European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Colin Murphy.

Cybercrime is a major threat to society that generates billions of euros for its perpetrators. It is a form of crime that is continuing to grow, with criminals showing increasing sophistication and resourcefulness. These criminal activities occur at all levels of society and take many forms, from investment fraud to phishing and the creation of bogus entities, including fake charities.

The rise in the use of digital solutions for everyday activities in business and public services is matched by the number of digital devices being used by citizens. People are now connecting to numerous digital accounts and are spending more time online than ever before. Coupled with this, cyberattacks and digital scams are on the rise. Not only is the number of incidents growing, but the complexity and the subsequent negative impact is also increasing.

Cybercrime can be relatively simple in appearance, such as spurious emails and text messages, or complex, involving a number of actors spreading malicious content through entire business or public service systems in order to block access for ransom purposes or to disable critical entities for ideological reasons.

The EU is active in tackling cybersecurity and cybercrime, as demonstrated by its cybersecurity strategy. It has a number of pieces of legislation in place or in the pipeline to tackle vulnerabilities, increase the resilience of essential services and address associated cybersecurity risks. Likewise, EU agencies are proactively dealing with the threat posed by cybercrime by supporting Member States and stakeholders in addressing emerging threats and strengthening resilience.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding cybercrime‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

Is the EU facing a migration crisis? Are the EU’s borders on the brink of collapse because of increased irregular migration? Would border fences help to stop or reduce irregular migration? How many of the world’s refugees and asylum seekers are headed towards the EU? Are the protection claims of asylum seekers genuine, or is subterfuge used to gain access to the EU? And what happened with the Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war into the EU? These are among the most common and important questions shaping the current discussion around migration and borders in the EU.

This briefing provides an overview of key trends and figures on migration, borders and asylum in the EU. The analysis critically situates these topics in the broader global and historical context, providing a synthetic, data‑rich and accessible presentation of major issues.

The analysis leads to several interesting findings that may challenge common perceptions about migration and borders in the EU, including the following.

• The majority of migrants enter the EU through legitimate legal channels.
• Most irregular migrants do not cross the EU’s external borders irregularly.
• There are significantly more legal migrants than irregular migrants in the EU.
• Building fences at the EU’s external borders does not seem to reduce irregular entries.
• The view of a dramatic increase in the number of migrants and refugees is contested.
• The EU’s share of the world’s refugees and asylum seekers remains limited.
• Reducing or stopping immigration would worsen the EU’s demographic challenges.
• The EU’s temporary protection scheme showed the Union’s capacity to provide protection swiftly to a significant number of people in need.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU migration and borders: Key facts and figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Global refugee population Refugees as a share of population (in %) The EU’s refugee population The EU’s share of world’s refugees (in %) Protection status and EU citizenship acquisitions by Syrian nationals (in thousands) Applications for international protection submitted in the EU Asylum applications and recognition rates in the Member States – 2013 2022 Beneficiaries of temporary protection in the EU (in millions) Fences at the EU’s external borders (in km) Border fences and irregular entries at the EU’s external land borders Dead and missing at the EU’s sea borders International migrants Stock of international migrants by main region of origin (in millions) Stock of international migrants by main region of destination (in millions) EU citizens and non EU citizens living in the EU (in millions) Lawful immigrants and detections of irregular entries (in millions) EU population projections (in millions) Visa access to the EU EU visas issued at Member States’ consulates (in millions) Visa verifications in the VIS and detections of irregular entries (in millions) Irregular entries in the EU and the US (in millions) Detections of irregular entries and refused entries at EU borders (in millions) Third country nationals found to be illegally present in the EU (in millions)

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Among the highlights of the March 2024 plenary session were the debates on preparation of the European Council meeting on 21 and 22 March 2024; the need to address urgent concerns regarding Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia, and the need to ensure the stability of EU agricultural production and impose sanctions on imports of Russian and Belarussian food and agricultural products to the EU. Members also debated the return of Romanian national treasure illegally appropriated by Russia.

Other important debates took place, inter alia, on: deteriorating living conditions in the EU; a healthy lifestyle and active ageing; the inclusion of the right to abortion in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, rising anti-LGBTIQ rhetoric and violence; and EU climate risk assessment. Members also discussed the annual designation of European capitals for children, and the Commission’s treatment of requests for public access to documents.

Representatives of the world cup-winning Spanish women’s national football team participated in Parliament’s official celebration to mark International Women’s Day. The last ‘This is Europe’ debate for this term followed a speech by Petteri Orpo, Prime Minister of Finland.

Revising financial rules, and guidelines for the 2025 EU budget

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on changes to the EU’s financial rules. The new rules are needed to align with changes in the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), aimed at ensuring more transparent, digital and value-based EU funding. Members also debated and adopted Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget, which the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) insists should be people-centred, prioritising investment that improves people’s lives and EU competitiveness. The adopted guidelines set Parliament’s position ahead of the Commission’s adoption of the draft 2025 budget, which will be debated in Parliament in the new term.

Protecting our environment Green claims

Parliament debated and voted a report at first reading on a proposal to regulate ‘green claims‘. The report from the Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) sets a timescale for verification of environmental claims and labelling schemes, which must be tailored to the complexity of the claim and company size.

Waste Framework Directive

Members adopted at first reading a proposal aimed at accelerating the fight against food waste and pushing textile producers to act to reduce clothing waste, by amending the Waste Framework Directive. The ENVI committee report on the proposal seeks to raise binding reduction targets in food processing and manufacturing to 20 % by 2030, and to 40 % per capita in retail, catering, food services and households.

Industrial pollution

The Industrial Emissions Directive sets rules on industrial pollution in the EU, including from industrial farming. Members adopted a provisional political agreement to update these rules. The ENVI committee succeeded in substantially amending the proposal, to include mining and battery production, placing ‘best available technique’ principles at the heart of granting permits, and setting binding environmental performance limit values for water. However, to lighten the administrative burden, governments must put e-permitting in place by 2035. ENVI Members also successfully introduced a 2026 deadline to reassess the need to address cattle farm emissions (currently excluded), and those from imported agricultural products.

Protecting EU businesses and consumers Compulsory licensing of patents

Members voted at first reading on a proposal to clarify rules on the compulsory licensing of patents. The Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) report proposes a number of changes, including that voluntary agreements should have greater priority than compulsory licensing, and licensees, not the rights-holder, should be responsible for any liability linked to a product. The Commission should have to identify all rights-holders, who would be paid for compulsory licences used within a set timeframe. When necessary, the Commission should compel rights-holders to disclose (against remuneration) trade secrets and know-how.

Toy safety

The EU Toy Directive helps to ensure toys sold in the EU are safe for our children. Members voted on an IMCO committee first-reading report that seeks to reduce the number of unsafe toys still sold in the EU. IMCO wishes to see digital product passports available for 10 years, for example, and linked to the Safety Gate Portal – allowing us all to report risks. The committee also proposes that the Commission provide small businesses with assistance to comply with the stricter toy safety rules.

EU customs

A central EU customs authority could offer traders lower compliance costs and ensure a more efficient, fraud-proof customs union. Members voted at first reading on proposals to establish an EU customs data hub and an EU customs authority. While the IMCO report on the file is generally supportive of the proposal, it would like to see a swifter process and a platform allowing everyone to report non-compliant goods.

Product design

Members adopted a provisional agreement on two files seeking stronger protection for product design against counterfeiting. Endorsed by the JURI committee, the agreement should future-proof design protection, protect registered designs for five years, renewable to a maximum 25 years (for a fee), liberalise the spare parts market, and give EU governments three years to transpose the EU rules into national law.

Protecting our democracy and the rule of law Media freedom act

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on a regulation setting the first-ever EU rules on media freedom, pluralism and protecting journalists – the European media freedom act. Under the new rules, governments must respect editorial freedom and exempt journalists from identifying their sources. Media companies will have to make their ownership structures public, and EU countries will investigate cases where media outlets become too concentrated. To protect journalists from government spying, Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) succeeded in eliminating ‘protecting national security’ as grounds for surveillance and ensured that all public authorities have to publish information about their annual advertising expenditure, including online.

Penalties for violating EU sanctions

Parliament adopted a political agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for violating EU sanctions, such as arms embargoes. The agreed text envisages criminalising the commission of certain crimes involving serious negligence and maintains fines proposed by the Council at 1 % or 5 % of companies’ total worldwide turnover (or €8 million or €40 million respectively), a choice left to Member States.

Freezing and confiscation of criminal money

Europol estimates the proceeds from organised crime in Europe at around €139 billion per year. Little of this money is confiscated. Members adopted a provisional agreement, reached after three rounds of trilogue negotiations with the Council, on a directive covering freezing and confiscation of criminal money. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) proposed a wider scope for the directive and to use confiscated property in the public interest.

Protecting our freedom of movement Cross-border associations

Parliament has long called for EU rules to help non-profit organisations to operate freely across borders. Members debated and voted at first reading on a JURI committee report, which although largely in favour of the Commission’s proposal, highlights the need for stricter definitions in regulating cross-border associations, and for such associations to be treated in the same way as other non-profits. LIBE Members propose that a minimum of three people should sit on their boards, and that such organisations should also pledge respect for European values, with funding blocked for those who breach them.

European Maritime Safety Agency

Members considered and voted at first reading on a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on a proposal to revise the framework of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), assigning it new roles on safety and sustainability and providing the means to carry out these revised objectives. The TRAN committee wants to see EMSA supervise European coast guard cooperation, support inspection training, monitor suspicious behaviour around pipelines and carry out other new functions.

Question time – EU governments’ preparedness to combat foreign interference, including from Russia

Věra Jourová (Vice-President of the Commission) answered Members’ questions on the EU preparedness to combat foreign interference, an increasing phenomenon, particularly in the light of Russia’s attempts to undermine support for Ukraine, as well as cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns in the run-up to the European elections.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, from the Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Budgets (BUDG) committees, on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, was approved without vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – March 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Claudia Vinci (1st edition).

In December 2023, the Commission presented a proposal on the protection of animals during transport, with a view to replacing and updating Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005.

This proposal, along with another on welfare and traceability of dogs and cats, is part of a legislative package to reform the current EU rules on animal welfare. The reform was announced in 2020 with the launch of the ‘farm to fork’ strategy, which aims to create a fairer, healthier and more environmentally friendly food system.

The proposed text introduces stricter rules regarding travel times, the minimum space between animals, transport conditions for vulnerable animals, transportation in extreme temperatures, safeguarding of animals transported to third countries, the utilisation of technological systems and the protection of cats and dogs in commercial transport.

