European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Liselotte Jensen.

The 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) in Sharm el‑Sheikh ended, after a 39-hour prolongation, on the morning of 20 November 2022. The conference host Egypt declared this year’s conference the ‘Implementation COP’ – about ensuring countries turn objectives into action. The event’s main delivery was an agreement on a ‘loss and damage’ fund, with only limited progress on the implementation programme to cut emissions faster.

Outcomes of the conference

COP27 agreed on an overarching ‘cover decision’, the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan. It reuses language on 1.5°C and phasing down coal from last year’s Glasgow Climate Pact, but makes the first ever mentions of food security risks, climate tipping points and the need for financial system reform. The main COP27 delivery was the ‘loss and damage’ fund. Targeting vulnerable developing countries, the fund will respond to loss and damage, the adverse effects of climate change. A transitional committee is to make recommendations at COP28 next year on operationalising the fund, with an emphasis on finding new and innovative funding arrangements. COP27 also finalised a mitigation work programme focused on pooling ideas to accelerate action, with no binding elements. Calls to ensure a peak in emissions by 2025 and a phase-down of fossil fuels were not included in the final text.

The Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture won a 4-year extension, with a debate surrounding food security and sustainable agriculture, but the final text includes no mention of the sustainable food systems advocated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Beyond the cover decision, countries launched a 12-month decarbonisation master plan under the Breakthrough Agenda. The United Nations (UN) launched the action plan to ensure early warning systems coverage for everyone, within 5 years, and the 2023-2027 work programme of the Technology Mechanism for technology transfer and deployment. The World Bank announced a financing facility to support the Global Shield against Climate Risks initiative for climate disaster impacts. The Global Environment Facility received pledges totalling US$105.6 million from six EU Member States, the Walloon region in Belgium and Switzerland, for climate adaptation in low-lying and low-income states. Home to 52 % of the world’s rainforests, Brazil, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo launched an alliance to halt deforestation, seeking funds to protect forest carbon sinks.

European Parliament position and role

At its October II plenary session ahead of COP27, the European Parliament adopted a COP27 resolution. It stressed that countries need to raise their targets to align with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C target. Welcoming the Glasgow Dialogue on ‘loss and damage’, Parliament urged the EU to engage ahead of COP27 with discussions concerning a potential loss and damage facility. Parliament also called on the EU to increase the proportion of adaptation finance in the Global Europe Instrument, noting the need to prioritise grants over loans in all climate finance, and to align all types of financial flows to the 1.5°C target.

Reactions and next steps

Developing nations and NGOs welcomed the creation of a ‘loss and damage’ fund as a major advance, although questions remain as to who would contribute to the fund and who would benefit. The absence of new targets on mitigation caused disappointment, with the latest UN Environment Programme emissions gap report stressing that current mitigation efforts are insufficient to limit global warming to 2°C, let alone 1.5°C. In particular, the lack of commitment to phase out fossil fuels has caused frustration. Next year, at COP28, the first global stocktake of the Paris Agreement will conclude, offering an opportunity to assess collective progress on climate action and determine what still needs to be done to reach the targets.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘COP27 climate change conference: Outcomes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Several simultaneous crises have put renewed pressure on the European Union to revise decision-making procedures and economic policies. Russia’s war on Ukraine, growing protectionism worldwide, technological rivalry with China and the US, problems with the rule of law in some Member States, post-pandemic issues and migration woes pose many challenges on the political side. On the economic front, many economists and politicians are calling for fiscal reforms, energy system overhaul and new EU funds. Those funds would finance the EU’s transition towards a green economy, and boost the bloc’s ability to deal with external shocks, such as the current energy crisis.

Among topics discussed are increasing the scope of qualified majority voting by EU Member States in the Council, creating more coherent unions for energy and health, improving rules for sharing the costs of immigration, and modifying enlargement policies. In the economic area, discussions focus on overhauling fiscal rules for the euro area and the wider EU, issuing more EU debt, countering unfair competition from abroad, increasing cooperation in the energy sector, and new industrial policies to foster growth of innovative and high-technology companies.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the EU and proposed reforms. Earlier papers on the State of the Union can be found in a recent edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’.

Economy

The European Stability mechanism is not ready for the next crisis
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

The EU’s trillion-euro question
European Policy Centre, November 2022

RePowering EU: Managing a tough energy transition
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

European Union fiscal rules: is a better system feasible?
Bruegel, October 2022

Does the European Union need an energy crisis fund?
Bruegel, October 2022

European fiscal rules and the German debt brake: Reform options
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October 2022

La stratégie industrielle de l’Union européenne: Concilier concurrence et défis géoéconomiques
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2022

The future of common borrowing
Jacques Delors Institute, October 2022

Monetary policy and central fiscal capacity in the euro area
LUISS School of European Political Economy, October 2022

Two large shocks in quick succession: How can Europe avoid another decade of growth disappointment?
Brookings Institution, September 2022

Should the European Union turn to financial markets to finance its programs?
Bruegel, September 2022

Politics

Europeans must prepare for the post-Biden era
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Flexible ‘EU-centricness’ is the key ingredient to ensure the European Political Community’s success
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2022

Can EU enlargement gain momentum?
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

Europe’s power is built upon its social contract
European Policy Centre, November 2022

After the storm: The EU in uncharted waters
European Policy Centre, November 2022

No power without values: Why the EU needs to embrace political leadership if it wants to safeguard democracy
European Policy Centre, November 2022

European strategic autonomy and defence after Ukraine
Real Instituto Elcano, November 2022

The European (geo)Political Community: More than meets the eye?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, October 2022

The EU and the creative and destructive impact of crises
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Five takeaways from the European Political Community summit
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

The (sorry) state of EU defense cooperation
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Analysis of the European Political Community misses the point
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, October 2022

A new generation of European Citizens’ Panels: Making citizens’ voices a regular part of policymaking
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Can Europe master its destiny through the European Political Community?
German Marshal Fund, October 2022

The potential implications of a proposed European Political Community
Institute of International and European Affairs, October 202

Towards QMV in EU foreign policy: Different paths at multiple speeds
Jacques Delors Centre, October 2022

More EU decisions by qualified majority voting: But how?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2022

The Commission v the member states: Who wins in court, and why?
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, October 2022

Enlarging and deepening: Giving substance to the European Political Community
Bruegel, September 2022

Five lessons on international rule of law support
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

European unity can endure the winter of discontent
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

The economic basis of democracy in Europe
Chatham House, September 2022

Science-based and evidence-based policy-making in the European Union: Coexisting or conflicting concepts?
College of Europe, September 2022

When founding member states look at the future of Europe: Benelux countries’ contribution to the COFOE
Egmont, September 2022

Mapping eco-social policy mixes for a just transition in Europe
European Trade Union Institute, September 2022

Strengthening the European Health Union
Federation for European Progressive Studies, September 2022

Is nationalism compatible with the European project?
Friends of Europe, September 2022

Divergence in the quality of political institutions in Europe
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, September 2022

Putin vs Monnet: European resilience, energy and the Ukraine war
Istituto Affari Internazionale, September 2022

A new dawn for EU enlargement?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

The Italian elections of 2022: What do they mean for the EU?
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, September 2022

EU subsidiarity as an antidote to centralisation and inefficiency
Wilfried Martens Centre, September 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Future EU reforms‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

World AIDS Day, proclaimed by the United Nations in 1988, takes place each year on 1 December. The aim is to raise awareness, fight prejudice, encourage progress in prevention, and improve treatment around the world. Although infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is preventable, significant HIV transmission remains a challenge to EU Member States’ health systems. This year’s theme ‘Equalize’ underlines the urgent need to address the inequalities that are holding back progress in ending acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and give equal access to essential HIV services.

Background

Attacking the body’s immune system (the white blood cells or ‘CD4 cells’), HIV weakens its defence against other infections and diseases, including tuberculosis and some types of cancer. The most advanced stage of HIV infection (with a CD4 count below 200) is AIDS. Found in a variety of body fluids, such as blood, semen, vaginal secretions and breast milk, HIV can be transmitted through sex, blood transfusion, the sharing of contaminated needles, and between mother and child during pregnancy, delivery and breastfeeding. People who are at high risk of getting HIV can take pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) medicine to reduce the risk of infection. People diagnosed with HIV and treated early can now expect to live a normal lifespan. Infections can be treated to prevent progression to AIDS by decreasing viral load in an infected body (antiretroviral therapy, ‘ART’). However ART does not cure HIV infection, and there is no vaccine.

There is some evidence that people living with HIV experience more severe outcomes and have higher comorbidities from COVID‑19.

The United Nations (UN) Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is leading the global effort to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030, as part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the UN in 2015 (Goal 3). UNAIDS unites the efforts of 11 UN organisations, including the World Health Organization (WHO).

On World AIDS Day 2022, the WHO’s three main messages to global decision-makers are: re-commit to end HIV, as the challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic require a renewed effort to address this public health threat by 2030; focus on equality to ensure that everyone, everywhere, has equal access to HIV prevention, testing, treatment and care; and focus on those who have been left behind in the global response to HIV and AIDS (children and key populations – men who have sex with men, transgender people, people who use drugs, sex workers, prisoners and migrants – and their partners). Facts and figures

UNAIDS data show that, in 2021, 1.5 million people contracted HIV, 38.4 million people were living with HIV, and 650 000 people died of AIDS-related causes.

According to the 2022 report on ‘HIV/AIDS surveillance in Europe’ (2021 data), published jointly by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe, HIV affects over 2.3 million people in the WHO European region (made up of 53 countries covering a vast geographical region from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans), including over 590 000 people in the EU/European Economic Area (EEA).

In the EU/EEA specifically, 16 624 people were newly diagnosed with HIV in 2021. The decline in new cases being diagnosed in 2020 and 2021 is probably due, in part, to decreased case detection because of less testing and limited surveillance capacity during lockdown, and may also result from reduced transmission owing to fewer physical contacts during the pandemic. The use of formal and informal PrEP may also have played a role in the decline in numbers of new HIV diagnoses.

An estimated 88 000 people are living with undiagnosed HIV in the EU/EEA, implying that about one in eight of those living with HIV are not aware of their status.

EU action on HIV/AIDS

EU Member States are responsible for their own healthcare policies and systems. However, according to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU complements national policies while also fostering cooperation between Member States. In the EU, HIV/AIDS policy focuses on prevention and on supporting people living with the disease. The European Commission has mobilised measures and instruments across several policy areas in the fight against HIV/AIDS. This includes support for Member States to help them reach the global target under Goal 3 of the UN SDGs, to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030. In that context, the Commission facilitates the exchange of best practices through the Health Security Committee, as well as dedicated networks on the EU Health Policy Platform.

