T-64) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk).[4]

7 April

The SMM saw:

• seven tanks (T-72) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city. 

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

5 April

The SMM noted that:

• 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present; and
• five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing for the first time. 

6 April

The SMM noted that:

• eight towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• five armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (types undetermined) near Romanivka (41km north-west of Donetsk);
• three ACVs (types undetermined) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
• three ACVs (types undetermined) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk);
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk);
• an ACV (type undetermined) in Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk);
• two ACVs (types undetermined) near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk);
• two ACVs (types undetermined) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP variants) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk); and
• two IFVs (BMP variants) near Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk).

6 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) mounted with a heavy-machine-gun and an APC (BTR-60) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• three IFVs (BMP-1) at a checkpoint in Kriakivka; and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

7 April

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) near a functional primary school in Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP variant) in the yard of a residential house in Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk);
• an ACV (type undetermined) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk);
• four IFVs (BMP-1) in the yards of residential houses in Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Tavrycheske (76km south of Donetsk).

Closure of Marinka entry-exit checkpoint following a reported gunfire incident

On 6 April, the SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was closed with no vehicles or pedestrians queuing. A Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a senior member of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (SBGS) at the EECP told the SMM that it had remained closed since 5 April after two men (a SBGS officer and a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier) had been injured by gunfire at the EECP on the same day. A senior staff member at the military hospital in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the two abovementioned men has been admitted to the hospital on 5 April with lower body injuries caused by gunfire. 

With the abovementioned EECP closed in Marinka and the EECP in Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) closed, reportedly for repairs, since 5 April, the SMM on 7 April observed an unusually long line of vehicles (about 400) queuing to exit non-government-controlled areas and many pedestrians waiting for buses at the checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). A number of civilians told the SMM that they had been queueing all day and would likely sleep in their cars at the EECP that evening to be able to pass the checkpoint the next day, while others said they had been waiting there for three days.

Mines near Shchastia and Vesela Hora and mine hazard signs seen for the first time

On 5 April, south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV again saw 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) across road H-21 south of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as 40 anti-tank mines (TM-62) further south-east across the same road leading to the bridge, about 1km north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 22 March 2019).

On 6 April, the SMM noted that a previously observed improvised explosive device and metal trip wire close to a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) had been removed. The same day, in Chermalyk, the SMM noted that a previously observed tail fin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) in a crater near a residential house had been removed.

On the eastern edge of Bakhmut, close to the intersection of road E-40, the SMM saw for the first time two white rectangular signs, assessed as improvised mine hazard signs, with “MINES” written in red in Ukrainian.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 6 April, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power transmission lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). On 6 and 7 April, the SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 7 April, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two cars (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates (with about 40 passengers) and 11 pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area. *

On 7 April, while at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six pedestrians entering Ukraine and a pedestrian exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 7 April, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians entering Ukraine and three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

On 7 April, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw ten cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), a full bus with Russian Federation licence plates and about 20 pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 16 cars (six with Russian Federation licence plates and ten with “DPR” plates), a full bus with “DPR” plates and 18 covered cargo trucks (eight with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 7 April, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw two men on bicycles entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 6 April, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing security reasons.
• On 7 April, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 7 April, at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 6 April, in Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces allowed the SMM to enter the railway yard, only after about 40 minutes waiting outside.

Conditional access:

• On 6 April, at a checkpoint in Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), four armed members of armed formations allowed the SMM to pass only by foot and accompanied by a member of the armed formations, citing security concerns in the area.  

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 5-6 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.[7]
• On 5 April, while following up on reports of a civilian casualty, medical staff at a hospital in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) refused to provide the SMM with information, citing the need for written permission from those in control. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The sentence in SMM Daily Report 6 April 2019 “On 4 April an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable tank (T-64) near Vuhlehirsk (government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk)” should have read “near Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk)”. 

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

NUR-SULTAN, 8 April 2019 - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák stressed the importance of regional co-operation in all three dimensions of comprehensive security during his visit today to Nur-Sultan. 

Kicking off his first visit to Central Asia during the Slovak 2019 Chairmanship, Lajčák underlined the strategic importance of the region as the Eurasian border of the OSCE. He commended the region’s governments on their positive dynamic towards more regional co-operation, particularly in combating terrorism, promoting good governance and environmental protection, and in strengthening intra-regional security, including with Afghanistan.