In the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) and to the Committee of Transport and Tourism (TRAN), with Daniel Buda (EPP, Romania) and Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg (Greens/EFA, Germany) as co-rapporteurs.

Complete version

• March 2024: ‘Review of the rules on the protection of animals during transport‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of animals during transport and related operations, amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/97 and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005Committee responsible:Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI)
Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2023)770
7/12/2023Rapporteur:Daniel Buda (EPP, Romania)
Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg (Greens/EFA, Germany)2023/0448(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Benoît Lutgen (EPP, Belgium)
Marianne Vind (S&D, Denmark)
Elsi Katainen (Renew, Finland)
Rosanna Conte (ID, Italy)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Antonio Albaladejo, Laurence Amand-Eeckhout, Pieter Baert, Anna Caprile, Polona Car, Micaela Del Monte, Clément Evroux, Liselotte Jensen, Monika Kiss, Silvia Kotanidis, Tarja Laaninen, Katrien Luyten, Rafal Manko, Hendrik Mildebrath, Maria Niestadt, Marketa Pape, Marianna Pari, Jakub Przetacznik, Magdalena Sapala, Rosamund Shreeves and Jaan Soone.

As the only European Union (EU) institution elected directly, the European Parliament is at the heart of representative democracy, the foundation upon which the EU is built. As the current – 2019 to 2024 – term wraps up, this paper from EPRS looks at a selection of the many achievements of the Parliament over the past five years in seeking to improve the European Union for its citizens. This term has not lacked for challenges, with an unprecedented pandemic closely followed by war on the EU’s eastern border, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Union, with Parliament frequently in the lead, has developed strong responses to these extraordinary challenges.

Parliament’s power and influence have evolved significantly over the years, and it is now a fully fledged legislative body whose influence is felt in virtually all areas of EU activity. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law‑making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. In recent months, the European Parliament has engaged in a process of reform, seeking to enable it to use these various powers more effectively and efficiently.

Parliament has been influential in shaping a range of new laws this term, including the Digital Services Act and the IRIS2 Regulation. Agricultural policy has seen reform, and major environmental legislation has been adopted, in the shape of the European Climate Law and the ‘fit for 55’ package. Responding to the pandemic, Parliament has focused on health. In the context of promoting democratic values, meanwhile, Parliament was able to shape key aspects of the Media Freedom Act and the directive addressing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).

Since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Parliament has played a key role in the EU’s response, including: several rounds of macro-financial assistance, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, and the Ukraine Facility. In external relations, however, Parliament’s real power often lies more in the area of agenda-setting.

Another important set of European Parliament prerogatives concerns the scrutiny and control of the executive, in particular the European Commission. Prominent examples of scrutiny work over the last five years have been the committee of inquiry on the Pegasus spyware scandal, successive special committees on tax scandals, culminating in creation of the new subcommittee on tax matters (FISC), and the working group scrutinising the activities of Frontex, the Border and Coast Guard Agency.

Since Parliament gave its consent in 2020 to the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021 to 2027, the Union has had to respond to huge challenges, including the economic fall-out from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine. Parliament has pushed for reforms, and has focused on the implementation of the Next Generation EU recovery instrument.

In the constitutional field, Parliament has sought to use its powers to uphold the EU’s values, for instance triggering a preventive mechanism in respect of the serious breach of EU values with regard to Hungary. The 2020 Conference on the Future of Europe meanwhile offered citizens the opportunity to help Parliament fine-tune recommendations for Treaty change.

Lastly, the power to set the EU agenda is a thread that runs through all Parliament’s work as a forum for debate and engagement. Stand-out examples during this term include the Parliament’s work on the forthcoming artificial intelligence act, and in the area of a minimum wage and minimum income. Parliament’s constitutional powers include appointments of people to certain senior positions in other EU institutions. Even when its opinions are not legally binding they allow it to exercise political leverage. This point was proved with the appointment in 2019 of the first European Chief Prosecutor.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024 – Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

Written by Gisela Grieger.

The EU adheres to a one-China policy that recognises the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legitimate government of China. It does not therefore maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The EU nonetheless shares with Taiwan common interests and values, including democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The general elections held in Taiwan in January 2024 once again testified to the maturity of the island’s democracy. The EU engages Taiwan in a number of policy areas, notably on trade and investment. In its resolutions, the European Parliament has, among other things, called repeatedly for closer cooperation with Taiwan, notably for the negotiation of agreements on supply chain resilience and bilateral investment relations.

Outcome of the January 2024 general elections in Taiwan

On 13 January 2024, the Taiwanese elected a new president from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for a third consecutive term, with robust voter turnout of almost 72 %. The DPP presidential candidate, Lai Ching-te, who has pledged to continue his predecessor’s non-confrontational approach to mainland China and has argued that Taiwan already enjoys de facto independence, will take over from his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, in whose cabinet he has served as Vice-President. He will be sworn in on 20 May 2024. Lai secured 40 % of the votes, down from the 57 % that marked Tsai’s 2020 landslide re-election victory, in a three-way race against opposition candidates Hou Yu-ih from the Kuomintang (KMT) and Ko Wen-je from the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who garnered 33 % and 26 % of the votes respectively after their failed joint ticket.

Seat distribution changes in the Legislative Yuan (2016-2024)

In the 2024 legislative elections, for the first time since 2004 no party has obtained the absolute majority, as the DPP lost its previous absolute majority of 61 seats in the unicameral Legislative Yuan, which has 113 seats (Figure 1). With 51 seats, it is now only the second-largest party. By contrast, the KMT increased its seats from 38 to 52, becoming the largest party. The TPP now holds eight seats and KMT-leaning Independents two seats. It is also worth noting that all other small parties have lost their seats. For now, the resulting hung parliament has turned the TPP, who gained a mere three seats, into a kingmaker and vital coalition partner for the DPP or the KMT to avoid legislative gridlock and to help shape cross-strait relations and thereby US-China relations, around one of the world’s major geopolitical flash points. On 1 February 2024, when Taiwan’s new legislative term began, Han Kuo-yu from the KMT was elected president of the Legislative Yuan.

EU policy towards Taiwan and EU-Taiwan cooperation

The EU pursues a one-China policy, which means that it recognises the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China and does not have official ties with Taiwan. The 2021 EU Indo-Pacific strategy references Taiwan with respect to the impact of the growing geopolitical tensions in the Taiwan Strait for the EU’s security and prosperity, to existing cooperation on data protection and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and to new opportunities on trade and investment and semiconductors to tackle supply chain vulnerabilities. The EU is represented in Taiwan through its European Economic and Trade Office, which reports annually on bilateral activities. The EU holds annual human rights consultations with Taiwan. In 2021, the bilateral trade consultations were upgraded to a trade and investment dialogue that oversees bilateral sectoral working groups on investment, intellectual property rights, sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures, technical barriers to trade and pharmaceuticals/cosmetics. The dialogue provides a forum to discuss renewable energy, digital trade facilitation, research and innovation and other topics of common interest.

EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations EU-Taiwan trade in goods and services, in € billion

According to Eurostat data (Figure 2), bilateral trade in goods decreased from €84.3 billion in 2022 to €77.6 billion in 2023 amid contracting global trade. EU imports from Taiwan shrunk from €49.2 billion to €47.1 billion and EU exports to Taiwan from €35.1 billion to €30.5 billion. In 2023, the EU ran a trade in goods deficit with Taiwan of €16.6 billion, up from €14.1 billion in 2022. In 2022, major Taiwanese export items to the EU were integrated circuits and electronic components (23 %), transport equipment (10.7 %) and electronic data processing and office equipment (10.6 %). The main EU export items to Taiwan were non-electrical machinery (32.7 %), transport equipment (15.5 %) and chemicals (15.4 %). According to Eurostat service trade data as of February 2024, in 2022 the EU and Taiwan traded services worth €18 billion, up from €13.9 billion in 2021.

EU-Taiwan FDI, stocks, outward and inward, in € billion

In 2022, EU foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks in Taiwan stood at €28.4 billion after steady growth from €6.8 billion back in 2013 (Figure 3). Taiwan’s FDI stocks in the EU remained at a low level between 2013 and 2019, ranging from €0.9 billion to €2.4 billion, but leapt in 2020 to €12 billion and again in 2022 to €20.7 billion. Recent examples of Taiwanese investment projects in the EU include a €3.5 billion investment in a semiconductor foundry in Dresden (Germany) by the world’s largest contract chipmaker, TSMC, and the investment of more than €5 billion in a battery plant in Dunkirk (France) by Prologium, the world’s only successful commercial manufacturer of solid-state electric vehicle batteries.

Since 2002, Taiwan has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with the status of a customs territory. It has never been the respondent in a WTO case, but has lodged a total of seven complaints against other WTO members, including one (DS377) against the EU in 2008 concerning the EU’s tariff treatment of certain information technology products under its commitments made under the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA). The most recent WTO trade policy review report on Taiwan was drawn up in 2023. Unlike the PRC, Taiwan is a party to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.

Although the EU has never launched a WTO complaint against Taiwan, the European Commission nonetheless lists a total of six trade barriers for Taiwan in its database, including local content requirements in public procurement for transport, localisation requirements for wind energy and several SPS measures pertaining to various animal diseases, including the non-recognition of the regionalisation principle.

In its resolution of 28 February 2024, the European Parliament ‘reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region’. It ‘strongly condemns China’s continued military provocations against Taiwan and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which endangers regional stability’. It ‘calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, cannot be accepted and will have high costs’. It ‘highlights that China’s territorial claims have no basis in international law’. It ‘notes that neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other’. It ‘expresses grave concern over China’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance’. It ‘denounces China’s blocking of Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations’. Finally, it ‘welcomes the visits to Taiwan, since 2021, by consecutive official delegations from Parliament committees’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-Taiwan ties after Taiwan’s 2024 elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Parliament to vote against EU political and economic agreements with Chile and Kenya, with many people writing to the President of the European Parliament on this subject in March 2024. These citizens are concerned that the agreements would be detrimental to local populations and environmental protection. They demand that Parliament review the EU’s trade policy.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French):

English

On 29 February 2024, the European Parliament approved EU agreements with Kenya and Chile.

On Parliament’s website, you can find the results of the votes. To display them, click on the + to the left of the headings (points 1, 4 and 5). The votes are sorted into three groups: in favour (+), against (-) and abstentions (0), and are listed by political group. At the top of the page, you can filter the results by political group, country or Member of the European Parliament (MEP).

