European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

Members gather in Strasbourg for the second plenary session of November 2022 against a backdrop of continued global tension. The agenda once again reflects the difficult situation, with tough budgetary decisions, threats to EU resilience, Ukraine’s situation and EU enlargement all scheduled for debate. Nevertheless, Members will also attend a ceremony to mark a more joyous occasion: Parliament’s ‘birthday’ on Tuesday. Members of the European Parliament, directly elected since 1979, have now represented European citizens’ for 70 years, culminating in Parliament’s position today as a cornerstone of the EU’s democratic legitimacy.

The social and economic crisis triggered by COVID-19, Russia’s war on Ukraine and the resulting energy price rises, are foremost in everyone’s mind. Parliament will therefore hold a question time session on Tuesday afternoon, during which Members will pose questions to the European Commission on the direction of future legislative reform of the economic governance framework. Amid challenging market conditions and the rising cost of refinancing, Members are expected to debate a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the borrowing strategy to finance Next Generation EU – the Union’s temporary post-coronavirus pandemic recovery instrument (NGEU) – on Monday evening. The report welcomes the smooth implementation of the strategy, allowing payment of a combination of loans and grants to Member States through EU programmes. However, the BUDG committee also underlines the need for transparency, urging the Commission to present systematic accounts of the spending to Parliament for proper scrutiny. In light of the growing cost of financing the NGEU debt, the committee also notes that new own resources are needed urgently, both those already under consideration and those due to be proposed in 2023. Members are therefore also due to consider another BUDG report on Tuesday, calling for rapid adoption of a decision on three new own resources. The resources proposed would gather contributions to the EU budget from an extended emissions trading scheme (ETS), a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), and a share of reallocated very large multinational company profits. The report also highlights the need for ambitious, balanced and transparent own resources that do not depend on taxing citizens, and that move away from gross national income-dependent resources towards financing tailored to objectives.

Members are also expected to hold a debate on Tuesday on the joint text agreed with the Council in conciliation on the 2023 EU budget, where a last-minute provisional agreement was reached between the negotiators early this week. The compromise reflects Parliament’s priorities to increase funding to address the consequences of the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, the post-pandemic recovery and to boost the green and digital transitions.

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On Tuesday morning, with recent gas pipeline sabotage and the damage done by the pandemic fresh in mind, Members are set to debate a report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), following a political agreement reached with the Council on boosting the resilience of critical entities in the EU. The proposal seeks to ensure key infrastructure and networks throughout the EU are prepared to face disruption, whether due to natural causes or hostile actors. The agreement covers 11 sectors, but allows for the exclusion of nationally sensitive entities such as defence, parliaments and central banks. Parliament’s negotiators have ensured protection for systems safeguarding the rule of law, and that entities covering six or more Member States will qualify as of particular European significance.

The rise in cyber-attacks and disinformation also demonstrate the need to set out a strong digital policy direction for Europe, in light of the omnipresence of digital technology in almost every aspect of modern life. On Thursday morning, Members are due to consider a provisional agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to establish the ‘Path to the digital decade‘ programme, setting out action to pursue the EU digital strategy to 2030. Negotiators representing Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) secured a strong role for Parliament in scrutinising progress on the digital targets. Measured according to a ‘digital compass’, these will strengthen broadband infrastructure, digitalise public and private sectors, narrow the digital divide and progress the adoption of new technologies such as artificial intelligence.

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The situation in Ukraine of course remains high on the agenda. On Tuesday afternoon, Members will pose questions to the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission Josep Borrell on the impact of Russia’s war of aggression on non-EU countries, in relation to the ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative‘ agreement. While the agreement has helped to prevent a widespread food global crisis, countries dependent on food imports and aid remain very vulnerable to any change in the situation. The recent renewal of the agreement – despite Russia’s indications that it would pull out – should also ease the pressure over the winter.

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An €18 billion Ukraine support package has been proposed for 2023, in the form of highly concessional loans backed by the EU budget. Three acts must be passed for disbursement to begin in early January, and if Parliament approves use of the urgent procedure, Members could vote directly on all three proposals for macro-financial assistance to Ukraine on Wednesday.

On Wednesday, Members are expected to vote on a motion for a resolution recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism, tabled following a debate on 18 October. So far, none of the EU sanctions in retaliation for Russia’s aggression refer to Russia as a terrorist state or a state sponsor of terrorism, a change which could facilitate the confiscation of Russian assets.

Ukraine’s recent request to join the EU, swiftly followed by Moldova and Georgia, has put enlargement firmly back on the agenda. However, European integration prospects for the Western Balkans and Türkiye have seen little progress in recent years. Aimed at re-energising EU enlargement policy, Members will debate an own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on a new EU enlargement strategy on Tuesday afternoon. The AFET committee proposes to overhaul the process and provide candidates with roadmaps setting specific milestones to reach on their path to EU membership. The report further suggests formal suspension of the current negotiations with Türkiye.

Members are expected to consider another AFET committee own-initiative report on Tuesday, on the deteriorating political and security situation in Libya. The report proposes to nominate an EU special representative for Libya, redoubling EU diplomatic efforts to promote peace. The AFET committee also recommends strong support for United Nations-led reconciliation efforts seeking a peaceful and democratic transition, in a country where weak governance and a proxy war have strengthened violent groups at the cost of democracy.

On Tuesday morning, Members are set to return to a proposal, blocked in the Council for years, to legislate to improve gender balance on boards in the EU. Gender-diverse company boards contribute to transparency and gender equality in the workplace and provide undeniable economic benefit. Nonetheless, only 34.1 % of the largest EU companies’ board members are women. Parliament has long pushed for progress on the proposal, finally reaching agreement with the Council on the text earlier this year. Parliament negotiators have ensured a 2026 deadline for companies to hit the target of minimum 33 % women directors, and specific penalties for companies that do not comply.

Finally, the common fisheries policy (CFP) gives EU countries equal access to fisheries resources in each other’s waters, but with a long-standing temporary provision enabling countries to reserve waters up to 12 miles from their coastlines for local and neighbouring fishing vessels: Croatian vessels may fish in Slovenian coastal waters, and vice versa, for instance. As the current agreement, which allows Member States to limit access to the 12-mile zone expires at the end of the year, Members are due to vote on Tuesday on a provisional agreement to extend the rules on access to coastal waters for another 10 years.

European Parliament Plenary Session – November II 2022 – agenda

Most of our ‘at a glance’ notes are available in several languages:

• The European Parliament at 70: Origins and long-term trajectories
• Borrowing strategy to finance Next Generation EU
• System of own resources of the EU
• 2023 EU Budget
• Resilience of critical entities
• 2030 policy programme: ‘Path to the digital decade
• Macro-financial assistance for Ukraine in 2023
• Russia’s war on Ukraine: Designating a state as a sponsor of terrorism
• New EU strategy for enlargement
• Situation in Libya
• Extension of EU rules on access to coastal waters
• Question time: New orientations for the EU’s economic governance framework
• Question time: The impact on third countries of Russia’s war on Ukraine in relation to the ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative’ agreement

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to eradicate forced and child labour worldwide.

According to estimates by the International Labour Organization (ILO), 27.6 million people (including 3.3 million children) are in forced labour while child labour affects 160 million children (almost one in ten). These phenomena occur across all continents to varying degrees. Eradication of forced labour by 2030 and child labour by 2025 is enshrined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 8.7.

The European Union (EU) has a long history of promoting respect for human rights and related labour rights, including decent work and freedom from forced labour, through a variety of internal and external policies. These include working together with international organisations, such as the International Labour Organization, World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Group of Seven (G7).

EU action to combat forced and child labour

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly prohibits forced labour (Article 5) and child labour (Article 32).

The EU has several laws in place to tackle forced labour, for instance on human trafficking and on sanctions against employers of migrants in an irregular situation. In addition, the European Commission has issued guidance to help EU businesses comply with international standards on forced labour in their operations and supply chains.

The EU purses a zero-tolerance approach to child labour in its international trade policy. It also works to address the root causes of child labour by tackling poverty, reducing inequalities, and increasing access to quality education and social protection. To achieve this, the EU supports partner governments, local actors and businesses, especially in the most affected countries. For example, EU free trade agreements require trading partners to implement the ILO’s conventions on the worst forms of child labour and on minimum working age. The EU participates in initiatives on specific supply chains, for cocoa and cotton for example, aiming to eliminate child labour.

The 2021-2024 EU strategy on child rights, adopted in March 2021, aims at tackling poverty and social exclusion, protecting and promoting the rights of children and building the best possible life for them both in the European Union and across the world.

The Council-led European Child Guarantee initiative promotes equal opportunities for all children, regardless of their background, in the EU. This includes access to early childhood education and care, education, play and leisure activities, healthcare, nutrition and housing. Each EU country has appointed their Child Guarantee Coordinator and should prepare national action plans to 2030.

European Parliament position on forced and child labour

In a March 2021 resolution regarding sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour, the European Parliament called for a ban on importing products related to severe human rights violations such as forced or child labour. It also stressed that the objective of combating these practices must be included in all EU free trade agreements.

In a June 2022 resolution on new EU rules on products made by forced labour, Parliament called for cooperation with partners who support ending forced labour globally and banning goods made by forced labour.

Besides monitoring EU external action, refining existing tools and considering new instruments to end forced labour and child labour, the European Parliament also adopts resolutions on specific issues.

In February 2020, Parliament adopted a resolution on child labour in mines in Madagascar, in which it highlighted that the EU long-term budget for 2021‑2027 should reflect the EU’s commitment to eliminate the worst forms of child labour.

In December 2020, Parliament adopted a resolution on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and in December 2021 a resolution on forced labour in the Linglong factory in Serbia.

New EU rules under discussion

In February 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal for a directive to foster sustainable corporate behaviour. Under these new rules, companies would be required to address adverse impacts of their activities on human rights (such as child labour and exploitation of workers), and on the environment, (pollution and biodiversity loss for example), both inside and outside the EU.

In reaction to a suggestion by Parliament in June 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation in September 2022, which would ban products made by forced labour from being sold in the EU.

Further information

• Corporate due diligence and corporate accountability, European Parliamentary Research Service, Legislative Train Schedule
• Ban on import of goods produced using modern forms of slavery and forced labour including that of children, European Parliamentary Research Service, Legislative Train Schedule
• Questions and Answers: Prohibition of products made by forced labour in the Union Market, European Commission, September 2022.
• External policy tools to address modern slavery and forced labour, European Parliamentary Research Service, Study, May 2022.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Antimicrobial-resistant infections are predicted to become the second biggest cause of death worldwide by 2050. Despite increasing investment in the development of new antimicrobials, awareness campaigns on antimicrobial misuse and abuse, and monitoring of antimicrobial use and resistance in animals, humans and the environment, antimicrobial resistance continues to grow and the last three decades have not seen even one novel antimicrobial class reach the market. Could the answer lie in a ‘Trojan horse’ strategy to disrupt a natural physiological process common to all bacteria?

In Homer’s telling of the fall of Troy, following an unsuccessful 10‑year siege, the Greeks offered the Trojans a large wooden horse. Once the gift was inside the city walls, out came an army, led by Odysseus, who destroyed the city and ended the war. While it may seem far-fetched to use an old Greek myth as an analogy for the fight against antimicrobial resistance (AMR), the market dearth of new antimicrobials, despite millions of euros invested, means bold new strategies are needed.

The Trojan horse that could be ‘offered’ to antimicrobial-resistant bacteria is gallium. This metal-based nanoparticle strategy exploits an essential living requirement for all living beings: iron acquisition. As an essential micronutrient, during an infection iron is used as a pawn in a tug of war between humans and bacteria: our organism sequesters iron in red blood cells, as well as in heme, ferritin and lactoferrin molecules; in parallel, bacteria secrete iron chellators (siderophores and heme carriers) that bind host ferric iron (Fe(III)) and transport it to the bacterial cell. Using gallium (Ga(III)) as an antimicrobial would mean tricking the bacteria into believing they have acquired iron. Gallium is an iron-mimetic metal, of similar electric charge, ion diameter and biochemistry to iron. It can enter bacterial cells through iron membrane receptors, like a Trojan horse, and then replace iron in physiological processes. However, unlike iron, it cannot be reduced to divalent gallium. Therefore, it inhibits essential cell biochemical processes that depend on iron as a co-factor, quickly becoming toxic for the bacteria and leading to its death.

