European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

Once dispersed in the environment, microplastic particles under 5 mm in size are extremely difficult to remove and very persistent. Today, they are present in the air, soil, freshwater, seas, oceans, plants and animals, and in several components of the human diet. Human exposure to microplastic particles is therefore widespread, raising concerns about potential health impacts.

The EU has committed to addressing microplastic pollution in two action plans –on the new circular economy and on zero pollution for air, water and soil – both of which are part of the European Green Deal. On 16 October 2023, the European Commission proposed a regulation to tackle microplastic pollution resulting from losses of plastic pellets – the industrial raw materials used to make plastic products. These losses are the third largest source of unintentional microplastic releases into the EU environment. The proposal would apply to all economic operators handling plastic pellets in the EU in quantities above 5 tonnes per year, as well as to EU and non-EU carriers transporting plastic pellets within the EU. It would set requirements for best handling practices, mandatory certification and self-declaration, and provide for the development of a harmonised methodology to estimate losses.

Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), responsible for the file, adopted its legislative report on 19 March 2024. The text awaits a vote during the second April 2024 plenary session, with a view to establishing Parliament’s position at first reading.

Complete version

• April 2024: ‘Reducing microplastic pollution from plastic pellet losses‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing plastic pellet losses to reduce microplastic pollution).Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2023) 645
16.10.2023Rapporteur:João Albuquerque (S&D, Portugal)2023/0373(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Catherine Chabaud (Renew Europe, France)
Ska Keller (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Karol Karski (ECR, Poland)
Idoia Villanueva Ruiz (The Left, Spain)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Plenary vote on the committee report

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Members sit down to a packed agenda for Parliament’s last plenary session before the European elections, with many legislative files reaching their conclusion. Parliament is scheduled to debate the conclusions of the recent European Council meeting on Tuesday morning. Members will debate Iran’s attack on Israel in a key debate on Wednesday. Parliament also marks the 20th anniversary of the 2004 EU enlargement in a formal sitting on Wednesday morning. An important vote is also expected on Thursday on simplifying common agricultural policy rules, following farmers’ protests.

To support Ukraine’s economy and avert an international food crisis, autonomous trade measures liberalising Ukrainian exports to the EU were introduced following Russia’s 2022 invasion. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are scheduled to consider a provisional agreement endorsed by the Committee on International Trade (INTA) to extend these trade measures for a further year, and introduce a ‘reinforced safeguard mechanism’ to limit imports of sensitive products, to protect EU farmers.

Also partly responding to farmers’ demands, Members are due to consider two reports from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI), in a debate set for Tuesday evening. The proposed revision addresses a dozen laws on seeds and other plant and forest reproductive material created to regulate marketing of seeds, young plants and other types of reproductive material. The committee proposes exemptions for materials sold in specific cases, such as small quantities of plant materials exchanged by farmers, and that new sustainability tests are only mandatory for agricultural crops. The committee also wants the Commission to provide technical assistance for forest reproductive contingency plans.

Protecting our environment

Members are due to consider several proposals during this session that seek to protect the environment. Revising EU rules on packaging and packaging waste returns to the plenary agenda on Wednesday, when Members are set to consider a provisional agreement endorsed by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). As per Parliament’s demands, the agreed text bans per- and polyfluorinated alkyl substances in food packaging, and sets new rules on bio-based feedstock in plastic packaging. If agreed, the new law could mean all packaging sold in the EU from 2030 is recyclable, and some packaging formats, such as single-use plastic packaging for condiments, would be forbidden. Take-away outlets would have to provide a way for customers to use their own containers, and EU countries should set up deposit return systems for drinks containers.

Plastic pellet losses are the third largest source of unintentional microplastic releases in the EU environment. Once dispersed, they are extremely difficult to remove – and no EU-level law covers this issue. Members are therefore scheduled to debate an ENVI committee report on a proposal aimed at preventing plastic pellet losses on Monday afternoon. The ENVI report seeks to widen the definition of pellets, as well as to include their transport in the scope of the proposal. The committee would like to see more complete risk assessments from economic operators, who would be required to use specific labels for better management of the pellets.

The proposal to better promote the repair of goods also returns to Parliament on Monday afternoon, when Members are expected to consider a political agreement on the file. The agreed text would ensure all EU countries introduce at least one measure promoting repair, that manufacturers ensure spare parts and tools are available (and do not hamper the repair of goods). Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) negotiators have ensured an extension of legal guarantees on repaired products of one year.

Protecting EU borders

Following the adoption of the immigration package during the last plenary session, Members are due to consider revising another tool used to improve border controls, combat illegal immigration and for other law-enforcement purposes, advanced passenger information (API), in a debate scheduled for Wednesday evening. If agreed, the provisional agreement reached between Parliament and Council would result in parallel new rules on the use of API for border management and for law enforcement, that will boost fundamental rights safeguards and data security, and strengthen supervision of the collection and transfer of passenger information.

Recent migration, security, and public health challenges led many EU countries within the Schengen area to reintroduce internal border checks. In response, the European Commission has proposed to revise the Schengen Borders Code, which lays down the rules for such temporary derogations. Earlier on Wednesday, Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement reached (after the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) rejected the Commission’s proposal on the instrumentalisation of migrants) by the co-legislators. The agreed text tightens the rules on temporary reintroduction of internal border controls and introduces bilateral voluntary cooperation on non-EU nationals found in border areas, which could apply to minors, but should not apply to asylum-seekers.

Protecting people

Several of Parliament’s key demands were retained in the compromise agreed on new laws to combat violence against women and domestic violence, despite the removal of the criminalisation of rape (on grounds of national competence). These include criminalisation of forced marriage and cyber-flashing; additional aggravating circumstances; and a five-year review of the legislation’s impact. If agreed, minimum EU standards will apply for criminalising severe violence and for enhancing prevention, access to justice and protection of victims. Members are scheduled to debate the compromise text negotiated by Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and the LIBE committee, on Tuesday afternoon.

Often involving violence, trafficking in human beings is a persistent crime that affects mostly women, with an estimated 7 000 victims per year in the EU – although the true figures are probably much higher. To step up EU action on combating this crime, Members are expected to debate a draft agreement on revising the Human Trafficking Directive on Monday afternoon. Endorsed by the LIBE and FEMM committees, the agreement supports Parliament’s inclusion of surrogacy, as well as the criminalisation of knowingly using services of a human-trafficking victim in the revised law.

An estimated 27.6 million people, including 3.3 million children, suffer under forced labour worldwide. To tackle the issue, Members are due to consider a draft agreement introducing new legislation to ban products produced under forced labour from the EU market, also on Monday afternoon. Endorsed by the Committees on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and on International Trade (INTA), the text tasks the Commission with EU-wide bans, withdrawal or disposal of such products. Parliament has ensured they are then donated, recycled or destroyed.

The EU is determined to resolve the employment issues created by digital platforms’ use of ‘gig’ work – for taxi or food-delivery services, for example. To this end, Members are set to vote on an agreement on a new law to improve platform working conditions on Wednesday afternoon. The outcome of difficult negotiations, and less stringent than the initial proposal, if agreed the legislation will set minimum working conditions for people who work through digital labour platforms, and introduce the first-ever EU rules on algorithmic management in the workplace.

Parliament has long supported facilitating access to education, employment, healthcare and culture for the millions of people in the EU with a form of disability. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are scheduled to consider a text agreed between the co-legislators on a proposal to create an EU-wide European disability card and European parking card. Endorsed by the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), the resulting law should mean disabled people’s rights to participate fully in daily life are equally recognised throughout the EU (including for non-EU residents).

To solve conflicts of competence between national courts when it comes to which court should try a criminal case in the EU, the co-legislators have agreed a draft law to regulate the transfer of proceedings in criminal matters. Members are set to consider the text endorsed by the LIBE committee, on Tuesday afternoon. The draft text largely maintains the original Commission proposal, with the addition of Parliament’s position on legal persons as victims, and proportionality as a criterion in transfer requests.

For its own part, Parliament proposed to set up a body to oversee ethical standards back in 2021. Subsequent negotiations between eight EU institutions and bodies led to a draft agreement on creating an interinstitutional body for ethical standards. Members are expected to debate the draft agreement in plenary on Thursday morning. The body should strengthen EU institutions’ ethics, integrity and transparency, by ensuring they have equivalent rules and an ethics culture, and raising awareness.

Reinforcing economic governance

To ensure prosperity and improve the balance between debt sustainability and sustainable and inclusive growth throughout the EU, the Council and Parliament have reached a provisional agreement on a far-reaching new economic governance framework to update the stability and growth pact. A debate on the package of economic files is expected on Tuesday morning. These would introduce nationally set medium-term fiscal plans and a reference trajectory for countries in debt. The plans would be based on net spending, and backed by a debt sustainability analysis that includes safeguards on debt sustainability and deficit resilience. As the first national plans will be based on 2023 figures, it is likely that a number of EU countries will come under the excessive deficit procedure.

To prevent EU banks from failing, holding sufficient prudential capital (‘own funds’) is essential. The Commission is therefore proposing to strengthen the prudential framework within the banking union through a pair of interconnected proposals, supported by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). Members are therefore due to consider a political agreement reached on the amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation on Wednesday afternoon, which largely retains the Commission’s proposal and most of the committee’s amendments. To align with the Basel Agreement and harmonise banking supervision, a new ‘output floor’ should ensure firms do not go below a certain level of risk-weighted asset. Banks will also have to take environment, social and governance risks into account when assessing collateral. As banks become exposed to crypto-assets, their disclosure will become mandatory under the new rules.

Also on Wednesday afternoon, Members are scheduled to debate a package of three draft agreements on tackling money-laundering and terrorist financing, strengthening the current rules and establishing an EU Anti-Money-Laundering Authority (AMLA) to ensure they are implemented correctly. Parliament insisted that AMLA mediate in disagreements between national supervisors and between Financial Intelligence Units. It also ensured that reporting of non-implementation or sanctions evasion and money-laundering risks are now included in the single rulebook. If agreed, a €10 000 EU-wide limit will apply for cash payments. Parliament also amended the proposal to extend the legitimate interest category to journalists and civil society organisations.

Turning to its own finances, the recent revision of the EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework to address EU priorities means amending the EU’s budget for this year. Draft amending budget No 1 (DAB1/2024) specifically raises the 2024 budget for security and defence, the neighbourhood and the world heading, and for the new Ukraine Reserve. Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) recommends approval of the Council position, which Members are set to consider on Thursday afternoon. The revision is also expected to considerably strengthen support for the Western Balkans under the current budget.