The European Commission negotiates EU international agreements on the instructions of the Council of the EU (the governments of member countries). At the end of the negotiations, the Council adopts the agreement. Parliament’s role is then limited to approving or rejecting the agreement. It has no power to amend it.

The President of the European Parliament cannot influence Members’ votes. In accordance with Article 2 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, Members exercise their mandate freely and independently.

You may also be interested in some additional information about the two agreements.

Agreements with Chile

In December 2023, the EU and Chile signed agreements to modernise and replace the 2002 Association Agreement that currently governs their relations.

The agreements establish a framework for deeper and broader political and economic cooperation with Chile, for example on foreign affairs and security, climate change, sustainable energy and human rights.

Under the agreements, over 95 % of trade between the EU and Chile will be duty-free. However, trade restrictions will remain in place for the most sensitive agricultural products, notably meat, certain fruit and vegetables, and olive oil. More information is available in this press release.

The European Parliament voted on two separate agreements with Chile: an Interim Trade Agreement, which is ratified at EU-level only, and a broader agreement (Advanced Framework Agreement), which must also be ratified by every EU country. The Interim Trade Agreement will expire when the Advanced Framework Agreement enters into force.

Parliament also adopted a resolution explaining its position on these agreements.

Agreement with Kenya

In December 2023, the EU and Kenya signed an Economic Partnership Agreement, with the aim of boosting bilateral trade, increasing investment, contributing to sustainable economic growth and working towards a green transition away from fossil fuel use. The agreement focuses on climate and environmental protection, workers’ rights and gender equality.

This agreement will further open the European market to Kenyan products and encourage European investment in Kenya. It aims to strengthen the EU’s relations with Africa.

French

Le 29 février dernier, le Parlement européen a approuvé les accords UE-Kenya et UE-Chili.

Sur le site du Parlement, vous pouvez trouver les résultats des votes, en cliquant sur le + à gauche des titres (points 1, 4 et 5). Les voix sont classées en trois catégories : pour (+), contre (-) et abstention (0), et sont listés par groupe politique. En haut de la page, vous avez la possibilité de filtrer les résultats par groupe politique, par pays ou par député.

Les accords internationaux sont négociés par la Commission européenne sur instruction du Conseil de l’UE (gouvernements des pays membres). À l’issue des négociations, le Conseil adopte l’accord. Le rôle du Parlement se limite alors à approuver ou rejeter l’accord. Il n’a pas le pouvoir de le modifier.

Nous tenons à préciser que la Présidente du Parlement européen ne peut pas influencer le vote des députés européens. Conformément à l’article 2 du règlement intérieur du Parlement, les députés européens exercent leur mandat de façon libre et indépendante.

Par ailleurs, quelques informations supplémentaires par rapport aux deux accords pourraient vous intéresser.

Accords avec le Chili

En décembre 2023, l’UE et le Chili ont signé des accords en vue de moderniser et de remplacer l’accord d’association de 2002 qui régit actuellement leurs relations.

Les accords établissent le cadre d’une coopération politique et économique plus approfondie et plus étendue avec le Chili, par exemple dans les domaines des affaires étrangères et de la sécurité, du changement climatique, de l’énergie durable et des droits humains.

Plus de 95 % des échanges commerciaux entre l’UE et le Chili seront exemptées de droits de douane. Cependant, des restrictions commerciales demeureront en place pour les produits agricoles les plus sensibles, notamment la viande, certains fruits et légumes, et l’huile d’olive. Plus d’information est disponible dans ce communiqué de presse.

Le Parlement européen a voté sur deux accords distincts avec le Chili : un accord commercial intérimaire, qui doit être ratifié uniquement au niveau de l’UE, et un accord plus large (accord-cadre avancé), qui doit être également ratifié par chacun des pays de l’UE. L’accord commercial intérimaire expirera lorsque l’accord-cadre avancé entrera en vigueur.

Par ailleurs, le Parlement a adopté une résolution expliquant sa position sur les accords.

Accord avec le Kenya

En décembre 2023, l’UE et le Kenya ont signé un accord de partenariat économique, avec pour objectifs de stimuler le commerce bilatéral, augmenter les investissements, contribuer à une croissance économique durable, et œuvrer à la transition écologique. L’accord met l’accent sur la protection du climat et de l’environnement, les droits des travailleurs et l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.

Cet accord ouvrira davantage le marché européen aux produits kényans et encouragera les investissements européens au Kenya. Il vise à renforcer les relations de l’UE avec l’Afrique.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Parliament is set to mark International Women’s Day in Strasbourg this year, with a debate on the Council decision inviting EU countries to ratify the 2019 International Labour Organization’s Violence and Harassment Convention on Tuesday. A European Commission statement is expected on its communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews due for adoption that same day. There will also be a Question Time session at which the Commission is called to answer Members’ questions regarding EU governments’ action to combat foreign interference, including from Russia. On Tuesday morning, Members are set to hear Council and Commission statements on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 21 and 22 March 2024. The following day, Members are due to hold a ‘This is Europe’ debate – the last of this term – with the Prime Minister of Finland, Petteri Orpo.

In a debate expected on Tuesday afternoon, Members are set to consider a provisional agreement on changes to the EU’s financial rules. The new rules are needed to align with changes introduced by the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), aimed at ensuring more transparent, digital and value-based EU funding. Members will then debate Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget, which the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report insists should be people-centred, prioritising investment to improve people’s lives and EU competitiveness. The guidelines adopted will set out Parliament’s position ahead of the Commission’s adoption of the draft 2025 budget.

Protecting our environment

Most people today want to contribute to a more sustainable way of life, but the European Commission finds that unscrupulous firms take advantage of consumers. Fully 53 % of the environmental claims the Commission looked at in the EU were vague, misleading or unfounded, and 40 % were unsubstantiated. To counter this fraud, on Monday evening Parliament is due to debate a report on a proposal to regulate ‘green claims‘. The report from the Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) sets a timescale for verification of environmental claims and labelling schemes, which must be tailored to the complexity of the claim and company size. The committees consider the verification system should be simpler.

Despite our efforts, we still waste nearly 60 million tonnes of food a year in the EU – more than half of it at home. On Wednesday, Members are expected to vote on a proposal to accelerate the fight against food waste and push textile producers to act to reduce clothing waste, by amending the Waste Framework Directive. The ENVI committee report on the proposal would raise binding reduction targets to 20 % by 2030, in food processing and manufacturing, and to 40 % per capita in retail, catering, food services and households.

The Industrial Emissions Directive sets rules on industrial pollution in the EU, including from industrial farming. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a provisional political agreement to update the rules. The ENVI committee succeeded in substantially amending the proposal, to include mining and battery production, placing ‘best available technique’ principles at the heart of granting permits, and setting binding environmental performance limit values for water. However, to lighten the administrative burden, governments must put e-permitting in place by 2035. ENVI Members also successfully introduced a 2026 deadline to reassess the need to address cattle farm emissions (currently excluded), and those from imported agricultural products.

Protecting EU businesses and consumers

The EU Toy Directive helps to ensure toys sold in the EU are safe for our children. However, to improve this protection and reduce the number of unsafe toys still sold in the EU, the legislation is now up for revision. Members are set to consider an IMCO committee report on Wednesday afternoon, which seeks to make digital product passports available for 10 years, for example, and link them to the Safety Gate Portal – allowing us all to report risks. The committee also proposes that the Commission provide small businesses with assistance to comply with the stricter toy safety rules.

A central EU customs authority could offer traders lower compliance costs and ensure a more efficient, fraud-proof customs union. In a vote scheduled for Wednesday evening, Members are due to vote at first reading on proposals to establish an EU customs data hub and an EU customs authority. While the IMCO report on the file is generally supportive of the proposal, it would like to see a faster process and a platform allowing people to report non-compliant goods.

A vote on a political agreement, reached in trilogue negotiations with the Council on an EU design package, is scheduled for Thursday morning. The two files seek stronger protection for product design against counterfeiting in the EU. Endorsed by the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), the agreement should future-proof design protection, protect registered designs for five years, renewable to a maximum 25 years (for a fee), liberalise the spare parts market, and give EU governments three years to transpose the EU rules into national law.

In crises like the recent pandemic, it is particularly useful to help companies obtain licences to produce products subject to patents – for new technologies, for example. Members are set to vote on Wednesday at first reading on a proposal clarifying rules for the compulsory licensing of patents. A JURI committee report proposes a number of changes. Voluntary agreements should have greater priority than compulsory licensing, and licensees, not the rights-holder, should be responsible for any liability linked to the product. The Commission should have to identify all rights-holders, who would be paid for compulsory licences used within a set timeframe. When necessary, the JURI Members consider the Commission should compel rights-holders to disclose (against remuneration) trade secrets and know-how.

Protecting our democracy and the rule of law

In a year of elections, ensuring journalists and media services are free from political and economic interference is particularly urgent. On Tuesday, Members are set to debate a provisional agreement on a regulation setting the first-ever EU rules on media freedom, pluralism and protecting journalists – the European media freedom act. Under the new rules, governments must respect editorial freedom and exempt journalists from identifying their sources. Media companies will have to make their ownership structures public and EU countries will investigate cases where media outlets become too concentrated. To protect journalists from government spying, Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) succeeded in eliminating ‘protecting national security’ as grounds for surveillance and ensured that all public authorities have to publish information about their annual advertising expenditure, including online.

Europol estimates the proceeds from organised crime in Europe at around €139 billion per year. Little of this money is confiscated. On Wednesday, Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement, reached after three rounds of trilogue negotiations with the Council, on a directive covering freezing and confiscation of criminal money. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) proposed a wider scope for the directive and using confiscated property in the public interest. LIBE Members proposed Member States help freeze property to facilitate confiscation and that profiting from circumventing EU sanctions be treated as criminal gains. EU countries should also strengthen their asset recovery offices, including to deal with cross-border cases.

Parliament is set to vote on Tuesday on a political agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for violating EU sanctions, such as arms embargoes. The agreement, endorsed by the LIBE committee, envisages criminalising the commission of certain crimes involving serious negligence and maintains fines proposed by the Council at 1 % or 5 % of companies’ total worldwide turnover (or €8 million or €40 million respectively), a choice left to Member States.

Protecting our cross-border freedom

Parliament has long called for EU rules to facilitate non-profit organisations to operate freely across borders. Although largely in favour of the Commission’s proposal, a JURI committee report, set for debate on Tuesday afternoon, highlights the need for stricter definitions in regulating cross-border associations. Such associations should be treated in the same way as other non-profits. LIBE Members propose a minimum of three people should sit on their boards. Such organisations should also pledge respect for European values, with funding blocked for those who breach them.

