European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The EU’s leaders took two crucial decisions at their summit on 27 June to set the framework for the new institutional cycle: one on high-level appointments, the other on the Union’s political priorities for the next 5 years, the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. Since the adoption of the previous edition of the EU’s long-term priorities in 2019, the EU has had to face major crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the energy crisis, and the change in the security environment following Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.

Are these global challenges reflected in the EU’s new long-term political priorities or has the list of political orientations remained unchanged? Is the new Strategic Agenda more of a continuation or does it constitute a real shift? To answer these questions, this briefing examines the new Strategic Agenda, outlining its content, developments in its substance during the adoption process, and similarities and differences with the political priorities set in the previous institutional cycles.

The findings of the analysis (see the table in the Annex) show that the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 constitutes an important shift in the EU’s political priorities compared with the previous Strategic Agenda, but that elements of continuity remain quite apparent nevertheless. The most obvious changes are the significance of security and defence, the importance granted to enlargement, the addition of new elements on EU competitiveness, and the salience of democracy (within the Union and in relations with third countries), which is a headline priority for the first time. Another noteworthy development is that less attention is paid to climate and environmental issues, even if some points were introduced during the drafting process.

At the same time, there is a substantial degree of continuity with the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024. Less than 20 % of the policy aspects are completely new, even though the length of the Strategic Agenda document has increased by 25 %. This observation tends to indicate that the previous EU priorities remain relevant and that a reshaping of the Agenda (rather than starting from scratch) was considered sufficient. Interestingly, many of the elements added seem to be a reiteration of policy issues addressed by the European Council in its conclusions over the last 5 years. Thus, the document appears to be a collection of previously agreed positions rather than a new set of guidelines. While the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the change in the geopolitical context have fed into the new Strategic Agenda, other major issues of recent years such as health and energy are less explicitly referred to than could have been expected considering the severity of the crises with which the EU has been confronted.

The European Council’s role in setting the EU’s political priorities

The European Council is composed of the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States, as well as its President and the President of the European Commission. Its role, as defined in Article 15 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to define its ‘general political directions and priorities’. The European Council sets the 5-year political priorities for the EU, at the start of the institutional cycle, shortly after the European elections, in a document known as the Strategic Agenda.

The Strategic Agenda influences the political priorities of the new Commission President and feeds into the subsequent Commission annual work programmes. Therefore, the guidelines outlined in the Strategic Agenda are likely to be reflected in the legislative proposals put forward by the Commission and, in turn, in the legislative work of the Parliament and the Council.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Strategic Agenda 2024-2029: Continuity or paradigm shift?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rebecca Torpey.

On 18 July, over 40 European leaders gathered for the fourth meeting of the European Political Community (EPC). It followed a series of international summits in the preceding weeks, including a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit and a G7 summit, plus two European Council meetings. Conflicts on the European continent and in its neighbourhood, as well as the upcoming United States presidential elections and their potential ramifications were most likely at the forefront of leaders’ minds. European unity in its support for Ukraine was the overarching theme, alongside three roundtable topics: migration, energy, and defending and securing democracy. The reset of the relationship between the United Kingdom and its European counterparts was also a clear ambition of the newly elected UK government, hosting the event. As with the previous EPC meetings, no concrete deliverables or statements were announced at the end of the summit.

1.     Background

The EPC’s fourth summit meeting took place on 18 July 2024 in the United Kingdom (UK), at Blenheim Palace in Oxfordshire, two weeks after the UK general election. It was French President Emmanuel Macron who originally proposed the idea, on 9 May 2022, of developing a forum for political dialogue between European countries. It was clarified at the first EPC that the intention of the informal platform was to foster discussion between peers at the highest level and build cooperation on issues of concern for the European continent. No declarations are therefore released after EPC meetings.

The EPC has no official budget or secretariat, with the host country taking on the majority of the organisational duties. In addition, tangible results and deliverables are limited, leading some to doubt the usefulness of the forum. Some academics have argued that establishing bureaucratic structures would increase transparency and differentiate the EPC from other European institutions. Others have suggested its informality and lack of institutionalisation have allowed the EPC to fill a gap. It has been reported, however, that European leaders want the EPC to remain informal.

EPC summits are held on a bi-annual basis, hosted alternately by a European Union (EU) and a non-EU country. The next EPC meeting is due to be hosted on 7 November 2024 by Hungary, which currently holds the rotating EU Council Presidency. However, a number of EU countries have downgraded their participation or even considered boycotting informal Council and European Council meetings chaired by Hungary following the ‘peace missions’ and international diplomacy carried out by Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, without prior EU coordination. However, the EPC is not an EU forum. Therefore, even if the boycott and/or downgrading is still ongoing, it does not guarantee that the EPC meeting would be impacted in the same way. Albania is expected to host the sixth EPC summit, during the first half of 2025.

In October 2022, the inaugural meeting of the EPC took place in Prague – the day before Czechia also hosted an informal European Council meeting in Prague Castle. The main discussion topics were peace and security, energy, and economic issues. The European leaders were also forthright about their unity in condemning Russia’s war on Ukraine and expressing support for Ukraine.

In June 2023, the second EPC meeting was hosted by Moldova, a country strongly affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine. Peace and security, and energy and interconnectivity were the two main agenda points. However, peace and security was the clear focus of the meeting, which took place in Bulboaca, a few kilometres from the Ukrainian border.

In October 2023, the third meeting of the EPC took place in Granada, Spain, continuing the trend of the host alternating between the EU country holding the rotating presidency of the Council and a non-EU country. During this meeting, European leaders discussed digitalisation, energy, and conflicts in Europe; they also emphasised their unity in support of Ukraine.

2.     Participation

Leaders from across Europe (with the exception of Russia and Belarus) were invited to participate in the fourth EPC summit. Over 40 heads of state or government took part in this EPC, including 24 EU Member States. Azerbaijan, which did not attend the EPC meeting in Granada, took part this time around. Again, for the third time, Türkiye did not attend. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, attended the summit and represented the EU. As the vote for the re-election of Ursula von der Leyen as European Commission President was also scheduled for 18 July on the European Parliament’s plenary agenda, von der Leyen was not present at the summit.

Source: European Council website.

For the first time, representatives of NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe attended the EPC. According to a UK government press release, the participation of these organisations was designed to demonstrate ‘the importance of unity in response to the arc of conflict and instability inside and near Europe’s borders that affects the UK and the continent’s interests equally’. Broadening participation to other international organisations may also have arisen from the desire of the previous UK government to limit the EU institutions’ role.

3.     Meeting format

The summit began with a plenary opened by host Prime Minister Keir Starmer. In his address, Starmer reaffirmed that the UK would stand with Ukraine as long as it takes and touched on the topics of the upcoming roundtables. Starmer also signalled that he wanted to reset the EU-UK relationship, stating that by working together EU countries ‘are a powerful force for good’ across the European continent. Then, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed European leaders, underlining the importance of European unity in the face of Russia’s attempts to create division and – without directly naming him – criticising Orbán’s recent ‘peace missions’ to Moscow and Beijing. European leaders then gathered for the family photo – a tradition at such summits.

The opening plenary was followed by three roundtables on: i) migration; ii) energy; and iii) defending and securing democracy. The roundtable model had already been used successfully at the previous EPC meetings as well as at the EU-African Union Summit in 2022. In contrast with previous EPC summits, the discussion at the roundtables was guided by key questions. Those questions had been prepared by government representatives (i.e. sherpas) and policy analysts during three expert meetings, co-organised by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office as well as the UK Mission to the EU.

Addressing European leaders at the closing plenary, the UK Prime Minister – building on his earlier comments about resetting EU-UK relationships – welcomed the rapprochement that had occurred at the summit. European leaders also attended a reception hosted by King Charles III in Blenheim Palace’s Long Library.

In addition, a number of smaller meetings were held in the margins of the summit. Charles Michel, Kier Starmer, Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and Moldovan President Maia Sandu met to discuss how their countries could strengthen their cooperation in order to support Moldova on its road to a more secure and prosperous future. On the sidelines of the EPC summit it was also announced that Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala, had signed a defence and security agreement.

