European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

Two and a half years after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU military aid under the European Peace Facility (EPF) is still falling behind, with fresh money needed despite the increased EPF budget reserved for Ukraine. The new plan set in place by the EU and its G7 partners to use windfall profits from frozen Russian assets only began to provide military and reconstruction support for Ukraine with the first payment on 26 July 2024. The EU will use the EPF to channel its military aid under this recent EU-G7 plan, amid persisting legal and (geo)political uncertainties.

New EPF financial ceiling and creation of the Ukraine Assistance Fund

On 18 March 2024, the Council increased the EPF’s financial ceiling by €5 billion in current prices and secured this top-up for military support to Ukraine, by establishing a dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) within the EPF, under Decision (CFSP) 2024/890, amending Council Decision (2021/509) establishing the EPF. The UAF focuses on increased joint procurement from the European defence industry, including Norway. Exceptionally, military products from elsewhere will be permitted, as sourcing kit without US components for instance can be problematic. Reimbursement of Member State donations will be limited after a transition period. The EPF’s global ceiling now totals over €17 billion in current prices for 2021‑2027, including €11.647 billion approved for Ukraine. Of this, €6.147 billion was mobilised so far (€3.770 billion for the first seven regular assistance measures of at least €0.5 billion each, plus €0.377 billion for the common costs of the EU military mission for Ukraine, plus €2 billion for the Ukraine ammunition plan). Some €5.5 billion remains blocked (around €0.5 billion for the eighth regular assistance measure, plus €5 billion for the UAF).

New plan to integrate windfall profits from frozen Russian assets into the EPF

On 12 February 2024, the Council adopted two regulations (EU 2024/576 and EU 2024/577) concerning restrictive measures (sanctions) in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, and amending former regulations. Regulation 2024/576 clarifies central securities depositories’ obligations when holding Central Bank of Russia assets and reserves with a total value exceeding €1 million, which are frozen due to EU sanctions. Central securities depositories must apply specific rules: set aside extraordinary cash balances accumulating due to EU sanctions alone; they cannot dispose of any ensuing net profits; and must report such profits to the European Commission. Only Euroclear Belgium falls within the scope of the regulation, while Luxembourg hosts the remainder of the Russian financial assets frozen in the EU.

On 21 May 2024, the Council gave the go-ahead for use of extraordinary revenues from frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine’s self-defence through the EPF (90 % of these profits), and for Ukraine’s reconstruction through the EU budget (10 %). The Council press release also notes the adoption of the corresponding ‘set of legal acts’ on the same day.

According to HR/VP Josep Borrell, the 24 June 2024 Foreign Affairs Council agreed on a legal framework for allocating ‘windfall profits’ from immobilised Russian assets to the EPF. However, one country continued ‘blocking the use of about €6 billion’ from the EPF (i.e. €5 billion from the UAF, plus about €1 billion to be reimbursed to Member States for their military assistance to Ukraine, including €500 million to Poland), by vetoing the set of seven legal acts intended to unblock the EPF. However, the HR/VP noted, as that country ‘did not participate in the [21 May] decision to use [the profits of] these assets, it has not the right to participate in deciding to which purpose they are allocated’. The HR/VP added these profits would be allocated to air defence, ammunition and supporting Ukraine’s [defence] industry; €1.4 billion would be available in July 2024, and another €1 billion by the end of 2024. The HR/VP added the issue would be dealt with speedily and discussed at the 27‑28 June 2024 European Council. Arguably, as these profits are primarily sourced from Russian assets, and do not originate from the EU budget or Member States (as the EPF does), a Member State cannot oppose their use to support Ukraine if a qualified majority (required by Article 215 TFEU for the EU sanctions regime) of Member States so decides.

In its 27 June 2024 conclusions, the European Council declared it: ‘looks forward to the first disbursement this summer; invites the Commission, the HR/VP and the Council to take work forward, while addressing all relevant legal and financial aspects, in order to provide additional funding for Ukraine by the end of the year in the form of loans serviced and repaid by future flows of the extraordinary revenues with a view to reaching approximately €50 billion together with G7 partners as discussed at the Apulia Summit, to support Ukraine’s current and future military, budget and reconstruction needs. (…) Russia’s assets should remain immobilised until Russia ceases its war of aggression against Ukraine and compensates it for the damage caused by this war’. At the Apulia Summit in Italy on 14 June 2024, the G7 decided ‘to make available approximately US$50 billion leveraging the extraordinary revenues of the immobilised Russian sovereign assets (…) stepping up [its] collective efforts to disarm and defund Russia’s military industrial complex’. This new plan seeks to provide Ukraine with a US$50 billion syndicated loan, repaid using revenue from frozen Russian assets, a loan the US would issue with Ukraine and G7 members by end-2024. This further illustrates the close EU/G7cooperation on sanctions implementation.

On 22 July 2024, the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council insist that EU support under the EPF is unblocked and explain the HR/VP’s update on progress towards the first transfer of €1.4 billion of windfall profits from frozen Russian assets, expected at the beginning of August 2024.

Having requested Euroclear make the required financial contribution, the Commission received the first transfer (‘instalment’) of €1.5 billion of revenue from immobilised Russian assets for Ukraine on 23 July 2024. In its Questions & Answers document of 26 July, the Commission confirmed the 90 %/10 % split in the financial contribution to the EPF for military assistance and the Ukraine Facility. This €50 billion instrument funded through the EU budget (€17 billion in grants and €33 billion in loans), was established by Regulation (EU)2024/792 of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 February 2024, to support Ukraine’s reconstruction. The Commission noted the next call to Euroclear should take place in March 2025. The Commission announced that the EU made the first payment of €1.5 billion to Ukraine on 26 July 2024, channelling the funding to Ukraine through the EPF and the Ukraine Facility.