Finally, on Monday evening, Members are set to consider a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on a proposal to revise the framework of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), assigning new roles on safety and sustainability and providing the means to carry out these revised objectives. The TRAN committee wants to see EMSA supervise European coast guard cooperation, support inspection training, monitor suspicious behaviour around pipelines and carry out other new functions. The committee demands that EMSA involve Parliament in appointing its executive director and that a Parliament representative sit on the management board.

• European Parliament Plenary Session March 2024
• International Women’s Day: Women in politics in the 2024 election year
• Question time: EU national action to combat foreign interference, including from Russia
• EU’s financial rules (recast)
• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2025 EU budget: Section III – European Commission
• ‘Green claims’ directive
• Toy safety
• Revised EU rules on industrial pollution
• European media freedom act
• Revised rules on the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
• Compulsory licensing of patents
• Freezing and confiscation of criminal money
• Harmonisation of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of EU sanctions

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

The European automotive industry is striving to adapt to market changes driven by the dual green and digital transition. Electrification has become the main strategy for reducing CO2 emissions, especially in urban traffic. At the same time, the average size and weight of cars have greatly increased. Big electric cars are the trend, but are they really the solution? Could better planning and optimisation of resources help?

According to Eurostat, average passenger car occupancy for urban mobility is usually less than 1.3 persons. Therefore, it is very common in cities for heavy cars to carry a single person. To transport the weight of that one person (80 kilogrammes for instance) means moving a full 1 800 kg. This could even reach 2 500 kg for big electric or hybrid cars with heavy long-range batteries. No matter the source of power used, this can never lead to efficient and sustainable mobility. Weight rates are usually over 10 times more favourable for the average motorbike or scooter and, of course, even better for lighter vehicles such as electric bicycles or kick-scooters.

Reducing CO2 emissions in transport is a key goal of the European Green Deal. However, specifications for choosing a city car are often based on the rare long trips that would best be made with a rented vehicle. Meanwhile, traditional emissions tests using gas analysers focus on the percentage concentration of pollutants and overlook references to the total quantity. The low speed limits generally established in Europe today also help to reduce emissions. However, efforts to reduce emissions may be counteracted by a trend towards bigger sports utility vehicles (SUVs), which are less agile and efficient but more comfortable and useful for longer drives.

Some people find themselves spending long periods every day in traffic, so they see their cars as a prolongation of their living rooms, with comfortable seats, plenty of space and ‘infotainment’, including big screens. Large vehicles also account for longer traffic jams. When anti-lock braking systems (ABS) were first introduced in premium cars, accidents increased initially for that sector owing to driver over-confidence. The same effect is again being seen with modern driving assist systems. Since large vehicles are especially safe for their occupants at low speeds, this has a pernicious effect on driver attention, consequently increasing casualty figures for other road users. Every year there are fewer victims of car accidents – but not among pedestrians, cyclists and other light vehicle users. This translates into further restrictions on the use of light vehicles, then considered unsafe, to the point of banning e-scooters and restricting the use of motorbikes – while cars are allowed in crowded areas. An alternative way to interpret these casualty figures would be to consider large heavy cars a menace to other users of public thoroughfares.

The EU automotive sector has traditionally excelled at producing vehicles with internal combustion engines (ICEs). The sector accounts for around 8 % of the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) and for 12.9 million direct and indirect jobs. However, the green transition, digitalisation and global competition have fundamentally altered its business model. Electrification has become the main strategy for decarbonising the sector, mostly through the extensive use of critical raw materials such as lithium-ion batteries, which have to be quite large to propel big cars with extended ranges.

Potential impacts and developments

Japan has been restricting car size in crowded areas since 1949, with the popular ‘Kei’ cars representing 40 % of the Japanese car market today. This Japanese regulation began with strict limits that have since evolved to set engine capacity at a maximum of 660 cc, vehicle length at 3.4 metres and total weight at 700 kg. Car ownership in Tokyo is restricted to corresponding parking spaces, following the idea that public thoroughfares are for public use, not for people to use for their exclusive benefit.

The high level of European industry specialisation in producing high quality ICEs accounts for its leading position in the market. However, electric vehicles do not require the same level of know-how, opening the door to other players. China became the top global car exporter in 2023, exporting mostly to Europe and Asia. China also dominates production of almost every raw material, technology and component used to make electric vehicles. Batteries require very polluting production and recycling methods, and they need to be charged.

Given the current electricity mix and the optimistic figures available, the equivalent emissions of a large electric car in Europe are of about 4 litres/100 km – not significantly lower than the emissions from a small ICE car (or Kei car). This figure is an average that results from considering: a total equivalent rising from 84 grammes CO2/km for some (partisan) sources to 125 g CO2/km considering the charging process alone for others; and that petrol produces 2.3 kg of CO2 per litre burned (i.e. divided by 23 to convert gCO2/km to l/100 km). In terms of the efficiency in transporting one person, a simple moped could do far better, not to mention public transport. Battery production process emissions are usually underestimated, considering that China produced the highest CO₂ emissions in 2022, accounting for nearly 31 % of the global total.

Anticipatory policymaking

On 4 October 2023, the European Commission initiated anti-subsidy investigations into EU imports of battery electric vehicles from China and is already considering provisional countervailing tariffs for five years. Although replacing one means of propulsion with another is clearly not enough, modest size electric cars are undoubtedly part of the solution. Even so, most European companies still lag behind in electric vehicle innovation. A smooth transition to alternative propulsion methods should be based on securing access to affordable batteries and semiconductors, improving innovation capacities in new technologies, reducing costs, and adopting a more circular approach – particularly on critical raw materials.

No European compact car qualifies as a ‘Kei’ car. As a result, 40 % of the Japanese car market is closed to competition from European manufacturers, and this share is increasing. The European Union regulation classifying vehicle categories already accounts for light four-wheelers or microcars (L7) and could be extended to include considerations regarding preferential access to urban areas. The various EU emission limits, such as the new Euro 7 regulation, propose values in g/km (not just concentrations) and revise measuring standards. The EU adopted an amendment to the EU light-duty vehicles (LDV) CO2 standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in April 2023, in line with the EU’s increased climate ambition. In July 2023, the European Commission tabled a package of three proposals for the greening of freight transport. These include CountEmissionsEU, a proposal for a single methodology to calculate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, this only refers to transport services. The European Commission also added a proposal for a regulation addressing the whole life cycle of vehicles, from design to end-of-life. With a view to ending the trend towards ever bigger and heavier vehicles, the European Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism is considering a proposal to overhaul the EU’s 2006 agreement standardising driving licence rules between Member States.

Promoting electric cars may lead to market distortions that run counter to European industrial interests. While complementary measures such as those contemplated in the critical raw materials act take effect, and besides the obvious move towards public transport, one way to allow the EU car industry to adapt while still reducing CO2 emissions could be to limit the size, weight and engine capacity of urban vehicles. An improved vehicle-to-passenger weight rate could hugely increase energy efficiency in urban transport.

Since light vehicles are especially suited to electrification – as increased use of bicycles and scooters can attest – and other alternative propulsion methods, it may become appropriate to let the market and European industry adapt at its own pace, with some institutional encouragement and support, to such new conditions of improved mobility efficiency.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if the problem with cars was not their method of propulsion?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if the problem with cars was not their method of propulsion?‘ on YouTube.

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Written by Stefano De Luca.

The European Union needs high-performing digital connectivity infrastructure to give all citizens the best access to digital services and to maintain prosperity. In the relentless pursuit of innovation and connectivity, the development of mobile communications technologies has been a defining force in shaping the way we communicate, work, and live.

As the 2030s approach, the groundwork for the next frontier in mobile communications is being laid – the era of 6G. Building upon the successes and advances of previous mobile generations, 6G promises to revolutionise the connectivity landscape. From ultra-high data rates and low-latency communication to the integration of artificial intelligence, 6G is poised to reshape the way we interact with the digital world.

However, with the promise of unprecedented capabilities comes a host of challenges. Critical aspects that demand attention in the development of 6G networks are privacy and cybersecurity. As 6G aims to push the boundaries of connectivity, enabling innovations such as holographic communication, seamless extended reality, and the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) on a massive scale, the potential risks to privacy and cybersecurity are magnified (e.g. mass data collection). Another critical aspect is its environmental footprint. While 6G aims for energy efficiency, the increasing demand for data and connectivity may still pose challenges related to energy consumption. Balancing technological progress with environmental considerations remains a key objective for the development of 6G.

Countries and companies that lead in 6G development and deployment are expected to gain a competitive edge in terms of technological innovation, economic growth, and influence in shaping global standards. The global race to 6G has already begun.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The path to 6G‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘The path to 6G‘ on YouTube.

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Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Jacques Delors, a passionate advocate of European integration, is widely considered to be the father of the European single market and the economic and monetary union. Previously a trade union activist, French Finance Minister, and MEP in the first directly elected European Parliament, he served three terms as the President of the European Commission, from 1985 to 1995. Jacques Delors died on 27 December 2023, aged 98.

Following his death, he leaves behind a huge legacy, with numerous commentators underlining his role as one of the architects of today’s EU. It was during his term in office that the Member States signed the Single European Act in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which paved the way for the transformation of the European Economic Community, and other pre-EU organisations, into the European Union.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Jacques Delors’ life and legacy.