4.     Summit hosts

The UK hosted the fourth EPC (the second time it had been hosted by a non-EU Member State) just two weeks after a general election that brought Starmer’s Labour party into government in the UK for the first time in 14 years. This provided an opportune moment for the new British Prime Minister to meet numerous European leaders, with Starmer describing the summit as ‘political speed-dating’.

Previous EPC summits had provided the host countries with an opportunity to showcase a topic of importance to them. Although it was not an official item on the agenda, Starmer emphasised that his focus was on resetting the UK’s relations with other European countries. This new chapter in EU-UK relations was apparent in Starmer’s prioritisation of bilateral meetings with the UK’s two closest neighbours. On the eve of the EPC, Starmer hosted the Irish Taoiseach, Simon Harris, for dinner at his country residence – the first official visitor he has met as Prime Minister. During the evening of the EPC, Starmer then hosted a bilateral dinner with President Macron. Starmer’s opening address was further evidence of a new UK attitude towards its European counterparts: ‘We want to work with all of you…To reset relationships…Rediscover our common interest…And renew the bonds of trust and friendship’; his address built on the King’s speech in the UK Parliament the previous day, which stressed that the new UK government would ‘reset the relationship with European partners’. In a doorstep interview, Charles Michel stated that ‘on the EU side we are ready to cooperate much more with the United Kingdom’. There have also been reports of a potential bilateral summit between the EU and UK, and at the EPC, Michel indicated to reporters that ‘It’d be good if this is possible in the future to have a bilateral summit so that we can put in place a clear framework for strategic cooperation between the United Kingdom and the EU’.

5. Key discussion topics

While there were three roundtable agenda topics, the war in Ukraine was the overarching issue that permeated all European leaders’ discussions. In his opening address, Starmer stated ‘So our first task here today is to confirm our steadfast support for Ukraine, to unite once again behind those values that we cherish and to say, we will face down aggression on this continent – together’. The importance of supporting Ukraine was also reflected in that fact that President Zelenskyy was given the floor to address European leaders right after Starmer at the opening plenary session.

Migration

The EPC roundtable on migration was led by Italy and Albania. In his doorstep interview, Michel stated that migration was a global challenge. As part of the reset in relations with the EU, one of the key areas for potential cooperation is illegal immigration. The UK reportedly wanted to discuss asylum-seekers crossing the Channel and an EU-wide returns agreement. In addition, Starmer stated that the UK had to tackle the ‘drivers of migration’ with its partners.

Defending and securing democracy

The roundtable on defending and securing democracy was led by France and Moldova. Both countries want to launch an EPC-level network to combat disinformation and foreign interference in Europe. When addressing the European Parliament in plenary on the day of her re-election, President von der Leyen announced that the Commission would propose a ‘European democracy shield’ – a structure dedicated to countering foreign information manipulation and interference. With Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine still on-going, discussions on the threat from Russia as well as mutual defence and security were at the core of EPC discussions. Security and defence is another area on which the UK government seems keen to increase cooperation with the EU. An EU-UK security pact was reportedly discussed at the NATO summit in Washington the week before.

Energy

The discussion on energy connectivity was led by the EU and Montenegro. Building energy resilience, a topic which has received increased attention at European Council level since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, was an important point of focus at this roundtable. European leaders also discussed new sanctions against 11 vessels that have been identified as carriers of Russian oil. European leaders also touched upon preparations for Ukraine’s energy needs in the upcoming winter.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Political Community meeting in Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, on 18 July 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

In today’s global, saturated textile and fashion system, obtaining accurate and precise data from upstream actors or from the supply chain can be challenging. Sustainability requires transparency, circularity, and more demand-driven operations; all this could help to bring down the textile production and consumption figures associated with ‘fast fashion’. Customer‑centric product design and production require new operations and business models based on more accurate data. The circular economy also entails new partnerships and open data sharing between actors in the ecosystem.

Transparency and traceability are challenging issues in today’s long, global, and saturated textile supply chains. The further down the supply chain the need for information goes, the harder it is to obtain reliable and accurate data.  Supply chain processes meanwhile generate a huge amount of data which, if correctly collected and precisely analysed, can help companies make more sustainable decisions throughout the entire upstream supply chain (from the fibre to the product phase).

The move towards a circular economy brings with it the need to acquire new kinds of data from downstream actions such as reuse, reselling, and recycling. This data is still largely missing, and new tools, measurements, and standards need to be developed to obtain and share data from these actions.

To realise the European Commission’s vision of a sustainable and circular textile sector, several regulations are on the way. The idea is that this will lead to the development of more sustainable practices in the industry and in business. Moreover, consumers might also change their behaviour if they are better informed. All this requires measurements and evaluations based on reliable data on the resources, materials, products, and processes used during a product’s lifetime.

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently published a study entitled ‘Identifying data gaps in the textile industry and assessing current initiatives to address them‘. This study examines data gaps throughout the textile supply and value chains, from the fibre to the end-of-product life stage. It also exposes the challenges involved: missing data, data accessibility, data management, reliability, and relevance, mandatory or non-mandatory data collection, data sharing, and data cost challenges. Drawing on a literature review, 17 stakeholder interviews and 2 expert workshops, it gathers essential insights from the field and evaluates current and forthcoming initiatives to address data gaps. It also discusses policy options geared towards harnessing data to contribute to the sustainable transition and implementation of a circular economy in the textile sector.

Read the full STOA study and the options brief to find out more. This research was presented to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 14 March 2024, together with a complementary study on the ‘digital product passport for the textile sector‘, which was followed by the release of a promotional video.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Ingeborg Odink (1st edition).

Child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are some of the most severe forms of violence against children, and they are crimes that know no borders. The constant increase in these crimes, exacerbated by the pandemic and the use of modern technologies, underscores the need for harmonised national legislation and international cooperation to improve prevention, protect victims and prosecute perpetrators.

The statistics for Europe are staggering, as acknowledged by both governmental and non-governmental organisations. Reports indicate that one in five children has experienced some form of sexual violence, with 70-85 % of child victims knowing their abuser. The EU has made combating child sexual abuse, both offline and online, a top priority of its agenda and a key objective of the EU security union strategy for 2020 to 2025.

The primary legislative instrument in this area for the EU is Directive 2011/93/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. However, a recent ex-post evaluation highlighted limitations in the directive, particularly in addressing technological advances since its entry into force.

To align the directive with these changes, on 6 February 2024 the Commission submitted a proposal for a revision of the directive. In Parliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The committee adopted its draft report on 24 April 2024.

Complete version

• July 2024: Combating child sexual abuse: Revising Directive (2011/93/EU) – recast (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child sexual abuse material and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (recast)Committee responsible:Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2024)060
6.2.2024Former rapporteur:Jeroen Lenaers (EPP, Netherlands)2024/0035(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be appointedOrdinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Awaiting committee decision

Written by Krisztina Binder.

The European Union (EU) has been pursuing cultural cooperation with its Mediterranean partners for decades, enhancing dialogue and understanding between people. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), an intergovernmental organisation composed of the 27 EU Member States and 16 Mediterranean partner countries, recently launched the Mediterranean Capitals of Culture & Dialogue initiative to promote diversity and shared cultural identity in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Alexandria in Egypt and Tirana in Albania have been chosen to become the first Mediterranean Capitals of Culture and Dialogue, in 2025.

Introduction

The Euro-Mediterranean region boasts a rich and diverse cultural life and heritage, shaped by the coexistence of various cultures and traditions and millennia of cultural exchange. Culture has therefore been an area of cooperation between the EU and its partners in the Mediterranean region for many years. EU cultural cooperation in the region is guided by the significant role that culture plays in achieving sustainable human development. The Commission’s New European Agenda for Culture, adopted in 2018, identified culture as a vector for sustainable social and economic development and a factor in promoting peace, including through people-to-people contacts fostered by education and youth projects. Cultural co‑creation meanwhile serves as a valuable tool for communicating EU values, including artistic freedom and cultural rights.

In 2022, a conference of Euro-Mediterranean region culture ministers – the first such ministerial meeting of the EU-Southern Partnership – was held in Naples, following up on the first G20 meeting devoted to culture, held a year earlier. The protection of cultural heritage and the role of culture in sustainable development were among the topics discussed at the conference. Its outcomes paved the way for new EU programmes supporting cultural initiatives in the Mediterranean.

Cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean region

Over the years, the network supporting Euro-Mediterranean relations has expanded. Several frameworks offer a structure for these relations and serve to promote cooperation in various areas, including culture.

The EU’s privileged partnership with the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern shores began in 1995, when the then 15 EU Member States and 12 Mediterranean partner countries launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona process. The objective was to establish an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity, while promoting better understanding among people through social, cultural and human exchange. The partners recognised the pivotal role of culture in relations between countries and understood that dialogue between cultures and human exchanges could further strengthen their relations.

Since 2004, European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) has governed relations between the EU and 16 of its geographically closest eastern and southern neighbours. Under the 2015 revised ENP, a 2021 joint communication on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood proposed a new agenda for the Mediterranean to relaunch and strengthen the strategic partnership with the 10 southern partners. This agenda guides the EU’s bilateral, regional and cross-regional cooperation under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). It also emphasises the need to foster inter‑religious and intercultural dialogues and enhance the capacity to combat the illegal trafficking of cultural heritage.

The 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme for the Southern Neighbourhood outlines the strategic priorities for regional cooperation, noting that ‘The role of culture as a vector for peace, democracy and economic development will continue to be supported to help build a more inclusive Mediterranean. Culture is a field where there is a real added value in working at regional level to reduce social isolation and build connections across the Mediterranean region’.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched in 2008, building on the Barcelona process and seeking to reinforce the partnership. Complementing EU bilateral and regional cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood, the UfM is an intergovernmental organisation that gathers all the EU Member States and 16 Mediterranean partner countries. It promotes regional cooperation and dialogue through the implementation of projects and initiatives addressing the objectives of regional stability, human development and economic integration. The permanent UfM secretariat, located in Barcelona, works closely with other institutions – such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM (PA-UfM) and the Euro‑Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) – to pursue the Barcelona process objectives.

Examples of cultural cooperation

Since 1995, a wide range of initiatives, programmes and projects have been developed to promote the exchange of ideas and foster better mutual knowledge and understanding.

Under the Barcelona process, the implementation of the partnership’s cultural dimension included the Euromed Heritage programme, which aimed to highlight and safeguard the physical and non-material heritage of the Mediterranean. The evaluation of its first phase, launched in 1998, emphasised that the region’s common cultural heritage benefited dialogue and cultural understanding.

The Euromed Audiovisual programme, initiated in 2000, supported Euro-Mediterranean cooperation projects in radio, television and cinema.

The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF), inaugurated in 2005, seeks to foster intercultural and civil society dialogue by bringing together civil society from across Europe and the Mediterranean to work on issues related to youth, media, values, religion, peace, co-existence and others.

To honour the cultural richness of the region, the UfM launched the Day of the Mediterranean – marked every year on 28 November – to foster a common Mediterranean identity, promote intercultural exchange and celebrate the region’s diversity.

Jointly coordinated with ALF and in partnership with ARLEM, the UfM has also recently launched the Mediterranean Capitals of Culture and Dialogue. The initiative is based on the 2022 Naples Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean/EU Southern Partnership culture ministers, who called for the creation of a Capital of Mediterranean Culture modelled on the European Capitals of Culture. A recommendation to the same effect by over 200 young civil society representatives was presented at the 2022 Forum des mondes méditerranéens. The new initiative, under which a northern and a southern Mediterranean city will be selected each year, is designed to promote the region’s cultural diversity and foster better mutual understanding among its people. Following a call for applications, Alexandria and Tirana were chosen to be the first Mediterranean Capitals of Culture and Dialogue in 2025, with a year-long programme planned for each city. The deadline for local and regional authorities representing cities from the UfM region to submit their applications for the 2026 edition was early July 2024.

The UfM also identifies and supports cooperation projects that reinforce partnerships across the region. For instance, the Euromed University of Fes (UEMF) in Morocco and the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) in Slovenia promote dialogue, mutual understanding and intercultural exchange. Within this context, fostering intercultural dialogue through educational, professional, cultural, and artistic exchange among young people in the Euro-Mediterranean region, in collaboration with ALF, is another of the UfM youth strategy‘s key actions.

Recently, a project to boost the cultural and creative industries and their contribution to economic growth and job creation was signed as part of a programme, the first in the context of the Morocco-EU partnership to support the cultural and creative industries in Morocco. Another initiative is CREACT4MED, a 4-year (2020- 2024) regional programme seeking to promote entrepreneurship and employment creation for youth and women by harnessing the cultural and creative industries in the Southern Neighbourhood.

In October 2021, the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) and Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) held a joint public hearing on ‘Culture in the EU’s external relations’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Euro-Mediterranean cultural cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai.

In June 2024, European citizens voted for their representatives in the European Parliament for the next five years, to defend their interests in the EU. This year’s election saw turnout of 51.1%, slightly higher than the previous election in 2019 (50.7%). The number of political groups has increased from seven to eight at the start of the new term. Half of the elected Members (MEPs) elected are new to the European Parliament. Women now make up 38.5% of all MEPs; this share is 2.1 percentage points lower than in the previous term (40.6%), the first significant drop since direct elections started in 1979.

Read this infographic on ‘Members of the European Parliament, 2024-2029‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

Critical and strategic raw materials are essential for the EU economy, its society and policy objectives. At the same time, their supply is at risk today – or in the foreseeable future. Raw material supply has become more salient since the introduction of the EU raw materials initiative, culminating with the recent adoption of the Critical Raw Materials Act. A new STOA study, with its associated options brief, aim at contributing to increasing EU strategic autonomy in critical raw materials through the instrumental role of research and innovation (R&I) in strengthening the EU’s global position.

Critical raw materials (CRM) are necessary for a robust EU economy but are also diverse in their nature and the challenges they pose. Methodologies exist to assess and monitor risks and possible impacts of supply disruption. Despite challenges regarding access to timely, high-quality data, these methodologies address both the status quo (CRM) and future developments (strategic raw materials, SRM) regarding supply and demand for raw materials. The outcome of CRM assessments has changed over time due to changing supply and demand realities. This will also continue to be the case in the assessment of SRM. These assessments and the accompanying background work provide a view of the entire supply chain for CRM. Options can then be developed to minimise supply risks and increase resilience.

The EU has addressed the issue of raw material criticality, including through strong engagement in R&I for CRM. EU policy, from the 2008 raw materials initiative to the recent Critical Raw Materials Act, has stressed the role of R&I. In parallel with this political focus, funding has increased significantly in EU programmes, including past Framework Programmes and the current Horizon Europe, as well as EIT RawMaterials, now reaching the end of its funding period. All this has allowed the EU to become an important patenting actor, especially in mining/processing and recycling, with strong international ties (particularly to the USA). Continued funding and policy support will be key to maintaining and profiting from this position.

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently published ‘The role of research and innovation in ensuring a safe and sustainable supply of critical raw materials in the EU‘. This study aims at illuminating the R&I’s role in ensuring a safe and sustainable supply of CRM. It provides background information on CRMs, related EU policies, sustainability issues, and public controversy, then identifies their connections with their respective needs for R&I. The study reviews the role of R&I and cooperation in securing the EU’s raw material supply, highlighting the significance of R&I along the value chain and analysing patenting activities and international cooperation. It concludes by presenting 11 policy options on EU institutional and R&I capacities, international collaboration and legitimacy, assessing each against a list of dimensions including costs, benefits and feasibility.

Read the full STOA study and the Options Brief to find out more. The study was presented to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 25 April 2024, which was followed by the release of a promotional video. Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The first plenary session of the tenth parliamentary term took place in Strasbourg from 16 to 19 July 2024. The Members of the new Parliament (sitting from 2024 to 2029) elected certain of their peers to the most important offices in Parliament – the President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors. During this session, Members also decided on the numerical strength of the standing committees, sub-committees and delegations. They held a debate on the need for the EU’s continued support for Ukraine, and then adopted a resolution reiterating support for Ukraine and condemning, in particular, Russia’s recent attacks on the country. However, the most discussed business was the debate with the candidate for President of the European Commission, and Members’ subsequent vote to confirm Ursula von der Leyen as President-elect for a new five-year mandate.

