European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp with Julie Claustre.

Even though the EU and Iran have worked together over the past 4 years to save the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), relations between the two sides have reached a new low. The EU is concerned about the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear programme in violation of the JCPOA and the country’s reluctance to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, the Iranian authorities’ violent crackdown on and execution of peaceful protesters has outraged Europeans – and their allies – and drawn new attention to human rights violations in the country.

Iran’s military support for Russia in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine has put the spotlight on Iran’s conventional weapons capabilities. Moreover, Iran continues to stoke tensions in the Middle East, providing military, financial and political support to non-state actors in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, as well as the Gaza Strip.

In response to these concerns, the EU has imposed restrictive measures on an increasing number of high-ranking Iranian individuals and entities under four EU sanctions regimes. Sanctions include an asset freeze and a prohibition on making funds and economic resources available to the listed individuals and entities; individuals are also banned from travelling to the EU.

Nevertheless, in December 2022, EU Member States reaffirmed their commitment to, and continued support for, the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA.

The European Parliament has adopted several resolutions critical of human rights violations in Iran, most recently in January 2023, and has called for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to be added to the EU terrorist list, while also expressing its continued support for the JCPOA. After Iran began to sanction certain of its Members in October 2022, Parliament decided in November 2022 that delegations and committees would no longer engage with the Iranian authorities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU relations with Iran‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

Members gather on 1 and 2 February for a plenary session in Brussels. Although  short, some major and pressing points are on the agenda nonetheless. On Wednesday, Members are due to hear Council and European Commission statements on the preparation of the special European Council meeting on 9 and 10 February, where the need to develop sustainable solutions on asylum and migration  is expected to be one of the main topics discussed. Members are also due to hear statements on the need for urgent update of the EU list of high-risk third countries for anti-money-laundering and terrorist financing purposes. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, is expected to make a statement on the situation on Afghanistan , where life for Afghans – and women in particular – has worsened since the Taliban takeover in 2021.

The main debate on Thursday morning is set for Members to hear Council and Commission statements on preparations  for the EU-Ukraine Summit, to be held in Kyiv on 3 February. Members are likely to restate their continued support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Parliament condemns Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and demands that Russia immediately terminates all military activity in Ukraine. In the meantime, following lengthy discussions, EU Member States, Norway, the UK and the US have decided to send Western-made main battle tanks (MBT) to Ukraine. However, the mix of different types of tank promised is not without issues.

With the next European elections on the horizon, measures to bring up to date the rules on political campaigning are increasingly urgent. Advances in digital technologies and social media, which allow political actors to reach large audiences with personalised messages during electoral campaigns, meant that risks such as the spread of false information, polarisation of the political debate, and voter manipulation, have greatly increased in political advertising. Members are due to vote on a Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) report on the proposal to adopt a regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, on Wednesday. While the report excludes political views expressed as editorials and sets criteria for political advertisements, it adds measures to prevent risks of foreign interference, with labelling and transparency obligations enhanced. The report proposes tighter rules on online targeting and delivery of political advertising, prohibiting the use of sensitive data. Subject to any amendments voted in plenary, the vote on the IMCO report should form the position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.

Members are expected to vote on two files initially scheduled for the January II plenary session and postponed to February. The first, scheduled for vote on Thursday morning, concerns European works councils (EWCs), which represent EU employees of large multinational companies, ensuring that their rights are protected when multinational companies take decisions affecting workers far from their workplace. The European Commission does not plan to revise the current EWC Directive, despite an evident lack of effective consultation. Members are therefore due to vote on a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), calling on the Commission to take action to ensure European works councils provide meaningful consultation, and an end to exemptions, tougher penalties and access to justice.

The second file concerns a report by the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) on the proposal for a directive to improve working conditions in platform wor . The report proposes to ensure correct employment status and promote transparency, fairness and accountability in platforms’ algorithmic management. The committee further recommends that the relevant labour, social protection and tax authorities should exchange information when people carry out platform work in a different EU country to that of the digital labour platform. The committee’s mandate to enter into trilogue negotiations with the Council was challenged during the January session, and the plenary will now vote on whether to confirm the mandate.

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Southern bluefin tuna is in high demand, overfished and classified as ‘endangered’ on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of threatened species, meaning they face a high risk of extinction in the wild. To counteract this downward trend, Members are due to vote on Thursday on a provisional agreement with the Council to transpose conservation and fisheries management measures adopted by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), of which the EU is a member. The proposal prohibits targeting southern bluefin tuna by EU vessels, with only by-catches allowed, and also brings the legislation into line with EU data protection rules.

Further reading

• European Parliament Plenary Session – February I, 2023, agenda
• Anti-money-laundering authority (AMLA): Countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism
• Regulating political advertising
• Revision of European Works Council Directive
• Improving the working conditions of platform workers
• Conservation of southern bluefin tuna: Transposing fisheries management measures

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Following Ukraine’s repeated requests, and almost a year of hesitation and delicate negotiations, in January 2023, EU Member States, Norway, the UK and the US finally decided to send Western-made main battle tanks (MBTs) to Ukraine. This issue of whether to supply such tanks has been particularly contentious since the start of the war.

Background: Weapons deliveries to Ukraine

For the first time in European Union history, on 28 February 2022, EU Member Statesagreed to jointly finance the provision of lethal weapons to a country at war, namely Ukraine. Funding for the move comes from the European Peace Facility (EPF) – an off-budget financing instrument initially worth €5 billion in 2018 prices (there is political agreement to increase the financial ceiling to €10.5 billion) and operational since July 2021. At the time of writing, support for Ukraine under the EPF amounts to €3.6 billion to date. The EU also, on 15 November 2022, launched an EU military assistance mission to train the Ukrainian army. The equipment so far delivered to Ukraine ranges from Soviet-era tanks to protective equipment. To coordinate supply and demand, the EU Military Staff has set up a clearing-house. Despite these efforts, EU countries were criticised for not providing weapons Ukraine needs, particularly modern Western-made battle tanks, which Ukraine had requested. This issue of whether to supply such tanks has been particularly contentious.

