OSCE

WARSAW, 10 July 2019 – In honoring the victims of the Srebrenica genocide in 1995, we must ensure that such acts are never repeated by addressing early indicators of mass atrocities, such as hate crimes, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir said today, ahead of tomorrow’s anniversary of the beginning of the massacre.

“The Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which thousands of Bosnian Muslim boys and men were killed, reminds us that when discrimination, intolerant and toxic public discourse, and bias-motivated incidents are not effectively addressed, they can undermine the security of societies by creating or exacerbating wider tensions,” said Gísladóttir. “These, in turn, can trigger larger conflicts across ethnic, religious or other communities, intensifying civil disturbances and even resulting in mass atrocities.”

Having all this in mind - understanding the root causes and precursors of hate crimes and their relationship to atrocity crimes, together with identifying risk factors that can lead to or enable their commission, will help States, the international community and civil society take the necessary measures to prevent these crimes from occurring.

In supporting participating States in preventing such escalations of violence within their jurisdictions, ODIHR works with governments, civil society and other intergovernmental organizations to ensure a more robust and effective response to all forms of hate crime in the OSCE region. Its globally unique set of tools to address hate crime helps societies prevent and respond to escalation of violence in order to ensure that mass atrocities against vulnerable groups and communities never happen again.

425279 Communication and Media Relations Section

A training course aimed to protect members of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) against environmental risks and strengthen their environmental emergency preparedness was held from 1 to 5 July 2019 in Vienna. 

The course, organized jointly by the CBRN Defence Centre of the Austrian Armed Forces and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities in close collaboration with the SMM, brought together 13 SMM environmental focal points as well as other SMM members and several international experts.  

“In order to ensure the safety and security of the members of the OSCE SMM, we aim to equip SMM environmental focal points with the basic knowledge and skills they need to be prepared and able to provide early warning for environmental risks,” said Vuk Žugić, Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.

Colonel Jürgen Schlechter, Commanding Officer of the CBRN Defence Centre of the Austrian Armed Forces, said: “This training gives us the opportunity to contribute to the OSCE efforts for enhancing the safety and security of the SMM members through being prepared for possible environmental threats in the region. We welcome the OSCE SMM environmental focal points to this training and we are pleased to share with them the accumulated knowhow and practical experience of our Centre in this field.”

The course increased the capacity of the SMM environmental focal points to respond to relevant environmental risks and emergencies and familiarized them with applicable safety rules, early warning, monitoring and reporting instruments, and tools for rapid assessment.

The five-day training course also included site visits to selected industrial facilities in Austria.  A follow-up workshop will take place in the second half of the year in Kyiv.  

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

High Tatras, Slovakia, 9 July 2019 - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic Miroslav Lajčák, successfully wrapped up the Informal Ministerial Gathering today. The informal meeting organized by the Slovak Chairmanship aimed at bringing together decision-makers in a relaxed, informal setting to discuss issues of relevance to the OSCE in a way that is conducive to real dialogue and exchange.

Opening the meeting in Slovakia’s High Tatras mountains this morning, Chairperson Lajčák underscored the need for real dialogue: “That is why we are here today: to talk to each other; to reflect; to exchange ideas. And, we need to look beyond that – to the longer-term future of the OSCE.”

The Gathering, which convened 23 foreign ministers, 11 state secretaries and almost 300 delegates from across the OSCE region, placed a strong focus on the past lessons, current practices and future potential of the Organization in the area of conflict prevention. “The OSCE has one of the strongest prevention toolboxes out there,” Lajčák stressed. “However, here is the truth, plain and simple, we are not using it correctly.

This message was reaffirmed by many participants of the discussions, who pointed to various mechanisms and capacities of the OSCE in this area, including its conflict cycle toolbox, field operations and institutions. In doing so, they emphasized that there is no need to create new mechanisms, but that more must be done to recommit to the Organization and to generate the political will to make better of use the OSCE’s existing toolbox.

Participants of the Informal Gathering also discussed the role of the OSCE within a changing multilateral landscape. They explored prevailing megatrends – from the erosion of global arms control to cyber, hybrid and environmental threats – and exchanged ideas on the various ways the OSCE can evolve and adapt, including through co-operation with the United Nations and various regional organizations. This discussion was shaped by the perspectives of top OSCE officials, including the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and the Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), as well as the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

The Informal Ministerial Gathering, which took place under Chatham House rules to encourage interactive dialogue, ended with a call to action from the Chairperson-in-Office. “I believe we need a very clear recommitment to our principles and commitments,” Lajčák said. “Not just through the speeches delivered by our ambassadors in Vienna, but from the highest level – and with one voice.”

Vienna, 09 July 2019 – Albania’s Acting Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Gent Cakaj will address the OSCE Permanent Council on 11 July 2019. In his address, Cakaj will present the priorities of Albania’s Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2020.

Albania will take over the OSCE Chairmanship from Slovakia on 1 January 2020.

Media are invited to cover the address by Acting Minister Cakaj on Thursday, 11 July, at 10:00 am at the Hofburg Congress Centre’s Neuer Saal (2nd floor).

Media wishing to attend the address are kindly requested to register by sending a message to press@osce.org by Wednesday, 10 July 2018 at 18:00.

Please note that, at the request of the incoming Chair, no video recording of the address will be possible.

For admittance to the Hofburg Congress Centre, please bring a valid press card to the security desk (main entrance from the Heldenplatz) and a document with a photo.)

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Civilians were injured due to shelling in Novhorodske and Pikuzy.
• The SMM saw fresh craters near Naberezhne and Lozove.
• A mini-UAV was lost near Bohdanivka after experiencing signal interference.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines near Veselohorivka and unexploded ordnance between Popasna and Pervomaisk as well as near Orlivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Novoazovsk and Zaichenko. *

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 190), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 370 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions (about 125), were recorded at southerly and north-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk); at south-easterly and southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol); and at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 165), compared with the previous 24 hours (400 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including all the explosions, were recorded at easterly and south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man injured due to shelling in Novhorodske

At a hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man (78 years old) with bandages on his head and lower part of his back. The man told the SMM that on 6 July, while standing outside his house at 241 Stakhanovska Street in Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk), he had heard a loud explosion and subsequently noticed shrapnel injuries to his head, neck and spine. He added that his vegetable garden is located next to positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Medical staff told the SMM that the man was admitted on the evening of 6 July with shrapnel injuries to his head and spine. The police also confirmed to the SMM that the man had been injured by shrapnel and that it had opened a criminal investigation.

Man injured due to shelling in Pikuzy

On 17 June, the Mission followed up on reports of a man injured by shelling on Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). At a single-storey house on 49 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a man (in his eighties) with burns on his back and saw that his house had no roof and that two north-north-west-facing windows were covered by tarpaulin. The man told the SMM that he had been at home on 10 June when the roof of his house had been hit by a round of a weapon and that it caught fire and burned down.

Fresh craters near Naberezhne and Lozove

On 6 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, in real time, at least six impacts in a field, assessed as probably being caused by 120mm mortar rounds, at locations about 80-150m north, north-west and south of positions of the armed formations near Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least 20 fresh craters in a field about 3km north-west of Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk), close to positions assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

Mini-UAV lost near Bohdanivka

Positioned in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM conducted a mini-UAV flight, which experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming. During the flight, the SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak) assessed as belonging to the State Emergency Services (SES) south of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

At the checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations, all of whom were wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them[2]. About 1km south-south-east of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area, the SMM saw that some concrete blocks had been moved and placed in between two sets of three containers at the parking lot about 50m south of the Prince Ihor Monument (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 4 July 2019).

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 6 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 1km east of its western and about 800m north of its southern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On 8 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

On the evening of 7 July, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six projectiles in flight at an assessed distance of 1-2km in easterly directions, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the night of 7-8 July, positioned at the northern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 90 explosions, about 250 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire as well as 15 bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, all at an assessed distance of 5-10km in easterly directions, all assessed as outside of the disengagement areas but within its 5km periphery.