Election of the President of the European Parliament

In a secret ballot (under Rule 16 of the revised Rules of Procedure), the newly elected Members first voted for a new President. Candidates could be proposed by a political group (or individual Members amounting to 1/20th of the whole Parliament). The outgoing President, Roberta Metsola (EPP, Malta), was elected for a second two‑and‑a‑half year mandate, on the first ballot, by 562 votes of 623 valid votes cast, with only one other candidate standing (Irene Montero, The Left, Spain).

Election of Parliament’s Vice-Presidents and Quaestors

Members then elected 14 Vice-Presidents, in two rounds of voting. The Vice-Presidents, who also serve a two-and-a-half year term, chair debates when the President cannot, with each Vice-President also responsible for specific aspects of parliamentary business. Members also elected Parliament’s five Quaestors, who are responsible for administrative and financial matters that directly concern Members and their working conditions. With the President and Vice-Presidents, the Quaestors make up Parliament’s Bureau, although the latter participate in an advisory capacity only.

New parliamentary committees

Before Parliament’s committees can hold their constitutive meetings, the Conference of Presidents (of the political groups) proposes the number of Members to sit on each committee. Members approved the proposal of the numbers to sit on the 20 committees and 4 sub-committees as well as the 48 standing delegations (under Rules 212 and 229). The Members appointed to each committee by the political groups (plus non-attached Members) were announced on 19 July. The committees should then elect their chairs and vice-chairs during meetings planned for 23 July. These appointments are generally the subject of an informal agreement among the political groups, using the d’Hondt method, and are expected to reflect the plurality of Member States and a fair representation of political views.

Election of the President of the European Commission

While the majority of EU leaders endorsed a second mandate for Ursula von der Leyen during the 27 June European Council meeting, she still needed the support of an absolute majority of Members of Parliament – at least 361). Members confirmed Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President-elect, by secret ballot with 401 votes for, 284 against and 15 abstentions.

Ursula von der Leyen presented her priorities for the next term in office, then debated with Members. These priorities will set the course for the whole term, against which Members scrutinise the Commission’s progress. Together, the new Commission President and EU governments will now propose the candidates for Commissioner posts. Parliament organises hearings of the Commissioners-designate, so that Members from the relevant parliamentary committees can assess their suitability. Members will then decide whether to approve the Commission as a whole at a plenary session later in the year.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – July 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Parliament to prioritise the End the Cage Age European citizens’ initiative in its legislative work. As the European Commission postponed its proposal on cage-free farming initially due at the end of 2023, many people have written to the European Parliament on this subject since July 2024.

We replied to those who took the time to write to the European Parliament (in Italian, Dutch, Spanish, English, French, Portuguese and German).

Italian

Il Parlamento europeo ha affrontato regolarmente la questione del a questione del benessere degli animali.

Nella risoluzione del 2021, il Parlamento ha invitato la Commissione europea a proporre una legge per abolire gradualmente l’uso delle gabbie negli allevamenti dell’UE, con l’obiettivo di eliminarlo entro il 2027, dando seguito all’iniziativa dei cittadini europei “End the Cage Age” (Basta animali in gabbia).

Il Parlamento ha anche istituito una commissione d’inchiesta sulla protezione degli animali durante il trasporto. Nel gennaio 2022, il Parlamento ha invitato il Consiglio dell’UE e la Commissione a rafforzare la protezione degli animali durante il trasporto all’interno e all’esterno dell’UE.

I deputati al Parlamento europeo hanno chiesto in diverse occasioni alla Commissione di spiegare perché non ha presentato una proposta sull’allevamento senza gabbie. Nel gennaio 2024, la Commissione ha risposto che la transizione verso sistemi senza gabbie richiede ulteriori consultazioni sui costi e sulla durata del periodo di transizione. Nel marzo 2024, una Commissaria ha dichiarato al Parlamento che sono ancora in corso i lavori relativi al seguito della risposta all’iniziativa End the Cage Age.

Il ruolo della Commissione è quello di proporre nuove leggi. Tuttavia, il Parlamento valuta le misure adottate dalla Commissione in risposta a un’iniziativa dei cittadini europei.

Vorremmo aggiungere che il Parlamento europeo dovrebbe continuare a lavorare su due proposte legislative sul benessere degli animali che la Commissione ha presentato nel dicembre 2023. In risposta al lavoro della commissione d’inchiesta del Parlamento, la prima proposta mira a rafforzare le norme UE sulla protezione degli animali durante il trasporto. La seconda introduce nuove norme sul benessere e la tracciabilità di cani e gatti, con prescrizioni per allevatori, rifugi e negozi di animali.

Dutch

Het Europees Parlement heeft dierenwelzijn regelmatig onder de aandacht gebracht.

In een resolutie van 2021 verzocht het Parlement de Europese Commissie een wet voor te stellen om het gebruik van kooien op Europese landbouwbedrijven geleidelijk af te schaffen, met als einddoel uiterlijk in 2027 een einde te maken aan het fokken in kooien, naar aanleiding van het Europees burgerinitiatief “End the Cage Age”.

Het Parlement heeft ook een enquêtecommissie opgericht over de bescherming van dieren tijdens het vervoer. In januari 2022 riep het Parlement de Raad van de EU en de Europese Commissie ertoe op de bescherming van dieren tijdens het vervoer binnen en buiten de EU te versterken.

De leden van het Europees Parlement hebben de Commissie herhaaldelijk gevraagd uit te leggen waarom zij geen voorstel over kooivrije landbouw heeft ingediend. In januari 2024 heeft de Commissie geantwoord dat de overgang naar kooivrije systemen verder overleg vereist over de kosten en de duur van de overgangsperiode. In maart 2024 deelde een Eurocommissaris het Parlement mee dat er verder wordt gewerkt aan de follow-up van het initiatief “End the Cage Age”.

Het is de taak van de Commissie om nieuwe wetten voor te stellen. Het Parlement beoordeelt echter de maatregelen die de Commissie naar aanleiding van een Europees burgerinitiatief heeft genomen.

Hier voegen wij graag aan toe dat het Parlement naar verwachting zal blijven werken aan twee wetgevingsvoorstellen over dierenwelzijn die de Commissie in december 2023 heeft gepresenteerd. Als reactie op de werkzaamheden van de enquêtecommissie van het Parlement heeft het eerste voorstel tot doel de EU-regels op het vlak van de bescherming van dieren tijdens het vervoer aan te scherpen. Het tweede voorstel bevat nieuwe regels voor het welzijn en de traceerbaarheid van honden en katten, met voorschriften voor fokkers, asielen en dierenwinkels.

Spanish

El Parlamento Europeo ha abordado con frecuencia la cuestión del bienestar animal.

En una Resolución de 2021, el Parlamento pidió a la Comisión Europea que propusiera una ley para eliminar gradualmente el uso de jaulas en las explotaciones agrícolas de la Unión, con el objetivo de poner fin a la cría en jaulas a más tardar en 2027, como seguimiento de la iniciativa ciudadana europea «End the Cage Age» (Acabemos con las jaulas).

El Parlamento también creó una comisión de investigación sobre la protección de los animales durante el transporte. En enero de 2022, el Parlamento pidió al Consejo de la UE y a la Comisión que reforzaran la protección de los animales durante el transporte dentro y fuera de la UE.

Los diputados al Parlamento Europeo han pedido reiteradamente a la Comisión que explique por qué no ha presentado una propuesta sobre la cría sin jaulas. En enero de 2024, la Comisión respondió que la transición a sistemas sin jaulas requiere nuevas consultas sobre los costes y la duración del período transitorio. En marzo de 2024, una comisaria dijo al Parlamento que proseguían los trabajos de seguimiento de la iniciativa «End the Cage Age».

Corresponde a la Comisión proponer nueva legislación. Sin embargo, el Parlamento evalúa las medidas adoptadas por la Comisión en respuesta a una iniciativa ciudadana europea.