Definition of ‘battle tanks’
Defining ‘battle tank’ is rather difficult, and definitions have changed considerably with the evolution of military doctrine over the more than 100 years of tank history. The MBT is generally believed to be a universal tank that provides a combination of mobility, firepower and protection. The Bundestag Research Service highlights the difficulties of finding a definition in a recent study. Rather than defining the term, it highlights characteristics, such as having the best armour and strongest firepower in direct combat on the battlefield. It explains that two common categories are used to differentiate between MBTs and other armoured vehicles: the armoured personnel carrier (APC) and the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). The study explains that ‘when speaking generally of a “tank”, these armoured vehicles are … explicitly not meant. What is generally meant … is only the “main battle tank”‘ [author’s translation]. The study concludes that a final, definitive and binding definition of a ‘(battle-) tank’ is ‘practically impossible’.
In terms of legal definitions, the 1992 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty ceased to apply in 2007, when Russia withdrew unilaterally), provides some answers. It states:
– Battle tank: ‘means a self-propelled armoured fighting vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun necessary to engage armoured and other targets, with high cross-country mobility, with a high level of self-protection, and which is not designed and equipped primarily to transport combat troops … [it weighs] at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen weight and which are armed with a 360‑degree traverse gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre.’
– Armoured personnel carrier: ‘means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped to transport a combat infantry squad and which, as a rule, is armed with an integral or organic weapon of less than 20 millimetres calibre.’
– Armoured infantry fighting vehicle: ‘means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, which normally provides the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside the vehicle under armoured protection, and which is armed with an integral or organic cannon of at least 20 millimetres calibre.’ Western-made tanks for Ukraine

Ukraine appealed directly for Western-made main battle tanks (MBTs) from at least April 2022 (Some EU countries have already delivered over 250 Soviet-era T‑72 tanks of various versions, but not Western-made MBTs). Some in the West fear that sending such tanks could escalate the war, drag NATO directly into the conflict or, in the worst case, even result in nuclear war. Though these fears are not baseless, experts dispute that deliveries of Western MBTs would escalate the war. They note that Poland, for instance, has already delivered 260 Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine, without leading to escalation or drawing Poland into the conflict. They also argue that no Russian army decision to increase the intensity of its offensive has been linked to delivery of new Western weaponry to date. Others cite risks of misuse, potential loss or diversion of Western equipment, giving the example of weapons falling into the hands of the Taliban.

In a major step, the United Kingdom confirmed in January 2023, that it intends to deliver 14 British-made Challenger 2 MBTs to Ukraine, being the first country to supply Ukraine with Western-made MBTs. Later in January 2023, the United States (US), Norway and EU Member States, including Germany, also decided to send MBTs and approve such deliveries by others – Germany must issue re-export licences for other countries to send their Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. Germany had previously shown reluctance, citing concerns that the move would escalate the war, that it would not consider unilateral action, and linking MBT deliveries to a US decision. In early January 2023, France, the US and Germany had already decided to deliver infantry fighting vehicles/armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine. These have been portrayed – though definitions are difficult (see box) – by some as ‘light’ battle tanks. However, calling them tanks ‘is technically a stretch’.

The head of the Ukrainian armed forces has said that 300 Western MBTs would be needed for a successful counter-offensive to push the Russians back to the 23 February 2022 line (all of Ukrainian territory except Crimea). Experts note that at least 100 tanks would be needed to have ‘any significant effect on the fighting’. At the time of writing, over 100 tanks have indeed been promised, with the first due to arrive in three or four months. Training for Ukrainian crews will also be provided, to become operational by early spring.

Western-made MBTs are likely to provide the Ukrainian army with an advantage over Russian systems, as experts note that Western MBTs are ‘technically superior’ (see Annex I). Most importantly however, there is enough ammunition for Western MBTs, while supplies for T‑72s are critically low. Experts warn however that it is necessary to remain ‘realistic about their likely impact on the battlefield’, arguing that they will not work miracles ‘even if deployed on a large scale and for prolonged periods of time’. Furthermore, Ukraine will have to overcome significant training and logistical challenges to operate them. A further issue is that Western-made MBTs are generally much heavier than T‑72s and there is little Ukrainian infrastructure, including bridges, which could support such tanks. Moreover, operating and maintaining four different MBTs (Challenger 2, M1 Abrams, Leopard 2, T‑72) will be ‘highly impractical’, require ‘enormous logistical support effort’ and would ‘consume vast … resources’. Experts therefore believe that the Leopard 2 should be the MBT of choice. The Ukrainian armed forces would need less training (as little as six weeks), they consume less fuel, and better European logistics and repair capacities exist. Indeed, according to some, the US M1 Abrams would be less suitable, as more challenging to maintain – unlike most Western tanks and the T-72, which have diesel engines, they have a gas turbine – and it consumes much more fuel. Training on Abrams takes up to 22 weeks, though in the current emergency could be cut down to 7 to 11 weeks, according to an expert. More, importantly Leopards are readily available in Europe. The Leopard 2 is operated by 13 European armies, which have over 2 000 such tanks in total. In September 2022, experts from the European Council on Foreign Relations therefore proposed the ‘creation of a consortium of European Leopard 2 users’ with the purpose of training and equipping a Ukrainian armoured brigade of approximately 90 tanks, with the EPF reimbursing countries that delivered tanks, so the latest version can be purchased for their own stocks. Poland has already announced its intent to ask for EU compensation for supplying its Leopard 2s.

European Parliament position

Parliament’s January 2023 resolution on the 2022 annual report on the implementation of the CSDP calls on the EU to step up and accelerate its efforts to provide Ukraine with necessary military aid and equipment, ‘including lethal equipment and especially heavy weaponry, including Leopard tanks and modern air defence systems, needed to win this war’. Members call on Member States to speed up their military assistance to Ukraine and specifically call on German Chancellor Olaf Scholz ‘to initiate a European consortium of relevant European countries in order to deliver Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine without further delay’. The European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine also ‘calls for consideration to be given to the possibility of a lend-lease military assistance facility for Ukraine’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Western-made tanks for Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak (1st edition).

Directive 2009/138/EC – also known as Solvency II – sets out the prudential regulatory framework for the insurance sector in the EU. The framework aims to establish the single market for insurance services further, while strengthening policyholders’ protection.

On 22 September 2021, the European Commission tabled a proposal for a directive that would amend Solvency II in essentially three ways: i) lowering regulatory obligations on small and low-risk profile insurance companies, ii) taking into account long-term and climate change risks, and iii) enhancing group-level and cross-border supervision.

In the European Parliament, the referral to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) was announced in plenary on 22 November 2021. Rapporteur Markus Ferber (EPP, Germany) tabled his draft report on 6 June 2022. The vote in committee has not yet been scheduled. The Council agreed its position in June 2022.

Versions

• January 2023: Proposal amending the Solvency II Directive (1st edition)

Directive amending Directive 2009/138/EC as regards proportionality, quality of supervision, reporting, long-term guarantee measures, macro-prudential tools, sustainability risks, group and cross-border supervision Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 581
22.9.2021
Rapporteur:Markus Ferber (EPP, Germany)2021/0295(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Eero Heinäluoma (S&D, Finland) Stéphanie Yon-Courtin (Renew, France) Henrike Hahn (Greens, Germany) Marco Zanni (ID, Italy) Johan van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium) Chris MacManus (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote

Written by Liselotte Jensen (1st edition).

