OSCE

419045 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Katya Andrusz SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

On 8 May, ODIHR and Transparency International (TI) launched a platform bringing together international organizations, civil society and academia to combat political corruption by building a shared awareness of the concept and its practice, and at the same time increasing the ability of TI offices across the OSCE region to analyse, monitor, and investigate real and potential cases.

“The public perception of widespread corruption among political officials is often at the core of growing dissatisfaction with democratic institutions,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “Unfortunately, we observe political corruption to a greater or lesser degree in a number of countries across the OSCE region. The platform we are launching today together with Transparency International will play an important role in both raising awareness of the problem and doing more to counteract it.”

“Political corruption can have very different meanings, but they all share the same root: The very conflictive relationship between money and politics,” said Delia Ferreira Rubio, Chair of Transparency International. “Rules are needed, but they are not enough. We need to strengthen enforcement, oversight, monitoring and sanctioning, and to understand that rules are contextual and need to have a goal.”

A broader understanding of political corruption and its key forms will ultimately lead to more effective implementation of anti-corruption initiatives and the promotion of reforms across the OSCE region. At the same time, it will also act as an early-warning mechanism if political corruption becomes an issue in any particular country.

The launch event was the first day of a two-and-a-half-day boot camp on combating political corruption. It covered issues including money in politics, the integrity of electoral processes, and abuse of state resources and electoral integrity. It also included case studies from a number of OSCE participating states. As well as giving ODIHR and TI the opportunity to promote a comprehensive understanding of political corruption, the platform established today will help develop future paths of co-operation between the two organizations.

“Political corruption affects the regular functioning of democratic institutions, ultimately eroding the confidence of citizens in a democracy,” said Gianluca Esposito, Executive Secretary of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). “We are glad to work with ODIHR in its important work in fighting political forms of corruption and promoting public integrity across the OSCE region.”

Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights supported a three-day training course for local prosecutors on Kyrgyzstan's new criminal justice legislation. The event was organized by the Prosecutor General's Office of the Kyrgyz Republic and held from 6 to 8 May 2019 in Bishkek. This is the first round of training for staff of Kyrgyzstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office. Similar training courses will be conducted in all regions of Kyrgyzstan throughout the year.

The purpose of the course was to improve the skills of prosecutors in the practical application of criminal legislation, procedures and the use of an automated information system called the Unified Register of Crimes and Misdemeanours.

The workshop was opened by Gulmira Davletbaeva, the Director of the Training Centre for Investigation Officers of the Prosecutor General’s Office and Kakhramon Sanginov, the Rule of Law Officer of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

In her welcoming speech, Davletbaeva thanked the partners for their ongoing fruitful co-operation in the regular organization of such training events and noted that the course contributes to the professional capacity and skills of the Prosecutor General's Office staff members.

Since 2018 more than 2,500 staff members of law enforcement agencies have completed training on new criminal legislation with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

CHISINAU, 10 May 2019 – The OSCE Special Representative for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, Franco Frattini, will visit Chisinau and Tiraspol on 10 and 11 May 2019 for talks with high-level Moldovan officials and the political leadership in Tiraspol.

During the visit, in his capacity as the Special Representative of the OSCE Slovak Chairmanship for 2019, Frattini will focus on ways to advance the Transdniestrian Settlement Process within the parameters endorsed by all 57 participating States at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan in December 2018.

In Chisinau, media representatives are invited to a press briefing with the OSCE Special Representative Franco Frattini and the Moldovan Chief Negotiator Cristina Lesnic, on 11 May, at 09:15 at the Government Building (entrance from Mitropolit G. Banulescu-Bodoni Street). On the same day in Bender, a press briefing with the Special Representative Franco Frattini and the Transdniestrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky will be held at 13:15 in the Bender Fortress.  

For more information, please contact Anna Vorobeva, Spokesperson of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, at +373 22 887 846 (landline), +373 69 149 510 (mobile), e-mail: Anna.Vorobeva@osce.org.

For further details please visit the website of the OSCE Mission to Moldova: http://www.osce.org/moldova/

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• It recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.  
• The SMM saw for the first time anti-tank mines near Bila Kamianka and Starohnativka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 115 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). On the evening of 7 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about ten explosions (three of which were assessed as impacts) and about 20 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed distance of less than 1km.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 135 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period  (about 460 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 7 May, while on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 75 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-7km east-north-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). On 8 May, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.7-1km south-south-east (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).

Positioned 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk)).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

7 May

The SMM saw three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stationary in parking areas near the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 14 MLRS (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 6 May 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

7 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Pavlivka (51km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 12 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019);
• 12 tanks (type undetermined), seven self-propelled howitzers or mortars, 13 towed howitzers or mortars and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (for previous observations in the area see above); and
• 24 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019).

7 May

The SMM saw at least five tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

8 May

The SMM noted that:

• six tanks (T-72) and eight self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) were present, and
• 52 tanks (T-64), three self-propelled mortars (2S9) and 22 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

8 May

The SMM noted that four mortars (one 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three BM-37 82mm) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

7 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (one BTR-D and one type undetermined) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk), and
• three IFVs (BMP-1) in Novoselivka (66km south of Donetsk).

8 May

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Olhynka (40km south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and four IFVs (three BMP-1 and one BMP variant) in Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

7 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted seven IFVs (six BMP-1 and one probable BMP variant) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

Helicopter and UAV seen flying in the security zone

On 8 May, the SMM saw a military helicopter flying north to south at a low altitude about 7.5km east of Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk). It also saw an unidentified UAV (assessed as a fixed-wing type) flying in a south-easterly direction near Petrovenky (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk).    