Since the early years of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, the EU has invested significantly in HIV/AIDS research. Both the EU’s former programme for research and innovation, Horizon 2020, and the 2021‑2027 Horizon Europe programme support research ranging from basic research to the development and testing of new treatments, new vaccine (e.g. through the European HIV Vaccine Alliance and the European AIDS Vaccine Initiative 2020), and novel diagnostic tools.

The ECDC has developed operational guidance to support countries in their efforts to integrate PrEP into their existing HIV prevention packages for those most at risk of HIV infection. Its July 2022 progress report underlines that certain key populations, such as people who inject drugs, prisoners and undocumented migrants, remain ineligible for PrEP in many countries.

On the world stage, the EU supports the Global Fund against AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (in 2019, the EU pledged €550 million for the 2020‑2022 period, and in September 2022, €715 million for the 2023-2025 period). In addition, in March 2022, the Global Fund approved US$15 million in emergency funding to support the continuity of HIV and tuberculosis prevention, testing and treatment services in Ukraine.

In its May 2021 resolution on accelerating progress and tackling inequalities towards ending AIDS as a public health threat by 2030, the European Parliament called on the Commission to address AIDS as a global public health crisis, to prioritise health as part of the EU–Africa strategy, to work with Member States and partners to invest in community engagement and community-led responses as key components in the fight against HIV/AIDS-related stigma and discrimination, and to integrate HIV prevention and care with other local healthcare service offers, as an entry point for HIV information, education, communication and training. Challenges

Despite the progress made, communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS are examples of epidemics that pose significant public health and economic challenges and require a multi-sectoral approach and multi-level cooperation.

Progress needs to be made in terms of diagnosis, which often comes too late, when the immune system has already started to fail. Delayed treatment can also lead to the spread of HIV infection to others.

Better prevention tools (awareness-raising, PrEp, needle exchange programmes, promotion of safer sex) are crucial, in particular for people who are reluctant to use health services. The fear of discrimination and stigmatisation can reduce the incentive to take an HIV test (HIV self-testing and community-based HIV testing can help).

Research and innovative solutions are required to find an effective prophylactic vaccine and therapeutic HIV vaccines or cure, to fight the threat of HIV drug resistance, and to improve the quality of life for those living with the disease, including long-term management of patients.

HIV infection has become a manageable chronic health condition. However many people living with HIV face inequalities. In addition to the prospect of reduced quality of life and poorer health outcomes than the rest of population, many of them are economically disadvantaged, have lower levels of education, and lack rapid access to quality treatment and care. The UNAIDS 2021‑2026 Global AIDS Strategy highlights the need for a new approach that reduces the inequalities that drive the AIDS epidemic and puts people at its centre, involving communities and prioritising human rights, respect and dignity.

This updates an ‘at a glance’ note from November 2021.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘World AIDS Day 2022: 1 December‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

In its resolution on the new circular economy action plan (CEAP) adopted in February 2021, the European Parliament reiterated its support to the move away from a traditional economic ‘take-make-consume-throw away’ pattern to a more circular economy. The Parliament made over 130 policy recommendations for more circularity. It called, among other things, on the Commission to propose science-based binding EU targets for reducing the use of primary raw materials and environmental impacts. It also demanded binding footprint targets for the whole product lifecycle for each product category placed on the EU market, and product-specific and/or sector-specific binding targets for recycled content.

A circular economy minimises waste through reusing, repairing, refurbishing and recycling existing materials and products. The EU’s circular economy action plan is a step towards reaching the European Union’s 2050 climate neutrality target through measures to normalise sustainable products in the EU, to empower consumers, to cut waste and increase circularity. The plan focuses on sectors that have a big circularity potential, such as electronics, packaging, plastics, textiles and buildings. The European Commission presented the overall plan in March 2020. While Parliament welcomed the Commission’s proposal as a contribution to the European Green Deal, it has asked the Commission to introduce binding EU targets for 2030 to reduce the EU’s consumption footprint. The Parliament also stressed the importance of ensuring products and materials on the EU market are durable, safe and non-toxic. Furthermore, the Parliament requested the Commission to propose waste targets to minimise waste output. Under the new CEAP, the European Commission is expected to propose new measures on 30 November 2022 to achieve the CEAP aims.

One of these new initiatives under the plan is a revision of the Packaging and Waste Directive. This Directive sets out the EU’s rules on managing packaging and packaging waste. Measured by weight, packaging accounts for over 3 % of all waste generated in the EU and is made up of: paper and cardboard (41 %); plastic (19 %); glass (19 %); wood (16 %); and metal (5 %). This waste can be reduced by transforming it into a resource through waste prevention, reuse, recyclability, compostable packaging and other measures. Thanks to a new law – adopted by Parliament and Council very recently – by the end of 2024, all mobile phones, tables and cameras sold in the EU will be equipped with a USB Type‑C charging port, cutting associated waste by up to 13 000 tonnes a year.

Furthermore, many products, such as plastics and chemicals, are still produced using virgin fossil-based carbon resources. In view of the EU’s ambition to reach climate neutrality by 2050, such fossil-based materials could be replaced with sustainably sourced bio-based materials, or by optimising the circular economy solution in which carbon rich products are recycled and remain stored.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Over the past few decades, the amount of clothes bought per person in the EU has increased by 40 %, with fast fashion and falling prices encouraging consumption. However, clothing has the fourth highest impact on the environment of all EU consumption categories. The production process and environmental footprint is large, due to the amount of water, chemicals, energy and micro plastics involved. Only 1 % of all clothes handed in for recycling are actually recycled into new clothes. The Commission has proposed several ways to counter the environmental impact, such as by designing clothes in a way that makes reuse and recycling easier – also known as circular fashion – convincing consumers to buy fewer clothes and incentivising consumers to opt for more sustainable options.

The first part of CEAP includes a proposed ecodesign directive, which sets out product-specific requirements to increase the lifetime and energy efficiency of the things we buy, making them more durable, repairable and reusable. In response, the Parliament adopted two resolutions in 2020 and 2021, calling on the Commission to establish a consumer’s ‘right to repair‘: Repair during the legal guarantee, the right to repair after the legal guarantee has expired, and the right for consumers to repair products themselves.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content Further reading and listening

See EPRS legislative train carriages for each of the circular economy files, for instance:

• Revision of Directive 94/62/EC on Packaging and Packaging Waste
• Ecodesign for a circular economy
• Substantiating green claims
• New circular economy action plan
• Right to Repair podcast
• Sustainable carbon cycles: Promoting removal, storage and recycling podcast
• Circular economy infographic
• New circular economy action plan
• Sustainable carbon cycles: Promoting removal, storage and recycling
• A common charger for electronic devices: Revision of the Radio Equipment Directive
• Textiles and the environment
• Setting ecodesign requirements for sustainable products
• Right to repair

Written by Issam Hallak (1st edition).

The European Parliament will shortly vote on adopting the regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA). The regulation would establish harmonised rules for crypto-assets at EU level, thereby providing legal certainty for crypto-assets not covered by existing EU legislation. By enhancing the protection of consumers and investors as well as financial stability, the regulation promotes innovation and use of crypto-assets.

The regulation identifies and covers three types of crypto-assets, namely asset-referenced tokens (ART), electronic money tokens (EMT), and other crypto-assets not covered by existing EU law. The legislation would regulate issuance and trading of crypto-assets as well as the management of the underlying assets, where applicable, with additional regulatory rules aimed at ‘significant’ ART and EMT. The provisional agreement resulting from the negotiations aims at securing liquidity and redemption, and envisages the inclusion of the environmental impact of crypto-assets in communications to investors.

Versions

• November 2022: Markets in crypto-assets (MiCA) (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Crypto-assets, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2020) 593
24.9.2020Rapporteur:Stefan Berger (EPP, Germany)2020/0265(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Eero Heinäluoma (S&D, Finland)
Ondřej Kovařik (Renew, Czechia)
Ernest Urtasun (Greens, Spain)
Antonio Maria Rinaldi (ID, Italy)
Andżelika A. Możdżanowska (ECR, Poland)
Chris Macmanus (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Final first-reading vote in plenary

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

Under the farm to fork strategy, part of the European Green Deal, the EU has set itself a double target: a 50 % reduction in the overall use of and risk from chemical plant protection products, and a 50 % reduction in the use of more hazardous ones by 2030. The proposal for a regulation tabled by the European Commission on 22 June 2022, which would replace the 2009 sustainable use directive, would require Member States to contribute collectively to achieving these EU-wide targets through the adoption and attainment of binding national targets. To protect biodiversity and citizens’ health, the use of all plant protection products would be banned in specific, sensitive areas. Monitoring and reporting obligations would be strengthened.

Stakeholders are strongly divided on the proposal. While environmental organisations are pushing for more ambition, the farming community is concerned about the lack of alternatives for farmers, the broad coverage of sensitive areas, and consequences for business continuity. Indicators used to track progress towards the targets are also subject to criticisms from various sides.

In Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). In the Council, work is ongoing at working party level.

Versions

• November 2022: Sustainable use of plant protection products (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the sustainable use of plant protection products and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 305
22.6.2022Rapporteur:Sarah Wiener (Greens/EFA, Austria)2022/0196(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Alexander Bernhuber (EPP, Austria)
Maria Arena (S&D, Belgium)
Jan Huitema (Renew, the Netherlands)
Anja Hazekamp (The Left, the Netherlands)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

After decades of growing global integration, the world is becoming more fragmented in a number of areas, many analysts say. Deglobalisation can be defined as movement towards a less connected world, characterised by powerful nation states, local solutions, and border controls, rather than global institutions, treaties, and free movement.

The recent growth of protectionism, problems with supply chains, the diminishing role of global institutions, geopolitical shifts, technological rivalry and falling foreign investment, as well as energy and food crises, have been accompanied by events such as Russia’s war on Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, Brexit, authoritarianism in China and populism in the US and elsewhere. On the other hand, phenomena such as the coronavirus pandemic, international crime and climate change demonstrate the continuing relevance of global collaboration.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the shifting balance between gobalising and deglobalising forces.

