European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Anita Orav.

In December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly designated 20 June as World Refugee Day, to mark the 50th anniversary of the 1951 Geneva Convention on to the Status of Refugees. It is a day to honour the courage of people who have been forced to flee their homes to escape conflict or persecution.

A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, receives international protection from another state on its territory.

A call for solidarity with refugees

According to United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates, 130.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced or are stateless in 2024, with over 32 million of them refugees. With growing numbers of people being forced to flee their homes, the international day serves as a reminder that refugees need support more than ever. This year, World Refugee Day is focusing on solidarity with refugees and creating a world where refugees are welcome. There are many ways to express solidarity, starting with an open and empathetic approach towards refugees, making them feel welcome and included. It also involves seeking solutions to end the conflicts causing their plight, providing them with opportunities to integrate and thrive in host societies, even temporarily, and ensuring adequate support for host countries and regions in their reception and integration efforts.

Looking for protection in the European Union

Many displaced people around the world seek protection in the European Union (EU). After a peak in migrant arrivals in 2015 and 2016, followed by a decrease due to the pandemic, arrival numbers began rising again in 2021. In 2023, over a million first-time asylum seekers applied for international protection in the EU, up 20 % from 2022 and the highest number since the peak in the 2015 to 2016 period. Additionally, there are nearly 6 million Ukrainians in the EU receiving support under the Temporary Protection Directive.

In addition to asylum-seekers arriving at EU borders, the EU has set up a system for all EU countries to receive refugees directly from countries outside the EU – such as Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan – that are currently hosting large numbers. This scheme is based largely on EU cooperation with the UNHCR, which helps resettle refugees directly from refugee camps. For the 2024-2025 period, 14 EU Member States have pledged more than 60 735 places for resettlement and humanitarian admission.

Solidarity and inclusion in the EU

The European Parliament has consistently called for solidarity with refugees. In its 2016 resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, Parliament emphasised that hosting Member States ‘must offer refugees support and opportunities to integrate and build a life in their new society’. It also noted that respect for the EU’s founding values, as well as respect for the fundamental rights of refugees, must be integral to the integration process.

While the responsibility for integration policies lies primarily with the Member States, the EU has established its guiding principles in the EU action plan on integration and inclusion (2021-2027) to support national, regional and local authorities and civil society. To help bring together innovation, good practice and analysis on migrant integration at both EU and country levels, the European Commission launched the European website on integration (EWSI). The site currently lists over 1 440 successful practices from across the EU Member States.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘World Refugee Day 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

Algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) are changing the way people live and work. Depending on how AI technologies are used and what purpose they serve, they can drive progress and benefit the whole of society, but they also raise ethical concerns and may cause harm. When introduced to the world of work, their transformative potential runs into complex national and EU rules. Existing labour laws, put in place before AI systems came on the scene, do not appear fit to provide meaningful guiderails.

As with any new technologies, tensions arise between two opposing regulatory approaches: strict regulation to safeguard society from potential hazards and minimum regulation to promote the technology’s deployment and innovation. For employers who invest in AI systems, the main motivation is better workplace organisation, increased productivity, and competitiveness. Workers, on the other hand, may fear losing their jobs, and also want to have a say in how AI and algorithms are to become part of their daily lives.

Focusing on workplace deployment of AI, this briefing looks at the state of play of algorithmic management in the workplace and some issues relating to the data that algorithms use and generate. It offers an overview of the current top-down EU legislative approach, of insights brought by the European Parliament, and of advances in collective bargaining, demonstrating the potential of a bottom-up approach to complement AI deployment.    

The briefing looks at the potential use of sleeping clauses in the existing EU legal framework and – taking note of the views of both employers and trade unions – highlights the many open questions that remain.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Addressing AI risks in the workplace: Workers and algorithms‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lasse Boehm with David Kläffling.

The European Union’s (EU) climate policies, part of the European Green Deal put forward by the von der Leyen Commission, will have profound consequences for other policy areas. During the 2019-2024 legislative term of the European Parliament, the EU adopted an overarching objective to cut net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, and achieve climate neutrality by 2050. This entails changing the way energy is produced and consumed in the EU, with knock-on effects for individual citizens, households, and businesses.

This briefing explores and maps out some of the social consequences of the Green Deal, focusing in particular on the effect the green transition will have on labour markets. It also touches briefly on the housing and transport sectors. The briefing’s purpose is to offer an overview of the most important impacts in these areas, without pretending to be a full study. For reasons of brevity, it leaves out or touches only briefly on other important dimensions, such as education and gender.

While insufficient action in the face of climate change would lead to significant costs as well as severe consequences for human life and the natural environment, the design of climate policies poses distributional challenges for individuals, and at a systemic level for different regions and industrial sectors. While studies on the Green Deal’s labour market consequences are often limited to the aggregate level, this ‘macro’ perspective can hide significant regional and sectoral diversity.

Existing EU funds and instruments have been designed to buffer against negative social consequences, particularly by providing upskilling opportunities, but their scope and size is limited. As the EU has only relatively limited competences in the area of social policy, significant policy action at national and regional level is unavoidable. The convergence and coordination of policy and funding instruments is crucial. Success or failure of regional, national, and European responses will be determined by the ability of policymakers to set up an integrated policy framework comprising social, labour market and industrial policy elements.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Social and labour market impactof the green transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The European Union’s institutional cycle begins anew every five years with the elections to the European Parliament. This is a crucial moment, as it updates both the hardware (the institutional leadership) and the software (the political priorities) of the EU. The European Council, composed of the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States, plays a significant role in both processes. Not only is it directly or indirectly involved in the choice of who fills most of the top EU positions, it also establishes the EU’s long-term political priorities through setting its Strategic Agenda.