Anti-tank mines near Bila Kamianka and Starohnativka

On 7 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time 40 anti-tank mines near a road leading from Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) to Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations. About 20m east of the aforementioned mines, the UAV again spotted two anti-tank mines. About 1.5km west of the former mines, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid across the road and again spotted six anti-tank mines (type undetermined) about 100m west, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 7 May, the SMM saw for the first time a freshly dug trench and a mine hazard sign (red square with “Mines” written in Russian) about 2km south of Novokyivka (non-government-controlled, 25km east of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines between Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), as well as to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-east of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 12 cars (three with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Polish licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian (a woman, aged 20-30) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (ten with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates and about 15 passengers on board exiting Ukraine.

People apply for passports of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions 

In non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, the SMM observed about 50 people (mixed gender and ages) in a queue in front of a building in Antratsyt (55km south-west of Luhansk). Outside the aforementioned building, the SMM noted four pieces of paper informing about eligibility, costs and documents tied to the submission of applications for passports of the Russian Federation. Several people waiting told the SMM that there were three queues: one for receiving information about obtaining the passports of the Russian Federation, one for receiving information about obtaining “LPR” “passports” and a third for receiving “LPR” “passports”.

In non-government-controlled Donetsk city, in front of a building at 56 Aksakova Street, the SMM observed two queues of about 15 and 45 people (mixed gender and ages). People in the first queue told the SMM that they had been submitting applications for passports of the Russian Federation; those in the second queue told the SMM that they had been waiting to receive other documents valid in non-government-controlled areas, including “DPR” “passports”. In Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 15 people queuing outside a building. Six of them told the SMM that they had been submitting applications for passports of the Russian Federation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delayed:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 20 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• At a hospital in Donetsk city, medical staff told the SMM that it could not provide information without permission from those in control. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

419075 Marina Živaljević

PODGORICA/CETINJE 7-9 May 2019 – To further strengthen Montenegro’s capacities in creating a digital cultural property database, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro with the support of the OSCE Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) organized a three-day workshop on best practices in protecting cultural heritage from traffickers in cultural property from 7 to 9 May 2019 in Podgorica and Cetinje.

This event was a follow-up to a regional workshop on combating illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property organized jointly with TNTD and the Italian OSCE Chairmanship in October 2018.

Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Siv-Katrine Leirtroe thanked all the participants and experts from Austria, North Macedonia, and representatives from the Ministries of Culture and Justice, the Basic Court Nikšić and the University Mediterranean for their participation.

“In addition to lectures, this workshop will facilitate discussions on best practices, mechanisms and tools to monitor archaeological sites and maintain controls in museums, protect museum artefacts and share good practices in inter-agency co-operation,” said Leirtroe opening the workshop. She also announced that two back-to-back workshops on the same topic will be organized in November this year.

Dražen Blažić, State Secretary of the Ministry Culture said that, on the one hand, cultural heritage testifies to our proud history, achievements and to the most valuable courses of our state and society. And on the other hand, cultural heritage in a contemporary context is an extremely important resource with economic potential for its valorisation. “Today we can conclude that cultural heritage is very often a target of numerous abuses and attempts of smuggling. For that reason, the prevention of illegal cross-border trade in cultural goods is an extremely important task, and requires a vigilant attitude by the state towards this emerging challenge,” said Blažić.

The first two days of the workshop were held in Podgorica with the third day held in the Historic Royal Capital of Cetinje where participants visited the National Museum of Montenegro, the old Government House, exhibition spaces of the Artistic, Historical and Ethnographic Museum, and King Nikola’s Palace.

Communication and Media Relations Section OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan

The OSCE-recommended model of intelligence-led policing (ILP) and its advantages for contemporary policing to the Uzbek Police, training workshop organized by the OSCE Secretariat, in co-operation with the OSCE Office of the Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, was held on 10 May 2019 in Tashkent.

The training workshop was attended by 25 police managers occupying decision- and policymaking positions in the Uzbek Police, operational structures and educational institution.

The OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit experts introduced the concept of ILP, as presented in the recently published OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing, and explained how this law enforcement model can complement and improve traditional policing approaches. Law enforcement experts from Estonia and Sweden gave presentations and shared information on ILP practices in their countries. Following the presentations, participants discussed the potential for implementing the ILP model in Uzbekistan.

ILP is a modern law enforcement model which facilitates proactive and efficient law enforcement management through combining intelligence gathering and analysis with informed decision-making procedures. The OSCE Guidebook on ILP has been translated into several languages and is used by law enforcement authorities and training institutions across the OSCE area.

“The success of ILP is to a large extent determined by the awareness and commitment of senior- and middle-level police management. Therefore today’s event has special significance, hopefully providing the Uzbek law enforcement management with new tools to improve their police services and strengthen their efforts against criminal activities,” said Guy Vinet, Head of the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department.

Juergen Becker of the OSCE Office of the Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan stressed that in line with its mandate, this OSCE field mission has been supporting the police services of Uzbekistan in further improving their competencies and skills in the field of a criminal investigation for more than ten years. This workshop, jointly implemented with the OSCE experts from Vienna, is another important step in this direction, he said.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission observed fresh damage caused by shelling to residential houses in Marinka.
• It recorded the presence of military hardware inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The Mission continued to monitor the situation of civilians crossing the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Novoazovsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). The highest numbers of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and south and south-south-east of  Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 460 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period  (about 60 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations, including most explosions, were recorded at north-easterly and south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 75 explosions, including 34 assessed as outgoing artillery rounds at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east.