A tale of two treatises: the Werner and Delors Reports and the birth of the euro
Bruegel, February 2024

Date with history: The birth of the European Union
Chatham House, February 2024

Ten reflections on Jacques Delors
Centre for European Reform, January 2024

Delors, Schäuble and Europe’s misdiagnosed competitiveness problem
Centre for European Reform, January 2024

Jacques Delors’ contributions were immense
European Centre for International Political Economy, January 2024

European Movement International’s obituary in commemoration of Jacques Delors
European Movement International, January 2024

Jacques Delors: European giant
European Policy Centre, January 2024

In memoriam: Jacques Delors
European University Institute, January 2024

Jacques Delors and a new European impulse
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, January 2024

The passing of Jacques Delors, architect of the euro: How will his legacy play out?
Institute for Research in Economic and Fiscal Issues, January 2024

“Come on, courage, the spring of Europe is still ahead of us!”
Jacques Delors Institute, January 2024

Jacques Delors (1925-2023) et l’Europe: Pensée, méthode, style
Le Grand Continent, January 2024

Disparition de Jacques Delors: Hommage à l’homme qui transforma l’Europe
Science Po, January 2024

Biographie: Jacques Delors
Toute l’Europe, January 2024

The Delors legacy: Lessons for the future
Trans-European Policy Studies Association, January 2024

Jacques Delors: A man ahead of his time
Wilson Center, January 2024

Europe according to Jacques Delors
Europe Jacques Delors, December 2023

Jacques Delors: Un message politique européen
Fondation Jean Jaurès, December 2023

In memory of president Jacques Delors
Fondation Jean Monnet pour Europe, December 2023

Delors: A great European
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, December 2023

Jacques Delors shaped the Europe we know today
Hertie School, December 2023

An architect of a united Europe
Jacques Delors Institute, December 2023

Personalism and European Integration: Jacques Delors and the legacy of the 1930s
Cambridge University Press, March 2023

L’héritage de Robert Schuman dans la vision et l’action de Jacques Delors
Institut Jacques Delors, 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Jacques Delors’ legacy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Union to set a strict EU 2040 climate target to keep the global temperature rise below 1.5°C. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since February 2024. They are asking the President to set the level of net emission reductions at 95 % compared to 1990 levels, in line with the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change (ESABCC) recommendation. Citizens want assurance that all EU countries will submit new individual 2035 climate targets ahead of the UN Climate Change Conference in 2025. They are also calling on the EU to phase out the use of all fossil fuels by 2040 and to limit the EU’s reliance on carbon capture technology.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in English and in French):

English European Parliament position

Parliament has long called for ambitious EU climate legislation, declaring a climate emergency prior to the United Nations Climate Change Conference COP25 in 2019.

In November 2023, ahead of the 2023 COP28 Conference, Parliament adopted a resolution outlining its position and giving a clear mandate to the Parliament delegation attending the summit.

Parliament welcomes the work of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change and its advice on determining an EU-wide 2040 climate target, and a greenhouse gas budget for 2030-2050. The resolution stresses that according to the Advisory Board, ‘the EU should take additional measures into account given that it has already exhausted its fair share of the global greenhouse gas budget in line with limiting global warming to 1.5°C’.

The resolution calls for an end to all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies, at national and EU level, as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest. The European Parliament also supports a global target to triple renewable energy and double energy efficiency by 2030, together with a swift and tangible phasing out of fossil fuels, and to halt all new investment in fossil fuel extraction.

European Commission plans for 2040 targets

The European Climate Law established an initial target to reduce EU net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030. It also required the Commission to propose an intermediate EU 2040 climate target.

On 6 February 2024, the Commission published a plan outlining Europe’s 2040 climate target. You can read more about the Commission’s plan in the press release.

After European Commissioner for Climate Action Wopke Hoekstra presented the plan, Members of the European Parliament shared their views on this topic.

The European Commission based the plan on an Impact Assessment and European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change advice. The main elements include:

• By 2040, the EU should reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions by 90 % compared to 1990 levels.
• The Commission expects fossil fuel consumption for energy will fall by approximately 80 % between 2021 and 2040 and that coal will be phased out.
• In line with the international commitment to transition away from fossil fuels, the Commission recommends that policies ensure any remaining fossil fuel combustion will be coupled as soon as possible with carbon capture and storage.

Next steps

This plan is the very first step in the process of the EU 2040 climate target becoming law. After the European elections have taken place in June 2024, the current Commission has indicated that it will be the responsibility of the next Commission to put forward a legislative proposal.

Parliament will then consider this proposal and adopt a position on it.

Once both the Parliament and the Council (representing EU governments) have adopted their positions, the two institutions will have to agree a common text in negotiations, which will then become part of a revised European Climate Law.

French Position du Parlement européen

Le Parlement a longtemps appelé à une législation ambitieuse de l’UE sur le climat, déclarant l’urgence climatique avant la conférence des Nations Unies sur le changement climatique COP25 en 2019.

En novembre 2023, avant la conférence COP28 de 2023, le Parlement a adopté une résolution exposant sa position et donnant un mandat clair à la délégation du Parlement participant au sommet.

Le Parlement salue les travaux du Conseil scientifique consultatif européen sur le changement climatique et de ses conseils sur la détermination d’un objectif climatique à l’échelle de l’Union pour 2040 et d’un budget relatif aux gaz à effet de serre pour 2030-2050. La résolution souligne que, selon le conseil consultatif, l’UE « devrait prendre des mesures supplémentaires pour tenir compte du fait qu’elle a déjà épuisé sa part équitable du budget mondial des gaz à effet de serre, conformément à l’objectif de limitation du réchauffement climatique à 1,5 °C ».

La résolution appelle à mettre fin à toutes les subventions directes et indirectes aux combustibles fossiles, au niveau national et de l’UE, dès que possible et d’ici 2025 au plus tard. Le Parlement européen soutient également un objectif mondial consistant à tripler les énergies renouvelables et à doubler l’efficacité énergétique d’ici 2030, ainsi qu’une suppression rapide et tangible des combustibles fossiles, et à mettre un terme à tous les nouveaux investissements dans l’extraction des combustibles fossiles.

Intentions de la Commission européenne pour les objectifs de 2040

La loi européenne sur le climat a fixé un objectif initial visant à réduire les émissions nettes de gaz à effet de serre d’au moins 55 % d’ici 2030. Elle oblige également la Commission de proposer un objectif climatique intermédiaire de l’UE à l’horizon 2040.

Le 6 février 2024, la Commission a publié un plan décrivant l’objectif climatique de l’Europe pour 2040. Vous pouvez en savoir plus sur le plan de la Commission dans le communiqué de presse.

Après que le commissaire européen chargé de l’action pour le climat, Wopke Hoekstra, a présenté le plan, les députés au Parlement européen ont partagé leur point de vue sur ce sujet.

La Commission européenne a fondé le plan sur une analyse d’impact et l’avis du Conseil scientifique consultatif européen sur le changement climatique. Les principaux éléments comprennent:

• D’ici à 2040, l’UE devrait réduire ses émissions nettes de gaz à effet de serre de 90 % par rapport au niveau de 1990.
• La Commission s’attend à ce que la consommation énergétique de combustibles fossiles diminue d’environ 80 % entre 2021 et 2040 et que le charbon soit progressivement éliminé.
• Conformément à l’engagement international en faveur de la transition vers l’abandon des combustibles fossiles, la Commission recommande que les politiques garantissent que toute combustion restante de combustibles fossiles soit couplée dès que possible au captage et au stockage du carbone.

Prochaines étapes

Ce plan constitue la toute première étape du processus d’adoption d’une loi fixant l’objectif climatique de l’UE à l’horizon 2040. Après les élections européennes de juin 2024, la Commission actuelle a indiqué qu’il incomberait à la prochaine Commission de présenter une proposition législative.

Le Parlement examinera ensuite cette proposition et adoptera une position à ce sujet.

Une fois que le Parlement et le Conseil (représentant les gouvernements de l’UE) auront adopté leurs positions, les deux institutions devront s’accorder sur un texte commun, qui fera alors partie d’une loi européenne révisée sur le climat.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

The pricing of goods and services that are traded within a multinational group is referred to as ‘transfer pricing’. The prices charged on such transactions affect the division of income between the different entities of the multinational group (and consequently, the taxable profits per country). To ensure that transactions between group entities are priced in a way that reflects their fair market value – i.e. as if the transactions were made between independent entities – countries have put in place strict transfer pricing rules. While these rules are made at national level, EU Member States generally stay close to (non-binding) OECD Guidelines. However, the number of transfer pricing tax disputes has risen over the years, with both tax authorities and companies spending significant time and resources on solving such cases.

On 12 September 2023, the European Commission tabled a proposal on harmonising transfer pricing rules within the EU. The main objective is to establish a common approach at EU level towards transfer pricing and define a number of key transfer pricing principles in order to enshrine them into EU law.

Complete version

• March 2024: ‘Harmonising transfer pricing rules within the EU‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council directive on transfer pricingCommittee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2023)532
12.9.2023Rapporteur:Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Greens/EFA, Denmark)2023/0322 (CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou (EPP, Greece)
René Repasi (S&D, Germany)
Gilles Boyer (Renew, France)
Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska (ECR, Poland)
José Gusmão (The Left, Portugal)Consultation
procedure (CNS) –
Parliament adopts
a non-binding
opinionNext steps expected: Vote in plenary on ECON committee report

© JeanLuc Ichard / Adobe Stock

Written by Anita Orav with Nefeli Barlaoura.

The fiction of ‘non-entry’ is a claim that states use in border management to deny the legal arrival of third-country nationals on their territory, regardless of their physical presence, until granted entry by a border or immigration officer. It is usually applied in transit zones at international airports between arrival gates and passport control, signifying that the persons who have arrived have not yet entered the territory of the destination country. Although physically present, they are not considered to have legally entered the state’s official territory until they have undergone the necessary clearance.

In the EU, all Member States make use of the fiction of non-entry in transit zones at ports of entry, but usually in a non-asylum context. In 2018, Germany was one of the first countries to extend this concept to include land crossings. Since the mass arrival of asylum-seekers in 2015-2016, other EU Member States have also increasingly looked into ways of using this claim to inhibit asylum-seekers’ entry to their territory and thereby avoid the obligation under international law to provide asylum-seekers with certain protection and aid. This, however, may lead to a risk of refoulement, as the fiction of non-entry limits asylum-seekers’ mobility and access to rights and procedures, including the asylum procedure.

The Screening Regulation is a legislative measure proposed as part of the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which aims to establish a pre-entry screening procedure applicable to third-country nationals before they are authorised to enter the territory. The use of the fiction of non-entry in EU legislation raises several concerns, such as the responsibility of the Member States, the asylum-seekers’ restricted access to rights, the use of detention, and possible violations of human rights.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Legal fiction of non-entry in EU asylum policy: Implications of the new Screening Regulation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Defence planning (including capability development planning) is the process of establishing the military forces and equipment that a state or alliance determines are required to meet its objectives or to counteract threats. There are three major capability development processes within the European Union: each Member State’s national planning; the NATO defence planning process, where applicable; and the EU’s planning, which has evolved gradually since the 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting and now consists of numerous components.

EU capability development planning

Rather than having one tool that determines its defence planning, the EU has set up several different processes. The EU’s capability process is neither cyclical nor linear, and is difficult to comprehend because it lacks a name and no formal document fully explains it. Furthermore, it involves a multitude of actors (see Annex I). These processes have evolved gradually since 1999.

The Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), which was established in 2003, is specifically mentioned in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and is solely under the control of the military structures, but has fallen ‘into obscurity‘. EU Military Staff, the source of military expertise in the European External Action Service (EEAS), identify the military requirements necessary to meet the EU level of ambition and highlight shortfalls.

