European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Issam Hallak.

Digital finance can broadly be defined as financial services and instruments that use or are based on new information and communication technologies (ICT). A wide range of segments of the financial system are therefore concerned, from digital payment services to the new market infrastructures of crypto-assets using distributed ledger technologies (DLT). Policymakers expect digital finance to benefit the financial system – for example, in terms of transaction and settlement costs, as well as financial inclusion. However, digital finance also poses new risks, especially for financial stability and the protection of citizens.

The idea behind the EU regulatory approach is that by providing a sound regulatory framework, homogenous throughout the EU, these risks can be monitored and controlled, while also favouring the desired innovation. To that end, the European Commission, together with the European supervisory authorities and the European Central Bank, conduct regular reviews of the EU regulatory framework and check its ability to face these risks and the potential needs for intervention. In 2020, the Commission tabled a major digital finance strategy to provide a sound, EU-level regulatory and supervisory framework in a number of digital finance domains.

The EU has already adopted new laws resulting from this initiative. The Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets is establishing a new legal environment for DLT-based ‘coins’ with a stable value (‘stablecoins’); another regulation will provide a framework for the monitoring and control of digital operational resilience for the financial sector. More legislative procedures are ongoing in the fields of open finance and the digital euro. New directions are being suggested, such as the establishment of a ‘unified ledger’, to smoothen transfers between instruments using different DLT market infrastructure.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital finance legislation: Overview and state of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nikolina Šajn.

The EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) has, over several decades and through successive reforms, devoted increased attention to the environment. This has led to the current CAP having a ‘green architecture’, which includes both mandatory elements – to which farmers must adhere in exchange for a full amount of direct payments – and voluntary elements – bringing extra payments for farmers engaging in farming practices that go beyond the basic requirements.

Mandatory requirements, also referred to as ‘conditionality’, include statutory management requirements laid out in different pieces of environmental legislation, but integrated into the CAP. They also include standards for good agricultural and environmental condition of land (GAECs) that, for instance, require crop rotation or diversification, establishment of buffer strips along rivers and lakes, or minimum soil cover in winter. The GAECs have been at the centre of farmer protests in several Member States in 2024 and were recently amended, reducing their ambition.

The voluntary elements include eco-schemes: a major novelty of the current CAP. They offer farmers a top-up on direct payments if they engage in additional environmentally sound practices. Which practices exactly, depends on individual Member States, as they have a significant flexibility in their design. As a result, more than 150 eco-schemes exist across the EU, the most popular addressing soil conservation and biodiversity. The second voluntary element comprises rural development agri‑environmental schemes, the oldest environmental measures in the CAP. Also designed by the Member States, they compensate farmers for cost and income foregone as a result of engaging in environmentally friendly practices, continued agricultural activity in areas where farming is difficult, and restrictions in Natura 2000 areas. Voluntary elements also include green investments.

Several studies warn that Member States have not been ambitious in implementing the CAP’s environmental measures. It is claimed that states have used the flexibility granted them to define the exact requirements and voluntary measures in ways that have not led to significant change on the ground. Finding ways to motivate farmers to engage in practices that truly benefit the environment, while ensuring their economic sustainability, remains a major challenge for negotiations on the post‑2027 CAP, particularly in the context of widespread farmer discontent.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Environment and the common agricultural policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román and Eric Pichon.

On 8-17 July 2024, the UN high-level political forum on sustainable development assessed progress towards SDG 2: ‘End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture’. It is unlikely this goal will be met by 2030. Instead, food insecurity, malnutrition and food prices have worsened globally.

The primary causes of food insecurity are threefold: conflict, economic instability, and extreme weather conditions, which frequently intersect and exacerbate one another. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has hindered the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and worsened the worldwide food crisis. This has shown that several food systems are unsustainable, relying too heavily on vulnerable global chains. This unsustainability is also highlighted by the fact that a third of the food produced globally is wasted or lost. In the EU itself, food inflation owing to the impact of extreme weather events, the pandemic and the war in Ukraine has led to more than eight EU citizens in 100 being unable to afford a proper meal on a regular basis, while 50 in 100 are overweight.

Better nutrition and agricultural sustainability are at the core of the EU’s new common agricultural policy and the ‘farm to fork’ and biodiversity strategies. These are now being put to the test by the impact of COVID-19 and Russia’s war on Ukraine. In poorer countries, the EU and its Member States act on food insecurity through humanitarian aid and development cooperation. The EU bases its external action towards SDG 2 on comprehensive strategies in conflict areas, substantial research capacities and the promotion of international cooperation. However, its impact is difficult to assess, while other EU policies, particularly on trade, have a spillover effect on other food systems around the world.

This briefing updates a previous edition by Anna Caprile and Eric Pichon, published in January 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Achieving food security: Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG 2) – The EU’s role in ending hunger and improving nutrition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Hunger and food insecurity in 2022 Acute food insecurity by key drivers (2023) Food system contradictions

Written by Anne Altmayer.

Aquaculture is an important sector of the EU’s blue economy and has the potential to play a more vital role as a sustainable food supplier under the European Green Deal.

However, while fish farming is one of the fastest growing food production sectors in the world, the EU, with its 1.1 million tonnes of farmed fish produced in 2022, accounts for less than 1 % of global production. For comparison, Norway’s aquaculture output in the same year alone exceeded that of the EU as a whole.

The EU’s self-sufficiency rate for fishery and aquaculture products is rather low, making the EU dependent on imports of these products.

Within the EU, aquaculture production is concentrated mainly in four countries, which for their part are specialised on the farming of particular species.

Despite the European Commission’s efforts to promote the development of aquaculture within the EU, the production rate is stagnating.

The constraints and barriers hampering the sector’s growth range from high administrative burdens, to limited access to space and water, to trade-related aspects and governance issues.

Over the past 20 years, the European Parliament has recurrently highlighted the EU’s strong dependency on imports of fisheries and aquaculture products, and called for remedies to strengthen the position of EU fish farmers.

Possible future developments could include a change in policy, with a view to improving the sector’s position as a major food supplier, and a change in production towards less cost-intensive and more sustainable methods.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU aquaculture: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Global aquaculture production, 1990-2020 Composition of EU aquaculture production by main commercial species (in volume), 2021 Aquaculture products: EU supply balance by volume (million tonnes)

Written by Stefano De Luca.

Advanced digital network infrastructure and digital services will be key in shaping the competitiveness of many European Union (EU) sectors – among them manufacturing, energy and healthcare – in the near future. Furthermore, these infrastructure and services are at the core of the twin digital and green transition that seeks to leverage the synergies between technological advancements and environmental sustainability. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the EU’s networks are up to the task, including in terms of transmission speed. Having high-performing fixed and mobile networks with a higher transmission speed can have a positive effect on economic development as well, by boosting the gross domestic product.