On 30 November 2022, as part of the European Green Deal, the Commission presented the legislative proposal for a Union certification framework for carbon removals. The initiative was first announced in the March 2020 new circular economy action plan and again highlighted in the climate target plan, as well as in the proposed ‘fit for 55’ revision of the regulation on land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), as an essential tool to drive progress towards the 2050 climate neutrality target. The stated aim of the initiative is to ensure high-quality EU certified carbon removals, through a transparent and credible governance framework. In doing so, this would open up the possibility for further investments towards carbon removal activities and increased deployment.

In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).

Versions

• January 2023: A Union certification framework for carbon removals (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union certification framework for carbon removals Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 672
31.11.2022
Rapporteur:Lídia Pereira (EPP, Portugal)2020/ 394 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

The crypto-asset sector, while still relatively new, has already changed the world of payments and investment forever. The fast-changing, mobile nature of the sector and its growing market prominence poses challenges, however, for tax authorities, which are not always able to track the capital gains made from trading crypto-assets.

On 8 December 2022, the European Commission proposed to set up a reporting framework which would require crypto-asset service providers to report transactions made by EU clients. This would help tax authorities to track the trade of crypto-assets and the proceeds gained, thereby reducing the risk of tax fraud and evasion. The reporting framework would be set-up by amending the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC), which is the main framework for other data exchanges between tax authorities. The proposal also puts forward a series of (smaller) changes to improve the existing exchange of tax-related information.

The proposed directive is subject to a special legislative procedure, requiring unanimous support in the Council, following consultation of the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee.

Versions

• January 2023: Tax transparency rules for crypto-asset transactions (DAC8) (1st edition)

Proposal for amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2022) 707
8.12.2022
Rapporteur:Not yet appointed2022/0413(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Consultation procedure
(CNS) – Parliament adopts
a non-binding opinion Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.

‘Food security’ is widely understood to mean ‘when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’. This definition was agreed at the World Food Summit, held in Rome in 1996.

A quarter of a century later, accessing available, nutritious and affordable food remains a challenge for nearly a third of the world’s population, with between 702 and 828 million people facing hunger in 2021. Despite the goal of ending world hunger within the decade, set in the UN 2030 Agenda, up to 670 million people could struggle with malnutrition in 2030.

In Europe, the common agricultural policy (CAP) guarantees food availability. For 60 years now, the CAP has supported our farmers and transformed the EU into an agricultural powerhouse. Food affordability, however, has become a growing source of concern for European citizens, owing to rising prices resulting from extreme weather episodes, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s war on Ukraine.  

The successive crises affecting Europe over the past two years have had a cumulative effect on food prices, driving them up. The post-pandemic economic recovery of 2021 led to a sudden surge in global demand, which the supply side was unable to meet. Skyrocketing energy prices was one result, in the second half of 2021. Already affected by higher electricity costs and continuing logistical bottlenecks, the European agricultural industry then faced two additional shocks in 2022, which exacerbated food inflation. The unprovoked war on Ukraine, one of the world’s most important agricultural producers, and Russia’s weaponisation of its own grain, energy, and fertiliser exports, caused severe disruption to global supply chains, and compromised the food security of millions of people in the developing world. At a time when European agricultural producers were being hit by higher feed, electricity and fertiliser costs, the unusually hot and dry summer experienced in parts of Europe during 2022 led to a significant reduction in crop and pasture production, adding further pressure to inflationary tendencies. As a result, food inflation reached 13.8 % in the euro area in December 2022, up from 3.2 % in December 2021, and surpassed energy as the main contributor to inflation.

Faced with this challenge, the EU has reacted decisively against the threats to global food security, and the drivers of food inflation. In March 2022, EU leaders committed to ‘improve our food security by reducing our dependencies on key imported agricultural products and inputs, in particular by increasing the EU production of plant-based proteins’. Following this decision, the European Commission enacted exceptional measures to support the agricultural sector amid the crisis, and encouraged Member States to make use of European and national mechanisms to cushion the effects of food inflation on citizens, such as VAT reductions for staple products.

The European Parliament has consistently called for the strengthening of the bloc’s agricultural resilience and mitigating the impact of inflation on European households. During the January I 2023 plenary session in Strasbourg, Members of the European Parliament questioned the European Commissioner for Agriculture, Janusz Wojciechowski, on the measures taken to combat food inflation. On 31 January, the European Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) will debate a draft report on ‘Ensuring food security and long-term resilience of the EU agriculture’. Members of the AGRI committee will debate a wide range of possible measures, from an EU protein strategy to overcome the vegetal protein deficit, to fostering innovative technologies in agriculture, such as new cultivation methods and AI-driven crop management.

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Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Gaby Umbach (GlobalStat, EUI).

Our infographic provides an insight into the economic performance of Australia and New Zealand compared to the EU, and looks at the trade dynamics between the two blocs. Australia and New Zealand are among the most developed countries in the world. Although the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted economic growth in 2020, GDP per capita quickly recovered and reached all-time highs the following year. While low unemployment rates and stable currencies contribute to economic strength, rising public debt and increasing inflation affected the recovery process in 2021. Trade relations between the two blocs have been expanding over the past 15 years, mainly driven by exports of goods and services from the EU to Australia and New Zealand, while imports have been stagnating. Being third on the list of main trade partners, the EU accounts for 9 % of Australia and New Zealand’s trade with the world, while the latter represents 1.2 % of the EU’s total trade in goods.

Read this infographic at aglance on ‘Australia and New Zealand: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU imports of services from AU and NZ (2021) EU exports of services to AU and NZ (2021) EU imports of goods from AU and NZ (2021 EU exports of goods to AU and NZ (2021) AU and NZ main trade partners (2021) EU main trade partners (2021) Top EU partners (2021) EU trade with Australia and New Zealand (2021) Business environment and socio-economic indicators FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data Total unemployment rate (% of total labour force) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita Female labour force participation rate Annual GDP growth (%)

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Union’s international trade has suffered from the COVID-19 pandemic, broken supply chains, the growth of protectionism in many regions and, most recently, from Russia’s war on Ukraine. The United States’ trade policy towards China, which is aimed at curbing the authoritarian country’s growing power, has exacerbated the fragmentation of trade.

The United States has adopted the Inflation Reduction Act, a massive green subsidy programme which analysts and politicians say may lower the competitiveness of some European clean-tech products. The EU is debating how to respond to the Act, including with the envisaged proposal of a Net-Zero Industry Act, setting a number of clean-tech objectives for 2030. The work of the new EU‑US Trade and Technology Council has so far made limited progress in resolving the trade spat.

This note offers links to a series of recent commentaries and reports from major international think tanks and research institutes on international trade policy.

