European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Clare Ferguson.

A new year means a new start at the European Parliament, with the January session agenda seeing Members welcoming a new EU Council presidency and considering a number of current and foreign affairs issues, including issuing a statement welcoming the ceasefire in Gaza. Members are expected to hear Council and European Commission statements on the implications for transatlantic relations of the new Trump administration, Russian sabotage in the Baltic, on the political situation in Venezuela and in Georgia, and on the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.

Looking ahead, a key debate scheduled for Wednesday morning focuses on the Polish EU Council Presidency‘s programme of activities for the coming six months. The programme covers seven linked aspects of security: external, internal, information, economic, energy, food and health, in line with its ‘Security, Europe’ motto and its priority to boost EU defence readiness in a deteriorating geopolitical situation. This follows a key debate on the conclusions of the December European Council meeting (the first chaired by its new President, António Costa), which followed an EU-Western Balkans Summit on 18 December.

As the human rights situation worsens in Belarus, with a continued climate of oppression in the country, the European Parliament has long criticised President Lukashenka’s regime and expressed concern about the human rights situation. It has called for the release of political prisoners and accountability for human rights issues, highlighting the cases of prisoners such as Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski. The Parliament’s engagement with Belarusian democratic forces includes a cooperation agreement signed by President Roberta Metsola. In advance of presidential ‘elections’ due to take place on 26 January and following a statement from the Commission, Members are due to hold a debate on the need for EU action on the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus, on Tuesday afternoon.

Online platforms have become an important space for public debate worldwide. Protecting this freedom of expression from foreign interference and bias has become a hot topic in recent months. Following Council and Commission statements on the need to enforce the Digital Services Act, Members are due to participate in a debate on Tuesday morning on protecting democracy online.

As the EU’s population ages, increasing mismatch between workers and jobs is beginning to stretch public budgets. Demographic change also has consequences for EU competitiveness, environmental and technological progress, and communities. Parliament has urged the simplification of cohesion policy instruments and enhancing coordination of EU funds to address these challenges. Members are set to debate the EU’s demographic challenge following a Commission statement on addressing demographic issues, scheduled on Wednesday afternoon.

Over 90 % of irregular migrants to the EU pay for the assistance of migrant smugglers. The migrant smuggling business brings considerable profits to the violent criminal groups involved – at great risk to the lives of those who use them to reach the EU. Parliament has consistently called for more cooperation and data sharing to combat this challenge. Following a Commission update on Wednesday, Members are due to debate criminal networks’ facilitation of irregular migration.

Finally, on Thursday morning, Members are due to hear a Commission statement on combating desertification, which follows the conclusion of the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention. While COP16 agreed financial support for land restoration and drought resilience initiatives, no legally binding framework was established to tackle drought.

• Outcome of the EU leaders’ meetings of 18-19 December 2024
• Priority dossiers under the Polish EU Council Presidency
• The Polish Parliament and EU affairs
• Belarus: Continued oppression and fake elections
• Information integrity online and the European democracy shield
• Addressing EU demographic challenges: towards the implementation of the 2023 Demography Toolbox
• Facilitation of irregular migration by criminal networks
• COP 16 desertification conference: Outcomes

Written by Anne Altmayer.

The Baltic has several unique features, comprising a mixture of saline and fresh water and a shallow depth, enabling a broad variety of habitats. Its fish species are rather limited in number, with the bulk of fish stocks spread among cod, herring and sprat.

The sea’s characteristics make it particularly vulnerable to environmental changes and many habitats and species of the Baltic Sea are not in good condition. The environmental deterioration is caused by several factors, including excessive nutrient input, pollution, climate change, invasive species and over-exploitation.

The worrying situation of the Baltic Sea habitats is leading to a dramatic decline in some commercial fish stocks, with fisheries losing economic and cultural importance.

A range of promising measures for specific fish species have been taken at EU level, the results of which could however be jeopardised if habitats cannot be restored.

Parliament has previously expressed concern about the state of the Baltic Sea over many years, and has played an important role in adopting measures to alleviate the situation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Baltic Sea fishing area: Current challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Top 10 species in landed weight and value, for EU Member States’ fleets operating in the Baltic Sea 2021 (tonnes, €)

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The focus of the December 2024 European Council meeting lay on two main issues: Ukraine and the European Union in the world. On Ukraine, the main message was that the EU will give full support to Ukraine for as long as necessary. In that context, EU leaders condemned Russia and those who support its war, and also discussed the path to peace. Regarding the EU in the world, EU leaders first examined developments in the Middle East, with a strong focus on the situation in Syria, and, over dinner, held a strategic discussion on the EU’s global engagement in the current geopolitical context. Notably, they discussed EU relations with the United States after the US elections, as well as the current ‘new positive energy’ in relations between the EU and the United Kingdom.

Additionally, based on the report by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, EU Heads of State or Government considered ways of increasing EU resilience, preparedness and crisis prevention. They also discussed migration, reviewing progress in the implementation of past conclusions and calling for legislation with a migration component to be given priority. In addition, they endorsed the ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice’ for the 2024-2029 period. Finally, EU leaders discussed enlargement, developments in Moldova and Georgia, and the situation in Venezuela.  

The European Council meeting, which was the first one chaired by its new President, António Costa, was preceded by an EU-Western Balkans summit on 18 December.

1.      EU-Western Balkans Summit

The day before the European Council meeting, EU leaders met in Brussels for a summit with the Western Balkans (WB) countries, aiming to emphasise the strategic importance of the partnership between the EU and the WB region. EU leaders discussed ways of: i) boosting the EU-WB partnership through the growth plan; ii) increasing the EU’s political and policy engagement with the WB (including areas such as foreign and security policy); iii) building a strong economic base; iv) easing the impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine and building resilience to Russia’s hybrid threats; v) cooperating in areas such as migration and tackling organised crime, terrorism and corruption; vi) building the social dimension of EU integration. At the summit, EU leaders also discussed the overall geopolitical challenges facing the EU and the WB, and agreed on a 17-page declaration.

2.     European Council meeting General

At the start of the meeting, EU leaders marked the 50th anniversary of the creation of the European Council as an informal body of Heads of State or Government. It formally became an EU institution with the Lisbon Treaty. The meeting began with the customary address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. Subsequently, EU leaders held an exchange of views with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The meeting concluded with a report by the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, on the achievements of the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU.

Ukraine

The discussion on Ukraine covered three broad topics: i) the path to peace; ii) EU support to Ukraine; and iii) the condemnation of Russia’s aggression and of those supporting it. With peace recently coming more to the fore in EU discussions, the European Council emphasised that Ukraine, as the country that had been invaded, must be part of any peace initiative for it to be credible. It reiterated its support for a lasting peace based on the UN Charter, international law and the principles of the Ukraine Peace Formula. The conclusions contained a notable shift in tone – ‘Russia must not prevail’ – and did not refer to any ‘scenarios’ or to peace-keeping forces, which are considered premature.

The European Council reiterated the EU’s commitment to providing ‘political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes and as intensely as needed’. EU leaders reviewed efforts to deliver military support, calling for increased efforts to deliver air defence systems, ammunition, missiles, and training and equipment for Ukrainian brigades. They also reiterated the importance of developing Ukraine’s defence industry and its cooperation with the EU defence industry. Moreover, they called, once again, on the Council to accelerate work on strengthening the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), which aims to strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces through the provision of training support (almost 70 000 soldiers have been trained since the mission launched).

EU leaders welcomed the implementation of the Ukraine Facility, which delivered payments of €16.2 billion in 2024 but is expected to deliver almost €4 billion less in 2025. They also welcomed the swift implementation of the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans initiative agreed by the G7 in Italy in October 2024. The ERA initiative, which is funded by profits from immobilised Russian assets, will result in €45 billion of support to Ukraine’s current and future military, budget and reconstruction needs. The first tranche of funds is due to be released in January 2025. Furthermore, EU leaders highlighted the importance of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (to be hosted by Italy in July 2025) as part of the EU’s commitment to support Ukraine’s repair, recovery and reconstruction.

The European Council reiterated its condemnation of Russia’s deliberate attacks against Ukraine’s civilian and energy infrastructure, which seek to weaponise winter conditions. It called for increased support to keep Ukraine’s energy infrastructure running and for Ukraine and Moldova’s energy systems to be further integrated into the EU’s network. Member States were praised for their exports of electricity to Ukraine.

EU leaders welcomed the adoption by the Council of the 15th package of sanctions against Russia, underlining the need for further measures to counter the circumvention of sanctions, including through third countries, and for their full enforcement. Furthermore, they condemned, and urged the cessation of, actions and support by third countries for Russia’s war of aggression, with Iran and North Korea specifically mentioned for their arms transfers to Russia and deepening military cooperation, including the deployment of North Korean forces to Russia for use against Ukraine.

Main message of the EP President: We need a path to real peace. But the guiding principle must remain ‘Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine’.