In its Digital Decade strategy, the European Commission put forward its vision for new strategic connectivity targets for 2030, such as preparing the EU for the roll-out of the next generation of broadband infrastructure with gigabit speeds. This briefing aims to provide an overview of full fibre and 5G mobile networks as part of the EU’s Digital Decade goal to accelerate deployment and investment in future-proof infrastructures. In this context, it discusses the current state of full fibre and 5G mobile technology in the EU, including the challenges of attracting private investment, and explores new business models for network deployment.

With 7 years left to reach the 2030 connectivity targets, it is paramount to understand where the EU stands in terms of future-proof network deployment, address the challenges and identify the opportunities that would help the EU telecom sector to thrive.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A future-proof network for the EU: Full fibre and 5G‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Colin Murphy.

Cyberbullying is a growing phenomenon and a significant issue for young people across Europe and indeed the world. Unlike ‘real-world’ bullying which ends when the victim’s situation changes, such as when school ends, cyberbullying can continue for its victims at any time. Cyberbullying can reach victims through social media, text messages, false information or images spread through various methods, and can be relentless.

The ubiquity of electronic devices means children and young people are more digitally connected than ever before. The scope for children to become victims of online aggression and indeed to engage in bullying behaviour is wide. In addition, an even more worrying aspect is the exposure of children and young people to harmful material or their coercion into providing sexual images of themselves. The increase in young people’s connectivity corresponds with the rise in volume of online child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and the growth in the number of cases of minors approached online in what is known as ‘sextortion’.

Victims often feel powerless, worthless and isolated and seldom report the abuse to parents or teachers. In some cases, it can lead the victim to substance abuse, self-harm and even suicide. Legislators are trying to keep pace with the ever-changing environment. While policies at European Union (EU) and international level are aimed at preventing cyberbullying, there have been calls for stronger EU action to prevent this form of online abuse. There are EU initiatives that address elements of the issue, but there is currently no EU-wide anti-online bullying law.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Cyberbullying among young people: Laws and policies in selected Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

As the new parliamentary mandate begins, this note looks back at notable achievements of the previous legislative term in the area of taxation. It then looks ahead to possible future action that could help the Member States and the European Union (EU) meet revenue needs in the context of climate and defence spending requirements, or bolster competitiveness by simplifying tax compliance for businesses operating across the single market.

Accomplishments and on-going work

Over the past few years, EU Member States’ public finances have been under considerable strain owing to the COVID-19 pandemic and the twin energy–cost-of-living crisis, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As these significant economic challenges evolved, tax administrations across the EU were quick to respond to constantly changing circumstances, introducing various tax-support measures to shield struggling households and businesses when prices skyrocketed.

In terms of legislative action at EU and international level, the key milestone was the 2021 OECD Inclusive Framework global agreement on a two-pillar solution to reform the international corporate tax system. The subsequent adoption of a minimum corporate tax (‘Pillar Two’) in the EU has ensured that large multinationals operating in the EU are today subject to an effective tax rate of at least 15 %. A multilateral convention to implement the other half of the global tax deal (‘Pillar One’), concerning the re-allocation of taxing rights on the profits of very large multinationals, should be open for signature soon, with the rules entering into force in 2025 (provided the convention is ratified by a critical mass of signatory countries).

At EU level, negotiations on some of the previous Commission’s initiatives remain ongoing, such as proposals to create a harmonised corporate tax base across the EU (BEFIT) or to update energy taxation rules (see Table 1). The Hungarian Presidency of the Council has committed to advancing the discussions on pending taxation files, while prioritising ‘fighting tax evasion, ensuring legal certainty for taxpayers, and supporting the international engagement of the EU’.

Table 1 – Ongoing initiatives in the Council in the area of taxation (non-exhaustive)

Legislative proposalObjectiveEuropean Parliament (opinion)Energy taxationAlign taxation of energy products and electricity with EU Green Deal objectivesAwaiting Parliament opinionVAT in the digital ageLower value added tax (VAT) administrative costs, harmonise VAT reporting and fight VAT fraudOpinionDebt-equity bias reduction allowance (DEBRA)Reduce debt-equity bias in corporate tax, encourage the re-equitisation of companies, strengthen capital markets unionOpinionTransfer pricing rulesEnshrine transfer pricing principles within EU law, avoid double taxation and increase tax certaintyOpinionBusiness in Europe: Framework for income taxation (BEFIT)Harmonise corporate tax base, lower business compliance costs and increase tax certaintyAwaiting Parliament opinionHead office tax system (HOT)Lower tax compliance costs of cross-border operating small businessesOpinionUnshellCounter shell companies when they are used for abusive tax purposesOpinionFaster and safer tax excess relief (FASTER)Accelerate withholding tax relief and strengthen capital markets unionOpinion*

*In May 2024, the Council reached a general approach on the FASTER initiative. As the text supported by the Council deviated considerably from the original Commission proposal, Parliament will be ‘reconsulted’ to provide its opinion. For further information on the state-of-play of EU initiatives, see the EU Legislative Train Schedule.

What might the future bring?

While upcoming legislation will ultimately depend on the priorities of the new College of Commissioners, and in particular the new Commissioner in charge of taxation, over the years the European Commission has carried out a range of preparatory studies and public consultations that may feed into potential future legislative initiatives.

In the area of direct taxation, the Commission is currently evaluating two directives that are instrumental in combating abusive tax practices. The first is the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC), through which national tax authorities share an increasing amount of information with their EU counterparts. The second is the Anti-Tax-Avoidance Directive (ATAD), a series of EU-wide measures against corporate tax avoidance. These evaluations will take stock of the current rules and their efficacy. They may then recommend modifications to strengthen or streamline the current framework. The EU will also continue the practice of listing third countries that fail to comply with international good governance tax standards and will evaluate how effective the measures taken by Member States against the listed countries have been.

In the area of VAT, the European Commission has been carrying out preparatory work concerning the travel and tourism industry, looking at the potential modernisation of VAT rules for travel agents, international flight and maritime passenger transport, and refunds for non-EU tourists as well as the possibility of changing the VAT rules for the financial and insurance services industry.

The Commission may also propose changes to the Tobacco Taxation Directive (which lays down EU-wide minimum tax rates on tobacco products), and the Excise Duty Directive (concerning excise duty rules on cross-border purchases of products, such as cigarettes and wine), taking into account the objectives of the Europe’s Beating Cancer plan.

