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European Parliamentary Research Service Blog
Updated: 2 months 2 weeks ago
Regulating nature restoration in the EU – answering citizens’ concerns
Citizens are calling on the European Union to adopt a law on nature restoration. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since May 2023, asking her to act now to fight biodiversity loss and climate change.
We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French and English):
EnglishIn its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, the European Parliament strongly welcomed the European Commission’s commitment to propose a law on nature restoration in the EU that includes binding targets.
In June 2022, the Commission presented a legislative proposal to restore nature in Europe, i.e. repairing habitats and reintroducing nature into all ecosystems. The proposal sets obligations for each EU country, with the aim of restoring at least 20 % of the EU’s land and marine areas by 2030. The ultimate goal is to extend these measures to all ecosystems that need to be restored by 2050.
In the European Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is examining the proposal. On 5 December 2022, the Member in charge of the file published his draft report, which aims at modifying the content of the proposal. The report was presented in committee on 12 January 2023 and Members tabled amendments to the draft report. You can watch the video of the committee meeting on this subject from January 2023 on our website.
As indicated in the planning document published on the ENVI website, the vote in committee is currently scheduled for 15 June 2023. Parliament’s plenary vote could take place as early as July. In the event of any changes, the information on the ENVI website and in the Legislative Observatory will be updated.
FrenchDans sa résolution du 9 juin 2021 sur la stratégie de l’Union européenne en matière de biodiversité pour 2030, le Parlement européen a vivement salué l’engagement de la Commission européenne à proposer une loi sur la restauration de la nature dans l’UE qui comprenne des objectifs contraignants.
En juin 2022, la Commission a présenté une proposition législative visant à restaurer la nature en Europe, c’est-à-dire réparer les habitats en mauvais état et réintroduire la nature dans tous les écosystèmes. La proposition fixe des obligations pour chaque pays de l’Union européenne, avec pour objectif de restaurer au moins 20% des zones terrestres et marines de l’UE d’ici 2030. L’objectif ultime est d’étendre, d’ici 2050, ces mesures à tous les écosystèmes devant être restaurés.
Au Parlement européen, la proposition est examinée par la commission de l’environnement, de la santé publique et de la sécurité alimentaire (ENVI). Le 5 décembre dernier, le député en charge du dossier a publié son projet de rapport qui vise à modifier le contenu de la proposition. Le rapport a été présenté en commission le 12 janvier 2023 et les députés ont déposé des amendements au projet de rapport. Sur notre site web, vous pouvez revoir la vidéo de la réunion de commission à ce sujet en janvier 2023.
Comme indiqué dans ce document de planification publié sur le site de la commission ENVI, le vote en commission est actuellement prévu pour le 15 juin 2023. Le vote en plénière du Parlement pourrait avoir lieu dès le mois de juillet. En cas de modifications, les informations figurant sur le site internet de la commission ENVI et dans l’Observatoire législatif seront mises à jour.
Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.
Categories: European Union
New economic governance rules [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Martin Höflmayr (1st edition).
On 26 April 2023, the European Commission published a package of three proposals to revise the EU’s economic governance framework: a regulation to replace the current preventive arm of the stability and growth pact (SGP), an amending Council regulation on the corrective arm of the SGP, and an amending Council directive to strengthen the role of independent fiscal institutions. The main proposal on the preventive arm is to be adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure with the Parliament and the Council as co-legislators.
The reform proposals are shaped by the trade-off between reducing higher and more dispersed public debt levels after several years of unprecedented fiscal challenges and the need for sustained public investment in the Union’s shared priorities. Stricter fiscal monitoring would ensure debt sustainability, based on a country-specific fiscal adjustment path anchored to a debt sustainability analysis framework. The Commission would negotiate a fiscal-structural plan bilaterally with Member States, with a minimum 4-year horizon; possible extension of the fiscal adjustment path to 7 years would provide an incentive to include investment and reform commitments. Greater political buy-in and better Member State ownership of the medium-term plan is also envisaged.
Both reference values – the 3 % deficit-to-GDP and 60 % debt-to-GDP ratios – would remain unchanged, the proposal introduces three additional safeguards: two numerical requirements over the agreed plan’s horizon and a minimum fiscal adjustment of 0.5 % of GDP per annum if a country is expected to be above the 3 % deficit ratio threshold in an excessive deficit procedure.
Versions- May 2023: New economic governance rules (1st edition)
COM(2022) 241;
COM(2023) 242;
26.4.2023Rapporteur:2023/0138(COD);
2023/0137(CNS);
2023/0136(NLE)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD);
Consultation procedure;
Non-legislative enactment
Next steps expected: Appointment of a rapporteur
Categories: European Union
Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]
Written by Marcin Grajewski.
Two anti-Kremlin armed groups, made up of Russian nationals fighting for Kyiv against their compatriots, have claimed they were behind a short incursion into Russian territory, prompting threats from Moscow, as the West pondered further sanctions against Russia and more arms deliveries to Ukraine. Ukraine has denied any role in the raid, while Russia has blamed ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ for the attack, and its Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, has vowed that Moscow will respond to any more cross-border raids swiftly and ‘extremely harshly.’
At the G7 summit of industrialised and democratic nations on 19-21 May, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked for more arms supplies for his country, including F-16 fighter jets. Russia said that the transfer of such planes would raise the question of NATO’s role in the 15-month-old military conflict. The US and other countries promised to start training Ukrainian pilots to use F-16s.
This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.
Ukraine’s growing defense tech prowess can help defeat Russia
Atlantic Council, May 2023
Ukraine’s European integration is the key to a sustainable peace
Atlantic Council, May 2023
Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive
Atlantic Council, May 2023
Deciphering Vladimir Putin’s unspoken Victory Day message
Atlantic Council, May 2023
Russia’s last red line: Will the West help Ukraine liberate Crimea?
Atlantic Council, May 2023
Global South does not buy western stance on Ukraine
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, May 2023
Backstopping Ukraine’s long-term security: Toward an Atlantic-Asian security community
Brookings Institution, May 2023
What really influences United Nations voting on Ukraine?
Bruegel, May 2023
Bank of Russia’s immobilised assets: what happens next?
Bruegel, May 2023
Sanctions against Russia will worsen its already poor economic prospects
Bruegel, May 2023
In every crisis an opportunity? European Union integration in defence and the War on Ukraine
Brussels Centre for Governance, May 2023
Is the EU ready for further enlargement?
Carnegie Europe, May 2023
Ukrainians Wait for Their Return Home
Carnegie Europe, May 2023
Tackling the constraints on EU foreign policy towards Ukraine
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2023
Tsar Nicholas I’s Crimean War and Putin’s in Ukraine: Plus ça change
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2023
Ukraine’s alarming demographics
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2023
Social media analysis disrupts Russian digital narratives
Chatham House, May 2023
How much aid has the U.S. sent Ukraine?
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023
How the Ukraine grain deal went from boon to burden for the Kremlin
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, May 2023
Navigating the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear warheads in Belarus: Key factors and considerations
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, May 2023
Culture clash: Russia, Ukraine, and the fight for the European public
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023
Keeping the lights on: The EU’s energy relationships since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023
The Ukraine war and European identity
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023
11th package of EU sanctions: Focusing on circumvention
European Policy Centre, May 2023
European politics in times of crisis: Developments in Germany, France and Italy, and consequences for the EU
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 2023
Ukraine’s refugees highlight the shameful EU housing crisis
Friends of Europe, May 2023
Defining Russia’s defeat: The war’s exit strategy and a new international security architecture
Friends of Europe, May 2023
Toward a Marshall Plan for Ukraine
German Marshall Fund, May 2023
Pathways to disaster: Russia’s war against Ukraine and the risks of inadvertent nuclear escalation
Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, May 2023
The war in Ukraine and the future of non-proliferation and arms control in the European continent
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2023
Applying for EU membership in time of war: “Accession through war” of Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2023
Europe’s evolving order and the war in Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2023
Is there life in the desert? Russian civil society after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine
International Centre for Defence and Security, May 2023
What should future U.S. policy toward Russia be in peacetime?
Rand Corporation, May 2023
What the drone strikes on the Kremlin reveal about the war in Ukraine
Rand Corporation, May 2023
Why does Ukraine want Western jets?