Middle East

Developments in the Middle East, notably in Syria, were a central discussion point for EU leaders. The European Council saw in the new situation in Syria – after an offensive which toppled the Assad regime on 27 November – an historic opportunity to reunite and rebuild an inclusive Syrian-led political process in line with the principles of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. EU leaders agreed on the main points of the EU approach to the Syrian transition, which must aim to: i) preserve national unity; ii) ensure the protection of all civilians; iii) ensure the provision of public services; iv) create the conditions for an inclusive and peaceful political transition; and v) create the conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified returns of Syrian refugees. Considering the potential impact on Europe, EU leaders stressed the need to prevent the re-emergence of terrorist groups and to ensure the destruction of Syria’s remaining chemical weapons. In this respect, they invited the Commission and the High Representative to submit to the Council potential support measures for Syria.

On Lebanon, the European Council welcomed the 27 November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, which followed mediation efforts, in particular by France and the United States. EU leaders urged all parties to implement the ceasefire, which is still holding, despite violations. They also underlined their continuing support for the Lebanese state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and state-building efforts, calling on Lebanese political leaders to overcome the political and economic impasse. Until the recent election of Joseph Aoun, the country had been without a president for several years and remains subject to a severe and lingering economic crisis.

Concerning Gaza, the European Council, reiterating its previous conclusions, called for a ceasefire, the release of all hostages, improved and sustained access for humanitarian assistance to Gaza, and an end to hostilities in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2735. EU leaders also declared their continuing commitment to international law and lasting peace based on the two-state solution. The European Council reiterated its continued support for the Palestinian Authority and for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides support to the civilian population of Gaza. Once again, it expressed concern over the consequences of Israeli legislation impeding the humanitarian work of the UNRWA.

Main message of the EP President: Dialogue, unity, respect for fundamental rights, and international law must guide the way forward. Now is our moment to step up.

EU in the world

Although there were no lengthy conclusions on the topic, President Costa noted that the EU’s global engagement had been an important focal point during this European Council meeting. EU leaders held a strategic discussion on the EU’s global engagement and priorities in the current geopolitical context. They also discussed EU relations with the United States, stressing the EU’s commitment to continue working with the US under the Trump administration, as well as relations with the United Kingdom and the current trend of ‘new positive energy’ since Keir Starmer became Prime Minister.

Resilience, preparedness, crisis prevention and response

The former President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, presented his report ‘Safer together: Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’ to EU leaders. In the context of an evolving threat landscape and of an increasing number of natural disasters due to climate change and environmental degradation, the European Council reaffirmed the urgency of strengthening resilience, preparedness, crisis prevention and response capacities. With a view to the future preparedness strategy, EU leaders invited the Commission, the High Representative and the Council to pursue work on the different work strands and actions at EU level.

Migration

On migration, EU leaders took stock of the progress made in implementing past conclusions on the issue, notably regarding the external dimension of migration, the implementation of adopted EU legislation and the application of existing legislation.

The European Council reiterated its support for the Commission’s planned legislative proposal on returns, due to be submitted in early 2025, and called on the co-legislators to advance, as a matter of priority, on files with a migration dimension. It took note of the Commission communication on the weaponisation of migration and strengthening security at the EU’s external borders.

Other items

Enlargement: The European Council underscored the importance of enlargement as a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity. EU leaders stated that both the EU and aspiring members had a responsibility to make the most of this opportunity. They endorsed the Council’s 35 pages of conclusions on enlargement, agreed on 17 December 2024.

Main message of the EP President: Enlargement must remain merit-based, founded on our criteria. But we need to step up our efforts, too.

Moldova: The European Council praised Moldova for the successful conduct of the presidential elections, together with the referendum on enshrining EU accession in the Moldovan constitution, despite Russia’s hybrid interference. EU leaders invited the Commission to urgently provide options for the strengthening of Moldova’s energy security. They committed to working with Moldova to enhance the country’s resilience and stability, and to support its reform efforts on its European path, specifically through the Growth Plan and the Reform and Growth Facility.

Georgia:The European Council reiterated its serious concerns regarding the path taken by the Georgian government, expressing regret at the Georgian government’s decision to suspend the country’s EU accession process until 2028. EU leaders condemned violence against those peaceful protestors, politicians and media, and highlighted that the EU would support the Georgian people’s European aspirations, if the authorities reverse their present course of action.

Venezuela:Once again, EU leaders expressed their concern about the situation in Venezuela and committed to mobilising the tools at their disposal to support democracy and a peaceful transition in the country. They also called for the release of all political detainees and for Venezuela to uphold international law.

Hybrid activities: The European Council strongly condemned Russia’s hybrid campaign against the EU and its Member States. EU leaders also welcomed the adoption of the first listings under the framework for restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities.

Freedom, security and justice:The European Council welcomed the Council Decision to lift the checks on persons at internal land borders with and between Bulgaria and Romania as of 1 January 2025. As flagged up in the EPRS Outlook briefing, the leaders endorsed the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice, a Treaty obligation with which the European Council did not comply during the 2019-2024 period.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the EU leaders’ meetings of 18-19 December 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Polona Car with Filippo Cassetti.

Dark patterns are deceptive techniques used by online platforms to manipulate users’ behaviour, often without their knowledge or consent. The EU regulatory framework against dark patterns is fragmented and lacks a unified legal definition. This can lead to legal uncertainty and inconsistent enforcement. Stakeholders and academics are calling for clearer definitions, stronger safeguards, and more effective enforcement of existing laws.

What are dark patterns?

Dark patterns or deceptive patterns can be described as ‘tricks used in websites and apps that make you do things that you didn’t mean to, like buying or signing up for something’. They are based on harmful online choice architecture. Their purpose is to influence a broad spectrum of consumer decisions, impeding the consumers’ ability to make informed choices. They intentionally affect users’ behaviour to manipulate them. Some dark patterns are designed to make the person feel compelled to purchase, either by the design of the website or by the ‘opportunity’ of the deal. Examples include fake urgency (for instance fake countdown timers) to pressure user action, disguised advertisement, and emotional manipulation to make users question their actions.

Absence of a single legal definition

There is no common definition of dark patterns in the EU legal framework. The Digital Services Act (DSA) describes them in its recital 67 as ‘practices that materially distort or impair, either on purpose or in effect, the ability of recipients of the service to make autonomous and informed choices or decisions’. According to the DSA, these practices are to be prohibited. The recent fitness check of EU consumer law on digital fairness defines dark patterns as ‘unfair commercial practices deployed through the structure, design or functionalities of digital interfaces or system architecture that can influence consumers to make decisions they would not have taken otherwise’. The various definitions nevertheless have two key features in common: the manipulative or deceptive nature of the practice and the resulting negative or harmful outcome. As this description is quite broad, to be able to determine whether a particular practice should be classified as a dark pattern, there are numerous guidelines and practical recommendations to consider.

Complexity of the existing legislative framework

Dark patterns were introduced into the EU’s legal framework by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD). However, the UCPD does not use the term ‘dark patterns’. What it prohibits are ‘misleading’ and ‘aggressive’ commercial practices. The UCPD protects consumers against unfair business-to-consumer (B2C) commercial practices in advertising, sales and after-sales. To this ‘first level’ of protection, a series of subsequent legal acts were added, offering protection where the UCPD failed to offer adequate protection against new players and technological advances: the UCPD clearly forbids only a limited number of dark patterns that are mentioned in its Annex I and these prohibitions do not deal with digital interfaces.

The above-mentioned fitness check raised concerns about how Article 25 of the DSA interacts with other EU legal acts. While it prohibits online platforms from using dark patterns, it excludes practices covered by the UCPD and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This means that if a dark pattern of an online platform provider violates the GDPR, its legality will be assessed according to the requirements of the GDPR, not the DSA. This situation creates legal uncertainty. Although the GDPR does not address dark patterns explicitly, particular techniques to obtain consent from data users could be interpreted as such. This leaves space for interpretation that could minimise the impact of the DSA.

Similarly, the UCPD has such a broad scope, covering all B2C relations, that the space left for applying the DSA is limited. Consequently, the clear and general prohibition of dark patterns in the DSA may still lead to a reliance on the UCDP’s case-by-case analysis. As a solution, the fitness check report proposed adding specific prohibitions of dark patterns to the UCPD. This could be done by expanding the UCPD’s Annex I with explicit prohibitions addressing online interfaces.

Parliament’s December 2023 resolution on addictive design of online service and consumer protection arrived at similar conclusions. It called on the Commission to close regulatory gaps relating to dark patterns, and strengthen transparency provisions, as the current rules were not sufficient to mitigate adverse effects. It argued that several dark patterns could already be addressed under the current list in Annex I of the UCPD. Nevertheless, it asked the Commission to assess the need to extend Annex I as a matter of urgency, to prohibit the most harmful practices. Parliament considered that development of ethical and fair digital products free of dark patterns should constitute reasonable professional diligence.

Other legal acts also address dark patterns. The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act introduces new prohibitions on dark patterns, without mentioning the term specifically. The AI Act prohibits subliminal techniques, purposefully manipulative or deceptive techniques or use of AI systems that exploit vulnerabilities based on age, disability or a specific social or economic situation (Articles 5(1)(a) and (b)) that could cause significant harm. Unlike the DSA, the AI Act requires case-by-case interpretation of specific terms such as ‘subliminal technique’ and ‘purposefully’ manipulative or deceptive. However, exploitation of some vulnerabilities under the AI Act (e.g. emotion-recognition) is classified as high-risk AI, but not prohibited.