In his meetings with the political leadership in Nur-Sultan, including President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev; Foreign Minister Beibut Atamkulov; and Chairperson of the Senate of the National Assembly, Dariga Nazarbayeva, Lajčák commended Kazakhstan – the first Central Asian country to have chaired the OSCE - on its long-standing history of co-operation with the Organization and its active role both, in Vienna and on the ground. “Kazakhstan is a key partner in and contributor to these dynamics by creating new initiatives on regional security and more opportunities for OSCE engagement,” said Lajčák.

“I would like to thank the government of Kazakhstan for its constructive support of the activities of the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan,” said Lajčák.  “In more than 20 years on the ground, the OSCE and Kazakhstan have achieved a lot together. The Office is active on a wide range of issues, from facilitating trade, furthering water governance and supporting Kazakhstan’s transition to a green economy, through to developing social services for victims of human trafficking and in engaging youth in the regional security dialogue. But there is still room for more and I am looking forward to further co-operation.”

Minister Lajčák saw the Programme Office’s work in action when listening to a group of young leaders from Kazakhstan and alumnae of OSCE youth programmes, such as Central Asian Youth Network and the training for Youth Leaders against Intolerance and Violent Extremism (OSCE LIVE).

Speaking about the work of the Slovak Chairmanship, he said: “we will fail in to respond to the challenges of tomorrow and create a safer future for all, If we do not include youth voices, perspectives and expertise in our brainstorming and in our decision-making processes, we will fail to respond to the challenges of tomorrow and fail to create a safer future for all.”

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office also met with representatives of civil society, underlining their crucial role in society and in the work of organizations, such as the OSCE: “Nothing we do at the OSCE stands a chance at achieving real progress on the ground without the buy-in and participation of civil society. We need them in any step forward across the OSCE region - big or small.”

416516 Communication and Media Relations Section

Ten Afghan law enforcement officers completed a ten-day training course on 5 April 2019, which focused on combating illicit drug trafficking and drug-related crimes.  The course, held at the St. Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation was organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department.

The course developed the knowledge of Afghan trainees and their practical skills in combating the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. It covered planning skills and tools to enhance the participants’ capacity to conduct crime scene investigations and to strengthen their techniques in forensics, such as the use of databases, pertinent equipment and tools, and photography and video recording. They learnt about countering money laundering and drug-related crimes, and identifying their proceeds. The trainees practiced searching residential areas and vehicles, and how to effectively use special equipment.

Deputy Head of the Saint Petersburg University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Colonel Sergey Triputin said that the Institute is interested in supporting Afghan law enforcement personnel in providing them with up-to-date skills and techniques required for combating the threat of illicit drugs. He called for further co-operation with all interested stakeholders, including the OSCE, in organizing joint training courses for Afghan law enforcement experts.

Guy Vinet, Head of the OSCE’s Strategic Police Matters Unit said that drugs-related crimes should be tackled not only by law enforcement but with help of social, human rights and educational institutions. Welcoming an Afghan female officer, who participated in the training, Vinet called for a greater role of women in policing, including combating illicit drugs. By enhancing the capacity of Afghanistan as an OSCE Partner for Co-operation to tackle the world drug problem, the OSCE assists in enriching the Afghan law enforcement with knowledge to counter drug-related crime and develop co-operation with different actors in this field from the ministries of health, education and others, he said.

The course was organized as part of the Transnational Threats Department’s activities to assists Afghanistan in line with the 2012 OSCE Concept for Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors, as well as the 2007 and 2011 OSCE Ministerial Council decisions on co-operation with Afghanistan.

This activity was supported by the government of the Russian Federation.

VIENNA, 8 April 2019 – The benefits of biometric technology in countering terrorism, and how to responsibly use and share collected biometric data, is the focus of a conference on Thursday, 11 April 2019 at the Hofburg in Vienna. The OSCE is this year partnering with the Biometrics Institute’s for its seventh annual borders conference. Media representatives are invited to cover the event’s opening session.

The two-day conference will bring together some 200 decision-makers, policy-makers, project managers and private sector representatives working in the area of border management.

The conference is designed to support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017), which decided that States shall develop and implement systems to collect biometric data (such as fingerprints, photographs and facial recognition) in order to responsibly and properly identify terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters.

Participants will learn about how and why biometric data is valuable to States in identifying terrorists, how states can develop and implement systems to collect biometric data responsibly and explore good practices in the sharing of biometric data between States.