Rand Corporation, May 2023
The trade-offs of Ukraine’s recovery: Fighting for the future
Rand Corporation, May 2023
Russian civil society actors in exile
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2023
Helping Ukraine is not only crucial for peace in Europe but also for world peace
Vox Ukraine, May 2023
Ukraine’s agriculture and farmland market: the impact of war
Vox Ukraine, May 2023
Towards an acceptable accounting of Ukraine’s post-war environmental damages
Vox Ukraine, May 2023
Americans show signs of impatience with Ukraine war
Brookings Institution, April 2023
Ukraine’s resilience is about winning the war
Carnegie Europe, April 2023
Why Ukraine needs security guarantees
Carnegie Europe, April 2023
Nine months of full-scale war in Ukraine: thoughts, feelings, actions
Cedos, April 2023
The EU increases its agri-food imports from Ukraine: causes and reactions from Central European states
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023
From Popasna to Bakhmut: The Wagner Group in the Russia-Ukraine war
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023
Protecting Europe’s critical infrastructure from Russian hybrid threats
Centre for European Reform, April 2023
Note to the West: Help Georgia and Moldova as well as Ukraine
Centre for European Reform, April 2023
Will Russia control the skies over Ukraine?
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, April 2023
Ukraine’s counter-offensive: Will it retake Crimea?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023
Working together toward accountability: How the ICC and a Special Tribunal on Aggression can work together on Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023
What Northern Ireland teaches us about ending the Ukraine war?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023
Judging Putin
Fondation Robert Schuman, April 2023
Rebuilding Ukraine: What the international community now needs to consider
German Institute of Development and Sustainability, April 2023
War in Ukraine, where quantity as well as quality matters
International Institute for International Studies, April 2023
Lessons from the past for Ukrainian recovery: A Marshall Plan for Ukraine
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023
Countering Russia’s nuclear threat in Europe
Rand Corporation, April 2023
Cyber operations in Russia’s war against Ukraine Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2023
Read this briefing on ‘Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
The G7 and Global Food Security
Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.
At this year’s G7 summit in Japan, the leaders of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, and the European Union, expressed their determination to uphold an international order based on the rule of law and the UN Charter, under serious threat due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As part of this strategy, the G7 nations committed to engage with partner countries worldwide to preserve international norms by addressing shared challenges, not least the current food crisis, recognised as posing the ‘highest risk of famine in a generation’.
For over a year, many countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, have been subject to an intense Russian diplomatic and disinformation campaign aimed at shifting the responsibility for the current food crisis, away from Moscow’s destabilising actions – such as the months-long Black Sea blockade – and blaming it on the international sanctions imposed on the Kremlin after its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.
To counter Russia’s strategy, and to strengthen present and future global food security, the G7 and invited nations (Australia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Comoros and the Cook Islands) committed to a series of joint actions outlined in the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, calling on other international partners to join these efforts.
The six-page document envisages three lines of action, aimed at addressing the immediate food security challenge, preparing for and preventing future food crises, and setting the building blocks of a resilient food system guaranteeing fair nutrition for all.
Responding to the most immediate challenge of the ongoing food crisis, the G7 nations commit to better donor coordination and a substantial increase in humanitarian and development assistance to food-stressed countries. The action statement highlights the importance of expanding and extending the Black Sea Grain Initiative, continuing the EU Solidarity Lanes, and restoring Ukraine’s agricultural sector. The G7 also commits to achieving greater transparency in international markets, given their influence on food prices and availability.
Beyond the current disruption, the G7 strategy outlines ways to prepare for and prevent future food security crises. On top of supply shortages caused by weather shocks and armed conflict, the skyrocketing prices for agricultural commodities owes much to unilateral trade restrictions to protect national markets, especially of fertilisers. Therefore, transparency and enforcing World Trade Organization rules is deemed crucial to ensuring food security. Increased data collection and monitoring, as well as support for the adoption of preparedness strategies by food-stressed countries is also considered to prevent future crises.
Ultimately, the G7 leaders recognise that ensuring food security for all depends on the resilience and adaptability of global food systems to changing weather and shrinking biodiversity. The G7 strategy devotes substantial attention to these challenges, outlining many initiatives enshrined in the European Union by the Green Deal, and the biodiversity and farm to fork strategies. Strengthening local production, ensuring affordable access to fertilisers or developing agricultural innovative technologies and making them accessible to less developed countries are some of the initiatives outlined to that end in the Hiroshima Action Statement.
In its attempt to undermine the post-World War II international consensus, Russia has resorted to the threat of nuclear war, and has deliberately aggravated a global food security crisis. In the highly symbolic city of Hiroshima, the G7 group of nations pushed back at Moscow’s challenge to the rules-based order, by showing that it is willing and able to engage the wider international community to ensure food security for all, while preserving the international rules that can make it possible.
Categories: European Union
Digital labelling of EU fertilising products [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Clément Evroux (1st edition).
On 27 February 2023, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation to allow voluntary digital labelling of EU fertilising products. This initiative follows similar EU legislative initiatives establishing the digital labelling of goods in other economic sectors, such as batteries. The rationale for digital labelling is provided by: on the one hand, the deployment of digital solutions such as QR codes, which can lower the cost of labelling while facilitating the updating of content; and on the other, the complexification of physical labelling, whose readability can prove difficult.
Against this backdrop, the proposal introduces a set of voluntary digital labelling schemes for EU fertilising products, whose requirements depend on the packaging arrangements and the users of the products (economic operators or end-users). The proposal also introduces a single set of technological requirements for all established labels, to ensure that labels are accessible free of charge, including for vulnerable groups.
In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection.
Versions- May 2023: Digital labelling of EU fertilising products (1st edition)
27.02.2023Rapporteur:2023/0049(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’)
Next steps expected: Appointment of the rapporteur
Categories: European Union
Net-zero industry act [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).
The required deployment of clean energy technologies to support the achievement of Europe’s 2030 and 2050 climate targets is considerable. Europe already largely imports these technologies, and many third countries have stepped up their efforts to expand their clean energy manufacturing capacity. On 16 March 2023, the Commission put forward a proposal for a ‘net-zero industry act’ that aims to expand the manufacturing capacity of net-zero technologies in the EU and enhance the resilience of its energy system.
The proposed regulation would set up enabling conditions for the manufacturing of 10 net-zero technologies (through streamlined administrative processes and access to regulatory sandboxes and European net-zero industry academies). Eight ‘strategic’ net-zero technologies would gain additional benefits (even shorter administrative processes, facilitated access to markets, and administrative support to access finance). The proposed regulation would aim to ensure that, by 2030, the manufacturing capacity in the EU for these strategic net-zero technologies reaches an overall benchmark of at least 40 % of the EU’s annual deployment needs. It would also set an EU‑level target for annual CO2 injection capacity by 2030 (50 million tonnes).
The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file.
Versions- May 2023: Net-zero industry act (1st edition)
16.3.2023Rapporteur:Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany)2023/0081(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Tsvetelina Penkova (S&D, Bulgaria)
Christophe Grudler (Renew, France)
Damien Carême (Greens/EFA, France)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia)
Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy)
Marc Botenga (The Left, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’)
Next steps expected: Publication of draft report
Categories: European Union
Disappearance of migrant children in the EU
Written by Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou.
Between 2018 and 2020, over 18 000 migrant and refugee children were reported as missing in Europe. It is feared that many may have been exploited and abused for sexual or labour purposes. The European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the need to address the disappearance of migrant children in the EU. The conflict in Ukraine and the subsequent mass displacement of people have only made the situation worse, creating fertile ground for criminal networks to take advantage of vulnerable people, especially children.
BackgroundThe number of migrant children has been growing, both globally and in the European Union (EU). According to 2020 estimates, 35.5 million children worldwide (1.5 million more than in 2000), were living outside their country of birth. In 2021, Lost in Europe, a journalism project investigating the disappearance of migrant children, reported that more than 18 000 migrant children had gone missing in Europe between 2018 and 2020. According to Missing Children Europe, migrant children are considered missing ‘when they are registered with state authorities and go missing from the reception/accommodation centres provided for them’. While most missing migrant children are understood to be unaccompanied minors (UAMs), they also include separated children and children that were travelling with family. According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), UAMs missing from first reception facilities are a major concern in many EU Member States. However, incomplete and inconsistent reporting makes it difficult to fully grasp the picture. The importance of data collection and sharing has been confirmed by several studies on missing migrants; a single contact point would arguably make it much easier to search for and find information about such people. In fact, registration is particularly relevant in the case of children, as it lessens the risk of them going missing while also helping families reunite. In addition, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there have been reports of children disappearing after having arrived in EU countries from Ukraine. Overall, the reasons for children’s disappearance include: poor reception conditions; a lack of child-friendly information; inefficient family reunification and guardian-appointment procedures; fear of detention or deportation; the desire to join family or friends in another country; and violence and abuse, including illegal adoption and trafficking.