On 7 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a spool wire stretched across road T-1316 about 250m north of the armed formations’ checkpoint at the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, as well as two red mine hazard signs placed on each side of the spool wire (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 2 July). The same UAV also spotted seven fresh craters, assessed as probably caused by mortar rounds, on the abovementioned road about 1km south of the disengagement area’s northern edge and about 1km north of its southern edge, between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and positions of the armed formations. It also spotted an anti-tank mine (TM-62) about 200m south of the crossroad between the aforementioned road and the railway line, inside the disengagement area (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas 8 JulyThe SMM saw an anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) in the western outskirts of Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

6 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a probable surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) and a transloader near Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol);
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) and two transloaders near Kalynove (65km south-west of Donetsk).

7 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Petrivske (61km south-west of Donetsk).

8 July

The SMM saw:

• four tanks (three T-72 and one T-64) at the railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk);
• two tanks (T-72) loaded on military trucks in Mykhailivka (37km north-west of Donetsk); and
• four tanks (T-72) near Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

8 July

The SMM noted that two sites were abandoned and that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

6 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR variant) near Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol).

7 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (a BRDM-2 and a BRM-1K) as well as three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) in Heorhiievka (27 south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (a BTR-4 Grom and a BMP-2) and four APCs (two BTR-70 and two BTR-80) near Avdiivka;
• nine IFVs (BMP-2) near Novobakhmutivka (government-controlled, 28km north of Donetsk).

8 July

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) in Avdiivka;
• nine IFVs (six BMP-2, two BMP-1 and a BTR-4) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk); and
• two military trucks towing two APCs (BTR-70) in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Non-SMM UAV seen in Popasna

In the morning of 8 July, while in Popasna, the SMM saw a mini-UAV flying at an altitude of 10-30m over the SMM forward patrol base (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 08 July 2019).

Presence of mines near Veselohorivka

On 4 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least 1,000 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) about 3km north-west of Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) laid in three rows running from south-west to north-east for 900m in a field. About 400m south-west of the aforementioned mines, the same UAV also spotted for the first time at least 150 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid in three rows running from south-west to north-east, as well as, about 150m south-west of the previously-mentioned mines, another 14 anti-tank mines (TM-62), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 28 May 2019).

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine hazard sign seen between Popasna and Pervomaisk and near Orlivka

On 7 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 11 pieces of UXO as well as an improvised hazard sign on a 1.5km stretch of road T-0504 (which is used regularly by the SMM), starting at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern edge of Popasna and finishing about 370m west of a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Pervomaisk. It spotted a tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7), as well as several hundred shell casings, about 60m east of the aforementioned checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as another eight RPG-7 tailfins, one in the middle of the road, the others between 1-8m north and 1-30m south of the road. About 200m south-east of the aforementioned checkpoint, the same UAV spotted a stick (about 60cm high), assessed as an improvised hazard sign, placed in the middle of a crater, assessed as recent and probably caused by an 82mm mortar round. Additionally, about 1.3km south-east of the aforementioned checkpoint, the same UAV spotted a complete RPG-7 round on the soft shoulder north of the road, with a possibly unexploded warhead still attached (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 24 June 2019).

On road T-0504 about 2km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and about 100m west-north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM saw again a piece of UXO, assessed as an RPG round, stuck in the ground, south of the aforementioned road facing east. About 30m east of the T-junction leading south to Novooleksandrivka (government-controlled, 65km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time a piece of UXO, assessed as an RPG round, lying on the ground, north of the aforementioned road facing west. In front of the checkpoint of the armed formations 1.7km south-east of Molodizhne, the SMM saw ten impacts on the aforementioned road and in the field, assessed as fresh and caused by rounds of an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1, canon 73mm) and of a rocket-propelled grenade. The SMM saw for the first time a copper wire over 1km long, lying along the road between the T-junction leading south to Novooleksandrivka and the T-junction leading north to Molodizhne, assessed to be from an anti-tank guided missile.

About 700m west of Orlivka (government-controlled, 22km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time the presence of an UXO, assessed as a projectile from a multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined), embedded in the asphalt in the middle of a road leading to Umanske (government-controlled, 25km north-west of Donetsk), regularly used by civilians and the SMM.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable assessments of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and land plots corresponding to a water pipeline between Petropavlivka (government-controlled, 27km north of Luhansk) and Popasna, repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna as well as to a power line between Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk) and Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). While positioned near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and facilitating the operation of the DFS, the SMM heard 33 ceasefire violations, including four undetermined explosions, assessed as near the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 29 cars (six with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Latvian license plate, as well as 15 with “DPR” plates), five covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, including one truck carrying timber on a trailer, as well as two with “DPR” plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian licence plate and two with “DPR” plates) and 24 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 24 cars (four with Ukrainian, 13 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates), 13 covered cargo trucks (10 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and two with “DPR” and “LPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two pedestrians (one woman in her thirties and a child) exiting Ukraine.

Protest against planned common broadcast of television programme between Ukrainian and Russian TV channels

At 21 Polova Street in Kyiv, in front of the office of a Ukrainian television channel, the SMM saw 20 people (mixed gender, aged 20-30 years old) gathering with political party flags and banners opposing the planned broadcast of a programme together with a Russian Federation television channel. Later, at the same location, the SMM saw that the gathering grew to about 400 people (mixed gender, aged 20-40 years old) and about 500-600 law enforcement officers. On the same day, at 11 Bankova Street, the SMM saw about 300 people (mixed gender, aged 20-40 years old) protesting against the aforementioned broadcast, some of them wearing clothing with insignia of the National Corps and Natsionalni Druzhyny. The protest ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south into the town, citing a “special military operation in the area”.
• At a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At the entrance of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), an armed soldier of the Ukrainian Armed Forces allowed the SMM to proceed to the settlement after about 30 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On 8 July, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM was unable to recover its UAV (see above).
• In the evening of 6 July and in the early morning and evening of 7 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming. On two occasions, the same UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), assessed as due to probable jamming.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was non-operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that one such site continues to be abandoned.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO) and one first responder.[1] The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 11,727 to 12,022 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[2].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 149 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 14 this week compared to 22 last week: seven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and seven into Ukraine (79 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and three were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when four families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (442 compared to 395 observed during the previous week). There were 225 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 217 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Yalta-Stakhanov; Luhansk-Yalta and Stakhanov-Kyiv.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 876 trucks (802 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (384 at the Gukovo BCP and 492 at the Donetsk BCP); 500 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 376 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates. Moreover, during the reporting week, trucks with registration plates from the Czech Republic were also noted.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 49 (compared to 58 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 167 to 118: of the total number of trucks scanned, 73 trucks (62 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 45 trucks (38 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[3] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly decreased from 157 to 155 vehicles; 79 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 76 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 21 occasions; the OTs assessed that 12 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. Cars with Georgian and Lithuanian licence plates were also observed.

On 2 July at 10:05, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed an ambulance arriving from the Russian Federation with three medical officers on board. The paramedics were observed moving from the vehicle to the main building. At 10:20, the medical crew accompanied an elderly woman to the ambulance and together they returned towards the Russian Federation.

During the reporting week, the OTs at the Donetsk BCP noticed the presence of a helicopter, flying along the border within Russian Federation airspace on four separate occasions.

On 6 July at 23:49, the OT heard a helicopter flying from the south in a northerly direction,  estimated to be flying at a low altitude. The sound of the helicopter was heard for around ten seconds. On 7 July at 01:07, the same OT noticed a helicopter flying in a southerly direction for around six seconds, above the BCP.

On 8 July at 00:00, a helicopter was noticed flying from the north in an easterly direction above the Donetsk BCP. On 8 July at 00:56, a helicopter was heard flying above the BCP area flying in a northerly direction.

On all occasions, the helicopters were flying in the dark, without any lights switched on.