China and the new globalization
Atlantic Council, January 2023

Russian foreign trade tracker
Bruegel, January 2023

Strategic tech cooperation between the EU and India
Clingendael, January 2023

The world trade crisis
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, January 2023

Trade liberalization at a crossroads: The US and China play key roles
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2023

Can the US and Africa usher in a new era for globalization?
Atlantic Council, December 2022

The Trade and Technology Council: The new window for European Union–United States collaboration
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, December 2022

The European Commission’s proposed anti-coercion instrument from an international law perspective
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, December 2022

Asia Pacific: The test case for a geopolitical EU trade strategy
Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2022

The impact of the Ukraine crisis on international trade
Bruegel, December 2022

Transatlantic woes: Neither side can have it all
Carnegie Europe, December 2022

Strengthening US–EU cooperation on trade and technology
Chatham House, December 2022

The future for global trade in a changing climate
Chatham House, December 2022

The contentious U.S.-China trade relationship
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022

Trade: What’s left of globalisation?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, December 2022

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the EU
E3G, December 2022

Competitive and innovative: The winning Europe that we need
European Centre for International Economic Policy, December 2022

2023 will be a defining year for Brexit and trade
European Centre for International Economic Policy, December 2022

How important are Mutual Recognition Agreements for trade facilitation?
European Centre for International Economic Policy, December 2022

A united front: How the US and the EU can move beyond trade tensions to counter China
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022

Setting the tone: The value of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022

How the EU and the US should overcome their trade and supply chain disputes
European Policy Centre, December 2022

China’s Xi knows that international consensus helps with business
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2022

How to save the WTO with more flexible trading rules
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022

Have trade agreements been bad for America?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022

The World Bank, the IMF, and the GATT/WTO: Which institution most supported trade reform in developing economies?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022

What do the stalled free trade talks between EU and Switzerland mean for their economies (and the United Kingdom)?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2022

Deglobalisation and protectionism
Bruegel, November 2022

Is globalisation really doomed?
Bruegel, November 2022

China and the challenge to global order
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Rewiring US trade policy to address new global realities
Brookings Institution, November 2022

In a green subsidy race, the EU should not imitate the US
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2022

The US-EU trade and technology council: assessments and recommendations
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2022

Will Biden’s trade policy shift after the midterms?
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

The globalization myth
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Managing risks in the EU-China economic relationship
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

Has globalisation really peaked for Europe?
European Centre for International Economic Policy, November 2022

The new globalization: SMEs and international trade – the supply chain is as important as direct exports
European Centre for International Economic Policy, November 2022

Refining the EU’s geoeconomic approach to trade policy
Egmont, November 2022

Walking out of the woods: EU industrial policy between the energy crisis and decarbonisation
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2022

How the G20 can advance WTO reform
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022

The EU should expand trade with the Indo-Pacific region
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022

The advance of China’s private sector pauses, but the trend is unclear
Bruegel, October 2022

Europe’s promised semiconductor subsidies need to be better targeted
Bruegel, October 2022

China and the West: growing apart as geopolitical tensions grow
Bruegel, October 2022

The role of international trade in realizing an inclusive circular economy
Chatham House, October 2022

Sea change in EU trade policy: Opportunities for diversification in the Indo-Pacific
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2022

Greening global trade Clingendael, September 2022

Read this briefing on ‘International trade‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nikolina Šajn (1st edition).

On 18 October 2022, the European Parliament’s rapporteur put forward a draft report on the Commission’s proposal for a regulation on geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products, while the discussions continue in the Council on the working party level.

The proposal, which the Commission adopted on 31 March 2022, would bring under a single legal document the provisions on the procedures for registering geographical indications (GIs) for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products that are currently spread over three regulations. It would increase the powers and responsibilities of producer groups, lay down rules on sustainability undertakings, clarify rules on the use of GI products as ingredients, and improve the protection of GI products online. The Commission would be empowered to transfer its tasks regarding the management of geographical indications, including the scrutiny, opposition, cancellation and amendments procedures, to the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

Versions

• January 2023: Geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Union geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products, and quality schemes for agricultural products, amending Regulations (EU) No 1308/2013, (EU) 2017/1001 and (EU) 2019/787 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 Committee responsible:Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI)COM(2022) 134
31.3.2022
Rapporteur:Paolo De Castro (S&D, Italy)2022/0089 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Álvaro Amaro (EPP, Portugal)
Irène Tolleret (Renew, France)
Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France)
Elena Lizzi (ID, Italy)
Mazaly Aguilar (ECR, Spain)
Eugenia Rodríguez Palop (GUE/NGL, Spain)Consultation procedure
(CNS) – Parliament adopts
a non-binding opinion Next steps expected: Committee vote

In 2022, people from across the European Union (EU) and elsewhere in the world turned to the European Parliament and its President, Roberta Metsola to request information, call for action to be taken, express their opinions, or suggest ideas on a wide range of topics.The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) replied in the 24 EU official languages.

In 2022, Ask EP received 10 839 individual messages and 35 151 campaign enquiries. Citizens wrote on various topics, notably the Russian invasion of Ukraine, EU democracy, energy, environmental protection, fundamental rights, social policy and many others. Ask EP also received questions related to the European Parliament and its Members, its traineeship offers and how to visit Parliament.

Most frequent topics in individual enquiries in 2022

The most frequently addressed topic in 2022 was matters concerning the European Parliament itself. The Parliament received more than 1 450 enquiries, in which citizens expressed interest in the Members of European Parliament and their activities, enquired about traineeship and job opportunities and the possibilities to visit Parliament. They also requested information on topics such as parliamentary questions, committee meetings and the right to petition.

The second most frequent topic on which citizens contacted Ask EP last year related to foreign affairs, with over 1 000 enquiries. In particular, people voiced their concerns following the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine; many of them were worried about the war in Ukraine and its consequences. Citizens also sent messages regarding other countries, such as China, Afghanistan and the protests in Iran.

Moreover, Parliament replied to approximately 430 enquiries in the area of freedom, security and justice. Citizens made comments and asked questions on various topics, such as the rule of law and democracy, legislation, migration and freedom of movement.

Finally, the European Parliament received many enquiries about citizens’ personal situations with requests for assistance to help them solve problems (financial support, legal aid, cross-border administrative issues, cases of discrimination, etc.). Although neither the European Parliament nor its President are able to resolve many of these types of requests directly, the Ask EP service provided citizens with a contact point and sources of information whenever possible.

Campaign messages sent to the European Parliament in 2022

As a response to political, humanitarian and economic events, citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament, expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. These messages may sometimes be identical, as part of wider public campaigns.

Between June and September 2022, the President received a large number of messages – almost 17 700 – calling on the House of European History to remove a poster of ‘the Madonna and Christ of Czestochowa with rainbow halos’ from a temporary exhibition.

The Board of Trustees of the House of European History responded, highlighting the story around the poster, as explained and contextualised in the exhibition. It also pointed out that the exhibition presented the views of both critics and proponents of the poster. The poster was one of about 150 selected to be part of the ‘When Walls Talk’ exhibition of posters illustrating European society over the last century.