This briefing outlines the EU’s institutional cycle and highlights the European Council’s role in this cycle in institutional terms. It also describes the processes involved in the allocation of EU top institutional jobs and the adoption of the EU’s long-term priorities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Council’s role at the start of the new EU institutional cycle‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU institutional cycle

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

Secondary movements occur when refugees or asylum-seekers move from the country in which they first arrived, to seek protection or for permanent resettlement elsewhere. While most asylum-seekers seek protection in countries close to their countries of origin, some are compelled or choose to move onwards (often in an irregular manner) from or through countries in which they have already, or could have sought, international protection, to other countries, where they may request such protection. Many different factors may influence these movements and the decision to settle in a particular country.

While asylum-seekers in the EU may have very legitimate reasons for seeking asylum in a Member State other that responsible for examining their asylum application, secondary movements are seen as a challenge for migration management in the EU. Although no genuine data are available that would provide reliable information about the scale of the phenomenon at the level of EU countries, some of the existing databases can give an indication of the travel routes relating to asylum-seekers’ secondary movements.

The aim of the common European asylum system’s current instruments has been to limit secondary movements of applicants for international protection between EU Member States. However, the increased inflow of asylum-seekers to Europe in the past decade has shown that the system has been unable to discourage secondary movements. For this purpose, among others, in 2016 and 2020 the European Commission proposed a comprehensive reform in order to harmonise asylum rules and introduce a range of new measures on asylum policy that would address such movements.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Secondary movements of asylum-seekers in the
EU asylum system‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Eurodac hits Member States (MS) with the highest share of foreign hits for each type of query

As a taxpayer, you want your money to be well spent. The European Union’s spending is based on a seven-year plan, the multiannual financial framework (MFF), and reflects the political priorities set by European leaders. The current long-term budget was agreed at the end of 2020, when the EU was addressing the dire economic and social consequences of the pandemic. With the Member States’ economies in bad shape, EU budgetary policy focused on means for recovery, in particular through the establishment of the temporary instrument Next Generation EU (NGEU). The 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU together form the largest budget ever financed in the EU.

With its power to decide on the EU budget, the European Parliament has always defended effective financing of the EU’s commitments and priorities and of EU citizens’ interests. Parliament secured budgetary reinforcements totalling €15 billion for 10 of the EU’s flagship programmes, including research, health, Erasmus+ and border protection. Parliament also enhanced the budget’s flexibility with €1 billion to cope with urgent needs, and established respect for the rule of law as a necessary condition for receiving EU financing.

As co-legislator, Parliament helped frame a legally binding plan to reform the EU’s financing system. This reform was one of the conditions set by Parliament for giving its consent to the 2021‑2027 MFF. Parliament successfully insisted on setting out a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources to finance additional expenditure for NGEU.

In December 2022, Parliament and the Council adopted the EU Conditionality Regulation, which allows the EU to take measures if breaches of the rule of law principle affect or risk affecting the EU’s financial interests. The effects of the strengthened rule of law mechanism are beginning to show. Both Member States and candidate countries have made significant improvements according to the most recent ‘Rule of Law Index‘.

From the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Parliament has insisted on credible, predictable and adequate EU funding for Ukraine in line with the country’s needs. In February 2024, an agreement on the first ever revision of the EU’s long-term budget was reachedafter Parliament’s repeated demands. The revision secured crucial financial resources for Ukraine, with €17 billion from the EU budget and €33 billion in loans, and further enhanced funding of €4 billion for migration-related challenges and to allow for some budget flexibility.

This scrutiny activity shows how Parliament used its law-making powers as well as its influence over the budget to protect EU citizens’ interests in the long-term EU budget. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Philippe Perchoc (updated on 05.07.2022).

Simone Veil, the first President of the directly elected European Parliament in 1979, and the first woman to hold the office, died on 30 June 2017, at the age of 89. A prominent French public figure beyond her years in office, she leaves an important and enduring legacy.

First President of the directly elected European Parliament © European Communities – EP, 17 July 1979

On 17 July 1979, Simone Veil was elected President of the European Parliament by her peers. She became the first female President of the Parliament, which had for the first time been elected directly by the citizens. In her first speech as President, she declared: ‘Our Parliament must also be a motive force in European integration. This is particularly true at a time when, as I already have mentioned, Europe’s prime need is a further measure of solidarity. This new Parliament will make it possible for the views of all Community citizens to be voiced at European level, and will at the same time more effectively impress upon every sector of society the need for a solidarity transcending immediate concerns, however legitimate, which must never be allowed to mask the fundamental interests of the Community’.

Indeed, the 1979 election was a turning point in the history of the European Parliament, as the newly directly elected assembly started to discuss possible reform of the European institutions. Altiero Spinelli launched a productive dialogue with Veil, President of the Parliament, on these issues as early as 1981. After her presidency, Simone Veil remained an active MEP until 1993, and the Parliament later decided to give her name to the agora, located in front of the Spinelli building, at the heart of its Brussels campus, as a symbolic way to encourage the continuation of this dialogue.

Defender of women’s rights

In France, Simone Veil is also known as a defender of human rights, in her capacity of judge working in the field of penitentiary policies. Known for her courage, she was nominated minister of health by the then newly elected President, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who tasked her with decriminalising abortion in France in 1975. After four years as a minister, she carried on her human rights work in the European Parliament until 1993. After a further brief period as a minister, she continued her respected legal career as a member of the French Constitutional Council from 1998 until 2007.

