European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

In June 2024, European voters are called to the polls to elect a new European Parliament. This is one of the biggest democratic exercises in what has been named a ‘super-election year‘. Roughly half the world’s population is expected to vote this year – but not all these elections will be free and fair. Decisive elections will take place in some of the world’s largest democratic regimes, including the European Union and the United States. The stakes are high for democracies, also considering women continue to be under-represented in EU countries at all levels of political decision-making, as well as in political parties, and that violence against women active in politics discourages many from entering the political arena. The Union has made steady and significant progress and the European Parliament is today one of the world’s most gender-balanced representative assemblies. Nevertheless, there are still significant divergences between EU countries. Electoral quotas are considered one of the most straightforward tools to fill the gender gap in representative assemblies.

Gender equality and women’s rights are a hot topic for political debates, with mainstream parties pushing for further progress, while more radical political forces wish to refocus on specific social roles for men and women. Where the race is tight, gender equality issues may even determine the outcome. In the United States, some commentators have noted that reproductive rights could decide the result of the upcoming presidential election, with polls indicating a significant gender gap in support for the two likely candidates. In Europe, a spring 2023 Eurobarometer survey shows that most EU citizens, both women and men, are informed about and interested in European politics, are aware of the importance of upcoming elections and likely to vote.

These European elections will follow what would have been one of the most ambitious and successful European Commissions in terms of adopting important gender equality legislation. With strong support from the European Parliament, the last five years have seen important legislation initiated and adopted. The Gender Balance on Boards directive wasadopted in 2022, a decade after the Commission made the initial proposal, paving the way for a more balanced representation of men and women among non-executive director positions in large listed companies. The directive on Binding Pay Transparency Measuresadopted in 2023 obliges companies to be more transparent about the salaries they pay, to ensure men and women are paid equally for the same work. Another directive to be adopted by the end of the legislative term strengthens national equality bodies so hey can provide better support to women who fight discrimination in the workplace, particularly the most vulnerable. The EU is also taking decisive action to combat gender-based violence. It ratified the Istanbul Convention in 2023 and is set to adopt a EU directive that will criminalise several types of off- and on-line violence against women, as well as improve prevention and protection of victims.

In politics, despite continuous progress, women continue to remain under-represented at all levels in parliaments and governments. The European Union has moved to close the gap faster than other levels of government. The share of women Members in the European Parliament was 39.9 % in February 2024 – above the European average for national parliaments (31.6 %) – but with big differences between Member States in terms of their representation in Parliament. The share of women in national parliaments also varies greatly among countries. The current European Commission has been the most gender balanced in history. The College is now made up of 13 women (48.1 %) and 14 men and is chaired by a woman president. However, at local and regional level, women continue to be under-represented in all EU Member States.

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Accept YouTube Content The share of female MEPs across EU countries

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Accept YouTube Content Gender balance in the European elections Percentage of women in parliamentary assemblies. Source: EIGE, Gender Statistics Database, 2023.

It is now widely recognised that structural and societal barriers continue to hinder women from seeking office and from fulfilling their mandates or accessing leadership positions once they are elected. Numerous obstacles block women from entering politics. These include individual women’s perceptions of their own abilities and of the costs and risks of running for office, together with broader factors, such as: unequal access to key resources (time, money, and political networks); unequal family responsibilities; male-dominated political cultures in parties and parliaments; gender roles and stereotypes in wider society; and an absence of female role models.

Types of violence experienced by female local politicians in the EU (% of those who reported having experienced violence). Data source: CEMR survey, 2023.

The level of abuse andviolence directed at women in politics and public life because they are women, and because of their increased presence, is one major obstacle. Violence against women in politics can take multiple forms. Psychological violence, including attacks on women’s private life, physical appearance or marital status, as well as symbolic violence seeking to marginalise women and make them feel incompetent are part of everyday politics in Europe. The digital world provides an environment where such violence thrives. Economic violence (preventing women from accessing adequate resources) and physical violence remain rarer, but their impact can be severe. Several European Parliament resolutions highlight the need to tackle harassment, as well online hate speech and cyber violence directed at female public figures, politicians and activists.

Party cultures and institutional structures can also act as barriers. Electoral systems can promote gender equality – or not. Thus, large multiple seats electoral constituencies are more favourable to increased female representation than single seat constituencies. One electoral mechanism is particularly effective in bringing about change in the most straightforward way: electoral quotas. It is true that some European countries have performed well in terms of increasing women’s presence in representative assemblies without quotas, by shifting towards a more gender egalitarian political and party culture overall. However, in other countries, where progress was slow, quotas have significantly accelerated progress towards gender equality in political representation. However, these need to be accompanied by other measures such as ‘zipped lists’ and a more favourable political environment for women in general. Eleven Member States (Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia) have binding gender quotas for the European elections. The European Parliament has initiated a reform of the European electoral legislation that would oblige Member States to achieve gender equality making use of the model that best fits their electoral system for European elections, but the initiative has stalled in the Council.

Related EPRS publications on women in politics

• EPRS briefing, Women in politics in the EU: State of play in 2024, March 2024
• EPRS Briefing, Violence against women active in politics in the EU: A serious obstacle to political participation, February 2024
• EPRS Briefing, Towards gender balance in the European elections: Electoral quotas – What can they achieve?, September 2023

Related EPRS multimedia

• Towards gender balance in the European elections: Electoral quotas

Written by Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Mittag, Professor at Sport University Cologne.

The creation and formalisation of the European Parliament’s political groups goes back to June 1953 and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community’s Common Assembly. This briefing analyses the evolution of the groups’ structures and trajectories until the European elections in 2019. It shows how the conflict between national, political and transnational ideological allegiances of delegated Members of the Common Assembly was already present from the start, providing an important impetus for the formalisation of the political groups. This formalisation created the basis for the groups’ key role in structuring the work of the Common Assembly and later of the European Parliament. The European Parliament’s competence for its own budget meanwhile made the groups’ formalisation imperative to allow the distribution of funds for office space, secretariats and policy-making resources.

The structure and power distribution among the groups has remained relatively stable to the present day. Changing national-level cleavages, such as the emergence of the Green and populist far-right parties has been reflected in the groups’ structure and composition. However, the number of groups has never exceeded ten and has been stable at seven since 2004, limiting the institutional impact of growing diversity. Key institutional factors for this relatively high concentration and stability include the budgetary and institutional benefits of group membership for individual Members of the European Parliament, and the importance of powerful and cohesive groups for exercising influence both in Parliament and in the EU’s legislative process.

While research into the history of the political groups is still in its infancy, possible areas worth exploring include the role of chairs and secretaries-general in organising and leading groups.

This briefing follows up a roundtable event hosted by EPRS on 27 June 2023, which included contributions by Hans-Gert Pöttering, former chair of the EPP Group and European Parliament President, Hannes Swoboda, former chair of the S&D Group, Gijs de Vries, former chair of the ELDR Group, and Jürgen Mittag, Sport University Cologne.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Seventy years of transnational political groups in the European Parliament: Origins and trajectories‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Accept YouTube Content ‘Seventy years of transnational political groups in the European Parliament’

Written by Anita Orav.

The free movement of people between the EU and the UK ended on 1 January 2021, with the end of the transitional period set out in the Withdrawal Agreement, signed in January 2020. The EU and UK both apply their own migration and asylum systems, with ad hoc cooperation on various aspects of migration.

Background

With the exceptions of EU and UK citizens covered by the Withdrawal Agreement, and citizens of Ireland, with which the UK shares a Common Travel Area, the free movement of people between the EU and the UK ended on 1 January 2021. Since then, the EU and UK apply their own immigration systems, with each treating the other’s citizens as any other third-country/non- national for long‑term stays (for work, study or family‑related mobility). For short stays – without the right to work – both the EU and UK have granted visa waivers to each other’s citizens. UK nationals may stay in the Schengen area for up to 90 days in any 180‑day period. Short‑term travel to Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania – outside the Schengen area – is counted separately for each, and similar time restrictions apply. UK nationals must have a passport valid for at least three months after their intended departure from the EU. EU nationals may stay in the UK for up to six months without a visa, provided they have a passport valid for the duration of their stay.

Legal migration for work or study

As non-nationals, EU citizens need a visa and a work permit to be employed in the UK. Moreover, their UK employers need to complete a right‑to‑work check (not applicable to EU employees who were already in the UK by 1 July 2021). UK citizens need a work permit to work in most EU countries. Generally, a job offer from an EU country is required to obtain a visa to move there. The UK has also established a points‑based system, which includes a route for skilled workers who have a job offer from an approved employer sponsor. Nevertheless, the UK is seeking to reduce the volume of migrants admitted, and on 4 December 2023 the UK government announced key measures to ‘cut net migration’.

The EU‑UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which came fully into force on 1 May 2021, includes provisions for business and professional mobility of natural persons in the context of trade in services. The aim is to facilitate short‑term business trips and temporary secondment of highly skilled employees. However, they are subject to eligibility criteria and conditions regarding experience, professional status, remuneration and allowed length of stay. Some sectors are excluded from the mobility rights in the TCA, even if they are providing services (e.g. public services, services of general interest, some transport services, and audiovisual services – in an effort to preserve cultural diversity).

The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has had a chilling effect on EU students’ applications to UK universities, which fell by 53 % after post‑Brexit rules took effect. Reasons for this decline include the need for visas, higher tuition fees, and loss of access to government‑subsidised loans for the payment of fees. Moreover, as of January 2024, international students may no longer bring their partners and children to the UK, with the exception of specific postgraduate courses categorised as research programmes. UK students coming to the EU also face higher tuition fees and visa requirements. As for student exchanges, the UK is no longer participating in the Erasmus+ programme and has instead set up the Turing scheme, which helps UK students to study anywhere in the world, including at EU universities.

Asylum policy

Post-Brexit, the UK is no longer bound by the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Previously, the UK adhered to the first phase of EU asylum directives on reception conditions, qualification and asylum procedures. It had also opted into the Dublin III Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation. The Dublin system contains a criterion for determining the state responsible for processing an asylum application: if the asylum‑seeker has neither family ties in nor a recent visa or residence permit for any EU Member State, the first country into which they enter is responsible. The entry into EU territory is recorded in the Eurodac database, which helps determine responsibility. For the British government, the Dublin system was beneficial in that it supported the transfer of asylum‑seekers back to other EU countries, as the majority of them had transited through the European continent on their way to the UK. This allowed for an overall reduction in the number of asylum applications made in the UK. Conversely, under the Dublin system, in cases where a migrant had family ties or a visa or residence permit in the UK it was possible for EU countries to transfer the applicant to the UK. In fact, for several years in the run‑up to Brexit, transfers into the UK were more numerous than transfers out of the UK.