Fresh damage caused by shelling to residential houses in Marinka

On the eastern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), at 128 Zhovtneva Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-eastern facing metal fence about 2m of an inhabited single-storey house and a fresh crater in an asphalted road about 4m north-east of the same house (and about 600m west-south-west of an old industrial compound displaying a red and gold flag on the western edge of Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled). The SMM assessed the crater as caused by the impact of a fragmentation grenade (VOG-25 or VOG 25-P, 40mm) fired from a south-westerly direction. The SMM saw several members of the State Emergency Services conducting repairs to the roof of the same house (which was covered by a nylon sheet) and replacing asbestos sheets on the roof of another house at 137 Zhovtneva Street. One of them said that they were performing scheduled repairs in the area.

At 128a Zhovtneva Street, the SMM saw cracked glass in a north-west facing window and shrapnel damage to the north-west facing side of a single-storey house. It also saw cracked glass in a south-west facing window and in a south-west facing door of a summer kitchen (about 2m south-west of the same house), as well as fresh shrapnel damage to the south-west facing side of a small construction and to a tree in the garden (about 3m and 2m north-west of the same house, respectively). About 2m north-east of the house, the SMM observed freshly moved soil which, according to the owner of the house (woman, aged 60-70), was used to cover a crater in the yard. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

At 144 Zhovtneva Street (about 40m of the previous house), the SMM saw over 80 holes in a south-west facing metal fence about 2m south-west of an inhabited single-storey house and in two nearby parked cars. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire. Three residents of the abovementioned street (two men and a woman, aged 50-90) told the SMM that they had been in their houses (some of them with their families) when shelling had occurred in the morning hours of 3 May.

About 1.5km east-south-east of the abovementioned location, at 285 Heroiv Chornobylia Street, the SMM saw two collapsed south-eastern facing walls. It also saw about five members of the State Emergency Service replacing wooden sections of the roof of the same house. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

About 70m west of the abovementioned house, at 291 Heroiv Chornobylia Street, the SMM saw at least seven holes in the south-eastern and south-western-facing sides of a single-storey house (assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel) and three shattered south-west-facing windows (covered by wooden panels), as well as fresh shrapnel damage to the plastic frame of one of the windows.

In the same area, the SMM saw a position of the Ukrainian Armed forces and that two houses were being used by them. Three residents of the above-mentioned street (three women, aged 30-80) told the SMM that they had been in their houses when shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 3 May.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 4 May, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), next to previously observed positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) covered with camouflage netting along with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck, as well as an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) north of the railway tracks and west of road T-1316 (about 500 east-south-east of the abovementioned IFV), all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 17 April 2019).

On 7 May, positioned in three locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 90 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire and about 193 explosions: 154 assessed as undetermined and 34 assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (see above), all assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

On 5 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three mortars (type undetermined) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

7 May

The SMM saw:

• eight tanks (one T-34 and seven T-72), ten towed howitzers (five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm ) and five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in the centre of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019) and
• four tanks (two T-64 and two T-72), four towed howitzers (2A65), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1), two MLRS (BM-21) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in the centre of Donetsk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 May 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

On 4 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 20 tanks (type undetermined), two pieces of anti-aircraft artillery (type undetermined) and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Other weapons observed:

On 4 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 16 self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 17 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Buhaivka.[4]

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

On 6 May, the SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

4 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• an ACV (type undetermined) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk);
• an ACV (type undetermined) north of the disengagement area near Zolote; and
• an ACV (type undetermined) near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

4 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an IFV near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), and
• four IFVs (BMP-1) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

7 May

The SMM saw:

• four IFVs (BTR-80) near Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk) and
• eight armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

On 4 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a new 60m trench running north-east from a position of the armed formations near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk).

5 May

On 5 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two type undetermined) and a probable IFV (BMP variant) near Sentianivka.

On 6 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Kypuche (formerly Artemivsk, 46km west of Luhansk).

7 May

The SMM saw:

• six IFVs (BMP-2) and six APCs (BTR-80) in the centre of Luhansk city (see above), and
• two armoured recovery vehicles (BREM-1), two APCs (BTR-80) and four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two BMP-2) in the centre of Donetsk city (see above).

Mines seen near Orikhove

On 4 May, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 82 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows in a field south of Orikhove.

Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints

In the morning of 7 May, at a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 200 vehicles and about 200 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 100 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction. In the afternoon, at the same location, the Mission saw about 100 vehicles queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas and about 120 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction.

In the morning of the same day, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on road H15 near Marinka, the SMM saw 80 cars and around 150 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas, as well as 12 buses stationary between the abovementioned checkpoint of the armed formations in Kreminets and the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka. In the afternoon, at the same location, the Mission saw no cars queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 25 vehicles as well as 100 people queuing in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and Popasna, as well as to damaged houses in Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 7 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates) and a mini-van (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine, and ten cars (three with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), a mini-van (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 6 May, while at a border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw no pedestrians or traffic entering or exiting Ukraine.

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 5 and 6 May, the Mission observed calm situations at a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service security post in Valok (188km south-east of Kherson) and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (see SMM Daily Report 1 May 2019).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM entrance to the town, citing ongoing operation in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their type.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

VIENNA, 8 May 2019 – Politico-military co-operation in Central Asia, how to increase women’s participation in decision-making processes in the security sector, and eliminating the threat posed by small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition are among the priorities of Tajikistan’s Chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), which the country’s Deputy Foreign Minister Zohir Saidzoda formally opened in Vienna today.

Addressing representatives of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation at the FSC, Saidzoda said that Tajikistan intends to perform its duties as Chair in good faith, guided by the established principles of equality, mutual respect, balance and continuity. It was the first time that his country assumed the role of FSC Chair, he added.

“Our main task will be to continue the ongoing work in further improving the control mechanisms in the politico-military field,” he said.

Saidzoda said that his country sees the OSCE as a unique regional organization capable of addressing a wide range of security and co-operation issues with significant potential for effective action.