For its part, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) includes an anti-circumvention rule (Article 13) aimed at capturing dark patterns used by gatekeepers to influence consumer decisions unlawfully. The Data Act mentions the prohibition of the use of dark patterns in relation to third parties and data holders when they are designing their digital interfaces (Recital 38). These should not be designed in a way to make decisions unduly difficult for the users. Specific prohibition of dark patterns was introduced for financial services, with the 2023 amendment to the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD). The amendment (Article 16(e)) prohibits traders from applying dark patterns when they are concluding financial services contracts at a distance. This variety of provisions used in different legal acts intended to address dark patterns could create a lack of coherence in implementation. This was outlined in the above-mentioned fitness check report, which established a need for further action. Based on this evaluation, the Commission announced a public consultation in preparation for the upcoming Digital Fairness Act in 2025, to remedy the situation.

Academic views

Inge Graef warns of risk of inconsistencies, leading to under-enforcement owing to the fragmented EU regulatory framework for dark patterns. Martin Brenncke underlines the difficulty of effective regulation as dark patterns act in between legitimate persuasive techniques and illegal methods of coercion and manipulation. In addition, dark patterns take advantage of consumer behaviour bias, while EU consumer legislation assumes that consumers are rational economic actors. Mark Leiser and Cristiana Santos underline the importance of clear labelling of dark patterns in enforcement, and publicising such actions to discourage deception. In addition, they highlight the need to update the EU acquis constantly, to confront emerging prohibited designs and forms of manipulation (for instance hyper-nudging).

Stakeholder positions

During the public consultation for the digital fairness fitness check, stakeholders expressed concern about the current legal framework, citing ambiguity, complexity and ineffective enforcement. A majority of respondents advocated enhanced protection against dark patterns and similar deceptive practices, recommending clearer and stronger safeguards. They proposed, among other things, a comprehensive ban on dark patterns, clearer definitions of key concepts to reduce uncertainty, and the placing of a ‘fairness by design’ obligation on businesses.

The European Consumer Organisation, BEUC, recommended ensuring better enforcement against dark patterns and in particular, reviewing the UCPD and CRD. For the two directives, BEUC proposed to introduce an anti-circumvention clause, modelled on the example introduced by the DMA. A March 2024 BEUC report proposed regulatory solutions, based on a horizontal principle of fairness by design.
Digital industry stakeholders meanwhile insist that a distinction must be drawn between deceptive practices and legitimate online persuasive methods, so as not to jeopardise innovation. In a recent report, Eurocommerce argued that dark partners are already sufficiently covered by existing legislation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Regulating dark patterns in the EU: Towards digital fairness‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

The recent cost-of-living crisis has exacerbated a longstanding problem with housing affordability in the EU. Higher building costs and mortgage rates, together with a related decrease in housing construction, have made access to home ownership more difficult. At the same time, investors use housing as a vehicle for investment. Growing numbers of people are struggling to access affordable housing, whether to rent or to buy, particularly in cities. Across Europe, homelessness is rising.

In addition, many residential buildings need to be made energy-efficient and decarbonised in order to achieve the EU’s energy and climate goals, lower energy consumption and reduce energy bills.

While the EU has no direct competence in the area of housing and only a limited scope of action to address social issues, it provides relevant guidance and funding, and has carried out several initiatives to support housing. Furthermore, certain EU rules have a indirect impact on housing provision, starting with the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. In parallel, many sources of EU funding are available for various housing-related purposes in the current financing period.

In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the lack of adequate and affordable housing, and the need to address it at EU level, emerged as a concern across the whole of the EU and the entire political spectrum. The new European Commission (‘von der Leyen II’) is giving housing policy visibility and weight by proposing a coordinated approach. For the first time, housing has become a distinct part of a commissioner’s portfolio. Dan Jørgensen, the new Commissioner for Energy and Housing, is responsible for dealing with several complex issues relating to housing.

The European Parliament voted on 18 December 2024 to set up a special committee on the housing crisis in the EU. Building on recent developments, the Commission’s 2025 work programme is expected to outline the next steps for the EU.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A coordinated EU approach to housing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Pieter Baert.

Equality between men and women is one of the key foundational principles of the European Union. Despite much progress, however, significant gaps persist between men and women regarding employment opportunities and income levels. Taxation can either mitigate or exacerbate these gender inequalities. On 13 January 2025, the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC) is due to hold a public hearing on the topic.

Implicit gender biases in joint taxation systems

In general, Member States do not differentiate explicitly between men and women in their tax systems. However, certain tax provisions may inadvertently carry implicit gender biases, often rooted in broader socio-economic and cultural factors.

One notable example is joint taxation, where married couples (or civil partners) file joint declarations, with household income taxed as a single unit. While a joint declaration does decrease the overall tax burden for the household, especially where there is significant income disparity between the two partners, it can also lead to a disproportionately higher marginal tax rate for the secondary earner (lower income earner), who often is a woman. This effect can make additional earnings less financially rewarding, discouraging women from entering the labour market or transitioning from part-time to full-time employment.

The consequences of these tax structures can contribute to broader gender inequalities by limiting women’s career advancement and undermining their economic independence in the long term. Joint taxation systems are increasingly being phased out, although several (European) countries continue to have them in place, on either a voluntary or a mandatory basis.

Although taxation remains largely a national prerogative, the European Commission has actively encouraged Member States to reform tax incentives that deter secondary earners from participating in the labour market. For example, the European Commission argued that Germany’s national recovery and resilience plan failed to address concerns about the country’s joint taxation system (‘Ehegattensplitting’), which, in the Commission’s opinion, reduces women’s potential for participating in the labour market.

VAT rates on feminine hygiene products and gender-based price discrimination

Over the years, the tax cost of menstrual products has been a topic of growing public debate. Since these products are used exclusively by women, the issue has gained attention for its gendered economic impact. Advocates for lowering or removing value added tax (VAT) on menstrual products argue that the tax places an unfair, systematic financial burden on women, and contributes to ‘period poverty‘. Unlike other consumer products, these goods are considered a matter of necessity rather than an expression of consumer choice.

In April 2022, a revision of the EU VAT Directive introduced greater flexibility for Member States to reduce VAT rates on female sanitary products. This change allowed Member States to lower the VAT rate to as little as 0 %, compared with the previous minimum rate of 5 % (Annex III, paragraph 3). The European Parliament urged Member States to take advantage of this increased flexibility. However, while several Member States have since reduced their VAT rates on such goods, practices remain quite divergent, as illustrated in Figure 1 below.

VAT rate on tampons (EU, 2024)

Tax policy experts are generally cautious about VAT rate reductions, citing the likelihood for suppliers to bypass these reductions by increasing their profit margins instead. However, a recent study by academics from the University of Vienna, which looked at VAT rate cuts on menstrual products in Austria, Belgium, France and Germany, found that the tax reduction had been fully passed on to consumers over time. With the lower price, households purchased products of higher quality, and low-income households increased their purchase volume of menstrual products, highlighting the potential of such reforms to improve access for disadvantaged groups.

While reducing VAT rates is one approach to making female hygiene products more affordable, some Member States and local governments have chosen to provide these goods for free in schools, public restrooms and other public spaces.

A related, and puzzling, phenomenon is that of gender-based price discrimination. Although not an explicit tax as such, this refers to the situation where women sometimes incur extra costs for products and services marketed to them compared with similar items for men, with the products differing often only in superficial aspects, such as colour, name or description. Common examples include shampoo, razors and hairdressing services. While no comprehensive EU-wide research has been conducted to assess the prevalence of such practices, a study by the German Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency examined over 1 500 products in Germany and found that female variants were priced higher in 2.3 % of cases, while male variants were more expensive in 1.4 % of cases.

EU Directive 2004/113 already prohibits discrimination in access to goods and services based on gender. In 2023, the European Commission said it had no plans at the time to introduce additional measures in that directive to address gender price discrimination.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Taxation’s impact on gender equality in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot.

The ninth edition of this annual publication presents 10 issues to watch in 2025, selected by the Members’ Research Service of the European Parliament. Some of these issues feature high on the 2025 European political agenda as they reflect the three pillars of the ‘competitiveness compass’ that the von der Leyen II Commission has identified for its 2024-2029 mandate: balancing scale with innovation for productivity, setting the 2040 climate target, and taking the next steps towards European economic security. Other subjects are more specific, such as waiting to move up a gear: European electric cars, and helping the EU compete on artificial intelligence. For some issues, progress has long been too slow and new impetus is needed: strengthening the European defence industry, and speeding up the return of irregular migrants. All these issues, as well as other issues beyond this list of 10, require financial means and investment, which in turn raises the additional challenge of shaping the EU’s future finances and strengthening capacity to invest in the future. The overarching issue of restoring trust in the public sphere – in traditional news media, social media, governments and institutions, and business – meanwhile affects all of the above.

As a new political cycle begins for the European institutions, with the latest mandates having started on 1 December 2024, this list of issues could seem daunting. Alternatively, they can be seen as a list of new opportunities for the European Union to assert itself, bounce back, and move ahead.