The CEO of Euroclear Belgium is opposed to seizure of frozen Russian assets (the capital), as initially requested by the US. It is feared that major investors would shun Europe as a result, fearing their assets could be ‘confiscated’, with considerable impact not only on Euroclear, but due to its systemic importance and size, on the global financial markets. Analysts from think tanks such as Chatham House or Bruegel also warn against the legal uncertainty and/or the risk of far-reaching financial market costs of asset confiscation. Chatham House analyst Creon Butler advises maintaining the status quo, ‘including the threat of confiscation as a last resort, reserving the treatment of frozen assets for maximum effect in support of Ukraine when negotiations to end the war eventually begin’. The European Central Bank is against asset confiscation on rule-of-law grounds.

In his press remarks after the 22 July 2024 Foreign Affairs Council, the HR/VP stated that most Member States insist on unblocking the payment due under the EPF for military support for Ukraine. This was in reference to the Member State blocking the use of the EPF for Ukraine, the EPF-lodged €5 billion UAF, and the eighth regular tranche of €500 million (the seventh dating from February 2023).

In its resolution of 17 July 2024 on the need for continuous EU support for Ukraine, the European Parliament regretted Hungary’s abuses of its veto power in the Council ‘to prevent essential aid from being granted to Ukraine’ and urged Hungary to lift its blockade of the EPF for Ukraine, ‘including the agreed reimbursement’ to Member States for the military aid they have delivered. It also condemned Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s July 2024 visit to the Russian Federation, deeming it ‘a blatant violation of the EU’s Treaties, including the principle of sincere cooperation’, a violation that ‘should be met with repercussions for Hungary’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Ukraine, the European Peace Facility and additional financing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger (1st edition).

On 24 January 2024, the European Commission published a legislative proposal under the ordinary legislative procedure for a new regulation on the screening of foreign investments in the Union. It seeks to revise and repeal Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union.

Parliament’s committee on international trade is expected to be in the lead to draft a report with contributing opinions from other committees; once adopted by the plenary, this will serve as Parliament’s position for the trilogue negotiations with the Council based on the position of the EU Member States. Once a common position is achieved, Parliament and the Council will adopt it separately, after which the new regulation can enter into force.

Regulation (EU) 2019/452 was adopted in March 2019 and has been applied since October 2020. It has struck a delicate balance between the EU’s strong belief in the benefits of open markets for its economic prosperity, and the acknowledgment of risks that may be associated with some foreign direct investment (FDI) in terms of security or public order. The Commission’s evaluation of the 2019 FDI screening regulation’s operation has revealed that the significant substantive and procedural discrepancies between national FDI screening mechanisms have undermined the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal instrument. It has therefore proposed a revision of the EU framework to enhance regulatory convergence.

Complete version

• September 2024: Screening of foreign investments in the Union (1st edition)

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the screening of foreign investments in the Union and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilCommittee responsible:International trade (INTA)COM(2024) 23
24 January 2024Rapporteur:To be determined2024/0017(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be determinedOrdinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Draft report Member States with/without an FDI screening mechanism in place, as of August 2024

Written by Gisela Grieger.

Mongolia is a geographically remote and resource-rich country with a peculiar location in northeast Asia. An ‘oasis of democracy’, it is sandwiched between its two expansionist authoritarian neighbours, China and Russia. This has required it to walk a delicate geopolitical tightrope of non‑alignment and a ‘third neighbour’ foreign policy to preserve its sovereignty and independence. During the past 35 years of bilateral diplomatic relations Mongolia has not been particularly high on the EU’s foreign policy agenda, with only a handful of EU Member States having an embassy there.

Since the 1990s, Mongolia has nonetheless benefited from EU development cooperation programmes aimed at supporting its sustainable economic and democratic development and from EU disaster relief for the increasingly harsh socioeconomic implications of its exposure to climate change. Classified as a lower-middle income country, Mongolia has also been a beneficiary of unilateral preferential access to the EU market, first under the generalised scheme of preferences (GSP) and later under the GSP+ scheme, and has been able to draw on additional EU funding programmes to bolster the diversification of its trade towards non-mining products.

Currently, an EU-Mongolia agreement on geographical indications is under negotiation with the same objective. The EU-Mongolia political and cooperation agreement (PCA), which entered into force in 2017, has significantly broadened the scope for bilateral, regional and international cooperation to policy areas that were previously not covered by the 1993 trade and economic cooperation agreement. Joint Committee meetings under the PCA have taken place regularly, with strands on political dialogue, human rights, trade and investment, and development cooperation.

EU reliance on resilient supply chains for critical raw materials (CRMs) to implement its green and digital transitions and Mongolian efforts to sustainably diversify its economic relations could draw the two partners closer. As the scramble for CRMs is in full swing and major CRM-importing countries have designed economic de-risking policies to find alternatives to China’s current quasi export monopoly on processed CRMs such as rare earths, the EU and Mongolia could enter into a CRM partnership, despite the geographical and geopolitical constraints and concerns that may arise over the environment and the investment climate owing to increased sourcing of CRMs from Mongolia.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-Mongolia relations: Possible critical raw materials partnership‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Mongolia’s top trade partners, trade in goods, 2023 Figure 2 – Main EU imports from Mongolia, 2023 Main EU exports to Mongolia, 2023

Written by Sidonia Mazur.

Pilot projects and preparatory actions (PPs and PAs) are tools in the EU budget designed to test new policy initiatives or prepare the ground for the adoption of future programmes. PPs and PAs give Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) the possibility to initiate innovative policies and fund them before a legal act has been adopted. The financing of both new PPs and PAs and those continued from previous years must be included in the EU budget under the annual budgetary procedure.

What are PPs and PAs?

PPs and PAs are covered by Article 58(2) of the EU’s Financial Regulation, which states that ‘pilot projects of an experimental nature’ are meant to test ‘the feasibility of an action and its usefulness’. Preparatory actions, meanwhile, are designed to ‘prepare proposals with a view to the adoption of future actions’.

PPs and PAs are an exception to the rule that appropriations may be entered in the EU budget only if a legal act has been adopted authorising the expenditure in question: PPs and PAs cannot be used for expenditure for which a legal basis already exists. Therefore, PPs and PAs are an attractive way for MEPs to transform their political ideas into future EU policies and programmes without waiting for legal initiatives from the European Commission. The European Parliament is not the only institution that has the right to propose PPs and PAs. The Council and the Commission can also put forward PPs and PAs, but very rarely do so.