For representatives of those States already using biometric systems, the conference will facilitate the exchange of good practices in using these tools and help to identify potential partnerships with other States to further improve the efficiency or minimize the costs of their current systems.

Media representatives are invited to attend the conference’s opening session from 14:00 to 14:25, Thursday, 11 April, in the Neuer Saal of the Hofburg Conference Centre. The session will feature welcoming remarks by:

Thomas Greminger, OSCE Secretary General
Lukáš Parízek, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic and Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship
Isabelle Moeller, Chief Executive of the Biometrics Institute

To register, please send an e-mail confirming your attendance to press@osce.org by 11:00, 11 April.

WARSAW, 8 April 2018 – Governments and political leaders must do more to end the impunity of violent perpetrators who attack Roma and Sinti, said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), on the occasion of International Roma Day.

“It is unacceptable that Roma and Sinti continue to face hate-motivated attacks and violence,” the ODIHR Director said.

Such violence is often fuelled by racist and anti-Roma rhetoric promoted by high-level public officials as well as populist politicians, all attempting to increase their voting base. “This whips up a climate of prejudice and intolerance, potentially leading to an unending spiral of violence against Roma and Sinti,” the Director said. “Racism and incitement to hatred must be condemned promptly and unequivocally.”

Existing laws and mechanisms must be enforced to ensure rapid and effective investigation of hate crime against Roma and Sinti.  Participating States should also ensure the imposition of enhanced sentences for racially-motivated crimes, in line both with their own domestic legislation and international human rights standards.

To effectively address hate crime and violence, OSCE participating States have committed to improving the access of Roma and Sinti to effective remedies such as the provision of legal aid. This requires the establishment of specific programmes and policies, as well as easy access to information regarding legislation, reporting and support mechanisms for victims.

ODIHR is helping to address such discrimination, hate crime and violence, for example by regularly providing a much-needed space for dialogue between Roma and Sinti civil society and representatives of participating States, as well as other international organizations. These focus not only on current incidents of systemic racism and discrimination against Roma, but also on legal and policy measures undertaken around the OSCE region to address and prevent them.

On the principle that any action taken for Roma must also be carried out with Roma, any project or programme aimed at increasing Roma inclusion must involve them as full partners in all phases of planning, implementation and evaluation.

International Roma Day marks the date of the first international meeting of Roma representatives across Europe, which took place in the United Kingdom on 8 April 1971.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• It recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM observed fresh craters near Kalynove-Borshchuvate.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near Marinka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities and repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its freedom of movement was also restricted near non-government-controlled Starolaspa.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 440 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), including about 280 projectiles recorded by an SMM camera, west-south-west and north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), and at southerly directions  of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Staryi Aidar (government-controlled, 20km north-west of Luhansk), north-north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), and north-east and north-north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 4 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. The same camera recorded 13 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 1-2km east and east-south-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 5 April, positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-8km north-north east and an explosion at an assessed range of 2-3km north-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. The SMM again saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and a red-and-black flag near a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the disengagement area. [3]

During the day on 5 April, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violations of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled-areas

4 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) near Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk);

• three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk); and
• a probable tank (T-64) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

5 April

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Roty (66km north-east of Donetsk); and
• a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Kostiantynivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

4 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three tanks (one T-72 and two probable T-72) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and
• two tanks (type undetermined) near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 14 tanks (T-72) near Fedorivka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled

4 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a tank (T-72) on a transport trailer in Kostiantynivka and
• 22 tanks (T-72) and six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

5 April

The SMM noted that four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

5 April

The SMM noted that five tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M20-15 Molot, 120mm) were missing for the first time.

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

5 April

The SMM noted that eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing, including six for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Non-government-controlled areas

4 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• at least four covered armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type unidentified), four IFVs (BMP-2) and three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (two MT-LB and one BTR-80) near Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) about 400m south-east of the Zolote disengagement area near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) within 300m of each other, parked about 15-20m from the nearest residential houses near Petrivske.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• six probable ACVs (type undetermined) near Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk);
• 22 IFVs (one BMP-1 and 21 BMP variants) and an APC (MT-LB) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk);
• seven IFVs (BMP variants) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• four ACVs near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• three ACVs near Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Holmivskyi (49km north-east of Donetsk).