Members are earlier expected to debate a text agreed following the conclusion of interinstitutional negotiations on a new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, on Tuesday afternoon. To help advance their internal reforms, the €6 billion fund should provide Western Balkan countries with certain benefits of EU membership before they join the EU. Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and BUDG committee nevertheless demand clear progress indicators, more safeguards and greater focus on rule of law and conditionality, and recommend stronger parliamentary oversight and transparency.

Strengthening industry

Members are due to vote on the draft agreement on a proposal to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications networks on Tuesday afternoon. The new gigabit infrastructure act, agreed between the co-legislators and endorsed by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), would allow tacit approval for permit-granting, the introduction of an optional fibre-ready label for buildings and an end to fees for intra-EU calls by 2029.

On Thursday morning, Members are scheduled to return to the proposed net zero industry act and a text agreed between the co-legislators in February. The proposal seeks to expand EU capacity to manufacture the clean energy technologies it needs to achieve its climate targets. Parliament’s ITRE committee negotiators ensured the agreement includes Parliament’s demand that EU countries can designate specific ‘net-zero acceleration valleys’ and take measures to increase their attractiveness.

Parliament is set to debate another agreement with the Council, negotiated by the ITRE committee, on a proposed cyber solidarity act on Wednesday afternoon. Aiming for stronger solidarity in the EU in detecting and responding to cyber-threats, if agreed, the new regulation would provide for a pan-European cybersecurity alert system, as well as emergency and incidence review mechanisms. Parliament has ensured new workforce skills are included in the objectives; a greater role and resources for the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA); and that funding for Digital Europe programme objectives, such as digital skills and artificial intelligence, are not diverted.

• European Parliament Plenary Session, April II 2024
• Targeted CAP amendments on environmental conditionality
• Extension of EU trade benefits to Ukraine
• Seeds and other plant and forest reproductive material
• Revising rules on packaging and packaging waste
• Microplastic pollution from plastic pellet losses
• Promoting the repair of goods
• Revised rules on advance passenger information
• Revision of the Schengen Borders Code
• EU rules on combating violence against women
• Revision of the Human Trafficking Directive
• Ban on products made using forced labour
• EU directive on platform work
• European disability card and European parking card
• The transfer of proceedings in criminal matters
• Interinstitutional body for ethical standards
• New economic governance framework
• Banking union
• Anti-money-laundering package
• Draft amending budget No 1/2024: Amendments required following MFF revision
• Establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans
• Gigabit infrastructure act
• Net-zero industry act
• Cyber-solidarity act

Written by Nera Kuljanic

Proteins are the building blocks of our bodies. They are also important for bodily function and regulatory processes. We get these essential nutrients from food. Is there enough protein to feed everyone? Where does it come from? Looking at the future, will there be enough sustainable and diverse protein, considering the growing population, climate change effects and geopolitical tensions? Is there room for some new protein sources on our plates and how easy are they to find on the market today?

The Parliament has been active on this topic in recent years. In 2021, the Parliament highlighted the potential of non-plant based alternative protein sources in the EU. After the COVID‑19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine disrupted supply chains and highlighted dependencies on foreign suppliers for agricultural inputs and commodities in 2022, Parliament invited the European Commission to propose ‘a comprehensive European protein strategy in order to increase European protein production and reduce the EU’s dependency on third countries in this regard’. Parliament also demanded measures to ‘facilitate access to markets of alternative proteins’. Most recently, in October 2023, the Parliament outlined its own vision for a European protein strategy. The Commission is currently putting together a legislative proposal on sustainable food systems (it was due by the end of 2023). 

In this context, the European Parliament Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) commissioned a study on the future role of alternative protein sources in sustainable animal and human nutrition, as proposed by STOA Panel member Martin Hlaváček (Renew, CZ). The study examines the current and projected protein balance, focusing on conventional and alternative protein sources (algae, insects, microbially fermented products, and cultured meat), analyses the current state-of-the-art of the alternatives and challenges and opportunities for their adoption, and describes policy options to support the development of those alternatives.

Protein balance

The data shows conventional proteins dominate the current protein balance. While globally most dietary protein comes from plants (57 %), in Europe most human dietary protein comes from animal sources (55‑60 %). Total alternative proteins consumed represent only a small fraction (2 % of the animal protein market). The sources of protein used in animal feed are both non-edible for humans (such as grass) and edible (mostly grains, including cereals and pulses). The EU is 77 % self-sufficient in feed protein sources, and has an ample supply of roughage, which is the primary feed protein source (but relatively low in proteins). However, the EU only produces a quarter of the high-protein oilseed meals it requires to feed its livestock sector.

Looking to 2050, the demand for proteins will increase and there are strong reasons – population growth, health, climate, environment, geopolitics – for questioning whether the current distribution of animal and plant-based proteins, and their relative contribution to the overall intake globally and in the EU can and should be maintained. Alternative proteins offer potential to contribute to a more sustainable and resilient protein balance. However, their current contribution is minimal and data on their usage, particularly in an EU context, are limited and sometimes outdated.

Closer look into alternative protein sources

While alternative proteins generally require less water and land and produce fewer greenhouse gas emissions compared to conventional animal proteins, there are variations and complexities within each alternative that necessitate further research and optimisation. For example, the energy use in producing some alternative proteins can be equivalent to or even higher than their conventional counterparts, and specific feed sources for alternatives such as insects and algae can result in higher greenhouse gas emissions compared to soybean. Alternative proteins generally tend to generate less waste, with some even offering circular economy benefits by utilising waste as an input, the full extent of their sustainability potential requires further investigation.

The potential of alternative proteins to replace conventional protein sources hinges on their nutritional contribution to people and animals’ diets. In human nutrition, some of the alternative protein sources offer a beneficial macronutrient profile when compared to conventional animal-based proteins, although research on their bioavailability depending on type of alternative protein, and how they are produced and processed, is ongoing. Similarly, for their micronutrient content, the impact of different production processes and processing deserves further investigation. Moreover, there are also questions of price, regulation, and consumer acceptance. The level of investment in R&D, commercial and technological maturity and industrial capacity further point to how the future of alternative proteins may play out.

Future support for the alternative proteins sector

While alternative protein sources present opportunities to strengthen European food security and sustainability, they face considerable obstacles in scaling up technologies, achieving commercial viability against subsidised conventional sources, and navigating complex regulations and legislative barriers. The study lays out complementary policy options to help scale up alternative protein development and production in the EU. Proposed interventions include 1) targeted research funding to advance technologies and address knowledge gaps, 2) industrial policy investments in infrastructure and processing facilities, 3) incorporating environmental considerations into regulatory approval processes, and 4) enhanced coordination across policies and stakeholders.

Read the interview with Professor Arnold van Huis about entomophagy (the human consumption of insects), and with Professor Mark Post about lab-grown meat.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

Women continue to be under-represented in EU countries at all levels of political decision-making as well as in political parties. The origins of this situation are complex, but one reason stands out: violence against women active in politics discourages many women from entering the political arena. Female politicians are exposed to two severe and intersecting forms of violence: political violence and gender-based violence.

Violence against people active in politics, whether men or women, is a major obstacle to the exercise of political rights and freedoms, and a serious violation of basic human rights. The increasing polarisation of liberal societies has been accompanied by rising violence against political stakeholders. However, this is only half the story. Violence against women in politics needs to be understood and addressed in a distinct manner. When political violence targets women just because they are women, when it takes sexist and sexualised forms and when it seeks to discourage women generally from taking part in political life, there is a gender dimension. This form of violence can also often be a backlash against women’s greater presence in political life. Violence against women in politics takes multiple forms, from physical attacks to psychological and symbolic abuse, including sexual and sexist comments, online hate speech and sexual harassment, etc. Women surveyed tend to consider the impact of this type of violence significant in terms of psychological discomfort. They also feel less ready to defend certain positions.

At EU level, several measures seek to combat violence against women in politics, either indirectly or specifically. The legislative proposal for combating violence against women covers crimes that also affect politicians, while the proposal to criminalise hate speech would also address the issue.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Violence against women active in politics in the EU: A serious obstacle to political participation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘Violence against women active in politics in the EU: A serious obstacle to political participation‘ on YouTube.

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Written by Kamil Baraník with Hugo Carmona Bas (1st edition).

The supplementary protection certificate (SPC) is a specific intellectual property right that extends the basic patent’s market exclusivity for plant protection products. The unitary patent became operational in the EU on 1 June 2023, unifying patent protection in all participating Member States. Despite this significant change, SPCs, which are inseparable from patent protection, remain regulated at national level. This fragmented regulatory approach has proven ineffective, leading to excessive administrative costs for SPC applicants, who have to navigate the national laws of each Member State where they seek SPC protection. To address this issue, on 27 April 2023 the Commission submitted a proposal for a regulation introducing a unitary SPC for plant protection products as a complement to the protection offered by the unitary patent. This proposal, coupled with a parallel proposal for an SPC for plant protection products of the same date, seeks to harmonise the process of granting SPCs for plant protection products in the single market.

In Parliament, the proposal was assigned to the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), with Tiemo Wölken (S&D, Germany) as rapporteur. Following the approval of the reports on the two proposals by the Parliament plenary at first reading, Parliament adopted its position for the interinstitutional negotiations. The Council has yet to agree on its negotiating mandate.

Complete version

• April 2024: ‘Unitary supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the unitary supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products and for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary protection certificate (recast).Committee responsible:Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2023)221
COM(2023)223
27.4.2023Rapporteur:Tiemo Wölken (S&D, Germany)2023/0126(COD)
2023/0128(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Javier Zarzalejos (EPP, Spain)
Adrián Vázquez Lázara (Renew, Spain)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Emmanuel Maurel (GUE/NGL, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio with Yana Diane Meulemeester.

From 19 April to 1 June 2024, 968 million Indian voters are eligible to elect the members of the Lok Sabha (lower house). Voting is to take more than six weeks in seven phases across states and territories, concluding with a final round on 1 June; the votes are set to be counted on 4 June. Since 1999, elections to the Lok Sabha have coincided with those for the European Parliament.

In 2023, India overtook China as the world’s most populous country. The government has been able to lower India’s poverty rate substantially through efficient delivery of welfare schemes, while other layers of Indian society have steadily improved their situation since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister in 2014. Inequality has not improved significantly, however, and job creation is lagging.