Gallium is not a novel promise. This FDA-approved drug for cancer treatment was shown more than 10 years ago to successfully inhibit the virulence of Acinetobacter baummannii, a nosocomial bacterial pathogen that has become resistant to virtually all known antimicrobials, including ‘last resort‘ ones. Since then, gallium’s antimicrobial activity has been demonstrated for other multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria considered by the World Health Organization (WHO) to be critical priority pathogens for the development of new antimicrobials. These include Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Enterobacterales species and Mycobacterium tuberculosis, responsible for tuberculosis, the second most deadly communicable disease (after COVID-19), causing 1.5 million deaths per year. More specifically, gallium was effective in a pilot phase Ib trial involving 20 patients with cystic fibrosis and chronic P. aeruginosa lung infections.

The exploration of bacterial iron acquisition as a novel antimicrobial strategy is not limited to the Trojan horse effect of gallium. Cefiderocol (developed by Shionogi) is a broad-spectrum siderophore-cephalosporin combination drug that showed activity against carbapenem-resistant pathogens for the treatment of complicated urinary-tract infections in double-blind clinical trials. In 2020, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) authorised its use as a ‘reserve’ against Gram-negative infections with limited treatment options. It is currently the only iron-acquisition antimicrobial authorised in the EU. Two other siderophore-cephalosporin products, GSK-3342830 (by GSK) and GT-1 (by Geom Therapeutics), are no longer in active development. The translational gap between the available evidence from preclinical research on iron-acquisition strategies as a target of antimicrobial drugs and the lack of follow-through in clinical trials could partially reflect known issues of fragmentation of EU health research and market failures.

Potential impacts and developments

When Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin in 1928, medicine entered a modern era, in which communicable diseases once responsible for child mortality, such as tuberculosis, pneumonia and diarrhoea, could finally be treated, contributing to a progressive improvement in life expectancy and quality. The emergence of bacteria resistant to all known antimicrobials could now push us back to a pre-antibiotic era, where people die from minor infections. The WHO has thus declared AMR to be a top 10 global public health threat.

Developing effective antimicrobials, raising health professional and public awareness to reduce the abuse and misuse of existing antimicrobials, strengthening surveillance, and investing in infection prevention and universal access to high-quality healthcare are some of the policy measures that the European Commission and WHO have indicated as an effective AMR response that integrates human, animal and environmental health (‘One Health’).

Effectively tackling AMR would reduce the mortality burden due to AMR infections. AMR directly caused 1.27 million worldwide deaths in 2019, estimated to rise to 10 million by 2050, surpassing cancer. In the EU alone, AMR is responsible for 33 000 yearly deaths, a trend which continues to increase, especially in eastern and southern countries, and is linked in part to lower investment in public healthcare.

A second impact would be reduced economic burden on EU national healthcare systems, which exceeds €1.1 billion yearly. COVID-19 showed how a health emergency can place extraordinary pressure on healthcare professionals and divert necessary attention from leading diseases (e.g. cardiovascular disease, dementia and cancer). The OECD estimates that applying simple policy measures proposed by the WHO (hygiene, antimicrobial stewardship, diagnostics and awareness campaigns) would save, in a year, about €3 for every €2 invested.

The emergence of ‘superbugs’ is a slow-motion pandemic, driven by the ease of lateral gene transfer in microbial communities and international spread through travel, including tourism and the food industry. Its cross-border nature calls for multidisciplinary, international coordination. Investing in universal antimicrobial access and access to safe water and sanitation would reduce the 5.7 million deaths worldwide due to treatable bacterial infections (e.g. cholera, dysentery, typhoid) in low- and middle-income countries and prevent dissemination of AMR.

Anticipatory policy-making

The EU supports research and development (R&D) projects on new therapeutics, vaccines and diagnostic tools through the FP7 and Horizon 2020 framework programmes and partnerships with Member States and industry. The EU-IMI partnership project GNA NOW is investing over €30 million in the discovery of new antimicrobials by 2024. The Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority considers AMR one of the top three priority cross-border threats and has allocated €580 million to the procurement of therapeutics against priority pathogens.

As part of the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe, the European Commission is currently revising EU pharmaceutical legislation, with expected adoption by the end of 2022. It includes ‘orphan’ medicinal products, used to treat rare diseases, a field typically underinvested in by the pharmaceutical industry. MDR tuberculosis and cystic fibrosis are examples of such diseases, for which new drugs and vaccines are urgently needed.

The discussion on antimicrobial R&D financing models usually centres around either ‘push‘ or ‘pull‘ incentives, which pay, respectively, for the inputs and outputs of R&D. Push incentives reduce the R&D cost for companies, whereas pull incentives reward successful R&D. A novel incentive model is ‘de-linkage’ (e.g. the UK’s ‘Netflix’ subscription and the US PASTEUR Act), where governments pay an annual subscription for new antimicrobials, regardless of use. Another recent strategy involves transferrable exclusivity extensions, which have faced criticism due to higher medicinal costs. A proposed solution has been the creation of a European public infrastructure to accompany the entire drug cycle independently of market failures.

Lastly, research into infection prevention and surveillance could be more effective than the development of new antimicrobials. Vaccines contribute to disease mitigation and eradication, with low resistance. With the innovation in RNA technologies and medical AI, we could soon see new vaccines against cystic fibrosis pathogens and tuberculosis, relieving pressure on AMR. Developments in diagnosis, such as wastewater monitoring, metagenomics and AMR gene sequencing, could further help to hinder AMR infections at their inception.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if a ‘Trojan horse’ strategy could help address antimicrobial resistance?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if a ‘Trojan horse’ strategy could help address antimicrobial resistance?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Leaders and government officials from across the world are meeting at the annual climate summit amid warnings that it might soon be too late to take meaningful measures to slow down the global warming that threatens to impoverish life on Earth and is already causing weather anomalies. ‘We are on a highway to climate hell with our foot on the accelerator… Humanity has a choice: Cooperate or perish,’ United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, said at the beginning of the meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.

The meeting – the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference of Parties, or COP27 – is scheduled to last until 18 November. At the centre of discussions now are the aid and investment that rich countries could provide to poorer nations to help them develop without increasing emissions of greenhouse gases. Officials are also debating a mechanism for compensating poorer countries for losses and damage caused by climate change, which has partly come due to the emissions of wealthy countries.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on climate issues published in the recent few months.

How Europe can salvage its climate credibility at COP27
Atlantic Council, November 2022

To meet energy security and climate goals, Africa needs investment in infrastructure
Atlantic Council, November 2022

The IEA World Energy Outlook 2022 highlights climate finance needs ahead of COP27
Atlantic Council, November 2022

China’s energy security realities and COP27 ambitions
Atlantic Council, November 2022

COP27: An opportunity to get serious about climate migration
Brookings Institution, November 2022

COP27 must focus on actions, not words
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Loss and damage finance in the climate negotiations
Chatham House, November 2022

What are the key issues at COP27?
Chatham House, November 2022

Geopolitical problems must not hamper progress at COP27
Chatham House, November 2022

Stop funding climate disaster
Corporate Europe, November 2022

Global climate agreements: Successes and failures
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Perilous pathogens: How climate change is increasing the threat of diseases
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Climate change and regional instability in the Horn of Africa
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Perspectives on designing a climate club: Alliance-building to strengthen international climate cooperation
EPICO, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, November 2022

Fair energy transition for all: How to get there?
European Policy Centre, November 2022

Climate disinformation is killing the planet
Friends of Europe, November 2022

Why international climate summits are doomed to fail, Part 1: Aspirations untethered from reality
Heritage Foundation, November 2022

Just energy transition partnerships: Can they really make a difference, and how?
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, November 2022

Brazil rainforest destruction accelerates to fastest rate since 2008
Wilson Center, November 2022

COP27 and financing for sustainable energy development
Atlantic Council, October 2022

It is unfair to push poor countries to reach zero carbon emissions too early
Brookings Institution, October 2022

In defence of borrowing for climate action
Centre for European Reform, October 2022

Aligning food systems with climate and biodiversity targets
Chatham House, October 2022

The deadly climate gamble
Corporate Europe, October 2022

COP27 Climate Summit in Egypt: What to expect
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

We’ll always have Paris: How to adapt multilateral climate cooperation to new realities
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

An African COP: What’s at stake for COP27?

Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, October 2022

Collaborating and delivering on climate action through a climate club: an independent report to the G7
London School of Economics, October 2022

Climate club: The way forward
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, October 2022

COP27’s success hinges on loss and damage finance discussions
World Resources Institute, October 2022

Where do we stand on COP26 climate promises? A progress report
World Resources Institute, October 2022

How does permitting for clean energy infrastructure work?
Brookings Institution, September 2022

How can the European Union adapt to climate change?
Bruegel, September 2022

EU climate change due diligence: Addressing climate change in the corporate sustainability due diligence proposal
Institute for European Environmental Policy, September 2022

Net-zero, circular transition in road transport
Institute for European Environmental Policy, September 2022

Russia’s climate action and geopolitics of energy transition: The uncertain and unsettling outlook following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Faire du fonds social pour le climat un levier de la lutte contre la pauvreté énergétique
Institut Jacques Delors, September 2022

How carbon tariffs and climate clubs can slow global warming
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean: The potential for hydrogen partnership
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2022

Climate club ‘green certificate’ would boost membership
Bruegel, August 2022

What the historic U.S. Climate Bill gets right and gets wrong
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Serious gaming: Grounding and directing climate action
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, August 2022

How can the European Union adapt to climate change while avoiding a new fault line?
Bruegel, July 2022

A Transatlantic energy and climate pact is now more necessary than ever
Bruegel, July 2022

Mobilising EU investors to narrow the developing-country climate-finance gap
Bruegel, July 2022

Conference on the Future of Europe: What is next for EU climate policies
Ecologic, July 2022

Read this briefing on ‘The COP27 climate talks‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

On the occasion of World Diabetes Day, the European Parliament is expected to hold a debate on prevention, management and better care of diabetes in the EU during the November II plenary session. World Diabetes Day – marked every year on 14 November – was proclaimed by the United Nations in 2007 to raise awareness of diabetes and related complications, and to promote prevention and care, including through education.

Background

Diabetes is a chronic disease that occurs when the pancreas is no longer able to produce insulin, or when the body cannot make good use of the insulin it produces. Insulin helps glucose get into the cells. If the body is not able to produce insulin or use it effectively, the result can be raised blood glucose levels (hyperglycaemia), causing damage to the heart, blood vessels, eyes, kidneys, teeth and nerves. People with diabetes are also more likely to become severely ill if infected by the Covid-19 virus.

There are three main types of diabetes: type 1, type 2 and gestational. Type 1 results from a lack of insulin production and is diagnosed mainly in childhood and in teenagers. Its causes are still unknown (a genetic predisposition can exist, but the inheritance pattern is unknown). Daily insulin injections are required to keep blood glucose levels under control. Type 2, which accounts for 90 % of all diabetes cases, results from the body being unable to use the insulin it produces effectively. Type 2 is diagnosed mainly in adults, although an increase in cases has recently been observed among children. Type 2 diabetes often results from excess body weight and physical inactivity. A healthy lifestyle, regular physical activity and maintaining a normal body weight can help prevent type 2 diabetes. However, those who have already contracted type 2 diabetes require oral drugs and/or insulin to maintain safe blood glucose levels. Gestational diabetes consists of high blood glucose during pregnancy. Women who are affected and their children are at increased risk of developing type 2 diabetes later in life.

‘Education to protect tomorrow‘ is the theme of the second year of the World Diabetes Days 2021-23 campaign ‘Access to Diabetes Care‘, underlining the need for better access to quality diabetes education for health professionals and people living with diabetes. Every year, the World Diabetes Day campaign focuses on a dedicated theme that runs for one or more years.