He highlighted the already close co-operation between his country and the OSCE in the politico-military field, and said that Tajikistan’s FSC Chairmanship would build on this.

“As of today, in Tajikistan, about 26,000 units of seized small arms and over 30 tonnes of surplus ammunitions were destroyed by the OSCE. Between 2009 and 2018 some three million square metres of land contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance were cleared,” he said.

How to counter the threat of small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition across the OSCE region would be among the Tajik Chair’s priorities, he said.

Referring to his country’s other priorities, Saidzoda said: “A special focus of Tajikistan’s Chairmanship will be drawing the FSC’s attention to politico-military aspects of security in the Central Asian context, and the need to strengthen the OSCE’s co-operation with regional organizations in Central Asia.”

Linked to this is the security situation in Afghanistan, he said, where “the presence of an immense number of munitions and weapons in the northern territories of Afghanistan suggests that the long-term border situation will remain unstable.”

He added that Tajikistan will also hold discussions on the importance of the role of women in the security sector, in particular their participation in decision-making.

Other areas of focus will include strengthening the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; confidence-and security-building measures in the politico-military area; and continued efforts to consolidate common positions among States on the updating of the Vienna Document.

“Tajikistan hopes to contribute to the promotion of genuine dialogue,” he said. “I assure you that Tajikistan will conduct its FSC Chairmanship on the basis of a balanced and impartial approach.”

PODGORICA, 8 May 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák, today in Podgorica, called Montenegro a success story for democratic transformation and Euro-Atlantic integration, and a role model for the region. “In the last two decades, Montenegro has made huge progress in consolidating peace and stability,” Lajčák said.

During his stay in Montenegro, the first South-Eastern European country he has visited since taking office in January, Chairperson Lajčák underlined the wide range of challenges the region is facing, ranging from deep-rooted grievances and the ongoing process of reconciliation, to the need to strengthen rule of law and freedom of the media.

“Other phenomena, such as illegal migration flows and violent extremism, continue to pose a threat to the country and the region. These challenges endanger the region’s aspirations and the stability of other participating States.” At the same time, he pointed to the value of the OSCE in this regard, as an organization which strives for regional approaches to regional challenges.

Emphasizing the strong and very practice-oriented Montenegrin-OSCE partnership, in particular on reforming the electoral system, building a free, resilient and professional media landscape, promoting security sector governance and reform, and strengthening regional youth co-operation in collaboration with RYCO, in his meetings with President Milo Đukanović, Prime Minister Duško Marković, Minister of Foreign Affairs Srdjan Darmanović, and Speaker of the Parliament Ivan Brajović, Minister Lajčák referred to the achievements made. “In the region, the OSCE has come a long way from assisting in the establishment of key democratic institutions to helping to build their functionality and strengthening their relationship with citizens,” he said.

Lajčák stressed that listening to critical voices is key in a maturing democracy. “Differences should be debated in parliament by all representatives, including the opposition. Boycotting cuts off any chance of dialogue - and therefore any chance of finding common ground. The only way to achieve progress is through dialogue.”

The Chairperson also met with representatives of civil society, key actors in reforming Montenegro and important partners of the OSCE Mission, and took the opportunity to show what Slovakia’s OSCE slogan “for people, dialogue and stability” means in action, delivering a bio-microscopic slit lamp to the hospital Klinički Centar and announcing Slovakia’s support for the reconstruction work of the Tanasije Petrović Grammar School in Pljevlja.

While in Montenegro, Minister Lajčák was awarded the honorary title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Montenegro as an acknowledgement of his contribution to the transformation of the country.

418982 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A three-day capacity-building course on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism (VERLT) took place in the town of Guliston from 2 to 4 May 2019. The training course served as the final phase of equipping public council members with relevant knowledge and skills to address and integrate aspects of preventing and countering VERLT into community policing efforts.

The course brought together 20 members of Regional Public Councils on Police Reform, more than half of them women. It was aimed at consolidating the theoretical knowledge that the public council members gained during the basic courses held in February and March 2019. The trainees learned how to develop communication strategies in the context of preventing and countering VERLT and discussed the national legal framework and practice. Promoting gender mainstreaming and mobilizing youth to tackle VERLT-related challenges were also part of the training.

Navruz Odinaev, a member of the Public Council operating at the Interior Ministry Headquarters said: “This advanced course will enable me to devise concrete projects on preventing and countering VERLT by identifying and managing respective risks, integrating gender mainstreaming, as well as by engaging young people in different initiatives.” 

Farosatmoh Gayurova, a member of the Khorog Public Council on Police Reform, said that she wants to apply her knowledge in preventing violent extremism and terrorist radicalization among young people and women.

During the course, the public council members developed various initiatives targeted at addressing and eradicating the root causes of VERLT at grassroots level. The initiatives are intended for integration into the annual action plans of Public Councils and practical implementation, subject to consent by the senior management of Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry.

Public Councils on Police Reform are advisory bodies to the Interior Ministry that function at the regional level, and are comprised of civil society activists. They help to develop and strengthen links between citizens and police by promoting community policing.

NUR-SULTAN, 8 May 2019 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today formally opened an election observation mission (EOM) for the 9 June early presidential election in Kazakhstan. The mission’s deployment follows an invitation from the country’s authorities.

The mission is led by Ambassador Urszula Gacek and consists of a core team of 11 experts based in Nur-Sultan. ODIHR has requested OSCE participating States to second 24 long-term observers and 300 short-term observers. The long-term observers will be deployed throughout the country in multinational teams of two from 14 May 2019, while the short-term observers will arrive a few days before the election.

The mission will assess the election’s compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. Observers will closely monitor voter registration, candidate registration, campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant government bodies, election-related legislation and its implementation, and the resolution of election-related disputes. The mission will also monitor media coverage of the campaign.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives of state authorities, political parties, civil society, the media, and the international community.