India is one of the world’s fastest growing economies, and the Modi government has set the goal of becoming a developed country by 2047, the centenary of Indian independence. However, analysts argue that India’s economic growth has failed to create the necessary stock of employment, especially for young people. In recent years, India has undergone a major digital transformation. With the landing on the moon in August 2023, India also consolidated its status as a space power.

Analysts have expressed concern about the situation of India’s democracy and human rights. This includes the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy, violence and discrimination against Muslims and members of other religious minorities, the rise of Hindu nationalism and abandonment of the country’s traditional secularist posture, and the legislation on telecommunications.

The year 2023 was an important moment for India’s foreign policy and its pursuit of global recognition and growing international stature. India hosted the G-20 Summit, championing the cause of the ‘Global South’ while projecting India’s global leadership. Modi also proposed to host the COP33 Summit in 2028, highlighting New Delhi’s commitment to fighting climate change.

The EU is India’s second largest trading partner and their cooperation is increasing; recently, an EU-India Connectivity Partnership and an EU-India Trade and Technology Council were added. They are currently negotiating three agreements, on free trade, investment protection and geographical indications.

Read the complete briefing on ‘India ahead of the 2024 elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

GDP growth in China and India (annual %),
2014 to 2025 India’s main trading partners in 2022 (€ million)

Written by Gisela Gieger.

A key function of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to serve for its members as a forum for the negotiation of global trade rules. However, since the WTO’s foundation in 1995, WTO members have largely failed to meet their self-defined negotiating objectives as set out in the comprehensive 2001 Doha Development Agenda (DDA). By the time of the 2024 Abu Dhabi Ministerial Conference, WTO members had settled on merely two multilateral agreements in almost 30 years: a 2013 agreement on trade facilitation and a partial agreement on fisheries subsidies, concluded in 2022.

As some of the DDA’s trade liberalisation items were dropped and negotiations on other items have stalled, sub-sets of WTO members have found other ways to craft new trade rules outside the WTO: either through bilateral or regional preferential trade agreements or through plurilateral trade negotiations, leading to the fragmentation of rules and questioning of the WTO’s legitimacy. Modelled on the successful conclusion in 1997 of the first WTO plurilateral agreement eliminating tariffs on information technology, groups of WTO members led by developed countries set up two separate tracks of plurilateral talks on liberalising trade in services and in environmental goods in 2013 and 2014 respectively. Both stalled in 2016 and virtually ended market access-enhancing efforts within the WTO. In 2017, a group of members launched three initiatives – on domestic services regulation, investment facilitation and e-commerce – to re-invigorate the WTO’s negotiating function. The initiatives marked a shift from a new market access-seeking approach to an approach prioritising trade and investment facilitation with a strong development dimension. Albeit more successful, their incorporation into the WTO legal architecture has been challenging given opposition from some members. If opposition were overcome, plurilaterals could be a means of multilateralising new trade rules, as was the case for the ‘codes of conduct’ under the pre-WTO GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) regime by 1995.

To retain legitimacy and relevance, experts suggest that the WTO could do more to leverage its role as a forum for deliberating emerging issues, such as plastics pollution, trade and gender, green and fossil fuel subsidies, trade and industrial policies, carbon border mechanisms and regulatory action, for sustainable trade towards concrete negotiated outcomes.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The WTO’s negotiating function: Towards plurilaterals and new trade challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Annastiina Papunen.

The special European Council meeting on 17-18 April will be an important step towards agreeing on the EU’s political priorities for the 2024-2029 period. The three main priorities are likely to centre on ‘a strong and secure Europe’, ‘a prosperous and competitive Europe’ and ‘a free and democratic Europe’. EU leaders are also expected to adopt lengthy conclusions related to competitiveness, notably addressing the single market and the capital markets union. They will also address the war in Ukraine, and hold a strategic debate on EU-Türkiye relations. They may also discuss developments in the Middle East following Iran’s attack on Israel.

1.     General

This will be the first meeting for two new members of the European Council: the new prime minister of Portugal, Luís Montenegro, as well as Simon Harris, the new Taoiseach (i.e. prime minister) of Ireland.

2.     Special European Council meeting, 17-18 April Strategic Agenda 2024-2029

EU leaders will dedicate a substantial part of their discussions to the next long term priorities of the European Union, to be set out in the strategic Agenda 2024-2029. The process has intensified recently and the main priorities have now been identified.

Process. In June 2023, European Council President Charles Michel invited EU leaders to start the reflection process on the priorities for the next institutional cycle, which will feature in the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. The first step in the reflection process was a discussion at the informal European Council meeting in Granada, Spain on 5‑6 October 2023. The second step was a series of meetings, each with a small number of EU leaders representing a mix of geographical regions in the EU, political party affiliations and diversity of opinion. Four meetings took place in late 2023: on 13 November in Berlin, 14 November in Copenhagen, 16 November in Zagreb, and 29 November in Paris. A second series of small group meetings has taken place more recently, on 2 April in Vilnius, 3 April in Bucharest, 11 April in Warsaw, and 12 April in Vienna. Whilst many EU leaders have participated in only one of these meetings, some have participated in two, notably Robert Abela, Nikos Christodoulides, Nikolay Denkov, Mette Frederiksen, Luc Frieden, Kaja Kallas, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Karl Nehammer, Petteri Orpo, Mark Rutte and Donald Tusk. Charles Michel, together with the Secretary-General of the Council, Thérèse Blanchet, has attended all of these meetings. On the other hand, the Commission President, also a member of the European Council, has not been involved thus far.

Priorities. EU leaders will discuss the current outline for the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, which in the view of Charles Michel is converging around the common goal of transforming ‘Europe into a strong, resilient and more prosperous union’. The current working draft is based on three main broad priorities:

1. ‘A strong and secure Europe’, including the topics of the EU’s international role, security and defence, migration, and enlargement.
2. ‘A prosperous and competitive Europe’, addressing many topics including competitiveness, innovation, digital, energy, climate change, food security and social policy
3. ‘A free and democratic Europe’, concentrating on the rule of law, and promoting democracy and fundamental values.

These main priorities, notably the ones mentioned under ‘A strong and secure Europe’, also reflect the main concerns of EU citizens – the war in Ukraine, immigration and the international situation – as expressed in the autumn 2023 Eurobarometer survey.

The draft Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 shows both similarities with and differences from the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024. Whilst the issue of migration is salient in both, an enhanced focus on security and defence as well as on enlargement is apparent in the 2024-2029 draft. As for the rule of law, it clearly has a prominent position in the 2024-2029 agenda compared to the current one, which hardly mentions it.

In the context of long-term EU priority-setting, Michel stressed that the EU needs to ensure that its financial decisions reflect its ambitions. Indeed, the draft Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 specifies that ‘the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) should take these priorities into account’.

Competitiveness

In the face of growing geopolitical and trade challenges, many Member States have underlined the need for greater focus on European competitiveness in the coming years. EU leaders are thus likely to hold a lengthy discussion on the future directions. The High-level report on the future of the Single Market, requested by the European Council in June 2023 and drawn up by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, will feed into the debate. Amongst the means proposed to support EU companies and incentivise investment, Letta mentions US style tax credits. He also advocates a joint industrial policy at EU level.

As a concrete measure stemming from the debate, EU leaders are expected to call for a horizontal Single Market Strategy by June 2025, an idea also raised by 15 Member States in a non-paper in January 2024. Building on previous initiatives designed to strength the Single Market, the strategy would put special focus on SMEs. There also seems to be political momentum for introducing a ‘European competitiveness deal‘ to encourage growth, productivity and innovation in Europe. In addition, EU leaders may insist on the need to reduce strategic dependencies and increase investments in infrastructure/connectivity. In that context, access to capital, notably for SMEs, as well as concrete measures aimed at advancing the capital markets union (CMU) will be central points for discussion. Possible measures on the latter range from harmonising national insolvency frameworks and corporate tax law to designing new products to mobilise investment. Considering the role of digital transformation for European competitiveness, EU leaders are also expected to request a joint communication on ways of strengthening the EU’s leadership in global digital affairs.

EU-Türkiye relations

In recent years, the European Council’s discussions on Türkiye have been overshadowed by other external relations issues, e.g. the war in Ukraine. Previously, Türkiye was regularly on the European Council agenda in connection with, i) the migration crisis; ii) Syria; and iii) illegal activities in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as with the key issue of the Cyprus settlement. Reunification of the island of Cyprus was the prominent subject in the Cypriot President’s speech to the European Parliament in June 2023. EU leaders will most likely reiterate their commitment to resolving the problem within the United Nations framework, in line with United Nations Security Council resolutions, and consistent with the EU’s principles and acquis.

In June 2023, the European Council requested the High Representative and the Commission to submit a report on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations. Based on this report, presented in November 2023, EU leaders will hold a strategic debate on EU-Türkiye relations. Reportedly, Germany wants work to be ‘taken forward’ on political, economic and trade relations with Türkiye, whilst Greece wants a balance between engaging with Türkiye and addressing Cyprus’s concerns.

Ukraine

Following a wave of missile attacks on cities and infrastructure, EU leaders may discuss developments in Ukraine, and notably the need to supply Ukraine with, inter alia, anti-aircraft defence systems. The European Parliament expressed its support for President Zelenskyy’s reiterated requests, by postponing the discharge for the Council’s 2022 budget, to pressure Member States to provide additional air defence systems. Moreover, considering the importance of sanctions against Russia in the EU’s response to the invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders may discuss a recent decision by the Court of Justice of the EU annulling the inclusion of two Russian oligarchs on a list of individuals under sanctions, and its likely consequences. Member States can still appeal the Court’s decision; whether or not to do so, could be part of EU leaders’ discussion.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Outlook for the special European Council meeting on 17-18 April 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Albaladejo Román.

Ukraine enjoys excellent conditions for agriculture, including around a third of the world’s most fertile land. Three crops dominate the country’s agricultural production: wheat, maize and sunflower, intended primarily for export. Medium-sized agricultural enterprises lead crop production, although some companies farm as much as 500 000 hectares. This is a direct consequence of Soviet collectivisation, and the agricultural policies adopted after Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Only recently did Ukraine start opening up its land market.

In 2013, Russia blocked Ukrainian exports to prevent Kyiv from developing closer ties with the EU. Following Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its military aggression in eastern Ukraine, Kyiv signed an association agreement with the EU, which became its primary market. Unlike most of its industrial production, Ukraine’s crops remained competitive in the EU market and exports surged. By 2021, agriculture represented 41 % of Ukraine’s exports, up from 27 % in 2013.