Does digitizing government payments increase financial access and usage?
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Renewing global climate change action for fragile and developing countries
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Human development in an age of uncertainty
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Introducing hyperlocal: Place governance in a fragmented world
Brookings Institution, November 2022

The free world and its enemies: What Putin’s war and China’s global ambitions mean for us
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Deglobalisation and protectionism
Bruegel, November 2022

Is globalisation really doomed?
Bruegel, November 2022

Is climate cooperation trumping human rights?
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Democratic innovations from around the world: Lessons for the West
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

The globalization myth
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

China’s growing interference in domestic politics: Globally and in the United States
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

A reliable global cyber power
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

Has Globalisation really peaked for Europe?
European Centre for International and Political Economy, November 2022

Principles for global order: How Europeans and the global south can shape the international order together
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

The geopolitics of space – The economy of space: Evolution and forecast
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2022

International trade: Globalisation is here to stay
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

‘Fragmentegration’: A new chapter for globalisation
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

The Biden-Xi meeting in Bali: What changed, what didn’t?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022

The portfolio of economic policies needed to fight climate change
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022

How the G20 can advance WTO reform
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022

Blockchain technology: Pain, perspective and positivity
Wilson Center, November 2022

China and the West: Growing apart as geopolitical tensions grow
Bruegel, October 2022

Geopolitics of the energy transition
Brussels School of Governance, October 2022

Supply chain sovereignty and globalization
Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2022

China between lockdowns and the 20th Party Congress: What can we expect for the EU and globally?
Egmont, October 2022

The American order is over, and China is ready to dive in
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, October 2022

Globalization is in retreat for the first time since the Second World War
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2022

The global minimum corporate tax will not end forces that drive tax competition
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2022

The globalization of remote work: Will digital offshoring make waves in the U.S. labor market?
Rand Corporation, October 2022

The challenge to cultivate global semiconductor talent
Wilson Centre, October 2022

Getting ready for post-pandemic border policy
Wilson Centre, October 2022

The age of fuzzy bifurcation: Lessons from the pandemic and the Ukraine War
Brussels School of Governance, September 2022

La transition géopolitique européenne
Groupe d’études géopolitiques, September 2022

Policy options for an equitable re-globalization
Hellenic Foundation for European and Security Policy, September 2022

Developments in the global gas markets up to 2030
Institute of Energy Economics at the Cologne University, September 2022

Fault lines: Global perspectives on a world in crisis
Open Society Foundation, September 2022

Russia is intensifying the global food crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2022

The U.S. could cope with deglobalisation, Europe could not
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

Water stress: A global problem that’s getting worse
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

Global value chain disruptions: Challenges and opportunities
Atlantic Council, July 2022

The awakening of geopolitical Europe?
Carnegie Europe, July 2022

Geopolitics of oil and inflation
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2022

The great rewiring: How global supply chains are reacting to today’s geopolitics
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2022

The de-globalisation of oil: Risks and implications from the politicisation of energy markets
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2022

Global economies disrupted, local communities responding
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2022

The great reset: towards an existential geopolitical order?
Friends of Europe, June 2022

Russia’s status as an energy superpower is waning
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2022

Read this briefing on ‘‘Deglobalisation’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Piotr Bąkowski.

Having originated in national police and intelligence circles in the early 2000s, the concept of ‘radicalisation’ quickly attracted the attention of EU policy-makers and became the framework of choice for analysing what it is that brings individuals and groups to terrorism. There is no uniform definition of radicalisation, even though the academics and institutions involved in tackling this phenomenon have come up with multiple interpretations. Experts tend to describe the radicalisation process as a set of stages and use models to illustrate how someone might go through these stages before becoming a terrorist. They disagree, however, on the role of specific factors in this process, such as ideology. Some have pointed to the undesired consequences of policies targeting radicalisation and questioned the concept’s suitability as a tool to advance our understanding of terrorism.

With the notable exception of rules on terrorist content online, EU action to prevent radicalisation is essentially non-legislative. The EU supports its Member States in countering radicalisation by coordinating their activities and facilitating information sharing and the exchange of best practice. The latter mostly takes places within the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), an umbrella network connecting ‘first-line practitioners’ – including youth workers, local authority representatives and prison officers – from across the EU. Projects tackling radicalisation receive funding from a range of EU funds and programmes, such as the Internal Security Fund and the EU’s framework programme for research and innovation (Horizon Europe).

The scope of EU activities is very broad, going beyond counter-terrorism policy and extending to areas such as education, employment and social inclusion, to name but a few. However, this comprehensive approach faces competence limitations: some of these areas are outside the EU’s remit, while in others the EU only plays a secondary role, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Unsurprisingly, the European Commission’s direct engagement with local and regional players – which is characteristic of its counter-radicalisation efforts – has led to tensions with the Member States. Over time, national governments have increasingly demanded a greater say in defining policy priorities. The EU has responded by restructuring the RAN and creating some additional cooperation structures to ensure the Member States’ participation.

The EU’s counter-radicalisation policy has been shaped by broader policy instruments on EU security and counter-terrorism and by strategies specifically targeting radicalisation. Their content has evolved over time to reflect the evolution of the EU terrorism threat landscape since the inception of the EU counter-radicalisation policy. Policy changes have been introduced, as the initial exclusive focus on jihadist terrorism has given way to a broader approach targeting various forms of extremism.

The coronavirus pandemic created a new context that may prove to be a breeding ground for extremism. Groups from various ideological backgrounds have already incorporated COVID-19 into their narratives; furthermore, the pandemic seems to have contributed to the emergence of new ideologies with a potential impact on radicalisation and violence. As internet use has soared, the increased online presence of extremists is particularly problematic, given its potential to exacerbate the already increasing polarisation of opinions. With social media platforms in the spotlight, these groups have been exploring other, less controlled environments. For example, there are reports of online video games being used as a tool for spreading propaganda among young people.

Whereas over the past 20 years the EU has adopted a prolific number of counter-terrorism measures, only recently have the first attempts been made to review and evaluate them. In 2017, the Commission gave a positive assessment of EU efforts to prevent radicalisation, stressing, however, the need to improve the coordination, outreach and impact of existing instruments. One year later, following an audit of the Commission’s counter-radicalisation activities, the European Court of Auditors concluded that the policy objectives and actions had been designed in a way that reflected Member States’ needs, but that there were some shortfalls regarding coordination and evaluation

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Preventing radicalisation in the European Union: How EU policy has evolved‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the November II 2022 plenary session was the ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the European Parliament, with the participation of the Prime Ministers of France, Belgium and Luxembourg.

Russia’s war against Ukraine again featured high on the agenda, not least with the adoption of a resolution recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and a joint debate with a vote on regulations governing EU financial assistance to Ukraine.

Political debates were held on Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and the state of play of the Hungarian recovery and resilience plan; on diabetes in the EU on the occasion of World Diabetes Day; and on the human rights situation in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar. Other debates included: the need for a European solution on asylum and migration including search and rescue; eliminating violence against women; the human rights situation in Egypt; and the legacy of the European Year of Youth 2022. Members also debated a post-2020 global biodiversity framework and the COP15 conference under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and protection of livestock farming and large carnivores. The EU response to the protests in Iran and EU-China relations were debated with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell.

Recognising Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism

Parliament adopted a resolution recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism, tabled following a debate on 18 October. The move could facilitate the introduction of a legal framework to officially designate states as sponsors of terrorism, allowing for more significant restrictive measures against Moscow, including the confiscation of Russian assets.

Resilience of critical entities

With recent gas pipeline sabotage and the damage done by the pandemic fresh in mind, Members debated and adopted the political agreement reached with the Council on boosting the resilience of critical entities in the EU. Parliament’s negotiators from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) ensured that systems safeguarding the rule of law will be prepared to face disruption, along with key infrastructure and networks throughout the EU.

Digital decade policy programme

The rise in cyber-attacks also demonstrates the need to set out a strong digital policy direction for Europe. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on the proposed ‘Path to the digital decade‘ programme, setting out action to pursue the EU digital strategy to 2030. Negotiators from the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) secured a strong role for Parliament in scrutinising progress on these digital targets. Measured with a ‘digital compass’, they will strengthen broadband infrastructure, digitalise public and private sectors, narrow the digital divide and progress adoption of new technologies.

Gender balance on corporate boards

While gender-diverse company boards provide undeniable benefits, only 34.1 % of the largest EU companies’ board members are women. Members adopted at second reading the proposal, blocked in the Council for many years, on improving gender balance on company boards in the EU. Parliament has long pushed for progress, finally reaching agreement with the Council on the text earlier this year. Parliament negotiators have ensured a 2026 deadline for companies to hit the target of minimum 33 % women directors, and specific penalties for companies that do not comply.

The European Union’s 2023 budget

Parliament debated and adopted the EU’s general budget for 2023, with Members voting by a large majority to endorse the provisional agreement reached on 14 November 2022 in conciliation between Parliament and the Council, and subsequently adopted by the Council. Parliament succeeded in ensuring funding for its priorities: support for Ukraine, the post-pandemic recovery, and the climate, energy and humanitarian crises. Commitment appropriations for 2023 will amount to €186.6 billion and payments to €168.6 billion, including special instruments.

Borrowing strategy to finance Next Generation EU

Members debated a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the borrowing strategy to finance Next Generation EU (the EU’s temporary post-coronavirus pandemic recovery instrument). The report welcomes the smooth implementation of the strategy, allowing payment of a combination of loans and grants to Member States through EU programmes. The BUDG committee also underlines the need for transparency, urging the Commission to present systematic accounts of the spending to Parliament for proper scrutiny.

System of own resources of the European Union

Members also voted overwhelmingly in favour of another BUDG report, calling for rapid adoption of a decision on three new own resources. The resources proposed would gather contributions to the EU budget from an extended emissions trading scheme (ETS), a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), and a share of reallocated very large multinational company profits. The report also highlights the need for ambitious, balanced and transparent own resources that do not depend on taxing citizens, and that move away from gross national income-dependent resources towards financing tailored to objectives.

Common fisheries policy – Access restrictions to Union waters

The common fisheries policy (CFP) gives EU countries equal access to fisheries resources in each other’s waters, but with a long-standing temporary provision enabling countries to reserve waters up to 12 miles from their coastlines for local and neighbouring fishing vessels. As the current agreement allowing Member States to limit access to the 12‑mile zone expires at the end of the year, Members adopted a provisional agreement to extend the rules on access to coastal waters for another 10 years.

New EU strategy for enlargement

Ukraine’s recent request to join the EU has put enlargement firmly back on the agenda. However, European integration prospects for the Western Balkans and Türkiye have seen little progress. Aimed at re-energising EU enlargement policy, Members debated and adopted an own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on a new EU enlargement strategy. The AFET committee proposes to overhaul the process and provide candidates with roadmaps setting specific milestones to reach on their path to EU membership. The report further suggests formal suspension of negotiations with Türkiye.

Situation in Libya

Members debated and adopted another AFET own-initiative report, on the deteriorating political and security situation in Libya. The report proposes to nominate an EU special representative for Libya, redoubling EU diplomatic efforts to promote peace. The AFET committee also recommends strong support for United Nations-led reconciliation efforts seeking a peaceful and democratic transition, in a country where weak governance and a proxy war have strengthened violent groups at the cost of democracy.