To address long-term security and defence challenges, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has been creating Capability Development Plans (CDPs) since 2008, which draw on the CDM process. It examines potential security scenarios for the future and offers suggestions for the capabilities that European armies should have in order to respond to a range of possible events. Defence planners from Member States can use it to determine opportunities for cooperation and priorities. The latest CDP review, of 2023, contains 14 priorities across five military domains (land, air, maritime, space, cyber), and eight priorities categorised under strategic enablers and force multipliers. The EU introduced Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017, which is an additional tool for enhancing defence capabilities through collaboration. The Member States have since launched 68 projects, in areas such as maritime, cyber, space and air. They have made 20 legally binding commitments coordinating defence-planning initiatives. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) provides an overview of the EU defence landscape and promotes collaboration by pointing out collaborative opportunities. Launched in 2017, CARD is a key instrument in advancing EU capability development. It is designed to enhance coherence and act as a guide for defence collaboration. The second CARD cycle was completed in 2022. It concludes that increased EU defence budgets in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine pose both a challenge and an opportunity for European defence. The announced additional funding may even close long-standing capability gaps.

The 2022 Strategic Compass called for adaptation of the EU’s defence capability planning and development and annual defence ministerial meetings on EU defence initiatives, addressing capability development, the first of which was held in November 2022, within the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence). It also calls for a reduction in critical gaps by 2025 on strategic enablers such as strategic airlift, space communication assets and cyber-defence capabilities, and emphasises next generation capabilities – for example, a main battle tank. An important element added by the Defence Investment Gap Analysis is the Commission’s suggestion to move progressively towards a joint EU defence programming and procurement function to enable Member States to better define capability priorities with the greatest urgency.

One of the major efforts undertaken by the Commission in the area of capability development has been the European Defence Fund, launched in 2017 with a budget of €8 billion for 2021-2027 (which is set to be increased to €9.5 billion) to incentivise joint defence research, innovation and capability development. A more recent addition, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has been the Commission’s efforts to incentivise joint procurement. The 2023 European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) seeks to address the EU’s most urgent and critical defence capability gaps and incentivise Member States to procure defence products jointly, with a budget of €300 million. It will serve as the basis for a more long-term European defence investment programme (EDIP), a proposal for which is expected on 5 March 2024 as part of a broader European defence industrial strategy (EDIS). Furthermore, to incentivise the ramping-up of production of missiles and ammunition, the EU has established a €500 million fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production.

EU defence planning has been notoriously difficult. According to experts, ‘defence planning remains stuck at the national, rather than at the European or even Atlantic level’. The reason for this is broadly the lack of political will to change it. EU defence planning is even more crucial because, in the absence of coordinated action to acquire strategic enablers – which is prohibitively expensive for smaller Member States – Member States will continue to rely on US assistance, whose future is far from certain, for the foreseeable future.

EU-NATO capability development cooperation
From the inception of the EU’s Capability Development Mechanism, coherence between EU and NATO capability processes has been a priority. As such, as early as 2003 a NATO-EU capability group was set up to ‘ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement’ of both organisations’ efforts to close capability gaps, but progress was hampered by political blockages. Defence capabilities is one of the strategic areas of cooperation between NATO and the EU and its importance is stressed in all three EU-NATO declarations. The third EU-NATO declaration (January 2023) speaks of ‘tangible results’ in the field of defence capabilities; this is where the ‘single set of forces principle’ is important – the notion that capabilities are owned by the Member States and can be used for NATO, the EU and other purposes rather than being limited to use in one organisation, which should ensure efficiency and avoid duplication. Many of the EU’s capability priorities correspond to NATO capability priorities; air-to-air refuelling is one specific example of how EU and NATO capability priorities complement each other. Moreover, many PESCO projects correspond to relevant NATO priorities, such as military mobility. There are also overlaps between CARD and the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and efforts have been made to guarantee coherence between the two processes, adhering to the logic of complementarity and avoiding duplication. For instance, inviting EU staff to NDPP consultations and NATO staff to CARD meetings has become common, even though the membership, scope and responsibilities differ. Standardisation is another important area of cooperation, with complementary efforts in this area and cross-participation in the relevant NATO and EU standardisation committees.

NATO Allies have agreed to develop and maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against potential enemies. The main tool for determining and prioritising the capabilities needed for the Alliance is the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). It aims to provide a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonised to enable Allies to provide the necessary forces and capabilities in the most efficient manner. The NDPP is a four-year programme that consists of five steps (political guidance, determine requirements, review results, apportion targets and facilitate implementation), which are typically completed sequentially. The NDPP focuses on capabilities in the short and medium term (up to 20 years). The responsible committee in NATO is called the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC). It is in charge of creating policies pertaining to defence planning and overseeing the coordination of all NDPP operations. The DPPC supervises the work of NATO bodies and committees responsible for defence planning on behalf of the North Atlantic Council. NATO also actively supports the identification and implementation of multinational cooperation in capability development and procuring capabilities. For instance, NATO commonly procures and operates a fleet of airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), one of the few military assets that are owned and operated by the Alliance rather than its members. NATO bodies and agencies also support national capability development initiatives in line with the NDPP. NATO’s High Visibility Projects (HVPs) support Allies and partner nations in identifying opportunities for multinational capability cooperation in critical areas like air-to-air refuelling and ammunition. The NATO Support and Procurement Agency offers NATO Allies and partner countries acquisition, logistical, operational and systems support, and related procurement.

European Parliament position

Parliament welcomes the EU’s ambition to strengthen its defence capabilities, stresses the need to make better use of EU initiatives and budgets, and calls for increased budgets. MEPs underline the importance of developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities with NATO, and stress the need to ensure coherence of output between EU and NATO capability development planning processes.

EU INITIATIVEMAIN ACTORSESTABLISHEDThe Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) identifies military requirements necessary to meet the EU level of ambition and highlights shortfalls.EU Military Staff within the European External Action Service (EEAS) draw it up. The EU Military Committee makes a proposal to the Political and Security Committee. It is approved by ministers of defence and foreign affairs.2003The Capability Development Plan (CDP) is a tool to analyse Member States’ military capabilities and inform them about priorities and collaborative opportunities.The European Defence Agency (EDA), in close cooperation with the Member States, and with active contributions from the EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff (EUMS). It is approved by ministers of defence.2008Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a Treaty-based framework to deepen defence cooperation among EU Member States.The Council at political level, Member States at project level. The EDA and EEAS, including the EUMS, act as the PESCO Secretariat.2017The European Defence Fund (EDF) – worth €8 billion – incentivises and supports collaborative, cross-border defence research and capability development.Implemented directly by the European Commission. The Commission is assisted by the EDF programme committee, also involving the EDA and the EEAS.2017The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) provides an overview of the EU defence landscape and facilitates cooperation by identifying collaborative opportunities.The EDA in cooperation with the EEAS, including the EUMS. Based on permanent dialogue between Member States and EU institutions. It is approved by the EU defence ministers.2017The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) is a short-term €300 million instrument that incentivises the joint procurement of defence equipment.Implemented directly by the European Commission. The Commission is assisted by Member State representatives within a programme committee, also involving the EDA and the EEAS.2023The Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) facilitates the ramping-up of ammunition production capacity, with a budget of €500 million.Implemented directly by the European Commission. The Commission is assisted by Member State representatives within a programme committee, also involving the EDA and the EEAS.2023The European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) will be a longer-term programme incentivising the joint procurement of defence equipment.European Commission (expected)2024 (proposed)ANNEX I

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘European Capability Development Planning‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

In June 2024, European voters are called to the polls to elect a new European Parliament. This is one of the biggest democratic exercises in what has been named a ‘super-election year‘. Roughly half the world’s population is expected to vote this year – but not all these elections will be free and fair. Decisive elections will take place in some of the world’s largest democratic regimes, including the European Union and the United States. The stakes are high for democracies, also considering women continue to be under-represented in EU countries at all levels of political decision-making, as well as in political parties, and that violence against women active in politics discourages many from entering the political arena. The Union has made steady and significant progress and the European Parliament is today one of the world’s most gender-balanced representative assemblies. Nevertheless, there are still significant divergences between EU countries. Electoral quotas are considered one of the most straightforward tools to fill the gender gap in representative assemblies.

Gender equality and women’s rights are a hot topic for political debates, with mainstream parties pushing for further progress, while more radical political forces wish to refocus on specific social roles for men and women. Where the race is tight, gender equality issues may even determine the outcome. In the United States, some commentators have noted that reproductive rights could decide the result of the upcoming presidential election, with polls indicating a significant gender gap in support for the two likely candidates. In Europe, a spring 2023 Eurobarometer survey shows that most EU citizens, both women and men, are informed about and interested in European politics, are aware of the importance of upcoming elections and likely to vote.

These European elections will follow what would have been one of the most ambitious and successful European Commissions in terms of adopting important gender equality legislation. With strong support from the European Parliament, the last five years have seen important legislation initiated and adopted. The Gender Balance on Boards directive wasadopted in 2022, a decade after the Commission made the initial proposal, paving the way for a more balanced representation of men and women among non-executive director positions in large listed companies. The directive on Binding Pay Transparency Measuresadopted in 2023 obliges companies to be more transparent about the salaries they pay, to ensure men and women are paid equally for the same work. Another directive to be adopted by the end of the legislative term strengthens national equality bodies so hey can provide better support to women who fight discrimination in the workplace, particularly the most vulnerable. The EU is also taking decisive action to combat gender-based violence. It ratified the Istanbul Convention in 2023 and is set to adopt a EU directive that will criminalise several types of off- and on-line violence against women, as well as improve prevention and protection of victims.

In politics, despite continuous progress, women continue to remain under-represented at all levels in parliaments and governments. The European Union has moved to close the gap faster than other levels of government. The share of women Members in the European Parliament was 39.9 % in February 2024 – above the European average for national parliaments (31.6 %) – but with big differences between Member States in terms of their representation in Parliament. The share of women in national parliaments also varies greatly among countries. The current European Commission has been the most gender balanced in history. The College is now made up of 13 women (48.1 %) and 14 men and is chaired by a woman president. However, at local and regional level, women continue to be under-represented in all EU Member States.

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Accept YouTube Content Gender balance in the European elections Percentage of women in parliamentary assemblies. Source: EIGE, Gender Statistics Database, 2023.