EU action to protect children in migrationIn recent years, the EU has adopted a series of policies relevant to children in migration. In February 2007, the European Commission adopted a decision requiring EU countries to reserve the telephone number 116000 as a hotline for reporting missing children, including UAMs of third-country origin. The hotline has been implemented gradually at national level and is now active in 32 countries.
In a communication from 2017, the European Commission laid out a list of priority actions aimed at contributing to the protection of children in migration. Moreover, in its 2020 communication on a new Pact on Migration and Asylum, the Commission stressed that ‘the reform of EU rules on asylum and return is an opportunity to strengthen safeguards and protection standards under EU law for migrant children’. It furthermore identified children’s rights as a priority to be taken into consideration as part of a broader range of initiatives, such as those set out in the 2020 action plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027 and the 2021 EU strategy on voluntary return and reintegration. In 2020, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on EU Member States to do ‘whatever is necessary and required in the best interests of the child’ to avoid the disappearance of thousands of child refugees and migrants globally.
More recently, the 2021 EU strategy on the rights of the child stressed the vulnerability of migrant children, who are often deeply traumatised by what they have had to endure in their country of origin or on a migratory route. The strategy notes that migrant children are more likely to be victims of abuse and violence, and that the risk of going missing increases ‘when children travel unaccompanied or are obliged to share overcrowded facilities with adult strangers’. Additionally, several directives look at the specific situation of migrant children, with a view to preventing them from going missing and falling victim to criminal networks. For instance, Article 24 of the Reception Conditions Directive and Article 25 of the Asylum Procedures Directive envisage the appointment of guardians for UAMs, while Article 14 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive requires Member States to provide specific assistance and support to child victims. Moreover, AMBER Alert Europe aims to achieve zero missing children in Europe by increasing the technological and human resources that are mobilised in searches for missing children.
In focus: The situation of missing Ukrainian childrenSince the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Magnolia has recorded more than 2 100 children as kidnapped, abducted, forcibly disappeared or simply missing inside Ukraine. Similarly, NGOs and public authorities have been warning about the risk of violence and trafficking facing children outside Ukraine too, stressing the importance of proper registration. The Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) has likewise warned of the danger faced by people fleeing Ukraine of falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, the Office of the European Parliament Vice-President, and EP Coordinator on Children’s Rights, Ewa Kopacz, cooperates with a number of stakeholders on the issue of missing Ukrainian children, while continuing to keep awareness of Ukrainian children high on the Parliament‘s agenda. In March 2022, the Commission presented a 10-point plan for stronger EU coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war against Ukraine. The plan envisages strengthening children’s protection by developing ‘standard operating procedures and uniform guidance for the reception and support of children, as well as specific procedures for the transfer of UAMs‘ and measures on recording and exchange of information. The plan also underpins the development of an anti-trafficking plan, while also supporting the ‘Safe Homes’ initiative. Finally, during the first joint mission of the Parliament, Commission and Council to Kyiv focusing on the protection of Ukrainian children under institutional care, Parliament’s Coordinator on Children’s Rights, Ewa Kopacz, met with First Lady Olena Zelenska and the Presidential Commissioner for Children, Daria Herasymczuk, to discuss the concerns for children illegally deported or retained in Russia and the Russian-occupied territories. European Parliament position
The need to tackle the disappearance of migrant children has featured in several Parliament resolutions in recent years. In a November 2014 resolution, Parliament stressed that many UAMs had disappeared or absconded after their arrival in the EU, and insisted that more should be done to ensure that the rights of migrant children were fully respected across the EU. In a December 2016 resolution, Parliament called on the Commission to ensure that UAMs do not disappear and to design a strategy for that purpose and for the purpose of identifying the whereabouts of missing children. In another December 2016 resolution, Parliament recommended reinforcing the existing tools for finding missing children and noted that children’s rights and the best interest of the child needed to be taken into account and assessed in all EU policies and actions, including migration and asylum.
In May 2018, Parliament called on the Member States to place all children and families with children in non-custodial, community-based accommodation while their immigration status is being processed. Parliament also stressed the need to host UAMs in separate facilities from adults to avoid any risk of violence and sexual abuse. In November 2019, Parliament called on the Member States to improve the situation of children in migration and stressed the importance of child protection as a fundamental principle for the EU. In March 2021, Parliament stressed that the EU strategy on the rights of the child needed to include measures to improve the situation of children in migration and protect their interests at every stage of asylum procedures. In April 2022, Parliament adopted a resolution on the protection of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine, which stressed the need to identify vulnerable groups and to move swiftly to appoint guardians for UAMs. Most recently, Parliament also highlighted the risk of children falling victim to human trafficking in relation to the situation of Ukrainian migrant- and displaced children.
This updates an ‘at a glance’ note by Micaela Del Monte and Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou published in September 2022.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Disappearance of migrant children in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Critical raw materials act [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).
The EU’s ambition to become a climate-neutral economy by 2050, and its ability to sustain the green and digital transition and achieve strategic autonomy, all rely heavily on reliable, secure and resilient access to critical raw materials (CRMs).
On 16 March 2023, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on CRMs. It introduces the concept of strategic raw materials (SRMs), which are key for some strategic technologies and vulnerable to shortages. The general objective of the proposed regulation is to improve the functioning of the single market by establishing a framework to ensure the EU’s access to a secure and sustainable supply of CRMs. To achieve this, the regulation would pursue four specific objectives: strengthening the whole SRM value chain; diversifying the EU’s imports of SRMs (so that by 2030, no third country would provide more than 65 % of the EU’s annual consumption of each SRM); improving the EU’s ability to monitor and mitigate the CRM supply risk; ensuring the free movement of CRMs and products containing CRMs placed on the EU market; and ensuring a high level of environmental protection, by improving their circularity and sustainability.
The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file.
Versions- May 2023: Critical raw materials act (1st edition)
16.3.2023Rapporteur:Nicola Beer (Renew, Germany)2023/0079(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Hildegard Bentele (EPP, Germany)
Mohammed Chahim (S&D, the Netherlands)
Henrike Hahn (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Izabela-Helena Kloc (ECR, Poland)
Marie Dauchy (ID, France)
Cornelia Ernst (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Discussion of draft report in committee
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Categories: European Union
Green transition [What Think Tanks are thinking]
Written by Marcin Grajewski.
The United States, China and the European Union are making more and more funds available for the green economic transition and efforts to fight climate change. Increased government spending on green technologies also serves the goal of establishing or expanding industries that have emerged as strategic at a time of global warming, as well as providing quality jobs. This subsidy race is strongly affected by the technological rivalry between China and the US.
However, the race in governments’ support to develop or strengthen sectors such as batteries, electronic vehicles, solar panels, wind turbines and many others, may not be the best solution for decarbonising the economy, some think-tank analysts say. It risks a downward race among governments, and suboptimal allocation of resources.
This note offers links to recent reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on the green transition. Analyses on EU clean tech and industrial policies can be found a previous edition of What think tanks are thinking.
Green hydrogen: Loaded up and (long-haul) trucking
Atlantic Council, May 2023
Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls
Finnish Institute for International Relations, May 2023
Industrial policy for electric vehicle supply chains and the US-EU fight over the Inflation Reduction Act
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2023
The US and the EU want to create a hydrogen economy: They need the BIS in BRICS
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2023
“Carbon management”: Opportunities and risks for ambitious climate policy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2023
Building a prosperous world with fewer emissions
Brookings Institution, April 2023
Green transition: Create a European energy agency
Bruegel, April 2023
North Sea Summit: Blowing in the wind?
Bruegel, April 2023
Mobilising transition finance will require credible corporate climate plans
Bruegel, April 2023
Why Europe’s critical raw materials strategy has to be international
Bruegel, April 2023
Rising to the challenge: EU actorness in climate policy and its global impact
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023
Europe’s pursuit of securing critical raw materials for the green transition
Chatham House, April 2023
The Critical Raw Materials Act: Digging in the dirt for a sustainable future
Climate Foresight, April 2023
Pour fabriquer une électricité non polluante, avoir un horizon de long terme
Fondation Jean Jaurès, April 2023
Greenhouse gas emissions in the EU
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2023
Rise in coal use and decline in hydropower cancelled out EU gains in renewables this year
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023
“Made in America” puts the brakes on electric vehicles Biden hopes to push
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023
Can China’s green energy acceleration put at risk the West’s hydrogen plans?