On election day itself, the ODIHR EOM will join efforts with the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results.

The mission will publish an interim report in the course of its work. The day after the election, a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions will be issued at a press conference. ODIHR will issue a final report on the observation approximately two months after the end of the election process.

The ODIHR election observation mission and the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

For further information, please visit www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/418187 or contact Kira Kalinina, Media Analyst, at +7 701 6436097 (Nur-Sultan mobile), or at kira.kalinina@odihr.kz

or

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile), or at katya.andrusz@odihr.pl.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man died after a metal object exploded in Velyka Novosilka.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• It continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Kozatske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 70 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at easterly directions of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and in areas south-south-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

A man died in Velyka Novoselivka after a metal object exploded

In Velyka Novosilka (government-controlled, 74km west of Donetsk) the head of the police station told the SMM that a man (in his thirties) had died on 4 May after a metal object he had found exploded as he had been trying to disassemble it at his house. He added that the man collected scrap metal. At the hospital in Velyka Novosilka the head of the intensive care unit told the SMM that the man had been brought to the hospital on 4 May with fatal trauma injuries to his head, hands and legs consistent with explosion wounds. At 43 Ohorodnyi Lane, where the deceased man reportedly lived, the SMM observed a funeral procession.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned near the disengagement areas near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

6 May

The SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) in Starobilsk (85km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable mortar (120mm) and three tanks (probable T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

6 May

The SMM saw three MLRS (9P138 Grad-1, 122mm), three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (three D-20, 152mm and three D-30 Lyagushka,122mm), three towed mortars (120mm), six tanks (three T-64 and three T-72) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira, 100mm) in the centre of Donetsk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

6 May

The SMM saw:

    -  six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near the train station in Rubizhne          (84km north-west of Luhansk); and

    - five surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) near the train station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

4 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in a field east of Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) in Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk).

5 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an APC (Saxon) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-1) near Lobacheve.

Mine hazard signs near Stepove

The SMM observed for the first time two red mine hazard signs with the words “Stop.Mine” written in Russian on wooden posts on the northern edge of road T-1303 about 2.2km north of Stepove (non-government-controlled, 27km west of Luhansk).

Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints

The SMM observed at least 50 people (mixed gender, in their sixties to eighties) with canes struggling to climb the wooden ramps of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska when crossing the contact line. Three pedestrians (in their forties) told the Mission that it had taken them about 60 to 90 minutes to cross the contact line between the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. At different entry-exit checkpoints interlocutors told the SMM that they are informed about the new electronic permits, which do not have an expiry date. Some added that they had already applied for these new permits.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), as well as damaged houses in Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Positioned near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM observed de-miners from the State Emergency Service drive towards the DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol). A second armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that it was not allowed to proceed because a unit of the armed formations was located immediately east of the checkpoint. He added that only civilians listed as living in Porokhnia were allowed to travel east past this checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that no demining activities had taken place. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

VIENNA, 7 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, called on the authorities to reinstate access to numerous web resources, including online media, social platforms and Google services, in Tajikistan.

“I appeal to the authorities to provide citizens with full and unrestricted access to the online news media, both national and international, as well as social platforms and search engines,” Désir said. “There can be no freedom of expression and freedom of information without an unhindered access to the internet.”

According to reports, for the last ten days most social media and messenger applications, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, Viber, and Telegram, have been intermittently blocked, while access to internet browsers also remains intermittent. Asia Plus, Avesta, and the Ozodi websites are among some of the publications that remain unavailable.

The Representative has frequently raised the issue of internet blocking in Central Asia and throughout the OSCE region.

418997 Communication and Media Relations Section

Representatives of Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy, the country’s Office of the Prosecutor General, the police and the State Service for Labour Issues visited the OSCE Secretariat and the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior on 7 and 8 May 2019 as part of an OSCE capacity-building project that aims to combat human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants.

The visit was organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department (SPMU).

On 7 May, the delegation met with the representatives of SPMU, the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and INTERPOL. They discussed the role and responsibilities of Labour Inspectorates and the need to provide specialized training in the interviewing of victims. The discussions also explored how to strengthen bilateral co-operation with other OSCE participating States to improve the exchange of information and better address transnational cases of human trafficking.

On 8 May, the delegation visited the Central Service for Combating Alien Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings of the Austrian Interior Ministry to learn about the Austrian institutional framework for combating human trafficking as well as about a special hotline run by the Ministry.

The project is supported with financial contributions from Austria, France, Norway, Slovakia and Switzerland.

VIENNA, 7 May 2019 – Participants in a two-day Vienna-based conference entitled Commitment – Data – Action! underlined the importance of comparable data for improving policies and measures to prevent violence against women and girls (VAWG).

The conference, which concluded today, was organized in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Development Program, UNICEF and UN Women and took an in-depth look at the OSCE-led Survey on Violence against Women, Well-being and Safety of Women. The survey was conducted in the spring and summer of 2018 in seven OSCE participating States. 15,179 women between the ages of 18 and 74 were interviewed about their experiences of violence in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova and Ukraine. The survey also covered Kosovo.

The OSCE Survey was based on the methodology used by the EU-wide survey on violence against women conducted by the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency in 2014. The collected data provides much-needed information on the current situation in OSCE participating States in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and will support the development of new approaches to protect and support women and girls.

The OSCE Secretary General, Thomas Greminger, said: “The survey results are a call for action. The OSCE commitments on preventing and combating violence against women are clear and numerous entry points for action exist. The survey findings can help us to take up the challenge in a more targeted and systematic way. That’s why this survey is very important to us.”