A tragic family history

During the Second World War, Simone Veil was arrested in the street in Nice, and in 1944 her family was deported to concentration camps because of their Jewish background. She was freed from Bobrek and returned to France in 1945, but neither her parents nor her brother returned. Throughout her life, Simone Veil battled to make sure the Holocaust is never forgotten. In 2018, she was buried in the Panthéon in Paris, where those whom the French state honours have been laid to rest ever since the French Revolution.

Read this At a glance on ‘Simone Veil, European political pioneer‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Years later, we are all still experiencing the consequences of the COVID‑19 pandemic, as EU countries recover from the severe economic downturn that followed the 2020 outbreak. The EU Recovery Instrument – Next Generation EU (NGEU) was specifically created to help Member States address these challenges. It has a strong focus on the twin green and digital transitions – key priorities backed by the European Parliament and a total budget for recovery initiatives of €806.9 billion, financed through EU borrowing on the markets, which has to be paid out by the end of 2026.

While the Council established the NGEU, Parliament co-legislated the rules for its implementation, adopting the regulation on the NGEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in February 2021. The RRF distributes 90 % of the NGEU allocation to the Member States, financing reforms and investments specified in their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). Parliament wanted to ensure the RRF is managed transparently, that it stimulates progress in the green, digital and energy sectors, supports children, young people and women, and that respect for the rule of law is among the key prerequisites for receiving funding.

The European Commission has to update Parliament on RRF implementation progress, and present annual, mid-term and ex-post reports. To ensure it receives timely and detailed information, and to enable an exchange of views with other institutions, Parliament insisted on a bi-monthly meeting between Members of its Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Budgets and the European Commission representatives in charge. In addition, Parliament set up a special standing working group for RRF scrutiny, to discuss the quality of NRRP measures and progress on their implementation.

Parliament has also adopted a number of resolutions on these topics. Members have called, for example, for a thorough assessment of the plans and payment requests, stressed the importance of sound execution of the RRF objectives, and demanded that respect for the rule of law be a pre-condition for disbursements.

Since 2022, Members have looked very closely at RRF expenditure through the annual budgetary discharge procedure. RRF-related issues are prominent in the work of Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT), and were included in a dedicated chapter of the decision granting budget discharge to the European Commission. This procedure applies only to RRF grants, however; the loans are beyond Parliament’s scrutiny. Implementation of the RRF entered a decisive stage in 2024, as the 2026 deadline for payment execution approaches. To closely monitor NGEU allocation Parliament, thus used both its powers over the budget and on oversight and scrutiny. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira.

How can the EU develop an innovation ecosystem involving our seas, oceans, and inland waters? And what about the effects of climate-related dynamics, biodiversity, energy efficiency, food, renewable energy and industrial competitiveness on the water, marine and maritime sectors? These questions were posed and answered at a European Parliament Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) workshop organised on 17 April 2024.

Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), the STOA Chair, was joined by STOA Member Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark) in welcoming the participants, and setting the stage for a comprehensive discussion on a future Knowledge and Innovation Community (KIC), proposed in the European Institute of Innovation & Technology (EIT) Strategic Innovation Agenda for 2021‑2027. According to Christian Ehler, the EIT is the right EU-level instrument to create an innovation and education ecosystem in the water, marine, and maritime sectors. Establishing a KIC (usually referred to as the ‘Water KIC’) would aim to strengthen innovation ecosystems and accelerate the uptake of new technologies. This pan-European, multi-disciplinary community would promote the global competitiveness of European fresh water, marine and maritime science and technology, bringing innovative projects to market that address urgent societal and sustainability challenges.

External experts Siri Granum Carson and Sveinung Sægrov from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, and Richard Sempere from Aix-Marseille University presented the findings of an ongoing STOA study into the role of technology and innovation in the fields of water and oceans and on the usefulness and establishment of a ‘Water KIC’. They underscored the need for sustainable and coherent political initiatives at all levels to tackle the challenges in these sectors. The experts emphasised the importance of a more innovative public-private and cross-sector cooperation, with innovation, education and training playing a critical role in scarcity and safety, water efficiency, ocean conservation, water utility operations, monitoring and treatment, maritime sector data and analytics.

The workshop featured two panels with key stakeholders. The goal was to gather feedback on the preliminary study findings and collect additional insights for its finalisation.

The first panel focused on ‘Building innovation ecosystems’. The panellists included Manuel Irun Molina, EIT Liaison Officer, Luca Perego, Head of Unit ‘Innovation and EIT’ at the European Commission’s Directorate General for Education and Culture, and Richard Zaltzman, CEO of EIT Food. The panel discussion highlighted the importance of building robust innovation ecosystems to address the major economic, environmental, and societal challenges in the water, marine, and maritime sectors. Luca Perego presented the current state of play of the ongoing ex-ante analysis evaluating the relevance of the ‘Water KIC’. Manuel Irun Molina of EIT reinforced the support provided for the launch of new KICs, and the best practice and coordination initiatives between the different communities already established. Richard Zaltzman from EIT Food reinforced the idea of exploiting synergies between KICs, while underpinning the need to focus on specific key priority areas to ensure effective management of the day-to-day activities of KICs.

The second panel focused on ‘Attracting private investment for education and innovation’. The panellists included Durk Krol, Executive Director of Water Europe, Kestutis Sadauskas, European Commission Deputy Director-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in charge of Mission Ocean, Margherita Cappelletto, Coordinator of the Sustainable Blue Economy Partnership, and Joaquim Poças Martins – entrepreneur and Professor of the University of Porto. The panel discussion emphasised the importance of attracting private investment to foster education and innovation in the water, marine, and maritime sectors. Durk Krol linked current EU industrial initiatives on chips and hydrogen with significant water needs, and consequently competing uses for water. Joaquim Poças Martins talked about two areas where a Water KIC could have considerable impact: water utilities and hydrogen production. Kestutis Sadauskas highlighted the current underfunding of the blue economy goals, and the importance of attracting private funding and the efforts and different instruments the European Commission is using to advance innovation in these sectors. He launched some ideas for consideration in the next political cycle – blue bonds, for example.