Facts and figures

According to the International Diabetes Federation (IDF), approximately 537 million adults (aged 20 to 79) around the world were living with diabetes in 2021. This number is expected to rise to 783 million by 2045. In addition, 541 million adults are at increased risk of developing type 2 diabetes.

Almost one in two (240 million) adults living with diabetes are undiagnosed.

The life expectancy of people living with diabetes is likely to be reduced as a result of their condition.

In the EU specifically, it is estimated that over 32 million people are suffering from diabetes.

Direct costs relating to diabetes reached estimated 9 % of total health expenditure in the EU in 2019, while diabetes can also result in indirect costs that are harder to measure, such as reduced work productivity.

EU action on diabetes

EU Member States are responsible for their own healthcare policies and systems. However, according to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, EU action should complement national policies. The EU focuses on prevention, research, information and education, while also fostering cooperation between Member States.

This is an update of an ‘at a glance’ note from November 2021.

The European Commission addresses diabetes in its work on non-communicable diseases (NCDs). It is supporting Member States as they work towards reaching the nine targets on NCDs of the United Nations (UN) and World Health Organization by 2025, as well as UN sustainable development goal 3.4, which aims to reduce premature mortality from NCDs by one third by 2030. To this end, in 2018 the Commission set up a steering group on health promotion, disease prevention and management of non-communicable diseases, which identifies best practice for dissemination and transfer between countries.

The new Healthier Together EU non-communicable diseases initiative (which covers the period 2022 to 2027), launched by the Commission in December 2021, aims to support EU countries in reducing the burden of NCDs, including diabetes, while improving citizens’ health, as part of efforts to build a European health union. The EU4Health programme, adopted in March 2021, and other EU programmes will support the implementation of the initiative in the EU Member States.

In the field of prevention, the Commission’s action focuses mainly on the key risk factors for type 2 diabetes, encouraging the promotion of healthy eating and physical activity and the reduction of obesity and the harmful use of tobacco and alcohol. The EU4Health programme will continue to provide funding for prevention during the 2021-2027 period. It will also support efforts to facilitate access to medicines and medical supplies, digitalise healthcare services, and set up a European health data space to promote the exchange of and access to various types of health data.

Under the Horizon Europe research and innovation programme, the EU supports several projects geared towards preventing diabetes, improving treatment and translating new knowledge into innovative applications.

MEPs Mobilising for Diabetes (MMD)

The MEP Interest Group on Diabetes MMD, which is continuing the work of the EU Diabetes Working Group, was set up in 2020 and is co-chaired by Sirpa Pietikäinen (EPP, Finland) and Christel Schaldemose (S&D, Denmark). The group aims to foster EU policy action around a series of priorities: improving diabetes care and risk reduction; promoting better access to medicines and technologies; and eliminating discrimination against people living with diabetes. In February 2021, the group published a Blueprint for action on diabetes in the European Union by 2030. On the occasion of World Diabetes Day 2022, it will organise a breakfast symposium on ‘Improving diabetes care for more resilient healthcare systems‘.

Challenges

Diabetes represents a growing threat in the EU. The ageing and increasingly overweight population, unhealthy diets and sedentary lifestyles are resulting in a rapidly increasing number of type 2 diabetes cases. Investment in prevention is essential to prevent diabetes through a healthy lifestyle starting in childhood.

This year’s World Diabetes Day focuses on education. Education plays a significant role in preventing not just diabetes but also its complications. This involves a cross-sectoral policy response relating to health, nutrition, education, mass media campaigns, social services, urban mobility, and physical and recreational activities.

Delivering better long-term care for patients living with diabetes means reducing significant disparities, both between and within Member States, so that all patients have access to quality medicines and medical devices at an affordable price. Lessons can be learned from the Covid-19 pandemic, which has highlighted health inequalities across the EU. The European Commission is organising a high-level conference on 22‑23 November 2022 on how we can better prepare ourselves for future health threats. Investment in research (e.g. innovative tools and technologies, such as continuous glucose monitoring systems and new insulin delivery systems) and improved digitalisation of health services can improve patients’ quality of life and help to reduce health inequalities.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘World Diabetes Day 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

The highlight of the November I 2022 plenary session was the debate on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20‑21 October 2022, during which European Union leaders discussed the latest developments in Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, Europe’s energy crisis, and external relations – with China in particular.

Members also debated Commission statements on the outcome of the modernisation of the Energy Charter, the EU response to the increasing crack-down on protests in Iran, and on the recent communication on ensuring the availability and affordability of fertilisers. Parliament adopted several legislative proposals, including on digital finance, cybersecurity and distortive foreign subsidies. 

Digital finance

In a joint debate on digital finance, Members discussed provisional agreements on two complementary files on information and communications technologies (ICT) in finance. Aimed at harmonising ICT resilience in EU financial institutions, Members first debated the proposed digital operational resilience act (DORA). Given the likely consequences of operational disruption in the financial sector, common key requirements across the EU could well assist Member States to increase resilience to cyber-attack more effectively than if each EU country sets out separate rules. Members then considered the proposal to amend existing directives on the regulation and supervision of the financial system. Part of the digital finance package, this new legislation should also reduce the risk of cyber-incidents across financial markets, whilst still encouraging innovation and competition. Parliament adopted both texts, which need now to be formally adopted by the Council to come into force.

REPowerEU in recovery and resilience plans

Members debated and adopted a joint report by Parliament’s Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on extending the use of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as the main funding tool for the REPowerEU chapters in EU countries’ recovery and resilience plans. These aim at ending EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerating investment in clean energy and reforms. The joint report underlined the need to help citizens and businesses facing hardship from high energy prices and the effects of COVID-19. The vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Cybersecurity across the Union

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council expanding the laws dealing with attacks on critical infrastructure and cybercrime, under an updated Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2). To protect critical sectors such as energy, transport, water, health, digital infrastructure and finance, all of which require a high level of protection, more entities and sectors will be obliged to take security measures. The increased scope should help strengthen European cybersecurity in the long term, including by establishing a cyber-crisis liaison network. Parliament has ensured that the directive will apply to central and regional public administrations. Once formally adopted by the Council, EU Member States will have 21 months to transpose the measures into national law.

Corporate Sustainability

Companies can play their part in protecting the environment and human rights as well as ensuring social responsibility and diversity on company boards. The proposed corporate sustainability directive amends and broadens the rules on sustainability reporting for companies, banks and insurance companies. Members debated and adopted a joint text negotiated with the Council by Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs, which aims to balance requirements for all companies (with at least 250 employees and a turnover of €40 million), to adhere to common standards in their impact on the environment, human rights, social standards and work ethics, with lighter reporting required of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

Distortive foreign subsidies

Foreign state financing can provide companies with an unfair financial advantage over their EU competitors. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on a proposed regulation to tackle such distortive foreign subsidies. Aimed at ensuring fair competition between all companies operating in the single market, the proposal suggests a threshold above which companies must notify the Commission about subsidies they receive from abroad, especially during mergers and acquisitions – seeking a balance between positive outcomes and market distortion. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) has ensured that additional measures strengthen the notification thresholds, with other support taken into consideration, specific channels for informing the Commission and for verification, shorter deadlines, and transparency of assessment.

Full application of the Schengen acquis in Croatia

Under the Schengen agreement, citizens enjoy free movement between countries, without controls at internal borders. However, Croatia, along with Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania – all part of the Schengen Agreement – continue to be subject to internal border controls while awaiting the agreement of the other Member States to become full participants in Schengen. Croatia has now been assessed as meeting all the necessary conditions for full application of the Schengen rules, meaning an end to internal border controls with the country, a decision backed by Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). Parliament debated and adopted its opinion, and it is now for the Council to decide on Croatia’s status.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Three committee decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were announced: from the Transport and Tourism (TRAN) Committee on the proposal for a directive on the inclusion of improved stability requirements and its alignment with stability requirements defined by the International Maritime Organization; and on the proposal for a directive on the framework for the deployment of intelligent transport systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport; and from the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee, on the proposal for a regulation on digital information exchange in terrorism cases.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – November I 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

How do we best protect ourselves in the digital age? Russia’s war on Ukraine and the resulting energy crisis underline the need to boost the European Union’s energy efficiency and cybersecurity. The agenda for the first plenary session of November 2022 therefore centres around joint debates on energy policy, digital finance and cybersecurity in the EU. Members will also hear about the outcome of the European Council meeting of 20 and 21 October, during which the European Union leaders discussed the latest developments in Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, Europe’s energy crisis and external relations, in particular with China.

Russia’s aggression has intensified the need to protect EU citizens from the consequences of cyber-attack. In Wednesday’s joint debate on digital finance, Members are expected to discuss two complementary files on information and communications technologies (ICT) in finance. Members are first due to debate the digital operational resilience act (DORA), proposed to harmonise ICT resilience in EU financial institutions. The Single Rulebook for financial services already governs risks to financial institutions, but it hardly touches upon ICT operational risks. Given the likely consequences of operational disruption in the financial sector, common key requirements across the EU could increase resilience to cyber-attack more effectively than if each EU country sets out separate rules. The ECON committee has ensured a differentiated approach for small, micro- and interconnected entities. Members are then set to consider a proposal also aiming to reduce ICT risks, by amending existing directives on the regulation and supervision of the financial system. Part of the digital finance package, this new legislation should reduce the risk of cyber-incidents across financial markets, whilst still encouraging innovation and competition. The ECON committee has underlined the need for proportionality for SMEs, and the necessity for robust governance.

Cyber-attacks remain on the agenda for Thursday, when Members are set to consider a provisional agreement reached with the Council expanding the laws dealing with attacks on critical infrastructure and cybercrime, under an updated Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2). To protect critical sectors such as energy, transport, water, health, digital infrastructure and finance, all of which require a high level of protection, more entities and sectors will be obliged to take security measures. The increased scope should help strengthen European cybersecurity in the long term, including by establishing a cyber-crisis liaison network. Parliament has ensured that the directive will apply to central and regional public administrations. Once agreed, the EU Member States will have 21 months to transpose the measures into national law.

When the EU put the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in place to support the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, energy efficiency was already a strong focus. On Wednesday afternoon , Members are due to debate a joint report by Parliament’s Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on extending the use of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as the main funding tool for the REPowerEU chapters in EU countries’ recovery and resilience plans. These aim at ending EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels and investing in clean energy and infrastructure. The joint report insists that funding prioritise investment schemes for small businesses and micro-enterprises, and especially tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, in light of the ongoing global energy market disruption. The vote will set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Companies can also play their part in protecting the environment and human rights as well as ensuring social responsibility and diversity on company boards. The proposed corporate sustainability directive should amend and broaden the rules on sustainability reporting for companies, banks and insurance companies. On Wednesday afternoon, Members are expected to consider a joint text negotiated with the Council by Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs that aims to balance requirements for all companies (with at least 250 employees and a turnover of €40 million), to adhere to common standards in their impact on the environment, human rights, social standards and work ethics, with lighter reporting required of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Companies will need to publish reports on their sustainability policies, to be certified independently.

Foreign state financing of companies can provide unfair financial advantage over their EU competitors. Members are due to consider a provisional agreement on a proposed regulation to tackle such distortive foreign subsidies on Thursday. Aiming to ensure fair competition between all companies operating in the single market, the proposal suggests a threshold above which companies must notify the Commission about subsidies they receive from abroad, especially during mergers and acquisitions – seeking a balance between positive outcomes and market distortion. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) has ensured that additional measures strengthen the notification thresholds, with other support taken into consideration, specific channels for informing the Commission and for verification, shorter deadlines, and transparency of assessment.

Under the Schengen agreement, citizens enjoy free movement between countries, without controls at internal borders. However, Croatia, along with Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania – all part of the Schengen agreement – continue to be subject to internal border controls while awaiting the agreement of the other Member States to become full participants in Schengen. Croatia has now been assessed as meeting all the necessary conditions for full application of the Schengen rules, meaning an end to internal border controls with the country, a decision backed by Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), in a report scheduled for consideration on Wednesday afternoon. Once the Parliament has adopted its opinion, it will be up to the Council to decide on Croatia’s status.