The European Commission announced several other files during the last term that have yet to be tabled. These include for example an EU charter on taxpayer’s rights. This charter would pinpoint residual tax barriers within the single market (such as the taxation of cross-border teleworkers) and recommend best practices drawn from across the EU. Other potential upcoming initiatives include measures to tackle the role of ‘enablers‘ in creating complex and opaque tax structures, or to advance public transparency around multinationals’ tax payments. The Commission’s action plan for fair and simple taxation also committed to exploring how to make full use of Article 116 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to allow taxation proposals to be adopted by ordinary legislative procedure, under certain circumstances.

In the context of the repayment of Next Generation EU funds, the debate on new ‘own resources‘ – revenue streams to the EU budget – is likely to resurface. The Commission has already put forward several proposals, currently pending in Council. Revenue from other sources – such as the financial transaction tax (FTT), Pillar One or BEFIT – may be allocated to the EU budget in the future, if those initiatives are adopted.

A number of important taxation developments are meanwhile under way beyond the EU’s borders. Acting on a request made by the Brazilian presidency of the G20, professor Gabriel Zucman (head of the EU Tax Observatory) published a blueprint for a global minimum wealth tax in June 2024. Under the proposal, individuals with more than US$1 billion in wealth would be required to pay a minimum amount of tax annually, equal to 2 % of their wealth. G20 finance ministers meeting on 25-26 July will discuss a possible way forward.

A potential obstacle to the historic OECD Inclusive Framework agreement is the critical stance of the United States Congress, which could complicate application of Pillar One in particular. The European Parliament has called on the Commission to come forward with a unilateral measure – a digital levy on digital companies or similar – in the event that there is a clear lack of progress on Pillar One.

In addition, following criticism by a number of non-EU countries of the outcome of the OECD tax reform, work is ongoing to establish a United Nations (UN) framework convention for international tax cooperation. The EU position is that this convention should focus on strengthening tax enforcement mechanisms, mobilising domestic resources, and avoiding inconsistencies or overlaps with the OECD’s work.

This note updates a previous edition, from February 2024.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU taxation: Looking back, and ahead‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Union to introduce a new European tax on the super-rich. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since July 2024.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

English

In the European Union (EU), tax matters, such as the introduction of a tax, fall within the competence of the member countries, with the EU having only limited powers. In order to put in place new tax rules at EU level, national governments, meeting in the EU Council, must adopt them unanimously on a proposal from the European Commission. The European Parliament only has a consultative role in this procedure: the Council must seek Parliament’s opinion, but is not obliged to follow it.

Nevertheless, the European Parliament is attaching increasing importance to tax issues. In 2020, Parliament set up a subcommittee to its Committee on Economic Affairs to deal with tax matters, and particularly the fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance. Previously, Parliament had established several temporary committees to examine the tax practices revealed by the LuxLeaks and Panama Papers affairs among others. In July 2023, Parliament held a debate on the subject “Tax the rich”.

Finally, the President of the European Parliament cannot influence the decisions of the Members of the European Parliament. According to Rule 2 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, Members exercise their mandate freely and independently.

French

Dans l’Union européenne (UE), les questions fiscales, telles que l’introduction d’un impôt, relèvent de la compétence des pays membres, l’UE n’ayant que des compétences limitées en la matière. Pour mettre en place des règles fiscales au niveau de l’UE, les gouvernements nationaux, réunis au sein du Conseil de l’UE, doivent les adopter à l’unanimité sur proposition de la Commission européenne. Le Parlement européen n’a qu’un rôle consultatif dans cette procédure: le Conseil doit demander l’avis du Parlement, mais il n’est pas tenu de le suivre.

Le Parlement européen accorde néanmoins une importance croissante aux questions fiscales. En 2020 il a créé une sous-commission au sein de sa commission des affaires économiques pour traiter les questions fiscales, et notamment la lutte contre la fraude fiscale, l’évasion fiscale et l’optimisation fiscale. Auparavant, le Parlement avait constitué plusieurs commissions temporaires qui ont examiné les pratiques fiscales révélées en particulier par les affaires LuxLeaks et Panama Papers. En juillet 2023, le Parlement a tenu un débat sur le sujet « Taxer les riches ».

Enfin, la Présidente du Parlement européen ne peut influencer les décisions des députés européens. Conformément à l’article 2 du règlement intérieur du Parlement, les députés européens exercent leur mandat de façon libre et indépendante.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Whether we drive or take the train to work, or walk to the supermarket, we probably all use some form of transport every day. Transport is responsible for around 25 % of greenhouse gas emissions, and under the Green Deal, EU leaders agreed to cut transport-related emissions by 90 % by 2050. This means replacing fossil fuels, changing our habits and switching to greener ways of getting around. Developing public transport and promoting active mobility are key to reaching this climate target. A co-legislator for the European Climate Law and the ‘fit for 55’ initiatives, the European Parliament has adopted a number of resolutions encouraging the European Commission to take further action.

In its 2020 resolution on the Green Deal, Parliament called for zero-emission public transport as well as cycling and walking infrastructure to reduce congestion and improve liveability in towns and cities. A year later, the Commission announced its urban mobility framework.

Parliament later demanded EU countries develop safe, accessible, affordable, smart, resilient and sustainable urban transport systems. The 2023 own‑initiative resolution states EU countries should develop collective transport services, such as car sharing and e‑bikes, and also states national governments should encourage the use of individually owned bicycles and other micro-mobility vehicles by providing biking and charging infrastructure. The resolution highlights the important role of artificial intelligence (AI) and digital solutions and demands better solutions for ticketing.

Parliament has also repeatedly highlighted cycling as a green transport option. Cycling reduces road congestion and greenhouse gas emissions and has a favourable impact on health tourism, the cycling industry and local employment. In a 2021 resolution, Parliament welcomed new cycling infrastructure in some Member States, and argued for its further expansion. Parliament adopted its first resolution on cycling in February 2023. It asked the Commission to develop a European cycling strategy, and to recognise cycling as equal to other forms of transport. Parliament argued that urban planning should always build cycling into mobility solutions, and tied into inter-urban transport systems.

Parliament demanded that urban mobility policies at all levels consider cycling, including the needs of those with disabilities and reduced mobility. In response to Parliament’s initiatives, the Commission proposed a European Declaration on Cycling in October 2023, recognising cycling as one of the most sustainable, accessible and inclusive, low-cost and healthy forms of transport.