Rand Corporation, April 2023
The green, digital and social transitions: Towards a new Eco-social pact
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, March 2023
Energy and climate challenges will continue in 2023
Brookings Institution, March 2023
Developing countries are key to climate action
Brookings Institution, March 2023
The ‘Green Golden Rule’ for the green transition
Bruegel, March 2023
The potential of sovereign sustainability-linked bonds in the drive for net-zero
Bruegel, March 2023
The Net-Zero Industry Act puts EU credibility at risk
Bruegel, March 2023
Climate adaptation: The race to cool down Europe’s cities
European Policy Centre, March 2023
Energy prices, not us subsidies, are Europe’s biggest headache
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023
What the IPCC report means for global action on 1.5°C
Chatham House, March 2023
Climate action in China
Chatham House, March 2023
Europe’s green industrial policy and the United States’ IRA: Reducing dependence on China
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2023
Certification of carbon dioxide removals evaluation of the Commission proposal
Ecologic Institute, March 2023
Blowing in the balance: Europe’s wind industry
Friends of Europe, March 2023
Que faut-il retenir du European Critical Raw Materials Act
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, March 2023
Building climate resilience in urban informal settlements through data co-production
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023
Four lessons on the interaction between climate change mitigation policies and social behaviour
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2023
A permanent EU Investment Fund for tackling the climate and energy crisis
Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, March 2023
The role of the ocean in climate policy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023
Power play: How the US benefits if China greens the Global South
Brookings Institution, February 2023
Climate versus trade? Reconciling international subsidy rules with industrial decarbonisation
Bruegel, February 2023
Climate action, social justice, and democracy: Europe’s new trilemma
Carnegie Europe, February 2023
Plugging green power into the EU-ASEAN partnership
Clingendael, Feruary 2023
For a green European industrial policy
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 2023
A European green deal diplomacy toolbox
E3G, February 2023
Strategy and risk: How to make the Green Deal Industrial Plan a geoeconomic success
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023
The power of pragmatism: Nuclear energy, technological innovation, and the green transition
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023
Decarbonise and democratise: How the European Green Deal could transform high-carbon economies
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023
EU poised to copy US subsidies for green technology: New evidence from China shows how it could backfire
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, February 2023
The US-EU race for green subsidies can help fight climate change
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2023
Where is the carbon premium? Global performance of green and brown stocks
Brookings Institution, January 2023
Carbon farming co-benefits: Approaches to enhance and safeguard biodiversity
Ecologic, Institute for European Environmental Studies, January 2023
More than just a petrol station: Norway’s contribution to European Union’s green strategic autonomy
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, January 2023
Read this briefing on ‘Green transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of Germany, 9 May 2023
Written by Ralf Drachenberg.
‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. In his address to the European Parliament on Europe Day, 9 May 2023, a geopolitical EU was a central theme for the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz. He stressed that, in a multipolar world, the EU needed ‘a genuine partnership with the countries of Asia, Africa and South America, without Eurocentrism’. He called for an enlarged EU with an honest enlargement policy, also in the context of a geopolitical Europe. He supported Parliament’s calls for EU reforms, notably the use of qualified majority voting in the Council on foreign policy and taxes, and promised to promote such changes within the European Council.
We need a geopolitical European Union, an enlarged and reformed European Union and, last but not least, a European Union that is open to the future.
Olaf Scholz
BackgroundRoberta Metsola launched the ‘This is Europe’ initiative shortly after her election as president of the European Parliament in January 2022. Olaf Scholz is the ninth EU leader to have addressed the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. These debates will continue during subsequent sessions.
A similar Parliament initiative, ahead of the 2019 European elections, saw a number of EU leaders speak in Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. A 2019 EPRS analysis of those future of Europe debates pinpointed similarities and differences in EU leaders’ views.
Figure 1 – Time devoted by Olaf Scholz to various topics in his speechThe ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), a bottom-up exercise that allowed EU citizens to express their opinions on the EU’s future policies and functioning. On 30 April 2022, the CoFoE plenary adopted 49 proposals (see EPRS overview), including more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. As a follow-up, Parliament adopted a resolution, by a large majority, calling for a convention in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. This call was backed by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union speech on 14 September 2022.
At the June 2022 European Council meeting, the Heads of State or Government ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up’, they did not provide specific guidelines in this respect. Instead, they merely stated that each EU institution should follow up on the proposals ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than acting jointly. EPRS research has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council, as expressed in the latter’s 2019‑2024 strategic agenda and its conclusions over the past 3 years.
Main focus of Olaf Scholz’s speechScholz addressed a wide range of topics in his speech to Parliament (see Figure 1). In terms of words, he devoted most attention to i) a geopolitical Europe, ii) migration, and iii) the war in Ukraine.
Geopolitical EuropeWithout using the expression, his vision of a geopolitical EU resembles the concept of strategic autonomy. He stressed that Europe needed to ‘invest more in our security and defence – in civil resilience, technological sovereignty, reliable supply chains, our independence in critical raw materials’. For Scholz, a geopolitical EU is one which knows its place in the world, and is aware of its global responsibility. Cooperation with other countries, including trade agreements, is crucial for the future, both for them and for Europe. For him, an honest enlargement policy and keeping the EU’s promises is also part of the concept.
MigrationChancellor Scholz stressed that EU Member States were ‘united by the goal of better managing and ordering irregular migration without betraying our values’. The solution must be based on European solidarity; however, in his view, one cannot wait for this solidarity to materialise out of thin air. Therefore, he called for the work to be finalised in the Council before the next EP elections. Given the demand for workers in many parts of Europe, linking regular migration opportunities with the call for countries of origin and transit to take back those who do not have the right to stay in the EU would increase the acceptance in the EU population for regular migration.
War in UkraineThe Chancellor underlined that the Union had seldom been more united than after this ‘despicable breach of the European and international peace order’. He called for the EU to remain steadfast in its support of Ukraine – as long as necessary. He indicated that the reconstruction of Ukraine would require political and financial capital for a long time, but stressed that a democratic Ukraine, a European Ukraine, was the ‘clearest rejection of Putin’s imperial, revisionist, illegal policy on our continent’.
Specific proposals and positionsThe German Chancellor used the opportunity to present his views on how the European Union should advance in specific policy areas. He reiterated earlier proposals, and made new ones, summarised below.
Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Rule of law / EU reforms‘To strengthen the European Commission’s ability to launch infringement procedures when our fundamental values are violated: freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’.EU reforms‘A reformed Europe should take decisions on foreign policy and taxes by qualified majority. It is not unanimity that creates the greatest possible legitimacy, but the democratic competition for majorities, and compromises that also do justice to the interests of the minority’.Trade‘It is more than reasonable to quickly conclude new and fair free trade agreements – with Mercosur, with Mexico, with India, Indonesia, Australia, Kenya and, in the future, with many other countries’.Security and defence‘The EU needs a closer integration of our defence efforts, and to build an integrated European defence industry’.Energy and climate‘Probably the greatest task is the departure of our countries, our economies and societies into a climate-neutral future’.Table – Specific proposals made by Olaf Scholz, by policy areaRead this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of Germany, 9 May 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Listing act [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Martin Höflmayr (1st edition).
The overwhelming majority of businesses in the European Union (EU) are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). They employ almost two thirds of the workforce, create 85 % of all new jobs and generate about three fifths of EU value added. In the period from 2010 to 2020, only a small proportion of EU SMEs said that they raised external financing through capital markets (4 %), while a quarter used bank loans, and a fifth used business-to-business trade credits or internal funds.
To make capital markets more attractive to EU SMEs and diversify their sources of external financing, the European Commission tabled three interconnected proposals in December 2022. They seek to streamline the listing process, balancing the regulatory and compliance costs to companies seeking to list, or already listed, and ensuring proper investor protection and market integrity.
The key amendments seek to cut red tape in the listing process: at the pre-IPO stage by facilitating the development and provision of investment research while avoiding conflicts of interest inherent in such research; at the IPO stage by making it easier and cheaper for issuers to draw up a prospectus; and at the post-IPO stage by providing more clarity on what constitutes inside information. A new directive on multiple-vote share structures would harmonise national laws and allow listed companies’ owners to raise more funds at a given voting share.
Versions- May 2023: Listing act (1st edition)
COM(2022) 761;
COM(2022) 760
7.12.2022Rapporteur:Alfred Sant (S&D, Malta)2022/0411(COD);
2022/0405(COD);
2022/0406(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Inese Vaidere (EPP, Latvia),
Eva Maria Poptcheva (Renew, Spain), Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France), Valentino Grant (ID, Italy),
Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report
Categories: European Union
Standards for equality bodies: Equal treatment between women and men in employment (ordinary legislative procedure) [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Ionel Zamfir (1st edition).