History teaches that it has been when under the pressure of events that the European Union (EU) has made most progress. It is already becoming clear how Russia’s war on Ukraine and changes in transatlantic relations have made the EU move ahead on security and defence. The challenges that are accumulating are the very same that offer the EU a chance to get stronger and assert itself on the world stage. These issues demand choices; they also offer opportunities. The European Parliament, as the place for debate among directly elected members and as co-legislator, will have an important role to play when it comes to deciding on the EU’s future course. The year 2025 will be a year of decisions – a theme that runs through this publication – as illustrated by its cover image.

These choices – these decisions – call for independent, objective and authoritative information: the motto of the European Parliamentary Research Service. EPRS publications rely on research, robust facts and figures, and informed analysis to provide the European Parliament’s Members with the elements they need to do their work, and ultimately build the trust that must underpin any democracy.

Readers will find analysis on issues that do not feature on this list of 10 in previous editions of this publication (listed under the ‘Further reading section’) and in the thousands of publications that EPRS has issued online and in paper over the years, enriching Parliament’s knowledge environment.

We hope that you will find this latest edition of ‘Ten Issues to watch’ informative and useful as you consider the challenges and opportunities of 2025.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Events that will shape 2025

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer and Rafał Mańko.

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, in force since 1997, sets out a unitary, democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice. The President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers (government) serve as the executive, while the Sejm (lower house) and the Senate (upper house) are vested with legislative power (Article 10). The Senate is considered a repository of democratic legitimacy on an equal footing with the Sejm, but the dominance of the Sejm in the legislative process is constitutionally guaranteed. The Sejm alone ultimately decides on the appointment of the government, on the wording of legislation, and on the acceptance or rejection of a presidential veto, among other things.

Members of the Sejm and Senate are elected for four years, on the same day, by universal, direct and secret ballot. Senators are chosen in single-member constituencies, while for Deputies a proportional open list system of multi-member constituencies applies, with a threshold of 5 % for political parties and 8 % for coalitions of parties. The Sejm may shorten its term of office by a resolution passed by a majority of at least two-thirds of the votes of the statutory number of Deputies. This simultaneously shortens the term of office of the Senate. The directly elected President of the Republic can also end a legislative term if the Sejm is unable to pass a vote of confidence in the government or adopt a budget within the constitutional deadline.

The government, composed of a prime minister and ministers, is accountable to the Sejm. It needs a vote of confidence by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies to be appointed. Once in place, the Sejm can pass a constructive vote of no confidence in the government (Article 158) or in an individual minister (Article 159). The debates in both assemblies are presided over by the Marshal or one of the Vice-Marshals elected from among their members. The two Marshals represent their assemblies in external matters and safeguard their rights.

Both houses have equal powers to amend the Constitution, with the Senate having (alongside the President and one-fifth of the Deputies) the right to initiate constitutional amendments; its consent is required for an amendment to be adopted. A majority of two-thirds in the Sejm and an absolute majority in the Senate are required to amend the Constitution.

When sitting in joint session, the Sejm and the Senate constitute the National Assembly. It has the power to declare that the President has a ‘permanent incapacity’ to exercise his/her duties and to indict him/her for infringing the Constitution or a statute, or for committing an offence.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Polish Parliament and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eszter Balázs (Legislative Planning and Coordination Unit, Directorate-General for the Presidency).

INTRODUCTION

Poland assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 January, and will hold the office until 30 June 2025. This is the second Polish Presidency after the country’s first stint in 2011. Poland is the opening member of a new trio, along with Denmark and Cyprus. Following Poland, Denmark will take over the presidency on 1 July 2025.

State and government

The Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska) is a parliamentary republic, with a president as head of state and a prime minister (formally, the president of the Council of Ministers) as head of government.

The current head of government is the former President of the European Council, Donald Tusk (Koalicja Obywatelska, Civic Coalition). He had a previous spell as prime minister between 2007 and 2014, before his election to head the European Council. The coalition government he leads took office on 13 December 2023. His predecessor as prime minister was Mateusz Morawiecki (Zjednoczona Prawica, United Right, 2017-2023).

After parliamentary elections, the prime minister is nominated by the president and, together with its cabinet and agenda, are approved by the parliament.

The current president is Andrzej Duda, who was an MEP in 2014 and 2015. As president-elect, he resigned his membership of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) party but was endorsed by PiS. His second term started in 2020. The next presidential elections are set for May 2025, during the country’s EU presidency. President Duda will stay in office until at least August 2025.

The president’s position in Poland is not as strong as, for instance, in France, but still much stronger than in countries such as Germany. Most importantly for the current governing coalition, the president can veto legislation (which can be overridden only by a three-fifths majority in the lower house of parliament). The president may also refer a law to the Constitutional Tribunal to check its compliance with the Polish Constitution. The president shares power with the government in defence and security, is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and represents Poland internationally.

Parliament

The Polish parliament is bicameral, with a lower house (Sejm) and an upper house (Senate). The Sejm has 460 deputies and the Senate 100 senators. On ceremonial occasions and for the removal of the sitting president, the two houses convene as the National Assembly.

Members are elected for four-year terms, by first-past-the post voting for the Senate, and proportional representation for the Sejm. For the latter, a 5 % entry threshold applies to parties, and 8 % to coalitions.

For a bill to become law, it has to be approved by both houses, although the Sejm can override a refusal of the Senate to pass a bill.

The last Senate and Sejm elections took place on 15 October 2023. Amid record-high voter turnout of 74.4 % and almost 22 million votes cast, the United Right alliance of PiS took 35.38 % of the vote, securing 194 seats in the Sejm and coming first for the third consecutive time. However, it was the opposition alliance Koalicja Obywatelska (KO) that formed a government: it obtained 30.7 % of the vote, translating into 157 seats, and teamed up with parts of the Trzecia Droga (Third Way, TD) coalition (14.4 %) and the coalition Lewica (The Left) (8.61 %). The governing coalition currently has 241 seats.

In the Senate the opposition alliance Pakt Senacki 2023 (Senate Pact 2023) won the plurality of votes and a majority of seats.

The election results mean that both the Senate and the Sejm are in the hands of the current government, while the president remains on the other side.

Parties and coalitions in the Sejm:

Government (241)

• KO (EPP in EP) – 156 members
• Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party, PSL-TD) (EPP in EP) – 32 members
• Polska 2050 Szymona Hołowni (Szymon Hołownia’s Poland 2050, PL2050) (Renew in EP) – 32 members
• Lewica (S&D in EP) – 21

Government is at times supported by (6)

• Razem (5)
• Independent (1)

Opposition (212)

• Zjednoczona Prawica (ECR in EP) – 190 members
• Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość (Confederation Liberty and Independence, KWiN) (ESN and PfE in EP) – 18 members
• Kukiz’15 (K’15) – 4 members

Parties and coalitions in the Senate:

• KO – 41 seats
• ZP – 34 seats
• TD – 11 seats
• Lewica – 9 seats
• Independent – 5 seats

The next elections for both houses are due to take place in October 2027.

European elections

The 2024 European elections in Poland were held on 9 June. Of the 53 seats for Poland, the governing coalition (EPP) secured 21 (+6 ) seats with 37.1 % of the vote, a coalition of the main opposition party PiS (ECR) obtained 20 seats (-7) with 36.2 %, and the anti-EU right-wing KWiN carried six seats with 12.1 % – three of them sit in ESN, two in PfE and one remains non-affiliated. The Nowa Lewica (New Left) coalition obtained three S&D seats (-1) with 6.3 %, while two members of the TD coalition (13.8%) sit with EPP and one with Renew.

The results mean that in this EP legislative term, there are nine more Polish MEPs in the EPP, five fewer in S&D, and seven fewer in the ECR, while Renew again has a Polish member.

State of play

During the previous PiS-led governments, clashes between the EU and Poland were frequent and resulted in the launch of an Article 7 TEU procedure and a delay in the disbursement of RRF and cohesion policy allocations. With the Tusk-government’s willingness to address rule of law concerns, RFF financing was released and the Article 7 procedure was closed in early 2024.

According to the most recent standard Eurobarometer survey, Poles consider the increased cost of living (42 %) as the main challenge for their country. They broadly support EU action in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including sanctions (86 %), Ukraine’s status as a candidate for EU membership (75 %) and the supply of military equipment to Ukraine (80 %). Some 59 % of the population have a positive image of the EU.

POLITICAL PRIORITIES OF THE POLISH PRESIDENCY

‘Security, Europe’ is the motto of the Polish Presidency, motivated by the geopolitical reality of the erosion of the rules-based international order. In its programme presented on 10 December 2024, the presidency covers seven intertwined facets of security: external, internal, information, economic, energy, food and health. The programme is short on climate and environment pledges, apart from their impact on security. The Polish programme leans on parts of the 18-month programme of the Poland-Denmark-Cyprus trio of which it is the first member.

In the external dimension of security, Poland will push to boost the defence readiness of Europe, by raising defence spending and by strengthening cooperation with NATO and like-minded countries. It wishes to engage with the US to increase the resilience of the transatlantic relationship.

Poland is one of the staunchest supporters of Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression, stressing that it is in the EU’s existential interest to stand by the country which is fighting for values that the EU shares. The presidency will work to maximise support to Ukraine militarily, economically and politically, with various Ukraine-linked points raised in several areas. The presidency will push strongly for further sanctions against Russia as well as for the use of profits from the Bank of Russia’s immobilised assets.