Parliament has used both its agenda-setting and law-making powers to encourage the use of more sustainable transport options, and many national authorities have responded by encouraging cycling. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

The European Parliament has long championed protection of human rights worldwide. To guarantee basic rights for everyone, it is important that those who violate human rights are punished. The EU adopted its own global human rights sanctions regime (EU GHRSR) in 2020, under which it can freeze assets and ban travel for people and organisations who seriously violate or abuse human rights, irrespective of where the infringement occurs. The EU applied its first human rights sanctions in March 2021 and by April 2024 had imposed restrictive measures on 108 individuals and 28 entities.

Even though Parliament has no formal role in the procedure for adopting new sanction regimes, it makes sure the human rights sanctions regime stays on the EU’s agenda. Parliament worked across three parliamentary terms between 2010 and 2020, using hearings, parliamentary questions, motions and own-initiative resolutions to call for EU-wide measures. After a 2018 position paper from the Dutch government led to discussion among EU Member States, Parliament stepped up its action, devoting a plenary debate to EU human rights sanctions in 2019, and adopting a resolution setting out recommendations. It adopted a further resolution in 2020, calling for the work to be finalised.

In May 2023, the High Representative, supported by the Commission, proposed to establish an EU foreign and security policy sanctions regime to target serious acts of corruption worldwide. The Commission and some Member States also support Parliament’s demand for Council decisions on sanctions to be adopted under qualified majority voting.

With attention now turning to the impact and effectiveness of the EU’s human rights sanctions, Parliament is pushing for a greater institutional role for itself, including parliamentary oversight of the EU GHRSR and an enhanced role in proposing cases for investigation. In 2023, a Parliament study recommended ways to expand its involvement in monitoring and scrutinising implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, for example through a dedicated parliamentary working group, development of an in-house monitoring capability, and more structured dialogue with other EU institutions on specific sanctions measures.

By pushing for external action and setting the EU’s agenda, Parliament ensures the issue of a human rights sanctions regime remains an EU priority. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Claudia Vinci.

The EU is the world’s largest milk producer. While milk is produced in all Member States, farm and herd sizes, yields and types of farming vary widely across Europe, from free-range farming in Alpine areas to large-scale specialised dairy farms. The EU’s dairy farmers produced 160 million tonnes of milk in 2022, 94 % of which was delivered to dairies where raw milk is processed into fresh products such as cheese or butter.

The EU dairy sector must comply with a large number of rules, covering hygiene, animal health and welfare, and official controls, among other things. However, there is also a range of instruments designed to support farmers and address market imbalances. These include common market organisation, public intervention and private storage provisions, direct payments and rural development measures, as part of the common agricultural policy (CAP). The CAP also encourages and supports producers’ organisations; these use their bargaining power to stabilise prices in the sector, thereby helping to increase farm milk prices and reduce price fluctuation.

In the coming years, growing EU and global demand is expected to support world dairy markets, but price fluctuations and market imbalances will continue to be problematic. Resilience and sustainability are key for the future of the sector. This can be achieved through innovation, as a way to reconcile the need for farmers to earn a decent living, consumer demand for affordable and quality dairy products, and environmental and animal health requirements.

This briefing updates a previous edition by Marie-Laure Augère-Granier, published in December 2018.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU dairy sector: Main features, challenges and prospects‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Distribution of dairy cows in the EU in 2020 Collection of cows’ milk by EU Member State

Written by David de Groot (updated on 02.08.2024).

People from racial and ethnic minority backgrounds face discrimination and its consequences on a daily basis. However, the exact scale of the problem is hard to gauge, owing to a lack of data and general under‑reporting of racist incidents. Although the European Union (EU) has been introducing legislation to combat racial and xenophobic discrimination since 2000, the problem persists. The global Black Lives Matter protests highlighted the need for new measures, while the COVID‑19 pandemic saw a major increase in reports of racist and xenophobic incidents, and the crisis it triggered had a disproportionately large negative effect on racial and ethnic minority groups, in the form of higher death and infection rates.

Studies point to the cost of racial discrimination not only for the individuals concerned, but also for society as a whole. For instance, a 2018 EPRS report argued that the loss in earnings caused by racial and ethnic discrimination for both individuals and societies amounts to billions of euros annually. EU citizens also acknowledge this problem: a 2019 survey found that over half of Europeans believe racial or ethnic discrimination to be widespread in their country.

To address racial discrimination and the inequalities it engenders, the European Commission has put forward a number of equality strategies and actions. The European Parliament, meanwhile, has long demanded an end to racial discrimination. In recent resolutions, Parliament has called for an end to structural racism, discrimination, racial profiling and police brutality; for protection of the right to protest peacefully; for an enhanced role for culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism; and for authorities to take an intersectional approach. On 20 and 21 March 2024, Members of the European Parliament from the Anti‑Racism and Diversity Intergroup (ARDI) co‑hosted the third EU Anti‑Racism and Diversity Week.

This updates a briefing from March 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU legislation and policies to fight racial and ethnic discrimination‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Prevalence of racial discrimination in different areas of life in the five years before the FRA 2022 EU Survey on Immigrants and Descendants of Immigrants, by country (%) Discrimination based on ethnic or immigrant background in different areas of life in the 12 months before the FRA EU MIDIS II survey of 2017, by survey target group (%)

You probably encounter artificial intelligence (AI) in your daily life, whether you are unlocking your phone using facial recognition or using ChatGPT to find some information quickly. While AI technologies can benefit society, create jobs and increase productivity, their application could also compromise fundamental rights and jeopardise users’ safety. The European Parliament has worked to define rules for AI systems that strike the right balance between fostering investment in this new technology and protecting fundamental rights.

Since 2020, Parliament has adopted several resolutions outlining how the EU should regulate AI to support innovation, ethical standards and trust in AI technology. It launched a Special Committee on AI in a Digital Age. In May 2022, Parliament adopted its roadmap to AI. Parliament advocated a horizontal, innovation-friendly regulation framework, proportionate to the specific types of risk particular AI systems incur.

The European Commission’s 2021 proposed AI Act was the first of its kind in the world. Parliament formally adopted the law in March 2024, and it is expected to enter into force soon. The rules laid down in the act apply to all AI systems sold or used in the EU, to ensure that only safe products are placed on the market. As Parliament advocated, the proposal introduced a risk-based approach: certain AI practices with unacceptable, harmful risks will be prohibited, high-risk AI systems regulated, and transparency obligations will apply for systems with minimal risk.