It is now widely recognised that structural and societal barriers continue to hinder women from seeking office and from fulfilling their mandates or accessing leadership positions once they are elected. Numerous obstacles block women from entering politics. These include individual women’s perceptions of their own abilities and of the costs and risks of running for office, together with broader factors, such as: unequal access to key resources (time, money, and political networks); unequal family responsibilities; male-dominated political cultures in parties and parliaments; gender roles and stereotypes in wider society; and an absence of female role models.

Types of violence experienced by female local politicians in the EU (% of those who reported having experienced violence). Data source: CEMR survey, 2023.

The level of abuse andviolence directed at women in politics and public life because they are women, and because of their increased presence, is one major obstacle. Violence against women in politics can take multiple forms. Psychological violence, including attacks on women’s private life, physical appearance or marital status, as well as symbolic violence seeking to marginalise women and make them feel incompetent are part of everyday politics in Europe. The digital world provides an environment where such violence thrives. Economic violence (preventing women from accessing adequate resources) and physical violence remain rarer, but their impact can be severe. Several European Parliament resolutions highlight the need to tackle harassment, as well online hate speech and cyber violence directed at female public figures, politicians and activists.

Party cultures and institutional structures can also act as barriers. Electoral systems can promote gender equality – or not. Thus, large multiple seats electoral constituencies are more favourable to increased female representation than single seat constituencies. One electoral mechanism is particularly effective in bringing about change in the most straightforward way: electoral quotas. It is true that some European countries have performed well in terms of increasing women’s presence in representative assemblies without quotas, by shifting towards a more gender egalitarian political and party culture overall. However, in other countries, where progress was slow, quotas have significantly accelerated progress towards gender equality in political representation. However, these need to be accompanied by other measures such as ‘zipped lists’ and a more favourable political environment for women in general. Eleven Member States (Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia) have binding gender quotas for the European elections. The European Parliament has initiated a reform of the European electoral legislation that would oblige Member States to achieve gender equality making use of the model that best fits their electoral system for European elections, but the initiative has stalled in the Council.

Related EPRS publications on women in politics

• EPRS briefing, Women in politics in the EU: State of play in 2024, March 2024
• EPRS Briefing, Violence against women active in politics in the EU: A serious obstacle to political participation, February 2024
• EPRS Briefing, Towards gender balance in the European elections: Electoral quotas – What can they achieve?, September 2023

Related EPRS multimedia

• Towards gender balance in the European elections: Electoral quotas

Written by Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Mittag, Professor at Sport University Cologne.

The creation and formalisation of the European Parliament’s political groups goes back to June 1953 and the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community’s Common Assembly. This briefing analyses the evolution of the groups’ structures and trajectories until the European elections in 2019. It shows how the conflict between national, political and transnational ideological allegiances of delegated Members of the Common Assembly was already present from the start, providing an important impetus for the formalisation of the political groups. This formalisation created the basis for the groups’ key role in structuring the work of the Common Assembly and later of the European Parliament. The European Parliament’s competence for its own budget meanwhile made the groups’ formalisation imperative to allow the distribution of funds for office space, secretariats and policy-making resources.

The structure and power distribution among the groups has remained relatively stable to the present day. Changing national-level cleavages, such as the emergence of the Green and populist far-right parties has been reflected in the groups’ structure and composition. However, the number of groups has never exceeded ten and has been stable at seven since 2004, limiting the institutional impact of growing diversity. Key institutional factors for this relatively high concentration and stability include the budgetary and institutional benefits of group membership for individual Members of the European Parliament, and the importance of powerful and cohesive groups for exercising influence both in Parliament and in the EU’s legislative process.

While research into the history of the political groups is still in its infancy, possible areas worth exploring include the role of chairs and secretaries-general in organising and leading groups.

This briefing follows up a roundtable event hosted by EPRS on 27 June 2023, which included contributions by Hans-Gert Pöttering, former chair of the EPP Group and European Parliament President, Hannes Swoboda, former chair of the S&D Group, Gijs de Vries, former chair of the ELDR Group, and Jürgen Mittag, Sport University Cologne.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Seventy years of transnational political groups in the European Parliament: Origins and trajectories‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Accept YouTube Content ‘Seventy years of transnational political groups in the European Parliament’

Written by Anita Orav.

The free movement of people between the EU and the UK ended on 1 January 2021, with the end of the transitional period set out in the Withdrawal Agreement, signed in January 2020. The EU and UK both apply their own migration and asylum systems, with ad hoc cooperation on various aspects of migration.

Background

With the exceptions of EU and UK citizens covered by the Withdrawal Agreement, and citizens of Ireland, with which the UK shares a Common Travel Area, the free movement of people between the EU and the UK ended on 1 January 2021. Since then, the EU and UK apply their own immigration systems, with each treating the other’s citizens as any other third-country/non- national for long‑term stays (for work, study or family‑related mobility). For short stays – without the right to work – both the EU and UK have granted visa waivers to each other’s citizens. UK nationals may stay in the Schengen area for up to 90 days in any 180‑day period. Short‑term travel to Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania – outside the Schengen area – is counted separately for each, and similar time restrictions apply. UK nationals must have a passport valid for at least three months after their intended departure from the EU. EU nationals may stay in the UK for up to six months without a visa, provided they have a passport valid for the duration of their stay.

Legal migration for work or study

As non-nationals, EU citizens need a visa and a work permit to be employed in the UK. Moreover, their UK employers need to complete a right‑to‑work check (not applicable to EU employees who were already in the UK by 1 July 2021). UK citizens need a work permit to work in most EU countries. Generally, a job offer from an EU country is required to obtain a visa to move there. The UK has also established a points‑based system, which includes a route for skilled workers who have a job offer from an approved employer sponsor. Nevertheless, the UK is seeking to reduce the volume of migrants admitted, and on 4 December 2023 the UK government announced key measures to ‘cut net migration’.

The EU‑UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which came fully into force on 1 May 2021, includes provisions for business and professional mobility of natural persons in the context of trade in services. The aim is to facilitate short‑term business trips and temporary secondment of highly skilled employees. However, they are subject to eligibility criteria and conditions regarding experience, professional status, remuneration and allowed length of stay. Some sectors are excluded from the mobility rights in the TCA, even if they are providing services (e.g. public services, services of general interest, some transport services, and audiovisual services – in an effort to preserve cultural diversity).

The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has had a chilling effect on EU students’ applications to UK universities, which fell by 53 % after post‑Brexit rules took effect. Reasons for this decline include the need for visas, higher tuition fees, and loss of access to government‑subsidised loans for the payment of fees. Moreover, as of January 2024, international students may no longer bring their partners and children to the UK, with the exception of specific postgraduate courses categorised as research programmes. UK students coming to the EU also face higher tuition fees and visa requirements. As for student exchanges, the UK is no longer participating in the Erasmus+ programme and has instead set up the Turing scheme, which helps UK students to study anywhere in the world, including at EU universities.

Asylum policy

Post-Brexit, the UK is no longer bound by the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Previously, the UK adhered to the first phase of EU asylum directives on reception conditions, qualification and asylum procedures. It had also opted into the Dublin III Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation. The Dublin system contains a criterion for determining the state responsible for processing an asylum application: if the asylum‑seeker has neither family ties in nor a recent visa or residence permit for any EU Member State, the first country into which they enter is responsible. The entry into EU territory is recorded in the Eurodac database, which helps determine responsibility. For the British government, the Dublin system was beneficial in that it supported the transfer of asylum‑seekers back to other EU countries, as the majority of them had transited through the European continent on their way to the UK. This allowed for an overall reduction in the number of asylum applications made in the UK. Conversely, under the Dublin system, in cases where a migrant had family ties or a visa or residence permit in the UK it was possible for EU countries to transfer the applicant to the UK. In fact, for several years in the run‑up to Brexit, transfers into the UK were more numerous than transfers out of the UK.

The CEAS instruments ceased to apply to the UK on 1 January 2021, and the sides have not yet agreed on an alternative asylum cooperation framework. The British government is reportedly looking for ways to cooperate with the EU on return of asylum‑seekers, whereas the EU has thus far not shown interest in discussing this possibility. Both the EU and the UK have been working on overhauling their own asylum systems. The EU is about to finalise reforms under the 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum, in an effort to establish faster and stricter procedures and to strike a new balance between collective responsibility and solidarity. The UK reformed its asylum policy through the Nationality and Borders Bill, which the British Parliament approved in April 2022. The act has been criticised by human rights organisations and more than 200 UK civil society groups for weakening refugee protection and criminalising asylum‑seekers who use irregular routes, in violation of the UK’s obligations under international law. Moreover, in April 2022, the UK also concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Rwanda with the aim of transferring irregularly arriving asylum‑seekers to Rwanda, where they would have their applications processed and possibly receive refugee status. While the MoU has been widely denounced due to Rwanda not being a safe country for asylum‑seekers (as confirmed by the UK Supreme Court ruling in 2023), the British government has stuck with the plan. In December 2023, it adopted the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill and signed a treaty with Rwanda, assuring that the scheme would be subject to rigorous oversight and monitoring mechanisms.

Irregular migration

Since 2018, there has been a sharp rise in attempts to reach the UK across the English Channel using small boats or inflatable dinghies. Many of those who arrive apply for asylum, which has contributed to an increase in asylum applications in the UK. According to the UK Home Office, 75 340 asylum applications were submitted in the UK between September 2022 and September 2023, similar to the number from the previous year. It has been suggested that this increase is partly due to the fact that asylum‑seekers can no longer reach the UK through the legal routes previously available under the Dublin system. Aiming to stop the Channel crossings, in July 2023 the UK government adopted the Illegal Migration Act, according to which anyone arriving irregularly into the UK will have their asylum claim deemed inadmissible.

Irregular migration is not covered by the TCA, so any cooperation between the EU and the UK in this area is ad hoc. The only aspect related to irregular migration included in the TCA is the chapter on law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil law matters, including cooperation with Europol. The chapter calls for strong cooperation between national police and judicial authorities, in particular for fighting and prosecuting cross‑border crime, including migrant smuggling. On 21 February 2024, a large‑scale operation involving authorities from Belgium, France and Germany with Europol and Eurojust coordination led to the dismantling of one of the most active migrant‑smuggling networks.