Question time

Members questioned Executive Vice-President of the Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, and Commissioner for Economy, Paolo Gentiloni, regarding the possible new direction for the EU’s economic governance framework. Members then questioned Josep Borrell on the impact of Russia’s war of aggression on non-EU countries, in relation to the ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative’ agreement. While the agreement helped to prevent widespread food global crisis, countries dependent on food imports and aid remain vulnerable.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, two mandates for negotiations from the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) and one from the LIBE committee.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – November II 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

The COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, global conflict and economic instability have all led to a rise in violence against women – and Parliament has been voicing serious concern about gender-based violence for nearly 40 years. The International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women on 25 November marks the start of 16 days of activism to end the violence. The annual United Nations (UN) ‘UNiTE! Activism to end violence against women and girls’ campaign aims to mobilise all of society to participate in preventing violence against women, and to stand in solidarity with feminist movements and women’s rights activists. The campaign is more than necessary, as such violence is rooted in inequalities between women and men, and continues to occur in many forms, remaining a serious and common human rights violation.

The statistics on gender-based violence in the EU show the importance of adopting a legal framework: 1 in 3 women has experienced some form of physical and/or sexual violence since the age of 15; 1 in 10 women has experienced some form of sexual violence since the age of 15 and 1 in 20 women has been raped. Just over 1 in 5 women has experienced physical and/or sexual violence from either a current or a previous partner, whilst 43 % of women have experienced some form of psychologically abusive and/or controlling behaviour when in a relationship.

Eliminating violence against women therefore remains high on the EU agenda. Work is ongoing in the Parliament and the Council on a proposal for an EU directive on violence against women and domestic violence, put forward by the European Commission in March this year. During a debate in plenary session on 23 November 2022, Commissioner Helena Dalli explained that the aim of the legislation is to criminalise specific offences, improve access to support and justice for victims and prevent such forms of violence across the EU. The proposal is modelled on the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention, the first instrument to set legally binding standards to prevent gender-based violence in Europe and develop measures to protect victims and punish violent perpetrators. EU accession to the Istanbul Convention continues to be pursued in parallel to the adoption of the proposed directive. At present, all EU Member States have signed the agreement, and 21 have ratified it. The Parliament has consistently called for EU accession to the Istanbul Convention and its ratification by all Member States.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Crises of all sorts worldwide continue to have a disproportionate effect on women, and the EU is keen to stamp out violence against women everywhere, not just at home. The war perpetuated by Russia against Ukraine makes it clear once again that women have different needs and are exposed to different risks than men. In such emergencies, a gender-sensitive response is vital to reduce the risks of gender-based violence and challenges that women face. It is also important to ensure that victims of sexual violence get justice, a point underlined in a resolution adopted by Parliament on 23 November. Parliament has also condemned the deterioration of women’s situation in Afghanistan and called on the country to combat violence against women and girls, including forced marriage and intimate partner violence. Outraged by the death of 22-year old Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in police custody in Iran after she allegedly violated the country’s compulsory veiling laws, Parliament passed a resolution condemning the repression of women and other protestors.

The COVID-19 pandemic also contributed to an increase of many forms of violence against women everywhere, including domestic violence, female genital mutilation (FGM) and human trafficking. The impacts of climate change on the risks women face could come to inflict an even greater burden – evidenced specifically by the heightened domestic violence and femicide rates following heatwaves.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Furthermore, as the world moves online, women are disproportionately victims of cyber-violence. Cyberviolence includes hate speech, trolling, sexual harassment and other image-based abuse. Deepfakes, which are hyper-realistic media products created through artificial intelligence techniques that manipulate how people look and speak target women in particular. The malicious use of deepfakes includes fraud and extortion, leaving women dealing with the devastating effects of non-consensual pornographic videos. Tackling these varied forms of gender-based violence is part of the 2020‑2025 EU gender equality strategy, which underlines that the violence and harassment has reached alarming levels and is consistently under-reported and overlooked.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content Further reading

EPRS topical digest on gender based violence, November 2022

Events for this year’s international day:

Universal Jurisdiction – Improving accountability for serious international crimes. Subcommittee on Human Rights and Committee on Legal Affairs. European Parliament in Brussels, room Antall 4Q2 and via webstreaming on 28 November 2022 at 16h30.

Public hearing on combating trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality. European Parliament in Brussels, room Antall 4Q2 and on 29 November 2022 from 09h00 to 10h30.

Written by Rita Lobo and Ulrich Jochheim.

Following the 20th Congress of China’s Communist party, which announced President Xi Jinping’s third 5‑year term as its General Secretary, EPRS held an online roundtable on Xi Jinping’s third mandate and what is next for China on 27 October 2022. The discussion focused on analysing China’s foreign and economic policy priorities.

Wolfgang Hiller, Director for Impact Assessment and European Added Value at EPRS, welcomed the participants and the audience. Following his introductory remarks René Repasi, (S&D, Germany), Vice-Chair of the Delegation for relations with the People’s Republic of China highlighted the importance of the Party Congress in identifying in which direction China is heading, particularly with regard to its foreign policy. The decision to allow Xi Jinping a third mandate as General Secretary – unseen since the times of Mao Zedong – was expected in the West. René Repasi suggested that the removal of Hu Jintao (Xi Jinping’s predecessor) from the Party Congress was staged deliberately, to set the tone for Xi Jinping’s third mandate. He added that there is a clear loyalty to Xi Jinping among those appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee. He pointed to the fact that Beijing has decided to shift from using GDP as a central measure of China’s global success towards the notion of national strength. Furthermore, he drew attention to expert estimates that China’s economic growth will not reach the 2022 target of 5.5 %, reaching only 3 % instead.

René Repasi emphasised that there was no reference to the future of the zero-coronavirus strategy during the Party Congress, and expects that it will not be lifted any time soon. With regard to the EU-China relationship, he raised concerns about the EU’s powerlessness to impose the same sanctions that it has on Russia vis-à-vis China, if the latter were to invade Taiwan. More specifically, he argued that the EU’s economic dependence on China makes the consequences of imposing sanctions even more challenging for the EU. As such, he stressed the need for the EU to diversify and to identify any dependencies, as well as to invest in the proposed corporate sustainability and due diligence directives. Lastly, in relation to Taiwan, René Repasi warned that Beijing has made clear that any attempt to recognise Taiwan’s independence by foreign states would be met with force.

Elena Lazarou, acting Head of the External Policies Unit of EPRS, presented the panel members: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics and German Marshall Fund of the United States; Yu Jie, Senior Research Fellow on China, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House; Alice Ekman, Senior Analyst in charge of Asia, European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and Ulrich Jochheim, Policy Analyst, External Policies Unit, Members’ Research Service, EPRS.

On energy, Elena Lazarou pointed out that China is the world’s biggest energy importer, in terms of both oil and gas, and asked how that would impact Europe’s energy challenge once the zero-coronavirus strategy is relaxed. René Repasi argued that, due to the current tensions between the European Parliament and China, particularly the sanctions against certain Members, he is not optimistic that the ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment would begin soon. He added that the decision to promote Li Qiang, who was responsible for the tough stance on the zero-coronavirus policy in Shanghai, signals that the strategy will remain.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Jacob Funk Kirkegaard focused on the key economic takeaways from the Party Congress. More specifically, the officials that Xi Jinping has appointed are not reformists and are primarily loyal to Xi Jinping, with no signal that the Chinese economy will reopen. He noted that China will not be able to reopen its economy until they have a vaccine that can protect their elderly population, likely not before the end of 2023. Although this benefits the EU in the short term, as China imports less liquid natural gas (LNG), in the longer term, it will have critical economic consequences for everyone. He also stressed China’s dramatic demographic transition and housing market collapse, which will slow economic growth. Jacob Funk Kirkegaard argued that China’s economic model is heavily dependent on investment and unless the country fundamentally changes its economic growth model, indebtedness will continue to rise, potentially leading to large-scale financial crisis. Stimulating Chinese public infrastructure investment will contribute to this indebtedness and will prove unsustainable. He warned that the EU should prepare for China potentially devaluing its currency. He added that should Russia lose its war (likely to happen in the next six months, in his opinion), this would be considered as a political setback for Xi Jinping but would not affect China’s economy. Lastly, he agreed that the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment is dead, politically.

Yu Jie began by highlighting a new section (five) of the Party Congress’ work report, referring to the need for China to improve its home-grown talents. While Xi Jinping had previously focused on finance and capital, the importance was placed on high-end manufacturing during this conference. According to Yu Jie, this strategy can only work if there is fair competition in the private and state sector. She also stressed that the newly appointed politburo members, mainly hold PhDs in nuclear science and physics, signifying a clear shift from appointing economic planners. On China-United States relations, she noted that Xi Jinping did not refer to the ‘strategic opportunity for China’, a term that advocated for a stable relationship with the West. The party no longer has an incentive to develop this to advance its economy. In her view, China is returning to a solely domestic focus.

Alice Ekman emphasised that China’s priorities have shifted from the economy to security. Moreover, she stressed that Xi Jinping’s speech was particularly ideological, with clear references to Marxism. This shift will have consequences for China’s interaction with the US and EU. She anticipates that Beijing will introduce further controls on the economy, including within the technology and private education sector. Increased surveillance of the Chinese population should also be expected, with Xi Jinping continuously warning against ‘hedonism, worship and egocentricity’. According to Ekman, this ideology was developed against the backdrop of the West’s sanctions against Russia and thus the need to become independent and self-reliant.  On China-US relations, she emphasised that Xi Jinping referred to ‘gross provocation in respect to Taiwan’, alluding to foreign interference. She noted that China continues to reach out to countries that it considers ‘friends’ while simultaneously maintaining its ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy to countries it considers hostile. Lastly, she highlighted Xi Jinping’s comments that he will support ‘patriots’ in Taiwan while fighting against separatist forces and foreign interference and stressed that China may attempt to promote its strategic objectives through lawfare, as it did in Hong Kong.

