OSCE

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure and to allow for the transfer of a body across the contact line.
• The Mission observed for the first time anti-tank mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka.
• A man died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Novoazovsk, Kozatske and Oleksandrivske in Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 45 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), and at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 12 tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019);
• 11 tanks, seven self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 12 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk (see above); and
• 23 tanks and three surface-to-air missile systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). In the same training area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 72 armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[4] (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 April 2019).

Other weapons observed[5]

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and five pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

21 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an ACV and two armoured personnel carriers (Kozak-2) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).

22 May

The SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP variants) and eight ACVs near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

21 May

The SMM saw three anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) in Luhansk city.

Presence of mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka

On 21 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 120 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two parallel rows running north to south in a field with previously observed mines about 1.5km south-east of Pyshchevyk.

On 22 May, 3km south of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 50km north of Donetsk) and about 20m east of road T-0516, the SMM observed for the first time two square red mine hazard signs, as well as a square yellow sign with the words “Restricted (Closed) Area. No Entry” written in Ukrainian.

Man died of natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka

The SMM followed up on information from an officer of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine about a man (in his seventies) who had died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) on 22 May. A member of staff at a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the man’s body had been brought to the hospital’s morgue on the same day.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline near Zolote. It also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitated and monitored transfer of body from government-controlled areas to non-government-controlled areas

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the transfer of a body of a member of the armed formations from government-controlled to non-government-controlled area in Luhansk region.

People apply for Russian Federation passports in Luhansk region

In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM observed 32 people (mixed gender, 20-65 years old) standing outside a building. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that they had been standing in line to apply for “LPR” “passports”, “necessary for obtaining a passport of the Russian Federation”, and also that another 15 people (mixed gender, 30-65 years old), which the SMM observed near the same building, had been applying for Russian Federation passports.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 20 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Novoazovsk or east to the border with the Russian Federation.
• At a checkpoint east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing firing exercises at a nearby training range”.
• In Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage east towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure and to allow for the transfer of a body across the contact line.
• The Mission observed for the first time anti-tank mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka.
• A man died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Novoazovsk, Kozatske and Oleksandrivske in Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 45 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), and at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 12 tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 9 May 2019);
• 11 tanks, seven self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 12 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk (see above); and
• 23 tanks and three surface-to-air missile systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). In the same training area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 72 armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[4] (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 25 April 2019).

Other weapons observed[5]

19 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and five pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

21 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an ACV and two armoured personnel carriers (Kozak-2) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).

22 May

The SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP variants) and eight ACVs near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

21 May

The SMM saw three anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) in Luhansk city.

Presence of mines near Pyshchevyk and mine hazard signs near Nelipivka

On 21 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 120 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two parallel rows running north to south in a field with previously observed mines about 1.5km south-east of Pyshchevyk.

On 22 May, 3km south of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 50km north of Donetsk) and about 20m east of road T-0516, the SMM observed for the first time two square red mine hazard signs, as well as a square yellow sign with the words “Restricted (Closed) Area. No Entry” written in Ukrainian.

Man died of natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka

The SMM followed up on information from an officer of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine about a man (in his seventies) who had died from natural causes at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) on 22 May. A member of staff at a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the man’s body had been brought to the hospital’s morgue on the same day.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline near Zolote. It also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM facilitated and monitored transfer of body from government-controlled areas to non-government-controlled areas

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the transfer of a body of a member of the armed formations from government-controlled to non-government-controlled area in Luhansk region.

People apply for Russian Federation passports in Luhansk region

In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM observed 32 people (mixed gender, 20-65 years old) standing outside a building. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that they had been standing in line to apply for “LPR” “passports”, “necessary for obtaining a passport of the Russian Federation”, and also that another 15 people (mixed gender, 30-65 years old), which the SMM observed near the same building, had been applying for Russian Federation passports.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 20 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Novoazovsk or east to the border with the Russian Federation.
• At a checkpoint east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing firing exercises at a nearby training range”.
• In Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage east towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

420644 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Gender, Diversity and Justice: Overview and Recommendations

Promoting change in policies, attitudes and training curricula to achieve higher representation of women and members of minorities in justice sector institutions was the focus of an event in Vienna on 23 May 2019, during which the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) launched its paper Gender, diversity and justice.

The event took place on the margins of the 28th session of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. The discussion highlighted that, while States and authorities keep making commitments on gender equality and non-discrimination, women and minorities are still under-represented in legal professions. Even in countries where women judges are strong in numbers, barriers to workplace equality and career advancement prevail. Women are still a small minority in functions such as court presidents or judges of supreme or constitutional courts. In prosecution services, too, women are under-represented and rarely rise to senior positions.