5 April

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (60km west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled areas

4 April             

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), six IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four ACVs (type undetermined) and an APC (BTR-70) near Ozarianivka (52km north of Donetsk);
• seven armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Leonidivka (41km north of Donetsk); and
• an ACV near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk).

5 April

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP variant) under camouflage in Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy machine-gun and an APC (BTR-60) near residential houses occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk); and
• three IFVs (BMP-1) in Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM saw an unidentified mini-UAV flying at a height of around 100m above the Mission’s position approximately 2km north-west of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Fresh craters spotted near Kalynove-Borshchuvate

On 4 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted eight impact craters (not seen in imagery from 30 March) assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds in a forested area near Kalynove-Borshchuvate. For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 1 April 2019.)

Presence of mines in Marinka

On 29 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time ten anti-tank mines (type unidentified) laid across a road in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), as well as an additional eight mines laid out along the same road, about 1.3km south-west of the previously-mentioned mines. The UAV also spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines which appear to be part of an extension of previously-observed mines, as well as an additional 85 anti-tank mines about 150m of the abovementioned five anti-tank mines.

The same UAV again spotted 18 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62M) laid out in two rows across a road on the northern edge of Marinka, as well as an additional four anti-tank mines laid out along the same road, about 210m north-east of the previously-mentioned mines. The UAV again spotted an additional 12 anti-tank mines laid out across a road perpendicular to the aforementioned one, 40-50m from the nearest residential houses. For the first time, the UAV spotted eight anti-tank mines (type unidentified) laid across a road about 800m north-east from the nearest residential area at the northern edge of Marinka.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining activities

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power transmission lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities conducted by five members of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU) at a residential house in Stanytsia Luhanska. The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see  SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he was not aware of any demining activities having taken place in the past 24 hours.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations initially denied the SMM passage to Starolaspa. After 20 minutes, the SMM was allowed to proceed to Starolaspa but not to Novolaspa (see above).

Other Impediments:

• On 4 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government-controlled areas north of Donetsk region.[6]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometers of the UAV’s position.

BRATISLAVA, 5 April 2019 - At today’s High-Level Meeting on the Reform of the Scales of Contributions organized by the Slovak Chairmanship in Bratislava, OSCE participating States discussed the need and common will to find a long-term and sustainable solution to the pressing issue of financial contributions to the OSCE. 

Resolving issues related to the governance and the sound management of the OSCE is of utmost importance for participating States, in order to focus on the urgent security related issues in the OSCE area. 

Participating States confirmed their ownership of and shared responsibility for the OSCE through active engagement in the discussions on ensuring a stable financial footing of the Organization. They reiterated their commitment to resolving outstanding issues as a matter of priority. 

“It is my understanding that participating States will work together constructively towards a consensual solution of the current funding crisis of the OSCE, which adversely affects the Organization’s activities. I also have the feeling that all participating States agreed on the urgent need of addressing and solving the issue,” concluded Slovak State Secretary and Special Representative for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship Lukás Parízek. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed damage from a mortar round to a house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a railway station in government-controlled Kostiantynivka and near non-government-controlled Korsun and Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including most of the explosions, were recorded at directions ranging from north-north-east to south-west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-west and south-west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas).

Damage from mortar round to residential house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 30 March, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted  a hole in the roof of a house, assessed as recent and caused by a mortar round, on Pervomaiska Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in this area, see SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 3-4 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and seven projectiles at an assessed range of 1-2km east and east-south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). On 4 April, positioned in five different locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 68 undetermined explosions, 24 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, as well as 18 shots of 30mm cannon fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 4 April, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violations of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled-areas

3 April

The SMM saw 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) stationary at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

4 April

The SMM saw:

• five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk), and
• two towed howitzers  (D-30) on road H-20 near Kostiantynivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

4April

The SMM saw 18 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled

4 April

The SMM saw:

• a towed howitzer (D-30) on a local road near Yelyzavetivka (43km north-west of Donetsk) and
• a towed mortar (2B16 Nona-K, 120mm­) near Kostiantynivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

31 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks (type undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) and 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). (Aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 78 armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) at the same training area, for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 29 March 2019.)

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

4 April

The SMM noted that four MLRSs (BM-21) were missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

1 April             

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2) close to houses in a residential area of Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 4 April 2019).