[1] First responders are OSCE staff or Mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time

[2] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[3] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 5 and 6 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 6 and 7 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours.
• A woman was injured by small-arms fire at a checkpoint near Horlivka and a woman suffered a concussion from shelling in Nova Marivka.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from small-arms fire to apartments in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and to houses and infrastructure in both Dokuchaievsk and Pervomaisk. It also saw damage from shelling to houses in Yasne, and a burnt church and damage from shelling to a house in Pikuzy.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV spotted members of the State Emergency Service conducting demining activities.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Shevchenko, Hryhorivka, Yuzhna Lomuvatka, Oleksandrivske, and Novoazovsk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 170), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). Nearly half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and south-easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 6 and 7 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 370), compared with the previous 24 hours. About half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west and west-north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), including about 270 explosions; and at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 5 and 6 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (12), compared with the previous reporting period (165 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded in areas south and south-south-west of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 6 and 7 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 400), compared with the previous 24 hours. Almost all of the ceasefire violations, including all of the explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Woman injured by small-arms fire at checkpoint in Horlivka

On 7 July, at a hospital in Horlivka, the SMM saw a woman (39 years old) with a bandage on her right lower leg and some blood visible through the bandage. The woman told the Mission that she had been standing at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka on the afternoon of 6 July when she heard gunfire and felt a bullet strike her leg. She told the SMM that civilians had provided her with first aid until an ambulance had arrived and taken her to the hospital. On the same day, a doctor at the hospital told the SMM that a woman was admitted on the afternoon of 6 July with a penetrating gunshot wound to her lower right leg.

Woman suffered concussion from shelling in Nova Marivka

On 12 June, a woman (64 years old) in Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk) told the SMM that on 9 June she had suffered a concussion due to shelling. She said that while in the yard of her house at 20 Tsentralna Street in Nova Marivka she had heard explosions close by and seen a round impact the southern part of her yard. The SMM saw a crater in the yard of the house as well as fresh damage to the house. On 6 July, medical staff in a hospital in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that the woman had been treated at the hospital for a concussion between 11 and 21 June (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 14 June 2019).

Apartments damaged by small-arms fire in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 5 July, the SMM saw fresh damage to two apartments in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk). At a four-storey apartment building at 1 Myru Street, the Mission saw a hole in a west-north-west facing window of a ground-floor apartment, as well as a corresponding hole in a refrigerator located about 1m opposite the window. A resident of the apartment (woman in her fifties) told the SMM that she had been at home when she heard shooting during the night of 4 July. About 90m north-north-east, in an apartment on the third floor of a four-storey residential building at 3 Myru Street, the SMM saw a hole and a partially shattered north-north-east facing window, as well as a dent and a scratch in a cabinet adjacent to the window, and saw a 7.62mm bullet embedded in the wall opposite the window. The Mission assessed all the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. Two residents of the apartment, a man and woman (in their forties), said they had found damage when they arrived home from their summer house on the morning of 4 July.

Houses damaged by heavy-machine-gun fire and shelling in Yasne

On 6 July, on the north-western edge of Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), at 23 Valova Street, the SMM saw five bullet holes in the asbestos roof of a summer kitchen located about 3m south of an inhabited house and about 50m south-east of trenches belonging to the armed formations. About 10m south-east of the house, at 21 Valova Street, the SMM saw two shattered bricks, as well as a deep scrape in the south-facing eave of the summer kitchen. The Mission assessed all of the damage as fresh and caused by heavy-machine-gun fire.

About 350m east-south-east of the above-mentioned houses, at 20 Khmelnytskoho Street, the SMM saw a summer kitchen attached to an inhabited house with almost half of its asbestos roof boards displaced on both the south-western and north-eastern sides. The Mission also saw at least 50 holes (1-5cm in diameter) on both sides of the roof. The SMM assessed all of the damage as fresh and caused by shrapnel from an undetermined weapon. About 400m south-west of the house, at a two-storey apartment building at 31A Shchorsa Street on the south-western edge of Yasne, the SMM saw two holes in the west-facing balcony window of a ground-floor apartment, as well as a corresponding hole in a door leading to the balcony and a corresponding mark on a west-facing kitchen wall, all assessed as fresh and caused by heavy-machine-gun fire.

About 40m south-south-west, at 33 Shchorsa Street, the SMM saw a freshly splintered external west-facing wooden window frame in a ground-floor apartment, assessed as caused by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7). About 30m south-east of the window frame, the SMM saw a piece of UXO assessed as the tailfin of a RPG-7 lying in a garden. Nine residents of the above-mentioned houses (mixed genders, in their fifties and sixties) separately told the SMM that they had heard gunfire during the day on 4 July.

Two apartments and a heating plant damaged by small-arms fire in Dokuchaievsk

On 6 July, at a five-storey apartment building located at 87/11 Tsentralna Street in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in the south-south-west-facing window of a third-floor apartment, assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. Two residents (a man and woman in their twenties and thirties) told the Mission that they had heard glass shatter on the morning of 4 July.

About 300m west of the building, at a heating plant at 102B Lenina Street, the SMM saw a bullet hole in a south-south-east-facing window, assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. A worker at the plant (a woman in her fifties) told the Mission she had heard gunfire on the morning of 4 July.

On 7 July, about 100m north-west from the heating plant, at a four-storey apartment building at 100 Lenina Street, the SMM saw a hole in a south-west-facing kitchen window of a third-floor apartment, assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. A resident of the apartment (a woman in her fifties) told the Mission that she had been at home on the morning of 5 July when she had heard a shattering noise in the kitchen. (For previous observations at 102B and 100 Lenina Street, see SMM Daily Report 3 June 2019).

Church burned, house damaged by shelling, and two craters in Pikuzy

On 6 July, in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), at the Church of Saint Spyridon, the SMM saw that the entire roof had burned and collapsed, the church dome was scorched, and pieces of the plastic façade were scattered in the yard. A resident of Pikuzy (man in his fifties) and a visitor (woman in her forties) told the Mission that the fire had begun in the evening of 5 July shortly after they had heard shelling and small-arms fire in the area.

About 300m west-south-west of the church, at an inhabited house at 7 Peremohy Street, the SMM saw two craters, one located 8m east and one located 9m north-east of the house, as well as shrapnel damage to a concrete curb about 9m south-east of the house, shrapnel in the yard, and an 80mm fuse tunnel in one of the craters, all assessed as fresh and caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a north-westerly direction. On the north-east-facing wall of the house, the SMM also saw a freshly shattered window and shrapnel marks on the wall, assessed as not recent. The owner of the house (a woman in her sixties) told the Mission that she had been at home in the evening of 5 July when she had heard shelling.

Gas pipeline and three houses damaged by small-arms-fire in Pervomaisk

On 6 July, on the northern edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw patched holes at three locations in the north-facing side of an elevated gas pipeline running east-to-west along Luhova Street, assessed as caused by small-arms fire.

At an inhabited house at 11 Luhova Street, the SMM saw a mark on the north-facing outer wall, assessed as caused by small-arms fire. About 30m west of the house, at an inhabited house at 13 Luhova Street, the Mission saw a freshly broken shingle on the north-facing roof of a one-storey residential house, assessed as caused by small-arms fire. About 20m west of the house, at an inhabited house at 15 Luhova Street, the SMM saw corresponding bullet holes in a north-facing metal gate, wooden fence, window, and wall of a chicken coop, all assessed as caused by a single shot of small-arms fire. Two residents of the neighbourhood separately told the SMM that they had heard shooting on the morning of 4 July.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 5 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five members of the State Emergency Services (SES) conducting demining activities inside the disengagement area.

On 6 July, in the morning, the SMM saw members of the SES enter the disengagement area with a white armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak). Shortly thereafter, the Mission saw three deminers with metal detectors in a field west of the road about 700m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk). In the afternoon, on the same road about 80m north of the bridge, the SMM saw eight workers with orange vests cutting grass and clearing debris from both sides of the road. Between the former forward position of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the Mission saw at least four members of the armed formations, all of whom were wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them.[2] On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the SMM visited former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near the railway bridge about 650m east-north-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and saw that they were empty, and also visited former positions of the armed formations in houses about 1km west-south-west of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and saw that they were empty.