“Raising this topic is not due to a fixation on numbers, but to emphasize that the under-representation of certain groups among judges and prosecutors has a negative impact on access to justice,” said Meaghan Fitzgerald, Deputy Head of the ODIHR Democratization Department. “We hope that this work will support participating States in building justice systems which are more inclusive.”

A needs assessment study conducted by ODIHR shows that society has greater trust in justice systems where the justice sector workforce is visibly more diverse. Diversity also makes judges and prosecutors more sensitive to different considerations for different groups, allowing them to overcome their implicit biases and unconscious stereotyping.

“The work of the International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ) is the embodiment of the ODIHR study. Our members know first-hand the unique insights they bring to adjudicating cases, especially those involving discrimination and violence against specific groups within society,” said Shawna Wilson, Executive Director of the IAWJ, who presented the work of the association, stressing the positive role that national associations of women judges can play.

ODIHR and the IAWJ used the gathering to discuss their future co-operation to support women judges, both to achieve gender parity in justice systems and to promote gender-sensitive decision-making.

ODIHR organized the side event in co-operation with the Permanent Mission of Norway to the International Organizations in Vienna and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its role as the secretariat of the Global Judicial Integrity Network.

420617 Communication and Media Relations Section

The democratic control of armed and security forces in the context of the eastern Mediterranean region was the focus of a seminar organized by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and Cyprus from 20 to 24 May 2019 in Larnaca. The discussion brought together more than 60 participants from OSCE participating States and the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation. The participants included senior officers from the armed forces, senior government officials, and representatives of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, academia and civil society.

As well as the democratic control of the armed and security forces, participants explored parliamentary oversight and respect for international humanitarian and human rights law for armed forces personnel, and regional security challenges.

Participants also shared experiences and best practices in applying the inter- and intra-state level commitments and principles enshrined in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, a landmark document adopted in 1994 detailing the governance of the security sector and the role of armed and security forces in democratic societies.

“Cyprus has decisively embarked on implementing its vision of creating a web of co-operation in the Eastern Mediterranean transforming the region into a model of prosperity, stability, and peace,” said Nikos Christodoulides, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, as he opened the event.

Ambassador Idibek Kalandar, Chairperson of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and Permanent Representative of Tajikistan to the OSCE, said: “We are convinced that the rebuilding of the spirit of comprehensiveness, transparency and co-operation among all participating States is crucial for our common future in the West and in the East.”

Marcel Peško, Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, recalled that “the Code of Conduct is a visionary document. This seminar creates an opportunity to engage in forward-looking dialogue and to build trust in the OSCE region including with the Partners for Co-operation”.

The Code of Conduct contains key principles and commitments for the 57 OSCE participating States related to security relations between States and to the control of all armed and security forces within a State.

The seminar was held in line with an FSC decision according to which the OSCE Secretariat is requested to organize at least one specialized seminar or workshop annually in order to facilitate better implementation and promote awareness of the Code of Conduct and support outreach in its regard. 

The seminar was co-hosted by the OSCE and Cyprus, with donor support provided by Germany, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic.

SARAJEVO, 23 May 2019 – A two-day training course on the role of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the context of regional and international security, which gathered some 40 participants from seven countries of South-Eastern Europe started today in Sarajevo. The training course is jointly organized by the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the OSCE Transnational Threats Department and the OSCE Mission to BiH.

Over the course of two days, security experts will explore ways in which international cyber/ICT policy tools can be used to mitigate the impact of major cyber incidents and improve the resilience of national ICT systems. It will also be an opportunity to exchange information and experience in the application of practical measures for enhancing regional cyber/ICT security.

A particular focus will be placed on the role of the OSCE cyber/ICT confidence-building measures (CBMs), which were jointly agreed upon and adopted by the OSCE participating States to improve security in cyberspace and prevent unnecessary inter-state tensions stemming from the use of ICTs. These CBMs offer concrete tools and mechanisms to reduce the risks of misperceptions, misunderstandings and conflict stemming from the use of ICTs in inter-state relations.

“In a digitalizing world, a potent cyber-attack could cripple an entire country more rapidly and systemically than any other threat,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH, Ambassador Bruce G. Berton. “It is a threat that requires our greater engagement, creative new solutions and, most importantly, improved co-ordination. Developing countries such as BiH are distinctly vulnerable to consequences of cyber-attacks due to the fragility of critical infrastructure, nascent economies, insufficiently aware citizens and users, and institutional inability for an effective response.” 

The OSCE Cyber Security Officer, Szilvia Toth, also underlined the need for international co-operation on cyber/ICT security, stating that “we must also recognize that risks stemming from cyberspace are global - every State is only as secure as its neighbour, and every region is only as secure as other regions.”

The training course in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fifth such regional training course organized across the OSCE area, with the aim of enhancing capacities and building confidence in cyberspace, while taking into account unique regional circumstances, best practices and approaches to cyber/ICT security.