How much money is available for PPs and PAs?

The total amount of appropriations in any budgetary year cannot exceed €40 million for pilot projects, and €100 million for preparatory actions. This means that the total maximum annual allocation for PPs and PAs combined is €140 million. However, the total amount of appropriations actually committed for new preparatory actions must not exceed €50 million. The EU can make a budgetary commitment for a pilot project for no more than 2 consecutive financial years. Budgets for a preparatory action, which often follows a pilot project, are limited to a maximum of 3 years.

Moreover, allocations for PPs and PAs must fit under the annual ceiling in commitments per heading set under the multiannual financial framework for each budgetary year. If a preparatory action is successful, a legal basis for that action could be prepared with a view to the new policy in future functioning under its own legal basis. Moreover, the lessons learnt from the implementation of a PP or a PA might result in the modification of an existing legal basis.

How are PPs and PAs adopted in the EU’s annual budgetary procedure?

The Parliament’s general budget rapporteur presents, in agreement with the other political groups’ shadow rapporteurs on the general budget, a compromise package of PPs and PAs, which the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) usually votes on as a block amendment. The compromise package is based on Parliament’s priorities, as set in Parliament’s general guidelines for the preparation of the budget for the following year. Under Rule 96 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (RoP), Parliament gives particular priority to PPs and PAs originating from its legislative initiative reports in accordance with Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and Rule 47 of the RoP. During the budgetary negotiations with the Council, individual PP and PA budgetary allocations can still change.

A parallel EPRS briefing on the EU’s annual budgetary procedure explains the steps, deadlines and actors involved in the annual budget-making exercise in the European Parliament.

Pre-assessment by the European Commission

In line with the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline, cooperation in budgetary matters and sound financial management, MEPs and the Council must propose pilot projects and preparatory actions to the Commission for pre-assessment before the July interinstitutional negotiations (trilogues) between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. Following the ‘Parliament 2024’ reform, the committee responsible for budgetary issues must send proposed PPs and PAs to the Commission only when those proposals have the support of a committee, a political group or Members reaching at least the low threshold (one 20th of Parliament’s component Members). The proposals are collected by the BUDG committee secretariat. Pre-assessments are mandatory under Rule 96 of the RoP. Pre-assessment participation is possible exclusively through a dedicated electronic form (downloadable from the BUDG eCommittee website) and limited to the Commission’s three working languages (English, French and German). According to Rule 96 of the RoP, PPs and PAs linked to Parliament’s legislative initiative reports in accordance with Article 225 TFEU and Rule 47 of the RoP are sent for information to the Commission and given priority during the vote.

The Commission evaluates the proposals using the following grading.

• Category A: PP/PA could be implemented as suggested by the European Parliament.
• Category B: PP/PA might under certain conditions be fully or partially implementable, but the project would need to be re-designed, or more information might be needed.
• Category C: PP/PA is fully covered by an existing legal base, or the ideas are otherwise being addressed.
• Category D: PP/PA cannot be implemented, or similar actions have already been carried out in the past.

Authors of PPs and PAs can use the feedback from the Commission to improve the design of their PP or PA proposal further and ask for re-assessment over the summer. Parliament’s budget rapporteur intends to include in the compromise package only those PPs or PAs that the Commission assessed as category A or B, as well as those PPs and PAs Parliament considered essential. All PP and PA proposals submitted for pre‑assessment, as well as those re-assessed, must also be tabled as budgetary amendments by the deadline set in the respective specialised committee or in BUDG.

Preliminary PP/PA adoption calendar in the EU’s annual budgetary procedure (2025 budget)19 March 2024Deadline for tabling PP/PA proposals for pre-assessment (first round)19 June 2024Publication of 2025 draft budget and European Commission Working document IV14 June 2024First round of PP/PA proposal pre-assessment completed by the Commission28 June 2024Deadline for contacting the Commission to seek re-assessment of first-round proposals25 July 2024 – 17.00Deadline for submitting PP/PA proposals for the second round of pre‑assessment (for newly elected MEPs)Early September 2024Second round of PP/PA proposal pre-assessment completed by the Commission5 September 2024 – 12 noonDeadline for tabling budgetary amendments (committees and MEPs)12 September 2024 – 12 noonDeadline for tabling budgetary amendments (political groups)7 October 2024 (Strasbourg)BUDG committee vote on budgetary amendmentsOctober II plenary (21‑24 October 2024)Adoption of Parliament’s readingNovember II plenary (25‑28 November 2024)Plenary vote and adoption of the budget

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Pilot projects and preparatory actions in the annual EU budgetary procedure‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sidonia Mazur.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Pilot projects and preparatory actions in the annual EU budgetary procedure‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak.

Digital finance can broadly be defined as financial services and instruments that use or are based on new information and communication technologies (ICT). A wide range of segments of the financial system are therefore concerned, from digital payment services to the new market infrastructures of crypto-assets using distributed ledger technologies (DLT). Policymakers expect digital finance to benefit the financial system – for example, in terms of transaction and settlement costs, as well as financial inclusion. However, digital finance also poses new risks, especially for financial stability and the protection of citizens.

The idea behind the EU regulatory approach is that by providing a sound regulatory framework, homogenous throughout the EU, these risks can be monitored and controlled, while also favouring the desired innovation. To that end, the European Commission, together with the European supervisory authorities and the European Central Bank, conduct regular reviews of the EU regulatory framework and check its ability to face these risks and the potential needs for intervention. In 2020, the Commission tabled a major digital finance strategy to provide a sound, EU-level regulatory and supervisory framework in a number of digital finance domains.

The EU has already adopted new laws resulting from this initiative. The Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets is establishing a new legal environment for DLT-based ‘coins’ with a stable value (‘stablecoins’); another regulation will provide a framework for the monitoring and control of digital operational resilience for the financial sector. More legislative procedures are ongoing in the fields of open finance and the digital euro. New directions are being suggested, such as the establishment of a ‘unified ledger’, to smoothen transfers between instruments using different DLT market infrastructure.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital finance legislation: Overview and state of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nikolina Šajn.

The EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) has, over several decades and through successive reforms, devoted increased attention to the environment. This has led to the current CAP having a ‘green architecture’, which includes both mandatory elements – to which farmers must adhere in exchange for a full amount of direct payments – and voluntary elements – bringing extra payments for farmers engaging in farming practices that go beyond the basic requirements.

Mandatory requirements, also referred to as ‘conditionality’, include statutory management requirements laid out in different pieces of environmental legislation, but integrated into the CAP. They also include standards for good agricultural and environmental condition of land (GAECs) that, for instance, require crop rotation or diversification, establishment of buffer strips along rivers and lakes, or minimum soil cover in winter. The GAECs have been at the centre of farmer protests in several Member States in 2024 and were recently amended, reducing their ambition.

The voluntary elements include eco-schemes: a major novelty of the current CAP. They offer farmers a top-up on direct payments if they engage in additional environmentally sound practices. Which practices exactly, depends on individual Member States, as they have a significant flexibility in their design. As a result, more than 150 eco-schemes exist across the EU, the most popular addressing soil conservation and biodiversity. The second voluntary element comprises rural development agri‑environmental schemes, the oldest environmental measures in the CAP. Also designed by the Member States, they compensate farmers for cost and income foregone as a result of engaging in environmentally friendly practices, continued agricultural activity in areas where farming is difficult, and restrictions in Natura 2000 areas. Voluntary elements also include green investments.

Several studies warn that Member States have not been ambitious in implementing the CAP’s environmental measures. It is claimed that states have used the flexibility granted them to define the exact requirements and voluntary measures in ways that have not led to significant change on the ground. Finding ways to motivate farmers to engage in practices that truly benefit the environment, while ensuring their economic sustainability, remains a major challenge for negotiations on the post‑2027 CAP, particularly in the context of widespread farmer discontent.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Environment and the common agricultural policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román and Eric Pichon.

On 8-17 July 2024, the UN high-level political forum on sustainable development assessed progress towards SDG 2: ‘End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture’. It is unlikely this goal will be met by 2030. Instead, food insecurity, malnutrition and food prices have worsened globally.

The primary causes of food insecurity are threefold: conflict, economic instability, and extreme weather conditions, which frequently intersect and exacerbate one another. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has hindered the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and worsened the worldwide food crisis. This has shown that several food systems are unsustainable, relying too heavily on vulnerable global chains. This unsustainability is also highlighted by the fact that a third of the food produced globally is wasted or lost. In the EU itself, food inflation owing to the impact of extreme weather events, the pandemic and the war in Ukraine has led to more than eight EU citizens in 100 being unable to afford a proper meal on a regular basis, while 50 in 100 are overweight.

Better nutrition and agricultural sustainability are at the core of the EU’s new common agricultural policy and the ‘farm to fork’ and biodiversity strategies. These are now being put to the test by the impact of COVID-19 and Russia’s war on Ukraine. In poorer countries, the EU and its Member States act on food insecurity through humanitarian aid and development cooperation. The EU bases its external action towards SDG 2 on comprehensive strategies in conflict areas, substantial research capacities and the promotion of international cooperation. However, its impact is difficult to assess, while other EU policies, particularly on trade, have a spillover effect on other food systems around the world.

This briefing updates a previous edition by Anna Caprile and Eric Pichon, published in January 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Achieving food security: Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG 2) – The EU’s role in ending hunger and improving nutrition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Hunger and food insecurity in 2022 Acute food insecurity by key drivers (2023) Food system contradictions

Written by Anne Altmayer.

Aquaculture is an important sector of the EU’s blue economy and has the potential to play a more vital role as a sustainable food supplier under the European Green Deal.

However, while fish farming is one of the fastest growing food production sectors in the world, the EU, with its 1.1 million tonnes of farmed fish produced in 2022, accounts for less than 1 % of global production. For comparison, Norway’s aquaculture output in the same year alone exceeded that of the EU as a whole.

The EU’s self-sufficiency rate for fishery and aquaculture products is rather low, making the EU dependent on imports of these products.

Within the EU, aquaculture production is concentrated mainly in four countries, which for their part are specialised on the farming of particular species.

Despite the European Commission’s efforts to promote the development of aquaculture within the EU, the production rate is stagnating.

The constraints and barriers hampering the sector’s growth range from high administrative burdens, to limited access to space and water, to trade-related aspects and governance issues.

Over the past 20 years, the European Parliament has recurrently highlighted the EU’s strong dependency on imports of fisheries and aquaculture products, and called for remedies to strengthen the position of EU fish farmers.

Possible future developments could include a change in policy, with a view to improving the sector’s position as a major food supplier, and a change in production towards less cost-intensive and more sustainable methods.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU aquaculture: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Global aquaculture production, 1990-2020 Composition of EU aquaculture production by main commercial species (in volume), 2021 Aquaculture products: EU supply balance by volume (million tonnes)

Written by Stefano De Luca.

Advanced digital network infrastructure and digital services will be key in shaping the competitiveness of many European Union (EU) sectors – among them manufacturing, energy and healthcare – in the near future. Furthermore, these infrastructure and services are at the core of the twin digital and green transition that seeks to leverage the synergies between technological advancements and environmental sustainability. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the EU’s networks are up to the task, including in terms of transmission speed. Having high-performing fixed and mobile networks with a higher transmission speed can have a positive effect on economic development as well, by boosting the gross domestic product.

In its Digital Decade strategy, the European Commission put forward its vision for new strategic connectivity targets for 2030, such as preparing the EU for the roll-out of the next generation of broadband infrastructure with gigabit speeds. This briefing aims to provide an overview of full fibre and 5G mobile networks as part of the EU’s Digital Decade goal to accelerate deployment and investment in future-proof infrastructures. In this context, it discusses the current state of full fibre and 5G mobile technology in the EU, including the challenges of attracting private investment, and explores new business models for network deployment.