Se espera que el Parlamento continúe trabajando en dos propuestas legislativas sobre bienestar animal que la Comisión presentó en diciembre de 2023. En respuesta al trabajo de la comisión de investigación del Parlamento, la primera propuesta tiene por objeto reforzar las normas de la Unión sobre la protección de los animales durante el transporte. La segunda introduce nuevas normas sobre el bienestar y la trazabilidad de perros y gatos, con requisitos para criadores, refugios y tiendas de mascotas.

English

The European Parliament has regularly addressed the issue of animal welfare.

In a 2021 resolution, Parliament called on the European Commission to propose a law to phase out the use of cages on EU farms, with the aim of ending cage-farming by 2027, following up the European citizens’ initiative ‘End the Cage Age’.

Parliament also set up a committee of inquiry on the protection of animals during transport. In January 2022, Parliament then called on the Council of the EU and the Commission to strengthen the protection of animals during transport within and outside the EU.

Members of the European Parliament have repeatedly asked the Commission to explain why it has not put forward a proposal on cage-free farming. In January 2024, the Commission replied that the transition to cage-free systems requires further consultations concerning the costs and the length of the transitional period. In March 2024, a Commissioner told Parliament that work was continuing on the follow-up to the End the Cage Age initiative.

It is the Commission’s role to propose new laws. However, Parliament assesses the measures taken by the Commission in response to a European citizen’s initiative.

We would add that Parliament is expected to continue work on two legislative proposals on animal welfare that the Commission presented in December 2023. In response to the work of Parliament’s committee of inquiry, the first proposal aims to strengthen EU rules on the protection of animals during transport. The second introduces new rules on the welfare and traceability of dogs and cats, with requirements for breeders, shelters and pet shops.

French

Le Parlement européen s’est régulièrement penché sur la question du bien-être animal.

Dans une résolution de 2021, le Parlement a invité la Commission européenne à proposer une loi supprimant progressivement, d’ici à 2027,  l’utilisation des cages dans les exploitations agricoles de l’Union européenne (UE), en réponse à l’initiative citoyenne européenne « End the Cage Age » (Pour une nouvelle ère sans cage).

Le Parlement a également créé une commission d’enquête sur la protection des animaux pendant le transport. En janvier 2022, le Parlement a ensuite invité le Conseil et la Commission à renforcer la protection des animaux pendant le transport à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur de l’UE.

Les députés au Parlement européen ont demandé à plusieurs reprises à la Commission d’expliquer pourquoi elle n’a pas présenté de proposition sur l’élevage sans cage. En janvier 2024, la Commission a répondu que la transition vers des systèmes sans cage nécessitait de nouvelles consultations concernant les coûts et la durée de la période transitoire. En mars 2024, une commissaire a déclaré au Parlement que les travaux se poursuivaient sur le suivi de l’initiative «End the Cage Age».

C’est la Commission européenne qui peut proposer de nouvelles lois. Toutefois, le Parlement évalue les mesures prises par la Commission en réponse à une initiative citoyenne européenne.

Nous ajoutons que le Parlement devrait poursuivre les travaux sur deux propositions législatives relatives au bien-être animal que la Commission a présentées en décembre 2023. En réponse aux travaux de la commission d’enquête du Parlement, la première proposition vise à renforcer les règles sur la protection des animaux pendant le transport. La seconde introduit de nouvelles règles sur le bien-être et la traçabilité des chiens et des chats, avec des exigences pour les éleveurs, les refuges et les animaleries.

German

Das Europäische Parlament befasst sich regelmäßig mit Fragen des Tierwohls.

In einer Entschließung aus dem Jahr 2021 forderte das Parlament die Europäische Kommission auf, einen Gesetzesvorschlag zur schrittweisen Abschaffung der Käfighaltung in landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben in der EU vorzulegen. Als Reaktion auf die Europäische Bürgerinitiative „Schluss mit der Käfighaltung“ (Englisch „End the Cage Age“) fordert das Parlament ein Ende der Käfighaltung bis 2027.

Außerdem setzte das Parlament einen Untersuchungsausschuss zum Schutz von Tieren beim Transport ein. In der Folge forderte das Parlament im Januar 2022 den Rat der EU und die Kommission auf, den Schutz von Tieren beim Transport innerhalb und außerhalb der EU zu verstärken.

Abgeordnete des Europäischen Parlaments haben wiederholt Fragen an die Kommission gerichtet, um zu erfahren, warum sie bislang keinen Gesetzesvorschlag zum Ende der Käfighaltung vorgelegt hat. Im Januar 2024 antwortete die Kommission, dass der Übergang zu käfiglosen Systemen noch weitere Beratungen hinsichtlich der Kosten und der Dauer der Übergangsperiode erfordere. Im März 2024 teilte eine EU-Kommissarin dem Parlament mit, dass die Arbeiten an den Folgemaßnahmen zur Initiative zum Ende der Käfighaltung andauerten.

Es ist die Aufgabe der Europäischen Kommission, neue Gesetze vorzuschlagen. Das Europäische Parlament bewertet jedoch die Maßnahmen, die von der Kommission als Antwort auf eine Europäische Bürgerinitiative ergriffen werden.

Wir möchten hinzufügen, dass das Parlament aller Voraussicht nach die Arbeit an zwei Gesetzesvorschlägen zum Tierschutz fortsetzen wird, die die Kommission im Dezember 2023 vorgelegt hat. Als Reaktion auf die Arbeit des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses zielt der erste Vorschlag darauf ab, die EU-weiten Regeln zum Schutz von Tieren beim Transport zu verschärfen. Mit dem zweiten Vorschlag werden neue Vorschriften zum Schutz und zur Rückverfolgbarkeit von Hunden und Katzen eingeführt, die Anforderungen an Züchter, Tierheime und Tierhandlungen enthalten.

Portuguese

O Parlamento Europeu tem abordado regularmente a questão do bem‑estar dos animais.

Numa resolução de 2021, o Parlamento instou a Comissão Europeia a propor uma lei para eliminar progressivamente a utilização de gaiolas nas explorações agrícolas da UE, com o objetivo de pôr termo à criação em gaiolas até 2027, em seguimento da Iniciativa de Cidadania Europeia «End the Cage Age» (Fim da era da gaiola).

O Parlamento criou igualmente uma comissão de inquérito sobre a proteção dos animais durante o transporte. Em janeiro de 2022, o Parlamento instou o Conselho da UE e a Comissão a reforçarem a proteção dos animais durante o transporte dentro e fora da UE.

Os deputados ao Parlamento Europeu solicitaram repetidamente à Comissão que explicasse a razão pela qual não apresentou uma proposta sobre a criação sem gaiolas. Em janeiro de 2024, a Comissão respondeu que a transição para sistemas sem gaiolas exige novas consultas sobre os custos e a duração do período transitório. Em março de 2024, uma comissária informou o Parlamento de que os trabalhos sobre o seguimento da iniciativa «End the Cage Age» ainda estavam em curso.

Cabe à Comissão propor nova legislação. No entanto, o Parlamento avalia as medidas tomadas pela Comissão em resposta a uma iniciativa de cidadania europeia.

Gostaríamos de acrescentar que o Parlamento deverá prosseguir os trabalhos sobre duas propostas legislativas em matéria de bem‑estar dos animais, apresentadas pela Comissão em dezembro de 2023. Em resposta ao trabalho da comissão de inquérito do Parlamento, a primeira proposta visa reforçar as regras da UE em matéria de proteção dos animais durante o transporte. A segunda proposta introduz novas regras relativas ao bem‑estar dos cães e dos gatos e à respetiva rastreabilidade, e prevê requisitos aplicáveis aos criadores, aos abrigos e às lojas de animais de companhia.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Gilles Pittoors (1st edition).

In December 2023, the Commission proposed to amend Directive (EU) 2015/637 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries, and Directive (EU) 2019/997 establishing an EU emergency travel document. The aim is to make improvements in the areas covered by the two directives, in response to crises such as COVID-19, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Ukraine, and repatriations from Israel and Gaza. The intended outcomes include enhanced legal clarity, streamlined cooperation, greater consular service effectiveness, and heightened standards of consular support and crisis response.