TIRANA, 23 May 2019 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission deployed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 30 June local elections in Albania, the mission will hold a press conference in Tirana on Friday, 24 May.

Ambassador Audrey Glover, the Head of the ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities. The press conference will also provide an opportunity for questions from journalists.

The ODIHR election observation mission will partner with a delegation from the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities for observation and the release of a preliminary statement of findings and conclusions on the day after the elections.

The mission's deployment follows an invitation from the Albanian government.

The ODIHR election observation mission and the OSCE Presence in Albania operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 12:00, Friday, 24 May, in the Antigonea 1 Room of the Rogner Hotel, Bulevardi “Dëshmorët e Kombit” 9, Tirana. 

For further information, please contact Egor Tilpunov, Media Analyst of the Election Observation Mission, on ++355 68 9900045 (mobile) or at yegor.tilpunov@odihr.al.

or

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR Spokesperson, on +48 725 880 257 (mobile) or at katya.andrusz@odihr.pl.

LONGYEARBYEN, 23 May 2019 – The concrete impact of global warming and the changing nature of the Arctic region are the focus of an OSCE PA visit hosted by the Norwegian parliament this week. In Svalbard, one of the world’s northernmost inhabited areas, OSCE parliamentarians explored new local realities in the High North and considered how climate change poses security risks for the entire OSCE region.

The PA delegation included President George Tsereteli (Georgia), Second Committee Chair Nilza de Sena (Portugal) and Rapporteur Elona Gjebrea Hoxha (Albania), and Secretary General Roberto Montella (Italy). It was joined north of the Arctic Circle by the Delegation of Norway to the OSCE PA.

In a series of seminars and field visits in Tromsø and Svalbard, Members were sensitized to the severe disruptions to the Arctic environment caused by a rise of temperatures in the region.

“The Arctic is warming up twice as fast any other region in the world, and in just one generation we have been able to note critical alterations to the local fauna and flora. Here in Svalbard, we can clearly observe how Arctic livelihoods are being impacted,” said Norwegian Head of Delegation Siv Mossleth.

OSCE parliamentarians also discussed ways to mitigate and adapt to climate change in the High North with local authorities.

“This visit is important for us to better understand the concerns emerging from Norway and other Arctic countries, and we can find inspiration in their close co-operation to promote sustainable development and protect biodiversity,” said President George Tsereteli. “As a forum of 57 countries covering the Northern Hemisphere, the OSCE PA is ideally suited to encourage discussions on these new threats and to promote a deeper involvement of parliamentarians in the fight against climate change.”

The visit illustrated the importance of monitoring variations in the Arctic ecosystem, and of understanding the ripple effect of changes in the Arctic climate.

“The Svalbard archipelago is one of the most sensitive areas to global warming, and the tangible impact on the Arctic environment and ecosystem we witness here causes disruptions at a larger scale in the rest of the world,” said the Chair of the OSCE PA’s economic and environmental committee, Nilza de Sena. “While few live in the Arctic region, the risks associated with climate-related disasters have become a reality for more and more people on the globe. This compels us to act with urgency to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change.”

Throughout the visit, participants were briefed on Arctic exploration, satellite observation, and other environmental research efforts undertaken to understand climate change and its impact on the Arctic region. Experts and scientists underlined the urgency to curb global greenhouse gas emissions in order to limit the effects of climate change.

“Even if drastic measures are taken, it will still take time for the climate to stabilize. But real action is necessary to prevent a complete shift,” said Second Committee Rapporteur Elona Gjebrea Hoxha. “It is therefore crucial to increase the awareness of parliamentarians all across the OSCE region and respond to this challenge before it is too late.”

The visit will inform debates of the OSCE PA’s General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment at the upcoming Luxembourg Annual Session (4-8 July 2019). The PA’s flagship event will be held this year under the theme “Advancing Sustainable Development to Promote Security: The Role of Parliaments.”

“It is important to closely engage parliamentarians to address the effects of climate change,” said Secretary General Roberto Montella. “I expect the discussions we have had this week will reinforce the Parliamentary Assembly’s engagement on Arctic issues, and we stand ready to support greater international co-operation and dialogue to respond to security, economic and environmental concerns in the High North and beyond.”

The visit continues tomorrow in Oslo, where President Tsereteli and his delegation will hold talks with Storting President Tone Trøen, Minister for Climate and Environment Ola Elvestuen, and Foreign Affairs State Secretary Marianne Hagen.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

On 21 and 22 May 2019, representatives of national human rights institutes and ombudspersons from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia and Azerbaijan as well as experts from international organizations and civil society gathered to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Ombudsperson Office in Dushanbe.

The two-day conference was organized by the Office of the Ombudsperson in Tajikistan and supported jointly by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and other international partners.