The workshop concluded with closing remarks from Pernille Weiss, reinforcing the case for strengthening the network of stakeholders active in these fields and ultimately contributing to the Commission’s ongoing work and the implementation of the EIT strategic agenda.

The workshop was a significant step towards understanding the potential strategic value of a ‘Water KIC’ and its role in addressing the major economic, environmental, and societal challenges in the water, marine, and maritime sectors. It underscored the importance of building robust innovation ecosystems and attracting private investment to foster education and innovation in these sectors, and will contribute to the finalisation of the ongoing STOA study.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Event recording:

https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/panel-for-future-of-science-and-technology_20240417-1400-SPECIAL-STOA

© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP

Written by Giulio Sabbati.

Updated on 04.06.2024.

This briefing, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service, aims to provide a broad range of key facts and figures about the European Parliament. Its many graphics offer a picture of the Parliament’s Members and the institution’s structures and activity in the current parliamentary term (July 2019 to June 2024) and in previous five-year terms since direct elections were introduced in June 1979.

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Interactive infographic: European Parliament: Facts and figures

The seven political groups in the current Parliament, in order of size, are:

• Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) (EPP),
• Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D),
• Renew Europe Group,
• Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA),
• European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR),
• Identity and Democracy Group (ID),
• The Left Group in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL.
  In addition, some MEPs sit as non-attached Members (‘Non-inscrits’ – NI).

The briefing is updated regularly, but for an up-to-date picture of the facts and figures on Members of the European Parliament today, as well as in each term since 1979, see our interactive infographic:
https://facts-and-figures.europarl.europa.eu/

Versions

• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: April 2024
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: May 2023
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: March 2022
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: October 2021
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: October 2019
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: April 2019 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: April 2018 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: March 2017 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: March 2016 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: April 2015 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: November 2014

Download images from the Graphics Warehouse.

Size of political group Conference of Presidents The bureau President of the European Parliament Number of legislative and own-initiative reports Number of trilogues per year and per committee Co-decision procedure Ordinary legislative procedure / co-decision European Parliament legislative activity, 2004-2023 Inter-parliamentary delegations Share of committee chairs by political group (April 2024) Parliamentary committees Activity in European Parliament plenary sessions in the ninth term so far (July 2019 – December 2023) Electoral threshold Minimum age of candidates Voting methods for citizens resident abroad Voting system and number of MEPs National parties and political groups in the European Parliament Strengths of the political groups in each parliamentary term Women MEPs by Member State Women in the European Parliament and EU national parliaments Proportion of men and women in the European Parliament Age of MEPs Age of MEPs Age distribution of MEPs Size of political groups in the European Parliament by Member State (as of 1 April 2024) Proportion of Members in each political group

Written by Hendrik Mildebrath.

Traditionally, political parties and electoral administrations in the European Union have been slow to adopt campaign and election technologies. However, there is now a noticeable shift among European actors towards leveraging key technologies to enhance political communication and voting procedures. Authorities in Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France and one district in Portugal have already used electronic voting methods. Additionally, political parties are widely adopting data-driven campaign technology throughout Europe, including in Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Hungary, Norway and the Netherlands. Experts anticipate that political parties will further harness artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance their communication strategies.

Outlining the risks and opportunities associated with these technologies, this briefing examines how the recently updated legal framework governs content management tools utilised by political parties for the creation and dissemination of content. More specifically, it shows that political parties, intermediary services and providers of content creation solutions are subject to a range of data processing restrictions, transparency obligations and risk management requirements under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the e-Privacy Directive (e-PD), and the Digital Services Act (DSA). These obligations will become more stringent once the Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA) and the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) become applicable after the 2024 European Parliament elections.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The arrival of e-voting and campaign technologies in Europe: Promise, perils and preparedness‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Velina Lilyanova.

To protect the EU’s financial interests and detect fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, it is necessary to know who benefits from EU funds. However, publicly available data are currently fragmented and often incomplete, complicating the process of identifying the final beneficiaries of EU funding. The European Parliament and its Committee on Budgetary Control have consistently called for transparency in the allocation and use of EU funds. The ultimate goal is to enable the tracing of funds, and ensure targeted and effective EU spending. When it comes to the EU’s Next Generation EU recovery instrument and its main component, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), Parliament has maintained its focus on ensuring transparency.

The RRF is a temporary instrument designed to release substantial financial support to EU Member States within a limited time (December 2026 at the latest). It is performance-based: unlike other EU spending programmes, RRF payments to Member States are not linked to the eligibility of a beneficiary, project, and declared costs, but to the satisfactory achievement of predefined milestones and targets. Funds enter the national budget and are further distributed within the Member State. Because of these characteristics, as well as its size and the timing and purpose of the instrument’s creation (amid the COVID-19 pandemic), public interest in how RRF funds are spent is high. Parliament has thus sought to increase the transparency of RRF implementation by introducing the requirement for Member States to report regularly on the 100 largest final beneficiaries of RRF funds, and publish the data on dedicated national online portals. Information as to where and on what RRF funds are spent is meant to increase the transparency of how the EU helps address common challenges, and improve its credibility. This is especially important as alleged cases of fraud emerge in the media and are reported by the European Public Prosecutors Office.