The proposal is subject to the consultation procedure. Within Parliament, the file was assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), with Loránt Vincze (EPP, Romania) as rapporteur. The Committees on Legal Affairs (JURI), Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Development (DEVE) were invited to submit opinions, with the latter deciding not to do so. The DEVE committee report was published in March 2024 and adopted in plenary on 24 April 2024. The proposal is now awaiting the Council’s final decision.

Complete version

• July 2024: Consular protection and the EU emergency travel document (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive (EU) 2015/637 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and Directive (EU) 2019/997 establishing an EU emergency travel documentCommittee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2023) 930 final
6.12.2023Rapporteur:Loránt Vincze (EPP, Romania)2023/0441(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Gilles Lebreton (ID, France)
Nacho Sánchez Amor (S&D, Spain)
Marina Kaljurand (S&D, Estonia)
Jana Toom (Renew, Estonia)
Tinneke Strik (Greens/EFA, Netherlands)
Assita Kanko (ECR, Belgium)
Miguel Urbán Crespo (The Left, Spain)Special legislative
procedure – consultationNext steps expected: Adoption by the Council

Written by Kristina Grošek.

The ninth parliamentary term formally ended on 15 July 2024, ahead of the constitutive part-session of the European Parliament elected on 6-9 June 2024. Despite their best efforts, the co‑legislators had not reached agreement on a number of legislative proposals before the end of the ninth term. These will form a major part of the business that needs to be picked up again in the tenth term. To ensure continuity in its work, Parliament has adopted rules on how to deal with unfinished files.

Unfinished business in the European Parliament

‘Unfinished business’ refers to any procedure on which parliamentary work was ongoing at the end of the parliamentary term, i.e. where the plenary had not taken a final decision. According to Rule 250 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, at the end of the last part-session before elections, all Parliament’s unfinished business is deemed to have lapsed, unless the Conference of Presidents – at the beginning of the new term – decides, on the basis of reasoned requests from parliamentary committees and other institutions, to resume or continue consideration of the unfinished business. Furthermore, Parliament can ask the European Commission to refer a proposal to it again, in order for work to resume (Rules 62 and 86).

Unfinished files at the end of the ninth parliamentary term

As of 1 July 2024, at the end of the ninth term, some 174 ordinary legislative procedure files were ongoing at different stages of the legislative process. Of these, around 60 remained at an early stage. There are also several other unfinished files (e.g. special legislative procedures, budgetary procedures, and non-legislative procedures). In line with Rule 250, once the committees have been constituted, the new Chair of the Conference of Committee Chairs (CCC) will invite each committee to provide information on the state of play of unfinished files, and on how they intend to handle them (resume work, or ask the Commission to modify or withdraw the proposal). The Conference of Presidents will then decide on which files work will resume and in what manner. On the basis of that decision, the President will then inform the Commission and the Council of Parliament’s plans.

Unfinished files at the end of the eighth parliamentary term

On 24 July 2019, the Chair of the CCC wrote to the chairs of all committees, requesting that they examine the unfinished files and inform him on how they proposed to proceed. Following this, at its meeting of 16 October 2019, the Conference of Presidents decided to resume work on 37 files under the ordinary legislative procedure where a first-reading position had not yet been adopted. The decision listed a further 83 files on which a first-reading position had already been adopted in plenary. Work was to resume on another 71 files (under various procedures), while the Commission was asked to withdraw 12 legislative proposals.

Commission and Council

The Treaties do not set out a specific procedure for handling unfinished legislative files at the end of a parliamentary term, but they do allow the Commission to change a proposal, as long as the Council has not acted (Article 293(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). For those files where the first reading has been concluded in Parliament, once the Council has transmitted its first-reading position, Treaty deadlines for the second reading must be respected. The 2007 joint declaration on practical arrangements for the co-decision procedure stipulates that the institutions coordinate their work, to enable proceedings to be conducted in a coherent and convergent fashion (point 6), with maximum efficiency (point 20).

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘Unfinished business from the ninth term‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tim Peters.

The Ukraine Facility is the EU’s flagship programme to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation following Russia’s full-scale war of aggression. The facility as defined by Regulation (EU) 2024/792 consists of three pillars and will mobilise up to €50 billion to ensure stable and predictable financial support for Ukraine between 2024 and 2027 and assist the country on its path towards EU membership. The Ukraine plan guides implementation of the facility’s Pillar I: it sets the conditions and serves as framework for disbursing funds, and outlines the reform pathway for Ukraine’s reconstruction and EU accession. Two tranches of exceptional bridge financing totalling €6 billion and pre-financing worth €1.9 billion have so far been transferred to Ukraine. Regular transfers of quarterly instalments from the Ukraine Facility are planned until 2027. Disbursal is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine plan quantitative and qualitative reform steps, and adhering to EU values.

Ukraine plan

The Ukraine plan sets out a coherent approach and clear priorities for reform in Ukraine. Its structure is defined by Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792. The plan ensures Ukraine’s ownership of implementation of the Ukraine Facility, as it was the responsibility of Ukraine’s government to draft it. Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, and Ukrainian civil society were consulted by the government during the plan’s drafting and it was then assessed by the European Commission. The plan constitutes the basis for support provided under Pillar I of the facility – covering direct financial support. However, all measures financed under Pillar II (investments) and Pillar III (accession assistance) should equally support the objectives and implementation of the Ukraine plan.

The Commission endorsed the plan on 15 April 2024 on the basis of the criteria set out in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792. On 14 May 2024, the Council adopted an implementing decision approving the plan. Payments to Ukraine will be disbursed by the EU subject to the implementation of the 69 reforms and 10 investments agreed, on the basis of 130 reform indicators and 16 investment indicators set out in the annex to the Council implementing decision.

The plan’s first part defines basic reforms that lay the foundations for accelerating economic recovery and strengthening institutional capacity in the areas of public administration reform, public financial management, the judicial system and the fight against corruption and money laundering. The second part outlines the reforms needed to develop the economy and improve citizens’ welfare in areas such as financial markets, human capital and decentralisation and regional policy. The third part focuses on priority sectors whose rapid development will stimulate broad economic growth, such as the energy sector, the agri-food sector, the green transition and environmental protection.

Ukraine Facility payments

Pillar I of the facility consists of €33 billion in loans and €5.27 billion in grants. Grants are paid out through the EU budget, through a new thematic special instrument, the Ukraine Reserve, set up over and above the EU’s budget expenditure ceilings. The loans will be guaranteed by the EU budget ‘headroom’. Funds from Pillar I are dedicated to providing Ukraine with direct financial assistance. At least 20 % of investments under the Ukraine plan must support climate change mitigation, adaption, environmental protection or the green transition. Furthermore, at least 20 % of Pillar I grants must go to sub-national authorities and local self-government.

Two tranches of exceptional bridge financing – consisting of €6 billion in loans – were disbursed in March and April 2024. On 28 June 2024, the Commission disbursed almost €1.9 billion in pre-financing to Ukraine, bringing total EU support transferred to Ukraine under the Facility to €7.9 billion in loans.

On 22 May 2024, the EU and Ukraine signed a framework agreement in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792. The agreement stipulates the terms for management, control, reporting, auditing and information sharing in relation to the Ukraine Facility funds. The EU and Ukraine also signed a loan agreement setting out the provisions for the management and implementation of funding borrowed by the Commission. Grant payments will be based on financing agreements. Each quarter, the Commission will pay funds to Ukraine subject to the qualitative and quantitative reform steps being fulfilled and a positive Council implementing decision. Table 1 outlines the heavily frontloaded preliminary annual payment schedule for Pillar I grants and loans.

Table 1 – Ukraine Facility Pillar 1 preliminary annual financing schedule (2024–2028)

20242025202620272028State budget support€16 billion€12.5 billion€7.2 billion€1.2 billion€1.32 billion**The transfer in 2028 is expected to be completed in January and provides financing for the indicators met in Q4 2027. Data source: Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. Scrutiny mechanisms

Transfers of the quarterly tranches are conditional on implementation of the Ukraine plan quantitative and qualitative reform steps during the previous quarter. The Commission assesses their fulfilment before proposing a Council implementing decision. Following Council approval – or amendment – the Commission adopts the financing decision authorising disbursement of the non-repayable support. The Commission also monitors the facility’s implementation against the indicators defined in the Ukraine plan, and will track progress on a publicly available Ukraine plan scoreboard, at the latest from 1 January 2025 (Article 21, Regulation (EU) 2024/792). The Commission will inform Parliament on progress, reforms and payment scheduling, including through the Ukraine Facility dialogue (Article 37 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792).