The CEAS instruments ceased to apply to the UK on 1 January 2021, and the sides have not yet agreed on an alternative asylum cooperation framework. The British government is reportedly looking for ways to cooperate with the EU on return of asylum‑seekers, whereas the EU has thus far not shown interest in discussing this possibility. Both the EU and the UK have been working on overhauling their own asylum systems. The EU is about to finalise reforms under the 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum, in an effort to establish faster and stricter procedures and to strike a new balance between collective responsibility and solidarity. The UK reformed its asylum policy through the Nationality and Borders Bill, which the British Parliament approved in April 2022. The act has been criticised by human rights organisations and more than 200 UK civil society groups for weakening refugee protection and criminalising asylum‑seekers who use irregular routes, in violation of the UK’s obligations under international law. Moreover, in April 2022, the UK also concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Rwanda with the aim of transferring irregularly arriving asylum‑seekers to Rwanda, where they would have their applications processed and possibly receive refugee status. While the MoU has been widely denounced due to Rwanda not being a safe country for asylum‑seekers (as confirmed by the UK Supreme Court ruling in 2023), the British government has stuck with the plan. In December 2023, it adopted the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill and signed a treaty with Rwanda, assuring that the scheme would be subject to rigorous oversight and monitoring mechanisms.

Irregular migration

Since 2018, there has been a sharp rise in attempts to reach the UK across the English Channel using small boats or inflatable dinghies. Many of those who arrive apply for asylum, which has contributed to an increase in asylum applications in the UK. According to the UK Home Office, 75 340 asylum applications were submitted in the UK between September 2022 and September 2023, similar to the number from the previous year. It has been suggested that this increase is partly due to the fact that asylum‑seekers can no longer reach the UK through the legal routes previously available under the Dublin system. Aiming to stop the Channel crossings, in July 2023 the UK government adopted the Illegal Migration Act, according to which anyone arriving irregularly into the UK will have their asylum claim deemed inadmissible.

Irregular migration is not covered by the TCA, so any cooperation between the EU and the UK in this area is ad hoc. The only aspect related to irregular migration included in the TCA is the chapter on law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil law matters, including cooperation with Europol. The chapter calls for strong cooperation between national police and judicial authorities, in particular for fighting and prosecuting cross‑border crime, including migrant smuggling. On 21 February 2024, a large‑scale operation involving authorities from Belgium, France and Germany with Europol and Eurojust coordination led to the dismantling of one of the most active migrant‑smuggling networks.

Post‑Brexit, several initiatives have aimed at increasing cooperation on curbing Channel crossings. In December 2022, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK issued a joint statement calling for an EU‑UK cooperation agreement to address irregular migration in north‑western Europe. In March 2023 the UK agreed to provide more than €500 million in funding to France over three years to increase the number of officers and patrols on the French coast, add new capabilities (including drones) and operate a new command centre and a new detention centre in northern France. On 18 February 2024, a working agreement was concluded between the UK’s migration agencies and Frontex, the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency. It forms part of wider EU‑UK cooperation to combat smuggling, human trafficking and facilitation of irregular immigration through exchange of intelligence, expertise and personnel. The details and the operationalisation of the agreement still need to be finalised.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-UK cooperation on migration and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the February II 2024 plenary session was the address by Yulia Navalnaya, widow of the assassinated Russian opposition activist and 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate Alexey Navalny. Important debates took place on European security and defence and the war in Gaza. Members adopted a large number of provisional agreements reached in interinstitutional negotiations. Members also adopted several agreements at first reading, on which negotiations with the Council would be required in the new legislative term.

Revising the EU’s finances

Within the overall revision of the EU’s long-term budget, aimed at facing current challenges, not least to help Ukraine, Members debated and adopted three reports. From the Committee on Budgets (BUDG), Members adopted a report recommending Parliament grant consent to the agreement reached on a first-ever revision of the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF). Members approved the political agreement reached by the BUDG and Foreign Affairs (AFET) committees with the Council to establish the €50 billion Ukraine Facility in support of Ukraine’s recovery and its path to EU accession. Members also adopted a joint report from BUDG and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) allocating more funding from the MFF to projects that develop or manufacture critical technologies and strengthen their value chains, via a new platform for strategic technologies for Europe (STEP).

EU in a new world CFSP and CSDP, human rights and democracy reports

Members debated and adopted two annual reports from the AFET committee. First on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which outlines four major challenges: Russia’s war against Ukraine; the need for a genuine European defence union; stronger defence of rules-based multilateralism, and reinforced strategic partnerships such as NATO. This year’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) report reflects the seismic changes in EU defence policy since 2022, with AFET demanding increased parliamentary scrutiny of the CSDP, to ensure increased EU defence spending is effective. Members debated and adopted a third AFET report reviewing EU efforts to promote human rights and democracy in 2022. This year’s report concurs with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’s assessment of a deteriorating international situation.

EU-Chile agreements

Members debated and followed the recommendation from the AFET and International Trade (INTA) committees to grant consent to conclusion of two EU-Chile agreements. A new advanced framework agreement (AFA) should modernise and replace today’s Association Agreement governing EU-Chile relations, with an interim trade agreement to be put in place until the AFA’s complete ratification.

EU-Seychelles agreement on access for fishing vessels to the waters of Mayotte

The EU fishing fleet already has access to rich tuna fishing grounds in the Seychelles through a sustainable fisheries partnership agreement. Members followed the recommendation from the Committee on Fisheries (PECH) to grant consent to the conclusion of a new six-year agreement to continue reciprocal fisheries access for Seychelles vessels to the waters of the French overseas departments of Mayotte.

A balanced environment for everyone Environmental crime

Parliament debated and adopted a political agreement reached with the Council on measures to tackle serious, organised environmental crime more effectively. The penalties for such activities will range from three to ten years in prison, with companies fined based on their annual worldwide turnover, or fixed amounts up to €40 million, attesting to the seriousness of such crimes – a choice left to EU governments.

Geographical indications

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council on revising legislation on geographical indications (GIs) for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products in a single legal act. The agreed text aims at simplifying and speeding up registration of GIs to help European producers obtain fairer prices for quality products, as well as strengthen removal of illegal use and provide better protection online.

Patents package

Members debated and adopted five first-reading reports from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) on legislative proposals concerning intellectual property rights on products affecting our environment. They aim to update and harmonise rules on supplementary protection certificates, which extend patent protection to compensate for lengthy compulsory testing and trials to ensure such products are safe before they can come to market. The first two concern supplementary protection certificates for plant protection products. Two more cover supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products. Another concerns the standard essential patents regulation, on patents protecting technology incorporated in a standard (such as 5G).

Detergents and surfactants

The EU is proposing to revise the Regulation on Detergents and Surfactants to ensure detergents using microorganisms are safe and to introduce a digital label to display mandatory consumer information. Members debated and adopted an ENVI committee report which enlarges the list of restricted microorganisms and adds specific rules for detergent refills, as well as precluding testing on animals.

Nature restoration law

Members adopted a provisional agreement reached in trilogue on the proposed EU nature restoration law, aimed at returning degraded ecosystems to health across the EU. The provisional agreement supports this objective, with time-bound and quantitative targets for ecosystems. In line with Parliament’s demands, EU national authorities should prioritise Natura 2000 sites until 2030 and an ’emergency brake’ should allow suspension of agricultural ecosystem restoration for up to one year under exceptional circumstances.

Protecting EU consumers and businesses Wholesale energy market manipulation

Apart from the environmental imperative, the EU is keen to protect consumers and businesses against wholesale energy market manipulation. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement with the Council, endorsed by the ITRE committee, aimed at avoiding a repeat of the recent energy crisis. The agreement reinforces the role of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.

Collecting and sharing data in the tourism sector

Platforms connecting hosts with guests help tourists find affordable places to stay and enable people to earn extra income, but also contribute to a lack of affordable accommodation and unfair competition. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council and endorsed by the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), on a proposal to regulate collection and sharing of data in the tourism sector.

Driving licences

To continue to improve road safety, the EU is working towards zero deaths on EU roads by 2050 and the Commission proposed a revision of the Driving Licence Directive. Members debated and adopted a report on the proposal from the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), which approves stricter rules for novice drivers, introduction of a digital driving licence, medical certification of fitness to drive, and a lower minimum age for coach, bus and truck driving licences to 18 years for certified professional drivers.

Faster and safer tax excess relief (‘FASTER’)

Inefficient tax relief procedures can discourage investors from investing other EU Member States. A proposal to move to faster and safer tax excess relief (‘FASTER’) aims for efficient, secure withholding tax procedures for cross-border investors and tax administrations. Members adopted a (non-binding) Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report strongly supporting the proposal.

Political advertising

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on evolving campaign techniques that pose new challenges on transparency and targeting in political advertising. The agreement seeks to help voters detect political advertisements and identify who is behind them. It sets strict limits on targeting and delivery techniques and enhances personal data protection. It bans profiling, using the data of people who are under voting age, and non-EU based entities financing political ads in the EU prior to an election.

Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report

Following Parliament’s demands, the Commission launched an annual rule of law review cycle in 2020. Members debated and adopted a Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee motion for a resolution on the Commission’s fourth annual rule of law report. The LIBE report highlights areas and rights that have not been addressed, and calls for a more vigorous approach to infringement proceedings.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Four decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – from the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) committees – were approved without vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – February II 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Van Tooren.

Little known and often misdiagnosed, rare diseases affect around 30 million people in the EU. Together with over 65 partner organisations, EURORDIS coordinates Rare Disease Day every 29 February (or on 28 February in non-leap years) – the rarest day on the calendar. The day raises awareness of rare diseases and advocates for people living with them, with the long-term goal of achieving equal access to diagnosis and therapy. Because cooperation is crucial to achieving this, the EU can play an important role by setting up programmes, networks and platforms to help experts, researchers and clinicians share their knowledge and experiences.

What is a ‘rare disease’?

Around 300 million people worldwide live with a rare disease, 30 million of whom live in the EU.

A disease is rare when it affects fewer than 1 in 2 000 people, while an ultra-rare disease affects fewer than 1 in 50 000 people. Some 72 % of rare diseases have a genetic origin, and 70 % already start during childhood.

Over 6 000 rare diseases exist, and only around 1 000 have been scientifically explored. Most are incurable, and are often called ‘orphan diseases’. Treatment is available for only around 5 % of rare diseases.

On average, rare disease patients have to wait five years for a diagnosis.

Because there is often little scientific knowledge about rare diseases, diagnoses come late and initial misdiagnoses are common. Moreover, specific treatments are often unavailable, or not easily accessible to patients. Patients have little information about their disease and their rights, and can suffer from a high level of psychological, social and economic vulnerability. They can feel a lack of or loss of autonomy, as the disease also affects their socio-economic status, family, education and work.

What does the European Parliament say?