Since 2023, data on the top 100 recipients has been accessible on the European Commission’s Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard. Member States are expected to continue updating the data twice a year. While all have complied, there is some concern that in practice the definition of ‘final recipient’ used in the RRF Regulation does not guarantee the desired level of transparency.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 100 largest recipients of Recovery and Resilience Facility funds‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

As social media has become the main gateway to information for many young people, how will it influence the youth vote in the 2024 European elections? The turnout among young people in the 2019 European elections was relatively high, and many hope for a repeat performance in June this year. But ahead of the 2024 elections, the main European institutions have largely ‘excluded’ themselves from one of the most popular video-sharing platforms among young people – TikTok – over data security concerns. Social media in itself is a difficult phenomenon to study, as recommendation algorithms mean that everyone sees different content.

Social media as a new campaign front in elections

According to Eurostat, 84 % of young people in the EU used the internet to participate in social media networks during 2022. Social media platforms have thus become a significant channel for political campaigning. As an example, the spring 2023 parliamentary elections in Finland were dubbed the ‘first TikTok elections‘, with some of the young candidates gaining publicity – and a seat in the parliament – quite possibly thanks to their visibility in the social media used by teens and young adults. Back then, some 70 % of 18-21 year-olds said they had seen political advertising on TikTok. Social media platforms are also the dominant news sources for 16-24 year-olds. TikTok, as the 24/7 news channel for many young people, has surged in popularity in recent years in Europe, particularly against rivals such as X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and Snapchat. Fact-checking services have found that social media platforms’ recommendation systems have a ‘funnelling effect‘, promoting a narrow selection of videos and narrowing the range of views to which users are exposed. There are concerns, but not yet enough research, as to whether social media and its recommendation algorithms are pushing users into bubbles, echo chambers with like-minded users, or even to ‘rabbit holes’ towards increasingly extreme content.

Young people’s participation in European elections and their media habits

The European Youth Forum has been campaigning to lower the voting age to 16; this is a national competence, however, and is therefore for the Member States to decide. In the 2024 European elections, four Member States (Belgium, Germany, Malta and Austria) will allow their citizens to vote from the age of 16, and in Greece the voting age is 17.

After declining ever since the first European elections in 1979, electoral turnout in the 2019 elections rose by 8 percentage points compared with 2014, reaching 50.6 %. This increase was driven by a surge in youth participation. The results of a Eurobarometer survey on youth and democracy published on 13 May 2024 show that 64 % of young people (aged 15 to 30) plan to vote in the upcoming European elections. However, 19 % of young people say they are not interested in politics and 13 % say they are not interested in voting. Although voting was considered the most effective action for making their voices heard by decision-makers, ‘engaging in social media’ came in second place, selected by 32 % of the young respondents.

A 2023 European Parliament study highlights that ‘young people have never withdrawn from politics or become inactive, but engage in various forms’. Social media is the preferred channel for young people’s online political engagement, offering the possibility to mobilise a massive number of people, at an incredible speed, across borders. On social media, young people inform themselves about politics and current affairs that they consider relevant to them.

The Eurobarometer News & Media Survey 2023 showed that, while older respondents have a preference for using the website of the news source (of a newspaper etc.) to access news, younger respondents are more likely read articles or posts that appear in their online social networks, or content shared by friends on messaging apps. Compared with the previous survey conducted in 2022, the use of TikTok as an online social media platform had increased across all age groups.

Examples of EU policies affecting social media ahead of the elections

In its meeting of 15 May 2024, the European Commission discussed the danger of disinformation accelerating ahead of the June elections. ‘Disinformation is on the rise, cheaper to produce with artificial intelligence and more widely distributed through social media’, Commission Vice-President Věra Jourová warned. The Commission had identified narratives that are pushed to undermine trust in media and election processes, and warned about deepfake video or audio clips trying to discredit candidates shortly before the elections.

In February 2023, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council banned their staff from using TikTok on their devices using work-related apps, owing to cyber security concerns. The Parliament also blocks the app on its internal Wi-Fi. However, during the winter and spring of 2024, ahead of the European elections, many of the candidates and the Parliament finally went back on the app, considering their presence on TikTok to be essential if they want to reach young voters.

The Commission has taken numerous actions regarding social platforms under the recent Digital Services Act – for example, requesting more information from X on its content moderation activities, in particular curtailing its team of content moderators and reducing linguistic coverage from eleven EU languages to seven. The Commission has also opened probes into Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, as well as TikTok. Although critical voices in the fact-checking community point out that these probes are too late to make a change ahead of the European elections, they will be useful for the future.

A strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation, signed by 44 companies – including Google, Meta and TikTok – was set up in 2022. The signatories committed to taking action in several areas to combat disinformation, inter alia setting up a rapid response system to ensure swift cooperation during election periods. Originally among the signatories, X later withdrew from the code in May 2023.

A year ahead of the elections, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) established a Task Force on the 2024 European Elections. The EDMO fact-checking network, covering all 27 EU Member States, has been publishing daily, weekly and monthly reports analysing disinformation narratives and trends linked to the European elections at national, regional and European level, as well as investigations to counter disinformation. Examples of disinformation circulating ahead of the elections include the EU ‘forcing people to eat insect food‘ against their will, and various themes linked to the Green Deal, such as the EU wanting to ban repairing cars older than 15 years. In Germany, false stories about how to use voting ballots have been circulating that would actually make the vote invalid.

On 21 May 2024, the Council approved conclusions on safeguarding elections from foreign interference, providing an overview of the various mechanisms that the EU has at its disposal. On 10 May, Eurostat also launched a temporary fact-checking service for the election period.