4 April

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60) near houses used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk); and
• three IFVs (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2 ) in Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

3 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• six IFVs (probable BMP variants) in Kozatske (36km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

4 April

The SMM saw an electronic counter measure system (RB-341V LEER-3) heading south-east on road T-0508 near Starobesheve (32km south-east of Donetsk).

Presence of mines and a mine hazard sign

On 1 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 50 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a field (from east to west for about 100m) about 2km east of Novotoshkivske.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time six anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a V shape across a road about 4km east of Novotoshkivske.

On 4 April, the SMM again saw six anti-tank mines (TM-62) (near previously observed mines) laid within 2m of the edge of road T-0504, about 180m south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna.

On 4 April, the SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign (with skull and cross bones and “Stop, Mines” written in Russian) on the western edge of road T-0513 approximately 4km north-east of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to power transmission lines near Novooleksandrivka (government-controlled, 65km west of Luhansk), Khoroshe (non-government-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk) and Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM observed a calm situation south of Kherson region

On 3 April, the SMM observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea. On 4 April, the SMM observed calm situations in areas along the Black Sea coast south of Kherson.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see  SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A minivan and four member of the armed formations blocked a road near Korsun (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), thus preventing the SMM from proceeding northward to Novoselivka (non-government-controlled, 37km north-east of Donetsk). One of them told the SMM that it could not proceed due to ongoing operational activities in the area.
•  An officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces denied access to the SMM at the train station in Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) citing “security procedures”. The SMM saw weapons in the area of the train station (see above).
• One armed member of the armed formations at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) prevented the SMM from continuing westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, two members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and requested to see the patrol plan which the Mission refused to show. On both occasions, they allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint after about 30 minutes.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

VIENNA / SARAJEVO, 5 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, and the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bruce G. Berton, expressed their concerns today regarding new amendments to the Law on Public Order and Peace in the Bosnia and Herzegovina entity of Republika Srpska (RS).

Amendments to the Law on Public Order and Peace adopted by the RS Government on 28 March, which would introduce the offence of unauthorized photographing or recording that impedes officials while carrying out their duties, envisaging fines of up to 1,500 BAM (some 767 euros) or imprisonment up to 60 days, may adversely affect freedom of expression and assembly, they warned. The RS National Assembly will be voting on the amendments on 16 April.

“Such provisions, if adopted, could severely endanger an already challenging environment for media professionals,” said Désir. “They run against international media freedom standards. Journalists must work in a safe working and legal environment, in order to report on issues of public interest, including street demonstrations, protests and the work of law enforcement authorities. I call on the RS National Assembly to refrain from adopting these amendments, and instead to engage in constructive discussions with the media community and other relevant stakeholders in finding a proper solution.”

Ambassador Berton said: “Given the limiting nature and severity of proposed sanctions in the draft amendment to the Law, a more extensive consultation process with relevant stakeholders, including the public, is necessary. Journalists must be able to cover events of public interest without fear. In addition, under international human rights standards, every person should enjoy the right to attend, observe and record a public peaceful assembly, which includes the right to record actions of law enforcement officers. The OSCE Mission to BiH stands ready to provide support to the relevant authorities on this matter.”

The Representative offered his Office’s legal assistance on this issue, stressing that he will be following the process closely.

VIENNA, 5 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed today’s court decision to convict the perpetrators responsible for killing one of the most prominent and critical journalists in Serbia, Slavko Ćuruvija.

The High Court in Belgrade sentenced former state security officials Radomir Marković and Milan Radonjić to 30 years in prison, and Ratko Romić and Miroslav Kurak to 20 years in prison for organizing and taking part in the murder of Ćuruvija, former owner of the newspaper Dnevni Telegrafand the weekly magazine Evropljanin, who was gunned down on 11 April 1999 in Belgrade.

“I welcome this first instance court decision against those who committed this heinous crime 20 years ago. Slavko Ćuruvija was a courageous journalist, not afraid to write about sensitive issues during very turbulent times in Serbia. He paid the highest price for his journalistic work and that is why it is of utmost importance that justice is served. This long-awaited ruling is significant, as it shows that there can be no impunity even for crimes committed 20 years ago,” Désir stated.

The Representative noted that his Office has been following the case closely for many years, stressing that impunity for crimes against journalists is unacceptable and constitutes a second crime against them. 

“This decision needs to be used as positive momentum, and I urge the Serbian authorities to finally shed light on other killings of prominent journalists, including Dada Vujasinovićin 1994 and Milan Pantić in 2001,” Désir said.