The European Parliament has repeatedly emphasised the importance of research on rare diseases and medicine development.

In its resolution of 24 November 2021 on the EU’s pharmaceutical strategy, Parliament emphasised the importance of research into and development of medicines for unmet needs. It referred specifically to cancers, including paediatric cancers, rare diseases, neurodegenerative and mental illnesses and antimicrobial resistance. It also urged the creation of an EU framework to help national governments implement plans to combat these illnesses. To end the situation where people in some EU countries can access medicines when others cannot, Parliament called on the Commission to consider policy options that would guarantee access to medicines in all Member States following the granting of EU-level authorisation.

In a 10 July 2020 resolution, Parliament called for an EU action plan on rare and neglected diseases in the context of a post‑pandemic public health strategy, a request reiterated in Members’ parliamentary questions.

How is the EU fighting rare disease?

Because misdiagnoses and lack of scientific knowledge are common issues with rare diseases, cooperation is very important. The EU has been working on a European Health Data Space to improve individuals’ access to and control of their electronic personal data, while also facilitating the re-use of medical data across the EU where that has benefits for society. Better access to an EU-wide pool of data could help medical staff to diagnose rare diseases earlier, especially since symptoms can differ from patient to patient and from disease to disease.

The European Joint Programme on Rare Diseases, launched in 2019, aims to develop an effective rare diseases research ecosystem to improve coordination across the EU to tackle the issues of delayed diagnoses, lack of medicines and reduced access to care. The EU adopted the Orphan Regulation on rare diseases in 2000, and adopted the Paediatric Regulation on medicines for children in 2006. These laws introduced obligations, incentives and rewards to stimulate the development of new medicines. The EU also launched a revision of its pharmaceutical legislation in 2023, to make medicines more available, accessible and affordable, while supporting the EU pharmaceutical industry in its research efforts, and setting higher environmental standards.

The EU also contributes to research coordination through European Reference Networks (ERNs). The ERNs are virtual networks gathering together healthcare providers across Europe to work on complex or rare diseases and conditions that require highly specialised treatment, and concentrated knowledge and resources.

The EU also supports platforms such as Orphanet and the European Platform on Rare Diseases Registries, which hold data on rare diseases and collect rare disease resources, including for refugees or displaced persons.

For its part, EURORDIS – Rare Diseases Europe is a non-profit organisation consisting of over 1 000 rare disease patient organisations from 74 countries, working to improve the lives of people living with a rare disease. It focuses on improving diagnoses, promoting research, increasing access to holistic care and making treatments more available, accessible and affordable.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara van Tooren; Graphic by Giulio Sabbati.

Between 6 and 9 June 2024, EU citizens will vote for the people they want to represent them in the European Parliament for the next five years. This will be the tenth time EU citizens can vote, since the first direct elections in 1979. Parliament has worked hard to demonstrate it has a meaningful influence on policies that affect citizens’ daily lives, and hopes to combat low voter turnout by simplifying electoral procedure across the member countries so that the elections are genuinely European.

Just as the day on which voters go to the polls varies across EU member countries, with the graphic above showing the different dates on voting takes place between 6 and 9 June, there are differences between the rules that apply to the elections in each country. The European Parliament has sought – since the first elections in 1979 – to set common rules for the European elections. Instead, at EU level only basic principles are set out, with each country filling in the details, usually based on its practices for national elections. One relatively minor set of changes, agreed in 2018, has yet to come into force since one Member State has not ratified them. Parliament has also made much more extensive proposals for reforms, but as yet there is no agreement among EU Member States on those.

European citizenship

From the beginning, Parliament has emphasised that its connection with citizens is crucial for EU democracy, being the main, if not the only European institution directly representing European voters and their wishes, expressed at the polls. Low voter numbers for the first elections in 1979 highlighted this need for a close relationship between citizens and decision makers. Since then, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty formally introduced the concept of European citizens, endowing EU nationals with all the electoral rights that citizenship implies.

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Accept YouTube Content The European citizen as a voter European political groups

Besides ensuring every European citizen can vote, equity between the elected candidates is also important. Since 1953, Members of Parliament are divided into groups based on ideology rather than nationality – a unique arrangement among international institutions. The political groups combine the elected representatives of the citizens of the different EU countries who share similar worldviews and political goals. The groups seek to bring together different national delegations, with a view to maximising their influence in the European Parliament and in EU decision making.

Gender balance

The European Parliament is one of the world’s most gender-balanced representative assemblies today, but there are still significant divergences between EU countries, and relatively few women have chaired large European political groups to date. A number of EU countries have introduced rules to make the elections more balanced and inclusive. The European Parliament has drafted a legislative proposal to support, among other things, a binding objective of gender balance for the European elections, although the Council has not yet endorsed it. For now, each Member State decides itself whether to apply electoral quotas.

To boost equal participation, 11 Member States (Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia) have binding gender quotas for the European elections. The exact quotas also differ for each of these countries. Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg apply the parity principle (50 % for each gender). Greece, Spain, Croatia, Portugal and Slovenia have a 40 % gender quota for European elections, and in Poland the minimal presence of each gender is set at 35 %. Romania requires parties ensure ‘balanced’ representation of both sexes on lists of candidates, but does not specifically define proportions.

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Accept YouTube Content Gender balance in the European elections Electoral participation of people with disabilities

The EU insists that people with disabilities are able to participate fully in society. Through its Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU guarantees all citizens, regardless of the Member State in which they reside, have the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament, and the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections. With the 2024 European elections approaching, the European Parliament is renewing its commitment to ensuring people with disabilities are able to participate without restriction in this major European political event.

Only six EU Member States (Austria, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands and Sweden) explicitly guarantee equal voting rights for all, regardless of ‘legal capacity’. Conversely, 14 Member States link the right to political participation to individuals’ legal capacity, often through automatic or quasi-automatic exclusion of people under partial or full guardianship regimes. As a result, 400 000 people with disabilities were denied the right to vote in the 2019 European elections, in a failure to comply with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Voting from abroad

One issue highlighted by the low voter turnout in 1979 was that EU citizens residing in another country were unable to vote. Members of the European Parliament therefore want to ensure that all European citizens, including those who live in a different EU country to that of their nationality, are able to participate in the European elections. However, little progress has been made since 1984. With more and more people residing temporarily or permanently in a country other than their country of origin today, the debate around this topic has become ever more salient. In 2019, around 17 million EU citizens were estimated to live in an EU Member State of which they were not nationals, 14 million of whom were of voting age. National rules still determine voting rights for EU citizens who have taken advantage of their right to live and work anywhere in the EU. These differ greatly across EU countries, with some still prohibiting such mobile citizens from voting entirely.

Citizens of 23 EU countries can vote from abroad in European elections. The four EU Member States whose citizens cannot are Czechia, Ireland, Malta and Slovakia.

Voting from prison

Another group of people for whom specific voting rules apply, are prisoners. The Council of Europe recognised that the deprivation of liberty is a punishment in itself in 1987, setting out that prison conditions should not aggravate prisoners’ inherent suffering. In 1996, the United Nations Human Rights Committee asserted that limitations to the right to vote should be objective and reasonable. In particular when ‘conviction for an offence is a basis for suspending the right to vote, the period of such suspension should be proportionate to the offence and the sentence’. In 2002, the Venice Commission adopted a code that defines some cumulative conditions under which the right to vote may be removed, including the legal basis, proportionality and type of conviction.

While a significant number of EU countries place no restrictions at all on prisoners voting, many Member States continue to deprive inmates of the right to vote, depending on the type of offence committed and/or the length of their sentence. In those cases where inmates do have the right to vote, they may vote by post, proxy, or at special polling stations. Eleven EU Member States have no restrictions on prisoners voting (Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden). Fourteen EU countries apply some restrictions linked to the length of the sentence and/or the kind of offence (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain). Bulgaria and Estonia do not allow prisoners to vote at all.

• 2024 European elections: National rules
• European elections 2024: Rules of a pan-European democratic event
• The European Parliament and the European citizen as voter
• Seventy years of transnational political groups in the European Parliament: Origins and trajectories
• Towards gender balance in the European elections: Electoral quotas – What can they achieve?
• People with disabilities and the European elections
• Voting from abroad in European Parliament elections
• Prisoners’ voting rights in European Parliament elections

Written by Gilles Pittoors.

This briefing traces the evolution of the debates on the European Parliament’s powers, and their (dis)connection to the organisation of the first direct European elections in 1979. It spans the period leading up to 1979, and also assesses the aftermath of these landmark elections. It shows that well into the 1970s, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) put great effort into de‑coupling the debates on organising Parliament’s direct elections from those on expanding its institutional powers. MEPs’ main fear was that demanding both as a package deal would be too much for Member State governments to swallow, creating a risk of ending up with neither. Separately pursuing more powers and direct elections was considered the smarter strategy.

Yet by the end of the 1970s, with progress being made on both fronts, it had become difficult for MEPs to maintain this distinction. Increasingly, MEPs pushed a discourse of a self‑reinforcing, virtuous circle of empowerment and elections. They developed this discourse further after the 1979 elections, when a disappointingly low voter turnout dictated a re‑coupling of the issues in order to maintain the momentum of the Parliament’s growing empowerment. The briefing concludes by connecting this historical debate to contemporary issues, highlighting how the question of Parliament’s powers has become intimately connected with questions of democracy, representation and elections.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Parliament, its powers, and the 1979 European elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

People with disabilities still find it hard to participate in elections in the European Union. This infographic compares national practices aimed at helping people with disabilities exercise their electoral rights in the EU.

Current situation

Getting involved in political life: standing for elected office, joining a political party, or following the news; is at the heart of what it means to live in a democracy. People with disabilities are active citizens, keen to participate given the right opportunities. However, they face legal, administrative, institutional and accessibility barriers to taking part.
Several EU initiatives encourage people with disabilities to participate in politics. With the 2024 European elections on the horizon, the European Parliament is committed to helping them take part. In May 2022, Parliament adopted a proposal to repeal the 1976 European Electoral Act and replace it with a new Council regulation on electing Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. The proposal is still under discussion within the Council. This would harmonise European election rules, notably ensuring that everyone can access information and vote on an equal basis, including those with disabilities. The new rules would mean national governments would have to ensure people with disabilities get: equal access to electoral materials, voting facilities and polling stations (Article 7); accessible postal voting; advance physical voting, proxy voting, and electronic and internet systems for voting (Article 8).

Existing postal voting and additional possibilities to vote in Member States Existing postal voting and additional possibilities to vote in Member States Table of pictograms table of pictograms

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘People with disabilities and the European elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Van Tooren.