Parliament secured important changes to the initial proposal. The definition of AI systems is now aligned with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) text. Moreover, the list of prohibited AI systems has been extended, and systems that influence voter behaviour are labelled high-risk. Parliament also ensured high-risk systems have to undergo a fundamental rights impact assessment before they are brought to market. Thanks to Parliament, citizens will be able to file complaints about AI systems, and receive explanations about decisions that affect their rights made using high-risk systems.

Parliament also succeeded in shaping the response to the rapid development of general-purpose AI (GPAI) models powering AI tools like ChatGPT. Characterised by their large size, opacity and the fact that they can be used and adapted beyond the purpose for which they were designed, these models present ethical and social risks: discrimination, misinformation and privacy violations. The AI Act introduces obligations on transparency and copyright law, and ensures content used for training for all GPAI models is disclosed. More stringent obligations will apply for more powerful, high-impact GPAI models. The newly named European AI Office, established within the European Commission, will have investigatory and enforcement powers over GPAI models, and a link to the scientific community to support its work.

Parliament acted swiftly in the face of the opportunities and challenges of this new technology. Parliament has set the agenda and shaped the new laws to ensure we can reap the benefits of new AI technologies while protecting our fundamental rights. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting.

This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Micaela Del Monte.

Having been elected to the European Parliament in June 2024, two members of the European Commission – Virginijus Sinkevičius (Lithuania) and Adina Vălean (Romania) – have resigned as commissioners in order to take up their seats. In this situation, the usual rule is that the vacancy must be filled by a new commissioner of the same nationality – unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise. On 15 July 2024, the day before the Parliament’s constitutive session, Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, announced that Executive Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič (Slovakia) would take over the duties of Sinkevicius, and Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra (the Netherlands) those of Valean.

Background

The College of Commissioners currently consists of one national per Member State. Any commissioner elected to the European Parliament who decides to take up their seat must resign, as the two offices are incompatible (Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 7(1) of the Electoral Act). The EU Treaties require, as a general rule, that a vacancy caused by such a resignation be filled for the remainder of the Commission’s term of office by a new member of the same nationality, appointed by the Council. However, the Council may, acting unanimously, on a proposal from the President of the Commission, decide not to fill the vacancy ‘in particular when the remainder of the Member’s term of office is short’ (Article 246 TFEU). In this case, another commissioner might be required to take over the duties of the non-replaced commissioner in the interim.

After the 2014 elections, four members of the Commission took up seats in the European Parliament, and were replaced for the final months of their mandates. On that occasion, Parliament held hearings with the candidate replacements before voting on their appointment. More recently in July 2019, five members of the Juncker Commission were elected to Parliament and two of those decided to take up their seats: Andrus Ansip (Estonia) and Corina Creţu (Romania). President Juncker proposed not to replace them. He noted that, during the 4 remaining months, the Commission’s focus would be on completing pending proposals. Moreover, pointing to the financial burden entailed by such replacements, Juncker suggested that, given the practice of working in ‘project teams’, other commissioners would be ‘fully capable’ of stepping in for departing colleagues. However the Council could not agree unanimously on his proposal, and the procedure to replace the two commissioners was launched, with the Estonian and Romanian governments proposing candidates. In the end, however, the Council did not appoint new commissioners.

The 2024 European elections

Following the 2024 elections in June, four commissioners were elected to the European Parliament (Virginijus Sinkevičius, Commissioner for environment, oceans and fisheries; Valdis Dombrovskis – Latvia, Executive Vice-President responsible for an economy that works for people; Adina Vălean, responsible for transport; and Dubravka Šuica – Croatia, Vice-President responsible for democracy and demography). Sinkevičius and Vălean have joined the Parliament while Šuica and Dombrovskis have remained in office. In July 2024, before Parliament’s constitutive plenary session, Ursula von der Leyen announced that Šefčovič would take over the portfolio of Sinkevičius (environment and fisheries) while Hoekstra would take over Vălean’s portfolio (transport). On 24 July, following von der Leyen’s proposal, the Council formally and unanimously took the decision not to fill the vacancies caused by the resignation of Sinkevičius and Vălean.

This is an update of an ‘at-a-glance‘ note written in July 2019 by Laura Tilindyte.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Replacement or otherwise of commissioners elected to the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are concerned about the arrest of Captain Paul Watson in Greenland. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since July 2024, asking her to intervene with the Danish authorities to stop Captain Watson from being extradited to Japan.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

Extradition is a national responsibility

According to European Union (EU) law, the European Parliament is not authorised to intervene in an extradition process, which is the responsibility of national authorities.

Although there is an EU-Agreement between the European Union and Japan on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, it states that is does not apply to extradition (Article 1). 

European Parliament position on whaling

In an October 2022 resolution, the European Parliament calls on Japan, Norway and Iceland to cease their whaling operations. Parliament strongly supports the continuation of the global moratorium on commercial whaling as well as the ban on international trade of whale products.

In an earlier resolution from June 2021, the European Parliament regrets Japan’s withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission and urges Norway and Japan to cease their whaling operations. Parliament also stresses the importance of protecting whale populations, from both a biodiversity and climate perspective.

EU laws protecting whales

The EU has adopted measures to protect cetaceans (whales, dolphins and porpoises) against hunting, capture and captivity, and against deliberate disturbance or trading, including cetacean products originating from non-EU countries.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The EU’s leaders took two crucial decisions at their summit on 27 June to set the framework for the new institutional cycle: one on high-level appointments, the other on the Union’s political priorities for the next 5 years, the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. Since the adoption of the previous edition of the EU’s long-term priorities in 2019, the EU has had to face major crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the energy crisis, and the change in the security environment following Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.

Are these global challenges reflected in the EU’s new long-term political priorities or has the list of political orientations remained unchanged? Is the new Strategic Agenda more of a continuation or does it constitute a real shift? To answer these questions, this briefing examines the new Strategic Agenda, outlining its content, developments in its substance during the adoption process, and similarities and differences with the political priorities set in the previous institutional cycles.

The findings of the analysis (see the table in the Annex) show that the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 constitutes an important shift in the EU’s political priorities compared with the previous Strategic Agenda, but that elements of continuity remain quite apparent nevertheless. The most obvious changes are the significance of security and defence, the importance granted to enlargement, the addition of new elements on EU competitiveness, and the salience of democracy (within the Union and in relations with third countries), which is a headline priority for the first time. Another noteworthy development is that less attention is paid to climate and environmental issues, even if some points were introduced during the drafting process.