With 7 years left to reach the 2030 connectivity targets, it is paramount to understand where the EU stands in terms of future-proof network deployment, address the challenges and identify the opportunities that would help the EU telecom sector to thrive.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A future-proof network for the EU: Full fibre and 5G‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Colin Murphy.

Cyberbullying is a growing phenomenon and a significant issue for young people across Europe and indeed the world. Unlike ‘real-world’ bullying which ends when the victim’s situation changes, such as when school ends, cyberbullying can continue for its victims at any time. Cyberbullying can reach victims through social media, text messages, false information or images spread through various methods, and can be relentless.

The ubiquity of electronic devices means children and young people are more digitally connected than ever before. The scope for children to become victims of online aggression and indeed to engage in bullying behaviour is wide. In addition, an even more worrying aspect is the exposure of children and young people to harmful material or their coercion into providing sexual images of themselves. The increase in young people’s connectivity corresponds with the rise in volume of online child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and the growth in the number of cases of minors approached online in what is known as ‘sextortion’.

Victims often feel powerless, worthless and isolated and seldom report the abuse to parents or teachers. In some cases, it can lead the victim to substance abuse, self-harm and even suicide. Legislators are trying to keep pace with the ever-changing environment. While policies at European Union (EU) and international level are aimed at preventing cyberbullying, there have been calls for stronger EU action to prevent this form of online abuse. There are EU initiatives that address elements of the issue, but there is currently no EU-wide anti-online bullying law.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Cyberbullying among young people: Laws and policies in selected Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

As the new parliamentary mandate begins, this note looks back at notable achievements of the previous legislative term in the area of taxation. It then looks ahead to possible future action that could help the Member States and the European Union (EU) meet revenue needs in the context of climate and defence spending requirements, or bolster competitiveness by simplifying tax compliance for businesses operating across the single market.

Accomplishments and on-going work

Over the past few years, EU Member States’ public finances have been under considerable strain owing to the COVID-19 pandemic and the twin energy–cost-of-living crisis, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As these significant economic challenges evolved, tax administrations across the EU were quick to respond to constantly changing circumstances, introducing various tax-support measures to shield struggling households and businesses when prices skyrocketed.

In terms of legislative action at EU and international level, the key milestone was the 2021 OECD Inclusive Framework global agreement on a two-pillar solution to reform the international corporate tax system. The subsequent adoption of a minimum corporate tax (‘Pillar Two’) in the EU has ensured that large multinationals operating in the EU are today subject to an effective tax rate of at least 15 %. A multilateral convention to implement the other half of the global tax deal (‘Pillar One’), concerning the re-allocation of taxing rights on the profits of very large multinationals, should be open for signature soon, with the rules entering into force in 2025 (provided the convention is ratified by a critical mass of signatory countries).

At EU level, negotiations on some of the previous Commission’s initiatives remain ongoing, such as proposals to create a harmonised corporate tax base across the EU (BEFIT) or to update energy taxation rules (see Table 1). The Hungarian Presidency of the Council has committed to advancing the discussions on pending taxation files, while prioritising ‘fighting tax evasion, ensuring legal certainty for taxpayers, and supporting the international engagement of the EU’.

Table 1 – Ongoing initiatives in the Council in the area of taxation (non-exhaustive)

Legislative proposalObjectiveEuropean Parliament (opinion)Energy taxationAlign taxation of energy products and electricity with EU Green Deal objectivesAwaiting Parliament opinionVAT in the digital ageLower value added tax (VAT) administrative costs, harmonise VAT reporting and fight VAT fraudOpinionDebt-equity bias reduction allowance (DEBRA)Reduce debt-equity bias in corporate tax, encourage the re-equitisation of companies, strengthen capital markets unionOpinionTransfer pricing rulesEnshrine transfer pricing principles within EU law, avoid double taxation and increase tax certaintyOpinionBusiness in Europe: Framework for income taxation (BEFIT)Harmonise corporate tax base, lower business compliance costs and increase tax certaintyAwaiting Parliament opinionHead office tax system (HOT)Lower tax compliance costs of cross-border operating small businessesOpinionUnshellCounter shell companies when they are used for abusive tax purposesOpinionFaster and safer tax excess relief (FASTER)Accelerate withholding tax relief and strengthen capital markets unionOpinion*

*In May 2024, the Council reached a general approach on the FASTER initiative. As the text supported by the Council deviated considerably from the original Commission proposal, Parliament will be ‘reconsulted’ to provide its opinion. For further information on the state-of-play of EU initiatives, see the EU Legislative Train Schedule.

What might the future bring?

While upcoming legislation will ultimately depend on the priorities of the new College of Commissioners, and in particular the new Commissioner in charge of taxation, over the years the European Commission has carried out a range of preparatory studies and public consultations that may feed into potential future legislative initiatives.

In the area of direct taxation, the Commission is currently evaluating two directives that are instrumental in combating abusive tax practices. The first is the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC), through which national tax authorities share an increasing amount of information with their EU counterparts. The second is the Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive (ATAD), a series of EU-wide measures against corporate tax avoidance. These evaluations will take stock of the current rules and their efficacy. They may then recommend modifications to strengthen or streamline the current framework. The EU will also continue the practice of listing third countries that fail to comply with international good governance tax standards and will evaluate how effective the measures taken by Member States against the listed countries have been.

In the area of VAT, the European Commission has been carrying out preparatory work concerning the travel and tourism industry, looking at the potential modernisation of VAT rules for travel agents, international flight and maritime passenger transport, and refunds for non-EU tourists as well as the possibility of changing the VAT rules for the financial and insurance services industry.

The Commission may also propose changes to the Tobacco Taxation Directive (which lays down EU-wide minimum tax rates on tobacco products), and the Excise Duty Directive (concerning excise duty rules on cross-border purchases of products, such as cigarettes and wine), taking into account the objectives of the Europe’s Beating Cancer plan.