Parliament returns to full swing for the second plenary session of February 2024, with a packed agenda. Against a backdrop of intense political and geopolitical issues, Members are expected to debate and vote on a number of important files. As we enter the third year of Russia’s unprovoked aggression, motions for resolutions on support for Ukraine are scheduled for consideration. Ahead of International Women’s Day on 8 March, Parliament welcomes several prominent women: Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank and Nadia Calviño, President of the European Investment Bank are scheduled to attend debates on annual reports on the ECB and EIB. However, the most poignant is set to be an address on Wednesday by Yulia Navalnaya, widow of the assassinated Russian opposition activist and 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate Alexey Navalny. Following Council and Commission statements on Navalny’s murder and the need to support Russian political prisoners, Members are due to debate and vote on a motion for resolution.

Revising the EU’s finances

Parliament has repeatedly demanded urgent revision of the EU’s long-term budget to face current challenges, not least to help Ukraine. In a joint debate on Tuesday, Members are due to consider a report from its Committee on Budgets (BUDG), one joint report from BUDG and the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), and another joint report from BUDG and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). BUDG recommends granting consent to the agreement reached on a first-ever revision of the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF). The revision should help to manage the costs of borrowing to help the EU recovery under the Next Generation EU initiative and provide €21 billion of additional funds, including €17 billion much-needed assistance for Ukraine.

With the MFF revision in place, Members are also set to consider the political agreement reached by BUDG and AFET with the Council to establish the Ukraine Facility, and so support Ukraine’s recovery and its path to EU accession. Up to €50 billion in grants and loans would be available up to 2027. Parliament has insisted that the Facility allow the use of frozen Russian assets to finance grants, and that Russia be ‘held fully accountable and pay for the massive damage caused by its war of aggression against Ukraine’. Parliament also secured enhanced democratic scrutiny of the Facility through strengthening the role of the European Parliament and the Verkhovna Rada.

The EU also intends to allocate more funding from the MFF to projects that develop or manufacture critical technologies and strengthen their value chains, via a new platform for strategic technologies for Europe (STEP). Despite Parliament’s demands for €13 billion for this important step in boosting the EU’s global position, the provisional agreement set for Members’ consideration allocates only €1.5 billion to the European Defence Fund.

EU in a new world

With an obvious focus on Russia’s war on Ukraine and the EU’s response, Parliament is due to consider the 2023 annual reports from the AFET committee on the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and common foreign and security policy (CFSP), in a joint debate scheduled for Wednesday morning.

In the face of new autocratic threats to the rules-based international order and peace, the AFET committee’s report on the CFSP outlines four major challenges: Russia’s war against Ukraine; the need for a genuine European defence union; stronger defence of rules-based multilateralism, and bolstering strategic partnerships such as through NATO. This year’s CSDP report reflects the seismic changes in EU defence policy since 2022. AFET’s demands include increased parliamentary scrutiny of the CSDP, to ensure increased EU defence spending is effective and a call to appoint a Defence Union Commissioner in the next European Commission. AFET also once again underlines the need for a Security and Defence Committee with full legislative and budgetary responsibilities.

A third AFET report scheduled for consideration on Tuesday reviews EU efforts to promote human rights and democracy in 2022, outlined in a report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). This year’s report concurs with the HR/VP’s assessment of a deteriorating international situation, with violations of international law and a continued rise in authoritarianism and threats to democracy. The AFET report calls for measures to strengthen EU instruments in support of human rights defenders, civil society and media organisations; action to tackle corruption; and application of EU global human rights sanctions.

In a joint debate scheduled for Thursday morning, Members are due to consider a recommendation from the AFET and International Trade (INTA) committees to grant consent to concluding two EU-Chile agreements. A new advanced framework agreement (AFA) would modernise and replace the existing Association Agreement governing relations between the EU and Chile, with an interim trade agreement to be put in place until the AFA’s ratification is complete. Parliament has succeeded in including strong parliamentary diplomacy within the agreements, which will also mean 95 % of EU-Chile trade will be duty free, and EU companies will have better access to raw materials from Chile.

The EU fishing fleet already has access to rich tuna fishing grounds in the Seychelles through a sustainable fisheries partnership agreement. On Thursday afternoon, Members are set to vote on a recommendation from Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) to grant consent to the conclusion of a new six-year agreement to continue reciprocal fisheries access for Seychelles vessels to the waters of the French overseas departments of Mayotte.

A balanced environment for everyone

On Monday evening, Parliament is expected to debate a political agreement reached with the Council on measures to tackle serious, organised environmental crime more effectively. The penalties for such activities will range from three to ten years in prison, with companies fined based on their annual worldwide turnover, or fixed amounts up to €40 million, attesting to the seriousness of such crimes – a choice left to EU governments. The Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) has succeeded in including a new offence relating to highly toxic mercury and mercury products to the list of criminal offences.  

At Tuesday lunchtime, Members vote on a provisional agreement reached in trilogue on the proposed EU nature restoration law, aimed at returning degraded ecosystems to health across the EU. The provisional agreement supports this objective, with time-bound and quantitative targets for ecosystems. In line with Parliament’s demands, EU national authorities should prioritise Natura 2000 sites until 2030. The co-legislators also agreed on derogations for renewable energy and defence projects. As Parliament requested, an ’emergency brake’ should allow suspension of agricultural ecosystem restoration for up to one year under exceptional circumstances impacting EU food production.

In a debate scheduled for Tuesday afternoon, Members are set to consider a provisional agreement reached with the Council on revising the legislation on geographical indications (GIs) for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products in a single legal act. GIs help European producers obtain fairer prices for quality products, yet the process could be speedier and more robust. The agreed text would simplify and speed-up registration, as well as strengthen removal of illegal use and provide better protection online. To maintain a focus on producer needs rather than intellectual property, the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) will provide technical assistance only, rather than managing the scheme.

In a joint debate, also scheduled for Tuesday afternoon, Members will consider a number of first-reading reports from the JURI committee on legislative proposals concerning intellectual property rights on products affecting our environment. In particular, they aim to update and harmonise rules on supplementary protection certificates, which extend patent protection to compensate for lengthy compulsory testing and trials to ensure such products are safe before they can come to market. The first two concern supplementary protection certificates for plant protection products. Two more cover supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products.

As concerns Parliament’s negotiating position on the standard essential patents regulation, Members are also due to vote on a JURI committee report, setting Parliament’s first-reading position. Standard essential patents protect technology incorporated in a standard (5G and the internet of things, for instance). The JURI report introduces several amendments to the Commission’s proposal, including: tasking the EUIPO competence centre with selection and training of evaluators; creating a Licensing Assistance Hub to help small businesses for free; and requesting that the Commission review the measures’ impact on competitiveness.

While detergents and surfactants can improve health and hygiene, they may also pose health and environmental risks. The EU is proposing to revise the Regulation on detergents and surfactants to ensure detergents using microorganisms are safe and to introduce a digital label to display mandatory consumer information. Members are set to debate an ENVI committee report on Monday evening, which enlarges the list of restricted microorganisms and adds specific rules for detergent refills. The report also adds a new article specifying that detergent safety be established without testing on animals.

Protecting EU consumers and businesses

Apart from the environmental imperative, the EU is keen to protect consumers and businesses against wholesale energy market manipulation. Aimed at avoiding a repeat of the recent energy crisis, Members are set to consider a provisional agreement with the Council, endorsed by the ITRE committee on Wednesday. Taking elements of Parliament’s position into account, the agreement reinforces the role of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators in inspections and reporting. The Agency will also have the power to impose penalties where there is a suspicion of market abuse affecting at least two EU countries. Parliament’s negotiators secured the inclusion of oversight mechanisms on liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices.

If you have ever used an online platform to rent holiday accommodation direct from a host, you may have wondered how such platforms collect and share data. Platforms connecting hosts with guests help tourists find affordable places to stay and enable people to earn extra income, but also contribute to a lack of affordable accommodation and unfair competition in the tourism sector. On Wednesday evening, Members are set to consider a provisional agreement with the Council, endorsed by the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), on a proposal to regulate data use by the sector. To increase consumer confidence, the co-legislators agreed that registration tools should be available online for free, and that hosts must provide specific information, which online platforms would then be responsible for checking. Each EU country would set up a single digital point for receiving the data collected.

While road safety has greatly improved in the EU, this is less the case for vulnerable users. To continue to improve the situation, the EU is working towards zero deaths on EU roads by 2050. The proposed revision of the Driving Licence Directive is one step in this direction. Members are set to debate a report from the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) on Tuesday morning, which approves the proposed stricter rules for novice drivers and introduction of a digital driving licence. However, the TRAN committee wishes to see medical certification, rather than self-assessment, of fitness to drive when obtaining or renewing a driving licence. To mitigate driver shortages, TRAN also wants to lower the minimum age for coach, bus and truck driving licences to 18 years for certified professional drivers.

Investors are often discouraged from making investments in another EU Member State due to inefficient tax relief procedures. A proposal to move to faster and safer tax excess relief (‘FASTER’), aims at encouraging growth with more efficient and secure withholding tax procedures in the EU for cross-border investors and tax administrations. On Wednesday afternoon, Members are due to vote on a (non-binding) Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report, which strongly supports the proposal.

100 days to the 2024 European elections

With just over 100 days to go to this year’s European elections, on Monday evening Members consider a provisional agreement reached (after several rounds of trilogue meetings) on evolving campaign techniques that pose new challenges on transparency and targeting in political advertising. The agreement seeks to help voters detect political advertisements and identify who is behind them. It sets strict limits on targeting and delivery techniques and enhances personal data protection in online political advertising. It bans profiling, using the data of people who are under voting age, and non-EU based entities financing political advertisements in the EU in the three months prior to an election or referendum. While the new rules will only apply 18 months after their entry into force, those on the non-discriminatory provision of cross-border political advertising (including for European political parties and political groups) would take effect in time for the 2024 European Parliament elections.

Judicial independence, the anti-corruption framework, media freedom and checks and balances are all vital to a thriving democracy. Following Parliament’s demands, the Commission launched an annual rule of law review cycle in 2020. On Wednesday afternoon, Members are due to consider a Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee motion for a resolution on the Commission’s fourth annual rule of law report. The LIBE report highlights that antisemitism, islamophobia and LGBTIQ+ rights have not been addressed, and calls for a more vigorous approach to infringement proceedings. It also reiterates Parliament’s demands to add a fundamental rights pillar, establish a panel of independent experts, and expand the report’s scope to candidate countries.