The Polish Presidency will pursue the integration of candidate countries. In parallel to that process, it will work on the four strands – values, policies, budget and governance – of future EU reform.

To ensure internal security for Europeans, and looking at migration through this lens, the presidency will work to protect the external borders and find innovative solutions to migration, including by establishing safe spaces in third countries. It aims to find an adequate answer to hybrid threats, such as the instrumentalisation of migration, of which Poland itself has been a victim.

The focus of the presidency on information security will extend to defence of democracy issues, including steps against information manipulation and foreign interference, to reduce the impact of hostile action in cyberspace. The presidency expects to fight against disinformation in areas such as environmental and climate policies.

Under economic security, Poland will look at how to make the EU economy more competitive and resilient. It intends to continue with robust cohesion policies, encourage the creation of innovative industries and cut red tape. For economic security, it considers a clean energy transition and affordable energy prices to be further essential elements. As drivers of climate policies, the presidency prefers incentives instead of penalties and restrictions.

To make Europe’s energy supplies more secure and versatile, the presidency seeks full withdrawal from Russian fossil fuel imports while providing access to sufficient energy, at lower prices, for the sake of competitiveness.

The presidency will focus on food security, through discussions on a common agricultural policy that encourages rather than forces farmers to limit climate change. In the broader focus on agriculture, it intends to protect vulnerable agricultural sectors, increase overall resilience and ensure that non-EU producers comply with EU standards. 

For secure public health policies in the EU, the presidency will concentrate on the digital transformation of healthcare, improving drug security in the EU and the mental health of children and adolescents.

During its tenure, the Polish Presidency will start discussions on the new post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), currently in preparation, although formal negotiations are not expected to kick off during its tenure. In February 2025, it will hold a conference on the next MFF, including on a new own-resources system that includes financing for higher defence spending.

Legislative work

Poland takes over the presidency from the trio of Spain, Belgium and Hungary. Its predecessor, Hungary presided over the inaugural period of the 10th legislature as well as the selection of the members of the new Commission, during which work on legislation largely ground to a halt, with only nine files closed with trilogue agreements. The to-do list for the Polish Presidency has thus remained largely unchanged, although several additional files have now arrived at the negotiation phase. The topics to be addressed by the presidency include the following issues.

Defence and security

In line with the presidency’s singular focus on security, Poland has the ambition to start and conclude negotiations with the Parliament on the European Defence Industry Programme once Parliament is ready with its position.

Economy, finance and budget

The Polish Presidency is expected to steer a number of ongoing negotiations to conclusion, and to open others that are ready for talks, including the bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework.

Parliament has been waiting for the Council to reach a general approach on a series of other economic and financial topics. From among these files, the Polish Presidency wants to make progress in particular on the payment services package, the digital euro files, the Union Customs Code and Customs Authority, and the Late Payment Directive. In the field of taxation, Poland wants to continue work on administrative cooperation and energy taxation.

In the area of the budget, the Presidency is keen on starting talks with the Parliament and closing the legislative process on Moldova’s Reform and Growth Facility, once Parliament is ready.

Migration

The Polish Presidency is ready to start trilogue negotiations on the two files on smuggling of migrants (relating to transport operators and Europol) and on the revision of the Visa Suspension Mechanism when Parliament is ready. The presidency is also keen to start negotiations on the EU Talent Pool once the Parliament establishes its starting position, possibly in the second half of the Presidency’s term. The presidency expects to find agreement with Parliament on the recently proposed temporary derogation from the Entry/Exit System.Expected new versions of the Returns Directive (early 2025) and the instrumentalisation of migration are two priority subjects the Polish Presidency would steer in the Council once the Commission has tabled them.

Justice and home affairs

Both institutions are ready to start trilogue negotiations on combatting child sexual abuse and combatting corruption. They will continue negotiations on protection of victims of crime, compulsory licensing of patents and the enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation. The presidency will continue work on rules to prevent unauthorised entries to the EU, judicial cooperation for the protection of adults, harmonising insolvency law and third-country interest representation.

Environment

Trilogue negotiations are currently under way on the Soil Monitoring Law and the Waste Framework Directive. The Polish Presidency intends to start negotiations with Parliament on several other important files for which the Council has already agreed on its position. These include priority substances in groundwater pollution, the Green Claims Directive, the accounting of greenhouse gas emissions of transport services, detergents and surfactants and the three files of the ‘one substance one assessment‘ package. The presidency will strive to reach a general approach on the proposed regulation on end-of-life vehicles.

Internal market and trade

On the files on the safety of toys and alternative dispute resolution for consumers, trilogue negotiations can start immediately. The Polish Presidency intends to start interinstitutional talks as soon as Parliament has a position on the screening of foreign investments. It will also continue in-house negotiations to find a full general approach on harmonising insolvency law.

Transport and tourism

Transport is another area where several topics have stayed in the pipeline of trilogue negotiations. The Hungarian Presidency kicked off talks on driving licences, driving disqualification, the single European railway area and on the Maritime Safety Agency. The Polish Presidency wants to make progress inside the Council on maximum weights and dimensions (for vehicles) currently blocked in the Council, the transport of animals, the Combined Transport Directive revision and on the long-stalled topic of air passenger rights. It will be able to start trilogue negotiations on river information services and the Package Travel Directive once Parliament establishes its mandates. Work on a pending revision of the roadworthiness package will start as soon as the Commission tables the proposal, the presidency said.

Employment and social affairs

The Polish Presidency will start negotiations with the Parliament on European Works Councils and restart them on the Coordination of social security systems. In addition, the Polish Presidency takes over the task of finding a general approach on the Traineeships directive and the long-stalled Equal Treatment Directive. The presidency also wants to conclude work on the Eurostat-related file on population and housing statistics.

Agriculture and fishery

The presidency expects to negotiate with the Parliament on the welfare of dogs and cats.

It will also concentrate its efforts to encourage Member States towards general approaches on new genomic techniques for plants, and the marketing of plant and forest reproductive material, files on which Parliament stands ready to start negotiations, and on forest monitoring, on which neither institution has a position yet.

Health security

Poland will continue the previous presidency’s efforts to clinch a deal on a general approach on the two files of the pharmaceuticals package, as comprehensive drug safety is among its priorities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the Polish EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marco Centrone and Meenakshi Fernandes.

In response to heightened geopolitical risks and security challenges, including Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine,European leaders have called for action to boost defence readiness. In this context, the European Union institutions have put forward several initiatives and reports. The European defence industrial strategy presents a range of ambitious measures to support Member States move towards a European defence union. The Letta Report calls for a ‘radical transformation to build a common market for the security and defence industry’. The Draghi Report presents ten proposals to improve the competitiveness of the European defence sector. The Niinistö Report underscores that security is a public good and that readiness is a common responsibility. A promising approach to respond to current and future challenges is deepening cooperation across Member States to leverage European economies of scale with regards to existing defence spending and activities, which are mainly organised at the national level.

What is the scope?

This ‘cost of non-Europe’ report investigates the quality of European defence spending and the extent to which deepening cooperation could leverage European economies of scale and boost efficiency, considering the nature of defence as a public good. It assesses the potential gains of scaling to the European level for different categories of defence spending. The research draws on an original quantitative analysis of publicly available data carried out by a research team from the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University based in Iași, Romania (see Annex I).

What are the key findings?

Table 1 presents the key findings for defence spending with respect to military forces and strategic assets, defence equipment procurement and defence research on emerging developing technologies. The cost of non-Europe in defence spending– in other words, the cost of not leveraging European economies of scale –is estimated to range from €18 to €57 billion per year.

European economies of scale can be leveraged by deeper cooperation between Member Statesfor all defence activities, including at the planning stage. The more ambitious and deeper the cooperation in the EU, the greater the potential gains for all Member States. The EU could provide complementary executive capacity and act further in the general interest of its citizens, thanks to the provision of financial incentives, facilitation and technical assistance. The EU could also reinforce the coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) process to broaden areas of common strategic interest especially for the 20-year horizon. Effort to improve the quality of European defence spending could promote higher standardisation and quality of European military equipment and generate other gains for society such as job creation, a more predictable environment for businesses and reinforced rule of law.

summary of findings

Read the complete study on ‘Improving the quality of European defence spending – Cost of non-Europe report‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Krisztina Binder.

To keep up with the constant shifts in labour markets and societies caused by major developments such as globalisation and technological advances, people need to develop their knowledge, skills and competences continuously. A varied and future-oriented skill set unlocks opportunities for individuals, promotes inclusion, social mobility and civic participation, and supplies the economy with the workforce needed for growth and innovation, not least in the context of the green and digital transitions. Offering quality learning opportunities, including upskilling and reskilling, that are accessible to learners of all ages and backgrounds is key to making all this possible.

The overall vision and objectives for education and training in the EU encompass lifelong learning that covers all levels and types of learning: formal, non-formal and informal, from early childhood to adulthood. In its 2020 communication on the European education area (EEA), the European Commission identified lifelong learning as an important aspect of education, while in its 2021 resolution on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training for 2021 to 2030, the Council highlighted lifelong learning and mobility as a priority area. The new Commission Executive Vice-President for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness, Roxana Mînzatu, is responsible for developing a ‘Union of skills’, focusing on adult and lifelong learning among other things. The European Parliament has always embraced a holistic view of lifelong learning, arguing that it should promote personal and professional growth, foster social participation and employability, and empower active citizens. Parliament has called repeatedly for quality, inclusive and accessible education for all throughout life, as well as endorsing stronger links between education and skills requirements. Additionally, Parliament has continually insisted on the importance of Erasmus+ as a key tool for education and training.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Fostering participation in education and training throughout life‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marc Jütten.