The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Gender, Melanne Verveer, stressed that States have a responsibility to make every effort to prevent violence against women, protect the survivors and prosecute the perpetrators. “Violence against women requires laws against it that are implemented, enforced and resourced. It needs policies and practices that work and are shared; monitoring that ensures accountability.”

Hilde Hardeman, the Director and Head of the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, underlined that eliminating violence against women and girls is at the core of the values of the European Union: “Violence against women and girls is a grave violation of human rights. What is more, such violence can also be a driver for conflict within societies. By gathering information on the scope of gender-based violence, we have provided the basis for addressing this fundamental problem. We now need to act together to end violence against women and girls once and for all”.

As its main conclusion, the survey called for enhanced efforts to implement legislation and to improve action plans addressing violence against women and girls. It found that violence is experienced by women from all parts of society, regardless of economic or social status. However, certain groups of women, such as younger women, those who are economically dependent or those who have children, are at higher risk. Gender-based violence can result in severe physical and psychological pain for the survivors, who in the vast majority of cases do not report incidents. Many women are not aware of the help that is available to them after they have experienced violence or are silenced by deeply-rooted attitudes that act as barriers to seeking help.

Four parallel working groups – on economic empowerment of women, on the provision of services and a multi-sectoral approach to violence against women and girls, on engaging men and boys in combating it, and on data collection and SMART national action plans – allowed for in-depth discussions on these topics.

Participants explored how OSCE participating States can use the data provided by the survey to develop policies and strategies for monitoring and reporting as well as for awareness raising and further research. They stressed the need to improve the implementation of national legal frameworks and data collection and provide necessary resources for services. They agreed that a co-ordinated and multi-sectoral response mechanism must be put in place. This would ensure that women and girls are informed about their options and that the police and judiciary are trained in protection and support of survivors. The participants also discussed the need for overarching efforts to change gender stereotypes, biases and prejudices such as awareness-raising campaigns and the mainstreaming of information about gender equality in the education system.

The survey and conference were funded by the European Union’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) as well as the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Women, UNICEF and the OSCE participating States Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, the United States and Sweden.

Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg in their capacity as States parties to the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE (Stockholm Convention), have appointed conciliators, arbitrators and alternates for new mandates of six years to the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.

The mandates of these States parties’ members were approaching expiry. The States parties therefore renewed the mandates of their members or, alternatively, nominated new members. Further States parties are also due to renew the mandates of their members and more nominations are expected in the next three months.

The appointments were made in accordance with Article 3 and 4 of the Stockholm Convention, which was agreed in 1992 and has 34 States parties to date.

The conciliators and arbitrators of the Court will be requested to elect a new Bureau whose term of office will terminate in October 2019. The Bureau consists of a President, a Vice-President and three other members.

The election will take place in a written procedure in line with the provisions of Article 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. The election procedure will start in Summer 2019 with an invitation to the members of the Court to nominate potential candidates for the President of the Court and the membership of the Bureau. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, in its capacity as Depositary State, will collect these nominations.

The following is a list of the conciliators, arbitrators and their alternates appointed by Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg:

Denmark

Conciliators                           

Jonas BERING LIISBERG
State Secretary for Foreign Policy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Peter TAKSØE-JENSEN
Ambassador
 

Arbitrator

Michael BRAAD
Ambassador
Director, Centre for Legal Services, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
                                                

Alternate

Tobias ELLING REHFELD
Ambassador

Germany

Conciliators

Christian TOMUSCHAT
Professor emeritus
Faculty of Law, Humboldt University Berlin
President of the Court (October 2013 to October 2019)

Doris KÖNIG
Justice of the Federal Constitutional Court

Arbitrator

Silja VÖNEKY
Professor of Public International Law, Comparative Law and Ethics of Law
(Co-)Director of the Institute for Public Law
University of Freiburg

Alternate

Christian WALTER
Chair of Public International Law and Public Law
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Hungary

Conciliators

Vanda LAMM
Professor, Institute of Legal Studies
Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Pal SONNEVEND
Vice-Dean, Professor
Faculty of Law, ELTE University of Budapest                                                

Arbitrator

János BRUHÁCS
Professor Emeritus, Professor of International Law
University of Pécs
 

Alternate

László BLUTMAN
Professor, University of Szeged

Italy

Conciliators

Riccardo PISILLO MAZZESCHI
Professor of International Law, University of Siena

Attila TANZI
Professor of International Law, University of Bologna
 

Arbitrator

Maria Chiara MALAGUTI
Professor of International Law
Università Cattolica Sacro Cuore, Milano
                                                 

Alternate

Ida CARACCIOLO
Professor of International Law, University of Napoli

Latvia

Conciliators

Egils LEVITS
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Latvia
Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Communities

Mārtiņš PAPARINSKIS
Reader in Public International Law, University College London                                                

Arbitrator

Inga REINE
Judge at the General Court, Court of Justice of the European Communities

Luxembourg

Conciliator

Michel REIFFERS
Vice-President of the Supreme Court of Luxembourg
Counsellor at the Constitutional Court
 

Arbitrator

Lynn SPIELMANN
Counsellor, Administrative Court, Luxembourg
 

Alternate

Annick EVERLING
Deputy Director, Justices of the Peace

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,895 to 11,274 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 74 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 14 this week compared to 13 last week: four of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and ten into Ukraine. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, two families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and seven into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (382 compared to 368 observed during the previous week). There were 196 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 186 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv and Stahanov – Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 527 trucks (797 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (151 at the Gukovo BCP and 376 at the Donetsk BCP); 290 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 237 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 57 (compared to 73 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 179 to 137: of the total number of trucks scanned, 44 trucks (32 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 93 trucks (68 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 157 to 113 vehicles; 52 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 61 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 24 occasions; the OTs assessed that 15 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, cars with licence plates from Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania and Poland were also noted.