Désir recalled the Safety of Journalists Decision adopted at the Ministerial Council in Milan that calls on OSCE participating States to “take effective measures to end impunity for crimes committed against journalists, by ensuring accountability as a key element in preventing future attack…”.

The Ministerial Decision on Safety of Journalists is available at https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/406538

The Representative’s previous public statements on SlavkoĆuruvija’s case are available at https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/377563, https://www.osce.org/fom/232486,https://www.osce.org/fom/100637, https://www.osce.org/fom/110303

Marina Živaljević

Strengthening regional and Adriatic-Ionian cross co-operation among youth was the topic of a conference organized by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro with the Ministry of Sport and Youth in Budva, Montenegro on 4 and 5 April 2019. 

The conference was organized within the framework of Montenegro’s Presidency of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) and gathered participants from countries of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative as well as from regional youth organizations, including the Regional Co-operation Office (RYCO), the Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO), the Western Balkan Fund and the European Youth Card Association (EYCA). The interactive nature of the conference encouraged participants to network, share good practices and discuss experiences and key challenges of regional cross co-operation.

In her opening remarks, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, emphasized that “the OSCE has recognized the importance of working with youth especially in contributing to peace and security”. She thanked the Slovakian OSCE Chairmanship for identifying youthengagement as a top priority for 2019.

Montenegro’s Minister of Sports and Youth, Nikola Janović,underlined his Government’s commitment to “strengtheningco-ordination mechanisms and creating better synergies with regional initiatives and organizations.” He stressed that theconference is an opportunity to highlight activities that promote the European Union’s strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian region and foster good neighbourly relations and co-operationwith the goal of enhancing opportunities for young people.

This conference was part of the overall assistance that the Mission provides in the area of enhancing youth participation through the better positioning and increased co-operation among youth in the region. This support includes assistance to the RYCO initiative and the Directorate for Youth in the Ministry of Sports and Youth.

Željka Šulc

Discussion on the implementation of strategic documents for the fight against corruption and the legal framework for protection of persons who report corruption in Republika Srpska, organized by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, was held on March 3 in Trebinje.

Some 20 representatives of local self-governance units and the civic sector from the region of Eastern Herzegovina attended the workshop.

The participants discussed the implementation of the Republika Srpska 2018-2022 Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan as well as the Law on Persons who Report Corruption at the local level.

The representative of the Republika Srpska Ministry of Justice provided a detailed explanation of the Law and its Action Plan to the participants, familiarizing them not only with these legal and strategic documents, but also with their obligations regarding their implementation.

The OSCE Mission to BiH plans to organize a similar event in December 2019 in order to assess the progress achieved in the implementation of the aforementioned documents.

VIENNA, 4 April 2019 - Improving our understanding of how technology is being misused to facilitate trafficking so that we can build better responses and exploring how technology can be adopted to help combat all form of trafficking, will be in focus at the 19th Alliance against Trafficking in Persons high-level conference, which will be held on 23 and 24 April in Vienna. 

Technology can be employed to deter the criminal operations of traffickers in the virtual space and disrupt the human trafficking marketplace by carrying out innovative, targeted and large-scale interventions. The Alliance Conference will raise awareness about such practices and participants will discuss how national legal and institutional frameworks could be adjusted to allow replicating these good practices on a wider scale. 

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) can also help victims by empowering them to report their exploitation, seek shelter and assistance, and engage in rehabilitation programs.

Opening and welcoming remarks will be made by Valiant Richey, Acting OSCE Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings; Rudolf Urbanovič, State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior of Slovakia, the National Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings; Melanie Thompson, Human Trafficking Survivor; Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Princess Eugenie of York and John Richmond, the United States Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons and the Director of the U.S. Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Person will deliver keynote addresses. The world's leading anti-trafficking experts will attend the Conference, as well as human trafficking survivors, NGOs and Tech companies’ representatives involved in the development of new technology tools tackling these crimes - including Microsoft, Nokia, Thorn, British Telecom -  who will display their new tools at the Conference.

During the Conference, four panel discussions and five side events will take place.

Representatives of the media who wish to attend and/or cover the meeting, should register by writing to press@osce.org by Sunday at 18:00 at the latest.

The conference will be streamed live at www.osce.org/live

Follow the conference and engage with leading anti-trafficking experts on Twitter via @osce_cthb using the hashtag #cthb19.