In addition to stealing millions of hectares of land, Russia has inflicted a terrible economic, environmental and human cost on Ukraine. By the end of 2023, the Ukrainian agricultural sector had sustained an estimated US$80 billion in damages and losses. Rebuilding Ukraine’s agriculture is expected to cost US$56.1 billion, and demining will cost an additional US$32 billion. Russia also blockaded Ukrainian agricultural exports. The EU Solidarity Lanes, the Black Sea Initiative, and the more recent Ukrainian Corridor have helped to keep Ukraine’s economy afloat, and avert a wider global food security crisis.

Ukraine applied for EU membership shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion. In December 2023, the European Council authorised the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine. Historically, agriculture has been a contentious issue in most enlargement negotiations, and integrating Ukraine’s sizeable agricultural sector poses a challenge to the EU, especially without prior reform of the common agricultural policy. Despite the early stage of Kyiv’s candidacy, some studies have tried to estimate the potential cost and benefits to the EU of Ukraine’s eventual membership of the bloc.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Ukrainian agriculture: From Russian invasion to EU integration‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Map of areas potentially contaminated by mines or unexploded ordnance Ukraine’s share of global agricultural exports and rank in the world before the Russian invasion Comparison of Ukrainian and EU production of selected agricultural products Map of Ukraine’s ecological regions

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Approaching the end of the mandate, a number of debates on important legislative proposals took place during the April I 2024 plenary session: on the migration and asylum package, reform of the EU electricity market, and the pharmaceutical package. Members also debated Russia’s undemocratic elections, and in particular their extension to the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, Chinese police activity in Europe, the rule of law in Hungary, and the rule of law and media freedom in Slovakia. His Majesty King Philippe, King of the Belgians, addressed the Parliament to mark his country’s presidency of the Council. Finally, President Roberta Metsola made a statement for International Roma Day.

Migration and asylum

Members debated the comprehensive revision of the EU laws that make up the migration and asylum package, piloted by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), and adopted interinstitutional agreements reached in December 2023 on 10 files:

1. A revised Asylum and Migration Management Regulation to replace the ‘Dublin’ Regulation, establishing a harmonised and swifter EU procedure for asylum requests.
2. A new crisis and force majeure regulation to better equip EU countries to face future migrant crises, with a separate solidarity mechanism.
3. New screening of third-country nationals at the EU’s external borders, so those who do not fulfil the conditions to enter the EU may be refused entry as a result.
4. A revised common procedure for asylum to speed up and harmonise the procedure across the EU, and introduce shorter deadlines for rejecting inadmissible claims.
5. Changes to the Eurodac Regulation to add facial images to fingerprints and maintain records on those who pose a security threat, to identify irregular migrants to the EU more effectively.
6. Amended rules on use of law-enforcement databases and the interoperability regulations, where Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in limiting the purpose of security checks.
7. New EU-wide standards for legal recognition of people applying for international protection and their rights under a revised Qualification Directive, based on EU Asylum Agency assessment of countries of origin.
8. A separate return border procedure to set EU-wide standards for treatment of applicants.
9. A revised Reception Conditions Directive setting out measures to help ensure asylum-seekers receive the same treatment wherever they arrive in the EU.
10. A new EU resettlement framework creating a voluntary scheme for EU countries to offer resettlement to vulnerable refugees hosted by non-EU countries, and providing a legal, organised and safe way for refugees to obtain a long-term solution to their situation.

Energy market Hydrogen and decarbonised gas market

In a joint debate, Members debated and adopted two agreed texts endorsed by the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), on the hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package. The agreement on the Gas Directive should increase consumer protection, by preventing disconnection and creating new rules providing for a supplier of last resort. It would also allow targeted price regulation in the event of a gas price crisis. The agreement on the Gas Regulation would allow pipeline gas from Russia and Belarus to be restricted, to protect EU security interests. Parliament introduced a voluntary mechanism to help develop the hydrogen market, to be implemented by the European Hydrogen Bank.

EU electricity market design

Members also debated and adopted provisional agreements on two texts to improve EU electricity market design. To reduce price volatility for consumers and improve low-carbon energy investment, the ITRE committee endorsed revisions aimed at strengthening consumer protection. Special provisions for vulnerable consumers would apply, in line with Parliament’s position.

EU certification framework for carbon removals

To help deliver climate neutrality by 2050, the EU is working on an EU certification framework for carbon removals – a voluntary tool to certify three types of carbon removal activity. Members adopted a provisional agreement that extends the scope of the Commission’s proposal, specifies additional minimum requirements and adds elements to increase environmental integrity.

CO2 standards for heavy duty vehicles

Members adopted stricter CO₂ standards for heavy-duty vehicles. The text agreed between the co‑legislators extends the scope of the regulation to almost all new heavy-duty vehicles from July 2025, includes vocational vehicles from 2035, and requires all new urban buses to be zero-emission by that date.

Soil monitoring and resilience

Healthy soil is essential for growing food and regulating our water, carbon and nutrient cycles. Members adopted at first reading a report from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) on a Commission proposal aimed at establishing the first-ever EU-wide common framework on soil monitoring and resilience. The committee proposes a more nuanced, five-level classification of soil ecological status, and adds more flexible sustainable soil management requirements.

Discharge 2022

Members debated a large number of reports concerning the discharge procedure for the EU’s 2022 budget, and in each case followed the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommendation. Parliament thus granted discharge to the European Commission, (including spending under the Recovery and Resilience Facility), all six executive agencies and the European Development Funds, for the implementation of the 2022 budget. CONT nevertheless highlighted ‘deterioration in the rule of law in some Member States’, and urged a consistent approach across financing instruments, as well as highlighting the low absorption rate in some Member States and a high level of error in 2022 expenditure. Once again, in the light of the continued institutional differences between Parliament and the European Council and the Council, the Parliament postponed the decision on discharge of their 2022 budget, as has been the case each financial year since 2009. In contrast, Parliament granted discharge to the other EU institutions and bodies, although CONT again made observations on opportunities to improve budgetary management. Parliament also granted discharge to all 33 EU decentralised agencies and 9 joint undertakings, with CONT welcoming their corrective actions following previous observations.

Pharmaceutical package

Members debated and adopted at first reading two ENVI committee reports on Commission proposals to revise EU pharmaceutical legislation. These aim to ensure medicines are more available, accessible and affordable across EU countries than is currently the case. Parliament has consistently called for a more coherent policy on pharmaceuticals that takes both public health interests and industry’s needs into account. The ENVI committee emphasised the need to support EU research and market attractiveness, calling for minimum regulatory data protection for new medicines, and two years’ market protection following market authorisation.

Cross-border processing of personal data

Shortcomings have been flagged in the enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) since it became applicable in 2018, particularly regarding cross-border processing of personal data. Members adopted a LIBE committee report on new rules that could address differences in the procedures employed by national data protection authorities, and sent it back to the committee for future trilogue negotiations.

New EU standards for equality bodies

Members adopted one proposal under the ordinary legislative procedure and gave consent to another, on new EU standards for equality bodies to strengthen national bodies and their mandate to fight discrimination on grounds of sex, race, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. The Committees on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) and on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) had endorsed a political agreement with the Council that stipulates equality bodies should have sufficient resources and independence, and apply impartial staff selection procedures.

Accidents in the maritime transport sector

Members adopted a provisional agreement reached on updating the EU principles governing the investigation of maritime accidents. While the EU directive has largely been successful, Parliament agreed to the obligation to inform maritime security authorities if an accident investigation body suspects an offence has been committed, and to remove the mandatory quality management system entailing significant additional workload with limited added value.

Preparing for the next term

Finally, Members adopted a range of amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, to implement recommendations made by the ‘Parliament 2024’ working group, to apply from the start of the next legislative term. The reforms, set out in a Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) report, will facilitate the legislative procedure, with among other things: expedited attribution of files to committees, improved procedures on overlapping committee competences, limits on use of the urgent procedure in plenary and stronger assessment of the budgetary implications of new proposals. A new format for ‘special scrutiny hearings’ is introduced and the rules for Commissioner hearings (renamed ‘confirmation hearings’) are simplified and clarified, in time to apply for the nominees to the next Commission.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the LIBE/FEMM committees on rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and two decisions from the ECON committee on packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) and on retail investor protection rules were announced.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – April I 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act moved close to final adoption when the European Parliament voted in favour of the text on 13 March. It will become law after the final endorsement of the Council of the European Union, making the Union the first major world power to adopt horizontal legislation governing AI.

The act defines the rules for using and selling artificial intelligence systems in the EU, and regulates general-purpose AI tools such as ChatGPT and AI-based biometric surveillance. It also requires much more transparency than up to now in high-risk AI systems, and delineates unacceptable risks of AI.

This note offers links to recent reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on artificial intelligence. More publications on the topic can be found in a previous edition of What think tanks are thinking.

Charting the geopolitics and European governance of Artificial Intelligence
Carnegie Europe, March 2024

The EU’s AI Act creates regulatory complexity for open-source AI
Center for Data Innovation, March 2024

What to expect from the Digital Markets Act
Centre for European Reform, March 2024

Quantum computing: A blessing and a threat to our digital world
Friends of Europe, March 2024

Artificial intelligence, diplomacy and democracy: from divergence to convergence
Friends of Europe, March 2024

Is the EU missing another tech wave with AI?
Atlantic Council, February 2024

Should the UN govern global AI?
Brookings Institution, February 2024

Fairness in machine learning: Regulation or standards?
Brookings Institution, February 2024

Licensing AI is not the answer, but it contains the answers
Brookings Institution, February 2024

Tech firms’ promise to fight election fakes is a good start, but only a start
Bruegel, February 2024

Intellectual monopolization on steroids: Big Tech in the AI age
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2024

The AI election year: How to counter the impact of Artificial Intelligence
German Council on Foreign Relations, February 2024

Quel rôle pour le groupe aéronaval à l’heure de la guerre en réseau?
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2024

Artificial Intelligence and democracy
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies,

Why artificial general intelligence lies beyond deep learning
Rand Corporation, February 2024

The dark side of urban Artificial Intelligence: addressing the environmental and social impact of algorithms
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, January 2024

The impact of generative AI in a global election year
Brookings Institution, January 2024

Effective AI regulation requires understanding general-purpose AI
Brookings Institution, January 2024

The implications of the AI boom for non-state armed actors
Brookings Institution, January 2024