Post‑Brexit, several initiatives have aimed at increasing cooperation on curbing Channel crossings. In December 2022, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK issued a joint statement calling for an EU‑UK cooperation agreement to address irregular migration in north‑western Europe. In March 2023 the UK agreed to provide more than €500 million in funding to France over three years to increase the number of officers and patrols on the French coast, add new capabilities (including drones) and operate a new command centre and a new detention centre in northern France. On 18 February 2024, a working agreement was concluded between the UK’s migration agencies and Frontex, the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency. It forms part of wider EU‑UK cooperation to combat smuggling, human trafficking and facilitation of irregular immigration through exchange of intelligence, expertise and personnel. The details and the operationalisation of the agreement still need to be finalised.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘EU-UK cooperation on migration and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the February II 2024 plenary session was the address by Yulia Navalnaya, widow of the assassinated Russian opposition activist and 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate Alexey Navalny. Important debates took place on European security and defence and the war in Gaza. Members adopted a large number of provisional agreements reached in interinstitutional negotiations. Members also adopted several agreements at first reading, on which negotiations with the Council would be required in the new legislative term.

Revising the EU’s finances

Within the overall revision of the EU’s long-term budget, aimed at facing current challenges, not least to help Ukraine, Members debated and adopted three reports. From the Committee on Budgets (BUDG), Members adopted a report recommending Parliament grant consent to the agreement reached on a first-ever revision of the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF). Members approved the political agreement reached by the BUDG and Foreign Affairs (AFET) committees with the Council to establish the €50 billion Ukraine Facility in support of Ukraine’s recovery and its path to EU accession. Members also adopted a joint report from BUDG and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) allocating more funding from the MFF to projects that develop or manufacture critical technologies and strengthen their value chains, via a new platform for strategic technologies for Europe (STEP).

EU in a new world CFSP and CSDP, human rights and democracy reports

Members debated and adopted two annual reports from the AFET committee. First on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which outlines four major challenges: Russia’s war against Ukraine; the need for a genuine European defence union; stronger defence of rules-based multilateralism, and reinforced strategic partnerships such as NATO. This year’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) report reflects the seismic changes in EU defence policy since 2022, with AFET demanding increased parliamentary scrutiny of the CSDP, to ensure increased EU defence spending is effective. Members debated and adopted a third AFET report reviewing EU efforts to promote human rights and democracy in 2022. This year’s report concurs with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’s assessment of a deteriorating international situation.

EU-Chile agreements

Members debated and followed the recommendation from the AFET and International Trade (INTA) committees to grant consent to conclusion of two EU-Chile agreements. A new advanced framework agreement (AFA) should modernise and replace today’s Association Agreement governing EU-Chile relations, with an interim trade agreement to be put in place until the AFA’s complete ratification.

EU-Seychelles agreement on access for fishing vessels to the waters of Mayotte

The EU fishing fleet already has access to rich tuna fishing grounds in the Seychelles through a sustainable fisheries partnership agreement. Members followed the recommendation from the Committee on Fisheries (PECH) to grant consent to the conclusion of a new six-year agreement to continue reciprocal fisheries access for Seychelles vessels to the waters of the French overseas departments of Mayotte.

A balanced environment for everyone Environmental crime

Parliament debated and adopted a political agreement reached with the Council on measures to tackle serious, organised environmental crime more effectively. The penalties for such activities will range from three to ten years in prison, with companies fined based on their annual worldwide turnover, or fixed amounts up to €40 million, attesting to the seriousness of such crimes – a choice left to EU governments.

Geographical indications

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council on revising legislation on geographical indications (GIs) for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products in a single legal act. The agreed text aims at simplifying and speeding up registration of GIs to help European producers obtain fairer prices for quality products, as well as strengthen removal of illegal use and provide better protection online.

Patents package

Members debated and adopted five first-reading reports from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) on legislative proposals concerning intellectual property rights on products affecting our environment. They aim to update and harmonise rules on supplementary protection certificates, which extend patent protection to compensate for lengthy compulsory testing and trials to ensure such products are safe before they can come to market. The first two concern supplementary protection certificates for plant protection products. Two more cover supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products. Another concerns the standard essential patents regulation, on patents protecting technology incorporated in a standard (such as 5G).

Detergents and surfactants

The EU is proposing to revise the Regulation on Detergents and Surfactants to ensure detergents using microorganisms are safe and to introduce a digital label to display mandatory consumer information. Members debated and adopted an ENVI committee report which enlarges the list of restricted microorganisms and adds specific rules for detergent refills, as well as precluding testing on animals.

Nature restoration law

Members adopted a provisional agreement reached in trilogue on the proposed EU nature restoration law, aimed at returning degraded ecosystems to health across the EU. The provisional agreement supports this objective, with time-bound and quantitative targets for ecosystems. In line with Parliament’s demands, EU national authorities should prioritise Natura 2000 sites until 2030 and an ’emergency brake’ should allow suspension of agricultural ecosystem restoration for up to one year under exceptional circumstances.

Protecting EU consumers and businesses Wholesale energy market manipulation

Apart from the environmental imperative, the EU is keen to protect consumers and businesses against wholesale energy market manipulation. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement with the Council, endorsed by the ITRE committee, aimed at avoiding a repeat of the recent energy crisis. The agreement reinforces the role of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.

Collecting and sharing data in the tourism sector

Platforms connecting hosts with guests help tourists find affordable places to stay and enable people to earn extra income, but also contribute to a lack of affordable accommodation and unfair competition. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council and endorsed by the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), on a proposal to regulate collection and sharing of data in the tourism sector.

Driving licences

To continue to improve road safety, the EU is working towards zero deaths on EU roads by 2050 and the Commission proposed a revision of the Driving Licence Directive. Members debated and adopted a report on the proposal from the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), which approves stricter rules for novice drivers, introduction of a digital driving licence, medical certification of fitness to drive, and a lower minimum age for coach, bus and truck driving licences to 18 years for certified professional drivers.

Faster and safer tax excess relief (‘FASTER’)

Inefficient tax relief procedures can discourage investors from investing other EU Member States. A proposal to move to faster and safer tax excess relief (‘FASTER’) aims for efficient, secure withholding tax procedures for cross-border investors and tax administrations. Members adopted a (non-binding) Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report strongly supporting the proposal.

Political advertising

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on evolving campaign techniques that pose new challenges on transparency and targeting in political advertising. The agreement seeks to help voters detect political advertisements and identify who is behind them. It sets strict limits on targeting and delivery techniques and enhances personal data protection. It bans profiling, using the data of people who are under voting age, and non-EU based entities financing political ads in the EU prior to an election.

Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report

Following Parliament’s demands, the Commission launched an annual rule of law review cycle in 2020. Members debated and adopted a Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee motion for a resolution on the Commission’s fourth annual rule of law report. The LIBE report highlights areas and rights that have not been addressed, and calls for a more vigorous approach to infringement proceedings.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Four decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – from the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) committees – were approved without vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – February II 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Van Tooren.

Little known and often misdiagnosed, rare diseases affect around 30 million people in the EU. Together with over 65 partner organisations, EURORDIS coordinates Rare Disease Day every 29 February (or on 28 February in non-leap years) – the rarest day on the calendar. The day raises awareness of rare diseases and advocates for people living with them, with the long-term goal of achieving equal access to diagnosis and therapy. Because cooperation is crucial to achieving this, the EU can play an important role by setting up programmes, networks and platforms to help experts, researchers and clinicians share their knowledge and experiences.

What is a ‘rare disease’?

Around 300 million people worldwide live with a rare disease, 30 million of whom live in the EU.

A disease is rare when it affects fewer than 1 in 2 000 people, while an ultra-rare disease affects fewer than 1 in 50 000 people. Some 72 % of rare diseases have a genetic origin, and 70 % already start during childhood.

Over 6 000 rare diseases exist, and only around 1 000 have been scientifically explored. Most are incurable, and are often called ‘orphan diseases’. Treatment is available for only around 5 % of rare diseases.

On average, rare disease patients have to wait five years for a diagnosis.

Because there is often little scientific knowledge about rare diseases, diagnoses come late and initial misdiagnoses are common. Moreover, specific treatments are often unavailable, or not easily accessible to patients. Patients have little information about their disease and their rights, and can suffer from a high level of psychological, social and economic vulnerability. They can feel a lack of or loss of autonomy, as the disease also affects their socio-economic status, family, education and work.

What does the European Parliament say?

The European Parliament has repeatedly emphasised the importance of research on rare diseases and medicine development.

In its resolution of 24 November 2021 on the EU’s pharmaceutical strategy, Parliament emphasised the importance of research into and development of medicines for unmet needs. It referred specifically to cancers, including paediatric cancers, rare diseases, neurodegenerative and mental illnesses and antimicrobial resistance. It also urged the creation of an EU framework to help national governments implement plans to combat these illnesses. To end the situation where people in some EU countries can access medicines when others cannot, Parliament called on the Commission to consider policy options that would guarantee access to medicines in all Member States following the granting of EU-level authorisation.

In a 10 July 2020 resolution, Parliament called for an EU action plan on rare and neglected diseases in the context of a post‑pandemic public health strategy, a request reiterated in Members’ parliamentary questions.

How is the EU fighting rare disease?

Because misdiagnoses and lack of scientific knowledge are common issues with rare diseases, cooperation is very important. The EU has been working on a European Health Data Space to improve individuals’ access to and control of their electronic personal data, while also facilitating the re-use of medical data across the EU where that has benefits for society. Better access to an EU-wide pool of data could help medical staff to diagnose rare diseases earlier, especially since symptoms can differ from patient to patient and from disease to disease.

The European Joint Programme on Rare Diseases, launched in 2019, aims to develop an effective rare diseases research ecosystem to improve coordination across the EU to tackle the issues of delayed diagnoses, lack of medicines and reduced access to care. The EU adopted the Orphan Regulation on rare diseases in 2000, and adopted the Paediatric Regulation on medicines for children in 2006. These laws introduced obligations, incentives and rewards to stimulate the development of new medicines. The EU also launched a revision of its pharmaceutical legislation in 2023, to make medicines more available, accessible and affordable, while supporting the EU pharmaceutical industry in its research efforts, and setting higher environmental standards.

The EU also contributes to research coordination through European Reference Networks (ERNs). The ERNs are virtual networks gathering together healthcare providers across Europe to work on complex or rare diseases and conditions that require highly specialised treatment, and concentrated knowledge and resources.

The EU also supports platforms such as Orphanet and the European Platform on Rare Diseases Registries, which hold data on rare diseases and collect rare disease resources, including for refugees or displaced persons.

For its part, EURORDIS – Rare Diseases Europe is a non-profit organisation consisting of over 1 000 rare disease patient organisations from 74 countries, working to improve the lives of people living with a rare disease. It focuses on improving diagnoses, promoting research, increasing access to holistic care and making treatments more available, accessible and affordable.