On 7 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw nine members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces enter the disengagement area. The Mission also saw seven members of the SES, as well as two explosive-sniffing dogs, checking the area on both sides of the wooden ramp on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, as well as nine civilian workers from the Luhansk Regional Road Service cleaning the road surface and sides of the road between the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Between the former forward position of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM saw five members of the armed formations, four of whom were wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them.

During the day on 7 July, while in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard a single shot of undetermined weapon at an assessed range of 300-400m south, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the night of 5 July, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an illumination flare at an assessed distance of 5-7km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the night of 6 July, the same camera recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and two projectiles and a muzzle flash at an assessed distance of 2-4km south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. During the day on 6 July, positioned near Pervomaisk  the SMM heard 15 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 4-5km west, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. In the early morning hours of 7 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 4-6km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the day on 7 July, positioned near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard a single shot of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1km north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On 6 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

6 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two tanks near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

6 July

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near the railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 12 tanks near in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

5 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) and
• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk).

6 July

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk);
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Umanske (25km north-west of Donetsk);
• four IFVs (BMP-2), five APCs (BTR-70), and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BTR-4) in Orlivka (22km north-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (MT-LB) near Yasnobrodivka (25km north-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) beside a residential house and about 150m from a school in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) just north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (also seen on 4 July).

7 July

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) near Orlivka;
• six APCs (BTR-70) and a towed gun (type undetermined) in and near Avdiivka;
• five IFVs (two BMP-1, two BMP-2 and one BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one BMP variant) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk); and
• 13 IFVs (seven BMP-2 and six BMP variants) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two ACVs and an IFV (BMP variant) near Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

6 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-1) near Lobacheve.

Non-SMM UAV seen on three occasions in Popasna

On the evening of 6 July, while in Popasna, the SMM saw a white mini-UAV flying 10-50m over the SMM forward patrol base. During the day on 7 July, on two occasions, the SMM again saw a similar mini-UAV flying about 10m over the ground.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

On 6 July, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable assessments of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and land plots corresponding to a water pipeline between Petropavlivka (government-controlled, 27km north of Luhansk) and Popasna, as well as repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and demining activities near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

On 6 and 7 July, the SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). On 7 July, while positioned near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and facilitating the operation of the DFS, the SMM heard 76 ceasefire violations, including six undetermined explosions, assessed as near the DFS, shortly after a bus of workers departed Yasynuvata for the DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 6 July, at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westward toward Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders “not to allow the SMM to cross the checkpoint.”
• On 6 July, at a checkpoint on the eastern outskirts of Hryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, again denied the SMM passage to the village, citing orders “not to allow the SMM to enter.”
• On 6 July, at a checkpoint in Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, denied the SMM passage west to Stepanivka (non-government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), citing their inability to contact their superiors for permission due to mobile network outages.
• On 7 July, at a checkpoint on the eastern outskirts of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage eastward to Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing demining activity.”
• On 7 July, at a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to the town on two occasions, citing an “ongoing operation in the area.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• During the evening of 5 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).[6]

On three occasions, while conducting mini-UAV flights near Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

LUXEMBOURG, 8 July 2019 – OSCE parliamentarians today voted overwhelmingly to adopt the Luxembourg Declaration, containing recommendations to national governments, parliaments and the international community in the fields of political affairs, security, economics, environment, human rights and humanitarian questions. The document endorses a multilateral approach to addressing common challenges in arms control, conflict resolution, the environment and human rights.

Following five days of work at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Annual Session in Luxembourg, which featured spirited debates and closely contested amendments, the parliamentarians adopted the Declaration in plenary by a vote of 94-7, with 11 abstentions. The theme of the Annual Session was “Advancing Sustainable Development to Promote Security: The Role of Parliaments.”

The Declaration emphasizes the commitment of OSCE PA members to implementing the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals. It urges parliaments and governments of OSCE countries to facilitate ratification of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change and fulfill their obligations to limit greenhouse gas emissions. It welcomes the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. (Download the Declaration in English, French and Russian here.)

It regrets the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, urges all sides to recommit to the preservation of effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and encourages OSCE participating States to sign the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

The Declaration also “recogniz[es] the essential role of parliaments in advancing sustainable development and security by adopting relevant legislation, providing oversight, ratifying treaties, approving budgets and setting agendas that prioritize the need to comply with international commitments.” It further urges parliaments to develop legislation with the aim of combating corruption, improving migration governance, and fighting organized crime.

It calls on OSCE countries “to place promotion and protection of human rights at the centre of their domestic as well as their foreign policy agendas” and encourages governments, parliaments, judicial bodies and national human rights institutions to consider requesting that the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights prepare legal reviews of laws and draft laws to ensure compliance with OSCE commitments.

Condemning all forms of terrorism and extremist violence, the Declaration calls on parliaments and governments to respond effectively to challenges stemming from returning and relocating terrorist fighters (FTFs), including by developing gender- and age-sensitive responses that reflect the varying roles of women and children as FTFs and family members of FTFs.

It recommends carbon pricing to account for the environmental harm of CO2 emissions and leverage economic incentives to move towards clean energy.

Urging a cessation of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, the Declaration calls for “the full withdrawal of heavy-calibre weaponry by both sides, an immediate end to the use of landmines and greater investment in demining efforts, the de-occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Ukrainian territory, and a comprehensive settlement based on full implementation of the Minsk Agreements, in particular the obligations under the Minsk Agreements which have not been fulfilled by the Russian Federation.”

The Declaration also encourages the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to intensify their dialogue in the context of the mediation led by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and to take “specific and tangible measures to reach a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.”

In addition to the three general committee resolutions, the Assembly adopted 15 supplementary items, covering topics including migration governance and promoting dignified return policies, the Russian militarization of Ukrainian territory, educating schoolchildren to avoid human trafficking, energy security, governance of private military and security companies, and the security and human rights situation in Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia.

Speakers at the Annual Session, which took place 4-8 July 2019, included President of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg Fernand Etgen, Prime Minister Xavier Bettel, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli, Founding Member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Steny Hoyer, OSCE Chair-in-Office Miroslav Lajcak, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, OSCE President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Liliane Maury Pasquier, and OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella.

Montella thanked OSCE PA members today for their participation in the Luxembourg meeting and their dedication to the Parliamentary Assembly.

In addition to adopting the Luxembourg Declaration today, the PA also elected officers for the 2018-2019 term.

For more information on the OSCE PA's Annual Session in Luxembourg, please click here.

OSCE PA photos are available on our Flickr page.

Please find additional photos at the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies Flickr page.

Videos can be found on the PA's YouTube channel.

Download the Luxembourg Declaration in English, French and Russian here.

 

PODGORICA, 8 July 2019 – The OSCE Mission in Montenegro and the OSCE Gender Section presented today the results of an OSCE survey that shows that social norms and attitudes contribute to gender inequality and violence against women, in the premises of the parliament during the 35th session of the Gender Equality Committee. The survey also showed that there is a sound legal framework for combating violence against women in Montenegro, but that it needs to be updated and fully implemented.

The Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women is the first of its kind conducted in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. It gives a detailed picture of the physical, sexual and psychological violence suffered by women and girls in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The survey was also conducted in Kosovo.

The study was conducted within the framework of an EU-funded project implemented in spring and summer 2018. In Montenegro, the research involved a representative survey of 1,227 women aged 18 to 74, 15 key expert interviews, eight focus group discussions and four in-depth interviews with women who had experienced violence.

The Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, said that the results of the survey will not only increase awareness and understanding of the problem, but will also contribute to improving national policymaking and the assistance provided to victims.

“It should be noticed that a number of steps have been taken by the Montenegrin authorities to align laws and policies with international standards in the area of promoting gender equality and combating violence against women. Nevertheless, by reflecting on the results of the survey, it becomes clear that we should all work together to strengthen synergetic actions and further contribute to gender equality and effectively end violence against women,” said Daviet.