Since February 2022, the President has received around 1 600 messages calling on her to defend pro-life positions, in particular following a suggestion by French President Emmanuel Macron to include the right to abortion in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In the past, the European Parliament has called on EU countries to safeguard individuals’ rights to make their own informed choices, while recognising that the EU has no direct powers to deal with sexual and reproductive health and rights in EU countries. More recently, the European Parliament proposed to include the right to safe and legal abortion in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. President Metsola has indicated that she would defend Parliament’s position on abortion.

Since November 2022, following the death in police custody of 22 year-old Mahsa Amini, both the European Parliament and its President have received messages requesting support for the protests in Iran. Parliament condemned the killing, as well as the widespread and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against protesting citizens. Parliament called on the Iranian authorities to immediately release and drop any charges against demonstrators.

The President also received almost 900 enquiries from citizens calling on the EU to recognise Georgia’s progress towards EU accession.

A separate campaign, which sent more than 500 messages, called on the President to award the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Julian Assange, co-founder of WikiLeaks (the prize was awarded to The Brave People of Ukraine).

Are you curious about our answers to other campaign messages in 2022? You can find all replies to campaigns – totalling over 50 enquiries – as well as posts on topical themes on the EPRS blog. A selection of other answers to questions frequently posed to the European Parliament can also be found on the EPRS blog.  

If you wish, you can put your questions and/or comments to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP), using our contact form, the Citizens’ app, or by post. We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

We look forward to your enquiries in 2023 and beyond!

Your Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass with Sophia Stone.

International Holocaust Remembrance Day marks the liberation, on 27 January 1945, of Auschwitz-Birkenau, the largest Nazi concentration and extermination camp. The Holocaust – the ‘systematic, bureaucratic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of approximately six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its collaborators’ between 1933 and 1945 also targeted other groups. These included the Roma, Sinti, the disabled and homosexuals. To commemorate the Holocaust victims, Israel’s President Isaac Herzog will formally address the European Parliament in a special plenary session in Brussels on 26 January 2023. President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola and President Herzog are then due to inaugurate the Holocaust Memorial in front of Parliament’s plenary chamber.

The Nazis killed the majority of European Jews, seized Jewish property, destroyed synagogues, Hebrew scripts, Jewish art and cultural property,. Not much was left of Jewish cultural heritage across Europe, not many Jews survived the Holocaust. For a decimated and traumatised Jewish population, it was difficult to claim their identity in Europe. The Holocaust strongly affected the evolution of Jewish culture.

Not bound by country borders, Jews lived for centuries across the European continent, using Hebrew for liturgical and religious purposes, often mixed with the local language. Following the Holocaust, the Judeo-Spanish language known as Ladino, which originated in Spain, almost reached extinction. The Holocaust also affected the use of the Yiddish language, which the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) considers, together with Ladino, endangered. However, thanks to the courage of Jewish communities, who continue to bear witness to Jewish life and culture, as well as revived academic interest during the COVID‑19 lockdowns, there is evidence of a revival of both languages. To help keep this linguistic heritage alive, the EU continues to support their use and related cultural heritage.

Beyond preserving Jewish languages and culture, it is important to continue to inform people of what happened during the Holocaust and its aftermath. Holocaust education allows reflection on legal and ethical issues, whilst promoting critical thinking. As Holocaust denial is on the rise and conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism and xenophobia take up increasing space on social media platforms, a clear view of historical events becomes increasingly important. Holocaust survivor and journalist Marian Turski’s call to ‘Never be a bystander … whenever any kind of minority is discriminated against’, serves as a reminder that everyone should speak out against discrimination. The European Union supports Holocaust education and research through numerous programmes, such as providing a handbook for teachers highlighting links between Holocaust education and human rights, or studies on antisemitism showing the growing insecurity of Jews living in the EU.

The European Parliament has adopted several resolutions on Holocaust remembrance, including an October 2018 resolution on the rise of neo-fascist violence in EU, calling attention to the rise of violence against Jews. The EU calls on EU countries to counter Holocaust denialism, and on November 2018, the EU became a permanent international partner of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (AISH).

Further reading

• The European Union and Holocaust remembrance
• Jewish art collections – Nazi looting
• Ladino: Judeo-Spanish language and culture in Europe
• Yiddish language and culture and its post-Holocaust fate in Europe
• Holocaust education: ‘Never, never be a bystander’
• Holocaust denial in criminal law: Legal frameworks in selected EU Member States
• Supporting Holocaust survivors

Topical digest

• International Holocaust Remembrance Day

Event

Remembering the Shoah, the Massacres on the Eastern Front – Panel Debate

House of European History. Thursday 26 January, 18.30-20.30 CET. Hybrid event.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Energy prices have recently fallen in the European Union, easing slightly the crisis caused by Russia’s 11-month-old war on Ukraine. EU emergency measures , diversification of supplies and a benign winter have reduced energy costs, which skyrocketed after Russia curtailed fossil fuel exports with the aim of pressing the EU to reduce support for Ukraine, and due to EU sanctions on Moscow.

In December, EU governments agreed to cap gas prices, hoping to better shield European households and businesses from price spikes, which have fuelled inflation and undermined economic growth. On 17 January, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she would propose a Net-Zero Industry Act, which envisages a number of clean tech objectives for 2030, to compete with the U.S. large green subsidy package. Nevertheless, the challenge to secure Europe’s energy supply in the long term will not be easily overcome.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the energy market. Earlier publication on the topic can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

European natural gas imports (data set)
Bruegel, January 2023

How does the U.S. government use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

European battery regulation: An exemplary step forward in more ways than one
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, January 2023

The G7’s role in developing a platform for global cooperation on industrial decarbonization
Atlantic Council, December 2023

Europe and the Caspian: The gas supply conundrum
Atlantic Council, December 2023

How can we measure the impact of carbon prices on global warming?
Brookings Institution, December 2022

Buying time for proper electricity market reform
Bruegel, December 2022

Energy crisis: Five questions that must be answered in 2023
Bruegel, December 2022

National energy policy responses to the energy crisis
Bruegel, December 2022

Will the European Union price cap on Russian oil work?
Bruegel, December 2022

Exploring cost-effective support mechanisms for hydrogen mobility infrastructure
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022

The revision of the Third Energy Package for gas
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022

Are we about to see a big bonus for Europe’s low-carbon ETS producers?
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022

Recommendations for a future-proof electricity market design
Centre on Regulation in Europe, December 2022

Will an EU oil price cap limit Russian aggression?
Chatham House, December 2022

The EU needs alternatives to Russian energy: Here’s the plan
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022

You can’t switch off the sun: How Germany can gain energy sovereignty with renewables
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022

Walking out of the woods: EU industrial policy between the energy crisis and decarbonisation
Instituto Affari Internazionali, December 2022

The Ukrainian conflict and the energy crisis: Sustaining the energy transition
Instituto Affari Internazionali, December 2022

Energy: Which security?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2022

Trend to watch 2023: Green awakening
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2022

Europe’s energy crisis: High stakes for the MENA region
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2022