Possible future steps

According to the 2023 News & Media Eurobarometer, 79 % of young Europeans (aged between 15 and 24) follow influencers – content creators who post content on social media and video-sharing platforms – while only 14 % of those aged over 55 do so. In the meeting of Education, Youth, Culture and Sport Ministers on 14 May 2024, the Council adopted conclusions on the rise of influencers as part of the EU’s media ecosystem, noting that influencers are having an increasing impact on the online content and information that people consume on a daily basis in the EU. While this impact is often positive, it can potentially be harmful, both to individuals’ mental health and at a societal level in areas such as democracy. The Council conclusions stress that influencers need media literacy skills to understand the potential negative impact of sharing mis- and disinformation, online hate speech, cyberbullying and other illegal or harmful content.

Among the recommendations proposed by the EU Youth Conference – held in March 2024 in Ghent, Belgium, as part of the 10th cycle of the EU Youth Dialogue – is a proposal to implement critical thinking workshops in schools, enabling youngsters to gain long-term critical thinking and media literacy skills. The youth representatives also proposed that the EU should, in cooperation with the Member States, establish a campaign for young people on how to identify quality information and fight disinformation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Youth, social media and the European elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

You probably use your phone or laptop every day, so you surely want to know your data is stored safely. In 2021, media organisations broke the story that several EU and non-EU governments had used Pegasus commercial spyware against journalists, politicians, diplomats, law enforcement officials, lawyers, business people and civil society actors. Pegasus is designed to breach mobile phones and extract vast amounts of data, including text messages, call interceptions, passwords, locations, microphone and camera recordings, and information from installed apps.

While other institutions shied away from action, the European Parliament responded immediately. It set up a Committee of Inquiry (the Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware – PEGA) to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware. During its mandate, the committee interviewed over 215 interlocutors, commissioned studies, held hearings with experts and people who had been targeted, and organised fact-finding visits to Israel, Poland, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary and Spain. In March 2023, PEGA adopted a 145‑page report with the results of its investigation; Parliament adopted its final recommendation in June 2023.

Parliament found that both EU and non-EU countries had used Pegasus and similar spyware for political and even criminal purposes. Parliament was concerned that some Member States had spied on targets under the pretext of ‘national security’ to escape EU oversight. It concluded that Greek and, in particular, Polish and Hungarian legal frameworks and practices violated Union law and did not offer citizens sufficient protection. Parliament also made specific recommendations for Spain and Cyprus. Parliament envisaged stronger institutional and legal safeguards to ensure fundamental rights-compliant use of spyware, such as conditions for ordering, authorising, executing, and overseeing spyware operations. It also advocated a clear definition of ‘national security’. Parliament called on the European Commission to enforce existing laws more stringently and to follow up on possible abuses. It also tasked the Commission with drafting new laws, such as common EU standards for the use of spyware and a regulation on commercial spyware on the EU market.

Although the PEGA committee terminated on 9 June 2023, the chair and rapporteur announced that Parliament would continue working on the topic, for instance, within the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.

Parliament used its powers of oversight and scrutiny to immediately take action to protect European citizens. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

We all benefit from a tax system that is fair and efficient, as it enables governments to provide important infrastructure and services. However, EU countries struggle with issues such as international corporate tax avoidance, with losses of around €35 to €70 billion annually in the EU and €60 billion in lost value added tax (VAT) revenue.

Taxation is very complex, in particular for companies operating across the EU. The difficulty of having to comply with all the different national tax rules creates barriers preventing businesses from enjoying the full benefits of the single market, to the detriment of economic growth, job creation and consumer choice.

EU countries have exclusive power to set and collect taxes. As such, the European Parliament can only produce non-binding opinions on tax-related matters. However, in June 2020, it decided to set up a Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC). This was the European Parliament’s first permanent committee on tax affairs, focusing on all tax-related matters, particularly the fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance, as well as tax transparency.

Four years later, the subcommittee has established itself as a key forum to discuss EU tax matters. Members have engaged extensively with tax experts from academia, non-governmental organisations and businesses and organised meetings with national parliaments to enhance cooperation. More specifically, the subcommittee held hearings on the status and efficacy of the tax reforms countries committed to as part of their post-pandemic recovery programmes to access the EU’s Next Generation EU recovery funds.

The FISC subcommittee has also engaged actively with countries outside the EU. It has used fact-finding missions, for instance to Singapore and the United States, to promote good tax governance standards, encouraging countries to join the global agreement on international corporate tax reform.

In addition, the FISC committee has adopted a series of recommendations to shape the EU’s tax agenda and maintain pressure on both the European Commission and the Council to enable a fairer and growth-friendly tax system. For example, FISC has called for measures to further harmonise electronic invoicing, to simplify the withholding tax framework and to counteract the misuse of shell companies. Several legislative initiatives in this area are now being debated by the Member States.

Parliament thus used its oversight and scrutiny powers to put pressure on both EU countries and the institutions to ensure their tax systems are fair and efficient. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Our daily or weekly groceries have become more expensive recently. These price rises are happening – even though the European Union is one of the world’s most food-secure regions – because the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disrupted feed, fertiliser and energy imports, while extreme weather events have led to crop failures. As a result of this confluence of factors, food prices have skyrocketed, hitting lower-income households most harshly. To protect EU citizens, the European Parliament has consistently advocated measures to make the EU depend less on imports and become more resilient to climate change.