The Head of the European (EU) Delegation to Montenegro, Aivo Orav, said that a lot of women who have experienced violence have never told anyone, whether that be the police, health services, a friend, neighbour or colleague. “Disclosed violence is only a fraction of the reality. The EU calls for a zero-tolerance approach towards violence, encourages victims to speak out and calls on politicians to act as responsible role models in preventing and combating sexual harassment,” said Orav.

Nada Drobnjak, President of the Committee for Gender Equality of the Parliament of Montenegro, said that violence against women is not an individual problem, but a problem of the entire society. “We try to move it from the private sphere, where it is predominantly kept, and show that it is the problem of all people, that violence against one woman must concern the whole society,” said Drobnjak, adding that the OSCE-led study should be considered as an additional call to action to Montenegrin institutions.

Presenting the survey findings, Serani Siegel, Project Manager in the Gender Section of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General, said that the impact of violence can be severe and long-lasting.

“Psychological consequences, such as anxiety and loss of confidence, were experienced by around half of women who have ever had a partner who was violent towards them. Yet only few women contact specific services after experiencing violence. This may be linked to the still widespread belief that domestic violence is a private matter that should be kept within the family. Attitudes, norms, and beliefs that justify violence against women need to be tackled at their root, as they continue to perpetuate this grave human rights violation,” said Siegel.

The OSCE-led Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women in Montenegro could be downloaded here.

 

425162 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported summer school for law students and young law researchers, focusing on the relationship between human rights and cybersecurity, began on 8 July 2019 in Nur-Sultan.

During this five-day summer school, 30 law students and young researchers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation will deepen their knowledge on the key legal aspects of development and the exercise of human rights in cyberspace. Participants will discuss national and international policies on internet governance and what challenges and opportunities it causes for protecting and enjoying citizen's rights and freedoms. The discussions will focus on public privacy in cyberspace, personal data regulations and protection, as well as on practices and steps to improve online security. The participants will also be tasked to develop a common project idea on international co-operation on human rights and cybersecurity matters.

National experts will present relevant topics related to the collection and analysis of digital evidence in court proceedings and automating fulfilment of legal transactions.

The summer school, which combines both academic and cultural programme elements, was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan and the M. Narikbayev KAZGUU University.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s long-standing activities to support human rights education in the host country.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions 17 - Partnerships for the goals

LUXEMBOURG, 7 July 2019 – High-level officials addressed the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly today, urging effective multilateralism and better alignment of regional organizations in advancing sustainable development. The OSCE PA is meeting in Luxembourg for its 28th Annual Session under the theme “Advancing Sustainable Development to Promote Security: The Role of Parliaments.”  Speeches by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, the OSCE Secretary General and President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) emphasized the important role that parliamentarians play in implementing international commitments, including those found in the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals.

OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak linked the approach of the UN’s SDGs to the comprehensive security model developed by the OSCE, arguing that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act laid the groundwork for the sustainable development agenda.

“Today, the OSCE through its field operations, autonomous institutions and secretariat – continues to be active in both stable countries and conflict settings. It has its own expertise, its own prevention toolbox, its own local knowledge,” he said. “And, it can, I believe, uniquely contribute to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.”

Parliamentarians have a crucial role to play, he said, including by increasing funding to schools and boosting the participation of women in local governments. “You are the link between the OSCE and the people it serves,” Lajcak said. “You inform and inspire the work of our Organization.” 

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger urged greater momentum on the sustainable development agenda, including by systematically mapping SDG-related activities in OSCE countries. Parliamentarians can contribute in a concrete way to this process by passing laws, allocating financial resources and holding governments to account, as well as by raising awareness and exercising leadership, he said.

“I see your manifest interest in today’s topic as encouragement to conduct a more systematic assessment of how the OSCE contributes to SDG implementation,” Greminger said. “So let us build further momentum on this issue.”

The Secretary General discussed other main priorities of the OSCE, including the crisis in and around Ukraine, cyber security and climate change. His biggest challenge as Secretary General is building a stronger sense of common purpose among participating States, he said. The OSCE has the potential to be the forum for meaningful diplomatic dialogue between the East and the West, Greminger noted, urging support from the PA in this regard.

PACE President Liliane Maury Pasquier discussed issues of common concern between the OSCE and Council of Europe, noting that both organizations are based on values found in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act and both are dedicated to establishing the rule of law. In an age in which multilateralism is increasingly challenged, she said, we should not underestimate the importance of the role that the assemblies of the Council of Europe and OSCE play in promoting international norms and sustainable development. Implementing SDGs is a multi-stakeholder process, she pointed out, in which parliamentarians must play a central role.

In plenary, OSCE PA Members agreed to a resolution authored by Belgian parliamentarian Nahima Lanjri, “Effective Migration Governance Based on Promoting Inclusive Societies and Dignified Returns,” which urges OSCE countries to adopt humane return policies.

Earlier in the day, the OSCE PA’s three general committees wrapped up their work and elected officers for the 2019-2020 term. In the General Committee on Political Affairs and Security, Members elected Filippo Lombardi (Switzerland) Chair, Costel Neculai Dunava (Romania) Vice Chair, and Laurynas Kasciunas (Lithuania) Rapporteur.I

In the Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment, Sofio Katsarava (Georgia) was elected Chair, Artur Gerasymov (Ukraine) Vice-Chair and Elona Gjebrea Hoxha (Albania) Rapporteur.

The Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions elected Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (Cyprus) Chair along with Vice-Chair Michael Georg Link (Germany) and Rapporteur Susana Amador (Portugal).

The resolutions that have been adopted by will be included in the draft Luxembourg Declaration to be voted on in plenary session on Monday.

For more information on the OSCE PA's Annual Session in Luxembourg, please click here.

OSCE PA photos are available on our Flickr page.

Please find additional photos at the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies Flickr page.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh gunfire damage to two houses in Yasynuvata. 
• Small-arms fire is assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Marinka; a mini-UAV was lost near Verkhnoshyrokivske after experiencing signal interference.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed workers removing vegetationalong the road north of the bridge.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote
• Small arms fire in close vicinity of SMM patrol members near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission concluded the search for the long-range UAV without recovering it.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Seven children injured due to unexploded ordnance in Dnipropetrovsk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in government-controlled Marinka and in non-government-controlled Novoazovsk, Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, Verkhnoshyrokivske and Yasne.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 450 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (165), compared with the previous reporting period (115 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Gunfire damage to two houses in Yasynuvata

At 27 Sevastopolska Street at the northern edge of Yasynuvata(non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed a hole (30cm x 60cm) in the north-facing side of the roof of a single-storey house, as well as two holes (10cm in diameter) in the south-facing side of the roof. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a 30mm projectile from an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) from a westerly direction, fragments of which had caused the two exit holes. At the same address, two siblings told the SMM that in the evening of 4 July, they had been at home and their parents had been in the kitchen when they heard the sound of a projectile impacting the roof above the adjacent room. 

At 14/41 Mikroraion Tsentralnyi, about 900m east of the aforementioned house, the SMM saw a hole (15cm in diameter) in a north-facing window of a first-floor apartment in a multi-storey house. It also saw fresh groove marks and a hole (20cm in diameter) in a wooden display case and a wardrobe inside the aforementioned apartment and a corresponding impact hole in the north-facing interior wall of the apartment. The Mission assessed that the damage was fresh and had been caused by an unexploded IFV (BMP-2, 30mm) projectile from a north-westerly direction. A resident of the apartment (a woman in her sixties) told the SMM that on the evening of 4 July her son had been at home, watching television, when the projectile had passed between him and the television screen and impacted the abovementioned wall.

Small-arms fire in the vicinity of SMM patrol members near the Zolote disengagement area 

On 5 July, positioned at the southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), about 600m east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), SMM patrol members heard two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1km north-west. They also heard whistling sounds, assessed as originating from bullets flying about 5m above their heads, and bullets ricocheting off a hard structure at an assessed distance of 5m-10m south. The SMM immediately left the area (see below).