November I 2022 Plenary Session agenda

• Corporate sustainability reporting directive
• Full application of the Schengen acquis in Croatia
• A high common level of cybersecurity – NIS2
• Distortive foreign subsidies
• REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans
• Digital operational resilience act (DORA)
• Amending digital operational requirements in financial services legislation

Written by Gisela Grieger with Rita Mendonca Barbosa Amorim.

On 26 October 2022, EPRS held an online roundtable on the 2022 US mid-term elections, which discussed the likelihood of a shift in power in the United States House of Representatives and the US Senate, as well as the domestic and foreign policy implications resulting from such a change.

Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service of EPRS, welcomed the participants and the audience. After providing introductory remarks he passed on the floor to keynote speaker Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, (S&D, Finland), First Vice-Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for relations with the United States.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri approved the Biden administration’s focus not only on Asia and notably on China, but also on the European continent that faces President Putin’s war against the West. She stressed that, in the run-up to the mid-terms on 8 November, the manifestation of extreme social conservatism in the US has mobilised the defenders of liberal values: of equality and women rights. However, she added that high inflation and fuel prices might outweigh concerns about abortion rights as the top political issue for many voters. Miapetra Kumpula-Natri emphasised that her greatest hope was that the mid-terms would be better than the 2020 presidential elections, so that Americans would regain trust in democracy. On EU-US trade relations, she raised concerns about recent US laws, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, that contain ‘America only’ provisions, highlighting that tensions with the US administration require cooperation grounded in democracy.

Elena Lazarou, acting Head of Unit of the External Policies Unit of EPRS, presented the panel: Bruce Stokes, Visiting Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF); Sarah Paden, Vice-President and National Political Director, Progressive Policy Institute; Mark Strand, President of the Congressional Institute and former Chief of Staff to US Senator Jim Talent; and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House. Elena Lazarou set the scene by summarising the reasons for Europeans’ focus on the US and on the mid-terms. Opening the panel discussion, she highlighted the great interest on this side of the Atlantic in US politics and in parliamentary cooperation with the US Congress.

Bruce Stokes emphasised that the US is an increasingly unstable democracy, since 10 of the last 12 elections resulted in a change of power in the White House, the House of Representatives or the Senate. He stressed that the US was deeply divided along party lines on almost every issue, including the economy, health care, violent crime, and climate change. Some 68 % of Democrats say that climate change is an important issue, but only 9 % of Republicans agree. Democrats want politicians to protect women’s rights, and abortion remains an important issue that may galvanise voters to vote Democrat, perhaps offsetting the Republican advantage in other voter segments. Importantly, 81 % of Democrats and 79 % of Republicans believe that the other party’s agenda would destroy America, another reflection of the deep polarisation of US society. As a result, Bruce Stokes concluded that building bridges in the new Congress could be extremely difficult. As for voter intentions, Republicans who previously trailed Democrats in national-level Congressional generic ballots that ask voters which party they would support in the election, have turned the page to lead these polls. A 26 October 2022 model suggests that Democrats would lose 20 to 30 House seats, enough for Republicans to take control. According to Bruce Stokes, the races in Georgia, Nevada and Pennsylvania will determine who will control the Senate.

Sarah Paden argued that what happens in the mid-terms is determinative of the 2024 presidential elections. She explained that state elections are important to US citizens when it comes to ‘bread and butter issues’ and that legislation is increasingly passed through state legislatures every year, in comparison to legislation passed by Congress. She focused on two developments: first, a new type of Republican candidate has emerged that is more extreme then Trump himself, with the new activist wing of the Republican Party becoming the mainstream, which has consequences for the political discourse. Second, a new breed of Republican election deniers have stoked very divisive rhetoric about the ‘stolen’ 2020 election and the legitimacy of Joe Biden’s presidency, are among the candidates for key roles in the US decentralised electoral system. Given the considerable latitude states have in the administration of elections, the success of election deniers could play a significant role in the next election cycle.

Mark Strand pointed out that, historically, the president’s party loses House seats in the mid-terms, adding that there were only two exceptions in recent history. In 2002, when George W. Bush won seats in the House after 9/11 and in 1998, when Republicans sought to impeach Bill Clinton and Democrats kept control of the House. He explained that this logic does not hold true for the Senate, since Senate races are more personality-driven. He stressed that Democrats currently hold a very narrow majority in the House and that the Senate is divided 50/50 with the Vice-President (who is also the president of the Senate) breaking the tie. Democrats only need to keep their 50 votes to maintain control of the Senate. Republicans, by contrast, would need to pick up one seat to flip the majority. In addition, Mark Strand indicated that Americans are quite comfortable with a divided government, since they are naturally suspicious of concentrated power. He added moreover that Americans are in a very angry place. It has been over 20 years since more people were satisfied with the way things are going in the country than it is today. According to the polls he presented, a majority of voters say that the government is corrupt and rigged against people like them and this sentiment is also shared by independent voters, who are most likely to determine the outcome of this election. Polls show that there is an immense polarisation between Democrats and Republicans, with both parties unwilling to work together, and cooperation even seen as a political danger. As a result, Mark Strand concluded that Americans are concerned about the future of democracy as a whole and believe that democracy is in danger of collapse.

Leslie Vinjamuri turned to foreign policy issues, arguing that the number one foreign policy issue is climate and that there is more bipartisanship on that than less. However, Donald Trump ensured that climate change and science remained fundamentally and deeply contested in significant and substantial parts of the Republican Party. According to Vinjamuri, although Europeans are worried about the competitive aspects of the Inflation Reduction Act, the law is a highly consequential achievement, including on climate. She argued that the mid-terms would not lead to a reversal of Biden’s climate policies, because Republicans would not gain the two-thirds majority required. However, a Republican majority in the House would lead to increased Republican oversight activities and provide a platform for rhetoric empowering climate denialism in a way that could be consequential in the run-up to the 2024 presidential elections. She argued that despite bipartisan consensus on China, if Republicans gain a majority in the House, the Biden administration’s two tracks – to compete and to cooperate with China – would become much more difficult to sustain, as Republicans would double-down on competition, turning the discourse into a more ideological one. On Russia, she posited that, if the Republicans gain a majority, there is a great chance that US support to Ukraine would decrease. However, US voters seem to support US aid to Ukraine and this would hold, especially if Russia continues to strike civilian targets in Ukraine. 

Several questions were raised during the Q&A session related to the policy implications for transatlantic relations of a shift of power in the US Congress, on China, and on climate issues. Bruce Stokes argued that if Republicans gain control in Congress, President Biden could veto Republican-led legislation, enacted by both chambers. He added that the establishment of a Republican-led select committee on China could lead to a further deterioration of US-China relations and could impact the EU’s willingness to cooperate with the US on policies towards China. Moreover, Stokes reminded the audience that Republicans have also expressed their interest in investigating the dealings of Hunter Biden, Joe Biden’s son, with both China and Ukraine, which could have repercussions for Congressional approval of support for Ukraine.

Written by Dessislava Yougova (1st edition).

Stratospheric ozone absorbs ultraviolet radiation from the sun and reduces the overall amount of radiation reaching the Earth’s surface. Ozone-depleting substances (ODS) are human-made chemicals that, once emitted, reach the upper atmosphere and destroy the protective ozone layer, causing what is known as the ozone hole. They have significant adverse impacts on human health and the environment and are also greenhouse gases with high global warming potential.

Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 on substances that deplete the ozone layer lays down rules on the production, use, trade, recovery, recycling, reclamation and destruction of ODS and sets out requirements and measures for products and equipment containing these substances. On 5 April 2022, the European Commission submitted a proposal for a regulation on ODS repealing the current one. The aim is to increase the efficiency of the existing measures in order to achieve additional emission reductions in line with the European Green Deal, to ensure more comprehensive monitoring of ODS, to reduce the administrative costs by simplifying the rules, to modernise the licensing system and reduce costs for industry, and to improve the coherence with other pieces of legislation such as Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases, which is being revised in parallel. One of the main objectives of the proposal is to prevent emissions from old products and equipment still containing ODS that have to be recovered and destroyed.

The file has been referred to the European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). The rapporteur – Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden) – published her draft report on 6 October 2022.

Versions

• October 2022: Revision of the Ozone Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on substances that deplete the ozone layer and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022)151
5.4.2022Rapporteur:Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden)2022/0100(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Rovana Plumb (S&D, Romania)
Ondřej Knotek (Renew, Czechia)
Pär Holmgren (Greens/EFA, Sweden)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Anja Hazekamp (The Left, Netherlands)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote on draft report

Written by Gregor Erbach and Sara Catharina Svensson.

The 27th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) will take place in Sharm el‑Sheikh, Egypt on 6-18 November 2022. Implementation, climate finance for developing countries, and options to address ‘loss and damage’ are expected to be some of the focus points of the conference this year. 

While per capita emissions are increasing in most developing countries, including China, India, and Egypt, they are falling in richer regions such as the US, UK and the EU. However, per capita emissions in lower-income countries including India, Egypt and Brazil are still far below the world and EU average. The latest UNEP emissions gap report emphasises that current efforts to curb emissions will not be enough to keep the increase in global temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Egypt has made this year’s conference the ‘Implementation COP’, to ensure that countries turn objectives into action.

The African Group, Egypt, China, India and several other countries want to see financial support for ‘loss and damage‘ brought to the table at COP. At COP26, last year, developing countries’ demands for a loss and damage response fund almost jeopardised the Glasgow Climate Pact. As a compromise, the conference launched the Glasgow Dialogue to discuss funding for ‘loss and damage’.

The European Parliament has adopted a resolution on COP27, welcoming the Glasgow Dialogue and calling for new sources of public finance prioritising grants to address the loss and damage associated with climate change. However, the Glasgow Dialogue received some criticism last year and may cause fresh tensions at COP27.

Another big issue will be the delivery of finance pledges. At COP 15, high-income nations committed to mobilise US$100 billion a year in new and additional climate funding for climate mitigation and adaptation in developing nations by 2020. Although the EU has raised its climate finance steadily since 2013, the developed countries still do not reach their collective target. High inflationary pressure and energy prices, causing developed countries to struggle with their own economies, may undermine the high levels of foreign aid that will be needed to provide for both the pledged finance and the potential loss and damage funds. However, many developing countries are also suffering from high energy prices and recessions, as well as climate impacts. This may increase the pressure on the US, the EU and the other developed countries to step up.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the current energy crisis have highlighted the interplay between climate change and international security. For example, the RePowerEU plan is intended to accelerate the rollout of renewable energy and reduce energy consumption, to put an end to the EU’s dependence on Russian gas.

The European Parliament has highlighted that the EU could reduce its GHG emissions by more than 55 % by 2030 if the EU adopts the ‘fit for 55‘ package and the RePowerEU plan. A trilogue agreement on the proposal to sell only zero-emission cars and vans by 2035 has recently been reached, signalling that the EU is serious about taking action to reach its climate targets. Parliament also supports policies and contributions to international climate finance and has urged the developed countries to make sure the promised US$100 billion is spent each year. 

See also:

• COP26 outcomes
• COP27
• Climate change and international security
• New partnership with Africa
• Climate action in the EU
• Fit for 55
• Loss and Damage: L&D

Interactive infographics

• https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/infographics/climateaction/
• https://epthinktank.eu/2018/12/03/cop-24-making-the-paris-agreement-operational/

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso.

The European Union (EU) has an energy strategy focused on providing households and businesses with secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy. This will require a major transformation of Europe’s energy system as well as massive investment. Alongside national funding, various EU instruments contribute to the financing of energy policy, which is central to efforts to decarbonise the European economy under the European Green Deal.

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the EU’s ground-breaking recovery instrument, created to counter the impact of the pandemic crisis, is a new and important source of funding for the policy area, since it includes investment and reform in the areas of energy efficiency, clean power and energy networks. The national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs), through which the RRF is implemented, have a strong focus on energy, investing €88.49 billion (17.9 % of their resources) in the policy area.