Ambassador Valeriu Chiveri, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, in his opening remarks highlighted the importance the OSCE gives to the work of ombudspersons across the region and the OSCE’s long-standing co-operation with their Offices. He said: “The OSCE stands ready to support the work of the Office of the Ombudsperson in Tajikistan in the future. We appreciate the constructive co-operation between the Office of the Ombudsperson and civil society here in Tajikistan and are keen to continue supporting the human rights-based dialogue between government institutions, the Office of the Ombudsperson and civil society as a pillar for stability and progress towards human rights protection.”

During the conference, achievements and prospects of the work of ombudspersons in Central Asia were discussed. Recognizing the challenges which still exist, the participants agreed to work closer together and to exchange experiences to improve the work of ombudspersons and national human rights institutes as well as the protection of human rights.

BRATISLAVA, 23 May 2019 – The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, congratulated Tajikistan on assuming the four-month Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation, concluding his visit of three Central Asian countries in Tajikistan on 22 May.

In his meetings with the leadership of Tajikistan, including President Emomali Rahmon, Deputy Foreign Minister Muzaffar Husainzoda and Speaker of the Upper House of the Parliament Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloyev, the OSCE Chair thanked Tajikistan for its strong and constructive support of the activities of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe for already 25 years, as well as for hosting one of the OSCE flagship initiatives, the Border Management Staff College.

He also expressed the Organization’s commitment to continuing its support of Tajikistan’s engagement with Afghanistan.

When speaking about activities on the ground, Chairperson Lajčák particularly mentioned the OSCE Programme Office’s work on clearing almost four million square meters of mine-contaminated land, contributing to border management and security, promoting gender equality through gender-sensitive police units, or fostering entrepreneurship with its Start-Up programme.

“Tajikistan and the OSCE have come a long way together,” the OSCE Chair said. “Through all of those initiatives, places of insecurity and tension have become hubs of economic opportunity,” he added.

Seeing first-hand the work of the OSCE’s Border Management Staff College, Minister Lajčák stressed that “it embodies the spirit of OSCE co-operation in the region for already ten years. More than 3,300 representatives from 59 countries have learned crucial skills to enhance border management and security. And this includes classes for women border officials – a big step in a traditionally male-dominated field.”

While in Tajikistan, the OSCE Chair also sat down with civil society actors to learn more about their activities and projects in the country. He met with a group of young people whom he encouraged to advocate for multilateralism and make their voices heard as the bridge-builders, peacebuilders and innovators of tomorrow.

The Chair underlined that “the OSCE and the Slovak Chairmanship are here to support Tajikistan in achieving its national priorities, furthering its reform efforts and consolidating stability in the region.”

VIENNA/BRATISLAVA, 23 May 2019 – The second preparatory meeting of the 27th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum, taking place on 27 and 28 May in Bratislava, will focus on economic progress and security in the OSCE area through energy co-operation, new technologies, good governance and connectivity in the digital era.

Officials and experts from 57 OSCE participating States and 11 Partners for Co-operation will participate in the discussions organized by Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE Secretariat, together with high-level representatives from international organizations, civil society, academia and the business community.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, Slovak State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs František Ružička, First Slovak State Secretary from the Ministry of Economy Vojtech Ferencz and Ambassador Olga Algayerová, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, will open the conference.

The discussion will focus on fostering co-operation and building partnerships for a secure energy future, improving the environmental footprint of energy-related activities, and protecting energy networks from natural and man-made disasters.

Journalists are invited to attend the opening session from 9.30 to 11.00 on Monday, 27 May, at Crowne Plaza Hotel in Bratislava.

Journalists wishing to attend are required to send an e-mail confirming their attendance to Robert.Zolak@mzv.sk no later than 26 May, Sunday, 16.00. The presentation of a valid ID is required for accreditation at the venue.

Please send all requests for brief interviews with the participants of the event to press@osce.org or mersiha.causevic-podzic@osce.org.

Follow the Forum’s activities on Twitter via #EEFOSCE.   

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Priority recommendations of the final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the 24 February 2019 parliamentary elections in Moldova call to eliminate gaps and ambiguities in the legal framework for elections and enhance professionalism of mid-level election administration.

The report, published on 22 May 2019, notes that the elections were competitive and fundamental rights were generally respected. However, the campaign took place against the backdrop of disaffection with public institutions and was tainted by allegations of pressure on public employees, strong indications of vote buying and the misuse of state resources.

The report states that the legal framework generally provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections. However, a number of provisions, including those related to the jurisdiction for complaints and appeals and the requirements for collecting and reviewing supporting signatures, lacked clarity, leading to their inconsistent application.

The report notes that most technical aspects of the elections were managed professionally and transparently at all levels. To improve professionalism and effectiveness of district election commissions and to allow for more extensive training, consideration could be given to revising the timeframe for their appointment, the report says.