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at an SMM mini-UAV near Marinka; another SMM mini-UAV lost near Verkhnoshyrokivske

While conducting a mini-UAV flight in the center of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven bursts of small–arms fire at an assessed range of 200m-250m north-east, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which was flying 200-250m north-east of the SMM patrol’s location. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Positioned on the western edge of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM conducted a mini-UAV flight, which twice experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming. During the second flight, the SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it.*

Search for long-range UAV concluded without recovering it

The SMM concluded the search for the long-range UAV lost on 27 June near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) (see SMM Spot Report 27 June 2019)  after conducting 25 mini-UAV flights, 22 of which experienced GPS signal interference assessed as probable jamming.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 5 July, the SMM saw members of the State Emergency Services (SES) cutting grass and removing vegetation along the road north and south of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska. It also saw three SES de-miners, equipped with metal detectors, stand next to the road about 350m north of the abovementioned position and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak). In the area between the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the former forward position of the armed formations, two members of an international organisation told the SMM that they were ready to support civilians with medical problems who were crossing the bridge.

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw at least five members of the armed formations, wearing a blue armband with “JCCC” written on it.[2]

At the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, outside the disengagement area, the SMM observed about 600 people queuing to exit and about 250 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM observed no people queuing but a regular flow of people moving north and south through the checkpoint and about 100 cars in the adjacent parking lot.

Positioned inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw two UAVs flying at an assessed range of 3-10km east-south-east outside the disengagement area.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 3 July, inside the disengagement near Zolote, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two soldiers near a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and again anti-tank mines (TM-62) under a camouflaged net across road T-1316, all about 1km south of its northern edge (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 2 July 2019). About 500m north-east, the same UAV again spotted an IFV (BMP-1) covered with camouflage netting, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 

On 5 July, positioned 500m south of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and six shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned 300m east of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west, assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as ten bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery. On the same day, positioned at the southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1km north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) (see above).

During the evening of 5 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded eight projectiles in flight, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery. 

During the day on 5 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas 

4 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya,152mm) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk). 

Non-government-controlled areas 

4 July 

An SMM long-range UAV spotted: 

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 22 June 2019); and
• three towed howitzers (2A65Msta-B) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk). 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

5 July

The SMM saw 

• three towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) in Kostiantynivka(60km north of Donetsk) and
• two tanks (T-64) in Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas 

On 3 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 

• 24 tanks in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk); 
• six tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk); 
• 14 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 35 tanks and 42 towed howitzers or mortars (types undetermined)in a training area near Myrne (41km south-east of Luhansk). 

4 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted: 

• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 11 towed howitzers (five 2A65 and six D-30Lyagushka) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Khrustalnyi  (see above); 
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a residential area of Shyroke (34km south-east of Luhansk).

Other weapons observed[5]

On 3 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed 18 self-propelled howitzers or mortars (types undetermined) and 29 towed howitzers or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region[6]

5 July

The SMM noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30) were present, while 21 towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and 28 towed howitzers (D-30) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

4 July 

An SMM-mini UAV spotted: 

• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) near Novooleksandrivka (64km north of Luhansk);  
• an ACV (type undetermined) under a camouflage net in a residential area of Popasna, about 10m from a civilian house; 
• a newly constructed mortar pit near an abandoned and destroyed building in Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk) (not seen in imagery of 2 June 2019); 
• alow band surveillance and acquisition radar (P-19)near Druzhba.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one undetermined) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk)

5 July

The SMM saw

• an APC (BTR-70) north of Stanytsia Luhanska and
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

On 4 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a new 40m trench in a field running from east to west about 80m from an armed formations checkpoint near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled,63km north-west of Luhansk) (not seen in imagery from 2 June 2019). 

On 5 July, the SMM saw about 40 new bullet casings on the ground near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Popasna.

New mine hazard sign near Novoluhanske

The SMM observed for the first time an improvised mine hazard sign attached to a wooden pole with “Mine” written in Ukrainian, 1m south of a road in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), 10m from a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an assessment of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) as well as repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The SMM also facilitated the operation of the DFS and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). 

Children injured by unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Dnipropetrovsk Region

On 2 July, the SMM followed up on media reports of children injured by the explosion of a piece of UXO in Pashena Balka (government-controlled, 25km south-west of Dnipro). Medical staff at a hospital in Dnipro told the SMM that six children (five boys aged between 5 and 16 years old and a 12-year-old girl) had been admitted to the hospital that same evening with multiple shrapnel injuries sustained while playing in a playground in Pashena Balka on 1 July due to the explosion of an UXO. The medical staff told the SMM that two of the boys were in a critical condition. 

Medical staff also told the SMM that additionally, a 12-year-old boy had been admitted on 2 July with fragmentation injuries due to the explosion of an UXO that he had found in Dnipro on the same day. 

On 4 July, a police officer in Dnipro told the SMM that a 12-year-old boy had found an UXOin a rubbish bin near a field in Pashena Balka where he had been playing together with five other children and that all had been injured while playing with the UXO. The police also confirmed to the SMM that another 12 year-old boy had been injured after a piece of UXO that he had found in Dnipro exploded. The police told the SMM that it had opened a criminal investigationfor the two incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south into the town, citing a “special military operation in the area”. 
• In Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to Valova Street, where it intended to conduct an impact site assessment, citing shelling of the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• The SMM was again prevented from proceeding northward on road T-1316 inside the Zolote disengagement area due to the presence of a concertina wire stretched across the road about 350m north of the armed formations’ checkpoint on the southern edge of the disengagement area.

Other impediments:

• During two flights over Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km NE of Mariupol), an SMM mini-UAV twice experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming. During the second flight, the SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it (see above).[8]
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven bursts of small-arms fire about 200m-250m north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely (see above). 
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC did not provide the SMM with security guarantees to conduct a mini-UAV flight south of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), citing “air defence activities”.

• In the evening hours of 4 July and early morning hours of 5 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Hirne (non-government-controlled, 56km east of Donetsk), assessed as due to probable jamming, as well as near Zemlianky (non-government-controlled, 17km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as due to jamming. 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.  

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardwareof 21 September 2016.

[4]Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5]The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6]The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[7]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[8]The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

SDGs SDGs:  5 - Gender equality 6 - Clean water and sanitation 13 - Climate action 14 - Life below water 15 - Life on land 17 - Partnerships for the goals

Vienna, 5 July 2019 – Including women at all stages of the planning and decision-making processes in environmental security enables more effective and sustainable responses to the challenges we face, stressed participants at today’s High-Level Discussion on Promoting the Role of Women in Addressing Environment and Security Challenges.

Organized by Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship in co-operation with the OSCE Gender Section, the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) and the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE, the event brought together advocates and practitioners at the international and national levels, to reflect on the impact of environmental challenges on women and explore how to integrate a gender perspective in environmental planning and decision-making. The objective of the discussion was to raise awareness among participating States on the linkages between environment and security through an integrated gender perspective, while providing examples of good practices from the OSCE region and beyond.

In his opening remarks, Norbert Kurilla, State Secretary in the Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic said: “The challenges related to the environment and security have taken on a greater urgency in recent years—a perfect example is the fact that we just recorded the hottest June temperatures worldwide since we began keeping records. We all know that environmental degradation disproportionately affects women and girls. Despite that, women are still under-represented in environmental decision-making and their role in natural resource management is largely neglected. How can the OSCE help participating States move towards more inclusive—and therefore more effective—environmental policymaking?“

Stressing that “environmental security is nothing new to the OSCE, which can be considered a trailblazer thanks to its comprehensive approach to security”, OSCE Secretary-General Thomas Greminger said that “women’s role as agents of change in tackling environmental challenges to security remains largely unexplored. This is a missed opportunity. But one that today’s discussions can help to rectify”.