416429 Communication and Media Relations Section

A regional workshop on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, was organized by the Belarus’ Foreign Ministry on 3 and 4 April 2019 in Minsk for representatives of countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The workshop was organized in co-operation with the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts, and supported by the OSCE and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, with funding from the European Union.

The workshop gathered more than 60 participants from Armenia,  Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, together with representatives of the Belarusian industrial sector and experts from international and regional organizations, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the CIS Executive Committee, Interpol, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Implementation Support Unit for the Biological Weapons Convention.

Participants shared national best practices, assessed the progress made, identified further measures to enhance implementation of the Resolution, and discussed how to build capacities at the national and regional levels.

In his opening speech, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus, Oleg Kravchenko, said his country is pursuing a consistent and responsible policy in this field.  He said a comprehensive approach to implementing the Resolution implies close co-operation and co-ordination at the regional and global levels so to effectively counter the proliferation of materials and technologies that can be used to create weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Head of the Forum for Security Co-operation Support Section of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Robin Mossinkoff, said that the OSCE, as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, has been recognized by the international community for its efforts in assisting the CIS States in improving their implementation of Resolution 1540 in recent years.

On behalf of Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, Aaron Junhoung Yoo noted with appreciation the efforts of the States in implementing Resolution 1540 and related ongoing activities arising from the recommendations of the first workshop in Minsk in 2013. This led to the development and submission of additional national implementation action plans, and the trilateral peer-review between Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, he said. Co-operation between the three States accelerated their process of accession to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and enhanced efforts towards harmonizing their national control lists with relevant multilateral export control regimes.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines at a railway station in government-controlled Kostiantynivka.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted while driving on a road north of Dokuchaievsk, at a heavy weapons holding area and at a checkpoint near Zaichenko, all in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The highest number of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as in areas south, south-east and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). All ceasefire violations (seven projectiles) were assessed as near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas). 

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 2 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded seven projectiles in flight at an assessed distance of 2-4km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation. 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violations of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

3 April 

The SMM saw at least 23 self-propelled howitzers (13 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and 10 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on flatbeds at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk). 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

2 April

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) stationary on road M03 about 5km south-east of Minkivka (78km north of Donetsk) and
• three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) loaded on trucks heading east on road M03, about 4.5km north-east of Vesela Dolyna (64km north of Donetsk).

3 April 

The SMM saw: 

• 29 tanks (19 T-72 and ten T-64) loaded on flatbeds at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (see above) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Pryovrazhne (19km north-east of Mariupol). 

Non-government-controlled areas

On 31 March, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 12 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 28 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)(for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 March 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region[3]

3 April

The SMM noted that seven multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) remained missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

1 April

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).

3 April 

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) within a residential area of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk). 

Non-government-controlled areas

1 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five IFVs (two BMP-1, two BMP variants and one BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

2 April

The SMM saw seven IFVs (BMP variants) in Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk). 

Electronic counter measure systemin non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

On 2 April, the SMM saw an electronic counter measure system (RB-341V LEER-3) on a military truck (KamAZ-5350) near Konkove (non-government-controlled, 79km south of Donetsk), heading south on road T-0508 (in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014).  

Presence of mines and a mine hazard sign

On 1 April, about 3km east of Novotoshkivske, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 64 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across road T-1303 in four rows and the remainder north of the same road (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 June 2018). On 3 April, the SMM saw six anti-tank mines (possible TM-62) laid within 2m of the edge of road T-0504, about 180m south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), near previously observed mines (see SMM Daily Report 30 March 2019). 

On the eastern edge of Nova Marivka, the SMM again saw a fallen tree spanning more than half of the width of a road, with a white board with “Stop! Mines” written on it in Russian, assessed as an improvised mine hazard sign. 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• After the SMM refused to show its patrol plan, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM access at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), thus preventing the SMM from proceeding westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• An armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing “orders from his superiors”.
• A minivan and five nearby members of the armed formations blocked a road north of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), thus preventing the SMM from proceeding onwards. One of them told the SMM that it could not proceed due to “ongoing operational activities” in the area. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 1 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk) and Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).[5]
• On 3 April, staff at the Hospital no. 2 in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to share information related to civilian casualties, citing instructions from those in control.

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, Maiorsk and Chermalyk were partially operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]The SMM visited an area previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that such site continued to be abandoned. 

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons

[5]The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.