Ukraine investment framework

Pillar II is the Ukraine investment framework, which provides grants and guarantees to de-risk private and public investment. That pillar is equipped with €6.97 billion in grants and is expected to incentivise investments of up to €40 billion. Micro-, small and medium-sized business will receive a minimum of 15 % of those guarantees. A first round of guarantee and grant agreements were signed during the 2024 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin and comprised €1.4 billion in blended finance grants and loan guarantees, seeking to unlock €6 billion in investments.

Use of immobilised Russian assets

Parliament has insisted repeatedly that Russia must pay for the massive damage caused by the war and that immobilised Russian assets should be confiscated. On 21 May 2024, the Council adopted a set of legal acts ensuring that the net profits generated from extraordinary revenues accruing to central securities depositories (CSDs) in the EU, as a result of the implementation of the EU restrictive measures, will be used for further support for Ukraine. These profits will be used to support Ukraine’s defence industry capacities and the country’s reconstruction, according to the following key: 90 % to the European Peace Facility, an off-budget instrument, and 10 % to programmes financed from the EU budget. This would give Ukraine revenue of approximately €3 billion per year. On 14 June 2024, G7 leaders agreed to launch ‘extraordinary revenue acceleration (ERA) loans’ for Ukraine, in order to make available approximately US$50 billion in additional funding for Ukraine by the end of 2024. Those loans would be serviced and repaid by future flows of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian sovereign assets held in G7 jurisdictions. The implementation of that agreement would require the EU to draw up new and amended rules.

A set of draft legal acts from the European Commission and the European External Action Service is expected in the coming months, to implement the most recent G7 leaders’ agreement on the use of extraordinary revenues from immobilised Russian assets.

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘Ukraine Facility: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafał Mańko.

Sixty years ago, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled on the conflict between a rule of Community law, part of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) (‘EEC Treaty’), and a subsequent rule of national law, part of a legislative act adopted by a Member State parliament. The ECJ ruled that such a conflict should be resolved in line with the primacy of EU law principle that national courts must apply. The Costa v Enel case concerned an Italian nationalisation law, which created a national electricity enterprise – ‘Enel’ –transferring all existing electricity enterprises operating in Italy to it, upon compensation (‘Enel Law’). Nicolino Flaminio Costa, a Milan advocate, was a customer of one of the electricity companies affected by the nationalisation. Urged by Professor Gian Galeazzo Stendardi, his colleague from the Milan Bar Council and an astute supporter of the primacy and direct effect of Community law, Costa did not allow Enel employees to check his energy meter, and refused to pay his first bill from Enel. Two lawsuits before a local small claims court followed, where Stendardi represented Costa. In the first, judge Antonio Carones made a preliminary reference only to the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC), asking it to evaluate the Enel Law’s conformity with the Italian Constitution and the EEC Treaty. The ICC not only confirmed the Enel Law’s constitutionality but also declared that a later Italian law must prevail over earlier Community law. When a second bill arrived, Costa sued again. This time, the case came before judge Vittorio Emanuele Fabbri, who filed two preliminary references, to the ICC and the ECJ.

Before the ECJ, the Italian government argued that judge Fabbri’s reference was ‘absolutely inadmissible’ because a later Italian law must prevail over the EEC Treaty. However, the ECJ declared the reference admissible, stating that a rule of Community law having direct effect must prevail over any national law that contravenes it. The ECJ argued that, if an opposite view were accepted, the uniformity of Community law across the Member States would be adversely affected, as any state could simply derogate from a selected Treaty rule by passing a domestic law. On the substance, the ECJ found that most Treaty rules invoked by the Italian judge did not have direct effect, so could not affect the case, save for two: the freedom of establishment and the prohibition on monopolies. It was left to the national judge to decide whether the latter of them was possibly breached.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Costa v Enel judgment: 60 years on The making of the doctrine of primacy of EU law‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

With the 2024 elections now over, during its first part-session, from 16 to 19 July 2024, the new Parliament is due to vote in a secret ballot on whether to approve the European Council’s chosen candidate for President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. She was the lead candidate for the European People’s Party. In Parliament, the candidate needs to secure 361 votes, i.e. an absolute majority of all Members (currently 720).

The President of the European Commission has taken on an ever more prominent leading role within the College of Commissioners, with the increasingly presidential system rather eclipsing the principle of collegiate decision-making.

The Commission President also plays a crucial role in relations between the European Parliament and the Commission. When presenting their priorities to Parliament prior to being elected, the candidate for Commission President sets the course for the whole term, during which they will be called to account by Parliament. Building on this, Parliament plays an increasingly prominent role in political agenda-setting, shaping the EU’s legislative programming together with the Commission and the Council.

Although more in-depth assessments of the 2019-2024 Commission presided over by Ursula von der Leyen will be made in the coming months, her presidency has been characterised by several severe crises, with the pandemic and international conflict presenting a stress test for her agenda. However, these issues did not prevent delivery on the majority of the Commission’s priority initiatives.

This updates a 2019 briefing by the same author, itself an update of a 2014 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Role and election of the President of the European Commission‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

At the January 2022 plenary sitting, the European Parliament (EP) is due to elect its 31st President, to hold office for the second half of the current term, up to the next European elections, following which the new Parliament will elect its President in July 2024. The President has an important and increasingly visible function in the EU institutional and international setting, mirroring the influential role of the Parliament as shaper of EU policies and as co-legislator. This is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note, the most recent edition of which was published in June 2019.

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘How is the European Parliament’s President elected?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘Rules on ‘revolving doors’ in the EU‘ on YouTube.

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Written by Clare Ferguson.

After the excitement of the European elections, the 720 newly elected Members of the European Parliament take office on 16 July. Their first tasks will be crucial in the organisation of the tenth Parliament (sitting from 2024 to 2029). The agenda for the parliamentary session in Strasbourg from 16‑19 July 2024 is at first, therefore, dedicated to electing certain of their peers to Parliament’s most important offices.

This first, constitutive session will open on Tuesday morning (under revised Rules of Procedure, which enter into force that day). Members cannot take part in debates or votes until the President has been elected. Therefore, electing a new President is Members’ first task. Voting should begin on Tuesday morning. The political groups (or individual Members amounting to 1/20th of the whole Parliament), propose the presidential candidates. To form a political group, a minimum of 23 MEPs, elected in at least one quarter (currently seven) of the EU Member States, is required (Rule 33). With political group formation taking place right up to the wire this time, political alliances are difficult to predict, but having already announced her candidacy, it is widely expected that outgoing President Roberta Metsola will gain a second two-and-a-half year mandate. Members elect their President by absolute majority, in a secret ballot (with up to four rounds, under Rule 16).

Once the new President takes the chair, the elections to Parliament’s Bureau follow. Traditionally, the holders of these key posts reflect the numerical strength of the political groups, and also respect geographical and gender balance, and negotiations among the political groups ensure this balance. The 14 Vice-Presidents are elected in a single ballot by an absolute majority of votes cast (two further rounds of voting are possible, under Rule 17, to fill any remaining seats). Each responsible for specific aspects of parliamentary business, Vice-Presidents chair debates when the President cannot. Parliament then elects five Quaestors, by absolute majority, in up to three ballots (under Rule 18). They are responsible for administrative and financial matters directly concerning Members and their working conditions. The President and Vice-Presidents make up the new Bureau of the Parliament, with the Quaestors participating in an advisory capacity.

Before Parliament’s committees can hold their constitutive meetings, the Conference of Presidents (of the political groups) proposes the number of Members to sit on each committee. Members are due to vote on these numbers on Wednesday (under Rule 212), following which the political groups can appoint the Members of each committee. The committees should then elect their chairs and vice-chairs during meetings planned for 23 July. These appointments are generally the subject of an informal agreement among the political groups, based on using the d’Hondt method, and are expected to reflect the plurality of Member States and a fair representation of political views.