The energy dimension of the NRRPs varies across the Member States, depending on factors such as their specific challenges, priorities and preferences in green spending, and size of the plans. One criticism that has emerged is that the plans could have done more to develop cross-border projects. In any case, other significant sources of public and private financing will be required to meet the major investment needs of the policy area.

The REPowerEU plan, designed to end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the green transition, has increased these needs. The European Parliament, a strong advocate for a common energy policy and a key player in scrutiny of RRF implementation, has stressed the need to enhance the RRF contribution to mitigating the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The European Parliament and the Council are currently examining a European Commission proposal to finance additional investment and reform in the field of energy. It would introduce new REPowerEU chapters to the NRRPs, using sums still available for RRF loans, some fresh resources and voluntary transfers from other EU instruments. The REPowerEU chapters should enhance the already important contribution that the RRF is making to financing energy investment and reform.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy policy in the national recovery and resilience plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Xi-Jinping won a third term in China’s top job, as secretary general of the Communist Party, at its Congress in October, solidifying his grip on power over a country which has become increasingly autocratic and abrasive in its foreign policy during his 10-year reign to date. Xi’s re-election for a third term broke with China’s recent tradition of leaders being replaced after two terms, in a sign he will yield power in a manner reminiscent of communist China’s founder Mao Zedong. His new reign begins amid fears that China might try to annex Taiwan, and with questions over the extent to which he will support Russia in its war against Ukraine. Domestically, Xi faces challenges including faltering growth, a property crisis, and huge debt levels.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on China, its international relations and domestic policies.

What Xi Jinping’s third term means for the world
Atlantic Council, October 2022

Reading between the lines of Xi’s party congress speech
Atlantic Council, October 2022

An allied strategy for China after the 20th Party Congress
Atlantic Council, October 2022

Tracking the biggest takeaways from China’s Communist Party Congress
Atlantic Council, October 2022

Why China’s leadership must respond to the country’s property crisis
Atlantic Council, October 2022

Xi’s three difficulties: The leadership line-up at the 20th Party Congress
Brookings Institution, October 2022

On the eve of the party congress: What’s ahead for China’s economy?
Brookings Institution, October 2022

Are worsening US-China relations in Taiwan’s interest?
Brookings Institution, October 2022

The critical importance of chips – and having a plan for them
Bruegel, October 2022

China’s real estate sector goes south
Bruegel, October 2022

China and the West: growing apart as geopolitical tensions grow
Bruegel, October 2022

Germany’s continued illusions about China and Russia
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

The inauguration of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

The new U.S National Security Strategy: Battling China for technological leadership
Centre for European Reform, October 2022

The EU should abandon chip nationalism
Centre for European Reform, October 2022

US-China rivalry in the Global South? Insights from a public opinion survey
Central European Institute for Asian Studies, October 2022

Taiwan Strait crisis: Implications for Europe
Central European Institute for Asian Studies, October 2022

Why a more inward-looking China is bad news for the world economy
Chatham House, October 2022

China’s Party Congress: a dose of foreign policy realism is needed
Chatham House, October 2022

Xi Jinping shows the world he is taking a tougher line
Chatham House, October 2022

The UK must avoid conflict with Europe and China
Chatham House, October 2022

We can’t make China dance to our tune
Clingendael, October 2022

How Xi will consolidate power at China’s twentieth party congress
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Washington raises stakes in war on Chinese technology
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

The Chinese Communist Party
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Xi Jinping seeks stability: The 20th National Congress of the CCP
Egmont Institute, October 2022

China between lockdowns and the 20th Party Congress: What can we expect for the EU and globally?
Egmont, October 2022

Watching China in Europe – October 2022
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

The China challenge: Xi Prepares for his third term and beyond
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

Why China is not all-In on supporting Russia
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

20e Congrès du Parti communiste chinois: Décryptage de la nouvelle équipe dirigeante
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2022

China’s economic challenges and the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
Institute for International Security Studies, October 2022

Brussels–Taipei: Changing the game?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2022

The foreign policy implications of China’s twentieth party congress
International Crisis Group, October 2022

China’s economic challenges and the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2022

Xi Jinping the III: Ruling through the pandemic and isolationism
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, October 2022

Key takeaways from Xi’s report to the party congress
Mercator Institute for China Studies, October 2022

The China-Europe freight train and the war in Ukraine: Triumph and tribulations in transcontinental shipping
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

Four years into the trade war, are the US and China decoupling?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2022

China’s private sector advance pauses, but the trend is unclear
Peterson Institute for International Economic, October 2022

The political geography of the South China Sea disputes
Rand Corporation, October 2022

Anticipating Chinese reactions to U.S. posture enhancements
Rand Corporation, October 2022

Building bridges? PGII versus BRI
Brookings Institution, September 2022

Succeeding in the AI competition with China: A strategy for action
Brookings Institution, September 2022

China’s top ranked corporations are not as opaque as they may seem
Bruegel, September 2022

The EU should abandon chip nationalism
Centre for European Reform, September 2022

China Party Congress: Xi’s political blueprint
Chatham House, September 2022

China is divided on Russia: Let’s keep it that way
Clingendael, September 2022

China’s repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

China’s footprint in Latin America
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2022

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Successful economic strategy or failed soft-power tool?
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, September 2022

Responding to the China challenge: Blueprint 2.0
Heritage Foundation, September 2022

“Comprehensive National Security” unleashed: How Xi’s approach shapes China’s policies at home and abroad
Mercator Institute for China Studies, September 2022

First trade war, now Russia’s real war. Why US exports to China continue to suffer
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Xi re-elected to China’s top job‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi.

The ‘farm to fork’ strategy is a roadmap to build a sustainable European Union (EU) food system, in line with the aims of the European Green Deal. Launched in May 2020, the strategy includes initiatives that are progressing at different speeds, within a lively political debate on the strategy’s objectives and priorities. The EU institutions are helping to shape the various elements of the strategy.

European Commission proposal – Where do we stand?

On 20 May 2020, the European Commission adopted a communication on ‘A farm to fork strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally friendly food system’, to address priorities and challenges relating to every step in the food chain. The strategy announced a number of legislative and non‑legislative initiatives, most of them listed in an annexed action plan. One of the leading initiatives was a proposal for a legislative framework for sustainable food systems (FSFS) – expected in 2023 – which was the subject of a public consultation in 2022 and includes the planned initiative on a sustainability labelling framework.

The Commission has already delivered on some ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiatives, for instance:

• the 2020 recommendations to EU countries on their common agricultural policy (CAP) strategic plans;
• the 2021 contingency plan to ensure food supply and food security in times of crisis;
• the EU code of conduct on responsible food business and marketing practices, in force as of July 2021;
• a proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, put forward in 2022.

The timetable for some initiatives is set in the EU biodiversity strategy (for instance the 2021 organic production action plan and the future action plan on better nutrient management). Other initiatives require multiple actions over a longer period, such as the improvement of producers’ position in the food chain, which involves the operation of EU rules on unfair trading practices and of CAP rules on agricultural markets.

The following tables outline ongoing and future ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiatives as regards food chain production segments (see Table 1) and areas spanning food services to food consumption (see Table 2).

Table 1 – Ongoing and planned ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiatives on sustainable food production

InitiativeState of playPlant protection products (PPPs)In June 2022, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal on the sustainable use of PPPs. Other rules adopted in the course of 2022 concern the facilitation of the marketing of PPPs with biological active substances and the collection of pesticide statistics.Farm sustainability data network (FSDN)In June 2022, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal to include data on sustainable farming practices in the current farm accountancy data network (FADN).Feed additivesCurrent feed additives rules were the subject of an evaluation in 2021, with a view to the adoption of a proposal for a regulation due in 2021 but not yet adopted.Carbon farmingAfter its 2021 communication on sustainable carbon cycles, the Commission is due to adopt a legislative proposal on EU rules on certifying carbon removals on farms in 2022.New genomic techniques (NGTs)Following a 2021 study on the status of NGTs under EU law, a public consultation took place in 2022 and the adoption of a legislative proposal on NGTs is due in 2023.Animal welfareOnce the fitness check of EU animal welfare legislation has been finalised in 2022, the revision of the legislation, including on animal transport and slaughter, is due in 2023.Source: Compiled by the author.

Table 2 – Ongoing and planned ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiatives beyond food production

InitiativeState of playGeographical indications (GIs)A legislative proposal published in 2022 aims to strengthen the legislative framework for GIs, so as to improve protection of intellectual property rights and increase uptake of GIs.Promotion policyAfter a public consultation, the Commission aims to enhance the role of EU promotion campaigns for agri‑food products in sustainable production and consumption in 2022.Marketing standardsThe legislative proposals expected in 2022 to revise marketing standards for fish and seafood products, agricultural products, and seeds and forests, have yet to be published.Nutrient profilesA legislative initiative on nutrient thresholds (announced for 2022) is still in preparation.Food labellingPreparatory work is ongoing on revised EU laws (announced for 2022) on front‑of‑pack nutrition labelling, origin indication for certain products, and date marking.Food contact materialsNew rules on recycled plastic intended to come into contact with food entered into force in 2022, while a major overhaul of EU food contact material laws is announced for 2023.Food procurement and school schemeIn 2023, the Commission is set to put forward minimum criteria for sustainable public procurement of food, and a review of the legal framework for the EU school scheme.Food wasteIn 2023, the Commission plans to propose legally binding targets to reduce food waste.Source: Compiled by the author.

When it comes to the ‘farm to fork’ strategy’s global dimension, a 2022 Commission report indicates tools to promote production sustainability standards in imports. It also identifies some areas for action: multilateral forums, bilateral cooperation and trade agreements, and unilateral EU measures. The chapter on sustainable food systems featuring in recent bilateral trade agreements and the legislative initiative on deforestation‑free goods are examples of measures to promote the global sustainability transition sought by the strategy.

The debate around the strategy remains lively

Generally greeted as a long‑awaited move towards a more sustainable EU food system, the ‘farm to fork’ strategy is contentious on two points. First, stakeholders and decision‑makers disagree on whether action on food emergencies (such as those caused first by the coronavirus pandemic and then by Russia’s war on Ukraine) should be prioritised over action on the environment and climate emergencies (which the strategy aims to tackle). Second, the Commission has not accommodated stakeholders’ and policy‑makers’ requests for an impact assessment of the strategy, whereas various studies have warned that some elements of the strategy risk having a negative effect on agricultural production. The Commission has stressed that most of the strategy’s initiatives involve an impact assessment, in line with the better regulation approach. Despite some delay on a few initiatives, the Commission intends to implement the strategy as planned.

The EU institutions’ positions

In Parliament, an October 2021 resolution on the ‘farm to fork’ strategy backed its main elements, stressing such issues as building a sustainable common food policy, helping the sustainability transition, and producing healthier food. The Council’s October 2020 conclusions on the strategy broadly welcomed the initiatives announced, conveying political messages on the need to ensure food security and support producers while contributing to EU climate neutrality by 2050. Both the European Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee welcomed the ‘farm to fork’ strategy in 2020. They suggested issues for consideration and identified gaps to address for an effective roadmap. These included the need for consistency between food‑related policies and the contribution of local and rural communities to such policies, the necessity of fair food prices reflecting the environmental and societal cost of production, and reciprocity of standards in trade agreements.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Taking the EU’s ‘farm to fork’ strategy forward‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vivienne Hallleux (1st edition).

As announced in the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, on 22 June 2022 the European Commission tabled a proposal for a nature restoration regulation. The proposed regulation would set multiple binding restoration targets and obligations across a broad range of ecosystems, from forests and agricultural land to urban areas, rivers and marine habitats, complementing other existing legal instruments. Altogether, these nature restoration measures should cover at least 20 % of the EU’s land and sea areas by 2030, and all ecosystems in need of restoration by 2050. Member States would be required to develop nature restoration plans to reach these targets at national level; the Commission would assess these plans.

While nature restoration enjoys strong public support, the proposal has raised concerns among stakeholders as regards the enforceability and achievability of the targets, the economic and social implications, the protection of property rights and the financial support for restoration.

The text is now with the co-legislators. In Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointed César Luena as rapporteur on 12 July 2022. The ENVI committee is expected to discuss the rapporteur’s draft report in January 2023.