The report also states that the campaign was competitive and visible throughout the country. However, political parties and civil society representatives reported widespread misuse of state resources. Reports also highlighted pressure on public employees to attend campaign events during work hours and government officials campaigning for political parties. The ODIHR report therefore recommends clarifying provisions related to the misuse of administrative resources and vote buying and introducing an effective enforcement mechanism to prevent these violations.

The report further notes that the electoral dispute resolution process was negatively affected by confusion over which body had jurisdiction to resolve complaints against candidates, jeopardizing the right to an effective remedy. The report recommends clarifying jurisdiction for each type of complaint.

Additional recommendations include providing sufficient authority and resources to the campaign finance oversight body, ensuring that voters are able to cast their votes free of pressure and undue influence, increasing confidence in the law enforcement, promoting a level playing field among contestants, ensuring the separation of state and party and making the tabulation of results more transparent.

For election day, the ODIHR Election Observation Mission was joined by delegations from the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and the Council of Europe and a European Parliament delegation. 

Politico-military aspects of border security and management in Central Asia were the focus of a meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) under Tajikistan’s chairmanship on 22 May 2019 in Vienna.

Participants debated how to further strengthen stability and security in border areas in the OSCE region in general, and in Central Asia in particular. 

Ambassador Idibek Kalandar of Tajikistan, the Chairperson of the FSC, noted that given the Central Asia countries’ proximity to Afghanistan, they face threats related to the illicit cross-border trade of weapons, ammunition and explosives, as well as other forms of trafficking. “These challenges should be addressed comprehensively and in a more efficient and effective way,” he said.  

Facilitating support to improve border security and management in the OSCE region through building capacity of border management staff was another topic of discussion during the meeting.

One of the key speakers, Jonathan Holland, Director of the OSCE Border Management Staff College (BMSC), highlighted the role of the College in enhancing co-operation and information exchange among border agencies in the OSCE area.

The College is an internationally recognized educational institution that delivers expertise and good practices in border security and management, with particular attention to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Since its inception ten years ago, more than 3,000 representatives of border security agencies from 59 countries have attended its courses.

The College offers specific courses for women border officials, thus contributing to the promotion of gender equality in a traditionally male-dominated field.

Veronika Goncharova, Project Manager at the Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) described the activities of the Program in assisting the countries of the region in enhancing their capacities in the border management and modernization of local border traffic regimes.

Since 2003, during nine phases the Programme focused on creating in Central Asia a modern border management infrastructure equipped with the necessary facilities, including 45 border crossing points and border stations, seven training centres and seven training classes for border guards, four dormitories for training centres.

Goncharova highlighted the main parameters of the next phase of BOMCA (2020-2025), which along with the Central Asian countries, will also include Afghanistan for the first time as a beneficiary.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Vrubivka.
• The Mission observed trench extensions in and near the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Novoazovsk in Donetsk region.*

• In Chernivtsi, the Mission saw gatherings in relation to the change of religious affiliations of local churches.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 45), compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at northerly and southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 280 explosions). Over two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), at easterly and southerly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Vrubivka

While conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Vrubivka (government-controlled, 72km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire about 500m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.5km south-east of its position. While landing the UAV, the SMM heard five additional shots of small-arms fire assessed at the same distance and direction. The SMM landed the UAV safely and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 20-21 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded ten projectiles in flight and a burst, all at an assessed range of 3-6km south-south-east and south (all unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as about 85 projectiles in flight and two bursts, all at an assessed range of 1-6km at easterly directions (all assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery). On the evening and morning of 20-21 May, positioned at six locations close to the disengagement area near Zolote, and through its camera on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM recorded about 550 bursts and shots and about 27 undetermined explosions (all assessed as within 5km periphery of the disengagement area).

On 15 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a 20m-long trench extension running east to west inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 100m west of its eastern edge and about 75m north of its southern edge. Imagery also revealed two other trench extensions outside the disengagement area, one 45m in length and one 75m in length, located 800m-1.6km east of the disengagement area’s eastern edge (all trench extensions not visible in imagery from 27 April 2019), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations.[3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

21 May

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) heading south on road H-21 near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

15 May

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed a tank (type undetermined) north-east of Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol).

20 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted ten tanks (six T-64 and four T-72) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

20 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Chermalyk.

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak variant) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and three IFVs (BMP-1) near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk);
• two APCs (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Katerynivka; and
• seven APCs (BTR-60) in Luhansk city. 

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water wells and pipelines in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and Popasna.

The Mission also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

On 20 May, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw ten cars (five with Ukrainian two with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as two with “LPR” plates), six trucks (four with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “LPR” plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 18 pedestrians (12 women and six men, aged 25-65) entering Ukraine, as well as ten cars (six with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “LPR” plates), three trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates), two buses (with unknown licence plates) and 13 pedestrians (seven women and six men, aged 25-65) exiting Ukraine.