FURTHER READING

• European Parliament Plenary Session February II, 2024
• 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate: Alexey Navalny
• Parliament’s consent to the revision of the 2021-2027 MFF
• Establishing the Ukraine Facility
• Strategic technologies for Europe platform
• Annual report on implementation of the common security and defence policy, 2023
• Annual report on implementation of the common foreign and security policy, 2023
• Human rights and democracy in the world: Assessing EU action in 2022
• EU-Chile agreements
• EU-Seychelles Agreement: Access for Seychelles fishing vessels to the waters of Mayotte
• Protecting the environment through criminal law
• Nature restoration regulation
• Geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products
• Supplementary protection certificates for plant protection products
• Supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products
• Parliament’s negotiating position on the standard essential patents regulation
• Regulation on detergents and surfactants
• Protection against wholesale energy market manipulation
• Data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services
• Revision of the Driving Licence Directive
• Faster and safer tax excess relief (‘FASTER’)
• Transparency and targeting of political advertising
• Commission’s fourth annual rule of law report

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Commission’s President, Ursula von der Leyen, announced on 16 February that she would soon put forward a strategy for the European defence industry, designed to strengthen military production and arms supply.

Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine two years ago reignited the EU’s push towards strengthening its defence capabilities and cooperation. The European Parliament and President von der Leyen, among others, believe that the EU should strive towards establishing a fully fledged ‘European Defence Union’, following on from a number of ground breaking initiatives and significant growth in military spending.

The discussion on the need for the EU to become more self-reliant in defence has intensified in response to comments made by Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee for the 2024 US presidential election, who suggested that the United States might disregard NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause and not protect from a potential Russian invasion those NATO allies who are not spending enough on defence.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on EU defence issues. Earlier analyses of Russia’s war on Ukraine can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Four NATO defense priorities for the upcoming Washington summit
Atlantic Council, February 2024

NATO should be ambitious with its new Southern Flank Strategy
Atlantic Council, February 2024

Trump courts real danger with his invitation to attack NATO
Brookings Institution, February 2024

Is defense a priority across Europe?
Carnegie Europe, February 2024

As Trump threatens NATO, is it time for Europe to get its act together?
Chatham House, February 2024

Donald Trump says he will not protect “delinquent” NATO members
Council of Foreign Relations, February 2024

Strengthening the political credibility of NATO extended nuclear deterrence
Egmont, February 2024

As Putin and Trump threaten from East and West, Europe must stand up for itself
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2024

The EU and military AI governance: Forging value-based coalitions in an age of strategic competition
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, February 2024

La Défense de l’Europe par les Européens: Un mythe, une nécessité, une ambition, un espoir?
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2024

NATO turns 75 and must deliver
German Council on Foreign Relations, February 2024

Trump-proofing Europe
German Council on Foreign Relations, February 2024

How the prospect of a second Trump presidency is already shaping geopolitics
Atlantic Council, January 2024

How Europe can escape its structural energy weakness amid great power competition
Atlantic Council, January 2024

UK-EU security cooperation after Ukraine
Carnegie Europe, January 2024

Germany’s paralysis holds back Europe
Carnegie Europe, January 2024

The EU rapid deployment capacity: Political priorities and real needs
Centre for Eastern Studies, January 2024

Can European defence take off?
Centre for European Reform, January 2024

Campaign roundup: Is NATO on the ballot in 2024?
Council of Foreign Relations, January 2024

The EU and the Red Sea: Now this is geopolitics
Egmont, January 2024

What future European defence and technological industrial basis (EDTIB) do we want/need? The Belgian case
Egmont, January 2024

Home alone: The sorry state of Europe’s plans for self-defence
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2024

EU-NATO relations in a new threat environment: Significant complementarity but a lack of strategic cooperation
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2024

The EU will become defensive, or superfluous
German Council on Foreign Relations, January 2024

75e sommet de l’OTAN à Washington : Un cadeau empoisonné pour l’administration Biden
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2024

From “as long as it takes” to “as long as we can”: will the West abandon Ukraine?
Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik, January 2024

The US and NATO must clamp down on Russian fossil fuels to end the war in Ukraine
Atlantic Council, December 2023

Expanding NATO’s competitive mindset: Deterring and defending across physical and virtual domains
Atlantic Council, December 2023

Arsenal of democracy: Integrating Ukraine into the West’s defense industrial base
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2023

Military exercises on NATO’s north-eastern flank. Moving towards intensification and synchronisation
Centre for Eastern Studies, December 2023

Future-proofing EU security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: Doubling down with friends
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2023

Ukraine: We are at a ‘Demosthenes moment’ in Europe
Egmont, December 2023

Guns. Lots of guns: EU strategic responsibility and the European defence industry
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2023

Stronger resilience through cooperation in the Sahel: Recommendations for a coordinated EU foreign and security policy in a multi-polar landscape
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, December 2023

The Israel-Hamas war two months on: what is it telling us about the new world order?
Friends of Europe, December 2023

Transatlantic cooperation on Ukraine: How Europe could respond to uncertainty over US assistance
German Council on Foreign Relations, December 2023

What’s at stake in the EU elections: Security and defense
German Marshall Fund, December 2024

Ukraine between NATO and the EU
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, December 2023

The future of multilateral peacebuilding and conflict prevention
Atlantic Council, November 2023

Vanishing partners: The implications of the Sahel coups for the EU’s security policy
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2023

Comment continuer à renforcer notre agenda européen de souveraineté et d’indépendance?
Confrontations Europe, November 2023

The Global Gateway at two: Implementing EU strategic ambitions
European Centre for Development Policy Management, November 2023

Striking absence: Europe’s missile gap and how to close it
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2023

Building weapons together (or not): How to strengthen the European defence industry
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2023

Franco-German leadership in European security: Engine in reverse gear?
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, November 2023

Évolution de l’OTAN : Poursuite ou accélération du processus de transformation?
Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire, November 2023

Europe is stuck over the Israel-Hamas war
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2023

NATO nuclear adaptation: Rationales for expanding the force posture in Europe
Polish Institute of International Affairs, November 2023

Freedom must be better armed than tyranny: Boosting research and industrial capacity for European defence
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, November 2023

Strategic interdependence: Europe’s new approach in a world of middle powers
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2023

Europe’s broken order and the prospect of a new Cold War
International Centre for Defence and Security, October 2023

Read this briefing on ‘European defence, strategic autonomy and NATO‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lauro Panella, Margarida Arenga, Marco Centrone, Christof Cesnovar, Meenakshi Fernandes, Aleksandra Heflich, Lenka Jančová, Christa Kammerhofer-Schlegel, and Jérôme Saulnier.

Why this study?

Since the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, European integration has ensured peace and advanced democratic governance, environmental protection, innovation and economic growth. Efforts to create the euro and to strengthen the single market are credited with raising incomes by at least 6 %.

Yet, Europe could offer more to ensure an effective response to cross-border challenges such as climate change, widening social inequality and wars that affect people’s daily lives and future prospects. The European Union (EU) could take further action to boost the provision of public goods, generate efficiency gains, reduce administrative costs and integrate the impacts of externalities.

This study applies the cost of non-Europe methodology to assess the potential benefits of more EU action in 10 policy areas. It considers different intensities and forms of EU action, from legislative to non-legislative, budgetary spending, savings for national budgets, investment and guarantees, assistance, supervision and enforcement action or involving citizens and communication.

What are the key findings?

This study investigates where the greatest opportunities lie for more EU action – which has the potential to generate up to €3 trillion each year by 2032, or about 18 % of the EU’s 2022 GDP. This is equivalent to €6 700 of potential benefits of greater EU action per citizen per year in the EU.Theoretical foundations and practical considerations, EPRS, European Parliament, October 2023.

The benefits reflect economic gains, as well as gains in terms of social and fundamental rights, and also protection of the environment. The benefits of more EU action could take up to 10 years to realise, depending on the policy area and the specific measures underlying the EU action.

Based on a mapping of the cost of non-Europe, the study identifies 10 key proposals for EU action (one per policy area analysed) that are most relevant to realising Europe’s untapped potential. Each key proposal is supported by resolutions and reports adopted by the European Parliament during the 2019-2024 legislature. Findings from this study can contribute to the setting of EU policy priorities in the 2024-2029 legislature.

What are the conclusions?

The costs of EU inaction are high. Citizens, civil society and businesses are paying the costs of a weak Europe. They pay for it in terms of lower income and revenues, lower living standards, and lower quality of life.

Potential benefits of ambitious common EU action in 10 policy areas Source: EPRS

More Europe does not imply a reduction in benefits for Member States. EU action could take many forms, as illustrated above. Such action naturally need not replace, but could rather enhance the action taken by Member States themselves.

The benefit of more EU action could be greater and more sustainable when providing public goods, such as clean air and good working conditions, with a holistic approach. For example, energy policy should consider low-income and rural populations. Social policy must account for the economic situation and ensure that no-one is left behind. Economic reforms should benefit all citizens.

Read the complete study on ‘Ten ways that Europe could do more for you – Mapping the cost of non-Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Jakub Przetacznik.

Two years after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the war appears to be at a stalemate. While Ukraine successfully recaptured large parts of its territory in the summer and autumn of 2022, the 2023 counter-offensive was not successful in liberating the whole of Ukraine and the war has turned into one of attrition. The European Union and United States have provided Ukraine with substantial military assistance, but continued military support is facing political challenges in both the EU and the US and its fate remains uncertain.

Military situation in Ukraine Figure 1 – Military situation in Ukraine
Source: Institute for the Study of War

The initial attack on Ukraine, from Belarus, Crimea, and the entire Russia-Ukraine border, caused Ukraine to temporarily lose control of a vast swathe of territory, including around Kyiv. The Ukrainian army recaptured a significant amount of territory in the summer and autumn of 2022; most importantly, the Russian army no longer occupies the north-east of Ukraine or any regional capital, nor does it fully occupy any region it claims, except Crimea. The occupation continues along the Sea of Azov and around 165 km westwards from Crimea. The 2023 counter-offensive did not succeed in its initial strategic target – to reach the Sea of Azov, separate the Russian army in Crimea from the rest of the country, and finally liberate the whole of Ukraine.

The result is the current stalemate on the frontline, with repetitive battles of attrition for small, but important, cities and villages, such as Bakhmut, Kupiansk and Avdiivka. One reason is that Russia managed to fortify its positions on the 1000 km-long southern frontline. The fortifications include, inter alia, trenches and anti-tank ‘dragon’s teeth’ and landmines. Another reason is the delay in delivering military equipment. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023 also had military implications and limited the Ukrainian army’s options. The fighting is currently concentrated in the Donbas, and the frontline is barely moving. Russia is also shelling Ukrainian targets, especially cities, across the country. Donated air defence systems have improved the situation, but every day civilians are victims of shelling and Ukraine’s infrastructure is being destroyed. The Ukrainian army had succeeded in destroying 20 % of Russia’s Black Sea fleet by December 2023, undermining Russia’s position and forcing it to move parts of its fleet from Crimea to official Russian territory. This allowed Ukraine to restart grain exports through ports under Ukrainian control, and to export its 2023 harvest.