The EU’s most powerful tool to address these challenges and ensure our food security is the common agricultural policy (CAP), which has supported the EU’s primary food producers – farmers – for over 60 years. In 2017, EU agricultural policy was thoroughly reformed. The European Parliament played a central role in shaping the new CAP, which was adopted in 2021 and consists of three regulations: on national strategic plans, on financing, management and monitoring; and on the single common organisation of the markets.

Parliament worked to ensure the new CAP rules incentivise a farming system that is greener, fairer, more efficient and better at preventing and mitigating future threats to food security. During long and intense negotiations, Parliament pushed for greater social and environmental commitments tosupport farmers, preserve biodiversity and maintain healthy soils. As a result, the new CAP devotes 35 % of its €95.5 billion budget to fund rural development, and 25 % of direct payments to farmers will aim to encourage sustainable farming and better animal welfare practices.

Members also advocated strongly for small and family farms, ensuring that at least 10 % of the direct payments budget reinforces the support allocated to them. Moreover, thanks to the European Parliament, at least 3 % of the CAP budget must specifically benefit young farmers. Because fairness and efficiency are important to keep farms running, Members pushed for the introduction of social conditionality – making payments dependent on respect for labour standards – and tougher measures to combat fraud, entailing better monitoring of funds.

Parliament also insisted on the creation of an annual €450 million crisis reserve to shield farmers, stabilise markets and protect consumers from future shocks. This mechanism was used for the first time following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, helping to mitigate energy and agricultural supply disruption, and averting a wider food security crisis in the EU. This way, Parliament used its law-making powers to shield farmers and protect consumers from future crises. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

On 24 February 2022, Russia’s unjustified aggression against Ukraine signalled the return of high-intensity warfare to Europe. In response, and to ensure the EU’s long-term goal of achieving defence industrial readiness, the European Commission adopted the first-ever European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) on 5 March 2024.

As an immediate and central step to deliver the strategy, the Commission put forward a proposal for a European defence industry programme (EDIP) regulation, also on 5 March 2024. EDIP – with a proposed budget of €1.5 billion – seeks to achieve defence industrial readiness by bridging the gap between short-term emergency measures that have been implemented since 2023 and will end in 2025 and a more structural, long-term approach.

Complete version

• May 2024: European defence industry programme (EDIP) (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely
availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP’) Committee responsible:Pending final decision on the referralCOM(2024) 0150
5.3.2024Rapporteur:To be determined2024/0061(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be determinedOrdinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and
Council on equal
footing – formerly
‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Draft report

Written by Piotr Bąkowski.

Cannabis is by far the most commonly used illicit drug in the European Union (EU), where its distribution, cultivation, possession and use (consumption) are largely banned. The prohibition of drug-related activities other than those performed for medical or scientific purposes is the defining feature of the international drug control system. Set up by the United Nations (UN), this system is composed of three complementary conventions, to which all EU Member States are party.

Countries around the world have made use of the flexibility of the UN system, forgoing criminal penalties in some cases (e.g. for possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use), or replacing them with administrative ones. The UN bodies monitoring compliance with the conventions seem to have come to accept these policy choices. However, they remain resistant to the still rare yet increasingly common practice of legalising the recreational use of cannabis, which may entail regulating drug distribution and sale in a manner akin to that for alcohol and tobacco.

In the EU, drug policy has remained primarily a Member State preserve. The EU has fostered Member State cooperation on law enforcement and health-related issues, while at the same time respecting their diverse philosophies on how to address recreational drug use. National approaches range from very restrictive policies that prioritise criminal law responses, to more liberal ones that focus primarily on reducing the health and social harms resulting from drug use. In 2021, Malta became the first Member State to legalise, within strict limits, recreational cannabis, and several others have since taken steps that could potentially lead to similar drug policy reforms.

This briefing updates an earlier one, entitled Recreational use of cannabis, published in 2023. The following EPRS policy analysts contributed to the country analyses: Antonio Albaladejo Roman (Spain), David De Groot (Germany), Micaela Del Monte (Luxembourg), Verena Kern (Austria), Silvia Kotanidis (Italy), Marie Lecerf (France), Gabija Leclerc (Lithuania), Katrien Luyten (Belgium), Ingeborg Odink (the Netherlands), Anita Orav (Estonia), Marketa Pape (Czechia), Martina Prpic (Croatia) and Rosamund Shreeves (Malta).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Recreational use of cannabis: Laws and policies in selected EU Member States’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira.

High-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) stands out as a critical nuclear fuel supply for medical isotopes production in the EU, as well as for advanced nuclear reactor development. Against a backdrop of a challenging global geopolitical context and the EU’s commitment to energy security and climate ambitions, HALEU could potentially be a game-changer. With the EU designing a comprehensive strategy for the development and deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs), the role of HALEU as a nuclear fuel is attracting attention for its promise of cost-effectiveness and reliability. Concurrently, HALEU already has significance beyond electricity production, particularly in the production of medical supplies in the EU, and their export to global markets. As the EU navigates the complexities of nuclear energy policy, anchored within ongoing geopolitical dynamics and climate imperatives, a thorough examination of HALEU’s potential and challenges is paramount for informed decision-making.

A timely STOA workshop was held on 8 April 2024 to further the discussion on the EU’s strategic autonomy in nuclear fuel supplies, with a particular emphasis on HALEU use and availability. The event responded to a mounting interest in SMRs and their capacity to address the EU’s dual goals of energy security and climate resilience, all while examining the critical production of isotopes crucial for medical diagnostics and cancer treatment.

The event featured opening statements from a panel of distinguished experts in the field. Jon Carmack, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Supply Chain at the Office of Nuclear Energy, US Department of Energy, shared insights into the work by the United States on promoting domestic production of HALEU and nuclear fuels in general via a recorded message. He highlighted the partnerships with the private sector within the US HALEU availability programme, which received US$700 million under the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act.