On 21 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), for 70 minutes, the SMM saw 27 cars (11 with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Polish licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” and eight with “DPR” plates), four trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 32 pedestrians (15 women and girls, and 17 men and boys, aged 5-70) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 37 cars (eight with Ukrainian, 15 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” and 12 with “DPR” plates), 145 trucks (57 with Ukrainian, 61 with Russian Federation and five with Belarusian licence plates, as well as 22 with “DPR” plates) and 11 pedestrians (four women and seven men, aged 30-70) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw a woman (aged 50-60) exiting Ukraine and no vehicles or pedestrians entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for 75 minutes, the SMM saw nine cars (one with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR“ plates)  entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 24 cars (five with Ukrainian and 12 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR“ plates), a truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a bus (with “DPR“ plates) exiting Ukraine.

Gatherings against change of religious affiliations of churches in Chernivtsi

On 20, 21 and 22 May, in Chernivtsi, the SMM saw 24-40 people (mixed gender and ages) gathered in front of the building of the Regional State Administration at 1 Hrushevskoho Street, some of whom were holding signs critical of decisions made by the regional administration to recognize changes in affiliation of churches in Chernivtsi region from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 20 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Novoazovsk or east to the border with the Russian Federation, citing an “ongoing operation” in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 20 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Vrubivka (government-controlled, 72km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 shots of small-arms fire about 500m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

420335 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

“Towards Regional Economic Connectivity – National Mechanisms for Trade and Transport Facilitation” was the title of an OSCE regional expert seminar that ended in Ashgabat on 22 May 2019.

The three-day event brought together national experts representing relevant institutions from the five Central Asian countries, as well as Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.

The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat organized the seminar as a follow-up to the 2018 OSCE Regional Ministerial Conference “Good Governance and Economic Connectivity - Best Practices within the OSCE region”. The discussions focused on trade facilitation, transport and transit management through harmonization of border and customs mechanisms, digitalization and public-private partnership.

Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, referred to the Ministerial Decision on strengthening good governance and promoting connectivity adopted in Hamburg in 2016, which states that  “connectivity through transport and trade facilitation, including through measures at different levels of government, can enhance economic co-operation that is mutually beneficial and contribute to good-neighbourly relations, confidence-building and trust in the OSCE area”.

“The seminar reaffirms the OSCE’s consistent approach to the strengthening of the regional dialogue and economic connectivity and we believe it will contribute to the development of strategic recommendations,” Drozd said.

The seminar participants shared best national practices, challenges and opportunities in the area of trade facilitation and sustainable transit and transport management as well as reforms of customs and administrative procedures. International experts elaborated on innovations and technologies for sustainable transport and connectivity. The seminar participants produced an outcome document that provides a set of recommendations to further enhance regional economic connectivity and co-operation through trade and transport facilitations and harmonization of border and customs mechanisms.

The regional event will be followed by a national seminar on international standards in effective management of logistics and supply chains, which will take place on 23 and 24 May 2019. The seminar will bring together representatives from Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Finance and Economy and its Institute of Strategic and Sustainable Development, the Ministry of Industry and Communication,  the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Affairs, relevant transport agencies and other institutions. The event will address specific customs, regulatory and administrative procedures, and will discuss best practices and recommendations for further development and implementation of related transport and trade policies.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Elections experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) presented their final report in Yerevan on the early parliamentary elections in Armenia that took place on 9 December 2018.

The findings and recommendations were presented during a series of meetings with representatives of state institutions, including the Parliamentary Committee on State and Legal Affairs, the Central Election Commission, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice and the Commission on Television and Radio. Separate meetings were held with representatives of parliamentary and non-parliamentary political parties, the media, civil society and international organizations.

ODIHR noted that the elections were held with respect for fundamental freedoms and enjoyed broad public trust. However, the experts drew attention to the need to strengthen trust in the integrity of the electoral process, remove gaps and ambiguities from electoral legislation, protect voters’ private data, increase the political participation of women, improve accountability and reporting on campaign finance, and support the editorial independence of the media.

“The will of the main electoral stakeholders to preserve the progress in having democratic elections is commendable and paves the way for an effective follow-up to ODIHR’s electoral recommendations,” said Alexander Shlyk, Head of the ODIHR Elections Department. “Upcoming electoral reform should be based on broad consultation and take place well in advance of the next elections, and ODIHR is ready to support such efforts.”