EU equality directives have laid down an obligation for Member States to establish equality bodies, mandated to assist victims of discrimination, and to prevent and fight discrimination on the grounds listed under the directives. The legal provisions are, however, general in nature and do little to define precisely these bodies’ mandate and way of working. This has led in practice to a great divergence among Member States. In some EU countries, lack of resources, insufficient independence or a limited focus on discrimination grounds have been serious obstacles to the functioning of these bodies. Other EU countries have taken a more ambitious approach.
After adopting a recommendation in 2018 on standards for equality bodies and assessing its implementation, the European Commission moved to binding legislation. The proposal, published in December 2022 together with another one as part of the equality package, aims to reinforce the equality bodies’ independence, resources and mandate.
While general welcoming the proposal, stakeholders have suggested specific legal changes to it.
In the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality. A rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs have not yet been appointed.
Versions- May 2023: Standards for equality bodies: Equal treatment between women and men in employment (ordinary legislative procedure) (1st edition)
7.12.2022Rapporteur:2022/0400(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Appointment of rapporteurs, draft report
Categories: European Union
Plenary round-up – May I 2023
Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.
Among the highlights of the May I plenary session were debates on the EU budget and own resources, as well as on 55 reports on the discharge for the 2021 budget. Members addressed a variety of issues, including the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact, and the role of farmers as enablers of the green transition and a resilient agricultural sector. Further debates concerned Ukrainian cereals on the European market, the act in support of ammunition production (on which Parliament voted to fast-track the legislative proposal, with a vote during the May II session), updating the anti-corruption legislative framework, the roadmap on a Social Europe, fighting cyberbullying of young people across the EU, and the adequacy of the protection afforded by the EU-US Data Privacy Framework. Members also considered Commission statements on oceans, biodiversity and fisheries. A debate was held on the European Citizens’ Initiative, ‘Stop Finning – Stop the trade’.
Finally, Members heard and then debated a ‘This is Europe’ address by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of Germany, and heard an address by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, President of Portugal, in a formal sitting.
2024 EU budget – Borrowing costs of the EU recovery instrumentThe biggest issue on Parliament’s agenda this plenary session was the EU budget. Members held a joint debate on the current multiannual EU budget and own resources. Parliament adopted a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) initiative report addressing the undermining of the EU’s capacity to finance its priorities as a result of rising borrowing costs for the EU recovery instrument. Members also debated a BUDG report urging a revision of the EU’s long-term budget by 2024. To avoid having to cancel existing programmes due to lack of funds, the committee calls on the Council to act urgently to adopt the stalled Own Resources Decision.
Discharge for 2021To ensure the transparent and democratic scrutiny of how public funds are spent, Parliament’s elected Members decide whether the EU institutions have disbursed their budget in accordance with the rules. Members debated and voted 55 reports on the discharge procedure for the EU’s 2021 budget. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommended granting discharge to all 33 EU decentralised agencies and 9 joint undertakings. However, the committee also drew attention to the European Court of Auditors’ recommendations, including the need for all joint undertakings to adopt common guidelines. In the light of the continued institutional differences between Parliament and the European Council and Council, the committee once again proposed to postpone the decision on discharge of their 2021 budget. In the interests of transparency, Parliament has refused to grant discharge to the Council each financial year since 2009. By contrast, the CONT committee proposed to grant discharge to all other EU institutions and bodies, although it again made observations on opportunities to improve budgetary management. For the first time, the discharge procedure for the European Commission also applied to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Here, the Commission appears to have taken previous CONT committee criticism on board, and CONT proposed that Parliament grant discharge to the Commission, all executive agencies and for the European Development Funds for 2021. However, it also drew attention to the need for stronger control on spending by national authorities and non-governmental organisations. Parliament voted to grant discharge in all cases, except for the Council and European Council.
Methane emissions reduction in the energy sectorMembers continue to focus on efforts towards mitigating climate change. The oil, gas and coal sectors are responsible for more than a third of man-made methane emissions worldwide. Members debated and adopted a position on the European Commission’s proposal for an EU strategy to reduce energy sector methane emissions, based on a joint report by Parliament’s Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and on Industry, Research and Energy. Parliament can now start interinstitutional negotiations on this basis. Among other changes, the report seeks to oblige the Commission to set a binding 2030 methane emissions reduction target for all actors in the sector.
Empowering consumers for the green transitionMembers debated a Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) report that seeks to strengthen protection and legal certainty for consumers and economic operators alike, in the context of a Commission proposal to empower consumers for the green transition. The adopted text sets Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.
EU accession to the Istanbul Convention on violence against womenMembers considered and followed a joint recommendation from the Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), voting to give Parliament’s consent for ratification of EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. First proposed in 2016, six EU countries have refused to ratify the Istanbul Convention on violence against women. However, as the European Court of Justice has ruled that unanimity in the Council is not necessary in this case, the way is open for EU accession to an agreement that addresses gender-based violence (GBV).
2022 reports on Serbia and KosovoMembers debated and adopted two Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee reports, following up the Commission’s annual reports for 2022 on Serbia and Kosovo. In the first, on Serbia, the committee welcomed the country’s continued ambition for EU membership. However, it regrets Serbia’s failure to align with EU sanctions against Russia and its continued difficult relations with Kosovo. Normalising relations between Belgrade and Pristina would be an important step forward on Serbia’s path to EU membership. Although the second report, on Kosovo, calls for a commitment to genuine dialogue with Serbia, the AFET committee commended Kosovo’s progress on reforms and fighting corruption, and particularly praised Kosovo’s condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop Finning – Stop the trade’Members held a debate on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop Finning – Stop the trade‘ which, with over 1.1 million signatures, has earned support across the EU. The initiative aims to ban fin trading – other than when naturally attached to the shark’s body – in the EU, which remains one of the biggest exporters and transit centres for shark fins. Indeed catching sharks is now largely carried out for the purpose of fin trading, according to the ECI’s organisers, in particular with the aim of exporting to Asian regions.
Opening of trilogue negotiationsMembers confirmed without a vote several mandates to enter interinstitutional negotiations, from the Budgets and Budgetary Control (BUDG/CONT) Committees on amendments to the EU’s Financial Regulation, from the Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committee on labelling of organic pet food, from the Foreign Affairs and Industry, Research and Energy (AFET/ITRE) Committees on European defence industry reinforcement through a common procurement act, and from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee on protection of workers from asbestos.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – May I 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Understanding silent and invisible assets
Written by Cécile Remeur.
At a time when global and cross-border crises are highlighting the interconnections between health, environment, peace, food security and energy sufficiency, notions such as externalities, public goods and biodiversity boundaries are gaining renewed interest, as a strong grasp of the various aspects of challenging situations becomes essential to help frame policy responses.
The notion of externalities is about asking whether all elements have been accounted for in price setting. When this is not the case, the mismatch is described as a positive or negative externality. The question then is how to correct the situation through pricing and with a price signal – something that can be achieved through taxation or regulation.
Beyond pricing, public goods – as opposed to private goods – are goods and services that can be enjoyed by all. They bring advantages to society as a whole, and their geographical scope can vary from local and regional to global.
Moving one step further, it is necessary to consider the effects on public goods of activities that might not be seen or occur at the same time or in the same place as the activities themselves. This relates to notions such as tipping points, footprints, sustainability and the preservation of biodiversity.
This briefing aims to shed light on those invisible effects, to complement existing discussions and pave the way for new tools to address environmental challenges.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding silent and invisible assets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Sudan crisis: Developments and implications
Written by Eric Pichon with Alessandra De Martini.
On 15 April 2023, violent armed clashes flared up again in Sudan between the main two military factions battling for control of the country: the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by former Sovereign Council leader General Muhammad Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagolo; and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), headed by Sudan’s de facto President, General Abdel Fattah Al‑Burhan. The armed attacks are causing numerous civilian casualties as well as massive population displacements to neighbouring countries, while foreign powers are evacuating their citizens. Despite a succession of ceasefires, the conflict seems likely to continue for the near future, with major repercussions for the regional balance of power.
BackgroundAfter Al-Bashir was deposed by a coup d’état in April 2019, Sudan attempted a transition to democracy. A transitional government led by a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council, headed by Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al‑Burhan and General Muhammad Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagolo, shared the power. The two military officers represented the competing military pillars of Al‑Bashir’s government: Al‑Burhan is a former Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) commander in Central Darfur State and in Yemen, and Hemedti is chief of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a paramilitary group in control of the mining sector (mainly gold in Darfur).