The European Commission announced several other files during the last term that have yet to be tabled. These include for example an EU charter on taxpayer’s rights. This charter would pinpoint residual tax barriers within the single market (such as the taxation of cross-border teleworkers) and recommend best practices drawn from across the EU. Other potential upcoming initiatives include measures to tackle the role of ‘enablers‘ in creating complex and opaque tax structures, or to advance public transparency around multinationals’ tax payments. The Commission’s action plan for fair and simple taxation also committed to exploring how to make full use of Article 116 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to allow taxation proposals to be adopted by ordinary legislative procedure, under certain circumstances.

In the context of the repayment of Next Generation EU funds, the debate on new ‘own resources‘ – revenue streams to the EU budget – is likely to resurface. The Commission has already put forward several proposals, currently pending in Council. Revenue from other sources – such as the financial transaction tax (FTT), Pillar One or BEFIT – may be allocated to the EU budget in the future, if those initiatives are adopted.

A number of important taxation developments are meanwhile under way beyond the EU’s borders. Acting on a request made by the Brazilian presidency of the G20, professor Gabriel Zucman (head of the EU Tax Observatory) published a blueprint for a global minimum wealth tax in June 2024. Under the proposal, individuals with more than US$1 billion in wealth would be required to pay a minimum amount of tax annually, equal to 2 % of their wealth. G20 finance ministers meeting on 25-26 July will discuss a possible way forward.

A potential obstacle to the historic OECD Inclusive Framework agreement is the critical stance of the United States Congress, which could complicate application of Pillar One in particular. The European Parliament has called on the Commission to come forward with a unilateral measure – a digital levy on digital companies or similar – in the event that there is a clear lack of progress on Pillar One.

In addition, following criticism by a number of non-EU countries of the outcome of the OECD tax reform, work is ongoing to establish a United Nations (UN) framework convention for international tax cooperation. The EU position is that this convention should focus on strengthening tax enforcement mechanisms, mobilising domestic resources, and avoiding inconsistencies or overlaps with the OECD’s work.

This note updates a previous edition, from February 2024.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU taxation: Looking back, and ahead‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Union to introduce a new European tax on the super-rich. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since July 2024.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

English

In the European Union (EU), tax matters, such as the introduction of a tax, fall within the competence of the member countries, with the EU having only limited powers. In order to put in place new tax rules at EU level, national governments, meeting in the EU Council, must adopt them unanimously on a proposal from the European Commission. The European Parliament only has a consultative role in this procedure: the Council must seek Parliament’s opinion, but is not obliged to follow it.

Nevertheless, the European Parliament is attaching increasing importance to tax issues. In 2020, Parliament set up a subcommittee to its Committee on Economic Affairs to deal with tax matters, and particularly the fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance. Previously, Parliament had established several temporary committees to examine the tax practices revealed by the LuxLeaks and Panama Papers affairs among others. In July 2023, Parliament held a debate on the subject “Tax the rich”.

Finally, the President of the European Parliament cannot influence the decisions of the Members of the European Parliament. According to Rule 2 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, Members exercise their mandate freely and independently.

French

Dans l’Union européenne (UE), les questions fiscales, telles que l’introduction d’un impôt, relèvent de la compétence des pays membres, l’UE n’ayant que des compétences limitées en la matière. Pour mettre en place des règles fiscales au niveau de l’UE, les gouvernements nationaux, réunis au sein du Conseil de l’UE, doivent les adopter à l’unanimité sur proposition de la Commission européenne. Le Parlement européen n’a qu’un rôle consultatif dans cette procédure: le Conseil doit demander l’avis du Parlement, mais il n’est pas tenu de le suivre.

Le Parlement européen accorde néanmoins une importance croissante aux questions fiscales. En 2020 il a créé une sous-commission au sein de sa commission des affaires économiques pour traiter les questions fiscales, et notamment la lutte contre la fraude fiscale, l’évasion fiscale et l’optimisation fiscale. Auparavant, le Parlement avait constitué plusieurs commissions temporaires qui ont examiné les pratiques fiscales révélées en particulier par les affaires LuxLeaks et Panama Papers. En juillet 2023, le Parlement a tenu un débat sur le sujet « Taxer les riches ».

Enfin, la Présidente du Parlement européen ne peut influencer les décisions des députés européens. Conformément à l’article 2 du règlement intérieur du Parlement, les députés européens exercent leur mandat de façon libre et indépendante.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Whether we drive or take the train to work, or walk to the supermarket, we probably all use some form of transport every day. Transport is responsible for around 25 % of greenhouse gas emissions, and under the Green Deal, EU leaders agreed to cut transport-related emissions by 90 % by 2050. This means replacing fossil fuels, changing our habits and switching to greener ways of getting around. Developing public transport and promoting active mobility are key to reaching this climate target. A co-legislator for the European Climate Law and the ‘fit for 55’ initiatives, the European Parliament has adopted a number of resolutions encouraging the European Commission to take further action.

In its 2020 resolution on the Green Deal, Parliament called for zero-emission public transport as well as cycling and walking infrastructure to reduce congestion and improve liveability in towns and cities. A year later, the Commission announced its urban mobility framework.

Parliament later demanded EU countries develop safe, accessible, affordable, smart, resilient and sustainable urban transport systems. The 2023 own‑initiative resolution states EU countries should develop collective transport services, such as car sharing and e‑bikes, and also states national governments should encourage the use of individually owned bicycles and other micro-mobility vehicles by providing biking and charging infrastructure. The resolution highlights the important role of artificial intelligence (AI) and digital solutions and demands better solutions for ticketing.

Parliament has also repeatedly highlighted cycling as a green transport option. Cycling reduces road congestion and greenhouse gas emissions and has a favourable impact on health tourism, the cycling industry and local employment. In a 2021 resolution, Parliament welcomed new cycling infrastructure in some Member States, and argued for its further expansion. Parliament adopted its first resolution on cycling in February 2023. It asked the Commission to develop a European cycling strategy, and to recognise cycling as equal to other forms of transport. Parliament argued that urban planning should always build cycling into mobility solutions, and tied into inter-urban transport systems.