The potential for ODIHR engagement in providing legal and technical expertise to assist the electoral reforms was discussed in separate meetings with representatives of the parliamentary structures, the Ministry of Justice and the Central Election Commission.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to promptly following up on ODIHR electoral assessments and recommendations.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• A man was injured by small-arms fire in Donetsk city.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Chermalyk.
• The Mission saw a tank in violation of withdrawal lines in Luhansk city.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk and a compound of the armed formations in Stare.*
• The Mission saw a gathering in Kyiv on the occasion of the presidential inauguration.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 50), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 170 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 280), compared with the previous 24 hours (40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at southerly, easterly and northerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man injured by small-arms fire in Trudivski area of Donetsk city

At Hospital No.14 in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw a man (55 years old) with bandages on his left leg and bruises on his left arm. The man told the SMM that he had been outside of his house in the south-western part of the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district on the afternoon of 8 May when he was shot with one bullet that struck both his left arm and left leg, breaking the lower half of his leg. The man added that ambulances could not reach his house due to security concerns so his wife and neighbour had provided first aid before a neighbour had carried him to the centre of the settlement from where he was transported in a military-type vehicle to an ambulance. A doctor at the hospital told the SMM that the man had arrived at the hospital with bullet wounds.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Chermalyk

While conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Chermalyk, the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire about 1km north, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1km north of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 19-20 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded seven projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), an explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as six bursts and 21 projectiles in flight (assessed as outside the disengagement area but within 5km of its periphery).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

19 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a tank (type undetermined) in a compound in Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

18 May

An SMM-mini UAV spotted three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) about 20m from residential houses in Dubovo-Vasylivka (73km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

18 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 20 tanks (13 T-64 and seven T-72) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 18 towed howitzers (probable 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) in a compound near Khrustalnyi (54km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 16 May 2019).

20 May

The SMM saw:

• eight tanks (four T-64 and four types undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

20 May

The SMM noted that all weapons were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

18 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) in Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

19. May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (MT-LB) and an armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23) near Holubivske (51km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured combat vehicle near Zemliane (11km north-west of Luhansk);
• an APC (MT-LB) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk);
• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Mykolaivka (15km east of Luhansk); and
• two armoured recovery vehicles (a BREM and a BTS-4A) in Luhansk city.

The SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) in the yard of a non-functioning school in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

20 May

The SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) in Luhansk city.

Government-controlled areas

20 May

The SMM saw:

• an APC (Varta) in Popasna;
• an IFV (BMP variant) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

While on the northern edge of Popasna on the evening of 19 May, the SMM saw an unidentified UAV (assessed as a fixed-wing type) overhead flying from west to east and then continuing east-north-east at an altitude of about 300m.

Presence of mines and trench extension near Popasna and unexploded ordnance near Tavrycheske

On 17 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time about 80 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in three rows in a field about 2km east of Popasna, assessed as not recent. Immediately west of the mines, the same UAV spotted a trench extension running from north to south-east for about 80m (not visible in imagery from 25 March 2019) with Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers digging. 

On 20 May, the SMM again saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a 120mm mortar round, embedded in the asphalt in the middle of the carriageway of road T0519 close to Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), about 200m north of the nearest houses.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to water pipelines near Zolote and between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna.

The Mission also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

People applying for passports of the Russian Federation in Luhansk region

In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM observed a queue of about 80 people (mixed genders, 25-50 years old) outside a building in the city. Some of them told the SMM that they had been queuing to submit and finalize applications for passports of the Russian Federation.

People gather in Kyiv on the occasion of the presidential inauguration

On the morning of 20 May, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 5,000 people (all ages and genders) in front of the Parliament building on the occasion of the presidential inauguration. The SMM observed the presence of about 1,000 law enforcement officers securing the areas around the Parliament building as well as adjacent streets. It observed a calm situation during the course of the event.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 20 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Novoazovsk or east to the border with the Russian Federation, citing an “ongoing operation” in the area.
• Outside of a compound of the armed formations in Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), four members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing orders from superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 18-19 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of northern and eastern Donetsk region and non-government-controlled areas of southern Luhansk region, including areas close to the contact line.[5]
• On 20 May, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire about 1km north, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly decreased from 10,963 to 10,896 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 371 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was six this week compared to 18 last week: five of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and one into Ukraine (67 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, two families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (351 compared to 358 observed during the previous week). There were 189 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 162 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv and Rovenky-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 842 trucks (579 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (263 at the Gukovo BCP and 579 at the Donetsk BCP); 439 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 403 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates. In addition, during the reporting week, trucks with Georgian licence plates were also observed.                                                                                           

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks remained on the same level – 50 as during the previous reporting period. These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 133 to 153: of the total number of trucks scanned, 90 trucks (59 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 63 trucks (41 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans significantly increased from 82 to 137 vehicles; 74 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 63 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 26 occasions; the OTs assessed that 16 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and ten to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, cars with licence plates from Georgia, Belarus and Lithuania were also noted.

On 14 May at 15:51, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a helicopter Mi-8 (green in colour), with white and blue stripes on its body flying from the north in an easterly direction. The aircraft flew only inside the airspace of the Russian Federation.

On 16 May at 13:52, an ambulance entered the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation and parked in front of the main building. Three paramedics were observed moving from the vehicle to the main building. At 14:20, the medical crew accompanied a civilian to the ambulance and together they returned towards the Russian Federation.