In November 2021, the military dissolved the Sovereign Council and the transitional government fell. After weeks of mass protests, Hamdok was reinstated as Prime Minister, but resigned in January 2022 due to a political deadlock. Al‑Burhan took control of the government and established a new ruling Sovereign Council, declining African Union (AU) and EU-Norway-UK-US mediation to resolve Sudan’s political crisis.
After months of negotiations and peace talks, political and military leaders and civilians signed a framework agreement in December 2022, envisaging the removal of the military’s involvement in the government and economy and establishing a 2-year transition period with a civilian-led administration prior to elections. In March 2023, the same stakeholders agreed to adopt a new constitution and to transfer the power to a civilian administration the following month.
The power struggle continued, however, and these deadlines were not met. One of the main disputes between the two military factions is the integration of the RSF into the national armed forces: Hemedti wants to postpone this procedure for 10 years, while Al‑Burhan aims to unite the two military forces within 2 years.
Current political and humanitarian situationFighting between the main two military factions reached a new level of violence in the capital on 15 April 2023. Khartoum emerged as the epicentre of the uprising, as it hosts some key locations, including the national intelligence services, the international airport and institutional buildings. The fighting quickly spread around the country, becoming a serious threat to regional stability. Some analysts have also reported a sharp increase in inter-tribal violence in the country’s west and south, owing to the current political and economic instability. Furthermore, they warn about the repercussions of refugee displacement to neighbouring countries, such as Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia or the Central African Republic. On 27 April 2023, the two sides agreed to extend a 72‑hour Saudi-US-mediated humanitarian ceasefire (which began on 24 April), for another 72 hours. On 1 May 2023, the United Nations envoy in Sudan, Volker Perthes, announced that Al-Burhan and Hemedti were willing to enter into talks. On 2 May, South Sudan announced it had brokered a 7‑day ceasefire between the RSF and SAF from 4 to 11 May.
The ceasefires failed and the spiral of violence is increasing daily. Air attacks and shooting persists and neither the RSF nor the SAF have manifested an intention to withdraw. Meanwhile, living conditions for civilians are dramatic. Civilian deaths are estimated at over 400, but statistics are difficult to gather. On 2 May 2023, UN agencies estimated that over 100 000 people had fled Sudan to neighbouring countries, including refugees from these countries – and this figure may quickly amount to 800 000. More than 330 000 people have been displaced within the country. Most of the hospitals are closed, or operate only in some emergencies. Stores, markets and banks have halted business, fearing bomb attacks. Accordingly, food prices are rising and the already acute food and drinking water shortage is worsening. The humanitarian needs are escalating rapidly as 65 % of Sudan’s population lived below the poverty line even before the latest clashes. Western embassies are evacuating their nationals.
Regional and international repercussionsSudan’s power struggles will have severe repercussions on the country’s attempts to transition to democracy, as well as on stability at regional level. Previously, the AU, the EU and the US have strongly supported the implementation of democratic reforms and provided considerable funding. However, this has failed to help achieve the negotiated targets (which included establishing a transitional civilian government, transitional justice and security and military reform).
Both sides have been trying to strengthen alliances inside and outside the country. Al‑Burhan has the support of veteran Darfuri rebels and some Islamist groups. Hemedti won ‘the favor of some democrats by criticizing the Islamists’ strong return‘, according to a Sudanese editorialist. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as the Wagner Group, reportedly provided weapons, training and troops for Hemedti’s RSF.
Several regional and international powers have economic and political interests in the sub‑Saharan country, which a democratic transition could have threatened. Egypt has sided with Al‑Burhan, until recently an ally against the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the River Nile, and ‘probably to try to prevent a dangerous precedent of successful transition from military autocracy to civilian democracy’, according to one security expert.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported the overthrowing of Al‑Bashir in 2019, and have sided with Hemedti, who provided them with troops to fight in Yemen. China and Russia have invested heavily in extracting Sudanese natural resources and it is expected that they will try to preserve their economic and security interests. According to experts, the fighting will continue for the foreseeable future. Strong diplomatic efforts involving regional players, such as the AU, the Arab League and the Horn of Africa’s Inter‑Governmental Association for Development (IGAD) may play a significant role in preventing the escalation of the conflict and in providing humanitarian help for civilians to overcome the crisis. An International Crisis Group expert suggests that one of the Arab countries might drive the dialogue for the cessation of hostilities, as these countries are the most affected by the crisis.
EU involvementThe day before the outbreak of the crisis, the EU and its partners expressed concern about the tensions. Shortly after, the EU High Representative called for a ceasefire and for humanitarian corridors to be set up. The EU special representative for the Horn of Africa has entered discussions with the AU and other stakeholders on ending the conflict. On 24 April 2023, the EU Foreign Affairs Council discussed evacuation plans and mediation possibilities to prevent the escalation of the conflict. EU Member State-led operations have evacuated most of the 1 700 EU citizens present in Sudan, as well as non-EU citizens. Humanitarian supply distribution and refugee corridors are among the first EU humanitarian priorities. During the 24 April Council meeting, Finland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto, (Special EU Envoy to Sudan in 2021), highlighted the risks of further Wagner Group engagement in the region, considering the lack of involvement from Western democracies. Some analysts recommend that the EU should take on a mediator role to support civilian actors in the political process.
Members from the European Parliament‘s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) visited Sudan in September 2022, to urge ‘all parties to come to an agreement’ to resume the path to democracy. They also expressed their concern that ‘further delay in agreeing on the way out of the crisis [would…] aggravate the already immense challenges that the people of Sudan are facing’.
AFET and the Committee on Development (DEVE) discussed the situation in Sudan on 26 April 2023. A particular focus was on evacuation plans activated for EU citizens living and working in the country. The committees urged cooperation with regional powers, to reach an agreement to enhance peace, development and humanitarian access. The committees also highlighted the importance of avoiding the regionalisation of the conflict, or a prolonged ceasefire that would allow both militias to resupply.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Sudan crisis: Developments and implications‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
CO₂ emission performance standards and reporting obligations for new heavy-duty vehicles [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Gregor Erbach (1st edition).
Road transport is a major contributor to climate change, and CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles have grown by 29 % since 1990, accounting for over a quarter of road transport CO2 emissions.
On 14 February 2023, the European Commission tabled a legislative proposal to revise Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 setting CO2 emission standards for new heavy-duty vehicles in the EU. The proposed revision would expand the scope of the regulation to include urban buses, coaches, trailers and other types of lorries. The average CO2 emissions of heavy-duty vehicles, compared with 2019 levels, would have to fall by 45 % from 2030, by 65 % from 2035, and by 90 % from 2040 onwards. The proposal sets CO2 requirements for new trailers and targets 100 % of newly registered urban buses to be zero-emission vehicles from 2030.
In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The Council is examining the proposal at working party level.
Versions- May 2023: CO₂ emission performance standards and reporting obligations for new heavy-duty vehicles (1st edition)
14.2.2023Rapporteur:Yannick Jadot (Greens/EFA, France)2023/0042(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jens Gieseke (EPP, Germany)
Christel Schaldemose (S&D, Denmark)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report
Categories: European Union
European Parliament Plenary Session – May I, 2023
Written by Clare Ferguson.
Members of the European Parliament meet in plenary from 8 to 11 May, a significant week in the European Union calendar, as Europe Day, celebrating peace and unity, falls on 9 May. That day, the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, is due to attend the plenary to take part in the latest ‘This is Europe’ debate. The following day, the President of Portugal, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, is expected to address Members in a formal sitting. On Tuesday, The Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell is due to make a statement on the situation in Sudan, where violence is aggravating the already immense challenges the people of Sudan are facing in plenary on Tuesday.
The biggest issue on Parliament’s plenary agenda for this session is the EU budget. Members are expected to hold a joint debate on the current EU budget and own resources on Monday evening. The EU’s current financial situation is very tight, with rising EU recovery instrument (EURI) borrowing costs undermining the EU’s capacity to finance its priorities. Members are set to debate a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report urging a revision of the EU’s long-term budget before 2024. To avoid having to cancel existing programmes due to lack of funds, the committee calls on the Council to act urgently to adopt the stalled Own Resources Decision.