In February 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy removed Valerii Zaluzhnyi from his position as head of the Ukrainian armed forces, the biggest change in the country’s military leadership since February 2022. It came after rumours that the President and General Zaluzhnyi, who has overseen Ukraine’s military campaign since the start of the war, were at odds. General Oleksandr Syrskyi was named as his replacement and tasked the army with improving planning of activities by command structures; improving logistics so as to answer soldiers’ needs; controlling the situation on every section of the frontline, keeping a balance between combat tasks and reconstituting units; and introducing new technologies and disseminating those which have proved successful (including unmanned systems and electronic warfare). However, efficient realisation of plans depends on timely delivery of Western military equipment. There are over 10 000 confirmed civilian deaths, with actual figures being considerably higher. Ukraine estimates, in February 2024, Russian army casualties at over 400 000, including at least 150 000 deaths. Ukrainian army casualties were unofficially estimated in August 2023 at 170 000-190 000, including 70 000 deaths.

EU and US military support

The EU has mobilised €5.6 billion to reimburse Member States for providing weapons to Ukraine, both lethal and non-lethal (€28 billion including Member States’ bilateral commitments). This amount includes: €3.6 billion for military equipment, both lethal and non-lethal, for the Ukrainian armed forces; and a €2 billion ammunition package, comprising joint procurement of 155-mm calibre artillery rounds and missiles, as well as reimbursement for ground-to-ground and artillery ammunition and missiles, donated to Ukraine by Member States from existing stocks or from reprioritising existing orders. This follows a March 2023 EU pledge to provide Ukraine with 1 million rounds of artillery ammunition by March 2024, a commitment that High Representative Josep Borrell has admitted the EU will fail to meet, with only slightly more than half set to be delivered by the deadline. A further 630 000 rounds are expected to be delivered by the end of 2024; the fund being used for this is the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget fund now worth €12 billion. The equipment delivered to Ukraine ranges from protective equipment and air and missile defences to highly advanced Western main battle tanks. Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and EU partner Norway have announced they are willing to send US-made F-16s to Kyiv, but the first batch promised by Denmark for the end of December 2023 has been delayed by at least six months. Several Member States committed to providing bilateral military assistance to Ukraine for 2024, totalling at least €21 billion (not including the Member States that have yet to send their commitments). Recently, Denmark declared it would send its entire ammunition stock to Ukraine and urged others to increase support for Kyiv.

Borrell presented the Foreign Affairs Council with a proposal in October 2023 and again in December 2023, requesting €5 billion annually for 2024-2027 in military aid to Ukraine under the EPF. This developed into a proposal for a single, non-repeatable top-up of €5 billion to the EPF, at the Foreign Affairs Council on 22 January 2024. The purpose of this was to create a ‘Ukraine Assistance Fund‘ within the EPF. At the time of writing, no agreement has been reached on this matter, as Member States disagree on how to modify the fund to better suit Ukraine’s needs and support Europe’s arms industry in fulfilling them. The eighth tranche of military assistance under the EPF also continues to be held up by Hungary. Moreover, the EU launched an EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) in November 2022. Almost 40 000 Ukrainian soldiers have been trained as of February 2024; following Member States’ agreement in January 2024, the number is expected to reach 60 000 by the end of summer 2024. 

The US has given almost US$44 billion in military assistance to Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. The Biden administration has given or promised to give Ukraine a long list of defence capabilities, including advanced radar and surveillance systems, Abrams battle tanks and anti-aircraft missiles. The agreement by the Biden administration to provide Ukraine with cluster munitions caused some controversy in July 2023.

EU and US support remains essential to assist Ukraine in its defence. EU military aid to Ukraine is even more important given that continued US support is not certain after the next US election – a second Trump presidency would very likely halt aid to Ukraine – and the current ‘Congressional funding crisis‘. After months of political wrangling, the US Senate approved a long-awaited US$95 billion aid package for Taiwan, Israel, and Ukraine in February 2024; the package includes, inter alia, US$60 billion for Kyiv and US$14 billion for Israel’s war against Hamas. Republicans were split and had already voted the bill down, while Democrats supported its passage. The bill is now before the House of Representatives, where its fate is uncertain. Therefore, at the beginning of 2024, continued Western assistance to Ukraine looked uncertain, as new funding was politically stuck in the US and EU. At the 2024 Munich Security Conference, President Zelenskyy thus pleaded for continued Western support for Ukraine. Ukraine is requesting, among other things, fighter and transport jets, ammunition, battle tanks, drones and long-range missiles. According to an expert from the Council on Foreign Relations think-tank: ‘So far, the West has provided most of what Ukraine has asked for, but much more slowly and in much smaller quantities than necessary.’

European Parliament position

Parliament has condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine from the start, and has called for increased support for Ukraine in several resolutions. In its resolution of 16 February 2023 marking one year of Russia’s invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine, Parliament called for a substantial increase in munitions deliveries to Ukraine; in 2022, Parliament had urged Member States to meet Ukraine’s need for weapons.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Ukraine: Military state of play – February 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens about rail passenger rights in Europe.

The European Union (EU) protects the rights of people travelling by train, including setting refunds for delays, the right to up-to-date information, and assistance for people with disabilities.

Current rail passenger rights

Under rules adopted in 2007 and updated in 2021, people travelling by train in the European Union have a number of rights. These include:

• a right to clear, accessible information about the price of tickets, timetables and delays, and information about how to file complaints;
• the right to reimbursement in the case of a delay of over 60 minutes, or the right to travel to their final destination via an alternative route;
• the right to non-discrimination and assistance for people with disabilities, provided they request this assistance at least 24 hours before their journey;
• the right to have complaints heard and adequately addressed;
• the right to purchase a single ticket for a journey, even when passengers transfer trains during the journey, provided they travel with the same company;
• an obligation that all trains must have space for bicycles.

What can citizens do?

Should a dispute arise with a railway carrier, citizens have various options:

• file a complaint with the relevant national authority;
• contact a European Consumer Centre in the country;
• use an out-of-court procedure;
• submit a complaint via the online dispute resolution;
• file a claim under the European small claims procedure.

European Railway Agency

To promote safety and cross-border travel by rail, the EU established the European Agency for Railways. This agency establishes and promotes shared standards for the design of trains, train tracks and other aspects such as signalling and communication, to move towards smoother rail travel throughout the EU. The agency also promotes railway safety by conducting regular analyses, and by setting up the European Rail Traffic Management System.

Further information

• Rail passengers’ rights and obligations in the EU, European Parliamentary Research Service, briefing, 2021
• Rail passenger rights, Your Europe
• Rights for travellers with disabilities or reduced mobility, Your Europe
• Passenger rights, Fact Sheets on the European Union, European Parliament, 2023

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

Almost two years since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU military assistance under the European Peace Facility (EPF) is lagging. The special European Council meeting of 1 February 2024 invited the Council to agree by early March 2024 to amend the regulation establishing the EPF, in order to increase its financial ceiling.

Is the European Peace Facility entering a new phase?

In October 2023 and again in December, the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) Josep Borrell proposed to the Foreign Affairs Council an envelope under the EPF of €5 billion a year for the years 2024 to 2027 for military assistance to Ukraine. At the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 22 January 2024, this evolved into a proposal for a single, non-repeatable €5 billion EPF top-up in order to establish a ‘Ukraine Assistance Fund‘ within the EPF, to encourage EU Member States to increase their military support for Ukraine. This support remains badly needed, as Ukraine is still suffering from ‘shell hunger’, despite EU efforts and those of the international artillery coalition led by France and the United States (US). EU military aid to Ukraine is all the more necessary given the potential outcome of the next US presidential elections and the current congressional funding crisis.

Between February 2022 and 1 February 2024, the US delivered US$44.2 billion in military assistance to Ukraine. On 4 February 2024, a bi-partisan deal in the Senate proposed a $118 billion draft package pairing strengthened security on the US–Mexico border with wartime aid for Israel and other US partners, with a $60 billion envelope for Ukraine. Top Republicans in the House immediately rejected the draft; it is still under discussion since the Senate on 11 February again supported it, through a procedural vote, and on 14 February, approved it.

During their 31 January 2024 informal meeting, EU defence ministers had discussed the way ahead for EU military support to Ukraine. In his press remarks upon arrival at that meeting, the HR/VP said:

It is obviously necessary to have a clear understanding of where we are with [the provision of] ammunition. Ministers have been asked to present exactly what they have done, what they are doing, what they plan to do, in order to have a clear understanding of what has to go all together to provide Ukraine with what it needs […]. Ukraine needs more ammunition. There is a big imbalance between the fire capacity from one side and the other, and this gap has to be filled.

Indeed, according to experts, the EU is not on track to hit the one million rounds of ammunition target decided by the Council on 20 March 2023 under a three-track approach: deliveries, joint procurement and ramping-up of ammunition production. ‘We … will try to solve the issues that some Member States want to be considered in the new stage of the EPF’, the HR/VP added, mentioning the need for the EPF to shift from funding the destocking of the previous existing material to supporting the production of the European defence industry. In his press remarks following the January 2024 informal meeting, the HR/VP said that he had reiterated the urgent need to agree on further military support for the short and long term, and that the Member States and the EU had shared the following aggregated data.

• Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (24 February 2022), the EU and its Member States have provided and placed €28 billion worth of military equipment.
• Many Member States provided their budgeted commitments for bilateral military assistance to Ukraine, amounting to at least €21 billion for 2024. Member States have submitted partial reimbursement requests (reportedly based on a reimbursement rate of between 25 % and 45 %) from the EPF funds for their military deliveries to Ukraine.
• The target of 40 000 Ukrainian soldiers trained through the EU military assistance mission for Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) had almost been reached on 1 February 2024; Member States agreed to add 20 000 soldiers, which would raise the number of trained soldiers to 60 000 by the end of summer 2024. The EPF operations pillar funds the common costs of EUMAM, while the EPF assistance pillar finances the assistance measures for the Ukrainian army.
• From March 2023 to 1 February 2024, 330 000 ammunition rounds have been delivered, mainly from existing stocks, representing only one third of the objective of one million ammunitions a year agreed by the Council on 20 March 2023. The HR/VP said he expected an additional 200 000 ammunition rounds by March 2024 from destocking and individual and joint procurement, thus reaching 52 % of the set objective (or slightly more, as not all Member States have sent their data). Deliveries of artillery ammunitions and missiles before 31 May 2023 – the first track of the ammunition plan for Ukraine – or orders placed for these items before 30 September 2023 through joint procurements – the second track of the ammunition plan – may be partially reimbursed from the EPF to the Member States.
• The HR/VP expects further deliveries of 600 000 ammunition rounds from orders Member States are placing, so as to reach the initial objective of one million rounds of ammunition deliveries by the end of 2024. According to the HR/VP, the industry’s production capacity will continue to increase as orders are placed; production capacity has already increased by 40 % since February 2022 and will again increase by 40 % in 2024, from a production capacity of 1 million rounds a year on 1 February 2024, to 1.4 million by the end of the year.