Ulrich Jochheim agreed that Xi Jinping’s speech was ideological and indicative that China has decided to turn inwards. He argued that China would turn to the concept of hybrid warfare to deal with Taiwan, using all means except classical warfare to manipulate Taiwan and improve its own geostrategic position. However, the composition of the Central Military Commission indicates that Xi is also planning to increasingly use military means to intimidate Taiwan. While Taiwan seems well-prepared to face disinformation campaigns, Jochheim anticipates that Xi Jinping will focus on manipulating the 2024 presidential elections in Taiwan. He concluded that China is becoming increasingly communist and stressed scepticism regarding the innovation and technology strategy. Several questions were raised during the Q&A session related to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. According to Alice Ekman, China’s aggressive and ambitious foreign policy will persist; as such, she predicts that the ultimate deadline for the invasion of Taiwan is 2049. She also described the types of lawfare tactics that China could deploy against Taiwan, namely, the extradition treaty to repatriate ‘Taiwanese criminals’ from foreign countries; adapting the Anti-Secession law making it more specific and turning it into a unilateral unification law; adding further institutions to its ‘black list’. However, Yu Jie noted that the current economic situation means there is very little that Xi Jinping can do, as he is not a risk-taker and the Chinese public would not be willing to exchange its standard of life for running Taiwan. Yu Jie also highlighted that China would struggle to consolidate power should it take Taiwan, with Kierkegaard also questioning China’s ability to finance an invasion of Taiwan. He also pointed out that sanctions following a Chinese invasion would not have the same effect as they do on Russia. Ulrich Jochheim anticipated that the EU will have no choice but to impose sanctions on China if it invades Taiwan. He also highlights that Republic of Korea and Japanese support for the EU on the Russian war in Ukraine is linked to their expectation of support should a war occur in their region. Kierkegaard responded that Russia and China complement each other economically, although historically they are not ‘natural allies’; and express similar anti-American sentiment. This convergence, for Alice Ekman, is greater than has been described and has materialised through stronger coordination. She believes that China is advocating for Russia to attend the G20 and is attempting to shape the agenda so that the war in Ukraine does not dominate. For Yu Jie, China is apprehensive of an unstable Russia on its borders. Ulrich Jochheim highlighted that the chief of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party will be the first foreign leader to visit China after the Party Congress – a symbolic event that aligns with the Party Congress’s ideological strategy. He concluded by arguing that China wants ‘to have its cake and eat it’ – e.g. to have good relations with Russia while simultaneously attempting to have a neutral position on Ukraine.  

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The European Parliament and its President have recently received a large number of messages calling for support for the protests in Iran. Citizens first began to write on this subject in November 2022. In its resolution of 6 October 2022, Parliament condemned the killing of Mahsa Amini and called for EU sanctions against her killers and those involved in violence against street protests. Parliament also condemned the widespread and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against protesting citizens, and called on the authorities to immediately release and drop any charges against demonstrators.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the European Parliament and its President on this matter (in English and German).

Main points made in the reply in English

Following the brutal death of Mahsa Amini, President Metsola spoke of the situation in Iran at the start of the plenary session on 3 October 2022. In her opening remarks, she said that the European Parliament stands with the women of Iran demanding change.

Addressing the European Parliament on 17 October, President Metsola paid tribute to the brave, defiant men and women protesting in Iran. She stressed that the sanctions adopted by the European Union (EU) ‘will hold accountable those who are responsible for the brutal crimes against women, youths and men – demonstrators outraged by the death in police custody of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini’.

On 9 November, President Metsola opened the plenary session, stating in response to the deteriorating situation in Iran: ‘We need an international investigation to keep the oppressive regime accountable for its ongoing human rights violations. It is now time to impose further targeted sanctions. There can be no business as usual with the Iranian regime’.

European Parliament’s position on the situation in Iran

On 6 October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the killing of Mahsa Amini and calling for EU sanctions against her killers and those involved in violence against street protests.

Parliament also condemns the widespread and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against the crowds, and calls on the authorities to immediately release and drop any charges against demonstrators.

Parliament encourages those EU countries with a diplomatic presence in Tehran to coordinate their actions in order to protect human rights defenders. More information is available in the press release on our website.

Regarding Iran’s nuclear activities, in December 2021, the European Parliament urged Iran to immediately cease nuclear activities that violate the Iran Nuclear deal. In February 2022, Parliament recalled that the Iran Nuclear deal remains the only way to stop the regime’s worrying nuclear activities.

EU-Iran relations

Diplomatic relations between the European Union and non-EU countries such as Iran are not led by the European Parliament, but by the European External Action Service (EEAS). Outside its borders, the European Union is usually represented by diplomatic representations, which have a similar role to that of an embassy. However, the EU as a bloc does not have a diplomatic representation in Iran. More information on the EU-Iran relations is available on the EEAS website.

Individual EU countries have the right to determine their own diplomatic relations with any country in the world, including Iran. Any decision on cutting bilateral diplomatic ties with Iran is for each individual EU country to take.

EU sanctions against Iran

Sanctions against certain countries, entities or individuals are not decided by the European Parliament, but by the Council of the European Union (representing the governments of EU countries). Each EU country is responsible for implementing these sanctions within their respective jurisdictions.

In response to the death of Mahsa Amini, and the violent repression of the recent demonstrations in Iran, the Council of the EU added, on 17 October and 14 November 2022, 40 individuals and 7 entities to the list of those subject to restrictive measures in the context of the existing Iran human rights sanctions regime. The measures imposed consist of a travel ban and an asset freeze. EU citizens and companies are forbidden to make funds available to the listed individuals and entities. Furthermore, the sanctions prohibit exports of equipment to Iran that might be used for internal repression or for monitoring telecommunications. More information about the EU sanctions against Iran is available on the Council’s website.

Main points made in the reply in German

Im Zuge des brutalen Tods von Mahsa Amini sprach Präsidentin Metsola in der Plenarsitzung am 3. Oktober 2022 über die Situation im Iran. Sie sagte in ihren einleitenden Worten, dass das Europäische Parlament den Frauen, die den Wandel im Iran fordern, zur Seite steht.

In ihrer Ansprache an das Europäische Parlament am 17. Oktober 2022, zollte Präsidentin Metsola den mutigen Männern und Frauen, welche im Iran protestieren, Tribut. Sie betonte, dass die von der Europäischen Union (EU) beschlossenen Sanktionen ‚diejenigen zur Rechenschaft ziehen werden, die für die brutalen Verbrechen gegen Frauen, Jugendliche und Männer verantwortlich sind – Demonstranten, die über den Tod der 22-jährigen Mahsa Amini in Polizeigewahrsam entsetzt sind‘.

Am 9. November 2022 hat Präsidentin Metsola die Plenarsitzung mit einer Antwort auf die sich verschlimmernde Situation im Iran begonnen: ‚Wir brauchen eine internationale Untersuchung um das unterdrückende Regime für ihre anhaltenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen. Jetzt ist die Zeit um mehr gezielte Sanktionen zu erzwingen. Wir können die bisherige Politik mit dem iranischen Regime nicht weiterführen‘.

Die Position des Europäischen Parlaments bezüglich der Situation im Iran

Am 6. Oktober 2022 verabschiedete das Europäische Parlament eine Entschließung, in welcher es die Ermordung von Mahsa Amini verurteilte und EU-Sanktionen gegen die Täter sowie alle, die in die Gewalt gegen die Straßenproteste involviert waren, forderte.

Das Parlament verurteilt außerdem den großflächigen und unverhältnismäßigen Personaleinsatz der iranischen Sicherheitskräfte gegen die Protestierenden und fordert die Behörden auf, Protestierende sofort freizulassen und alle Anschuldigungen gegen sie fallen zu lassen.

Das Parlament ermutigt die EU-Länder mit einer diplomatischen Vertretung in Teheran, ihre Bemühungen zum Schutz von Menschenrechtsverteidigern zu koordinieren. Weitere Informationen sind in der Pressemitteilung auf unserer Website erhältlich.

Bezüglich Irans nuklearer Aktivitäten im Dezember 2021 hat das Europäische Parlament den Iran aufgefordert, diese sofort zu beenden, da sie die Bestimmungen des iranischen Atomdeals verletzen. Im Februar 2022 erinnerte das Parlament daran, dass der Atomdeal das einzige Mittel sei, die besorgniserregenden Atomaktivitäten des iranischen Regimes einzuschränken.

EU-Iran Beziehungen

Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Drittstaaten, wie zum Beispiel dem Iran, werden nicht durch das Parlament, sondern den Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst (EAD) verwaltet.

Außerhalb ihrer Grenzen wird die Europäische Union meistens durch diplomatische Vertretungen repräsentiert, welche eine ähnliche Rolle wie eine Botschaft einnehmen. Allerdings hat die EU selbst keine diplomatische Vertretung im Iran. Mehr Informationen zu den EU-Iran-Beziehungen sind auf der Website des EAD erhältlich.

EU-Länder haben das Recht ihre diplomatische Beziehungen mit jedem Land der Welt zu gestalten, auch mit dem Iran. Jede Entscheidung, diplomatische Beziehungen mit dem Iran zu beenden, obliegt jedem EU-Land.

EU-Sanktionen gegen den Iran

Sanktionen gegen Länder, Einheiten oder Individuen werden nicht vom Europäischen Parlament, sondern vom Rat der Europäischen Union getroffen (dieser repräsentiert die Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten). EU-Länder sind für die Durchsetzung der Sanktionen innerhalb des eigenen Hoheitsgebiets verantwortlich.

Als Reaktion auf den Tod von Mahsa Amini und die gewalttätige Unterdrückung der aktuellen Demonstrationen im Iran, hat der Rat der Europäischen Union am 17. Oktober 2022 sowie am 14. November 2022, im Rahmen der angesichts der Menschenrechtslage in Iran bestehenden Sanktionsregelung, 40 Personen und sieben Organisationen in die Liste der Personen, Einrichtungen und Organisationen, die restriktiven Maßnahmen unterliegen, aufgenommen. Bei den verhängten Maßnahmen handelt es sich um ein Reiseverbot und das Einfrieren von Vermögenswerten. EU-Bürgern und Unternehmen ist es untersagt, die aufgelisteten Personen und Einrichtungen mit finanziellen Mitteln zu unterstützen. Außerdem verbieten die Sanktionen Exporte mit Equipment in den Iran, welche für die interne Unterdrückung oder für die Überwachung von Telekommunikation benutzt werden könnte. Mehr Informationen über die EU-Sanktionen gegen den Iran sind auf der Website des Rates erhältlich.

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou (1st edition).

In 2021, Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Belarusian regime began actively attracting migrants from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and other countries, before encouraging and even forcing them to cross the borders into the European Union. This put pressure on the neighbouring countries of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and was the Belarusian regime’s response to EU sanctions imposed following the regime’s rigging of elections in 2020 and violent repression of civil society in 2021.

In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum, coupled with a proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code (SBC), to define the instrumentalisation of migrants. The proposal was initiated following the increasing role of state actors in the facilitation of irregular migration, using certain migratory flows as a tool for political purposes. The main changes the proposal brings include extending registration periods for asylum applications, applying the border procedure to all asylum claims, limiting reception conditions to meet only basic needs, and expediting return procedures.

The proposal is now being examined by the Parliament and the Council.