At the same time, there is a substantial degree of continuity with the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024. Less than 20 % of the policy aspects are completely new, even though the length of the Strategic Agenda document has increased by 25 %. This observation tends to indicate that the previous EU priorities remain relevant and that a reshaping of the Agenda (rather than starting from scratch) was considered sufficient. Interestingly, many of the elements added seem to be a reiteration of policy issues addressed by the European Council in its conclusions over the last 5 years. Thus, the document appears to be a collection of previously agreed positions rather than a new set of guidelines. While the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the change in the geopolitical context have fed into the new Strategic Agenda, other major issues of recent years such as health and energy are less explicitly referred to than could have been expected considering the severity of the crises with which the EU has been confronted.

The European Council’s role in setting the EU’s political priorities

The European Council is composed of the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States, as well as its President and the President of the European Commission. Its role, as defined in Article 15 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to define its ‘general political directions and priorities’. The European Council sets the 5-year political priorities for the EU, at the start of the institutional cycle, shortly after the European elections, in a document known as the Strategic Agenda.

The Strategic Agenda influences the political priorities of the new Commission President and feeds into the subsequent Commission annual work programmes. Therefore, the guidelines outlined in the Strategic Agenda are likely to be reflected in the legislative proposals put forward by the Commission and, in turn, in the legislative work of the Parliament and the Council.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Strategic Agenda 2024-2029: Continuity or paradigm shift?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rebecca Torpey.

On 18 July, over 40 European leaders gathered for the fourth meeting of the European Political Community (EPC). It followed a series of international summits in the preceding weeks, including a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit and a G7 summit, plus two European Council meetings. Conflicts on the European continent and in its neighbourhood, as well as the upcoming United States presidential elections and their potential ramifications were most likely at the forefront of leaders’ minds. European unity in its support for Ukraine was the overarching theme, alongside three roundtable topics: migration, energy, and defending and securing democracy. The reset of the relationship between the United Kingdom and its European counterparts was also a clear ambition of the newly elected UK government, hosting the event. As with the previous EPC meetings, no concrete deliverables or statements were announced at the end of the summit.

1.     Background

The EPC’s fourth summit meeting took place on 18 July 2024 in the United Kingdom (UK), at Blenheim Palace in Oxfordshire, two weeks after the UK general election. It was French President Emmanuel Macron who originally proposed the idea, on 9 May 2022, of developing a forum for political dialogue between European countries. It was clarified at the first EPC that the intention of the informal platform was to foster discussion between peers at the highest level and build cooperation on issues of concern for the European continent. No declarations are therefore released after EPC meetings.

The EPC has no official budget or secretariat, with the host country taking on the majority of the organisational duties. In addition, tangible results and deliverables are limited, leading some to doubt the usefulness of the forum. Some academics have argued that establishing bureaucratic structures would increase transparency and differentiate the EPC from other European institutions. Others have suggested its informality and lack of institutionalisation have allowed the EPC to fill a gap. It has been reported, however, that European leaders want the EPC to remain informal.

EPC summits are held on a bi-annual basis, hosted alternately by a European Union (EU) and a non-EU country. The next EPC meeting is due to be hosted on 7 November 2024 by Hungary, which currently holds the rotating EU Council Presidency. However, a number of EU countries have downgraded their participation or even considered boycotting informal Council and European Council meetings chaired by Hungary following the ‘peace missions’ and international diplomacy carried out by Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, without prior EU coordination. However, the EPC is not an EU forum. Therefore, even if the boycott and/or downgrading is still ongoing, it does not guarantee that the EPC meeting would be impacted in the same way. Albania is expected to host the sixth EPC summit, during the first half of 2025.

In October 2022, the inaugural meeting of the EPC took place in Prague – the day before Czechia also hosted an informal European Council meeting in Prague Castle. The main discussion topics were peace and security, energy, and economic issues. The European leaders were also forthright about their unity in condemning Russia’s war on Ukraine and expressing support for Ukraine.

In June 2023, the second EPC meeting was hosted by Moldova, a country strongly affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine. Peace and security, and energy and interconnectivity were the two main agenda points. However, peace and security was the clear focus of the meeting, which took place in Bulboaca, a few kilometres from the Ukrainian border.

In October 2023, the third meeting of the EPC took place in Granada, Spain, continuing the trend of the host alternating between the EU country holding the rotating presidency of the Council and a non-EU country. During this meeting, European leaders discussed digitalisation, energy, and conflicts in Europe; they also emphasised their unity in support of Ukraine.

2.     Participation

Leaders from across Europe (with the exception of Russia and Belarus) were invited to participate in the fourth EPC summit. Over 40 heads of state or government took part in this EPC, including 24 EU Member States. Azerbaijan, which did not attend the EPC meeting in Granada, took part this time around. Again, for the third time, Türkiye did not attend. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, attended the summit and represented the EU. As the vote for the re-election of Ursula von der Leyen as European Commission President was also scheduled for 18 July on the European Parliament’s plenary agenda, von der Leyen was not present at the summit.

Source: European Council website.

For the first time, representatives of NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe attended the EPC. According to a UK government press release, the participation of these organisations was designed to demonstrate ‘the importance of unity in response to the arc of conflict and instability inside and near Europe’s borders that affects the UK and the continent’s interests equally’. Broadening participation to other international organisations may also have arisen from the desire of the previous UK government to limit the EU institutions’ role.

3.     Meeting format

The summit began with a plenary opened by host Prime Minister Keir Starmer. In his address, Starmer reaffirmed that the UK would stand with Ukraine as long as it takes and touched on the topics of the upcoming roundtables. Starmer also signalled that he wanted to reset the EU-UK relationship, stating that by working together EU countries ‘are a powerful force for good’ across the European continent. Then, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed European leaders, underlining the importance of European unity in the face of Russia’s attempts to create division and – without directly naming him – criticising Orbán’s recent ‘peace missions’ to Moscow and Beijing. European leaders then gathered for the family photo – a tradition at such summits.

The opening plenary was followed by three roundtables on: i) migration; ii) energy; and iii) defending and securing democracy. The roundtable model had already been used successfully at the previous EPC meetings as well as at the EU-African Union Summit in 2022. In contrast with previous EPC summits, the discussion at the roundtables was guided by key questions. Those questions had been prepared by government representatives (i.e. sherpas) and policy analysts during three expert meetings, co-organised by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office as well as the UK Mission to the EU.

Addressing European leaders at the closing plenary, the UK Prime Minister – building on his earlier comments about resetting EU-UK relationships – welcomed the rapprochement that had occurred at the summit. European leaders also attended a reception hosted by King Charles III in Blenheim Palace’s Long Library.

In addition, a number of smaller meetings were held in the margins of the summit. Charles Michel, Kier Starmer, Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and Moldovan President Maia Sandu met to discuss how their countries could strengthen their cooperation in order to support Moldova on its road to a more secure and prosperous future. On the sidelines of the EPC summit it was also announced that Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala, had signed a defence and security agreement.