Europe’s looming energy disaster
Bruegel, November 2022

Surviving the winter: Ukraine ahead of an energy crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2022

In a green subsidy race, the EU should not imitate the US
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2022

How to save energy in a smarter way
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

Tracking Europe’s energy security: Four lessons from the EU’s new energy deals
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Fair energy transition for all: How to get there?
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2022

The share of renewables in energy consumption is increasing
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, November 2022

How to accelerate renewable energies in France? The challenge of territorial integration and value sharing
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, November 2022

Just energy transition partnerships: Can they really make a difference, and how?
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, November 2022

Are small modular reactors Europe’s energy salvation?
Instituto Affari Internazionali, November 2022

Germany energy policy in turbulent times: Between transition chances and lock-in risks
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

Nuclear energy and global energy security in the new tripolar world order
Atlantic Council, October 2022

How to help people in Europe and Central Asia pay their energy bills
Brookings Institution, October 2022

How European Union energy policies could mitigate the coming recession
Bruegel, October 2022

Europe’s quest for energy security and the renewed case for a strong Mediterranean green energy partnership
Bruegel, October 2022

Electricity markets will need an overhaul, but not now
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2022

Russia: threats and offers of energy cooperation
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

The European wholesale electricity market: From crisis to net zero
Centre on Regulation in Europe, October 2022

Deals of a lifetime: Why the EU should include renewables in its response to the energy crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Running on empty: How trust among EU states can survive the energy crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Transitioning towards energy security beyond EU borders: Why, where and how?
GLOBSEC, November 2022

The European Union’s uneasy journey through the energy crisis
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, October 2022

The United States and the euro zone face different challenges in battling inflation
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2022

How does permitting for clean energy infrastructure work?
Brookings Institution, September 2022

An assessment of Europe’s options for addressing the crisis in energy markets
Bruegel, September 2022

The EU’s energy plan for a difficult winter: What are the options?
Centre for European Reform, September 2022

To what extent has the EU Green Deal changed EU energy policies
College of Europe, September 2022

How the Inflation Reduction Act will help the United States to lead in the clean energy economy
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

Europe’s energy and resource challenge: The Arctic is part of the solution
Egmont, September 2023

State of the Union: How the energy crisis can strengthen EU unity
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

Putin vs Monnet: European resilience, energy and the Ukraine war
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Read this briefing on ‘The EU’s energy markets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlights of the January I 2023 plenary session were debates on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 December 2022 and the presentation of activities planned under the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The session opened with a ceremony marking the 30th anniversary of the single market, followed by a debate with the Council and Commission on the matter.

Debates were held on the surge of respiratory infections and the shortage of medication in Europe; on the need to increase transparency, integrity and accountability in the EU institutions; on terrorist threats posed by far-right extremist networks; on criminalisation of humanitarian assistance, as well as on the Global Gateway. Members also debated foreign affairs issues, including the EU’s response to the appalling attack against civilians in Dnipro; strengthening action against the Putin regime and military support; and the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, spoke on the EU response to the protests and executions in Iran, and on strengthening the EU‑Latin America partnership.

During question time, Members posed questions to Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski on EU action to tackle food price inflation in Europe. Finally, Parliament elected Marc Angel (S&D, Luxembourg) to the post of Vice‑President of the European Parliament.

Thirtieth anniversary of the single market

In relation to EU freedoms, for 30 years, the single market has benefited Europeans through free competition under fair rules and the liberty to live, work, shop and retire anywhere in Europe. Estimates suggest the single market has added between 8 % and 9 % to EU gross domestic product. With 447 million consumers and 23 million companies, however, the single market is a constantly evolving entity, which needs to adapt to challenges such as the pandemic. Members adopted, by a large majority, a resolution, tabled by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), which underlines the single market’s vital role in creating a European polity. The IMCO text seeks renewed Member State commitment to implementing and enforcing existing single market legislation correctly, and looks forward to renewed action to strengthen and modernise the single market.

Strengthening EU rules on waste shipments

Stronger rules on waste shipments would ensure that EU efforts to recycle waste do not lead to environmental degradation outside the EU. Members debated and adopted a report from Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) calling for stronger European Commission proposals to this end, not least on monitoring what actually happens to waste exported outside the EU. The committee would like to see an assessment of waste management in non-EU countries that takes labour standards into consideration, as well as an end to EU exports of plastic waste. The vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations on EU rules on waste shipments with the Council.

Unshell – Rules to prevent misuse of shell entities for tax purposes

While shell companies, or ‘shells’ (entities with no, or minimal, economic activity) may serve commercial or business functions, they are also used to evade taxes. In response to a European Commission proposal for an instrument to ‘unshell’ companies being used to abuse the tax system, Parliament debated and voted overwhelmingly in favour of a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report. Members support the ECON proposals to lower gateway thresholds to prevent EU shell companies from benefiting from tax advantages, impose shorter deadlines to address rebuttals, and review the rules to prevent misuse of shell entities for tax purposes after five years. The proposal now requires unanimity in the Council, where negotiations are ongoing, following consultation of Parliament.

Revision of the European Works Councils Directive

European works councils (EWCs) represent EU employees of large multinational companies, to ensure that their rights are protected. Despite an evident lack of effective consultation, however, the European Commission does not plan to revise the current EWC Directive. Members debated a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), which calls on the Commission to take action to ensure European works councils provide meaningful consultation, end exemptions, and introduce tougher penalties. The vote will take place in plenary on 2 February.

Human rights and democracy in the world

The consequences, particularly for the most vulnerable, of Russia’s war on Ukraine are highlighted in the response to the Commission’s 2021 annual report on human rights and democracy in the world, drafted by Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI). The report calls for a strong approach to war criminals and human rights violators in the context of the war in Ukraine. It also condemns the increasing threats to freedom of expression in many countries, and welcomes EU action to protect the most vulnerable, wherever they live. In this respect, Members debated and adopted the Human rights and democracy in the world, 2021 report, which in particular favours integrating human rights values in trade agreements, and looks forward to greater cooperation between EU institutions on human rights issues.

Annual reports on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) in 2022

In a dynamic geopolitical situation, the EU can demonstrate its capacity to address external vulnerabilities in a robust manner – such as the unprecedented decision to mobilise funding for Member State weapons delivery to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression. Members debated and adopted the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) 2022 annual report on implementation of the CFSP, which highlights the combined effects of Russia’s war against Ukraine and worsening climate and energy crises, with increasingly assertive authoritarian regimes such as China and Iran posing new risks to stability. In its report, AFET proposes that the EU redouble its efforts to strengthen international security through a military and defence union, by supporting qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council on security issues, ensuring greater strategic autonomy, and stronger mitigation of climate change vulnerabilities.