On 6 May, the OTs at both BCPs observed a helicopter, flying along the border within Russian Federation airspace on two separate occasions.

A helicopter Mi-8 was first noted at 14:58 at the Donetsk BCP, flying from the north to an easterly direction. Later on, at 15:17, the OT at the Gukovo BCP observed a helicopter flying from the north, which made a circle above the BCP area and left to an easterly direction. Both helicopters were white with blue and grey stripes painted on the bottom.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 2 April 2019 to 7 May 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 3 and 4 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 4 and 5 May, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from shelling to houses in Dokuchaievsk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Zaitseve.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission recorded small-arms fire and explosions inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw mines, including for the first time, near Krymske, Prychepylivka and Zholobok.
• It saw demining activities near Myrne and mine hazard signs near Berezivka, Bohdanivka and Chermalyk, some of them new.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Katerynivka, as well as to enable the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• In Dnipropetrovsk region, the SMM monitored a court hearing in which a foreign national was sentenced to prison for fighting for the armed formations.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Verkhnoshyrokivske and in Naberezhne, and at a border crossing point near Izvaryne.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 3 and 4 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 130), compared with the previous reporting period (about 250 explosions). Nearly half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-south-westerly and south-easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including an undetermined explosion at an estimated range of 2-3km south-south-east assessed as within 500m of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), north-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 4 and 5 May, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 70), compared with the previous 24 hours. Over three quarters of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), easterly directions of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and southerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 3 and 4 May, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 50), compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 4 and 5 May, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however, more explosions (about 70), compared with the previous 24 hours. All of the ceasefire violations were recorded at south-westerly directions of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk), southerly directions of Popasna and north-westerly directions of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters and damage from shelling to houses in Dokuchaievsk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 4 May, about 1.5m south of an uninhabited house at 13 Lesi Ukrainky Street in the south-western part of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round but could not assess the direction of fire. The metal roof and stone walls of the south-western part of the house were collapsed and broken. About 5m south-west of 13 Lesi Ukrainky Street, at an inhabited house at 11 Lesi Ukrainky Street, the SMM saw fresh damage (a hole about 20cm in diameter) in the north-west facing part of the roof of the house, assessed as caused by shrapnel or debris from the explosion.  

Across the street at 14 Lesi Ukrainky Street, the SMM saw a second fresh crater about 5m north-west of an inhabited house. About 25m north-east of the house, at 16 Lesi Ukrainky street, the SMM saw two shattered north-facing windows of an inhabited house, assessed as caused by shrapnel or a blast wave.

About 25m north-north-west of the previously mentioned house, at 15 Lesi Ukrainky Street, the SMM saw a hole (about 25cm in diameter) in the southern end of the bathroom ceiling and a corresponding hole in a northern wall inside of the same room. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh but could not determine the cause. About 30m north-east of the aforementioned house, at 17 Lesi Ukrainky Street, the SMM saw a 40cm hole in the edge of the south-west-facing part of the roof, as well as two shattered south-facing windows of the house, assessed as caused by a blast wave.

About 40m west-north-west of 17 Lesi Ukrainky Street, at 26 Kotovskoho Street, the SMM saw a third fresh crater about 5m south-west of an uninhabited house, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round, but could not assess the direction of fire. About 2m north-west of the crater, the SMM saw an uprooted tree and a large hole in the south-east facing side of a garage, assessed as caused by shrapnel and a blast wave. Five residents of the damaged houses and neighbouring houses separately told the SMM that they had been at home when shelling had begun on the night of 3 May and that members of the armed formations had cleaned debris from the area of the impacts on 3 May.

On the same day, on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), about 500m east of the western edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two fresh craters assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds originating from a west-south-westerly direction in the yard about 5m east of a two-storey inhabited apartment building at 15 Lizy Chaikinoi Street. The SMM saw two 82mm mortar tailfins, as well as shrapnel in and around the two craters, and seven shattered east-facing windows. About 100m east-south-east of the building, at 8 Lizy Chaikinoi Street, the SMM saw two shattered east-facing windows of another two-storey inhabited apartment building. Three residents (mixed ages and genders) separately told the SMM that they had been at home when shelling had taken place in the early morning of 4 May.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zaitseve

During the day on 4 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zaitseve (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.6km north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.6km north-east of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV.*

Disengagement areas[2]

While in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on the evening of 3 May, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an estimated range of 5-7km south-west. The SMM was unable to assess whether the explosion was inside or outside the disengagement area. Positioned inside the disengagement area on 4 and 5 May, the SMM observed calm situations.

During the day on 4 May, positioned on the northern and eastern edges of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire and 19 explosions (17 undetermined and two assessed as outgoing mortar rounds), all assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) on 4 May, the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]  Positioned north of the disengagement area on 5 May, the SMM heard ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

5 May

The SMM saw a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Dubovo-Vasylivka (73km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

3 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) and
• eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk).

4 May

The SMM saw five tanks (T-72), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten towed howitzers (five D-30 and five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), five MLRS (BM-21), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and two anti-tank missiles (9K111 Fagot, 122mm) in the centre of Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

3 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 12 tanks (T-64), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above); and
• two tanks (T-64), three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), a self-propelled howitzer (2S1), the barrel and turret of a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) being mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and 17 towed howitzers (nine 2A65 and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

3 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted five infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP-2) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk).

5 May

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Zolote (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 4 May 2019), and
• an APC (BTR-70) in Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

3 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) in a field about 3km north-north-east of Zholobok (47km west of Luhansk).

5 May

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) in Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

On 4 May, the SMM saw about 1000 members of the armed formations, most of them armed, rehearsing for a parade, along with an IFV (BMP-2), in the centre of Luhansk city (see above).