Economic security has become crucial for the EU. Both the Letta Report on the future of the single market and the Draghi Report on the future of European competitiveness emphasise the need to intensify efforts to secure the EU’s supply of critical raw materials (CRM). Europe is vulnerable to both coercion and geo-economic fragmentation because of its high dependency on strategic raw materials from countries with which the EU is not strategically aligned. Diversifying imports of strategic raw materials is key to mastering the clean transition of Europe’s economy, mitigating supply chain risks and reducing the EU’s strategic dependencies.

In line with its CRM strategy, the EU is seeking to conclude new partnerships in the context of the EU trade and Global Gateway strategies. However, the EU is not the only actor looking to secure access to CRM supplies. China, for example, is bolstering its global dominance in strategic and emerging technologies, continuously increasing its presence in Latin America (and Africa) in order to secure its supply of strategic raw materials. The region is primarily rich in lithium and copper, which are essential for renewable energy technologies and the production of the lithium-ion batteries used in laptops, smartphones, and hybrid and electric vehicles.

Since 2023, Latin America, too, has won the EU’s renewed attention, and real steps to enhance cooperation on CRM have been taken. In 2023, the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Argentina and Chile on sustainable raw materials value chains. In November 2024, an interim trade agreement with Chile was ratified – the first EU trade agreement comprising a specific chapter on energy and raw materials. In December 2024, the EU and Mercosur finally reached a political agreement on the EU–Mercosur partnership agreement. As Mercosur countries, primarily Argentina and Brazil, are major producers of CRM, the agreement could help the EU secure an efficient, reliable and sustainable flow of the raw materials that are critical for the clean transition and for the EU’s strategic autonomy more widely.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU–Latin America: Enhancing cooperation on critical raw materialsin the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Latin America’s share in global production and reserves of selected critical raw materials in 2023 (%)

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Although origin labelling for food cannot be directly linked to a product’s intrinsic quality, consumers are increasingly interested in local food systems and in short supply chains. While the easiest way to convey origin information is through labelling, European Union (EU) law requires the display of such information only for a limited number of food products. EU consumers and consumer groups have long advocated greater transparency on food product origins.

In force since December 2014, the EU regulation on the provision of food information to consumers updated and harmonised food labelling requirements, set harmonised rules for the presentation of allergen information and tightened up the rules to prevent misleading practices. The regulation allows EU countries to adopt additional national measures concerning the mandatory labelling of food products, as long as these are justified by reasons specifically defined in the regulation.

Indicating the country of origin is currently mandatory for certain food products, such as fresh fruit and vegetables, fishery products, honey, olive oil, eggs, beef and beef products, unprocessed meat of swine, sheep, goat and poultry and the primary ingredient of a food when it differs from the origin given for the product as a whole. In the absence of EU rules, some EU countries have enacted national legislation requiring mandatory origin labelling for certain categories of foods.

As part of its ‘farm to fork’ strategy, adopted in 2020, the Commission intended to revise existing rules to extend the mandatory indication of origin to more categories of food products. However, such a proposal never emerged, and if or when it will be put forward remains unclear.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Food origin labelling: Developments and issues‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Raffaele Ventura (GlobalStat, EUI).

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of China compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2023, while China’s GDP growth rate has returned to increase against the previous year, Europe’s GDP growth rate continues to decline and stands at 0.6 percent. Both countries’ inflation rates are down from the prior year, but Europe’s rate remains at 6.3 percent while China’s is at 0.2 percent. Over the last decade, trade between the EU and China has generally risen. Nevertheless, EU imports of goods from China saw a significant drop after 2022. The EU continues to be China’s primary trade partner, while China ranks as the EU’s second-largest partner.

Read this infographic on ‘China: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU-UK trade, € billion GDP growth
(annual change, %) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(at PPP 1 in thousands of international dollars) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) 0
20
40
60
80
202320212019201720152013201120092007
60.7
24.5
(International dollars, 1 000s)(International dollars, 1 000s)(International dollars, 1 000s)
China
EU-27
current prices, Purchasing power parity
Total unemployment rate
(% of total labour force) FDI and remittances
Foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows (% of GDP) Public finances, monetary and financial data China business environment and socio-economic indicators EU trade with China Main trade partners (2023)
Trade in goods, exports plus imports Top EU partners (2023)
Trade in goods EU exports of goods to China (2023) EU imports of goods from China (2023) EU exports of services to China (2023) EU imports of services from China (2023)

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 6 December 2024, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the four founding members of Mercosur – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – reached a political agreement on the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur association agreement. Additional negotiations had taken place since March 2023 to address various concerns sparked by an earlier 2019 agreement in principle. While the legal basis of the text, now referred to as the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement, is still unknown, several ratification scenarios could be envisaged.

Background

The negotiations on the EU-Mercosur agreement were based on 1999 Council negotiating guidelines that sought to conclude an association agreement with Mercosur to upgrade the 1995 bloc-to-bloc Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement (IFCA), in force since 1999. The three-pronged structure of the agreement originally envisaged is similar to other such agreements the EU concluded in the past with Central America (2012) and Chile (2002, modernised in 2024): it comprises a trade pillar, a political dialogue pillar and a cooperation pillar. The Commission, in charge of the trade pillar negotiations, published the chapters of the trade pillar on its dedicated website as agreed under the 2019 political agreement. In contrast, the European External Action Service, in charge of the negotiations on the other parts, has not published the text of the remaining pillars, although the corresponding negotiations closed in July 2020.

Following the political agreement on the trade pillar reached in December 2024 and the publication of its chapters as amended, and of a summary of the changes, the text is now due to undergo legal revision (‘scrubbing’) prior to being translated into the EU’s official languages. Once this is completed, the Commission will submit to the Council proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the whole agreement. The agreement will then need to be ratified.

Commission proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the agreement

The Commission proposals, expected in mid-2025, will spell out the substantive legal bases that determine whether the EU-Mercosur agreement will be submitted for ratification as a mixed agreement that – next to provisions relating to the EU’s exclusive trade competence (‘EU-only’ agreement) set out in Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – contains provisions concerning competence(s) shared between the EU and its Member States. It is also conceivable that the agreement will be split into two agreements (one EU only, one mixed) that either: a) enter into force consecutively –first as an interim EU-only agreement, which then elapses once the final mixed agreement has been ratified by the EU Member States; or b) co-exist as legally separate agreements after their ratification.

Unlike EU-only agreements, mixed agreements not only require Council ratification and European Parliament consent but also ratification by the EU Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The Council adopts its decisions to sign (under Article 218(5) TFEU) and – after the European Parliament has given its consent – concludes (under Article 218(6)) the agreement and, if necessary, agrees on its provisional application. It does so by qualified majority, with Article 218(8) providing a number of exceptions when unanimity is required, including for association agreements.

Ratification scenarios

As the Commission has not indicated the legal basis it intends to propose for the EU-Mercosur agreement, several ratification scenarios used in the recent past could be envisaged.

1) The EU-Canada agreement model: A single mixed agreement

The Commission’s initial proposal for Council decisions to sign and conclude the EU-Canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement (CETA) was subsequently modified to use a mixed legal basis. In its proposal for a Council decision, the Commission states that – since it could not agree with EU Member States whether CETA was a mixed agreement, and since CETA’s provisional application since 2017 was a priority – CETA was based on Article 43(2) (agriculture/fisheries), Article 91 (transport), Article 100(2) (transport), Article 153(2) (social policy), Article 192(1) (environment) and the first subparagraph of Article 207(4) (common commercial policy), in conjunction with Article 218(5), and was thus deemed a mixed agreement. Experts have argued that several legal bases (e.g. for the environment) would not have been applicable to CETA in light of the 2017 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Opinion 2/15 on the distribution of exclusive and shared competences in the EU-Singapore free trade agreement (FTA). Since CETA’s ratification at EU level, its ratification by EU Member States (17 of 27 have ratified as of December 2024) has been very slow. Mixed agreements bear the risk of blockage by a single EU Member State.

2) The EU-Chile agreement model: Split into an interim EU-only agreement and final mixed agreement

In 2023, the Commission submitted two proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the text for the modernisation of the 2002 EU-Chile association agreement. The proposals envisaged an interim EU-only agreement entering into force after ratification at EU level and ceasing to apply once a mixed agreement including the EU-only part enters into force after its ratification by all EU Member States:

• a proposal for an EU-only EU-Chile interim trade agreement (ITA) based on Article 91(1), Article 100(2) and Article 207(4) first paragraph, in conjunction with Article 218(5), adopted by a related Council decision; and
• a proposal for an EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement (AFA), a mixed agreement including the trade pillar, based on Article 91(1), Article 100(2), Article 207(4) first paragraph, Article 212 (economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries), in conjunction with Article 218(5), adopted by a related Council decision. In its proposal for the AFA, the Commission states that the substantive legal basis for the Council decision depends mainly on the AFA’s objective and content. It adds that ‘the AFA pursues two main objectives and has two main components which fall within the scope of the common commercial policy, transport, and of the economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries’. It concludes that, given ‘the fact that the predominant components of the Agreement are trade policy, transport, and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries, the voting rule for this particular case is therefore qualified majority’.