The €5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund within the EPF: A work in progress

Initially, the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) was the only point on the draft agenda of the special European Council meeting of 1 February 2024. EU leaders discussed the mid-term review of the 2021-2027 MFF, including support for Ukraine. This support consists mainly of the Ukraine Facility, a €50 billion fund, split between €17 billion in grants and €33 billion in loans, for 2024 to 2027, to help Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation towards EU accession. The European Council came to an agreement on the Ukraine Facility.

In his press remarks before the meeting, the HR/VP said he would urge EU leaders to increase military support for Ukraine, through the Ukraine Assistance Fund within the EPF. He also confirmed that ‘some Member States, Hungary for example’, had expressed their wish to no longer participate in the EPF, albeit without obstructing it. The leaders did not, however, reach an agreement on the Ukraine Assistance Fund. The European Council reviewed the Council’s work on military support for Ukraine under the EPF and the proposed rise in the facility’s overall financial ceiling and invited the Council to reach an agreement by early March 2024 to amend Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509. The EPF ceiling, set at €12 billion in current prices, would receive a one-off top-up of €5 billion, based on the 22 January 2024 HR/VP proposal, which no longer includes a €5 billion ‘annual’ top-up for the four coming years, marking a drastic down-sizing of the HR/VP’s initial ambition. Decision 2021/509 establishing the EPF has already been amended twice for the first and second tracks of the ammunition plan.

The European Council also invited the Council to take into account ‘suggestions by the Member States’. This refers, inter alia, to Germany’s request for a detailed list of commitments from other Member States for military deliveries in 2024 and to reduce its own real contribution to the EPF comparatively. On 8 January 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz had pointed out that Germany was, after the US, the world’s second-biggest provider of military aid to Ukraine, committed to deliver weapons and military material worth over €7 billion in 2024 alone. He had called on the other EU Member States to step up their support for Ukraine, asking them to present, by 1 February (the day of the special European Council meeting), a detailed summary of their military deliveries to Ukraine.

Lastly, the European Council reiterated ‘the urgent need to accelerate the delivery of ammunition and missiles, notably in view of the commitment to provide Ukraine with one million rounds of artillery ammunition’ and called on Member States ‘to explore all options to meet Ukraine’s needs …, including continued stock donations, redirection of existing orders and the placing of the necessary new orders, which will contribute to increasing European industry’s production capacity’.

On 27 February, Members of the European Parliament are expected to vote on a report urging Member States to approve the HR/VP’s initial proposal for a €20 billion Ukraine assistance fund within the EPF, and to accelerate ammunition deliveries from their stocks to Ukraine through the EPF.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘European Peace Facility: Continued EU military assistance to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eszter Fay.

The development of new products and services from the convergence of digital and space technologies provides us with a space economy, or ‘space-as-a-service’.

However, the sustainability of space-based infrastructure in orbit and beyond is an emerging policy issue that is likely to become increasingly important in the coming decades. Accumulation of space debris could hinder our future exploration and exploitation of space. And in the near future, the observation of the universe from Earth could become impossible.

The space industry – mainly satellite manufacturing, support ground equipment manufacturing, and the launch industry – is growing fast. This creates environmental sustainability challenges such as the impact of re-entries, or light pollution that hinders astronomical observation, and environmental impacts on Earth itself.

How can we shape outer space economic development to save this planet? How can Europe establish, manage and protect its infrastructure in space, so humanity benefits from outer-space activity? Can Europe maintain a lead on clean space policy and technology? And can civil society help address space challenges to maximise public understanding and support for an ambitious European space strategy?

During the workshop on the ‘Future of Space – the sustainable path‘, organised by the European Parliament’s STOA Panel for Future of Science and Technology, experts from several disciplines discussed these questions with policymakers.

EU Space Law

According to STOA Vice-Chair Ivo Hristov (S&D, Bulgaria), this debate was very timely, as the European Commission was holding a public consultation on a draft law on space, planned for adoption in early 2024. The new EU Space Law will be structured around three main pillars:

1. Guaranteed safe satellite traffic, aimed at mitigating the risk of collision caused by space debris;
2. Resilient EU space infrastructure, in particular against cyberattacks;
3. Sustainable space operations to ensure our ability to use space as an important economic engine.

Space pollution

Space pollution is self-sustained. More than 8 000 space craft currently create debris by colliding with space debris orbiting the Earth. Today, 128 million objects larger than 1 mm (and of those, 34 000 are bigger than 10 cm and 900 000  bigger than 1 cm) are currently spinning through space at 7 km/sec.

Because space debris increases the light in the sky, it hampers astronomical observation and damages radio frequency, both of which need a dark and quiet sky. A 2023 United Nations report identified space debris as one of our planet’s tipping points, which could impact our lives significantly (next to a Gulf stream collapse or melting polar ice, for instance).

The European Space Agency (ESA) carries out important space debris mitigation activities, including the ‘Zero Debris Charter‘ to drive guarantees to remove satellites from orbit at the end of their life. A vehicle capable of capturing space debris is being developed in the framework of the world’s first mission to remove debris from Earth’s orbit.

Moving to sustainable space activities

Experts present at the workshop from ESA, the European Commission and the European space community put forward elements that could enable more sustainable and fair space activities.

• More research programmes are needed on space sustainability – for example, to assess the impact on the upper atmosphere of burning metals during satellite re-entries.
• Political action and better regulation of commercial satellite launches are needed to enhance space sustainability. This regulation should be incorporated into EU environmental policy.
• Companies need legal certainty and legislation allowing open competition on a level playing field. International regulation of frequencies and orbits should make the market more accessible.
• A positive narrative on space exploration could be developed, including on international scientific cooperation, solidarity and inclusive reflection, to attract younger generations to engage in space science.
• Space development demands a multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural approach: It is not ‘only’ technological innovation. This should have an impact on research and innovation policies. The race for commercial development in space cannot be pursued without an ethical reflection, in terms of justice and sustainability. Space is a common good. An impactful European position would require investment in innovation and support for start-ups and companies who can play a role in the space economy.
• The systematic use of space sustainability rating tools could help encourage space actors to design and implement more sustainable and more responsible space missions for the long-term sustainability of the space environment.

For more details, you can watch the event recording here and an EPRS video here.

Your opinion matters to us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu and follow us on X at @EP_ScienceTech.

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira.

In an important election year for the European Parliament, the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) demonstrated its commitment to embracing and disseminating the most recent social science on democratic participation with the 21st STOA Annual Lecture under the theme ‘Making Democracy Work for Everyone’.

Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), Chair of STOA opened the meeting, with keynote speaker, Professor Michael Bruter, an expert in political science and European Research Council grantee, giving a compelling address on the importance of social sciences in addressing societal challenges and in supporting policymakers in taking informed and fact-based decisions.

Professor Bruter shared his insights into the challenges and solutions for democratic inclusion across generations, personal situations, and global contexts. His lecture acknowledged the intricate tapestry of democratic processes, highlighting the paramount importance of inclusivity. He addressed the generational gaps, socio-economic disparities, and diverse global contexts that can hinder equal representation and participation. Professor Bruter argued that democracy (i.e. democratic institutions) needs to adapt and be more responsive to citizens’ needs.

Making democracy work for everyone

A panel discussion featuring Sylvia Kritzinger (Professor at the Department of Government of Vienna University), Barbara Prainsack (Chair of European Group on Ethics in Science and Technology), Yves Dejaeghere (Executive Director of Federation for Innovation in Democracy – Europe), and moderated by Sandra Parthie (Member of the European Economic and Social Committee), further explored the dynamics of democracy and sought solutions for a future where the democratic process is not just a mechanism but a living, thriving entity, serving everyone.

The concept of ‘loser consent’ was brought to the forefront of the discussion, with an emphasis on the potential backlash when losers refuse to accept electoral outcomes. Sylvia Kritzinger also explored the meaning of voting, and drew attention to the diverse interpretations people attach to this fundamental democratic act. Importantly, there was a great emphasis on the need to engage the younger generation, who brings a fresh perspective and enthusiasm, thus contributing to the vitality of our democratic discourse.

A recent opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, chaired by panellist Barbara Prainsack, explores several challenges to democracy, and in particular the role of private companies and social media in shaping public spaces and people’s opinions. During the discussion, recommendations on digital literacy and addressing the digital divide were underlined as essential components in strengthening our democratic values.

From his hands-on experience in supporting the creation of citizens’ assemblies across Europe, Yves Dejaeghere broadened the perspective on democracy. He highlighted the diminishing importance of intermediary forces (i.e. democratic institutions) and advocated for a more comprehensive view of democracy, citing examples of both the positive and negative aspects of citizens’ assemblies, and the importance of concrete decisions and outcomes that are taken forward by the political actors.

During the discussion with the audience, it became clear that democratic inclusion is a complex issue, and a shift in perspective is urgent. Democracies need to adapt to citizens rather than the other way around. This comes in light of citizens’ increasing demands from their democracies.

The keynote speaker and the panellists recognised citizens’ efforts to contribute positively to their democracies and stressed the need to create conditions that use this goodwill for community benefit.

The participants agreed that restoring hope to those who have become disillusioned is paramount, alongside a new focus on returning citizens to the heart of democratic thinking and practice, while creating a vision for a better future for the current and next generations.

A recording of the event is available on the STOA website.

Read the interview with Professor Michael Bruter.

Your opinion matters to us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu and follow us on X at @EP_ScienceTech.

STOA Annual Lecture 2024 – Making democracy work for everyone© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP

Written by Naja Bentzen with Kate Dwyer (European Parliament Liaison Office, Washington DC) and Eric Pichon.

Conflict, food insecurity and climate shocks, among other crises, have destabilised African countries in recent years and curbed economic activity. Nevertheless, sub-Saharan Africa is seen as an emerging geopolitical force; and the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are actively reframing their partnerships with the region.

Background: Challenges in a geostrategic environment

Sub-Saharan Africa holds the key to addressing many of the world’s most critical challenges. The region has one of the world’s youngest and fastest-growing populations, encompasses one of the largest free trade areas, has natural resources essential for renewable and low-carbon technologies, and holds a quarter of the seats in the United Nations General Assembly. There are, however, obstacles hampering the region’s geopolitical influence. Democratic backsliding and security crises relating to violent extremism and military coups have intensified in several sub-Saharan African countries in recent years. Out of the region’s 49 countries, 22 are considered fragile or conflict-affected. Some 462 million sub-Saharan Africans were living in extreme poverty in 2023, and public health challenges persist. Alongside climate-related issues, economic shocks from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have exacerbated food insecurity and the region’s debt.