How the EU can navigate the geopolitics of AI
Carnegie Europe, January 2024

Rethinking concerns about AI’s energy use
Center for Data Innovation, January 2024

The New York Times’ copyright lawsuit against OpenAI threatens the future of AI and fair use
Center for Data Innovation, January 2024

The long-termist fear of a future malevolent superintelligence is hindering our progress today
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2024

Envisioning Africa’s AI governance landscape in 2024
European Centre for Development Policy Management, January 2024

Nuclear arms control policies and safety in artificial intelligence: Transferable lessons or false equivalence?
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2024

Algorithms by and for the workers
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, January 2024

Rethinking concerns about AI’s energy use
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, January 2024

Pour une Autorité française de l’IA
Institut Montaigne, January 2024

The promise and peril of AI in the power grid
Rand Corporation, January 2024

AI poses risks to both authoritarian and democratic politics
Wilson Center, January 2024

A cluster analysis of national AI strategies
Brookings Institution, December 2023

New technologies in the workplace: A round-up of project research
Bruegel, December 2023

Skills or a degree? The rise of skills-based hiring for AI and green jobs
Bruegel, December 2023

The competitive relationship between cloud computing and generative AI
Bruegel, December 2023

Artificial intelligence and energy consumption
Bruegel, December 2023

Policymakers should use the SETI model to prepare for AI doomsday scenarios
Center for Data Innovation, December 2023

What Is Artificial Intelligence (AI)?
Council on Foreign Affairs, December 2023

Artificial Intelligence and the clustering of human capital: The risks for Europe
European Centre for International Political Economy, December 2023

Après le ravage des écrans, l’école doit-elle vraiment sauter dans le train de l’intelligence artificielle?
Institut Thomas More, December 2023

Philosophical debates about AI risks are a distraction
Rand Corporation, December 2023

The EU AI Act is a cautionary tale in open-source AI regulation
Center for Data Innovation, December 2023

Generative AI: Global governance and the risk-based approach
Centre on Regulation in Europe, November 2023

AI won’t be safe until we rein in Big Tech
European Policy Studies, November 2023

The drama at OpenAI shows that AI governance remains in the hands of a select few
Chatham House, November 2023

The global race for Artificial Intelligence regulation
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2023

Awareness of artificial intelligence: Diffusion of information about AI versus ChatGPT in the United States
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, November 2023

The geopolitics of Generative AI: international implications and the role of the European Union
Real Institute Elcano, November 2024

Read this briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anja Radjenovic (1st edition).

In November 2023, the Commission proposed a directive to modernise and strengthen the legal framework on the fight against migrant smuggling. The proposal addresses the steady rise in irregular arrivals in the EU and the rise in smuggling on all main EU entry routes. The current directive defining the offence of facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence in the EU, and the framework decision on strengthening of the penal framework have both been widely criticised for their failure to provide legal certainty and uniformity of implementation. Parliament has been the main critic of these legal acts since their adoption in 2002. Many human rights players have also warned that the overly broad definition of migrant smuggling has resulted in the investigation and prosecution of innocent people, be they smuggled migrants or individuals providing humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants.

To clearly define and effectively sanction migrant smuggling, the Commission would replace the existing rules with others focused on criminal offences, penalties for natural persons, liability of and sanctions for legal persons, but also on jurisdiction, prevention, investigation and data collection.

In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the LIBE committee, with Birgit Sippel (S&D, Germany) as rapporteur. The next expected step is the publication of a draft report.

Complete version

• March 2024: ‘Preventing and countering the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the EU‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHACommittee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2023) 755
28.11.2023Rapporteur:Birgit Sippel (S&D, Germany)2023/0439(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Lena Düpont (EPP, Germany)
Fabienne Keller (Renew, France)
Erik Marquardt (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Jorge Buxadé Villalba (ECR, Spain)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Eszter Fay with Niklas Dreier.

In the fast-evolving landscape of scientific research, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) Academic Freedom Roundtable ‘Research Integrity in Open Science for Europe’ brought together researchers and European policymakers to discuss the challenges and opportunities presented by Open Science. Amidst insightful discussions on Open Science’s challenges and ethical dimensions, the event, held on 21 February 2024, invited us to question who truly benefits from Open Science’s promise of transparency and societal impact? How does Open Science reshape our understanding of research excellence?

Open Science as a policy priority for the European Union

As we navigate a time where scepticism toward science is prevalent, STOA Vice-Chair Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia) underscored the need to increase transparency and trustworthiness in scientific endeavours by facilitating Open Science. EU Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education, and Youth Iliana Ivanova reaffirmed the EU’s policy commitment to promoting Open Science. Yet, in this very endeavour, Commissioner Ivanova emphasised the importance of developing assessment methods that measure research excellence beyond traditional measures such as citations. The evaluative focus, she noted, should be on rewarding and fostering research with a positive societal impact. These introductory remarks thus raised the question: Who benefits from Open Science research?

Open Science for and by whom?

Professor Frank Miedema, from the University of Utrecht, stressed in his keynote on ‘Science in Transition’ the need to question why and for whom we should pursue Open Science. He advocated for a shift from ‘science for science’ to ‘science for society’, echoing Commissioner Ivanova’s position. While advocating for more data accessibility, Professor Miedema also highlighted the importance of considering scenarios where withholding research data might be pertinent. Likewise, Marcel Bogers, Professor of Open & Collaborative Innovation at Eindhoven University of Technology, cautioned against excessive data openness, drawing parallels between Open Science and his expertise in open innovation. Referring to a recent open innovation study, he demonstrated that beyond an optimal threshold, excessive openness may detrimentally affect performance. Professor Bogers asserted that advancing Open Science would require a reassessment of how research is incentivised, alluding to challenges linked to fostering and evaluating the excellence of Open Science research.

Assessing research quality: Challenges to Open Science

The subsequent panel discussed the challenges hindering the transition to Open Science. Dr Elizabeth Gadd, Head of Research Culture & Assessment at Loughborough University, underscored the need to revamp the incentive and assessment system for research. Dr Gadd introduced the INORMS SCOPE Framework as a solution to assess research quality beyond traditional citation metrics, thereby also mitigating global inequalities in scientific output assessment. The SCOPE framework, an acronym for START, CONTEXT, OPTIONS, PROBE, and EVALUATE, offers a comprehensive five-stage model for responsible research evaluation, guiding evaluators in planning and assessing research endeavours. This framework is based on three principles advocating a discerning and strategic approach to evaluation. First, evaluating only where necessary, stressing the importance of considering alternative strategies. Second, evaluating with the evaluated, emphasising collaboration and inclusivity by involving the communities or individuals under evaluation. Third, drawing on evaluation expertise, underscoring the necessity for a thorough and informed evaluation process aligned with academic research standards to ensure validity, reliability and comprehensive understanding.

Signe Mezinska, Associate Professor at the University of Latvia, emphasised the social disparities within the scientific community and across countries, especially regarding the economic costs associated with publishing according to Open Science principles. Elaborating on these inequalities, Henriikka Mustajoki, Head of Development, Open Science, Finland, grounded the justification for the Open Science movement in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While advocating for data accessibility to all, she acknowledged the potential systemic pressures that widespread openness might pose to Open Science researchers’ academic freedom and freedom of speech. Kadri Simm, Chair of Practical Philosophy at the University of Tartu, and Olivier Le Gall, Chair of the French Advisory Board on Research Integrity, further identified potential challenges arising from emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, particularly regarding confidentiality in handling diverse data sources. To address these challenges, the experts on the panel delved into the ethical dimensions of Open Science and discussed the Responsible Open Science in Europe (ROSiE) guidelines as a potential solution to ethical conflicts.

An ethical framework for Open Science: Responsible Open Science in Europe (ROpen ScienceiE) general guidelines and academic freedom

Professor Rose Bernabe from the University of Oslo presented the ROSiE guidelines project and advocated for their inclusion in the European definition of academic freedom. Funded by the EU’s research and innovation programme Horizon 2020, the project aims to collaboratively develop and foster foundational tools that facilitate responsible Open Science and research integrity. As Dr Simm noted that specific approaches to Open Science conflict with each other, she also emphasised that the ROpen ScienceiE guidelines represent a promising initial move towards establishing a comprehensive ethical framework for Open Science.

The STOA Academic Freedom Roundtable highlighted the complexity and urgency of navigating the Open Science landscape. The event not only underscored the benefits of Open Science but also called attention to the challenges, which demand collaborative solutions. As we chart a course towards Open Science, embracing diverse perspectives and establishing responsible guidelines will be crucial to ensuring a future where research serves society while preserving academic freedom and ethical integrity.

For more details, you can watch the event recording.

Read the ESMH interview with Teodora Konach from the ROSiE project on ‘Paving the way towards responsible open science‘.

Your opinion matters to us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu and follow us on X at @EP_ScienceTech.

Written by Marc Jüttten.

The multidimensional crisis and spiralling violence in Haiti has reached its peak, with criminal gangs in control of 80 % of the capital Port-au-Prince. On 11 March 2024, Prime Minister Ariel Henry announced his resignation. Hopes lie with a transitional governance arrangement that was agreed at a meeting in Jamaica between Haitian stakeholders, CARICOM and representatives from the international community. The installation of the Transitional Presidential Council is a precondition set by Kenya to lead the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in October 2023.

Haiti’s multidimensional crisis

Since the 7 July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, insecurity has spiked and gang control of the country has expanded continuously. According to the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, in January and February 2023, 1 193 people have been killed by gang violence. Homicides rose from 1 141 in 2019 to 2 183 in 2022 and more than 4 700 in 2023, representing an increase of 400 % within five years. Currently, 80 % of the capital Port-au-Prince is under the control of criminal gangs. On 3 March 2024, the government declared a three-day state of emergency and a night-time curfew after armed gangs stormed the country’s two biggest jails, allowing more than 4 000 criminals to escape back onto the streets.

The explosion of violence in Haiti does not come as a surprise. In fact, the multidimensional crises have been looming for years and are characterised by the intertwining of politics and criminal business, political deadlock, extreme violence, and dire humanitarian conditions. Some experts also blame the international community for their failure to contribute to a long-term solution. Since the assassination of President Moïse, the country has lacked an elected president, legislature, and mayors. Backed by the international community, Ariel Henry has acted as Haiti’s prime minister since 20 July 2021, following the resignation of Claude Joseph as interim Prime Minister. However, a political stalemate has persisted over whether Henry or a transitional government should govern until elections can be convened and an elected government is in place. According to observers, the vacuum of democratically accountable political authority has created space for the gangs to expand their influence. The dramatic escalation in violence and protests, including roadblocks, has led to food and fuel shortages and thousands fleeing their homes. The World Food Programme estimates that 4.4 million people, representing 44 % of Haiti’s population, are facing acute food insecurity. This includes 1.4 million living in an emergency situation and about 276 000 children aged between six months and six years. Currently, more than 360 000 people have been internally displaced. In addition, the health system is on the brink of collapse, with many health facilities having been forced to shut down.