Versions

• October 2022: EU nature restoration regulation: Setting binding targets for healthy ecosystems (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on nature restoration Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022)304
22.6.2022Rapporteur:César Luena (S&D, Spain)2022/0195(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Christine Schneider (EPP, Germany)
María Soraya Rodrígues Ramos (Renew Spain)
Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Mick Wallace (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of a draft report

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on her to award the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Mr Julian Assange, co-founder of WikiLeaks.

Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in October 2022. The European Parliament awards the prize each year through a process involving many actors. The final decision on the winner of the prize is made by the leaders of the political groups.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English, Italian, French and German).

Main points made in the reply in English

The European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize pays tribute to the work of human rights defenders and is the highest recognition the European Union attaches to their human rights efforts. Respect for fundamental freedoms is a core value of the European Union, which it promotes through its external policy.

In September of each year, a political group or at least 40 Members of the European Parliament may nominate candidates for the Sakharov Prize. Each Member may support only a single candidate. From the list of nominees, three finalists are then shortlisted, following a joint vote in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Development and the Subcommittee on Human Rights.

This year, the three finalists are :

• Julian Assange, co-founder of the WikiLeaks association
• the people of Ukraine, represented by their president, elected leaders, and civil society
• the Truth Commission in Colombia

Julian Assange was nominated by Sabrina Pignedoli and 40 Members of the European Parliament.

Please note that the winner is chosen by the leaders of the political groups; the President’s role is to announce the winner. The award ceremony will take place in December.

Main points made in the reply in Italian

Il Premio Sacharov del Parlamento europeo rende omaggio all’attività dei difensori dei diritti umani ed è il massimo riconoscimento che l’Unione europea conferisce agli sforzi compiuti a favore dei diritti dell’uomo. Il rispetto delle libertà fondamentali è un valore basilare dell’Unione europea, che essa promuove attraverso la sua politica esterna.

Nel settembre di ogni anno un gruppo politico o almeno quaranta deputati al Parlamento europeo possono nominare i candidati al premio Sacharov. Ciascun deputato può sostenere una sola candidatura. Dall’elenco dei candidati vengono selezionati quindi tre finalisti mediante un voto congiunto della commissione per gli affari esteri, della commissione per lo sviluppo e della sottocommissione per i diritti dell’uomo.

Quest’anno i tre finalisti sono:

• Julian Assange, co-fondatore di Wikileaks
• il popolo dell’Ucraina, rappresentato dal loro presidente, dai leader eletti e dalla società civile
• la Commissione per la verità della Colombia

Julian Assange è stato nominato da Sabrina Pignedoli e altri 40 eurodeputati.

Le segnaliamo che il vincitore viene scelto dai leader dei gruppi politici; il ruolo della Presidente è annunciare il vincitore. La cerimonia di assegnazione del premio si terrà a dicembre.

Main points made in the reply in French

Le prix Sakharov du Parlement européen rend hommage au travail des défenseurs des droits de l’homme. Il s’agit de la plus haute reconnaissance que l’Union européenne attache à leurs efforts en matière de droits de l’homme. Le respect des libertés fondamentales est une valeur essentielle de l’Union européenne, qu’elle promeut dans le cadre de sa politique extérieure.

Chaque année, en septembre, les groupes politiques ou au moins 40 députés au Parlement européen peuvent nominer des candidats au prix Sakharov. Chaque député ne peut soutenir qu’un seul candidat. Sur la liste des candidats proposés, trois finalistes sont ensuite sélectionnés lors d’un vote conjoint de la commission des affaires étrangères et de la commission du développement, ainsi que de la sous-commission « droits de l’homme ».

Cette année, les trois finalistes sont:

• Julian Assange, co-fondateur de Wikileaks
• Le brave peuple d’Ukraine, représenté par son président, ses dirigeants élus et la société civile
• La Commission de la vérité de Colombie

Julian Assange a été nominé par Sabrina Pignedoli et 40 députés européens.

Veuillez noter que le lauréat est choisi par les présidents des groupes politiques; le rôle de la Présidente est d’annoncer le lauréat. La cérémonie de remise du prix aura lieu en décembre.

Main points made in the reply in German

Der Sacharow-Preis des Europäischen Parlaments wird an Personen und Organisationen verliehen, die sich für Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten einsetzen. Er ist die höchste Anerkennung, die die Europäische Union für Bemühungen um Menschenrechte vergibt. Die Achtung der Grundfreiheiten ist ein Grundwert der Europäischen Union, den sie somit auch durch ihre Außenpolitik fördert.

Jeden September können eine Fraktion oder mindestens 40 Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments Kandidaten für den Sacharow-Preis nominieren. Jedes Mitglied kann nur einen Kandidaten unterstützen. Von der Liste der Kandidaten werden drei Finalisten bei einer gemeinsamen Abstimmung des Ausschusses für auswärtige Angelegenheiten und des Entwicklungsausschusses sowie des Unterausschusses Menschenrechte in die engere Wahl gezogen.

In diesem Jahr sind die drei Finalisten:

• Julian Assange, Mitbegründer der Vereinigung WikiLeaks
• Das ukrainische Volk, vertreten durch seinen Präsidenten, seine gewählten Politiker und die Zivilgesellschaft
• Die Wahrheitskommission in Kolumbien

Julian Assange wurde von der Abgeordneten Sabrina Pignedoli und weiteren 40 Mitgliedern des Europäischen Parlaments nominiert.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass der Gewinner von den Fraktionsvorsitzenden ausgewählt wird; Aufgabe des Präsidenten ist es, den Gewinner bekanntzugeben. Die Preisverleihung findet im Dezember statt.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 8 November 2022, the US will hold mid-term elections. All 435 seats of the House (of Representatives) and 35 of the 100 Senate seats are on the ballot. The mid-terms will not only shape the power distribution of the 118th US Congress (2023-2024) and the chances of legislation being passed in a highly polarised Congress but also provide insights into which direction the US may take in the 2024 presidential race. In mid-term elections, US voters typically set an end to a ‘unified’ government where the president’s party is in control of both chambers, as was the situation during the 117th US Congress (2021-2022), by flipping the majority in at least one chamber. Historical precedent suggests a strong correlation between the incumbent president’s approval rating and the loss of House seats faced by the president’s party. Given President Biden’s current low approval rating, this does not bode well for Democrats. Recent polls suggest that the Democrats are likely to lose their thin majority in the House, but may retain control of the Senate. Of late, a string of vital legislative wins and two Supreme Court rulings have created some new momentum for Democrats.

The US primaries’ results for Republican candidates endorsed by former President Donald Trump suggest that his influence on the Republican Party should not be underestimated. Trump’s narrative about the ‘stolen election of 2020’ continues to resonate strongly with rank-and-file Republicans and the Republican voter base. Few Republican candidates have publicly distanced themselves from that narrative and many of those who have, as well as those who voted for Trump’s impeachment, have lost in the primaries against a Trump-endorsed Republican challenger. A Republican-controlled House is likely to mean legislative gridlock in many policy areas, with President Biden resorting to more executive orders for regulatory action, to his power to veto legislation, and to an increased focus on foreign policy, in particular if Republicans also take control of the Senate. Indeed, the House Republican legislative platform for the 118th Congress is testimony to growing partisanship on a wide range of sensitive domestic issues and to comparatively more bipartisanship on foreign policy issues.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 2022 US mid-term elections: Legislation meets politics‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eamonn Noonan.

The Russian invasion has caused huge destruction of life and property in Ukraine. Reconstruction will be a long and costly process, and the EU and others are already marshalling funds for this effort. Some EU leaders have expressed support for using frozen Russian central bank (RCB) funds towards reconstruction, but it is unclear if this will actually happen. There are recent examples of sovereign assets being confiscated and used to compensate victims of injustice, but the confiscation of Russia’s sovereign funds raises complex legal and political issues that are unlikely to be resolved quickly or easily.

Reconstruction costs and funding sources

The European Union is already engaged in efforts to prepare the reconstruction of Ukraine. The estimated costs are huge. On 18 May 2022, a European Commission communication announced plans to establish a Ukraine reconstruction platform. This would become the ‘strategic governance body’, led jointly by Ukraine’s National Recovery Council, the Commission and international partners. It would channel and coordinate financial support for reconstruction, in the form of the ‘RebuildUkraine’ facility.

At the ‘Ukraine Recovery’ Conference in Lugano, Switzerland on 4-5 July, Ukrainian prime minister Denys Shmygal stated that total reconstruction costs would amount to around US$750 billion, an estimate shared by the Kyiv School of Economics. The prime minister noted that Ukraine had so far received around US$100 billion for this purpose. The European Parliament strongly supports the provision of macro-financial aid for Ukraine.

Since the 24 February invasion, Ukraine’s Western partners and international organisations have been generous and swift in their financial support. The European Union, World Bank and International Monetary Fund were among the first to provide macro-financial assistance and emergency financing packages to the Ukrainian government. The financial support from the US and the UK to date is one of the largest emergency assistance packages in history.

The possibility of mobilising other, less conventional sources of funding remains open. The Commission communication and Shmygal both noted that the RCB’s substantial holdings abroad could be a source of income for Ukraine’s recovery. The US, the EU and other partners moved to freeze these funds within days of the invasion. The funds amount to approximately US$300-500 billion. This figure dwarfs any amount likely to be realised from the seizure of sanctioned oligarchs’ assets.

EU response: ‘Freeze and seize’

The Commission set up the ‘freeze and seize‘ task force in March 2022, in order to identify and freeze the assets of Russian oligarchs, and to ensure a coordinated approach within the EU and with other G7 partners. A proposed directive on asset recovery and confiscation will enhance the ability of national authorities to identify, freeze, confiscate and manage tainted assets. The focus is on the assets of individuals involved in criminal activities; the proposal does not specifically address the confiscation of Russian sovereign funds. The US has created a similar task force, known as Kleptocapture.

The European Parliament has called for compensation from Russia for war damages, arguing that Russian assets frozen as a result of sanctions ‘should be legally confiscated in accordance with international law’.

Political, strategic and legal obstacles

There are major political and strategic obstacles hampering confiscation of Russian sovereign funds. On the political front, the UN Compensation Commission serves as an interesting precedent. This was set up by the UN Security Council to deal with claims from Kuwait against Iraq, and it awarded US$52 billion in compensation to the victims of Saddam Hussein’s invasion. It is difficult to imagine the UN taking this approach in this case however. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia would be able to veto any such proposal to compensate Ukraine.

In 2018, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Arbitration Institute ordered Russian state-owned company Gazprom to pay US$2.9 billion in compensation to Ukraine’s Naftogaz, and this was duly paid. This is a not a reliable precedent for a judgment involving far greater amounts awarded directly against the Russian State, however, whose disregard for international law is well established. Early in 2022, the US confiscated US$7 billion from Afghan central bank funds, to be used to compensate the victims of terrorism, including relatives of 9/11 victims, and for humanitarian aid. A significant part of the legal justification for this step was that the US was a direct party to the conflict in Afghanistan; this argument cannot be made in relation to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

In law, there is a clear distinction between freezing assets (preventing their use) and confiscating them (removing title from the original owner). Legal analysts note that the principle of sovereign immunity is a formidable obstacle to the confiscation of RCB assets. Any such step could well be overturned by legal challenges, and any failure to comply with due legal process in the matter would be seen as undermining the rules-based order to which the West is committed. A further consideration is that confiscation without a UN Security Council decision could set a precedent that could later be used against the US or its allies. The  Economist also points out that seizure of sovereign assets could deter other countries, notably China, from holding substantial assets in the West in future.

Alternative avenues for compensation

These considerations may explain why the EU has not highlighted the possible use of frozen Russian assets among the potential sources for reconstruction, since the Commission’s communication in May. The moral case for seizing RCB assets is compelling, and the amounts involved are substantial. A significant foresight exercise may be needed in order to identify and resolve issues around legal authority and the legal basis, in addition to the problem of enforcing a judgment against Russia. The practical and political obstacles are such that alternative strategies need to be considered. Radosław Sikorski (EPP, Poland) Member of the European Parliament has called for legislation to allow victims of Russian terror to claim compensation from Russian state assets.