4.     Summit hosts

The UK hosted the fourth EPC (the second time it had been hosted by a non-EU Member State) just two weeks after a general election that brought Starmer’s Labour party into government in the UK for the first time in 14 years. This provided an opportune moment for the new British Prime Minister to meet numerous European leaders, with Starmer describing the summit as ‘political speed-dating’.

Previous EPC summits had provided the host countries with an opportunity to showcase a topic of importance to them. Although it was not an official item on the agenda, Starmer emphasised that his focus was on resetting the UK’s relations with other European countries. This new chapter in EU-UK relations was apparent in Starmer’s prioritisation of bilateral meetings with the UK’s two closest neighbours. On the eve of the EPC, Starmer hosted the Irish Taoiseach, Simon Harris, for dinner at his country residence – the first official visitor he has met as Prime Minister. During the evening of the EPC, Starmer then hosted a bilateral dinner with President Macron. Starmer’s opening address was further evidence of a new UK attitude towards its European counterparts: ‘We want to work with all of you…To reset relationships…Rediscover our common interest…And renew the bonds of trust and friendship’; his address built on the King’s speech in the UK Parliament the previous day, which stressed that the new UK government would ‘reset the relationship with European partners’. In a doorstep interview, Charles Michel stated that ‘on the EU side we are ready to cooperate much more with the United Kingdom’. There have also been reports of a potential bilateral summit between the EU and UK, and at the EPC, Michel indicated to reporters that ‘It’d be good if this is possible in the future to have a bilateral summit so that we can put in place a clear framework for strategic cooperation between the United Kingdom and the EU’.

5. Key discussion topics

While there were three roundtable agenda topics, the war in Ukraine was the overarching issue that permeated all European leaders’ discussions. In his opening address, Starmer stated ‘So our first task here today is to confirm our steadfast support for Ukraine, to unite once again behind those values that we cherish and to say, we will face down aggression on this continent – together’. The importance of supporting Ukraine was also reflected in that fact that President Zelenskyy was given the floor to address European leaders right after Starmer at the opening plenary session.

Migration

The EPC roundtable on migration was led by Italy and Albania. In his doorstep interview, Michel stated that migration was a global challenge. As part of the reset in relations with the EU, one of the key areas for potential cooperation is illegal immigration. The UK reportedly wanted to discuss asylum-seekers crossing the Channel and an EU-wide returns agreement. In addition, Starmer stated that the UK had to tackle the ‘drivers of migration’ with its partners.

Defending and securing democracy

The roundtable on defending and securing democracy was led by France and Moldova. Both countries want to launch an EPC-level network to combat disinformation and foreign interference in Europe. When addressing the European Parliament in plenary on the day of her re-election, President von der Leyen announced that the Commission would propose a ‘European democracy shield’ – a structure dedicated to countering foreign information manipulation and interference. With Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine still on-going, discussions on the threat from Russia as well as mutual defence and security were at the core of EPC discussions. Security and defence is another area on which the UK government seems keen to increase cooperation with the EU. An EU-UK security pact was reportedly discussed at the NATO summit in Washington the week before.

Energy

The discussion on energy connectivity was led by the EU and Montenegro. Building energy resilience, a topic which has received increased attention at European Council level since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, was an important point of focus at this roundtable. European leaders also discussed new sanctions against 11 vessels that have been identified as carriers of Russian oil. European leaders also touched upon preparations for Ukraine’s energy needs in the upcoming winter.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Political Community meeting in Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, on 18 July 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

In today’s global, saturated textile and fashion system, obtaining accurate and precise data from upstream actors or from the supply chain can be challenging. Sustainability requires transparency, circularity, and more demand-driven operations; all this could help to bring down the textile production and consumption figures associated with ‘fast fashion’. Customer‑centric product design and production require new operations and business models based on more accurate data. The circular economy also entails new partnerships and open data sharing between actors in the ecosystem.

Transparency and traceability are challenging issues in today’s long, global, and saturated textile supply chains. The further down the supply chain the need for information goes, the harder it is to obtain reliable and accurate data.  Supply chain processes meanwhile generate a huge amount of data which, if correctly collected and precisely analysed, can help companies make more sustainable decisions throughout the entire upstream supply chain (from the fibre to the product phase).

The move towards a circular economy brings with it the need to acquire new kinds of data from downstream actions such as reuse, reselling, and recycling. This data is still largely missing, and new tools, measurements, and standards need to be developed to obtain and share data from these actions.

To realise the European Commission’s vision of a sustainable and circular textile sector, several regulations are on the way. The idea is that this will lead to the development of more sustainable practices in the industry and in business. Moreover, consumers might also change their behaviour if they are better informed. All this requires measurements and evaluations based on reliable data on the resources, materials, products, and processes used during a product’s lifetime.

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently published a study entitled ‘Identifying data gaps in the textile industry and assessing current initiatives to address them‘. This study examines data gaps throughout the textile supply and value chains, from the fibre to the end-of-product life stage. It also exposes the challenges involved: missing data, data accessibility, data management, reliability, and relevance, mandatory or non-mandatory data collection, data sharing, and data cost challenges. Drawing on a literature review, 17 stakeholder interviews and 2 expert workshops, it gathers essential insights from the field and evaluates current and forthcoming initiatives to address data gaps. It also discusses policy options geared towards harnessing data to contribute to the sustainable transition and implementation of a circular economy in the textile sector.

Read the full STOA study and the options brief to find out more. This research was presented to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 14 March 2024, together with a complementary study on the ‘digital product passport for the textile sector‘, which was followed by the release of a promotional video.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Ingeborg Odink (1st edition).

Child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are some of the most severe forms of violence against children, and they are crimes that know no borders. The constant increase in these crimes, exacerbated by the pandemic and the use of modern technologies, underscores the need for harmonised national legislation and international cooperation to improve prevention, protect victims and prosecute perpetrators.

The statistics for Europe are staggering, as acknowledged by both governmental and non-governmental organisations. Reports indicate that one in five children has experienced some form of sexual violence, with 70-85 % of child victims knowing their abuser. The EU has made combating child sexual abuse, both offline and online, a top priority of its agenda and a key objective of the EU security union strategy for 2020 to 2025.

The primary legislative instrument in this area for the EU is Directive 2011/93/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. However, a recent ex-post evaluation highlighted limitations in the directive, particularly in addressing technological advances since its entry into force.