International community response

In October 2023, the UNSC (in response to the 2022 request by the Haitian authorities for an international specialised armed police force to address the insecurity resulting from criminal action by armed gangs) authorised the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti; it will be headed by Kenya, which agreed to deploy 1 000 police officers. Other countries such as Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, and Jamaica have also pledged to contribute. Despite its authorisation by the UNSC, the mission is not a UN peacekeeping operation but a multinational operation conducted by an ad hoc coalition tasked with supporting the Haitian National Police in re-establishing security and building security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections.

Given the recent dramatic security deterioration, on 11 March 2024 the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) convened Haitian stakeholders and representatives from Brazil, Canada, France, Mexico, UN and the United States to discuss the multidimensional crisis in Haiti. Following the meeting in Jamaica, CARICOM issued an outcome declaration on a transitional governance arrangement. Participants agreed on the establishment of a Transitional Presidential Council comprised of seven voting and two observer members that should swiftly select and appoint an interim Prime Minister. The Transitional Presidential Council will, together with the Interim Prime Minister, appoint an inclusive Council of Ministers. Individuals who have been sanctioned by the UN, individuals intending to compete in the next election, and individuals who oppose UNSC Resolution 2699 authorising the Multinational Security Support Mission are excluded from the council. Ariel Henry has committed to resigning immediately upon the installation of the council. The installation of the Transitional Presidential Council (which at the time of writing is still in the making) is a precondition set by Kenya to lead the security mission.

United States (US) Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced on 11 March 2024 an additional US$100 million to fund the deployment of the security support mission, bringing total US support for this effort to US$300 million. He also announced an additional US$33 million in humanitarian aid.

However, Jimmy Cherizier – one of Haiti’s most powerful gang leaders, known as ‘Barbecue’, who is under UN and European Union (EU) sanctions – has said that his coalition of armed groups, known as the ‘G9 Family and Allies’, will continue the fight for Haiti’s liberation, painting himself as a revolutionary and threatening political leaders who are set to take part in the Transitional Presidential Council.

European Union support for Haiti

The EU has allocated more than €200 million in bilateral assistance to the country since 2021, with the focus on enabling the continuity of basic public services for the Haitian population. Overall, since 1994, the EU has supported Haiti with €500 million, which makes Haiti the largest recipient of EU humanitarian aid in Latin America and the Caribbean. The EU’s support for Haiti is twofold: on the one hand, to strengthen institutional capacity, and on the other to facilitate the population’s access to basic public services in the very insecure and volatile context. Given the recent developments, the European Commission allocated an additional €20 million in emergency humanitarian aid to Haiti on 13 March 2024 to help humanitarian partners address the most urgent needs of the population, in terms of protection, food assistance, nutrition, water and sanitation, and healthcare.

On 21 October 2022, the UN Security Council adopted a sanctions regime against members of the Haitian political and economic elite who support armed gangs. On 28 July 2023, the EU set up an autonomous framework allowing the EU to impose sanctions on individuals (such as the above-mentioned Jimmy Cherizier) and entities responsible for threatening the peace, security or stability of Haiti, or for undermining democracy or the rule of law in Haiti. On 15 January, the EU added four more people to the list of those sanctioned in connection with the situation in Haiti. HR/VP Borrell said that the EU would support the broader objectives of the Multinational Security Support Mission, once it is deployed, through the EU’s cooperation instruments.

Views

While international actors including the US and the EU welcomed the outcome of the Jamaica meeting, an expert from Medico International criticised the agreement as another short-term technocratic solution from the outside with the principal objective of avoiding a refugee and migration wave that would affect the region. It would not provide for a sustainable solution to build a democratic state in Haiti. Jake Johnston, Haiti expert at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, criticises the fact that the US and other foreign powers have pushed Haiti into a pact that will face legitimacy concerns and is unlikely to lead to a solution to the current crisis by itself.

European Parliament position

In October 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on human rights breaches in Haiti and called for a durable, time-bound and commonly accepted solution to allow for fair legislative and presidential elections. Moreover, Parliament encouraged the EU and international financial institutions to increase their financial support for Haiti. On 5 February 2024, during their plenary session, MEPs exchanged views with the European Commission on the situation in Haiti on the eve of the deployment of the United Nations Multinational Security Support Mission.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Haiti in a spiral of violence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition).

European Works Councils (EWCs) are bodies that should guarantee employees the right to be consulted on important issues in large multinational companies active in multiple EU countries. The possibility to set up EWCs was introduced 30 years ago and the rules were revised in 2009. However, with limited rights to information and little influence, EWCs have been criticised for being ineffective, on account of unclear definitions, non-dissuasive sanctions and ineffective access to justice.

In February 2023, the European Parliament called for legislative action to address the shortcomings identified and strengthen the functioning of EWCs. In response, the European Commission consulted European social partners and put forward a proposal in January 2024 to revise the 2009 directive.

The European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs is preparing a report, with a view to securing a mandate for interinstitutional negotiations in the next legislative term.

Complete version

• March 2024: ‘Revision of the European Works Councils Directive: Stronger social dialogue in a multinational context‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/38/EC as regards the establishment and functioning of European Works Councils and the effective enforcement of transnational information and consultation rightsCommittee responsible:Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL)COM(2024) 14
24.1.2024Rapporteur:Dennis Radtke (EPP, Germany)2024/0006(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Brando Benifei (S&D, Italy)
Jozef Mihál (Renew, Slovakia)
Rosa D’Amato (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Elżbieta Rafalska (ECR, Poland)
Elena Lizzi (ID, Italy)
Eugenia Rodríguez Palop (The Left, Spain)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Committee vote

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

At the 21-22 March European Council meeting, discussions will focus on Ukraine, security and defence, the Middle East and enlargement. Concerning security and defence, EU leaders will consider the new European defence industrial strategy presented by the European Commission. On Ukraine, they are expected to reiterate their commitment to supporting the country, and welcome the establishment of a Ukraine Assistance Fund regarding military aid as well as the 13th package of sanctions against Russia. The leaders may also discuss anew the use of revenues from frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine. As the Middle East remains a delicate topic, with differing positions, concrete conclusions with clear positions are unlikely. On enlargement, EU leaders will probably welcome the Commission’s recommendation to open negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. As is usual in the spring, EU leaders will endorse the policy priorities of the annual sustainable growth survey, and meet in an inclusive Euro Summit format.

1.     General

Following the customary opening address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, the Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander De Croo, as leader of the country currently holding the six-month presidency of the Council of the EU, is expected to provide an overview of progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions.

Following recent national elections in Portugal, this will probably be the last time that long-time European Council member Antonio Costa represents Portugal at a regular European Council meeting. As regards Bulgaria, it is not yet clear who will represent the country: after Nikolai Denkov’s resignation as prime minister on 6 March 2024, Mariya Gabriel is expected to become the next prime minister in accordance with the power-sharing agreement between the political parties in the Bulgarian government. If Gabriel is sworn in on time, she will attend the European Council; if not, according to the Bulgarian Constitution, it would be the President, Rumen Radev, attending.

EU leaders will also have a lunch with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and meet with their counterparts of the countries in the European Economic Area, namely Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, to mark the 30th anniversary of their relationship.

2.     European Council meeting Ukraine

Ukraine remains top of the agenda at the European Council more than two years after Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine, and ten years since the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. The European Council will reiterate its willingness to support Ukraine for as long as it takes, while condemning the actions of Russia and those who support its war. In line with this, EU leaders will welcome the adoption of the 13th package of sanctions, and most likely also restate their support for ongoing efforts to prosecute the Russian leadership for their crimes. Back in February, the European Council had welcomed the agreement reached on the Council Decision and Council Regulation concerning revenues from frozen Russian assets. Recently, however, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed using the profits to buy much needed military equipment for Ukraine. This idea has received pushback from some Member States, as the general agreement was that the money would be used to help to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. After the 12 March meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, the Belgian finance minister stated that there should be a proposal by the end of that week on the mobilisation of profits from frozen Russian assets. Therefore, it is likely that the March European Council will review progress and define the next steps on the use of these profits to support Ukraine.

The European Council may welcome the Council decision to establish the Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF), as part of the ongoing reform of the European Peace Facility (EPF). High Representative (HR/VP) Josep Borrell initially proposed the creation of the fund, which would be part of the EPF, but dedicated solely to Ukraine. The €5 billion fund will be used to refund Member States for their military donations to Ukraine. There have been disagreements among Member States regarding the specifics of the scheme. France has demanded a ‘buy European’ clause – some of the biggest players in the EU defence industry are French companies. Meanwhile, Germany has asked for bilateral aid to be taken into consideration when determining how much each Member State should contribute to the fund – Germany is the largest European military donor to Ukraine. Nevertheless, Coreper managed to reach a compromise whereby around 50 % of bilateral aid would be taken into account when considering contributions, and there would initially be flexibility on the ‘buy European’ aspect.

The EU failed to reach its target of sending a million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine in 2023, this – combined with a lack of agreement on US military funding – has left Ukraine without vital military support as it continues defend against Russia’s war machine. However, EU leaders may welcome a recent Czech-led initiative that has been launched to obtain 800 000 units of ammunition that could be delivered within weeks. The European Council may also support the bilateral agreements providing security commitments that Ukraine has concluded with several Member States.

The European Council will most likely also condemn the illegal ‘elections’ held by Russia in occupied Ukrainian territories (Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzia and Kherson). Following the death of Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most high-profile political prisoner, EU Heads of State or Government may also criticise the mistreatment of political prisoners in Russia.

Security and defence

The war in Ukraine has lent new impetus to discussions on EU security and defence. The European Council may reiterate its commitment to increasing defence expenditure and to boosting EU defence industry competitiveness, in line with the Strategic Compass and the Versailles Declaration. The Strategic Compass 2024 annual report is due to be presented in the course of the spring. If released before the European Council meeting (as was last year’s annual report), then EU leaders may review the findings and discuss implementation of the Strategic Compass.