Presence of mines near Krymske, Prychepylivka and Zholobok

On 3 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 100 anti-tank mines (T-62) (not seen in imagery from 1 April 2019) laid in three rows from east to west in a field about 5km south-east of Krymske (government-controlled, 42km north-west of Luhansk), near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It also again spotted at least 50 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid in two partially completed rows running north-south for approximately 200m near Ukrainian Armed Forces positions south-west of Krymske. The same UAV again spotted about 150 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in three rows from east to west in a field about 2.5km south-east of Prychepylivka. The UAV also spotted for the first time at least 60 anti-tank mines (TM-62) (not seen in imagery from 1 April 2019) laid out in three rows near a road about 3km north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) near positions of the armed formations.

Demining activities near Myrne and mine hazard signs near Berezivka, Bohdanivka and Chermalyk

On 5 May, on road T-0512, about 5km east of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw 11 members of an international demining organization conducting demining activities in a field south of the road (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 April 2019).

On 3 May, about 1.5km east of Berezivka (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign with “Warning! Mines!” in Ukrainian about 30m south of a road leading east to Tarasivka (government-controlled, 43km north-west of Donetsk). On 4 May, about 100m north-west of Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs reading “Attention. Mine.” in Russian on red sign posts about 3m north of a road leading north-west to Krynychne (non-government-controlled, 45km west of Luhansk).

On 5 May, in a forested part of Bobrove (government-controlled, 56km north-west of Luhansk) bordering the Siverskyi Donets River, the SMM saw that previously-observed mine hazard signs on the south-western side of the road leading to Borivske (government-controlled, 65km north-west of Luhansk) were no longer present. A local resident (male, 65 years old) told the SMM that the signs had been removed after a military unit formerly stationed in the area had left.

On the same day, on the eastern edge of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that a previously-observed red mine hazard sign with “Stop Mines” written in Ukrainian and attached to a rope extended across a road leading to a cemetery was still present.

SMM facilitation of demining activities and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

On 4 May, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities reportedly carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in and around cemeteries in government-controlled areas near Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) (for previous activities, see SMM Daily Report 4 May 2019). On 4 and 5 May, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of government control

On 5 May, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six cars (five with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates, and ten pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. After a few minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 25 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine, as well as 33 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine.

Brazilian national sentenced to prison for fighting for the armed formations

On 3 May, the SMM attended the final trial hearing of Rafael Lusvarghi, a Brazilian national, versus the State at Pavlohrad city district court of the Dnepropetrovsk region. Mr. Lusvarghi was found guilty under article 258-3, part 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (participation in terrorist organizations) and under article 260, part 2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (participation in illegal military units). Mr. Lusvarghi pleaded guilty to the charges of participating in illegal military units but denied the terrorist charges. The court sentenced him to 13 years in prison.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 5 May, in the northern part of Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the centre of the village.
• On 5 May, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Delay:

• On 5 May, at a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), four armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM for 20 minutes before allowing it to proceed east toward government-controlled areas.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 4 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zaitseve (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM safely landed the UAV (see above).
• On 5 May, the SMM followed up on reports of an injured woman at Hospital No.9 in Donetsk city. A doctor at the hospital told the Mission that he was ordered by a superior not to provide the SMM with information about the case.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

VIENNA, 6 May 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today called for an effective investigation into the attempted murder of journalist Vadim Komarov in Cherkasy, Ukraine.

“I condemn this very violent attack against journalist Vadim Komarov in Cherkazy that has left him in a coma and barely alive. This is an attempted murder against a local investigative journalist known for his reporting on corruption. This targeted attack is particularly alarming and cannot remain unpunished. The investigation was promptly initiated and I call on the authorities to do their utmost to fully investigate the crime,” Désir stressed.

Local journalist and blogger Vadim Komarov, known for his investigative reports on corruption, was attacked in the morning of 4 May in the centre of the city of Cherkasy. He was hit on the head several times and is still in coma after a neurosurgical operation in a local hospital.

“I hope Vadim Komarov will fully recover soon and that he and his colleagues will be protected from violence and intimidation,” the Representative said.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

397628 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presented a spot report on the implementation of the National War Crimes Processing Strategy and its 2018 draft revisions on 6 May 2019 at the Cantonal Court in Bihac.

The report, Observations on the National War Crimes Processing Strategy and its 2018 Draft Revisions, including its relation to the Rules of the Road Category A cases, reviews the progress achieved by the BiH judiciary since the introduction of the National War Crimes Processing Strategy in 2008 and identifies challenges and obstacles to its implementation that the revised strategy aims to address. 

The OSCE Mission to BiH urged the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the revisions to the Strategy without further delay.

“The proposed revised National War Crimes Processing Strategy enhances the criminal and political framework for the work of relevant institutions,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Bruce G. Berton.

Burton explained that the revised strategy brings at least three major advantages. Firstly, it allows for a greater flow of legally less complex cases from state to entity and Brcko District levels, enabling in turn the BiH Prosecutor’s Office to focus its resources on the most complex war crimes cases – which is its primary duty. Secondly, the revised Strategy provides for a more prominent role of the Supervisory Body in charge of implementing the Strategy and for grounds for holding judicial authorities accountable for acting in contravention of the aim and purpose of the Strategy. Finally, it provides for strengthening the normative framework for property claims in litigations.

“Those are the reasons why the Mission invites the Council of Ministers to adopt this revised Strategy without further delay,” said Berton. 

The revised National War Crimes Processing Strategy addresses the challenges that remain in ensuring that pending cases are processed efficiently. It will help secure justice for war crimes victims and will support the country as it moves forward towards reconciliation and lasting peace.