To ensure the transparent and democratic scrutiny of how public funds are spent, Parliament’s elected Members decide whether the EU institutions have disbursed their budget in accordance with the rules. On Tuesday, Members are due to discuss a number of files concerning the discharge procedure for the EU’s 2021 budget. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommends granting discharge to all 33 EU decentralised agencies and 9 joint undertakings. However, the committee also draws attention to the European Court of Auditors’ recommendations, including the need for all joint undertakings to adopt common guidelines. In the light of the continued institutional differences between Parliament and the European Council and the Council, the committee once again proposes to postpone the decision on discharge of their 2021 budget. In the interests of transparency, Parliament has refused to grant discharge to the Council each financial year since 2009. In contrast, the CONT committee proposes to grant discharge to all other EU institutions and bodies, although it again makes observations on opportunities to improve budgetary management. For the first time, the discharge procedure for the European Commission will also apply to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Here, the Commission appears to have taken previous CONT committee criticism on board, and CONT proposes that Parliament grant discharge to the Commission, all executive agencies and for the European Development Funds for 2021. However, it also draws attention to the need for stronger control on spending by national authorities and non-governmental organisations.
Members continue to focus on efforts towards mitigating climate change on Monday evening. The oil, gas and coal sectors are responsible for more than a third of man-made methane emissions worldwide. Parliament’s Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and on Industry, Research and Energy have examined the European Commission’s proposals for an EU strategy to reduce energy sector methane emissions and Members are due to debate their joint report on Monday evening, with the aim of fixing the institution’s position for trilogue negotiations. Among other changes, the report seeks to oblige the Commission to set a binding 2030 methane emissions reduction target for all actors in the sector.
To prevent companies making bogus claims about the environmental impact of their products, among other things, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) have prepared a report that seeks to strengthen protection and legal certainty for consumers and economic operators alike, in the context of a Commission proposal to empower consumers for the green transition. Members are due to debate the report on Tuesday evening, with the resulting text setting Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.
In a joint debate also scheduled for Tuesday evening, Members are due to consider a recommendation from the Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) to grant the Council’s request for Parliament’s consent for ratification of EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. First proposed in 2016, six EU countries have refused to ratify the Istanbul Convention on violence against women. However, as the European Court of Justice has ruled that unanimity in the Council is not necessary in this case, the way is open for a broader EU accession to an agreement that addresses gender-based violence (GBV).
Each year, Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) reviews the Commission’s reports on reform progress in countries hoping to join the EU. Members are due to debate the committee’s findings on two of these reports, for 2022, on Tuesday evening. In the first, on Serbia, the committee welcomes the country’s continued ambition for EU membership. However, it regrets Serbia’s failure to align with EU sanctions against Russia and its continued difficult relations with Kosovo. Normalising relations between Belgrade and Pristina would be an important step forward on Serbia’s path to EU membership. Although the second report, on Kosovo, calls for a commitment to genuine dialogue with Serbia, the AFET committee commends Kosovo’s progress on reforms and fighting corruption, and particularly praises Kosovo’s condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
With over 1.1 million signatures, the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop Finning – Stop the trade‘ has earned support across the EU. Members are therefore due to debate the defence of sharks and rays on Thursday morning. The initiative aims to ban fin trading – other than when naturally attached to the shark’s body – in the EU, which remains one of the biggest exporters and transit centres for shark fins. Indeed catching sharks is now largely for fin trading, according to the ECI’s organisers, in particular with the aim of exporting to Asian regions.
Agenda Plenary Session May I 2023
- Situation in Sudan
- EU Budget Discharge 2021 – European Commission
- EU Budget Discharge 2021 – Other institutions
- EU Budget Discharge 2021 – Decentralised agencies
- Impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing borrowing costs for the European Union Recovery Instrument
- Reducing methane emissions in the energy sector
- Empowering consumers for the green transition
- EU accession to the Istanbul Convention
- 2022 report on Serbia
- 2022 report on Kosovo
- ‘Stop Finning – Stop the Trade!’: European Citizens’ Initiative in defence of sharks and rays
Categories: European Union
What if nature taught us to adapt to climate change? [Science and Technology Podcast]
Written by Nera Kuljanic with Michael Sicaud-Clyet.
Over the past 3.8 billion years, nature has been engineering itself to survive. It has also developed efficient and sustainable adaptation mechanisms against changing environmental conditions. To further the EU’s political ambitions, could we employ biomimicry to mitigate climate change and achieve climate neutrality?
Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, societies have gone from a set of metabolisms – using energy from water, wind and living beings – to a techno-industrial metabolism in which the economic and productive systems rely on carbon-based energy and excessive non-sustainable exploitation of natural resources. This new relationship between human beings and their environment has led to ecosystemic challenges such as climate change and diminishing biodiversity. Thus, over the past 200 years, the planet has been experiencing further biophysical transformations than what would otherwise have occurred naturally. While techno-industrial societies rely on fossil fuels, high temperatures and pressure to transform materials or create movement, natural ecosystems rely on molecular chemistry or physics, giving us clues on how we can use energy with maximum efficiency and adapt to changing environments.
Biomimicry comes from the Greek words bios (life) and mimikos (one who imitates). It is not a new practice; the most famous example of biomimicry is Leonardo Da Vinci’s flying machine inspired by birds. Biomimicry is a multidisciplinary approach that seeks to learn from nature’s biological mechanisms and imitate them to solve system problems. It is linked to biomimetics – the ‘interdisciplinary cooperation of biology and technology or other fields of innovation with the goal of solving practical problems through the function analysis of biological systems, their abstraction into models, and the transfer into and application of these models to the solution’.
There are three levels of practice in biomimicry. The organism level involves copying the form, shape or structure of a specific organism. The behaviour level involves imitating natural processes, such as the interaction between an ecosystem and its surroundings. The ecosystem level is about imitating the working principles of ecosystems, i.e. how different parts of an organism interact on a large scale.
Potential impacts and developmentsAt the organism level, most biomimicked structures fulfil an aesthetic purpose. Over the centuries, trees and plants have served as a source of inspiration for structures such as the ornamental structural columns in Greek and Roman classical architecture. In some rare cases, bio-inspired structures can interact with the environment. One such example is the Taichung Metropolitan Opera House in Taiwan, which can collect rainwater that is then filtered and reused.
At the behaviour level, biomimicry can make a greater contribution to fighting climate change and its impacts. A well-known example is the Harare Eastgate Centre, designed to resemble the shape and functioning of a termite mound. Termite mounds have a climate control function. Similarly, the way the centre extends upwards, the different wind velocities at its top and bottom, the fresh air that is drawn by means of a Venturi effect, as well as the heat emitted by the people and machinery on its premises give the building an impressively stable interior temperature, achieved without resorting to costly and energy-hungry air-conditioning. The building thus both mitigates climate change, by reducing energy consumption, and adapts to extreme heat events.
It is at the ecosystem level that biomimicry could have the biggest mitigating effect on climate change. An example includes the natural carbon removal process. Decomposition of organic matter ‘includes physical, chemical and biological mechanisms that transform organic matter into increasingly stable forms’. In boreal ecosystems, plant litter serves as a carbon source for micro-organisms that can degrade cellulose, hemicellulose and lignin. Bacteria provide trees with a number of substances (nitrogen, phosphorus, phytohormones and natural antibiotics) that improve their growth and protect them from disease. Fungi provide the forest ecosystem with nutrients, water and minerals. They also completely digest the lignin and produce humus, an organo-mineral complex that consists of about 60 % carbon, 6 % nitrogen, and smaller amounts of phosphorus and sulphur. The formation of this humic substance contributes to soil fertility and carbon storage. Fungi secrete glomalin (a glycoprotein made of glucose), which is estimated to contain a third of the carbon sequestered in the Earth’s soils. Finally, earthworms help to store carbon by mixing humus and clay provided by trees. Through all the above processes, decomposition plays an important role in the global carbon cycle by fixing nearly as much carbon as photosynthesis does. In 2019, natural land sinks, such as forests, grasslands and wetlands, fixed around 11.5 Gigatons of CO2, which is about 28 % of human-caused emissions. Thus, a whole ecosystem composed of trees, litter and micro-organisms produces an efficient process of carbon capture and storage.
There is currently no technology mimicking decomposition as a way to mitigate climate change. An ongoing ERC-funded project, CO2LIFE, ‘intends to develop a biomimetic chemical process that converts CO2 into valuable molecules using membrane technology’. CO2LIFE’s starting point is acknowledging nature’s effective mechanism to concentrate CO2 and fixate it into organic material, especially glucose, by means of enzymatic action. The findings of this project could make an important contribution towards developing a technology that imitates nature’s biological processes to mitigate climate change.