At the December 2023 meeting, the European Council had asked the HR/VP and the Commission to present the European defence industrial strategy as soon as possible, including a proposal for a European defence investment programme (EDIP). EU leaders are likely to welcome the strategy, which was presented on 5 March, and invite the Council to take work forward. The EDIP will give access to €1.5 billion in funds over three years to support the defence industry. However, European Commissioner Thierry Breton has stated that the industry could need closer to €100 billion. Estonia, France and Poland have also called for increased funds for the EU’s defence industry. In that context, French President Emmanuel Macron and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, then followed by the Belgian prime minister, have suggested issuing joint debt to support the weapons industry. However, Germany, the Netherlands, and other ‘frugal’ Member States, are against the use of common bonds. Ways of finding extra funding for defence investment may be a discussion point during the meeting.

Middle East

The European Council did not manage to agree on extensive conclusions on the Middle East at its two most recent meetings (December 2023 and February 2024). The topic remains extremely sensitive, with Member States holding differing views on many aspects. However, the topic has been put on the agenda, which shows a willingness to address recent developments at the upcoming meeting. EU leaders are likely to reiterate: i) their condemnation of Hamas; ii) their call for the return of all hostages; iii) their support for the two-state solution – as the best foundation for lasting peace; and iv) Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international humanitarian law.

Since the 7 October attack by Hamas, over 31 000 Palestinians have reportedly been killed by Israeli forces. This has led to accusations that Israel is not doing enough to protect civilian lives as it carries out its war on Hamas. On 14 February, the Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, and Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, sent a letter to the Commission requesting an ‘urgent review’ to determine whether Israel was complying with the obligations (respect for human rights and democratic principles) included in the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The Taoiseach stated that he believed the EU-Israel Association Agreement would be discussed at the March European Council meeting.

Concerns are mounting regarding a potential Israeli military operation in Rafah, where 1.5 million displaced Palestinians are thought to be sheltering. On 16 February, the HR/VP released a statement calling on the Israeli government not to launch a military operation in Rafah. After the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 19 February, Borrell confirmed that all but one of the Member States supported the statement. The lone Member State against the statement is thought to be Hungary.

With famine said to be ‘imminent’ in Gaza, EU leaders may welcome the aid that, on 12 March, began making its way to Gaza through the Cyprus-Gaza humanitarian corridor. The mission involves several international partners including the United Arab Emirates and United States.

A key point in the discussion at the European Council’s October 2023 meeting was whether or not it should call for (a) humanitarian pause(s). The wording has now evolved, with some, including von der Leyen, calling for ‘an immediate humanitarian pause leading to a sustainable ceasefire’. However, it is still to be seen whether all Member States will agree to such a wording. In December 2023, a number of EU countries voted against or abstained in a UN General Assembly vote calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.

EU leaders may also condemn the violence carried out by Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Yet there is no unity among Member States on this matter. The HR/VP has confirmed that, after suggesting imposing sanctions on violent settlers at the Munich Security Conference, not all Member States were in agreement with this proposal. The Council has been working on sanctions against extremist Israeli settlers who are breaking international law through the illegal expansion of Israeli settlements beyond pre-1967 borders, but Hungary and Czechia have opposed these sanctions, further demonstrating the divisions between Member states. Some countries, such as France, have already unilaterally placed sanctions on extremist settlers.

Enlargement

On 12 March, during the European Parliament’s plenary debate ahead of the European Council meeting, von der Leyen announced that the Commission had decided to recommend that the Council open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Member States such as Slovenia, Croatia, and Italy have supported BiH’s membership prospects; others, including Austria, have called for the membership process of Ukraine and Moldova to also include BiH. The Member States will officially decide whether or not to open negotiations. As requested by the European Council, the Commission has put forward proposals for draft negotiating frameworks for Ukraine and Moldova. These may also be included in discussions on enlargement in the European Council.

Other items Migration

EU leaders will discuss migration, following up on the discussion held in December 2023, during which they underlined the need to pursue a strategic and comprehensive approach in this area. The leaders will take stock of progress on orientations given at previous meetings.

Agriculture

In response to widespread farmers’ protests, the European Council discussed the challenges facing the agriculture sector at its 1 February meeting, committing to keep the issue under review. Twenty‑two EU agriculture ministers (all except Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden) have called on the Commission to ‘propose concrete steps forward and precise solutions’ to the issues outlined at the 26 February meeting of agriculture and fisheries ministers. In response, on 15 March, the Commission put forward legislative proposals to simplify certain elements of the common agricultural policy, and a document on the food supply chain. EU leaders will probably discuss the issues facing the sector and the Commission’s proposals.

Strategic Agenda 2024-2029

The indicative leaders’ agenda for 2024 announced a debate on the ‘strategic agenda and internal reforms’. European Council President Charles Michel will probably take stock of reflections so far in the process of setting the new long-term priorities for the EU, the strategic agenda 2024-2029. He will also update EU-leaders on the second series of meetings, each with a small number of EU leaders, representing a mix of geographical regions, political party affiliations and opinions. Possible dates for these meetings are 1-2 April and 11-12 April, ahead of the 16-17 April European Council meeting, which is expected to discuss a first draft. The European Council is scheduled to adopt the strategic agenda 2024-2029 at the end of June.

European Semester

As part of the European Semester process, EU leaders are expected to endorse policy priorities for the 2024 annual sustainable growth survey and the Council recommendation on euro-area economic policy. The discussion on the high-level report written by Enrico Letta on the future of single market, requested by EU leaders for the March meeting, may be postponed owing to the packed agenda. Meanwhile, in a non-paper, 15 Member States, led by Finland, have proposed ideas for further developing the EU’s single market.

3.     Euro Summit

The Euro Summit will convene on Friday 22 March to discuss the economic situation and policy coordination. It will take stock of Eurogroup work on capital markets union, since well‑functioning capital markets are viewed as essential to ensure EU competitiveness.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 21-22 March 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Present-day European children have been through a lot: a global pandemic, a global financial crisis and wars in the EU’s neighbouring regions. In just a few years, once they become adults, they will have to face the consequences of the decisions taken today. Therefore whether these decisions have to do with the protection of the environment, public health policies or demographics, governments should seek to ensure that children are sufficiently empowered to contribute to responsible choices for their generation’s future.

According to EU and international instruments, children have the right to be heard and to have a say in all decisions that may affect them and their well-being, whether in their home, community, school, or in legal and administrative matters. Ensuring children’s right to express their views on matters relevant to them is a key objective of the European Union. Children’s participation can take many forms, in ways that are adapted to their age and maturity; for instance they can express their views through writing and speech but also through painting and drawing. The upcoming European elections in June 2024 further highlight the importance of engaging children in the EU’s democratic processes. Four Member States (Belgium, Germany, Malta and Austria) allow their 16-year-old citizens to vote.

Stakeholders call for more extensive consultations with children while stressing the need to make policy and decision making in areas concerning children both accessible and child-friendly. An open and inclusive consultation would provide children with the opportunity to contribute to the definition of new policy priorities and to the evaluation and revision of existing measures.

This briefing looks at the international and EU policy framework relevant to children’s participation in democratic life. It also gives practical examples of how this participation is enabled through local youth parliaments, municipal children’s councils and ad hoc consultations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Children’s participation in the democratic life of the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 7 March 2024, the President of the United States (US), Joe Biden, used his State of the Union (SOTU) address to a joint session of the 118th US Congress (2023‑2024) to start his re‑election campaign in earnest. Biden has been trailing Donald Trump, his only remaining Republican challenger in the presidential race, in polls in six swing states that Biden won in 2020 and where several thousand voters are expected to decide the outcome of the US elections on 5 November 2024. The SOTU was an opportunity for the President to tout his achievements and set out his vision for a second term in stark contrast to that of Trump, whom he referred to as his ‘predecessor’ rather than by name. With his age seen by many as a liability, Biden’s performance seemed more relevant than the substance of his speech, and was widely perceived as a forceful demonstration of his readiness to fight.

Background

President Biden delivered his 2024 SOTU address against the backdrop of severe global security challenges and a domestic audience that is deeply and increasingly divided over both domestic and foreign policy priorities. Throughout 2023, Republicans in the House of Representatives were engulfed in infighting, ousting former Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R‑California) and replacing him with Mike Johnson (R‑Louisiana), but passing only a scant number of bills. The 118th Congress therefore risks becoming the most unproductive in modern history. Reagan‑era Republicans who believe in the benefits of US leadership in the world and of supporting Ukraine against Russia have largely been side‑lined by Trump‑era Republicans eager to divert US funds away from Europe and towards the Indo‑Pacific or towards bolstering security at home.

State of the Union address
The SOTU address is mandated by the US Constitution, which in Article II dictates that the President ‘shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient’. From 1790 to 1946, the speech was referred to as the ‘Annual Message’, and since 1947, it has been known as the SOTU address. Over time, both its content and form have changed, with some presidents choosing to present the address in writing.

This ideological shift has recently also reverberated in the Senate. In response to President Biden’s 2023 emergency supplemental funding request for key national security priorities in 2024, which included appropriations for Israel, Taiwan, Ukraine, border security and humanitarian aid for Gaza and Ukraine, the Senate negotiated a bipartisan border security and immigration package that ultimately failed to pass because of election politics. Speaker Johnson stated that the bill would be ‘dead on arrival‘ in the House. However, on 13 February 2024, the Senate passed (70-29) the National Security Act (H.R. 815), which includes US$60 billion for Ukraine but is devoid of border security provisions. Speaker Johnson has not brought the amended bill to the House floor, calling it a ‘status quo‘ bill that lacks the provisions of the House Republican‑spearheaded Secure Our Border Act (H.R. 2). (NB: five days after the SOTU, House Democrats launched a rare ‘discharge petition‘ which, if it receives enough signatures, would force the Speaker to bring the bill to the floor. Its outcome remains uncertain.) Amid Trump’s tightening grip on the Republican Party, the longest‑serving Republican Senate leader, Mitch McConnell (R‑Kentucky), who has been a strong advocate of US support for Ukraine, announced that he would step down from his position in November. As Biden gave his address, Ukraine funding continued to be blocked in the House, with border security becoming a politically charged campaign topic, Republican support for Ukraine steadily diminishing, and new conflicts (Gaza) and other flash‑points (Taiwan Strait) capturing Americans’ attention.