According to Stefano Ciccarello, the acting Director-General of the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA), the EU acquired around 300 kg of HALEU for non-power applications (i.e. medical isotopes production and research reactors) in 2022, half of which was supplied by Russia and the other half by the US. ESA expects that HALEU needs for non-power applications will be around 700‑1 000 kg/year in 2035. As ESA proposes that these needs are met through domestic production, it therefore launched the preparatory phase for a European production capability to secure a supply of HALEU to fuel European research reactors and the production of medical radioisotopes. Stefano Ciccarello also noted that, depending on the rate of SMR deployment, there is potential competition between the use of HALEU for health applications and energy production.

Ghislain Pascal, policy officer from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy, introduced the recently launched European Industrial Alliance on SMRs, including its governance model. The Alliance hopes to provide a framework for coordinating activities, preparing analytical studies, sharing best practices, developing, and conducting joint actions aimed at fostering the deployment of SMRs in Europe.

Navid Samandari, Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of Seaborg Technologies, highlighted the challenges of the deployment of advanced nuclear reactor technologies in Europe, particularly when compared to the situation in the US. He underscored the critical importance of having a diversified and secure supply chain of nuclear fuels, including HALEU fuel. However, he stated that this is not the case in the EU, prompting his company to pivot towards low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This shift inevitably led to increased costs and delays in bringing their advanced modular reactor design to market.

On the other hand, Hidde Baars, Government Affairs Director Netherlands & EU at Urenco, a leading European manufacturer of nuclear fuels, offered reassurance regarding HALEU supply. He affirmed that Urenco is committed to producing all types of fuels required, including HALEU, and ensuring their availability where needed. He stated that at the current level of HALEU demand in the EU, investment in production capacity is not necessary, while showing support for the role of the recently launched European Industrial Alliance on SMRs in bringing together European stakeholders and advancing decision making at the EU level.

A lively Q&A session was opened by former Member Paul Rübig, who mentioned the ongoing work of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) on drafting a report on medical isotopes and asked about the quantities of HALEU available and mapping of stockpiles. STOA Panel member Jutta Paulus (Greens, Germany)  enquired about the costs and possible economies of scale of SMRs, recent failures of SMR deployment and potential proliferation risks.

Panellists addressed questions from the audience, underlining that EU HALEU production for medical isotopes is in a preparatory stage, but stressing that there are many uncertainties regarding the development of SMRs, in particular the hard-to-estimate future fuel needs. It was also clarified that SMRs can be of third or fourth generation, and that third-generation SMRs (the same generation of conventional nuclear power plants in operation that use LEU) are a mature technology and probably already cost-effective. On proliferation, the importance of the Euratom safeguards legal framework and EU nuclear inspectors was mentioned, as well as the need for international cooperation on the topic in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In closing the debate, STOA Panel member Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark) reiterated the importance of a continuous, comprehensive political discussion based on sound scientific evidence, especially in the context of the need to reduce dependence on Russian gas and fossil fuels in general.

This workshop served as a platform for a much-needed balanced discussion on nuclear energy in the EU, acknowledging both its potential benefits and drawbacks. It provided a comprehensive overview of the latest advances in reactors that use HALEU and contributed to the political discussion in the EU on how this particular fuel could potentially play a role in ensuring a more secure energy supply.

For more details, you can watch the event recording or read a comprehensive EPRS briefing entitled: Strategic autonomy and the future of nuclear energy in the EU: Use and availability of high-assay low-enriched uranium and its potential role in securing a clean, safe energy supply.

Your opinion matters to us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu and follow us on X at @EP_ScienceTech.

© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP

In this year of elections more than ever, everyone needs access to fair and unbiased reporting. You might have noticed worrying trends in the news about media politicisation and a lack of transparency around media ownership across the European Union. With threats, harassment, public shaming and even assassinations of journalists having a considerable chilling effect on the media landscape, Parliament has advocated better protection for press freedom and media pluralism in the EU and beyond. Its November 2020 resolution, for example, raised awareness of attempts by some EU governments to silence critical media and undermine media freedom and pluralism. So what has the Parliament done to protect our media environment?

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), the first ever EU-level regulation on media freedom, pluralism and protecting journalists, applies since April 2024. It ensures that the rules are the same for media online and offline, throughout the EU. It addresses the risk of ‘media capture’ through hidden funding, lack of transparency in the ownership of media outlets, the use of spyware, and provides guarantees against financial distress and market concentration. Parliament succeeded in removing a proposed reference to ‘protecting national security’ that might give state authorities a ‘blank cheque’ to spy on journalists. The act states that EU countries will have to respect media service providers’ editorial freedom. In line with Parliament’s request, all public authorities will have to publish annual accounts of their public advertising expenditure, including when advertising on online platforms. Parliament also ensured that very big online platforms, sometimes known as ‘gateways’, have to give a statement of reasons before they restrict content.

At the time of her murder in 2017, Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia was facing 43 different vexatious libel suits. To end this type of harassment of journalists – strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) – the EU adopted its Anti-SLAPP Directive in April 2024. The law obliges EU countries to ensure courts can dismiss these kinds of cases as unfounded, and do so early, under a mechanism for early dismissal of abusive cases,to avoid lengthy and cumbersome civil procedures. To help EU countries organise measures to deal with criminal proceedings brought abusively against journalists and other activists, the European Commission has provided guidance in a non-binding recommendation.

This way, Parliament used both its law-making and agenda-setting powers to promote democratic participation, fight disinformation and support media freedom and pluralism. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.