Members also debated and adopted a second AFET report, on EU defence initiatives, its 2022 report on the EU’s CSDP. Noting the dramatic deterioration of the security situation resulting from Russia’s actions, the committee urges that the EU provide all necessary assistance to Ukraine. It welcomes progress made in 2022, such as on the Strategic Compass, and looks forward to proposals for stronger EU defence financing. Not limited to European soil, the report calls for stronger security partnerships in Africa and in the maritime sphere, particularly the Indo-Pacific. It also welcomes the climate change and defence roadmap, and underlines the need for more investment in ‘green’ defence.

Protection of the EU’s financial interests and combating fraud – Annual report 2021

Corruption is a major challenge for the EU – all Member States are affected by the problem to some extent – and this exposure to organised crime, undetected fraud and high-level corruption can seriously harm the EU’s budget. Combating fraud and protecting the EU’s financial interests is therefore crucial. Members debated and adopted a Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) own-initiative report on these efforts, detailed in the European Commission’s 2021 annual report on the protection of the EU’s financial interests (known as the PIF report).

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members challenged the mandate for negotiations from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee on the proposal for a directive on improving working conditions in platform work, and a vote on confirming the mandate is now scheduled in plenary on 2 February 2023.

Read this ‘plenary at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – January I 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lasse Boehm with Chiara Scalamandrè.

The war in Ukraine has put Europe’s dependence on energy imports under the spotlight. The United States (US) has stepped in and pledged to increase its exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe. While this helps address the shortfall in energy imports from Russia in the short term, it raises the question as to how far the EU wants to build an energy partnership with the US.

Closely intertwined with the energy challenge is the fight against climate change. With the European Union (EU) committing to more ambitious policies within the framework of the Green Deal, it has an interest in international partners also raising their level of ambition. Here, too, the US is a key partner. As one of the world’s largest CO2 emitters, the US also plays a key role in bringing the world closer to reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement.

The US Inflation Reduction Act, a huge investment bill pouring billions of dollars into the American economy by favouring US-made clean energy and technology, brings these considerations together. The EU will have to consider how to integrate its climate, energy and industrial policies, so as to contribute towards climate goals and energy security while at the same time retaining the global competitiveness of its economy. This, in turn, has far-reaching repercussions for related policy areas such as international trade, as well as for the ongoing debate over the future of the EU’s budget and its macroeconomic governance framework.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-US climate and energy relations in light of the Inflation Reduction Act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by David de Groot (1st edition).

On 25 November 2021, the European Commission put forward a proposal to modify Council Directive 94/80/EC on the right of mobile EU citizens to vote and stand as candidates in municipal elections. The proposal tied in with the Commission President’s priority for a new push for European democracy. The proposal was presented together with three others: a proposal to modify Directive 93/109/EC on EU citizens’ right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament; a proposal on transparency and targeting of political advertising; and a proposal to revise EU Regulation No 1141/2014 on the funding of European political parties and foundations.

Although Directive 94/80/EC gave EU citizens living in another Member State the right to vote and stand in municipal elections under the same legal provisions and procedures as citizens of that Member State, the procedures under which these rights are exercised are subject to national legislation and procedures, which vary between Member States. The Commission’s proposal has been designed to address some of the concerns raised during the years since the directive entered into force and, in particular, the fact that despite the measures in place, mobile EU citizens still face difficulties in exercising their electoral rights in municipal elections.

Versions

• January 2023: Revision of Council Directive 94/80/EC: Electoral rights of mobile Union citizens in municipal elections (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council Directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast) Committees responsible:Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2021)0733
25.11.2021
Rapporteur:Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (ECR, Poland)2021/0373(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Paulo Rangel (EPP, Portugal)
Domènec Ruiz Devesa (S&D, Spain),
Yana Toom (Renew, Estonia),
Damian Boeselager (Greens/EFA Germany), Konstantinos Arvanitis (The Left, Greece)Consultation procedure
(CNS) – Parliament adopts
a non-binding opinion Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Giulio Sabbati.

The European single market celebrates its 30th anniversary this year. On 1 January 1993, the then 12 Member States abolished border controls between each other, launching free movement of people, goods, services and capital. This infographic celebrates the single market’s anniversary, looking at the history of the European Union (EU) in terms of macro-economic indicators as the number of Member States has grown. It shows exports of goods, services and investments; movement of people within the EU to live, study or work; and the digital single market, covering e-commerce sales of enterprises and online purchases by individuals. The final section looks at the EU in the world.

Although we are celebrating the 30th anniversary of the single market, the idea of a unified Europe began in the 1950s with the founding of the Communities. But to secure the single market, many steps were required. The timeline below highlights the major milestones needed to achieve the single market.

Read the complete infographic on ‘30 years of the European single market‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The global investment gap between high-income and low- and middle-income countries has been widening in recent years, even more so in the aftermath of the double crisis caused by the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This divergence and underfunding are also negatively affecting global connectivity, which requires substantial financial resources for both its expansion and its maintenance. This is important for recovery from the current crisis, as the modern world is based on multifaceted links between communities, economies and countries, and connectivity is known to contribute to economic growth, supply chain efficiency and resilience to shocks.

Since 2015, the EU has been making efforts to narrow this investment gap and support global connectivity, not least to counter the influence of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, experts considered EU assistance and investments to be fragmented, leading to inefficiencies, gaps and overlaps. Taking into account this and the growing importance of connectivity, made clear by the pandemic, the EU launched its Global Gateway strategy on 1 December 2021. Its worldwide scope is not limited to selected regions or countries.

The strategy promises to mobilise up to €300 billion in investment to boost smart, clean and secure digital, energy and transport links and strengthen health, education and research systems across the world. Perhaps the most significant initiative so far has been the launch of the first regional Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package in February 2022. Other deliverables include the signing of international agreements and the inauguration of the first infrastructure projects.

Many think tanks and experts have welcomed the Global Gateway as an attempt to boost efficiency, coherence and strategic drive in the EU’s connectivity and investment policies. Opinions are divided, however, on whether sufficient funding can be mobilised and it remains to be seen if the Team Europe approach, bringing together the EU, financial institutions and Member States, will deliver.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Global Gateway: Taking stock after its first year‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Poorer countries attract less private investment in infrastructure and see a dip in the number of projects funded

Written by Sebastian Clapp (1st edition).

On 19 July 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on establishing the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA). On 1 December 2022, the Council adopted its general approach. EDIRPA is a short-term joint defence procurement instrument worth €500 million. It seeks to address the most urgent and critical defence capability gaps and is aimed at incentivising Member States to procure defence products jointly. It does not prescribe what will be procured, as this is left up to the Member States that will need to fulfil the criteria set by EDIRPA.

The proposal follows the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has reshaped the geopolitical environment in Europe dramatically and intensified discussions across EU capitals on defence investments and capabilities. Given a practical mandate at the Versailles Summit in March 2022, the Commission presented a defence investment gap analysis in May 2022, proposing the EDIRPA as one of a number of means to address defence-related investment, capability and industrial gaps

Versions

• January 2023: European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act Committees responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) and Foreign Affairs (AFET) (jointly – Rule 58)COM(2022) 349
19.7.2022
Rapporteur:Michael Gahler (EPP, Gerrnany) and Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland)2022/0219(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be appointedOrdinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Monika Kiss.