“Enhancing women’s contribution to environmental decision-making – locally, nationally, regionally and globally – would have a positive and enduring impact on security for us all.

Including women and integrating gender perspectives in environmental strategies would help ensure that natural resources are managed more inclusively and sustainably. It would also help to unlock women’s full participation in social, economic and political life,” he said.

As a good example of how this can be done, Greminger highlighted the OSCE’s project on Women, Water Management and Conflict Prevention. “Targeting both female and male water professionals from Central Asia and Afghanistan, the project builds their capacities in gender-sensitive water governance and water diplomacy. It also aims to increase women’s participation in water management and conflict resolution at all levels,” said the Secretary General.

The high-level event featured a conversation with Mary Robinson, Former President of Ireland and former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, former UN Special Envoy on Climate Change, and founder of the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice.  This conversation was moderated by Melanne Verveer, Special Representative of the OSCE Chair-in-Office on Gender Issues and Executive Director of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security at Georgetown University, Washington DC, who noted that “the nexus of gender, climate, and conflict is something we will increasingly have to grapple with. This is a call to action on every part of society - including the OSCE, its member states, and individuals.” 

Referring to recent scientific reports including the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in October 2018, Robinson said: “It is no longer the case that the 2030 agenda is entirely voluntary or the Paris Climate agreement almost voluntary – they have both become imperative because of the science, and we have to implement them both in full, and with much more ambition.”

Robinson underlined the relationship between climate change and security, and stressed the importance of the role of women in tackling the issue: “The more we recognize that we have an existential threat of climate change, the more the security implications become self-evident and we have to increasingly make that connection. I hope that this discussion and our meeting today will help the OSCE to really fully commit to the role of women as mediators, the need right across the board for women to be in positions of power and responsibility, and to understand and support women’s agency on the ground and give it more platform and more space.”

In his closing remarks, Vuk Žugić, Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities reiterated the crucial role of women as agents of change in addressing environment and security challenges and in promoting environmental co-operation within and across societies and borders.  “We will make every effort to advance women’s participation in our activities towards enhancing security and stability in the OSCE region in conformity with the goals of the 2030 Agenda” said Žugić. The Head of the OSCE’s Gender Section, Amarsanaa Darisuren, added, “The event today gave us all a better understanding about the nexus between gender, environment and conflict and opened a window of opportunity for further discussion and action for the OSCE”.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Gunfire occurred in close vicinity of SMM patrol members at the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw fresh damage due to shelling in Patriotychne, Azov, Marinka and craters in Pikuzy. It also observed fresh craters near Sakhanka and in Novoluhanske, as well as damaged and destroyed buildings and ongoing fires in and near Pikuzy and Vodiane.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw that concrete blocks near the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were no longer present; it also observed workers cutting trees and grass along the road north of the bridge.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Hryhorivka and Horlivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 450), compared with the previous reporting period (384 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at westerly and northerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly and northerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (115), compared with the previous reporting period (eight explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas inside and around the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

 

Gunfire in close vicinity of SMM patrol members at Zolote disengagement area

On 4 July, positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and about 30 shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-west. The SMM patrol members heard bullets flying 10-15m above their heads and also heard and saw bullets impacting electricity poles 10-15m south-west of their position. A few seconds later, the SMM patrol members heard about 20 bursts of outgoing machine-gun and about 30 shots of small-arms fire, at an assessed distance of 5m north-north-west, within the area of the checkpoint. One SMM patrol member, who was at the time talking to a member of the armed formations at the checkpoint, immediately took cover behind a checkpoint fortification, while the driver of one of the SMM vehicles immediately reversed to pick up the other SMM patrol member. While driving away, they heard again bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, assessed as an exchange of fire. The SMM returned safely to its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk). (See also SMM Spot Report 4 July 2019.)

Fresh damage due to shelling in Patriotychne, Azov, Marinka and craters in Pikuzy

On 3 July, on the western outskirts of Patriotychne (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a west-north-westerly direction. About 300m further north-east, the Mission saw two broken windows on the west- and north-facing sides of a one-storey agricultural compound, assessed as caused by shrapnel from the explosion of the abovementioned artillery round. Four workers (men in their fifties) of the agricultural compound told the SMM that shelling occurred on the morning of 2 July.

About 240m further west of the compound, the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a west-north-westerly direction. About 120m south of the crater, the Mission saw broken windows on the north-west-facing side of a one-storey house, assessed as caused by shrapnel from the explosion of the abovementioned artillery round.

On the same day, in the southern part of Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a hole in the west-facing wall and another hole in the south-west-facing corner of the roof of a two-storey house, and debris scattered in front of the house. The SMM assessed both as fresh impacts of 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction. About 50m further east, in the garden of the same house, the Mission observed four fresh craters 5-10m apart. The SMM was unable to assess the type of weapons used and direction of fire.

On 4 July, the SMM followed up on reports that a building was damaged by shelling on 30 June in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). At 147 Prokofieva Street, the Mission saw a fresh crater in the garden of a house, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a north-easterly direction. About 3m west-north-west of the crater, the SMM observed two recently broken window panes placed on the ground against a wall. About 3m south-south-east of the crater, it also saw two holes on the north-north-east-facing wall of a shed. The Mission assessed the damage as caused by shrapnel. About 10m south-east of the same house, the SMM saw pieces of concrete chipped off on all sides of an electricity pylon and recently cut electrical cables along the street. The Mission could not assess the type of weapon used and direction of fire. A resident of the house (woman, 49 years old) told the Mission that, while at home, she had heard two explosions in the early morning hours of 30 June.

On the same day, in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), on Akhmatovoi Street, 20m north-north-east from the Culture House, the SMM saw four fresh craters (three in concrete slabs and one on soft ground) about 5m apart: two assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds and two as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, all fired from a west-north-westerly direction. About 20m further north-north-east, on Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM observed for the first time a 120mm mortar tailfin embedded in the asphalt road with splinter grooves around it. The closest positions of the armed formations are located 150-200m west. Five residents of Pikuzy (two women, 40-60 years old; and three men, 30-50 years old) told the SMM together that shelling had occurred in the settlement on the morning of 3 July. For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 28 June 2019.

Fresh craters near Sakhanka and in Novoluhanske, damaged and destroyed buildings and ongoing fires in and near Pikuzy and Vodiane

On 2 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed five fresh craters (not seen in imagery from 16 June) in a field approximately 700m east of the south-eastern edge of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM was unable to assess the type of weapons used and direction of fire.

The same aerial imagery also revealed ongoing fires and numerous recently burnt buildings in residential areas (some destroyed, and others damaged) in the western part of Pikuzy, and in the southern part of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), as well as numerous fresh craters in areas north and west of Pikuzy and north-east of Vodiane (all not seen in imagery from 16 June). The SMM was unable to assess the type of weapons used and direction of fire.

On 3 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a damaged concrete panel fence in the backyard of a building in a residential area in the centre of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission was unable to assess the type of weapon used and direction of fire. About 600m further west, on the edge of a field, the same UAV spotted a crater (assessed as caused by a 82mm mortar round fired from an undetermined direction) and a probable crater 80m apart.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On the afternoon of 3 July, inside the disengagement area and north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the State Emergency Services (SES) and three persons in civilian clothing who stated that they were employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with a truck and a crane, continuing to dismantle the concrete blocks of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On the morning of 4 July, at the same location, the SMM noted that the concrete blocks were no longer present and saw 17 workers in civilian clothing with a tractor cleaning the area, removing sand and cutting trees. In the afternoon, the Mission saw that concrete slabs were being placed near the Ukrainian Border Guard Service post at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP), outside the disengagement area, and that positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the western side of the road that leads from the EECP to the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, about 50m south-west of the EECP, were being removed. On the same day, the SMM saw SES members cutting trees and grass along the road inside the disengagement area, north of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

During the day on 4 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw up to six members of the armed formations, all wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them, standing in the area between the checkpoint of the armed formations just south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the former forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps on the broken part of the bridge.[2]  In the former forward position of the armed formations, it also saw a member of the armed formations in camouflage clothing.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 2 July, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed six recent probable craters approximately 300m west of the eastern edge of the area and 800m south of its northern edge, as well as eight recent craters and burnt trees about 600m north-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on its southern edge. The SMM was unable to assess the type of weapons used and direction of fire. The craters were not seen in imagery from 10 June 2019.