The ratification of the EU-Chile agreement may be seen as a pertinent model, given the considerable similarities in the structure (objectives) and content with the EU-Mercosur agreement, despite the absence of some elements (such as investment protection and far-reaching investment liberalisation) from the latter due to a Council mandate dating back to a pre-Lisbon Treaty era, when investment was entirely an EU Member State competence. Moreover, the Council mandate (Title XI) refers to an ITA.

3) The EU-Singapore agreement model: Split into separate EU-only and mixed agreements

After the 2017 CJEU Opinion 2/15 determined that the EU-Singapore FTA contained elements of shared competences (i.e. provisions on portfolio investment and investment dispute settlement) and therefore would have been deemed a mixed agreement, in 2018 the EU-Singapore FTA was split into an FTA based on Article 91, Article 100(2) and Article 207(4) and into an investment protection agreement (IPA) based on Article 207(4), both in conjunction with Article 218(5). The former entered into force and the latter continues its process of ratification by EU Member States. The EU-Vietnam FTA underwent a similar split, the result of which is two legally separate agreements that remain separate after ratification.

Consent by the European Parliament, and formal conclusion

Under Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure (RoP), Parliament decides by a single vote – in accordance with Rule 107 RoP – on a Council request to give its consent to the conclusion, renewal or amendment of an international agreement. It provides that, if Parliament declines to give its consent, its President must inform the Council that the agreement at issue cannot be concluded, renewed or amended. The consent procedure may not be prolonged for more than one year.

Following Parliament’s consent, the Council would be able to adopt a decision to conclude the agreement pursuant to the procedure and voting rules set out in Article 218(6) and Article 218(8) TFEU respectively.

Read this complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Ratification scenarios for the EU‑Mercosur agreement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The European Union’s external relations topped the agenda for the December 2024 plenary session, with several debates on statements by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, attending the plenary for the first time in her new capacity. These included the toppling of the Syrian regime and its consequences; Russia’s disinformation activities and fraudulent justification of its war against Ukraine; the use of rape as a weapon of war (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan). The day after Kallas’s remarks on the crackdown on peaceful pro-European demonstrators in Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, President of Georgia, addressed Members in a formal sitting.

Other debates on Commission statements covered, inter alia: the situation in Mayotte following the recent devastating cyclone; a European innovation act; harassment and cyber-violence against female politicians in EU candidate and neighbouring countries; a shared vision for sustainable European tourism; promoting social dialogue and the right to strike; tackling abusive subcontracting; the need to ensure swift action and transparency on public-sector corruption allegations; urgent EU action to preserve nature and biodiversity; and the Commission’s plans to revise outstanding proposals on animal welfare in its 2025 work plan.

Members also debated ahead of the European Council meeting of 19 December 2024 and set out their expectations ahead of the EU-Western Balkans Summit that took place the previous day. Parliament created two new standing committees, upgrading the former sub-committees on Public Health, and on Security and Defence; and set up two special committees: on the European Democracy Shield, and the Housing Crisis.

Sakharov Prize 2024

The Sakharov Prize celebrates those who defend fundamental freedoms and human rights, in often very difficult circumstances. President Roberta Metsola awarded the 2024 prize to María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, leaders of Venezuela’s democratic opposition, recognised by Parliament as the Venezuelan people’s democratically chosen leaders.

Election of the Ombudsman

Teresa Anjinho was elected to serve as the next European Ombudsman in a vote conducted in two ballots. She will hold the office for the 2024-2029 term. Under the incumbent, Emily O’Reilly, the role of the European Ombudsman has seen important changes, with a new statute put in place.

Activities of the European Ombudsman: 2023 annual report

Parliament debated a Committee on Petitions (PETI) report proposing that Members approve the European Ombudsman’s 2023 activity report. The report highlights key issues, including transparency, accountability, and ethical concerns. The Ombudsman’s 2023 report notes that the Ombudsman opened 393 complaint-based inquiries and tackled systemic issues through 5 own-initiative inquiries, further cementing the role in promoting good administration.

Regional emergency support for reconstruction

Climate-related disasters are recurring increasingly often in Europe. To speed up the EU’s support for those affected, Members debated and adopted the RESTORE regional emergency support proposal. It seeks to allow EU countries to re-programme up to €17.7 billion from EU cohesion policy funds for disaster relief and reconstruction. This includes financing reconstruction work by up to 100 %, with 30 % pre-financing to allow funds to be immediately available.

EU conclusion of the UN Mauritius Convention

Investor-State dispute settlement, used to resolve disputes in international investment agreements, has long been criticised for its opacity. New rules came into force in 2014 to address the transparency issue, by mandating public access to proceedings and documents, bolstering legitimacy and public trust. Those rules apply only to post-2014 agreements, but the 2014 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Mauritius Convention would extend their scope to earlier treaties. The EU sees the convention as a key step toward modernising the process. Following a Committee on International Trade (INTA) recommendation, Parliament gave consent to the EU’s conclusion of the Mauritius Convention.

EU priorities for the 69th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women

Members debated EU priorities on gender equality. The plenary adopted a recommendation from Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) which urges the EU to lead by example on addressing gender-based violence, ensuring healthcare access, promoting gender equality in decision-making, and applying gender mainstreaming across policies, ahead of the 69th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women. The session will mark the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted by 189 countries in 1995, which provides a global roadmap for gender equality.

Misinformation and disinformation on social media

Romania recently annulled its presidential elections due to foreign interference linked to disinformation campaigns. Intelligence reports revealed thousands of accounts, many associated with foreign influence, amplifying political messaging. Following a Commission statement on the misinformation and disinformation on social media, Parliament debated measures to ensure that online platforms conform to the rules under the Digital Services Act, as well as strengthening EU resilience against election interference.

Improving EU farmers’ and agricultural workers’ working conditions and wellbeing

Following a statement from the European Commission, Members debated measures to improve working conditions and mental wellbeing for farmers and agricultural workers. Farmers face significantly higher risks at work than in other sectors, with fatality rates at 233 % above average, and elevated stress leading to higher suicide rates. Parliament has already called for improved working conditions in the sector, particularly for those working in remote regions.

Updating the European strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities

Parliament heard and debated a Commission statement on the need to update the EU’s 2021-2030 disability rights strategy, to focus on new initiatives for 2025-2030. While progress has been made on accessibility, employment, and inclusion through flagship action like the Disability Employment Package and the AccessibleEU resource centre, challenges remain for disability rights in areas including poverty, education, housing, and healthcare.

Right to clean drinking water in the EU

Access to clean drinking water is a fundamental right long championed by Parliament, but water scarcity, microplastics and other contaminants persist in the EU. Members debated a Commission statement on the right to clean drinking water , where updated EU rules under the Drinking Water Directive aim to enhance water quality and improve access for vulnerable groups.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the Employment and Social Affairs Committee (EMPL), on the establishment and functioning of European works councils, was approved by a vote. Another, from the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON), on the framework for financial data access, was approved without a vote.

Corrigenda

Following committee approval of the corrigendum on the European health data space legislative file, voted in plenary before the end of last term, it was approved, under Rule 251 of the Rules of Procedure.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – December 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen

The role of information integrity in the proposed European democracy shield, announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, was the subject of a roundtable discussion organised by EPRS on 10 December 2024. The notion of information integrity has been gaining ground in multilateral and international forums in recent years. The panel connected multilateral and European diplomatic perspectives on how to make our information ecosystems healthy, while protecting fundamental rights. Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service, opened the event, which was moderated by Michael Adam, Head of the Digital Policies Unit.

In her keynote speech, First Vice-President of the European Parliament, Sabine Verheyen (EPP, Germany), built on the EPRS motto, ‘Empowering through knowledge’. She underscored the importance of empowering citizens to navigate the digital landscape and resist the flood of manipulative content. She emphasised the need to build and maintain a resilient and trustworthy information sphere, in line with the announced European democracy shield. This includes strict enforcement of the EU’s digital regulation, notably the Digital Services Act (DSA), and the work of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and its regional hubs. It also includes the Artificial Intelligence Act, alongside the European Media Freedom Act and the regulation on political advertising.

Arvin Gadgil, Director of the Global Policy Centre for Governance, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), underlined that no aspect of information integrity can be limited by borders – and neither can the solutions. With UNDP the biggest development programme in the UN system ( present in 170 countries), he noted information integrity will become an increasing programming area for the UNDP. In the future, more countries will likely ask for UNDP assistance to build information integrity. The EU supports much of this assistance. He also underlined the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement, which requires long-term collaboration with trusted partners to find solutions, for example via the Global Action Coalition on Information Integrity (supported by Denmark’s Tech4Democracy Initiative). 