After a series of relaxations of China’s zero-tolerance COVID measures at the end of 2022 (the country was practically closed for inbound travellers with most types of visas for almost three years), the Chinese government announced on 26 December 2022 that it would reopen its border to international travellers from 8 January 2023. This reopening means that China has dropped the requirements for five days quarantine in a hotel and three additional days of self-isolation at home that applied to international arrivals. However, travellers must still present a negative COVID‑19 test result obtained within 48 hours before departure. This measure applies to inbound travellers coming for business, employment, study and family visits. At the same time, the government declared its intention to increase international flights and to bring the schedule back to pre-coronavirus levels.

Following these announcements, bookings for international tickets for a date after 8 January 2023 increased by more than 85 % for both outbound and inbound travellers, according to International Air Transport Association (IATA) data.

Source: International Air Transport Association, 2023, ‘China to reopen border to international travelers’, All Rights Reserved. Available at IATA Economics page.

As early as mid-December 2022, just one week after the first mitigating measures, China has seen a significant outbreak of COVID‑19. The Chinese government has been criticised, among others, by the World Health Organization (WHO), for under-representing the real number of COVID‑19 cases and deaths. The Chinese National Health Commission takes a ‘narrow’ definition of COVID‑19 death, taking only deaths caused by pneumonia and respiratory failure after contracting the virus into account. The WHO intends to continue monitoring the situation and urged all countries to maintain vigilance.

In this context, some countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, India and Malaysia, have introduced measures for travellers arriving from China. Some EU Member States also started applying measures as well from the end of December 2022. Italy imposed mandatory tests for passengers from China upon arrival, after 97 positive results were registered from a sample of 212, and has called on the EU to follow suit. Spain decided to test, to carry out temperature checks, and to impose COVID certificates. France has required pre-travel negative tests from passengers from China, masks on planes and PCR tests on arrival for all passengers. Belgium has announced it will not require test results from travellers, but is testing the wastewater from planes and scanning the samples for new variants. Differing reasons were advanced for these diverging and uncoordinated responses: past experiences of COVID‑19, fear of new variants, concerns about the reliability of Chinese data, or economic reasons (for instance, Austria decided not to ask for tests, as China is the most important Asian source market for the coming tourism season). Following the European Union’s Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) meeting on 4 January 2022, called by the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, EU countries agreed on a coordinated precautionary approach, including the following elements for Member States:

• recommendation to wear a mask or FFP2/N95/KN95 respirators on all passengers on flights to and from China,
• advice to incoming and outgoing international travellers, as well as to aircraft and airport personnel, regarding personal hygiene and health measures,
• recommended introduction for all passengers departing from China to Member States, of the requirement for a negative COVID‑19 test taken not more than 48 hours prior to departure from China,
• recommendation to complement these measures with:
  • random testing of passengers arriving from China on arrival in the Member States, as appropriate, and the sequencing of all positive results to strengthen surveillance of the epidemiological situation,
  • testing and sequencing of wastewater from airports with international flights and aircraft arriving from China,
  • continuing to promote vaccine sharing and the uptake of vaccines, including booster doses, particularly among vulnerable groups.

The EU Member States agreed to assess the situation and review the introduced measures by mid-January 2023.

This coordinated approach led to reinforced measures in several EU countries, Belgium, for instance requires a negative PCR test, valid for 48 hours, before boarding the plane as of 8 January 2023, as does Austria from 7 January 2023. Besides the Member States already mentioned, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden have so far stepped up rules on travellers from China in response to the rising cases.

Some stakeholders in the transport sector have been critical of the EU approach. In a joint statement, Airlines for Europe (A4E), International Air Transport Association (IATA) and ACI (Airports Council International) stated that the EU recommendation was not in line with the assessment published by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) on 3 January 2023. The ECDC has declared that the current surge of COVID‑19 cases in China is not expected to affect the epidemiological situation in the EU/European Economic Area (EEA), because the COVID‑19 variants circulating in China are already present in the EU/EEA, and the population has already acquired higher immunity. Systematic testing of travellers from China is not therefore considered a scientifically driven and risk-based measure.

The measures taken by EU Member States were also subject to criticism in China, stating that these are ‘attempts to manipulate the COVID measures for political purposes’. China also threatened to ‘take countermeasures based on the principle of reciprocity’.

China also declined an EU offer of help through vaccine donations, with the Chinese government insisting that the situation is under control and that the country has an adequate quantity of medical supplies.

On 10 January 2023, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the ECDC published a joint statement as an addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol. This document reiterates the recommendations of the Swedish Presidency, recommending airports and operators ensure:

• the use of masks or respirators for passengers and crew on flights,
• enhanced personal hygiene and health measures for both travellers and aircraft and airport personnel,
• the requirement for a negative COVID-19 test taken not more than 48 hours (RADTs) or 72 hours (NAATs) prior to departure,
• facilitated random testing of passengers upon arrival, and support for local health authorities in sampling wastewater from airports and aircraft.

Impact on the tourism sector

Before the pandemic, Chinese tourists represented an important share of the EU’s tourism sector. Statistics show the number of outbound journeys of Chinese tourists has grown steadily during the last decade. Of the nearly 170 million outbound trips from China in 2019, nearly all were for private purposes, rather than business trips. Chinese tourist spending on international tourism has also increased strongly over the last ten years, reaching a peak of over US$277 billion in 2018.

Some 28 % of trips made by Chinese tourists were to the EU, with a preference for larger cities. France was the EU country most visited by Chinese tourists in 2019, with more than 2.4 million Chinese visitors, who spent around €4 billion. Other popular EU destinations included Italy, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Austria. In 2021, arrivals from China in the European country totalled roughly 55 000, dropping from around 158 000 in 2020 and over 1.55 million in 2019. In 2020, due to the pandemic and the severe COVID‑19 measures in China, the number of outbound tourists fell to around 20.3 million

Travel figures are more moderate in the other direction. Before the pandemic, China was the 11th most popular destination outside the EU for EU citizens. In 2018, EU residents made 1.75 million trips to China. Trips to China represented close to 2 % of the total number of trips made outside the EU in 2018, 48 % of which were for professional purposes. The number of trips to China declined considerably because of the pandemic and the related measures, to 125 000 trips in 2020 and 26 000 in 2021, mostly for professional purposes.

Although China’s lifting of COVID‑19 measures does not signal a green light for international leisure tourists willing to visit China, the Chinese government plans to ease restrictions for tourists and to issue tourist visas, without indicating a timeline. This development could boost both aviation and tourism, presuming that China intends to ease travel restrictions gradually. It remains to be seen if the measures taken by the EU will impact this trend.