Versions

• November 2022: Instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum Committee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2021)890
14.12.2021Rapporteur:Patryk Jaki (ECR, Poland)2021/0427(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Lena Düpont (EPP, Germany)
Pietro Bartolo (S&D, Italy)
Róża Thun und Hohenstein (Renew, Poland)
Tineke Strik (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)
Patricia Chagnon (ID, France)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of the draft report

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

On 9 November 2022, the European Commission proposed a temporary emergency regulation on accelerating the deployment of renewable energy. Its main aim is to simplify permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects, in particular for solar installations, heat pumps, and projects involving the repowering of renewable energy plants. Accelerating the rollout of renewables is considered one of the main measures that could help the EU address the current energy crisis, improve security of supply and reduce energy prices.

Background

The European Commission published a legislative proposal for a Council regulation laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy on 9 November 2022. The proposal defines renewable energy projects as being of an overriding public interest and proposes to streamline the permit-granting procedure for installing solar energy equipment, repowering renewable energy plants and deploying heat pumps. The regulation targets technologies that are quick to implement in the short term, have considerable potential for reducing gas consumption and, because of their low operational cost, could help bring down energy bills. The regulation would apply for 1 year, but its length could be extended following a review scheduled to take place by 1 July 2023.

The regulation comes in response to the European Council conclusions of 20-21 October 2022, which called for the ‘fast-tracking of the simplification of permitting procedures to accelerate the rollout of renewables and related grids’. It complements several other regulations adopted in 2022 to mitigate the energy crisis, such as the regulations on gas storage, gas demand reduction and on addressing high energy prices. The newly proposed regulation also builds on the REPowerEU plan, which includes a revision of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) focusing on long-term structural changes (currently under negotiation).

The legal basis for this regulation is Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which envisages adoption by the Council only. The Commission justifies the use of this article as opposed to Article 194 (joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council), by the urgent and temporary nature of the measure, and the time needed to adopt and begin transposing the revised Renewable Energy Directive. The lack of ‘democratic checks’ was one of the concerns voiced by the European Environmental Bureau, along with reservations regarding the interplay with environmental legislation. However, industry players, such as Solar Power Europe, have been strongly supportive of the emergency proposal.

Main points of the proposed Council regulation Overriding public interest

The proposal regards renewable energy plants and installations as being of an overriding public interest and therefore as eligible for a simplified assessment during the permit-granting procedures. Some derogations from EU environmental legislation (the Water Framework, Birds and Habitats Directives) would be made possible, providing appropriate species conservation measures were ensured.

Solar energy installations

A maximum 1-month deadline is proposed for the permit-granting procedure for solar energy equipment on artificial structures such as buildings. These installations would also be exempt from some environmental assessments. Small-scale installations (50 kW or less) for ‘renewables self-consumers’, as defined in the RED, would benefit from ‘positive administrative silence’, whereby the permit would be considered granted if there was no feedback from the relevant authorities within a month of the application being submitted.

Repowering renewable plants

The permit-granting period for repowering (i.e. the renewal or upgrading) of renewable power plants would be limited to 6 months; this period would also cover all relevant environmental assessments that needed to be made. Environmental assessments would be limited to potential impacts resulting from the change or extension compared to the original project. Moreover, a simplified procedure for grid connections would apply in cases of repowering not exceeding a 15 % increase in total capacity.

Heat pumps

The proposal introduces a 3-month deadline for permit granting for the installation of heat pumps. The grid connection of smaller heat pumps would be permitted automatically following notification to the relevant entity (up to 12 kW capacity, or up to 50 kW capacity if installed by a renewables self-consumer).

Legislative context

As part of the REPowerEU plan of May 2022 to phase out Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the clean energy transition, the Commission proposed a targeted revision of the Renewable Energy Directive. This revision aims to increase to 45 % the target share of renewable energy sources in EU consumption by 2030. The currently binding target is 32 %, while a broader RED revision as part of the ‘fit for 55’ package proposed a target of 40 %. The REPowerEU revision also proposed simplified procedures for renewable energy installations, overlapping to some extent with the newly proposed regulation on accelerating the deployment of renewables that is the focus of this paper (e.g. permit granting for solar installations and repowering of renewable energy power plants). While negotiations on the longer-term revision of the RED are currently ongoing, the newly proposed regulation is seen as a temporary emergency measure responding to the need to achieve some of the REPowerEU objectives faster in the light of the worsening energy crisis, in particular the objective to accelerate the rollout of renewables.

European Parliament position

As Article 122 TFEU is the legal basis, the Parliament is not participating in the negotiations. However, it has taken a position on the revised version of the RED, which includes provisions that touch upon the same topics. On 14 September 2022, Parliament adopted its first-reading position on the RED revision proposed under the ‘fit for 55’ package. The position supported the streamlining of permitting procedures for both renewable energy projects and related grid infrastructure projects. It also highlighted the importance of accelerating the deployment of solar rooftops and heat pumps in order to reduce fossil fuel imports.

On 14 November 2022, Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) voted on its draft amendments to the RED revision under REPowerEU. The report supports the new target of 45 %, calls for shorter approval periods for new renewable installations and supports simplified assessments. Parliament is expected to vote on this report during its December 2022 plenary session.

In its resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU’s response to the increase in energy prices in Europe, Parliament commented on the use of Article 122 as the legal basis for the recent regulation on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices. It regretted that the Commission proposal took the form of a Council regulation under Article 122 rather than a regulation under the ordinary legislative procedure. Parliament also confirmed its readiness to ‘act swiftly on this pressing issue if called upon, as it requires full democratic legitimacy and accountability’. The currently proposed regulation on accelerating renewables is the fourth in a series of energy-related acts proposed in 2022 under Article 122. The others include the above-mentioned regulation to address high energy prices, the regulation on gas demand reduction and the recently proposed regulation on enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks.

The Member States’ ambassadors to the EU (Coreper) discussed the text on 18 November 2022. The energy ministers in the Council are expected to reach a political agreement on 24 November 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Accelerating the deployment of renewable energy during the crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen (1st edition).

An independent media is a pillar of democracy and an important part of the economy, helping to shape public opinion and hold those in power to account. In recent years, however, there have been increasingly worrying trends across the European Union (EU), as documented in the annual rule of law reports by the European Commission and other tools such as the Media Pluralism Monitor.

Published on 16 September 2022, the European media freedom act (EMFA) proposes a new set of rules and mechanisms to promote media pluralism and independence across the EU, and amends the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD, Directive 2010/13/EU). The aim is to prevent political interference in editorial decisions and ensure transparency of media ownership. Member States will be required to assess the impact of media concentrations. The proposed act stresses the importance of an independent and adequately funded public service media, and seeks to protect journalists from having to disclose their sources and from the use of spyware against them. It also sets requirements for fair audience measurement systems and transparent allocation of state advertising. Media content would be better protected against unjustified online content removal, and a new European board for media services would be established to assist in the implementation of the EU media law framework.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) has been designated the committee responsible, with the Committees on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) asked to give opinions. The procedure is in its initial stages and in the preparatory phase in Parliament.

Versions

• November 2022: European media freedom act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU Committee responsible:Culture and Education (CULT)COM(2022)457
16.09.2022Rapporteur:To be appointed2022/0277(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

Adopted in 1989, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was the first international instrument to explicitly recognise children as human beings with innate rights. Ratified by 197 countries, including all EU Member States, it has become the landmark treaty on children’s rights, outlining universal standards for the care, treatment, survival, development, protection and participation of all children.

The promotion and protection of children’s rights is one of the key objectives embedded in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Moreover, Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU recognises that children are entitled to ‘protection and care as is necessary for their well-being’. The same article recognises that the child’s best interests should be the primary consideration for public authorities and private institutions.

Over the years, the EU has moved from a sectoral approach towards a more coherent policy approach. Whereas initially, children’s rights were developed in relation to specific areas – such as the free movement of persons – since 2000 the EU has taken a more coordinated line. This briefing offers an overview of the most relevant actions at European level to address and promote children’s rights before looking at upcoming challenges.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Children’s rights in the EU in the light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf and Micaela Del Monte.

More than 8 months into Russia’s war on Ukraine, there is no end in sight. The invasion has forced millions of people to flee Ukraine or seek refuge in other parts of the country, causing a European humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions. The chaos created by the conflict has increased the risk of violence and exploitation exponentially, especially for the most vulnerable people, such as those with disabilities. Estimates show that around 2.7 million people with disabilities in Ukraine face a disproportionate risk of violence or death, and lack access to medical support; this number will most likely increase as the conflict goes on. Since the war began, the European Parliament has been drawing attention to the needs of people with disabilities.

The humanitarian situation of people fleeing or being displaced within Ukraine

As of 8 November 2022, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimated that over 7.8 million people had fled from Ukraine to neighbouring countries since the start of the conflict; more than 4.6 million of them had registered for temporary protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe. As of 14 November, 16 631 civilian casualties (6 557 killed and 10 074 injured) were recorded in Ukraine, though the figures could be higher owing to the ongoing hostilities and ensuing difficulties in reporting. The raging conflict keeps increasing the numbers of casualties and the extent of the destruction and displacement within Ukraine, thus causing one of the greatest European humanitarian crises of recent times.

Specific risks facing Ukrainians with disabilities in times of conflict

People with disabilities (PWDs) in Ukraine were already extremely vulnerable prior to the Russian invasion. Taking this into account, the European Commission’s 2021-2027 action plan on integration and inclusion mentioned that migrants with disabilities may face discrimination. It stressed the special educational needs of children with disabilities and also pointed to the difficulties migrants with disabilities face in accessing the labour market. During armed conflicts, the needs and vulnerabilities of PWDs are amplified, as is the risk of discrimination towards them. The war in Ukraine is no exception: the mass displacement and chaos triggered by the conflict have raised serious concerns about violations of human rights inside and outside the country, in particular those of vulnerable people, such as women, children, LGBTI people, Roma and PWDs. In April 2022, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) warned that 2.7 million PWDs in Ukraine were at risk of being abandoned in their homes or in residential care, with ‘no access to life-sustaining medications, oxygen supplies, food, water, sanitation, support for daily living and other basic facilities’. June 2022 estimates show that more than 143 000 PWDs have been displaced since the outbreak of the war.

Furthermore, the conflict has exposed PWDs to a disproportionate risk of death or injury and hampered their access to emergency information. PWDs often have no way to reach shelters or safe places, and because of mass displacement they have been disconnected from their support networks. The UN ‘Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 February to 31 July 2022′ pointed to a lack of ‘access to bomb shelters, evacuation trains, necessary medication and adequate housing suited to their needs’ for PWDs. Another UN report stressed that Ukrainian children ‘with visual, hearing, developmental or intellectual disabilities’ are at higher risk of danger because ‘they may not have learned about or understood what was happening’ or were removed from or abandoned in their institutions without appropriate support. Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Inclusion Europe reported that before the war, around 261 000 people in Ukraine had disability status due to intellectual and psychosocial disorders. The sirens, explosions and alarms, in addition to the bombing and shelling, have caused them stress, depression and anxiety, in some cases exacerbating their chronic disease. Moreover, Inclusion Europe points to the difficulty such people face in accessing medical services, psychological assistance and psychiatric care, and to the fact that autistic people cannot stay in overcrowded bomb shelters.