The strength of the political groups in Parliament is therefore at its most evident at this point in the legislature, as their preferred candidates for the Bureau and committee offices find out how much support they have. Negotiations to form these political groups (Members sit with others of similar political persuasion, rather than by nationality) began immediately after the June 2024 elections, and reflect the changes in the political landscape foreshadowed by the results. Political groups must comply with certain rules before informing Parliament’s Secretary-General of their composition. Some are closely aligned with a European political party, whereas others draw their membership from a wider range of national parties. Their presidents meet in the Conference of Presidents, chaired by the President of Parliament.

Once Parliament’s President is in place, it will be time to turn to the appointment of the next European Commission. While the majority of EU leaders endorsed a second mandate for Ursula von der Leyen during the 27 June European Council meeting, she still needs the support of an absolute majority of Members of Parliament – at least 361). Members are set to vote on the candidate for Commission President during this session, by secret ballot on Thursday. If von der Leyen does not obtain the required majority, the European Council would need to propose a new candidate within a month, and Parliament would then vote on the new candidate at the session scheduled for September. Von der Leyen is scheduled to present her priorities to Parliament on Thursday morning, before the vote. These will set the course for the whole term, against which Members scrutinise the Commission’s progress. Together, the new Commission President and EU leaders then propose their candidates for Commissioner posts. Parliament organises hearings of the Commissioners-designate, so that Members from the relevant parliamentary committees can assess their suitability. Members will then decide whether to approve the Commission as a whole at a plenary session later in the year.

Members are also due to hear statements on Wednesday morning from the European Council and the Commission on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 27 June. However, as the process of appointing Parliament’s office-holders takes up considerable time, the customary statement on the priorities of the incoming Council Presidency, held by Hungary, which began on 1 July, is likely to take place during the September session.

• European Parliament Plenary Session July 2024
• Electing the European Parliament’s President
• Results of the May 2024 European elections
• European Parliament Rules of Procedure 2024‑2029
• Understanding the d’Hondt method: Allocation of parliamentary seats and leadership positions
• Rules on political groups in the European Parliament
• Role and election of the President of the European Commission
• Timeline to new EU institutional leadership
• Outcome of the European Council meeting of 27 June 2024
• How plenary works

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

The ‘revolving doors’ phenomenon has frequently caught media and public attention in recent years. This publication offers an overview of how the post term activities of members of the EU institutions –Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament, as opposed to staff members – are regulated by the EU institutions. The European Ombudsman has looked into the issue of revolving doors in the context of several individual cases; on a few occasions this has ended in an unsatisfactory outcome for the institution or body under investigation and prompted the European Ombudsman to make specific recommendations to avoid a repeat of maladministration in future cases. At EU level, almost all institutions place some restrictions on post-term activities, while a comparative overview of EU Member States shows that just a small number of them legislate for this aspect of the post-term activity of parliamentarians.

Read the in-depth analysis on ‘Rules on ‘revolving doors’ in the EU: Post-mandate restrictions on members of EU institutions and parliamentarians in Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘Rules on ‘revolving doors’ in the EU‘ on YouTube.

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Written by Naja Bentzen.

Misleading information can throw any of us off course. Both misinformation – mistakes without ill intent – and disinformation – created and spread with the aim of fooling people – can make it hard to take informed decisions. Fast evolving technologies – including deepfake video and audio – make it too easy to produce and spread deceptive content very rapidly. Many of us worry about the effect: some 85 % of people worldwide are concerned about the impact of disinformation on their fellow citizens; 87 % think disinformation has already affected political life in their country; and 38 % of EU citizens list false and/or misleading information as a threat to democracy. These tips will help you steer around falsehoods.

Fact-checking compass

Read this infographic on ‘Fact-checking compass: How to spot information manipulation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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The European Union strongly condemned Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Now, more than two years later, the war has already claimed over 10 000 civilian lives, and generated at least 3.5 million internal refugees and 6.3 million Ukrainians have fled the country. The ongoing attack has reverberated beyond Ukraine’s borders, affecting food security, energy prices and inflation both in the EU and beyond. The European Parliament labelled Russia’s war ‘the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945’. The EU’s response has been structured along three axes: political, economic and military support for Ukraine; isolation and containment of Russia; and enhancement of EU and EU neighbourhood resilience.

Parliament’s extraordinary meeting of 1 March 2022, where it adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning Russia’s aggression and setting the direction for the EU response, was one of the first international gatherings Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy attended. Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, was the first EU leader to visit Kyiv, on 1 April 2022.

Since then, Parliament has dealt with more than 40 legislative files of paramount importance for Ukraine and adopted over 30 non-legislative resolutions on aspects of EU support for Ukraine, including: several rounds of macro-financial assistance; the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP); and the Ukraine Facility, earmarking €50 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Parliament has also unwaveringly supported Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, advocating successfully in June 2022 for Ukraine to be granted candidate country status, and in December 2023 for Member States to start accession negotiations. During EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee meetings, Members have discussed parliamentary follow-up to Ukraine’s official accession request with their Ukrainian counterparts, as well as EU military and humanitarian support, sanctions, accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes, and preparations for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Moreover, Parliament has used its powers to advocate a tougher policy of containment towards Russia. It supports economic sanctions (including a November 2023 resolution making specific recommendations on sanctions enforcement, monitoring and circumvention), and urges the EU to explore ways to confiscate frozen Russian assets and use them for Ukraine’s reconstruction. In May 2024, the Council approved a plan to use €3 billion of the profits from these frozen assets to support Ukraine. The EU recently adopted a 14th comprehensive package of sanctions, cracking down on circumvention and adopting energy measures, as well as listing additional individuals and entities for sanction.

Other initiatives Parliament champions include the ‘Generators of Hope’ campaign to supply Ukraine with energy equipment for the winter. In December 2022, the European Parliament awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize to the brave people of Ukraine. 

Parliament is therefore employing its budgetary, agenda-setting, external action and law-making powers to mobilise solid EU support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression, and to ensure that the EU honours its pledges. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Martin Höflmayr and Giulio Sabbati, with David Kläffling.

The European Union’s economic outlook for 2024 reflects cautious optimism, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth estimated at 1.0 % for the EU and 0.8 % for the euro area. As inflation is projected to continue declining towards the European Central Bank’s 2 % target by 2025, a soft landing is within reach. Near-term growth is mainly driven by real wages and private consumption, while high interest rates keep private investment sluggish. This marks a slight improvement from the previous forecast for the EU, while the euro area forecast remains unchanged. Economic expansion in southern EU countries continues to outpace that of those in the north and west, promoting convergence. Unemployment rates continued to fall in the Member States with the highest rates, leading to a further reduction in disparities across the EU. Overall, the EU unemployment rate at the beginning of 2024 stood at a record low of 6.0 %. This positive momentum coincides with the 20th anniversary of the EU’s enlargement to 10 additional Member States, highlighting the single market’s beneficial integration effects.

Launched as a response to the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Next Generation EU (NGEU) and its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) have also supported recovery and economic convergence in the EU. Against the backdrop of new EU fiscal rules, in place as of this year, NGEU and the RRF are expected to continue playing a significant role in financing strategic investment and reform up to 2026. In that context, this publication aims to track the state of the EU economy. It builds on a well-established EPRS series, ‘Monitoring the EU’s economic outlook’, becoming quarterly.

Read this infographic on ‘Economic Outlook Quarterly: A soft landing within reach‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

RRF payments so far, % committed resources Composition of NGEU and RRF resources Next Generation EU (NGEU) EU inflation
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) monthly data, % HICP in the EU
EU inflation, share of HICP items by change in annual inflation rate, % Unemployment rate by gender in the EU Member States
Q1-2024, % of the labour force Total unemployment rate in the EU General government balance, European Commission spring forecast, % of GDP Government consolidated gross debt, change Q4-2019 vs Q4-2023, percentage points of GDP Quarterly GDP growth in the EU Member States
% change, Q4-2019 and Q1-2024 GDP growth in the EU
Quarterly, % change compared to same period in previous year