Charles Baubion, Head of the Information Integrity Team, Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD), cautioned never to take democracy for granted: upholding the values of democracy requires constant attention and continuous reflection, leveraging democracy’s ability to self-improve. Earlier this year, the OECD report ‘Facts not fakes: Tackling disinformation, strengthening information integrity‘ emphasised the urgency of boosting ‘the integrity of information spaces and combating disinformation’ to reinforce democracy and strengthen the fabric of open societies. In November 2024, the OECD invited stakeholders to comment on draft recommendations on information integrity, aiming to promote information integrity in line with the universal human rights of freedom of opinion and expression. Similar to the UN and EU approaches, all stakeholders and all levels of society are factored in. Charles Baubion emphasised that social media company self-regulation is not enough, more transparency and accountability is needed, not least with the added challenge of handling the role of AI. The Digital Services Act is a good example of EU leadership in this area.

Filip Grzegorzewski, Head of Information Integrity Division, European External Action Service (EEAS) started by defining foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), a pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact our values, procedures and political processes. The EEAS focuses on behaviour rather than on narratives. Triggered by Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the EU has built a comprehensive toolbox to address the challenges. The work includes cooperating with all 27 Member States to reinforce internal defence against FIMI. Moreover, the EEAS expands these efforts across the world through its external network of 145 delegations and 24 common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations. The EEAS also helps build resilience against FIMI in regions closest to home, via four task forces for the immediate neighbourhood: East, South, Western Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the EEAS helps tackle FIMI globally, including via cooperation within the G7’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism.

Seemab Sheikh, Acting Deputy Tech Ambassador, Denmark, explained that the Danish tech ambassador (the first such post in the world) moved from San Francisco to Copenhagen last year, to expand the focus beyond the US, including Europe and the Global South. In addition to the work on the UN Global Digital Compact, Denmark, alongside the Netherlands and Wikimedia, is leading a multi-stakeholder task force for the Freedom Online Coalition, working towards a blueprint for a holistic and positive online information ecosystem. She noted, in the face of the erosion of information integrity, which AI is accelerating, tech companies need to take greater social responsibility. Information integrity will be a high priority during Denmark’s presidency in the second half of 2025, prioritising cooperation with private companies and with a special focus on AI, as well as enhancing resilience against hybrid threats. Seemab Sheikh noted the potential of the announced European democracy shield initiative to further strengthen and coordinate the EU’s response to FIMI.

Naja Bentzen highlighted the increasing influence of ‘corporate diplomacy’ on our information ecosystems, or our collective cognitive infrastructure. In some respects, the very large online platforms and search engines, with more than 45 million users in the EU, wield more geopolitical and geostrategic influence than most nation states. In the next years, underlying tension between what Anu Bradford sees as three different models for tech regulation (the EU’s rights-driven model; the US market-driven model; and China’s state-driven model) is likely to become even more visible. Brussels will face serious challenges in enforcing its rights-driven digital regulation, which is directly linked to the European democracy shield initiative.

The roundtable discussion took a bird’s-eye view of the challenges to our global information sphere, as well as the solutions. Meanwhile, current developments underscored the pertinence of the topic: Just four days before the event, Romania became the first EU country to cancel an election over foreign interference, following reports about information manipulation on TikTok. Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) held an exchange of views with TikTok over compliance with the Digital Services Act (DSA). On 17 December 2024, the European Commission made statements, accompanied by a debate, in Parliament on misinformation and disinformation on social media platforms and risks to the integrity of elections in Europe. The following day, Parliament voted to establish a new Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield.

Indeed, as the exchange with the audience at the EPRS event also illustrated, democracy cannot be taken for granted. Against this backdrop, the discussion on the role of information integrity in a potential European democracy shield – and how to link such a shield with the rest of the world – could hardly have been more timely and relevant.

Citizens have expressed concern about the proposed EU-Mercosur Trade Deal and in particular its potential impact on agriculture and the environment. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since November 2023, calling on her to reject the treaty in its current form because they consider it poses significant risk to European agriculture, climate commitments, and global environmental stability.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

EU negotiations

The European Commission is negotiating a Trade Agreement with the Mercosur countries on behalf of the European Union (EU).

Responding to a September 2024 parliamentary question, the Commission stated the agreement should take into account concerns raised by the EU agricultural sector. The Commission also wants a clear commitment from Mercosur to stop deforestation and make the Paris Agreement a key part of the trade deal.

European Parliament position

During a November 2024 visit to Paris to address a business forum, President Metsola spoke of the negotiations in an interview. She expressed the hope of finding a balanced solution that both protects the interests of EU farmers and unlocks new opportunities for EU businesses. She emphasised that no EU country should be left feeling isolated or abandoned.

In a 2020 resolution, Parliament recognised the importance of a stronger partnership with Latin America and the additional trade opportunities this would bring. Parliament stressed that the agreement must ensure fair competition and guarantee that European standards are upheld. Parliament wanted additional commitments on labour rights and environmental protection including the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement.

More recently, in a 2023 resolution Parliament reiterated that the agreement should only be ratified if it includes climate change and deforestation commitments.

The European Parliament delegation for Mercosur is closely following the discussions.

Next steps

Once the negotiations are over, the Council adopts the agreement. The European Parliament must either approve or reject the deal; it cannot amend it.

If the final agreement covers areas beyond trade, it would also have to be ratified by each individual EU country. 

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020 was followed by a period of tense relations, mainly around the issues concerning implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. The economic consequences of Brexit started to materialise. In 2023, the new UK government of Rishi Sunak agreed with the EU on the Windsor Framework, designed to find solutions to issues related to the implementation of the Protocol. A period of gradually improving relations ensued.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine made it clear that the EU and UK are facing a common threat and need to coordinate their policies better. Progress has been made in an increasing number of fields, from defence, through trade, research and innovation, to competition policies. With the change of leadership in the UK to a Labour government and the emergence of a new political cycle in the EU for 2024-2029, the reset of EU-UK relations has increasingly been gaining momentum.

While the UK has made clear that it will not return to the single market or customs union, the government of Keir Starmer has started to engage diplomatically with the EU, with a reset of the relationship as its priority. Both sides are interested mainly in a security and defence pact, the scope of which remains to be defined. The EU’s interests include improving mobility into the UK (including youth mobility), maintaining fisheries access, and ensuring rights of EU citizens in the UK. There are also a number of EU programmes that the UK may be considering joining, to mutual benefit, once financial contributions have been negotiated. The negotiations are set to intensify in early 2025.

The re-election of Donald Trump may complicate these negotiations, as it is likely to bring disruption, and its effects remain to be seen. The expert community sees possibilities for stronger cooperation on a range of issues such as climate and energy policies, resilience of supply chains, approximation of laws and building the defence industrial base. The European Parliament has been calling in numerous resolutions for closer cooperation in many areas not covered by the current arrangements.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-UK relations: Towards a stronger partnership in uneasy times in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anita Orav.

Drawing attention to migrants’ human rights and highlighting their contribution to society, International Migrants’ Day is observed every year on 18 December. The day was designated by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2000 in response to growing migration numbers around the world.

Context

Migration is and will continue to be part of the human experience, both globally and in the EU, as a natural response to adversity and violence of various kinds. On 1 January 2022, 27.3 million people (6.1 %) of the 448.8 million people living in the EU were non-EU citizens. Most migrants – approximately 2 to 3 million per year – arrive in the EU using legal channels. However, wars and upheaval in neighbouring countries are also triggering displacement of people and increased irregular arrivals of migrants.

Migration management in the EU

The EU and its Member States have shared competence in migration policy. In recent years, the priority accorded to migration has been reflected in the EU budget, with €22.7 billion allocated to migration and border policy from 2021 to 2027. Acknowledging that the EU needed to move away from ad hoc solutions and put in place a predictable and reliable migration management system, the European Commission put forward a new pact on migration and asylum in 2020. The pact combines key EU policies on migration, asylum and border management and was adopted in spring 2024. In addition, the Commission has initiated reforms to its legal migration policy by proposing a skills and talent package, intended to attract and retain highly skilled third-country nationals, and by creating the EU Talent Pool, which will match employers in the EU with jobseekers from non-EU countries. The objective is to help address critical labour shortages across Europe and to offer a response to the demographic situation in the EU of an ageing population. Research confirms that legal migration channels are a viable way to mitigate the problem of a declining EU workforce.

Honouring the contributions of migrants and respecting their rights

The theme for International Migrants’ Day in 2024 is ‘Honouring the contributions of migrants and respecting their rights’. It was chosen to raise awareness of the issue of exploitation and to highlight migrants’ positive contribution to society. The European Commission asserts that legal migration is an investment in the economy and society.

The EU action plan on integration and inclusion addresses perennial barriers to migrants’ education, labour market and housing. At the end of 2024, a mid-term review of progress made will be published, based on consultations with the Member States. Progress on practical action to support integration in areas such as health, housing and employment can already be visualised in the Commission’s progress tracker.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has previously advocated a humane, solidarity-based and common approach to migration. In its resolution of 25 November 2021, taking into consideration that total labour supply in the euro area was projected to fall by 13 % (20 million people) between 2019 and 2070, Parliament encouraged the development of adequate legal economic migration channels.

Parliament’s adoption of the new pact on migration and asylum, to be applied from mid-2026, confirmed its willingness to take ‘an important step, to a common European asylum and migration policy that is well functioning and long-term’.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘International Migrants’ Day: 18 December 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.