Anticipatory policy-makingAn important issue regarding the further development of biomimetic solutions is the overall lack of financial investment in nature-based solutions and biodiversity restoration. Indeed, the development of biomimetic solutions could benefit from more substantial policy support, as is the case in the United States, where the government has provided funding for biomimicry research. In the EU, Germany hosts more than 100 public research institutions conducting biomimicry-related research and development, and a pioneering research centre in biomimicry was established in France in 2014. The EU has been funding work such as the Horizon 2020 AIRCOAT project and the Horizon Europe Nature4Nature project.
The role of education policy is important to further the understanding of the complexities of natural ecosystems. There are a number of higher education programmes in biomimicry in the EU – for instance, in the Netherlands, Spain and France – aimed at understanding nature’s capacity for solving system problems.
Finally, carbon-farming methods, where CO2 is removed from the atmosphere and stored in plant materials or soils, might need to be certified as part of the recently proposed regulation establishing a Union certification framework for carbon removals. Similar schemes could apply to future biomimetic technologies replicating chemical and biological processes from nature, to store and convert carbon.
Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if nature taught us to adapt to climate change?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Listen to podcast ‘What if nature taught us to adapt to climate change?’ on YouTube.
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Categories: European Union
Türkiye’s high-stakes elections [What Think Tanks are thinking]
Written by Marcin Grajewski.
Türkiye holds presidential and parliamentary elections on 14 May 2023, which could mark a political turnaround after two decades of increasing autocratic rule of the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan faces an unprecedented challenge from the main opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the head of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and presidential nominee for the six-party Nation Alliance bloc.
The elections take place amid a serious economic crisis and what analysts say is democratic erosion under Erdogan’s government. Polls predict a record voter turnout, and a tight race between the incumbent president and Kilicdaroglu. Under the Erdogan party’s rule, the Muslim country has abandoned its secularist tradition and turned into an increasingly difficult partner for the West, including the European Union and NATO.
This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Türkiye’s election, its relations with the EU and its internal and foreign policies.
Letter from Istanbul: Turkey has difficult years ahead
Brookings Institution, April 2023
Green politics could have an outsized impact on Türkiye’s elections
Carnegie Europe, April 2023
The strategic consequences of a Kılıçdaroğlu victory over Erdoğan
Carnegie Europe, April 2023
What the 2023 Turkish general election could mean for the EU-Turkey elections
Centre for European Reform, April 2023
Experts insights: Turkish elections
Clingendael, April 2023
Erdoğan is losing but the Turkish opposition is far from an assured victory
Democracy Paradox, April 2023
How the West should prepare for the Turkish elections
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023
La Turquie, nouveau leader des non-alignés? Analyse de son repositionnement géostratégique
Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, April 2023
A new new Turkey? What an opposition victory would mean for Ankara’s foreign policy
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2023
Un équilibre entre sécurité et innovation: La vision de l’opposition turque sur les politiques numériques du pays
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023
Les coalitions politiques en Turquie à la veille des élections de 2023
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023
Turkey goes to the polls: What lies ahead for its relations with the EU?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023
EU-Turkey-UK triangulation: The key to Euro-Atlantic security
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023
At a crossroads: What is at stake in Turkey‘s elections?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2023
What Turkey’s elections mean for Ukraine
Wilson Center, April 2023
Will earthquake be Erdogan’s Tarpeian rock?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, March 2023
The EU and Turkey after the elections: The start of a new chapter
Centre for European Reform, March 2023
Erdoğan is in danger
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023
Has there been a rapprochement between Turkey and the West after the invasion of Ukraine
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, March 2023
Turkey vis-à-vis Russia’s war against Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023
Turkey’s foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean: Peace-making in Cyprus at a cross-road
IPC-Mercator, March 2023
Consequences of the war in Ukraine: Two Areas of contention -Turkey and the Balkans
Rand Corporation, March 2023
Political and economic implications of the Turkish earthquakes:
Centralisation of power has eroded state capacity
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023
The politics of Türkiye’s earthquake
Carnegie Europe, February 2023
Sailing through the storm: Türkiye’s Black Sea strategyaAmidst the Russian-Ukrainian war
Carnegie Europe, February 2023
Turkey’s neutral stance in Ukraine: How sustainable will it be?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, February 2023
Turkey’s profound transformation matters to Europe
Carnegie Europe, January 2023
Is the EU ready for and/or willing to a change in Turkey?Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, January 2023
From aid to inclusion: A better way to help Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023
Turkey’s Kurds: Kingmakers in the upcoming elections?
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, January 2023
Governance practices in Turkey: A comparative perspective
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, January 2023
U.S., Turkey sanction ISIS financial network
Wilson Center, January 2023
Turkey’s global military footprint in 2022
Atlantic Council, December 2022
Turkey learns that hard power is a global common currency: Defense diplomacy elevates Ankara’s status on the international stage
Atlantic Council, December 2022
Understanding Turkey’s geostrategic posture
Carnegie Europe, November 2022
Bromance: Turkey’s activity in the Western Balkans
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2023
Turkey’s Eurasian ambitions at a time of geopolitical uncertainty
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2022
Read this briefing on ‘Türkiye’s high-stakes elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Schengen Area and EU visa policy
Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask about the European Union’s rules regarding the Schengen Area and EU visa policy.
The Schengen area enables EU citizens and non-EU nationals, who are legally present in the EU, to travel between countries without being checked at national borders. It contributes to the free movement of citizens, allowing them to live, work and move around without formalities.
Twenty-seven countries are part of the Schengen agreement. They include most EU countries as well as four non-EU countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland).
The EU Member States Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland and Romania are not Schengen countries. Ireland has opted out of joining the agreement, while Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania are expected to join in the future.
Common rules for border checksTo ensure safe and controlled entry into the Schengen area, the Schengen Borders Code sets common rules for checks at the external border. These include checks on persons, duration of stay, as well as harmonised visa requirements for the Schengen area.
Member countries are evaluated regularly through the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism, to verify that the rules concerning the Schengen area are being applied.
In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code, which aims to improve the Schengen system’s resilience to serious threats, and to adapt it to new challenges. The proposal, which falls under the ordinary legislative procedure, is at the initial stage of the legislative process.
Common visa policyThe EU has established a common visa policy for travellers transiting or intending to stay for a short period in the Schengen area. It facilitates the entry of legal visitors into the EU, while strengthening internal security.
The most common type of visa for non-EU citizens is a short-stay visa, entitling a person to stay up to 90 days in a period of 180 days. Any of the Schengen countries can grant a visa, according to the Visa Code, which was updated in November 2021 to make the application process faster and easier, as well as to improve cooperation with non-EU countries. Visa requests for longer stays are managed by the EU country in which the visa applicant wishes to stay.
The EU has a common list of countries whose citizens must have a visa when crossing the external borders and a list of countries whose citizens are exempt from that requirement. These lists are set out in a 2021 regulation.
Temporary reintroduction of internal border controlsWhile the EU aims to keep the internal borders of the Schengen area open to facilitate free movement, member countries have the right to reintroduce internal border controls temporarily in exceptional circumstances, for instance:
- foreseeable events (e.g. sports events) drawing significant attention (renewable periods of 30 days, up to 6 months);
- immediate action that needs to be taken to respond to a threat (renewable periods of 20 days, up to 2 months);
- persistent serious deficiencies relating to external border control (3 renewals of any period up to 2 years).
These measures should only be introduced as a last resort to protect common interests within the Schengen Area. Recent examples include: some countries introduced internal border controls during the large-scale arrivals of migrants and refugees into the EU in 2015; and temporary internal border controls and travel restrictions from 2020 onwards, to prevent the spread of the coronavirus.
While sometimes necessary, internal border controls or closures can have a negative effect on both the economy and the fundamental freedoms of EU citizens. The European Parliament considers the Schengen Area a key EU achievement. In a 2021 resolution, Parliament expressed its commitment to safeguarding border-free movement.
Schengen enlargementCroatia joined the Schengen area on 1 January 2023, following a period of intensive preparation and substantial efforts to meet all the necessary requirements.
Bulgaria and Romania have not yet joined the Schengen area, although they fulfil the criteria for full membership. The decision to allow new states to enter the border-free zone is taken unanimously by national governments. In a resolution on Bulgarian and Romanian accession to the Schengen area, adopted in October 2022, the European Parliament reiterated its long-standing position that Bulgaria and Romania should be allowed to join the Schengen area.
Further information- The impact of coronavirus on Schengen borders, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, April 2020
- Temporary border controls in the Schengen area, European Parliamentary Research Service, At A Glance, March 2020
- Revision of the common visa code, European Parliament, Legislative Train
- Schengen, Borders and Visa, European Commission
Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.
Categories: European Union
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