Similarly, the World Economic Forum stresses that PWDs are facing a ‘crisis within a crisis’ not only because civilian infrastructures, including hospitals and residential care facilities, are under shelling but also because people in wheelchairs or who are visually or otherwise impaired are facing unprecedented challenges in trying to escape the hostilities. This is why the NGO Humanity and Inclusion has highlighted the urgent need to ensure that the specific needs of PWDs are identified and taken into account in humanitarian measures. Likewise, UN experts call ‘for urgent action to protect Ukrainian children with disabilities in residential care institutions’. Stakeholders, such as the European Disability Forum and the European Association of Service providers for Persons with Disabilities (EASPD), are also closely monitoring the situation of PWDs who are in Ukraine or have fled the country.

International and European Union initiatives

A September 2022 UNCRPD report on the situation of PWDs in Ukraine points to states’ obligations regarding PWDs in the context of armed conflict. It refers to Article 11 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which requires states parties to ensure the inclusion of PWDs when meeting their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law. At the time of writing, there were 185 states parties to the convention; it was ratified by both Russia (2012) and Ukraine (2010).

Since the war began, the EU has activated its Temporary Protection Directive, coordinated the largest EU Civil Protection Mechanism operation to date and stepped up its financial assistance to Ukraine (the EU and its Member States have disbursed €1.4 billion in humanitarian aid to Ukraine since 2014). The EU has also arranged for the cohesion funds to be used to help Member States welcome fleeing Ukrainians. In March 2022, a Commission communication on welcoming those fleeing war in Ukraine stressed the need to pay particular attention to vulnerable categories, including children with special needs or disabilities and PWDs in general. It pointed out that the European Social Fund Plus can support community-based services and accommodation, especially for those with special needs or disabilities, and also for children and the elderly.

This year, the Commission, together with the European Disability Forum, is organising the annual conference to mark the European Day of Persons with Disabilities. The conference will focus on: issues faced by young people with disabilities; the international instruments available in support of PWDs; and the escalation of violence in Ukraine, which has affected PWDs particularly badly. In line with EU operational guidance on the inclusion of PWDs in EU humanitarian aid, the needs of PWDs are mainstreamed in EU actions to foster a disability-inclusive humanitarian response. Similarly, EU-funded projects in Ukraine, run by partners such as Humanity and Inclusion and the World Health Organization, target and prioritise PWDs in terms of protection, psychosocial support, hygiene, health and shelter.

The European Parliament’s position

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, Parliament recalled that ‘attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under international humanitarian law and therefore constitute war crimes’. It called on the Commission, EU Member States and UN agencies to offer humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. Parliament stressed the needs of ‘vulnerable groups, minorities, and women and children, since they are particularly affected in conflict situations and need special protection and support, in particular children in institutional care, unaccompanied children, and children with disabilities and other serious illnesses’ and highlighted the need to ‘ensure that they continue to receive the necessary care and life-saving treatment and are immediately evacuated to safety’. In its resolution of 7 April 2022, Parliament called for the promotion of mechanisms to relocate refugees among the Member States, including fast coordinated transportation of refugees, in particular unaccompanied children and children with disabilities. Members reiterated their concern about PWDs in a resolution of 19 May 2022, underlining the importance of offering specialised protection and care to PWDs coming from Ukraine, and a resolution of September 2022 calling on Member States to ‘address the plight of vulnerable groups, including … people with disabilities in EU public statements about forcible transfers, and to support activists and NGOs on the ground who are trying to take care of them and facilitate their safe return’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: People with disabilities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson.

The European Commission has adopted a proposal to improve the functioning of EU gas markets during the current energy crisis. It introduces a joint purchasing tool, seeks to improve efficiency and security of gas supply, and limits prices and volatility. The proposed Council regulation is under discussion among EU Member States.

Background

On 18 October 2022, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Council regulation enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks. This is one of several urgent EU legislative actions undertaken to address the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. The proposal is linked to the Commission’s REPower EU plan (18 May 2022), which aims to end Europe’s reliance on energy imports from Russia and accelerate the clean energy transition. And it is closely related to other emergency EU legislation adopted over the course of 2022, including an EU Regulation on filling in gas storage levels; a Council Regulation voluntarily curbing gas consumption over the winter period; and a Council Regulation containing a series of emergency measures (demand reduction, market intervention and windfall levies) to address the problem of very high energy prices across the EU in 2022 and 2023 (see EPRS briefing on the topic).

Legal basis

The proposed Council regulation uses Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as its legal basis, like many other urgent EU proposals adopted in the face of the energy crisis. Article 122 TFEU is designed for use in case of a serious threat to energy supplies, and it is certainly the case that close energy ties between the EU and Russia (until recently the leading supplier of fossil fuels to Europe) have collapsed because of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This deterioration of energy relations is evident from the EU embargo on imports of Russian coal; the impending EU embargo on Russian oil and oil-related products; and the drastic reduction in Russian pipeline gas supplies. Article 122 TFEU can accelerate the process of EU decision-making in an emergency situation, because it only requires the agreement of the Council of the EU and does not provide for any legislative role for the European Parliament. However, frequent use of Article 122 TFEU can reduce the level of democratic scrutiny over EU policies. The normal legal basis for EU energy policies is Article 194 TFEU, which is being used to revise more permanent legislation on EU gas markets. Furthermore, Article 194 TFEU was used to agree the EU regulation on gas storage, which was swiftly adopted by the Parliament and Council under an expedited procedure.

Main features of the proposed Council regulation

This proposal aims to develop greater joint purchasing of gas and ensure the efficient operation of gas infrastructure, pipelines and LNG terminals. It also includes measures to enhance security of supply, and takes action to address the current problem of high prices and volatility in EU gas markets. In light of the emergency character of the Council regulation and its related legal basis (Article 122 TFEU), the Commission has proposed that it should be valid for a period of one year, albeit with the possibility of prolongation.

Joint purchasing

The EU would take the first concrete steps towards the joint purchasing of gas by developing a temporary joint purchasing tool. The tool would be ready by spring 2023 and impact on gas supplies during the next filling season (i.e. ahead of winter 2023/2024). Joint purchasing would involve a two-step process. Firstly, gas purchasing companies would aggregate their demand using a dedicated service provider, hired under a public procurement procedure. Member States would have to ensure at least 15 % of their storage filling requirements for next year were included by their companies in the demand aggregation process (roughly 13.5 billion cubic metres across the EU as a whole). The second step would involve some of these companies voluntarily deciding to form a gas purchasing consortium (or even multiple consortia that vary by region). The idea is that a gas purchasing consortium could negotiate lower prices and ensure a more stable supply, especially in a context of scarcity. This proposal is consistent with a longstanding demand of the European Parliament for a joint EU gas purchasing mechanism.

Efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals

The proposal grants the gas system operators more tools to react rapidly to changes in gas flows and possible contractual congestion. These are becoming more problematic because of the urgent need to diversify gas supplies away from Russia, which in turn sharply increases the EU’s reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, obtained from a wide range of exporting countries. The proposal envisages a transparency platform and the development of an organised market of secondary capacities for LNG imports, similar to those already in existence for the transport of gas via pipelines. This is consistent with the Commission’s legislative proposal (December 2021) to reform EU gas and hydrogen markets.

Security of supply

The proposal would facilitate Member States in taking further steps to reduce EU gas demand beyond this winter. Security of supply will remain a major concern going into the following winter (2023-2024) because of the (likely) total interruption of Russian gas supplies, making it much harder to fill in gas storage sites to their full capacity. To better prepare for an emergency, Member States would be able to redefine their protected consumers, so long as vulnerable households continue to be protected in all circumstances. Member States would likewise be able to reduce the ‘non-essential consumption’ of protected customers, provided this does not lead to disconnection. Critical gas-fired power plants would now be covered by a solidarity protection obligation. Default rules for bilateral solidarity between Member States would henceforth apply in all instances where no solidarity agreements exist. This has now become a necessity, given that only six out of the 40 required solidarity agreements are in place. In the event of an EU or regional emergency involving major gas disruptions and supply shortages, the Council of the EU would have the possibility to decide on an efficient allocation of gas capacities.

Addressing high prices and volatility

The proposal would develop a new complementary benchmark for LNG imports to Europe. The Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF), Europe’s main market hub for gas, remains too dependent on prices for pipeline gas from Russia, with the result that its operation may now be artificially inflating EU gas prices. The EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) would be tasked with developing this new benchmark. The proposal also envisages the future possibility of developing a gas market correction mechanism, in the form of a potential new Council Regulation that would establish a maximum dynamic price at which natural gas transactions can take place in the TTF spot markets.

The proposal would introduce an intra-day price volatility management mechanism aimed at limiting large price movements in electricity and gas derivatives contracts within the same trading day, and which would complement existing ‘circuit breakers’ established on trading platforms. To this specific end, and to better assess issues relating to high pricing and volatility, ACER and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) would be allocated new tasks and required to cooperate more closely.

The proposal does not include concrete measures to implement a price cap on gas imports to the EU, and therefore does not fully address the European Council’s request for a ‘temporary dynamic price corridor’ and a ‘temporary EU framework to cap the price of gas in electricity generation’ (see below).

Next steps

Member States are in the process of negotiating the final text of the Council regulation, and some have expressed their dissatisfaction with a text that does not contain concrete proposals for a cap on gas prices, as requested by the European Council on 20-21 October 2022. The Commission has previously expressed its concerns about the unintended consequences of a gas price cap, arguing that it could disincentivise demand reduction and jeopardise security of supply to Europe. Nevertheless, some kind of plan to curb gas prices could form part of the process of Member States agreeing to the text of this Council regulation.

The Council regulation is currently under discussion and may be adopted at the extraordinary meeting of energy ministers on 24 November 2022, possibly alongside a new plan to limit future gas prices.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Enhancing solidarity in EU gas markets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia has recently launched the heaviest missile barrage against Ukraine since it began its attack on the country nearly nine months ago. This follows the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the east and south, which led to Russia abandoning the southern city of Kherson, the only regional capital it had captured since the February invasion.