Foreign policy: Ukraine, Gaza, Red Sea and China

Whereas US foreign policy played a marginal role in the 2023 SOTU, Biden’s 2024 SOTU featured prominent references to the need for the US to support Ukraine, the US response to the Hamas‑Israel conflict and the Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea, and US policy on China. In a departure from the traditional SOTU structure, Biden began by addressing foreign policy, comparing the current reality with the ‘unprecedented moment’ in US history that President Franklin Roosevelt faced when he delivered his 1941 ‘Four Freedoms Speech‘ to Congress as war raged in Europe. Biden framed his SOTU as a similar effort to ‘wake up the Congress and alert the American people’ that ‘freedom and democracy are under attack, both at home and overseas’. In a swipe at Trump, he made an energetic and passionate case for US leadership in the world, continued US support for Ukraine, and for speaking the truth and burying the lies about the ‘stolen’ 2020 elections and the 6 January 2021 attack on the US Capitol. He reminded Congress that ‘history is watching’ and urged it to pass the bipartisan National Security Bill, pledging that he would not bow down to Russia, unlike his predecessor who, Biden highlighted, said he would encourage Russia to do ‘whatever the hell they want‘ to NATO members that do not spend 2 % of their gross domestic product (GDP) on national defence. Biden welcomed Sweden to NATO and greeted Sweden’s Prime Minister, who was present in the Chamber as one of the President’s private SOTU guests.

Biden’s references to the Hamas‑Israel conflict were a delicate balancing act between affirming Israel’s right to pursue Hamas and reminding Israel that humanitarian assistance ‘cannot be a secondary consideration or a bargaining chip’ and that ‘protecting and saving innocent lives has to be a priority’. The President has drawn heavy criticism for his strong backing of Israel after the October 2023 massacre and hostage‑taking by Hamas and for failing to obtain a ceasefire to ease the suffering of innocent Palestinians in Gaza. Many Arab and Muslim Americans and young progressive voters in key swing states voted ‘uncommitted‘ in recent primaries, rather than for Biden. Biden, while not able to announce a ceasefire, stated that he would be directing the US military ‘to lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary pier in the Mediterranean on the Gaza coast that can receive large ships carrying food, water, medicine and temporary shelters’. The pier would complement ongoing US airdrops of humanitarian aid packages. The day after the SOTU, the activation of the Cyprus maritime corridor – a joint effort of the EU, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the US – was endorsed.

Regarding the Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea, Biden stated that he had ‘built a coalition of more than a dozen countries (Operation Prosperity Guardian) to defend international shipping and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea’ and had ‘ordered strikes to degrade Houthi capabilities and defend U.S. forces in the region’. With China, Biden emphasised that the US seeks competition, not conflict, underscoring that his China policy has been more successful than that of his predecessor. Countering assertions that the US is falling behind China, he stressed the strong US GDP, the US trade deficit with China being at its lowest point in over 10 years, US measures taken against China’s unfair economic practices and to prevent the most advanced US technologies being used in Chinese weapons, US promotion of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and the bolstered US partnerships and alliances in the Indo‑Pacific.

Domestic policy: Health, education, tax fairness and voting and labour rights

Biden showcased his accomplishments in terms of numbers of jobs and infrastructure projects created and the volume of private investments in manufacturing and research. As many Americans believe they were better off under Trump, Biden touted the strong economic recovery from COVID‑19, GDP growth, declining inflation and lower prescription drug costs seen during his administration. He set out a laundry list of initiatives for a second term, each time needling Republicans over positions he believes are backwards rather than future-oriented. Notably, he bolstered his case for fixing the immigration system by calling out Trump’s demonising statement that immigrants ‘poison the blood of our country‘. His plans address extremely divisive subjects such as defending reproductive freedom (including abortion rights and in vitro fertilisation, topics set to once again play a major role in mobilising the electoral power of women), extending caps on prescription drug costs and making tax credits for healthcare premiums permanent. He announced plans to use tax credits to lower mortgage rates, to build and renovate affordable homes, to provide access to pre‑school for three and four year‑olds, to make college more affordable, to restore the child tax credit, to raise the corporate minimum tax from 15 % to at least 21 % and to introduce a minimum tax of 25 % for billionaires now paying 8.2 %. He called on Congress to pass a bill to transform women’s health research, to pass the Shrinkflation Prevention Act to crack down on price gouging and deceptive pricing, and to finally pass the Freedom to Vote Act, the John Lewis Voting Rights Act, the Equality Act, the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act and a ban on assault weapons. Commentators noted the SOTU’s ‘far feistier tone‘ designed ‘to prove his doubters wrong by flashing his combative side’, and how he at times went off‑script to respond to hecklers and jokingly tackled concerns about his age. Fact checking of his figures revealed most of them to be accurate, although some claims were found to lack context.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘President Biden’s 2024 State of the Union address‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marc Jütten with Dorothee Falkenberg.

On 1 January 2024, BRICS – the intergovernmental organisation comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – admitted four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The group’s decision to open the door to new members was taken at its Johannesburg summit in August 2023, sparking a debate about its growing international influence.

According to estimates, BRICS+, as the organisation has been informally called since its expansion, now accounts for 37.3 % of world GDP, or more than half as much as the EU (14.5 %). However, besides an increase in economic power the new members could bring potential conflicts (Saudi Arabia/Iran or Egypt/Ethiopia) into the group, making the reaching of consensus on common political positions more difficult.

Since the new members would only contribute roughly 4 % to the group’s cumulative GDP, the significance of the expansion should be seen beyond the purely economic effect, in the form of greater influence for the group and for developing countries as a whole within international organisations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods institutions.

The EU engages with BRICS+ countries individually. For instance, it has strategic partnerships with Brazil, India and South Africa, and is negotiating a free trade agreement with India. On the other hand, current conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza show the divergent approaches to security taken by the EU and BRICS+.

The European Parliament has stressed that further political dialogue with the BRICS countries is needed, including on an individual basis. In an exchange of views with European Commission representatives in October 2023, Members of the Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) underlined the need to keep an eye on the group’s expansion, especially considering the effect of a potential BRICS+ currency and the consequences for EU trade policy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Expansion of BRICS: A quest for greater global influence?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. The trilogy of resilience, competitiveness and security was at the centre of the vision of Europe that the Prime Minister of Finland, Petteri Orpo, shared with the European Parliament on 13 March 2024. Regarding competitiveness, he mentioned the single market, State aid, trade and economic governance. On security, he argued that the concept not only included security and defence, but also border protection and preparedness to make the EU more resilient. Orpo also emphasised that, for Finland, ‘the EU is the most important political and economic frame of reference and community of values’, and stressed that EU leaders had to ‘fight against any pessimism and show an example and leadership’.

We now find ourselves at a key moment in history, one that calls for our courage, unity, and determination.  

Petteri Orpo Background

Roberta Metsola launched the ‘This is Europe’ initiative shortly after her election as President of the European Parliament in January 2022. Petteri Orpo is the 13th EU leader to have addressed the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. A similar Parliament initiative, ahead of the 2019 European elections, saw 20 EU leaders speak in Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. A 2019 EPRS analysis of the future of Europe debates pinpointed the similarities and differences in EU leaders’ views.

Figure 1 – Time devoted by Petteri Orpo to various topics in his speech. Source: EPRS.

The ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), and the preparations for the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. The CoFoE produced 49 proposals on the EU’s future policies and functioning (see the EPRS overview), including more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. Research by EPRS has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council, as expressed in the latter’s Strategic Agenda 2019 2024 and its conclusions.

On the initiative of European Council President Charles Michel, EU leaders have started the reflection process on the priorities for the next institutional cycle, which will lead to the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. The first step in the reflection process was a discussion at the informal European Council meeting in Granada on 5‑6 October 2023. The second step entailed a series of meetings, each with a small number of EU leaders representing a mix of geographical regions in the EU, political party affiliations and diversity of opinion. Four meetings have taken place to date, on 13 November in Berlin, 14 November in Copenhagen, 16 November in Zagreb, and 29 November in Paris. Another series of small group meetings will take place in early April, ahead of the special European Council meeting on 17-18 April.

Main focus of Petteri Orpo’s speech

Orpo covered a number of topics in his speech to Parliament (see Figure 1), devoting most attention to i) security and defence, ii) the war in Ukraine, iii) EU resilience, and iv) climate.

Security and defence

In Orpo’s view, ‘we are living in a time where practically all policy fields are linked to our security, and without security, we cannot ensure a prosperous future for Europe’. Security and defence is an important pillar of ‘European comprehensive security’, and the Finnish Prime Minister sees the strengthening of the EU’s defence industry as ‘priority number one’. He called on Member States to pool their resources.

War in Ukraine

Prime Minister Orpo stressed that the war in Ukraine threatened the very principles on which the European Union was built. He reiterated that agreeing unanimously on the EU’s Ukraine Facility had been crucial, and called on Member States to strengthen the support for Ukraine so that it can win this war, while at the same time enhancing the EU’s own defence capabilities. The next step is to deliver swiftly on ammunition production and to agree on additional funding for the European Peace Facility and Ukraine Assistance Fund.

EU resilience

For Orpo, the EU and its Member States must be better prepared for a growing number of increasingly complex crises. Therefore, he proposed that the Commission should develop an EU strategy for a ‘Preparedness Union’. This strategy should be based on a whole-of-society approach, in which the needs and contributions of all policy sectors are taken into account.

Climate

Orpo stressed that the EU should combat climate change and support biodiversity in a way that acknowledges the diverse circumstances across the Member States. In his view, a technology-neutral, cost-effective clean transition will pave the way for sustainable growth. He called for the EU’s climate policy to be recalibrated in the next institutional cycle, moving away from overly detailed regulation to fostering innovation.

Specific proposals and positions

Prime Minister Orpo used the opportunity to present his views on how the European Union should advance in specific areas, summarised below.

Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Economic governance‘We must also utilise existing instruments more effectively. This means reforming the next MFF and seeking more financial resources from the markets, for example through the EIB and by developing the Capital Markets Union.’State aid‘It is crucial that we restore the normal State aid rules. A healthy single market benefits all European citizens and businesses – today and in the long term.’Trade policy‘If we want to be globally relevant, we need a better ability to conclude, ratify and implement trade deals, not a better ability to bring them down.’Competitiveness‘We must build our competitiveness by developing our strengths, and through market-based solutions, with a fully functioning internal market at the core.’Innovation and research‘We must foster innovation and skills, strengthen our internal market, and ensure significant funding for innovation and research.’Table 1 – Specific proposals made by Petteri Orpo, by policy area

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Petteri Orpo, Prime Minister of Finland, 13 March 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.