Philip Zelikow and Simon Johnson suggest that instead of confiscation, frozen assets could be used as a lever to achieve concessions from Russia. When the Russian war on Ukraine finally ends, countries that have imposed sanctions could insist on a condition for unfreezing RCB assets and for ending sanctions: that the Russian government agrees to make reparations to Ukraine. This would not require a Security Council resolution. Russia would face the reality that the loss of frozen assets, offset by a restoration of external economic links, would be preferable to the long-term continuation of the asset freeze coupled with continued economic isolation.

A further option is a tariff on Russian oil exports, with the revenue being allocated to Ukraine. Another is the diversion of payments for Russian oil into escrow accounts, to be released only when an agreement is reached on the lifting of sanctions and the provision of funding to Ukraine. With arrangements like this in place, Ukraine’s rebuilding could proceed, and Russia would ultimately have to bear a significant share of the costs.

The reconstruction of Ukraine is likely to be a generational task, extending far into the future. Efforts to secure compensation from Russia will be pursued vigorously – whether or not this involves the confiscation of currently frozen sovereign assets.

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘Confiscating Russian sovereign assets to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction: Mission impossible?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel.

At their 20-21 October 2002 meeting, European Union leaders focused on Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, energy and the economy, as well as on external relations, paying specific attention to China. They reiterated the EU’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and confirmed EU political, financial, military and humanitarian support to Ukraine. On energy, EU leaders agreed that the Council and the European Commission will ‘urgently submit concrete decisions’ on energy-related measures, including a gas price cap, an issue that still divides the Member States. The EU leaders also discussed means to protect critical infrastructure. During their exchange on external relations, EU leaders held a strategic discussion on relations with China, without adopting conclusions; discussed the preparation of the EU-ASEAN Commemorative Summit; took stock of the preparation of the upcoming United Nations-led summits on climate change and biodiversity; and condemned Iran’s human rights breaches. For the seventh time in a row, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed the European Council, stressing ‘terror must lose. Ukraine and all of Europe must win’. The European Parliament President, Roberta Metsola, addressed the leaders, noting that Ukraine is defending Europe and that ‘real peace can only come with justice – with a Tribunal to look into war crimes, perpetrators and restitution’.

1. Background

The European Council meeting began with the customary address by the President of the European Parliament. Roberta Metsola referred to reservations expressed regarding re-opening the EU multiannual financial framework (MFF). She stressed that a revision was needed ‘to respond to crises or to finance new priorities’ and underlined that ‘the MFF needed to be future-proofed with in-built flexibility’ to finance new priorities. President Metsola also drew attention to Moldova, stressing that it needs EU assistance, at a time when it is confronted with the ‘economic, humanitarian, energy or even political’ consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The meeting’s topics – Ukraine, energy and the economy – showed continuity with the informal European Council meeting held in Prague on 7 October 2022, and the next regular meeting on 15‑16 December 2022, as announced in the indicative 2022 Leaders’ Agenda. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called the meeting ‘fruitful’, underlining that the EU leaders ‘have this conviction that when [they] meet together [they] can increase [their] influence and have genuine constructive impact’. He announced a summit with Latin American and Caribbean countries for 2023, under the Spanish rotating presidency of the Council of the EU.

EU leaders offered Mario Draghi, the outgoing Prime Minister of Italy, a round of applause, whilst President Michel praised him for his ‘concise, brief and powerful style’.

2. European Council meeting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders reiterated the Union’s ‘full support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity’. They recalled their statement of 30 September 2022, condemning Russia’s illegal annexation of the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, and confirmed that the EU would never recognise this, just as it has not recognised the annexation of Crimea, Russia having ‘no legitimate basis for any action on the territory of Ukraine’. The EU leaders condemned the recent drone attacks ‘targeting civilians and civilian objects and infrastructure in Kyiv and across Ukraine’ and expressed support for the International Atomic Energy Agency in its efforts to maintain the safety and security of the Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia.

Addressing EU leaders by video-conference, President Zelenskyy stressed that a third of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure had been destroyed as a result of Russia’s attacks using Iranian combat drones, depleting Ukraine’s ability to export energy. He underlined that the IRIS‑T system provided by Germany protects both Ukrainians and Europeans, and urged transatlantic partners to supply more such systems ‘to create a truly reliable air shield’.

The EU leaders noted Ukraine’s ‘readiness for a just peace’ and again noted its right to defend itself, to liberate all illegally occupied territories and to re-establish its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Justice and accountability for war crimes were among the key issues discussed by the EU leaders. Several Member States, including Lithuania and Estonia, supported the creation of a special tribunal for war crimes committed in Ukraine, whist the EU institutions are ‘to explore options so that full accountability can be ensured’.

Reconstruction will be at the centre of the International Expert Conference hosted by the German Presidency of the G7 in Berlin on 25 October 2022. Leaders invited the Commission to present legally valid options for funding Ukraine’s reconstruction, including by using frozen Russian assets.

When it comes to military support, EU leaders noted that the Union will conduct an EU military assistance mission, aimed at training Ukrainian armed forces. Given that Ukraine is a country at war, the mission will be conducted on EU soil, a first for a common security and defence policy mission. Over €10 billion has been allocated from the European Peace Facility (EPF) to cover common costs. The EU leaders also noted that an additional €500 million in EU military assistance was agreed in the Council, increasing the total provided to Ukraine since the start of the war to €3.1 billion. This amount represents nearly 55 % of the entire EPF envelope planned to 2027.  

As regards economic and financial assistance, the EU Heads of State or Government called for the rapid disbursement of the remaining €3 billion in macro-financial assistance. They invited the Commission and the Council to work on ‘a more structural solution for providing assistance to Ukraine’. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen underlined that ‘it is important for Ukraine to have a predictable and stable flow of income’, stressing that Ukraine needed between €3 and €4 billion per month for its basic needs, which the EU, the United States and the international financial instructions could cover. She confirmed that the EU’s contribution could be around €1.5 billion a month in 2023, with the disbursement mechanism still to be developed by the Ministers of Finance. The EU leaders also stressed that existing mechanisms – the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine – facilitated access to the single market and should be implemented in full. With Ukraine recently granted candidate country status, President Michel stressed the need for the EU ‘to act to ensure that this is a credible and strong perspective for Ukraine’

In view of the coming winter, humanitarian aid was also discussed. President von der Leyen underlined that more than 11 million people were internally displaced in Ukraine and that the EU would provide €175 million for their basic needs, as well as several emergency shelters.

The EU leaders discussed the support to Russia of Belarus and Iran. They confirmed the Union’s readiness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Belarus and called on the regime to stop allowing the Russian military to wage war on Ukraine from Belarusian territory. They condemned Iran’s military support for Russia, and welcomed the sanctions on individuals and entities over the delivery of Iranian combat drones to Russia, adopted by the Council on 20 October 2022. Although no further sanctions targeting Russia have been agreed for now, EU leaders recalled that the existing sanctions should be implemented in close cooperation with international partners, and explored means to ‘increase collective pressure on Russia’ to end the war.  

Moreover, EU leaders stressed that a common approach to granting visas to Russian applicants was paramount and welcomed the reviewed guidelines issued by the European Commission.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament:President Metsola stressed that Russia’s strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure require sanctions to be stepped up, military support increased, and efforts redoubled to ensure war crimes do not remain unpunished.

Food availability and affordability

Although not envisaged in Charles Michel’s invitation letter, EU leaders discussed, as anticipated in the EPRS outlook, the issue of global food security, which has been negatively impacted by Russia’s war on Ukraine. EU countries are not at risk of food shortages, however higher food prices (e.g. the price of bread in the EU was 18 % higher on average in August 2022 than a year earlier), are affecting EU consumers, who are simultaneously facing high energy prices and inflation. The European Council notably dismissed the false narrative according to which EU sanctions against Russia were contributing to global food insecurity, by reiterating that ‘EU sanctions against Russia do not prohibit the export of agricultural and food products’.

EU leaders restated their support for EU-Ukraine solidarity lanes and highlighted the important role the initiative plays in enabling Ukrainian crop, agricultural and fertiliser exports. The European Council called for improved solidarity lane efficiency, which would not only contribute to global food security, but also offer an alternative to exporting via ports at a time when Russia is warning it may not extend the Black Sea grain initiative, the extension of which EU leaders had also advocated.

Energy and the economy

In his invitation letter, President Michel anticipated that the energy debate would be ‘the focal point’ of the meeting, stressing that work needed to be intensified on the three lines of action already discussed informally at the Prague European Council meeting: 1) reduced energy demand; 2) greater security of supply; and 3) reduced prices. During the Tripartite Social Summit preceding the European Council meeting, he had warned against ‘national-only approaches’ to the energy crisis, considering them a mistake which would ‘endanger our single market, which benefits us all’.

At the meeting, EU leaders reiterated that ‘Russia bears the sole responsibility for the current energy and economic crises’. They underlined the importance of European unity and coordination in tackling energy and fighting its weaponisation by Russia. EU leaders reached an ‘agreement on energy’, which, in the words of Charles Michel, provides ‘a framework together with a list of measures’, which must now be fine-tuned [and made] ready’ by the European Commission and energy ministers. The roadmap includes a ‘temporary EU framework to cap the price of gas in electricity generation’, ‘improvements to the functioning of energy markets’, ‘energy solidarity measures in case of gas supply disruptions at national, regional or Union level’, as well as measures for energy savings. EU leaders underlined the weight that EU Member States represent collectively on the gas market and the key role of the EU energy platform (open to countries in the Western Balkans as well as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), in pooling demand and facilitating joint procurement of gas and hydrogen.

President Michel called the Prague meeting ‘a stepping stone’, since it facilitated the much-needed preparatory work. He stressed that EU unity was visible in the conclusions, as Member States commit to act together on lowering prices, security of supply and on reducing demand, and mentioned that EU leaders hoped for a gradual implementation of the agreement. On the second day of the meeting, President Michel underlined that the energy agreement had had an immediate effect on the markets, observable through a fall in prices.

President von der Leyen confirmed that EU leaders had given the European Commission a clear roadmap on energy, and stressed that the agreed joint purchasing of gas would increase the EU’s market power. She also confirmed that the Commission would review State aid rules by prolonging the Temporary Crisis Framework, allowing Member States to support companies, and that almost €40 billion would be made available to support vulnerable households and businesses.

The European Council, which will continue to work on (‘remain seized of’) the energy file, committed to supporting the coordination of energy policy responses whilst stressing the importance of accelerating investment in renewables, infrastructure, interconnection, and storage. It called on the European Commission ‘to speed up work on the structural reform of the electricity market’ and expressed its support for the development of a full, sovereign and climate neutral energy Union.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament:President Metsola stressed that the EU ‘needs to lower [energy] prices to help return to solid economic growth everywhere’. She warned against high interest rates, stressing that in such a case the ‘Next Generation EU debt repayment will wipe out the budget’s entire crisis response capacity and start eating into the EU programmes’.

Critical infrastructure

The EU leaders expressed their unity and determination to respond to disruption of critical infrastructure, and condemned the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines. They agreed that the resilience of critical infrastructure was key to the EU and the Member States, requiring their joint cooperation. They also underlined the importance of rapid decision-making, recalling that the European Commission had proposed a recommendation on a coordinated Union approach to strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, which awaits the Council’s approval.

External relations

A strategic discussion took place on relations with China. President Michel stressed that the discussion was highly important, regardless of the absence of written conclusions. The EU leaders took stock of the systemic differences – on democracy, the rule of law and human rights – which distinguish the EU from China, and confirmed their agreement on introducing ‘more reciprocity’ in the EU’s relations with China, including on economic issues and climate change.

The EU leaders prepared for the EU-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Commemorative Summit to take place on 14 December 2022, expressing the hope that it would allow for a deepening of the EU’s strategic partnership with ASEAN.