Parliament demanded that urban mobility policies at all levels consider cycling, including the needs of those with disabilities and reduced mobility. In response to Parliament’s initiatives, the Commission proposed a European Declaration on Cycling in October 2023, recognising cycling as one of the most sustainable, accessible and inclusive, low-cost and healthy forms of transport.

Parliament has used both its agenda-setting and law-making powers to encourage the use of more sustainable transport options, and many national authorities have responded by encouraging cycling. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

The European Parliament has long championed protection of human rights worldwide. To guarantee basic rights for everyone, it is important that those who violate human rights are punished. The EU adopted its own global human rights sanctions regime (EU GHRSR) in 2020, under which it can freeze assets and ban travel for people and organisations who seriously violate or abuse human rights, irrespective of where the infringement occurs. The EU applied its first human rights sanctions in March 2021 and by April 2024 had imposed restrictive measures on 108 individuals and 28 entities.

Even though Parliament has no formal role in the procedure for adopting new sanction regimes, it makes sure the human rights sanctions regime stays on the EU’s agenda. Parliament worked across three parliamentary terms between 2010 and 2020, using hearings, parliamentary questions, motions and own-initiative resolutions to call for EU-wide measures. After a 2018 position paper from the Dutch government led to discussion among EU Member States, Parliament stepped up its action, devoting a plenary debate to EU human rights sanctions in 2019, and adopting a resolution setting out recommendations. It adopted a further resolution in 2020, calling for the work to be finalised.

In May 2023, the High Representative, supported by the Commission, proposed to establish an EU foreign and security policy sanctions regime to target serious acts of corruption worldwide. The Commission and some Member States also support Parliament’s demand for Council decisions on sanctions to be adopted under qualified majority voting.

With attention now turning to the impact and effectiveness of the EU’s human rights sanctions, Parliament is pushing for a greater institutional role for itself, including parliamentary oversight of the EU GHRSR and an enhanced role in proposing cases for investigation. In 2023, a Parliament study recommended ways to expand its involvement in monitoring and scrutinising implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, for example through a dedicated parliamentary working group, development of an in-house monitoring capability, and more structured dialogue with other EU institutions on specific sanctions measures.

By pushing for external action and setting the EU’s agenda, Parliament ensures the issue of a human rights sanctions regime remains an EU priority. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Claudia Vinci.

The EU is the world’s largest milk producer. While milk is produced in all Member States, farm and herd sizes, yields and types of farming vary widely across Europe, from free-range farming in Alpine areas to large-scale specialised dairy farms. The EU’s dairy farmers produced 160 million tonnes of milk in 2022, 94 % of which was delivered to dairies where raw milk is processed into fresh products such as cheese or butter.

The EU dairy sector must comply with a large number of rules, covering hygiene, animal health and welfare, and official controls, among other things. However, there is also a range of instruments designed to support farmers and address market imbalances. These include common market organisation, public intervention and private storage provisions, direct payments and rural development measures, as part of the common agricultural policy (CAP). The CAP also encourages and supports producers’ organisations; these use their bargaining power to stabilise prices in the sector, thereby helping to increase farm milk prices and reduce price fluctuation.

In the coming years, growing EU and global demand is expected to support world dairy markets, but price fluctuations and market imbalances will continue to be problematic. Resilience and sustainability are key for the future of the sector. This can be achieved through innovation, as a way to reconcile the need for farmers to earn a decent living, consumer demand for affordable and quality dairy products, and environmental and animal health requirements.

This briefing updates a previous edition by Marie-Laure Augère-Granier, published in December 2018.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU dairy sector: Main features, challenges and prospects‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Distribution of dairy cows in the EU in 2020 Collection of cows’ milk by EU Member State

Written by David de Groot (updated on 02.08.2024).

People from racial and ethnic minority backgrounds face discrimination and its consequences on a daily basis. However, the exact scale of the problem is hard to gauge, owing to a lack of data and general under‑reporting of racist incidents. Although the European Union (EU) has been introducing legislation to combat racial and xenophobic discrimination since 2000, the problem persists. The global Black Lives Matter protests highlighted the need for new measures, while the COVID‑19 pandemic saw a major increase in reports of racist and xenophobic incidents, and the crisis it triggered had a disproportionately large negative effect on racial and ethnic minority groups, in the form of higher death and infection rates.

Studies point to the cost of racial discrimination not only for the individuals concerned, but also for society as a whole. For instance, a 2018 EPRS report argued that the loss in earnings caused by racial and ethnic discrimination for both individuals and societies amounts to billions of euros annually. EU citizens also acknowledge this problem: a 2019 survey found that over half of Europeans believe racial or ethnic discrimination to be widespread in their country.

To address racial discrimination and the inequalities it engenders, the European Commission has put forward a number of equality strategies and actions. The European Parliament, meanwhile, has long demanded an end to racial discrimination. In recent resolutions, Parliament has called for an end to structural racism, discrimination, racial profiling and police brutality; for protection of the right to protest peacefully; for an enhanced role for culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism; and for authorities to take an intersectional approach. On 20 and 21 March 2024, Members of the European Parliament from the Anti‑Racism and Diversity Intergroup (ARDI) co‑hosted the third EU Anti‑Racism and Diversity Week.

This updates a briefing from March 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU legislation and policies to fight racial and ethnic discrimination‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Prevalence of racial discrimination in different areas of life in the five years before the FRA 2022 EU Survey on Immigrants and Descendants of Immigrants, by country (%) Discrimination based on ethnic or immigrant background in different areas of life in the 12 months before the FRA EU MIDIS II survey of 2017, by survey target group (%)

You probably encounter artificial intelligence (AI) in your daily life, whether you are unlocking your phone using facial recognition or using ChatGPT to find some information quickly. While AI technologies can benefit society, create jobs and increase productivity, their application could also compromise fundamental rights and jeopardise users’ safety. The European Parliament has worked to define rules for AI systems that strike the right balance between fostering investment in this new technology and protecting fundamental rights.