On 15 November, a missile landed in Poland, killing two and sparking fears that Russia had attacked a NATO country. A NATO and Polish investigation showed that the blast most likely came from a stray rocket of the Ukrainian air defence system. However, the military alliance said Moscow, not Kyiv, was ultimately responsible for the explosion in Poland. At their summit in Bali, G20 leaders issued a closing declaration saying that ‘most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine’, although it acknowledged that ‘there were other views’.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Financing and governing the recovery, reconstruction, and modernization of Ukraine
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Can EU enlargement gain momentum?
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

If Russia goes nuclear: Three scenarios for the Ukraine war
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

Massive strikes on civilian infrastructure
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

The war against Ukraine and European defence: When will we square the circle?
Egmont, November 2022

Defend. Resist. Repeat: Ukraine’s lessons for European defence
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

How to defeat Russia and prevent nuclear armageddon with one weird trick
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

More tortoise, less hare: How Europeans can ramp up military supplies for Ukraine in the long war
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

De quoi le Président Poutine a-t-il peur?
Fondation Robert Schuman, November 2022

Dear Israel, time to step up on Ukraine
Friends of Europe, November 2022

L’europe face à la Russie: Quel avenir pour la stratégie des sanctions?
Institut Jacques Delors, November 2022

After Ukraine, a shattered multilateralism?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

How the Ukraine war could disrupt climate policies in the MENA region
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

Ukraine: unconventional impact at sea?
International Institute for Security Studies, November 2022

Where do the war in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia lead
International Institute for Peace, November 2022

Western Balkans accession to EU: Lessons for Ukraine
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, November 2022

Living in limbo: Displaced Ukrainians in Poland
Migration Policy Institute, November 2022

The waning India-Russia partnership is an unexpected effect of the war in Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, November 2022

Iran assists Russia with weapons: The military and political consequences
Polish Institute of International Affairs, November 2022

Putin’s ‘popular Monarchism’ leads Russia into ruin
Wilson Centre, November 2022

U.S. perception of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Wilson Centre, November 2022

Heroic arts: The Remarkable story of Ukrainian artists confronting Russia
Wilson Centre, November 2022

Ukraine recovery and reconstruction: cities must be part of it
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, October 2022

Takeaway from Berlin Ukraine recovery conference: Donor coordination for Ukraine is coming but not here yet
Brookings Institution, October 2022

Ukrainian recovery funding must be tied to anti-corruption
Brookings Institution, October 2022

Russia may prefer sabotage of critical infrastructure over nuclear weapons
Brookings Institution, October 2022

History reveals how to get Ukraine reconstruction right: anti-corruption
Brookings Institution, October 2022

Ukrainian refugees: Challenges in a welcoming Europe
Brookings Institution, October 2022

How have sanctions impacted Russia?
Bruegel, October 2022

Is European support for Ukraine dependent on the United States?
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Is European support for Ukraine dependent on the United States?
Centre for European Reform, October “022

A struggle to survive: Ukraine’s economy in wartime
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, October 2022

Can Iranian drones turn Russia’s fortunes in the Ukraine war?
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

On the Ukraine war, Germany has a leadership problem. Here’s why
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

The EU and Ukraine: Strategy and morality
Egmont, October 2022

Putin’s last ally: Why the Belarusian army cannot help Russia in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

No loitering: What Russia’s Iranian drones could mean for Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Mob unhappy: Why Russia is unlikely to emerge victorious in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Old order dying: What European decision-makers think of Russia
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Strengthening the impact of EU sanctions against Russian aggression in Ukraine
European Policy Centre, October 2022

EU responses to Ukrainian arrival: Not (yet) a blueprint
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Keeping a cool head: How to improve the EU migration crisis response
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Zelensky hopes for security guarantees
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

Russia’s dirty bomb claim is a dirty lie
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

Implications of the War in Ukraine on Asia
International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2022

Russia’s ‘dirty bomb’ diplomacy
International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2022

Quelle défense pour Taïwan? Réflexions au miroir de la guerre en Ukraine
Institut Thomas More, October 2022

Sanctions against Russia: EU seeks coordination to limit circumvention
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

Ukraine’s dream could be Taiwan’s nightmare
Rand Corporation, October 2022

The West and Russia the day after
Rand Corporation, October 2022

Russia’s comments about a ‘dirty bomb’ betray the state’s weakness
Wilson Centre, October 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine nine months on‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

The European Peace Facility (EPF), operational since July 2021, finances activities with military implications, and supports the armies of partner countries and EU Member States with infrastructure, training and equipment. Reacting to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for the first time in its history the EU has now mobilised funds for the delivery by Member States of military equipment, including lethal weaponry, to assist a partner country.

EPF military assistance for Ukraine to date

The EPF entered into force in March 2021. Its financial ceiling is €5.692 billion (2021 prices) for 2021 to 2027, with an annual ceiling due to increase from €420 million in 2021 to €1.132 billion in 2027. Member States make yearly contributions to the EPF, an off-budget tool, in proportion to their gross national incomes.

Reacting quickly and unanimously to Russia’s war on Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, the Council has now adopted 12 decisions, providing for six tranches, each consisting of two assistance measures (mainly lethal equipment but also non-lethal support) for the Ukrainian armed forces (UAF). Each tranche has been worth €500 million. The Council’s two most recent decisions were adopted on17 October 2022 – 2022/1971 and 2022/1972 – and also allowed the financing to be used for the maintenance and repair of military equipment already delivered.

The six tranches of EPF-funded military equipment for Ukraine delivered by Member States are worth €3 billion, split between lethal equipment and platforms (€2.82 billion) and non-lethal support (€0.18 billion). In just 8 months, more than half the EPF’s 7-year budget has been mobilised. Through the EEAS-hosted clearing house and the EPF committee, Member States can ask to be reimbursed, in part at least, for the equipment they have delivered, for lethal support, such as tanks, air defence systems, anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles and ammunition, and non-lethal support, such as bullet-proof vests, helmets, first aid kits and fuel. Three Member States that used their constructive abstention with regard to the provision of lethal support on 17 October 2022, have made additional contributions, totalling €0.1 billion, for non-lethal support, raising the total EPF contribution to military assistance for Ukraine to €3.1 billion.

EU military assistance mission in support of Ukraine
In response to the Ukrainian authorities’ request for an EU military training mission, at its meeting on 17 October 2022, the Council set up an EU military assistance mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). This was intended to enhance the military capability of the UAF to conduct military operations effectively, to enable Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, effectively exercise its sovereignty, and protect civilians. The EUMAM will train 15 000 UAF personnel, in at least two training centres in Member States (one in Poland, the other in Germany), with the mission’s operational headquarters within the EEAS-hosted Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) in Brussels. The mission will be open to the participation of third states, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. The initial duration of this non-executive mission is 2 years. The EPF will finance the mission’s common costs up to €106.7 million. Use of the EPF elsewhere in the world

The EPF was not designed to respond to a war on the European continent. Its original purpose was to allow the financing of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) activities with military or defence implications, and to express the EU’s ambition as a global security provider, for both its citizens and its partners. During its first 18 months of existence, the EPF has been used to fund the military component of CSDP (common security and defence policy) activities, mainly in Ukraine, but also, in other countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, in the Western Balkans and in sub-Saharan Africa, and to assist the armies of partner countries, but without lethal elements.

Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans

On 2 December 2021, the Council, established three EPF assistance measures for non-lethal equipment for the armies of Georgia (€12.75 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2134), Moldova (€7 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2136), and Ukraine (€31 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2135). On 30 June 2022 it adopted a further assistance measure for Moldova (€40 million of non-lethal equipment, Decision (CFSP) 2022/1093) and on 4 November 2021 an assistance measure (€10 million) for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (Decision (EU) 2021/1923), to provide the country’s demining battalion with medical and transport vehicles, and metal detectors). On 9 June 2022 the Council adopted an assistance measure (€6 million) for the Balkan Medical Task Force (BMTF), to equip the medical units of the armies of five Western Balkan non-EU countries (Albania, BiH, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia), and of Slovenia (Decision (CFSP) 2022/906).

Sub-Saharan Africa

In the 2021-2022 period, the Council adopted a number of assistance measures and one concept note in relation to this region, incidentally the scene for the first ever mobilisation of EPF funds (for African Union (AU)-led PSOs):

• on 22 July 2021, the Council approved an assistance measure (€130 million, Decision (EU) 2021/1210) in the form of a general support programme for peace support operations (PSOs) of the African Union for 2021;
• on 21 April 2022, the Council agreed a new assistance measure to mobilise additional funding (€600 million, Decision (CFSP) 2022/667) for those PSOs, covering the years 2022 to 2024. Under this decision, the Council approved additional support to enhance the operational effectiveness of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin against Boko Haram, in partnership with the AU (€10 million). The EPF funding of €600 million also includes additional support (€120 million) for the military component of the AU mission in Somalia/AU Transition Mission in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS), approved by the Council on 6 July 2022, and support (€15 million) for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission to Mozambique (SAMIM), approved on 8 September 2022. EPF support for AU-led PSOs now totals €730 million. This support was previously funded under the African Peace Facility;
• on 30 July 2021, the Council released a concept note for an urgent measure (€4 million) to equip the EU Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM MOZ);
• on 19 November 2021, the Council approved an assistance measure (€40 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2032) for rapid reaction forces trained by EUTM MOZ;  
• on 21 April 2022, the Council mobilised €45 million (Decision(CFSP) 2022/668) to further equip these forces;
• on 18 July 2022, the Council agreed an assistance measure (€25 million, Decision (CFSP) 2022/1236) for the army of Niger;
• on 2 December 2021, Council approved an assistance measure in support of the Malian army, in conjunction with the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) (€24 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2137);
• in April 2022, the Council suspended the operational part of the training of the Malian army under the EUTM Mali, given the likely increasing interferences and abuses of Wagner mercenaries. The Council confirmed this suspension on 17 October 2022.

In addition to these direct military assistance measures for partner countries, the EPF also funds the common costs of active CSDP military operations and missions in sub-Saharan Africa (such as EUTM MOZ). These cover 5 to 10 % of an operation’s total costs. They used to be funded under the Athena mechanism.

European Parliament position
On 8 June 2022, in its recommendation on EU foreign, security and defence policy, Parliament called for the right to be involved in the implementation and scrutiny of the EPF; for Ukraine to be supplied with weapons without delay, in line with its needs, notably by using the EPF; and for increased assistance for Georgia and Moldova through the EPF.
In its resolution of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine, Parliament called on the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission to coordinate weapons deliveries through the clearing house, including an EU initiative for the delivery of advanced weapons systems, such as Leopard tanks, and called on Member States to start training Ukrainian soldiers immediately in this regard. It also called on Member States and other countries supporting Ukraine to consider a lend-lease military assistance facility for Ukraine.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘European Peace Facility: Ukraine and beyond‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.