During the day on 4 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three airbursts at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east and south, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard bursts of heavy-machine gun and shots of small-arms fire, assessed as inside the disengagement area (see above). On the same day, positioned in Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and on the southern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard two undetermined explosions and 48 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery.

During the day on 4 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

4 July

The SMM saw a tank (type undetermined) in Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

2 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• a 20m extension of a trench, about 3km east of Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol);
• a 350m extension of a trench about 300m south-east of the edge of Vodiane and
• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near the EECP of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 350m north of the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area as well as a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle on the same road just north of the area’s northern edge.

4 July

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk);
• four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) in Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk);
• four IFVs (two BMP variant and one type undetermined) – two in military compounds and two parked between residential buildings, including one less than 150m from a functioning school – and an APC (BTR-80) in Popasna; and
• an APC (BTR-70) just north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) (also seen on 3 July).

Non-government-controlled areas

2 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• four ACVs on the south-eastern edge of Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) and
• two probable ACVs near Pikuzy.

3 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) on the west-south-western edge of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water intake near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna. The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw eight cars (one with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation, one with Polish, and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine. The Mission also saw 23 cars (six with Ukrainian, ten with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates), a bus with “DPR” plates and four pedestrians (three women in their thirties and a child) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On the eastern outskirts of Hryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) denied the SMM passage after the Mission refused to show its patrol plan. They also cited “ongoing kinetic activity in the area”.
• At a school in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), where the SMM was following up on reports of conflict-related damage, a staff member refused to let the Mission enter the building without permission from senior members of the armed formations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine. 

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

A two-week youth camp on restoration and documentation of cultural heritage in the village of Letnicë/Letnica, Viti/Vitina municipality, concluded on 5 July 2019.

The camp was organized by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo in co-operation with NGO Cultural Heritage without Borders Kosovo (CHwB) for 17 students of architecture and related fields with the aim to expand information and awareness on the values of cultural heritage, along with its cultural, social and economic benefits, but also to increase the students’ skills in the techniques of preserving cultural heritage sites.

In the course of the program, the students were divided into two teams, one focused on restoration and another on documentation work. Over the past two weeks, the restoration team conducted practical work at the 19th century Mill of Frok Dokić under the guidance of CHwB expert Nol Binakaj and craftsmen Besfort Axhanela and Dukagjin Dibra. They rebuilt an outer wall of the mill using the original building technique and removed a damaged layer of the ceiling and refurbished it with special protective material.

At the same time, the documentation team worked on drafting a development plan to revive Letnicë/Letnica’s tourism through reviving its cultural heritage offer. Under the guidance of conservation architect Rand Eppich, the students developed a concept conservation and development plan for the village based on interviews with local residents, available documents on the village and cultural heritage sites documentation.

The youth camp in Letnicë/Letnica is a follow-up to a similar programme organized last year by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

The camps will be followed by an internship programme for ten participants, who will work at the key cultural heritage institutions for a period of three months to further expand their knowledge on other institutional aspects of cultural heritage protection, preservation and promotion.

Marina Živaljević

Representatives of the Montenegrin State Election Commission (SEC) visited their Slovenian counterparts in Ljubljana from 3 to 5 July 2019 to hear about the country’s experiences of administering local and parliamentary elections.

The visit is part of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro’s project on elections which seeks to improve the transparency of the Montenegrin SEC, as well as increase the level of public confidence in the electoral process.

Ɖorđije Vukčević, SEC Chairman and Veljo Čađenović, SEC Secretary, together with four Commission advisers, met with representatives of the Slovenian State Election Commission, Ljubljana’s City Electoral Commission and the Ministry of Home Affairs.

“The meetings provided a wealth of insights to the Montenegrin SEC, as well as a platform to improve co-operation with regional election administration bodies,” said Vukčević.

Darko Brajović, National Programme Officer in the Mission to Montenegro, said that if voters are unable to get the information they need easily, public trust in the electoral system may decline. “The study visit saw both Commissions having a discussion on ways to tackle this issue,” said Brajović.

The visit helped the Montenegrin SEC to establish closer co-operation with Slovenian election administration bodies, which will help the Commission to exchange knowledge and ideas on how to deliver well-run elections.

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro remains committed to working with the State Election Commission to improve its transparency and public trust.

424913

An OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan-supported Gender Economics International Summer School was conducted from 2 to 6 July 2019 in Tashkent for some 35 young employees of the public sector and non-governmental organizations from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan working on issues of women's empowerment and gender equality.

During the week, participants have been gaining knowledge on methods and tools for implementing gender-sensitive indicators, developing indices and indicators of economic development, measuring gender wage and pension gaps, gender financial inclusion, gender mainstreaming in public policies. Participants will present and discuss their research plans on the last day of summer school.

It is believed that the training program will strengthen the potential of young scientists and researchers in the theoretical and empirical approach when assessing various socio-economic impacts on society.

The importance of applying gender strategies for stimulating economic growth and improving social security systems was underlined by Juergen Becker, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan Senior Project Officer, at the opening panel on 2 July. “The OSCE recognizes that equal rights of women and men are essential to foster peace, security, and sustainable development. The OSCE congratulates Uzbekistan on recent steps, including the election of Xonim Tanzila Narbayeva as Chairperson of the Senate. The OSCE recognizes the recent statements of President of Uzbekistan on advancing women’s issues,” said Becker.

This Summer School was organized with the support of Sapienza University (Italy), the National University of Uzbekistan and the Tashkent Institute of Finance under the extra-budgetary project “Support to managerial capacity building of female managers” funded by Germany, Norway and the Netherlands.

424952 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

Two OSCE-supported training seminars on enhancing dialogue and co-operation between the courts and media concluded on 5 July 2019 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The two-day consecutive training seminars covered topics such as effective communication strategies between courts and the media, best practices in interaction with journalists and the general public through various channels and in different contexts, the role of the media in covering court proceedings, and the proper framing of requests to access court acts. The events also included a session dedicated to the use of new media tools and social networks as well as the drafting of press releases and the organization of press briefings.

Some forty judges-co-ordinators, press secretaries, journalists and bloggers from the cities of Almaty, Kyzylorda, Taraz and Shymkent, and the Almaty, East Kazakhstan, Turkestan regions took part in the events. They learned to prepare for public interviews and press conferences, handle conflict situations, interact and respond to critical materials in social media, and also reviewed some practical cases.

The seminars, co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, the Supreme Court, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Kazakhstan, the League of Court Journalists of Kazakhstan, Internews Kazakhstan and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), are part of the Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to enhance co-operation between courts and the media.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

On 4 July, an SMM patrol consisting of four members and two armoured vehicles was positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area ( 60km west of Luhansk) preparing to conduct a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle flight. At 11:55, the SMM patrol members, two of whom were outside and two inside the vehicles, with doors open, heard 30-40 bursts of heavy-machine gun and 20-30 shots of small-arms fire, all assessed as originating 1-2km north-north-west of their position. The SMM members heard bullets flying 10-15m above their heads and also heard and saw bullets impacting electricity poles 10-15m south-west of their position.

A few seconds later, the SMM patrol members heard 20-30 bursts of outgoing machine-gun and 20-30 shots of small-arms fire, at an assessed distance of 5m north-north-west, within the area of the checkpoint. One SMM patrol member, who was at the time talking to a member of the armed formations at the checkpoint, immediately took cover behind a checkpoint fortification, while the driver of one of the SMM vehicles immediately reversed to pick up the other SMM patrol member. At 11:57, all SMM patrol members had entered the vehicles and started driving away, when they heard again bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, assessed as an exchange of fire. The SMM returned safely to its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).