Since 2020, Parliament has adopted several resolutions outlining how the EU should regulate AI to support innovation, ethical standards and trust in AI technology. It launched a Special Committee on AI in a Digital Age. In May 2022, Parliament adopted its roadmap to AI. Parliament advocated a horizontal, innovation-friendly regulation framework, proportionate to the specific types of risk particular AI systems incur.

The European Commission’s 2021 proposed AI Act was the first of its kind in the world. Parliament formally adopted the law in March 2024, and it is expected to enter into force soon. The rules laid down in the act apply to all AI systems sold or used in the EU, to ensure that only safe products are placed on the market. As Parliament advocated, the proposal introduced a risk-based approach: certain AI practices with unacceptable, harmful risks will be prohibited, high-risk AI systems regulated, and transparency obligations will apply for systems with minimal risk.

Parliament secured important changes to the initial proposal. The definition of AI systems is now aligned with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) text. Moreover, the list of prohibited AI systems has been extended, and systems that influence voter behaviour are labelled high-risk. Parliament also ensured high-risk systems have to undergo a fundamental rights impact assessment before they are brought to market. Thanks to Parliament, citizens will be able to file complaints about AI systems, and receive explanations about decisions that affect their rights made using high-risk systems.

Parliament also succeeded in shaping the response to the rapid development of general-purpose AI (GPAI) models powering AI tools like ChatGPT. Characterised by their large size, opacity and the fact that they can be used and adapted beyond the purpose for which they were designed, these models present ethical and social risks: discrimination, misinformation and privacy violations. The AI Act introduces obligations on transparency and copyright law, and ensures content used for training for all GPAI models is disclosed. More stringent obligations will apply for more powerful, high-impact GPAI models. The newly named European AI Office, established within the European Commission, will have investigatory and enforcement powers over GPAI models, and a link to the scientific community to support its work.

Parliament acted swiftly in the face of the opportunities and challenges of this new technology. Parliament has set the agenda and shaped the new laws to ensure we can reap the benefits of new AI technologies while protecting our fundamental rights. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting.

This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Micaela Del Monte.

Having been elected to the European Parliament in June 2024, two members of the European Commission – Virginijus Sinkevičius (Lithuania) and Adina Vălean (Romania) – have resigned as commissioners in order to take up their seats. In this situation, the usual rule is that the vacancy must be filled by a new commissioner of the same nationality – unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise. On 15 July 2024, the day before the Parliament’s constitutive session, Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, announced that Executive Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič (Slovakia) would take over the duties of Sinkevicius, and Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra (the Netherlands) those of Valean.

Background

The College of Commissioners currently consists of one national per Member State. Any commissioner elected to the European Parliament who decides to take up their seat must resign, as the two offices are incompatible (Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 7(1) of the Electoral Act). The EU Treaties require, as a general rule, that a vacancy caused by such a resignation be filled for the remainder of the Commission’s term of office by a new member of the same nationality, appointed by the Council. However, the Council may, acting unanimously, on a proposal from the President of the Commission, decide not to fill the vacancy ‘in particular when the remainder of the Member’s term of office is short’ (Article 246 TFEU). In this case, another commissioner might be required to take over the duties of the non-replaced commissioner in the interim.

After the 2014 elections, four members of the Commission took up seats in the European Parliament, and were replaced for the final months of their mandates. On that occasion, Parliament held hearings with the candidate replacements before voting on their appointment. More recently in July 2019, five members of the Juncker Commission were elected to Parliament and two of those decided to take up their seats: Andrus Ansip (Estonia) and Corina Creţu (Romania). President Juncker proposed not to replace them. He noted that, during the 4 remaining months, the Commission’s focus would be on completing pending proposals. Moreover, pointing to the financial burden entailed by such replacements, Juncker suggested that, given the practice of working in ‘project teams’, other commissioners would be ‘fully capable’ of stepping in for departing colleagues. However the Council could not agree unanimously on his proposal, and the procedure to replace the two commissioners was launched, with the Estonian and Romanian governments proposing candidates. In the end, however, the Council did not appoint new commissioners.

The 2024 European elections

Following the 2024 elections in June, four commissioners were elected to the European Parliament (Virginijus Sinkevičius, Commissioner for environment, oceans and fisheries; Valdis Dombrovskis – Latvia, Executive Vice-President responsible for an economy that works for people; Adina Vălean, responsible for transport; and Dubravka Šuica – Croatia, Vice-President responsible for democracy and demography). Sinkevičius and Vălean have joined the Parliament while Šuica and Dombrovskis have remained in office. In July 2024, before Parliament’s constitutive plenary session, Ursula von der Leyen announced that Šefčovič would take over the portfolio of Sinkevičius (environment and fisheries) while Hoekstra would take over Vălean’s portfolio (transport). On 24 July, following von der Leyen’s proposal, the Council formally and unanimously took the decision not to fill the vacancies caused by the resignation of Sinkevičius and Vălean.

This is an update of an ‘at-a-glance‘ note written in July 2019 by Laura Tilindyte.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Replacement or otherwise of commissioners elected to the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are concerned about the arrest of Captain Paul Watson in Greenland. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since July 2024, asking her to intervene with the Danish authorities to stop Captain Watson from being extradited to Japan.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

Extradition is a national responsibility

According to European Union (EU) law, the European Parliament is not authorised to intervene in an extradition process, which is the responsibility of national authorities.

Although there is an EU-Agreement between the European Union and Japan on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, it states that is does not apply to extradition (Article 1). 

European Parliament position on whaling

In an October 2022 resolution, the European Parliament calls on Japan, Norway and Iceland to cease their whaling operations. Parliament strongly supports the continuation of the global moratorium on commercial whaling as well as the ban on international trade of whale products.

In an earlier resolution from June 2021, the European Parliament regrets Japan’s withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission and urges Norway and Japan to cease their whaling operations. Parliament also stresses the importance of protecting whale populations, from both a biodiversity and climate perspective.

EU laws protecting whales

The EU has adopted measures to protect cetaceans (whales, dolphins and porpoises) against hunting, capture and captivity, and against deliberate disturbance or trading, including cetacean products originating from non-EU countries.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.