On the same day at 10:08, the OT at the Gukovo BCP noted two ambulances entering the BCP area from the Russian Federation and driving behind the main building. At 10:29, the ambulances returned towards the Russian Federation.

On 18 May at 06:28, the OT observed a white minivan with the inscription in Russian "ПЛУТОН ритуальный кортеж" (ritual procession) crossing from Ukraine into the Russian Federation.  

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 9 April 2019 to 14 May 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

ASHGABAT, 21 May 2019 – Visiting Turkmenistan today, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, underlined the strategic importance of Central Asia for Eurasian security.

“Co-operation and multilateralism are part of Turkmenistan’s history and culture. This country was crossed by countless merchants, traveling on the Silk Road,”  the Chairperson said.

“Turkmenistan has served as the crossroads of civilizations. So, it makes perfect sense that it should play a pivotal role in building bridges - in bringing actors, neighbours and states together,” he continued, commending Turkmenistan’s commitment to hosting both, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat and the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia. 

Positive messages on regional co-operation and dialogue, including with Afghanistan, were the Chairperson’s main takeaways from his meetings with Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and Chairperson of the Mejlis Gulshat Mammedova.

Speaking about achievements in the 20 years of OSCE presence in the country, during a lecture at the International University for Humanities and Development, Lajčák stressed that much has been done on building a strong and constructive partnership between the OSCE and Turkmenistan. However, he continued, there is still room for more joint activities in line with Turkmenistan’s strategic priorities, in the fields of rule of law, connectivity, good governance and energy security, but also on facilitating trade and transport co-operation.

Concluding his lecture, he expressed his hope that we are entering an age that will be defined by dialogue and co-operation, calling them the “key ingredients for a peaceful and prosperous Central Asia.“

420185 Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, led by Head of Office Pierre von Arx, visited the southern provinces of Kyrgyzstan, Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken from 12 to 18 May 2019 to follow up on and plan programmatic activities with local authorities, implementing partners and civil society.

The visit included meetings with representatives of the Plenipotentiary Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan in Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken provinces. Its Deputy Head, Kaldarali Mamataliev, congratulated the OSCE for its 20-year presence in Kyrgyzstan.

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek’s programmatic activities, especially in the field of economic development and digitalization, community policing, as well as preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT), were highly welcomed by local authorities in all three provinces.

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek was able to visit a number of projects it supports, amongst them the opening of Entrepreneurship Support Centres (ESCs) in both Jalal-Abad and Batken cities. The ESC in Osh had been opened in 2018 and had provided 500 business consultation services since, most of which were aimed at women and former migrants. Further to this, the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek had the opportunity to meet with local police departments and discuss and view Mobile Police Reception (MPR) vehicles which the Programme Office supports.

In line with the “Year of the Regions and Digitalization”, the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek also used the opportunity to discuss digitalization initiatives with counterparts, specifically to increasingly facilitate interagency electronic connectivity, aiming to reduce the use of paper and reduce risks of exposure to corruption for citizens.

Besides meeting with provincial heads and mayors of southern provinces and cities, the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek also met with civil society representatives, namely the Woman Initiative Group in Osh, as well as a number of implementing partners working in the field of judicial reform and human rights.

The visit gave an important impulse for planning and prioritizing programmatic activities in 2019 and 2020.

420179 Kunduz Rysbek SDGs SDGs:  8 - Decent work and economic growth

On 15 and 17 May 2019 the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, Ambassador Pierre von Arx, together with local authorities, members of the Kyrgyz Parliament and entrepreneurs, opened two new Entrepreneurship Support Centres (ECS) in the cities of Djalal-Abad and Batken, southern Kyrgyzstan. 

The new ESCs will enhance the vital role that small and medium sized enterprises (SME) play in developing Kyrgyzstan’s economy and potentially lead to the opening of new businesses and jobs in southern Kyrgyzstan.  The latter is particularly important, as SMEs generate about 40 per cent of the total gross domestic product and provide jobs to 20 per cent of the working-age population in the country.

The Government’s support to these projects demonstrates the importance they attach to fostering economic growth by creating a more favourable business climate in the country, as well as to the partnership with the OSCE.

The new ESCs have been established together with local authorities in Jalal-Abad and Batken, in partnership with the Young Entrepreneurs Business Association. The two new Centres will provide advisory services and legal consultations to existing and aspiring entrepreneurs, as well as training courses on business-related topics.

They will also help strengthen constructive dialogue between local authorities and the business sector and facilitate the creation of new partnerships among entrepreneurs from other provinces, thus generating new business opportunities.

The opening of the two new ESCs followed the successful opening and operation of an ESC in the city of Osh in December 2017, with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, the German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH and the UNDP in the Kyrgyz Republic.