Growing Russian and Chinese influence further challenge EU and US cooperation with sub-Saharan African countries. Since 2000, China has significantly expanded its trade, investment and financial ties with the region, as well as increasing its political and military engagement. Russia has similarly intensified its military, political and economic ties with the region in recent years, including through the Wagner Group.

The EU and the US share an interest in a prosperous, peaceful and democratic Africa. During the 2021 EU–US Summit, they voiced concern over the deteriorating political, humanitarian and security situations in several sub-Saharan African countries. In their 2023 joint summit statement, they reaffirmed their commitment to enhance cooperation with African partners and tackle common security challenges together with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In a recent joint initiative, the EU and the US teamed up to advance the development of the Trans-African (Lobito) Corridor, a flagship project of the G7’s 2022 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).

European Union–Africa relations

For the past 23 years, EU relations with sub-Saharan Africa were underpinned by the Cotonou Agreement, a legally binding treaty between the EU and sub-Saharan African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries covering trade, development and political cooperation. On 1 January 2024, the provisional application of the Samoa Agreement replaced the Cotonou Agreement with a new structure for EU–ACP relations and more flexibility for levels of action and types of cooperation. This framework complements the Africa–EU partnership, established at the first Africa–EU Summit in 2000, and the Joint Africa–EU Strategy, adopted in 2007 to strengthen political partnership and enhance cooperation. Recognising the evolving geopolitical environment, in 2020, the European Commission and the High Representative published a joint communication, ‘Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa’. They proposed centring a new EU–Africa strategy on five thematic partnerships: green transition and energy; digital transformation; sustainable growth and jobs; peace and governance; and migration and mobility. The strategy was discussed at the 2022 African Union (AU)–EU Summit. The concluding declaration, ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’, highlighted a reaffirmed commitment to multilateralism and renewed partnerships for both peace and security and migration and mobility. At the same time, the EU pledged €150 billion in investment for 2021-2027 through the Global Gateway programme, to support its common ambition with Africa for 2030 and the AU Agenda 2063. The EU further pledged to provide specific packages for health and education systems and mobilise €425 million through Team Europe to support vaccination efforts. During the 2022 AU–EU Commission-to-Commission meeting, Commissioners agreed to launch a €750 million programme for infrastructure investment in Africa. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has made it clear that the EU is not deterred by the slow implementation of its Africa strategy, but intends to rethink its strategic presence to ensure it shows the same unity of purpose towards Africa as it does towards Ukraine. In building on its economic partnership agreements (EPA) with ACP partners, the EU launched a landmark EPA with Kenya in December 2023 to enhance trade, investment and development. The EU also supports the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) through its Peace Facility and common security and defence policy.

European Parliament role and responsibilities

Parliament is at the forefront of reshaping the EU’s Africa strategy. A 2017 resolution on boosting development in Africa included many of the priority areas subsequently set out in the 2020 joint communication. In a 2021 resolution on the EU–Africa strategy, Parliament urged both sides ‘to move beyond the donor-recipient relationship’, prioritise human development and human rights, and adapt their priorities in the light of COVID‑19. Throughout 2022 and 2023, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) passed several resolutions on various aspects of EU–Africa relations, including security threats in western and Sahelian Africa. Parliament has been a strategic partner of the AU’s Pan-African Parliament (PAP) since its inauguration in 2004. In 2009, MEPs created a standing Delegation for the Pan-African Parliament (DPAP). In 2015, Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group (DEG) designated the PAP as a priority regional parliament. MEPs also regularly exchange with African parliamentarians through the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and, as of February 2024, the Africa–EU Parliamentary Assembly. In 2023, the European Parliament opened an office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to liaise with the AU.

United States–Africa Relations

US–Africa policy has generally prioritised development, trade and investment, democracy and governance, and peace and security. Through State Department initiatives and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US has made vital contributions to curb public health crises, expand political rights and civil liberties, and spur economic growth. Under Obama, the US launched several programmes to increase engagement, including the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), the African Women’s Entrepreneurship Program and Power Africa. Despite strained relations between the US and sub-Saharan Africa, in 2019, the Trump administration launched Prosper Africa as a key vehicle for US trade and investment aid. In an attempt to reframe Africa’s importance to US national security interests, the Biden administration adopted a new US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa in 2022. With its core objectives – fostering open societies; democratic and security dividends; pandemic recovery and economic opportunity; and climate adaptation and a just energy transition – the strategy aims to address immediate crises and threats while working towards strengthening Africa’s capabilities to solve global problems. During the 2022 US–Africa Leaders Summit, the Biden administration pledged to invest US$55 billion to support its strategic objectives for 2023-2026, and supported greater African representation in international institutions. The 2022 strategy has increased high-level engagement by US officials, and led to the creation of the President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the US.

US Congress role and responsibilities

The US Congress plays a crucial role in supporting American policy objectives in Africa. Each chamber has sub-committees on sub-Saharan Africa to address a range of pressing topics, including governance, human rights and development challenges. In 2000 and 2015, Congress enacted and reauthorised the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a preferential trade agreement that has substantially improved African export competiveness and contributed to the creation of tens of thousands of jobs. Congress also created the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2004, one of the main US policy initiatives in Africa, to form partnerships with countries committed to democratic governance, economic freedom and investing in their populations. During the 115th and 117th Congress, key legislation on Africa included the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act, establishing the US Development Finance Corporation, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program. In addition to authorising executive action and diplomatic engagement, Congress appropriates and oversees all US foreign assistance for Africa. The House Democracy Partnership (HDP) also maintains legislative strengthening partnerships with the legislatures of Liberia and Kenya. In 2023, the House launched a US–Africa Policy Working Group to enhance cooperation with the continent and increase its understanding of ongoing challenges.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU and US strategies towards sub-Saharan Africa‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by David De Groot and Silvia Kotanidis.

In June 2024, around 400 million EU citizens go to the polls to elect the Members of the European Parliament’s 10th legislature. As the only EU institution that represents EU citizens, elections to the European Parliament are therefore major democratic events, and the only one at EU level that resembles national democratic electoral consultation. European elections, however, differ from the national version, as they are part of a context of multi-tier government, sometimes perceived as ‘second order elections’.

The main difference is that the European elections are a rather fragmented exercise, since a great part of the electoral process, including the way in which the right to vote is exercised, remains subject to national rules. In addition, the lack of a real transnational forum in which to debate European (as opposed to national) issues during European elections is one reason why European elections have failed to earn attention comparable to national elections, despite the prominent role the European Parliament has acquired in European policy-making in recent decades.

A number of reforms have been put forward over the years. Measures to harmonise rules or mechanisms that would personalise the elections and hence bring more visibility to the candidates and their campaigns have been proposed. Two reforms are pending. In one case, to harmonise a few aspects of the electoral process. In the other, to make additional deeper reforms with the introduction of a Union-wide constituency. A repeat of the lead candidate process (a political rather than a legal practice), is also likely to be attempted for the 2024 elections.

This briefing explores the legal framework of the EU electoral rules, highlighting which aspects are governed by national rules, and describes the innovations the reforms currently on the table could bring. It also analyses decisions on the composition of Parliament and initiatives to strengthen the resilience of the electoral process.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European elections 2024: Rules of a pan-European democratic event‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

Access to housing in the EU has become problematic in recent years. Demography and urbanisation-related structural factors, aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the conflict in Ukraine, soaring energy prices, the cost-of-living crisis and (already high) housing prices that keep rising are preventing many people from accessing decent housing solutions. The lack of affordable housing supply only adds to this situation. These difficulties affect not only low- but now also middle-income households, as well as specific vulnerable groups, among them young people. Overall, there is not enough ‘social housing’ provision in the EU to meet increased demand.

While both the EU and the United Nations recognise the right to housing, the longstanding crisis in housing affordability has had an adverse impact on people’s living standards, well-being and social inclusion. This is especially the case with young people, many of whom are struggling to access any form of decent housing, in particular in cities. Throughout the EU, the number of young people experiencing homelessness is on the rise.

The primary responsibility for housing policies in the EU lies with the Member States, while the concrete provision of social housing is often ensured by regions and cities. The EU has no direct competence in the area of housing and only a limited scope of action to address social issues, yet it provides relevant guidance and funding. Furthermore, certain EU rules have an indirect impact on housing provision.

This briefing provides an inexhaustive overview of what is being done across the EU to improve housing affordability in general, with a specific focus on making housing accessible to young people.

Several recent developments could be seen as paving the way to a new approach to the provision of affordable housing in the EU.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Social and youth housing in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Caprile and Eric Pichon.

This series of maps illustrates Russia’s expanding diplomatic, economic and military engagement across the African continent. It also provides a visual representation of the deployment of hybrid tools, such as information manipulation campaigns, and the multi‑faceted presence of the paramilitary company Wagner, both of which are integral parts of Russia’s current strategy in Africa.

Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the subsequent open confrontation with the West in all arenas, has put the spotlight on the African continent again as an area of geopolitical rivalry. Russia’s current engagement on the continent seeks to break the diplomatic and economic isolation imposed by the West, to reassert its own relevance on the international stage as the champion of the new ‘polycentric world’, and to advance its geo‑strategic ambitions in mining, energy and military presence in key areas, such as the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.

Russia made significant diplomatic efforts to ensure a high turnout at the second Russia‑Africa summit, held in Saint Petersburg in July 2023, which was well attended but by significantly fewer Heads of State than the first summit, in 2019. However, the 2023 summit failed to address several African leaders’ concerns about the impact of the war in Ukraine on their countries’ economies. As evidenced in votes on recent United Nations (UN) resolutions, the African countries’ positions on the war vary greatly. Russia’s expanding influence in Africa also plays out through non‑official channels, such as the use of private military companies (such as the Wagner Group) and information manipulation campaigns.

Russia has concluded military cooperation agreements with 43 African countries, and is a major, though declining, arms supplier to Africa. This cooperation is not linked to democratic pledges, and in multiple African countries hit by coups, Russia has continued or strengthened its military cooperation. Beyond arms, Russia’s trade with Africa is relatively insignificant compared with other trade partners. Russia’s presence is stronger in the African mining and energy markets, notably through mining concessions to Wagner‑associated companies, and it has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with 20 countries, with plans to build nuclear plants in Egypt and Nigeria.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia in Africa: An atlas‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Attendance at Russia-Africa summit (Saint Petersburg, Russia, 27 28 July 2023) Vote on the withdrawal of Russia troops from Ukraine (ES 11/1, March 2022) Vote on an immediate end to the war in Ukraine (ES 11/6, February 2023) Wagner and Russian interference in Africa Russia-Africa military agreements and arms trade, and recent coups Russian arms export to Africa Africa’s main trade partners Russian trade with Africa in a snapshot Energy and mining cooperation