Taking stock of preparations for the UN Climate Change Conference (COP27 – in Sharm el-Sheikh from 6 to 18 November 2022) and for the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15 – in Montreal from 7 to 19 December 2022), EU leaders underlined the urgency of climate action and the importance of protecting biodiversity.

EU leaders welcomed the sanctions imposed on 17 October 2022, on those Iranian entities and individuals responsible for the death of Mahsa Amini and for the violent repression of the peaceful protests which have followed her death, calling on the regime to end its human rights violations.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council meeting of 20 – 21 October 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte.

In December 2013, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 2 November as the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists. The date was chosen in commemoration of the assassination in Mali of Claude Verlon and Ghislaine Dupont, two French journalists, on 2 November 2013. The EU is actively engaged in protecting the independence and safety of journalists, as a crucial component in the proper democratic functioning of its institutions and Member States. Nevertheless, in recent years an increasing number of attacks and threats against journalists have been documented and reported in Europe too. The Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists reports that, in 2021 alone, six journalists were killed in Europe, two of them in EU Member States (Greece and the Netherlands).

Background

Although the EU is actively committed to protecting the safety and independence of journalists as an integral part a proper democratic society, journalists are nevertheless increasingly vulnerable to direct attacks on their physical safety and integrity. In recent years those attacks and threats against journalists have been documented and reported, including by the Commission annual rule of law reports (2020, 2021 and 2022) and the Media Pluralism Monitor. The objective of the attacks is to silence journalists who act as public watchdogs, and ultimately to prevent the creation of a public civic space where citizens can have a democratic debate on issues of public interest. Female media workers appear to be subject to more threats, in particular online harassment, than their male counterparts. Threats, harassment, public shaming and even assassinations of journalists have been reported, for instance, by Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR). In 2021, MFRR tracked 626 alerts affecting 1 063 individuals or media entities in 30 countries, including the murders of three journalists: investigative journalist Peter R. de Vries in the Netherlands, crime reporter Giorgos Karaivaz in Greece, and local radio presenter Hazım Özsu in Turkey. Journalists are targeted and killed in reprisal for their work. Along similar lines, the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists reports that 46 journalists have been killed (13 in 2022 alone) and 1 373 alerts have been received from 42 countries since 2015. In Europe, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made the situation even worse; as reported by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ); 35 journalists and media professionals have been killed in Ukraine since 1992, 15 of them since the start of the conflict in February 2022.

A 2022 study commissioned by the European Parliament confirms the progressive erosion of media freedom around the world and concludes that ‘Impunity remains unacceptably high, with most cases of killings remaining unresolved. Imprisonments are on the rise, while online spaces are becoming increasingly hostile and replete with gender-based hate speech. Between 2012 and 2021, among the 224 recorded cases of complete impunity, 185 (82.6 %) were concentrated in 12 countries: Mexico (26 cases); Somalia (25); Syria (22); India (21); Afghanistan (17); Iraq (17); Philippines (14); Brazil (14); Pakistan (12); Bangladesh (7); South Sudan (5); and the Russian Federation (5). Moreover, the study confirms that a majority of deaths happen because journalists are killed by way of reprisal for their work, while some lose their life in crossfire, i.e. on a battlefield or in a military context. Among those killed because of their work, 28.8 % were working on political journalism, 23.8 % were war reporters, 15.8 % were human rights reporters, while 10.7 % were investigating crime and 9.6 % corruption cases.

The UNESCO observatory of killed journalists reports that 1 561 journalists have been killed since 1993 around the globe, and that in only 164 cases can the status of judicial enquiry for the murder be considered ‘resolved’. This indicator acts as a form of country assessment on impunity for killings. It is worth noting that, according to the same observatory, the proportion of killings in countries that are not experiencing conflicts has been constantly increasing, from 50 % in 2016 to 61 % in 2020. Journalists and media professionals lost their lives in dangerous assignments – for instance, while covering riots – or because they were involved in political journalism, war reporting, or investigations related to human rights, crime and corruption. Against that backdrop, it is therefore important to ensure that investigations and prosecutions of crimes against journalists are conducted with impartiality, transparency and independence, to enable them to fulfil ‘their crucial role on the ground‘. Among other things, investigative journalists play a key role in combating organised crime and corruption and, because of that, they are more likely to be subject to threats and violence including physical and verbal abuse. Therefore, it is important to prevent a culture of impunity.

EU action

In 2021, the Commission recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists stressed that citizens need to have access to multiple sources of information to ensure that they can both build their own opinion and scrutinise governments. According to the Commission, the main objective of the EU’s action was to ‘prevent the emergence of a ‘culture’ of impunity regarding attacks against journalists’, which is why it invited Member States to create a safe and enabling environment. Specific recommendations were addressed to protect and empower female journalists, to raise awareness, to train law enforcement authorities and to tackle online attacks against journalists.

On 27 April 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal for a directive designed to protect people who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘strategic lawsuits against public participation’ – SLAPP) in civil matters with cross-border implications, and also a recommendation. The proposal, which is currently being negotiated by the co-legislators, aims to provide national tribunals and courts with the necessary tools to deal with SLAPP, protect journalists, activists and human rights defenders and, more generally, whoever acts as a societal public watchdog. The proposal also aims to collect data on SLAPP in a more systematic way, raise awareness about SLAPP among professionals, and provide support for victims. However, according to a 2022 study, only 11 %, or 62, of the 570 SLAPP cases recorded were cross-border cases, which means the vast majority of them remain outside the scope of the proposed directive. This is why the Commission has also put forward a recommendation inviting Member States to: adopt ‘effective, appropriate and proportionate’ national legal provisions providing equivalent safeguards to victims of SLAPP in domestic cases; review domestic provisions applicable to defamation (i.e. to abolish prison sentences for defamation cases) to ensure that they do not impact disproportionately on freedom of expression and have a ‘chilling effect’; develop training for legal professionals; and develop campaigns to raise awareness.

European Parliament position

Parliament has called consistently for action to ensure respect for and enhancement of EU fundamental values as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

In 2018, a Parliament resolution highlighted how journalists were still the target of deadly attacks, and recalled the importance of ensuring media freedom and pluralism. Parliament noted the recent political developments in various Member States that had led to increased pressure on and threats against journalists. Member States were urged to set up an independent and impartial regulatory body to report violence and threats against journalists and to ensure the protection and safety of journalists at national level. The same year, another resolution focused on the case of two Slovak journalists, Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová. In 2019, the situation of journalists in Malta and Slovakia was on Parliament’s radar, and another resolution followed the revelations concerning the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia. A 2020 resolution and a 2021 resolution stressed again how journalists, and in particular investigative journalists, are increasingly victims of hatred and violence with the sole aim of preventing public scrutiny and accountability. In June 2021, Parliament expressed, once again, its concerns regarding the erosion of media freedom and referred to ‘smear campaigns against academics, journalists, judges, legal professionals, civil society organisations and activists’ with the purpose of limiting their independence. More recently, in November 2021, Parliament called firmly for legislative action to address the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, non-governmental organisations and civil society.

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine once more dominated the agenda for the October II 2022 plenary session, with Members participating in a number of debates on the consequences of the war: the social and economic repercussions and the introduction of a windfall tax; the impact on migration flows; recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism; and the Lukashenko regime’s active role in the war against Ukraine. Parliament also debated preparations for the European Council meeting of 20‑21 October 2022 with the Council and the European Commission.

Members also debated the 2023 Commission work programme, on the day of its adoption by the Commission. Further debates were held on EU action on mental health; marking the International Day of Eradication of Poverty; the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia; rising hate crime against LGBTIQ people; continued internal border controls in the Schengen area; and setting up a comprehensive framework for missing children and missing persons at risk. Looking further afield, Members debated EU–Western Balkan relations in the light of the new enlargement package; the political situation in Tunisia, particularly on fighting sexual violence; the outcome of the first meeting of the European Political Community; global food security; and protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems.

Finally, in a formal sitting, Members heard an address by Zuzana Čaputová, President of Slovakia.

‘Fit for 55’: Alternative fuels

Members held a joint debate on ‘fit for 55’ package proposals related to vehicle fuels, focused on encouraging the use of ‘clean’ vehicles and sustainable maritime fuels. The lack of alternative fuel infrastructure (recharging and refilling stations) hampers the wider take-up of electric and other vehicles in EU countries. More outlets at closer ranges (as the vehicles require more frequent recharge) could boost adoption of cleaner vehicles. Members considered a report from Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) proposing, inter alia, to speed up the rollout of higher-power refilling stations, particularly in regions where uptake is slow. As exhaust gases produced by shipping are also a significant source of air pollution, Members debated measures supporting greater use of sustainable maritime fuels. A TRAN committee report proposes higher cuts to emissions and introduces a target for the use of renewable fuels. Recognising that the sector will need support to adapt, the TRAN committee also proposes setting up an Ocean Fund aimed at decarbonising maritime transport. Members adopted both TRAN reports, setting Parliament’s position for interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

UN Climate Change Conference 2022

Members adopted a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the 27th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27). The resolution, tabled by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), looks to move the debate forward from promises to real action on global goals for climate adaptation, in advance of COP27. The resolution confirms the ENVI committee’s call urging all parties to show leadership, to align with the Paris Agreement and to ensure support for developing countries.

European Union general budget for 2023

Members considered the Council’s position on the draft EU budget for 2023, and introduced amendments to address the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In adopting a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the proposals, Parliament reverses most of the reductions proposed by the Council, proposing to make a considerable increase in spending on Parliament’s priorities instead. These include: addressing the consequences of the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, defence, research, humanitarian aid, Erasmus+, digitalisation and infrastructure. As the resolution completes Parliament’s reading of the Union budget for 2023, conciliation negotiations between the co-legislators will now begin.

Amending budget 4/2022

The Russian war and the recent pandemic have also led to revised estimates on growth and inflation. Members adopted a pressing amending budget (the fourth of this year), concerning the EU’s own resources, following a BUDG committee recommendation that Parliament agree to the proposed changes. These reflect updated revenue forecasts and were previously endorsed by the Council. The committee notes the €3.6 billion increase in own resources and urges greater speed in introducing new own resources to pay for the COVID‑19 recovery. However, as Parliament has not yet taken a position on the REPowerEU proposal, BUDG underlines that changes proposed in draft amending budget DAB 4/2022 will have no bearing on the legislative outcome on that file. The committee also commends the changes to Eurojust’s mandate in relation to support for Ukraine, but criticises the redeployment of resources as set out in the proposal.

Budget discharge 2020

As the EU institutions run on a budget ultimately provided by European citizens, Parliament is responsible for overseeing their use of this funding. Members considered three files regarding decisions postponed in May 2022 on budgetary discharge for 2020. Due to a persistent lack of cooperation in this scrutiny process, Parliament had again refused to grant budget discharge to the European Council and the Council. Following a re-examination of the situation, Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) notes a continued lack of progress. The CONT committee criticises a lack of transparency that could be improved by splitting the European Council and Council budget sections, and reiterates concern regarding European Council interference in legislative matters where it has no role to play. Parliament therefore decided once again to refuse to grant discharge to the two institutions. Parliament also again refused to grant budget discharge concerning the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), citing the need for more action on fundamental rights. Conversely, while Parliament had also previously withheld a discharge decision for the 2020 budget of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), Parliament followed a CONT committee recommendation to grant budget discharge.

Question time: Protecting critical infrastructure in the EU against attacks and countering hybrid attacks

During Tuesday’s question time, Members debated the urgent need to protect key EU infrastructure against physical and digital threats, including hybrid attacks, with European Commissioner for Promoting our European Way of Life, Vice-President Margaritis Schinas.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without voting, several mandates for negotiation: two from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on the proposal for a regulation establishing a collaboration platform to support functioning of joint investigation teams and on the proposal for a directive on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States; one from the Committee on International Trade (INTA) on a proposal for a regulation on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries; a joint mandate from the Committees on Foreign Affairs, INTA and Constitutional Affairs (AFET/INTA/AFCO) on the proposal for a regulation on rules for the exercise of the Union’s rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Brexit agreements; and one from the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) on a proposed regulation on a 2023‑2027 connectivity programme.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October II 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.