To align the directive with these changes, on 6 February 2024 the Commission submitted a proposal for a revision of the directive. In Parliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The committee adopted its draft report on 24 April 2024.

Complete version

• July 2024: Combating child sexual abuse: Revising Directive (2011/93/EU) – recast (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child sexual abuse material and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (recast)Committee responsible:Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2024)060
6.2.2024Former rapporteur:Jeroen Lenaers (EPP, Netherlands)2024/0035(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be appointedOrdinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Awaiting committee decision

Written by Krisztina Binder.

The European Union (EU) has been pursuing cultural cooperation with its Mediterranean partners for decades, enhancing dialogue and understanding between people. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), an intergovernmental organisation composed of the 27 EU Member States and 16 Mediterranean partner countries, recently launched the Mediterranean Capitals of Culture & Dialogue initiative to promote diversity and shared cultural identity in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Alexandria in Egypt and Tirana in Albania have been chosen to become the first Mediterranean Capitals of Culture and Dialogue, in 2025.

Introduction

The Euro-Mediterranean region boasts a rich and diverse cultural life and heritage, shaped by the coexistence of various cultures and traditions and millennia of cultural exchange. Culture has therefore been an area of cooperation between the EU and its partners in the Mediterranean region for many years. EU cultural cooperation in the region is guided by the significant role that culture plays in achieving sustainable human development. The Commission’s New European Agenda for Culture, adopted in 2018, identified culture as a vector for sustainable social and economic development and a factor in promoting peace, including through people-to-people contacts fostered by education and youth projects. Cultural co‑creation meanwhile serves as a valuable tool for communicating EU values, including artistic freedom and cultural rights.

In 2022, a conference of Euro-Mediterranean region culture ministers – the first such ministerial meeting of the EU-Southern Partnership – was held in Naples, following up on the first G20 meeting devoted to culture, held a year earlier. The protection of cultural heritage and the role of culture in sustainable development were among the topics discussed at the conference. Its outcomes paved the way for new EU programmes supporting cultural initiatives in the Mediterranean.

Cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean region

Over the years, the network supporting Euro-Mediterranean relations has expanded. Several frameworks offer a structure for these relations and serve to promote cooperation in various areas, including culture.

The EU’s privileged partnership with the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern shores began in 1995, when the then 15 EU Member States and 12 Mediterranean partner countries launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona process. The objective was to establish an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity, while promoting better understanding among people through social, cultural and human exchange. The partners recognised the pivotal role of culture in relations between countries and understood that dialogue between cultures and human exchanges could further strengthen their relations.

Since 2004, European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) has governed relations between the EU and 16 of its geographically closest eastern and southern neighbours. Under the 2015 revised ENP, a 2021 joint communication on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood proposed a new agenda for the Mediterranean to relaunch and strengthen the strategic partnership with the 10 southern partners. This agenda guides the EU’s bilateral, regional and cross-regional cooperation under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). It also emphasises the need to foster inter‑religious and intercultural dialogues and enhance the capacity to combat the illegal trafficking of cultural heritage.

The 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme for the Southern Neighbourhood outlines the strategic priorities for regional cooperation, noting that ‘The role of culture as a vector for peace, democracy and economic development will continue to be supported to help build a more inclusive Mediterranean. Culture is a field where there is a real added value in working at regional level to reduce social isolation and build connections across the Mediterranean region’.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched in 2008, building on the Barcelona process and seeking to reinforce the partnership. Complementing EU bilateral and regional cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood, the UfM is an intergovernmental organisation that gathers all the EU Member States and 16 Mediterranean partner countries. It promotes regional cooperation and dialogue through the implementation of projects and initiatives addressing the objectives of regional stability, human development and economic integration. The permanent UfM secretariat, located in Barcelona, works closely with other institutions – such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM (PA-UfM) and the Euro‑Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) – to pursue the Barcelona process objectives.

Examples of cultural cooperation

Since 1995, a wide range of initiatives, programmes and projects have been developed to promote the exchange of ideas and foster better mutual knowledge and understanding.

Under the Barcelona process, the implementation of the partnership’s cultural dimension included the Euromed Heritage programme, which aimed to highlight and safeguard the physical and non-material heritage of the Mediterranean. The evaluation of its first phase, launched in 1998, emphasised that the region’s common cultural heritage benefited dialogue and cultural understanding.

The Euromed Audiovisual programme, initiated in 2000, supported Euro-Mediterranean cooperation projects in radio, television and cinema.

The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF), inaugurated in 2005, seeks to foster intercultural and civil society dialogue by bringing together civil society from across Europe and the Mediterranean to work on issues related to youth, media, values, religion, peace, co-existence and others.

To honour the cultural richness of the region, the UfM launched the Day of the Mediterranean – marked every year on 28 November – to foster a common Mediterranean identity, promote intercultural exchange and celebrate the region’s diversity.

Jointly coordinated with ALF and in partnership with ARLEM, the UfM has also recently launched the Mediterranean Capitals of Culture and Dialogue. The initiative is based on the 2022 Naples Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean/EU Southern Partnership culture ministers, who called for the creation of a Capital of Mediterranean Culture modelled on the European Capitals of Culture. A recommendation to the same effect by over 200 young civil society representatives was presented at the 2022 Forum des mondes méditerranéens. The new initiative, under which a northern and a southern Mediterranean city will be selected each year, is designed to promote the region’s cultural diversity and foster better mutual understanding among its people. Following a call for applications, Alexandria and Tirana were chosen to be the first Mediterranean Capitals of Culture and Dialogue in 2025, with a year-long programme planned for each city. The deadline for local and regional authorities representing cities from the UfM region to submit their applications for the 2026 edition was early July 2024.

The UfM also identifies and supports cooperation projects that reinforce partnerships across the region. For instance, the Euromed University of Fes (UEMF) in Morocco and the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) in Slovenia promote dialogue, mutual understanding and intercultural exchange. Within this context, fostering intercultural dialogue through educational, professional, cultural, and artistic exchange among young people in the Euro-Mediterranean region, in collaboration with ALF, is another of the UfM youth strategy‘s key actions.

Recently, a project to boost the cultural and creative industries and their contribution to economic growth and job creation was signed as part of a programme, the first in the context of the Morocco-EU partnership to support the cultural and creative industries in Morocco. Another initiative is CREACT4MED, a 4-year (2020- 2024) regional programme seeking to promote entrepreneurship and employment creation for youth and women by harnessing the cultural and creative industries in the Southern Neighbourhood.

In October 2021, the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) and Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) held a joint public hearing on ‘Culture in the EU’s external relations’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Euro-Mediterranean cultural cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.