European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso.

The European Union (EU) has an energy strategy focused on providing households and businesses with secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy. This will require a major transformation of Europe’s energy system as well as massive investment. Alongside national funding, various EU instruments contribute to the financing of energy policy, which is central to efforts to decarbonise the European economy under the European Green Deal.

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the EU’s ground-breaking recovery instrument, created to counter the impact of the pandemic crisis, is a new and important source of funding for the policy area, since it includes investment and reform in the areas of energy efficiency, clean power and energy networks. The national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs), through which the RRF is implemented, have a strong focus on energy, investing €88.49 billion (17.9 % of their resources) in the policy area.

The energy dimension of the NRRPs varies across the Member States, depending on factors such as their specific challenges, priorities and preferences in green spending, and size of the plans. One criticism that has emerged is that the plans could have done more to develop cross-border projects. In any case, other significant sources of public and private financing will be required to meet the major investment needs of the policy area.

The REPowerEU plan, designed to end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the green transition, has increased these needs. The European Parliament, a strong advocate for a common energy policy and a key player in scrutiny of RRF implementation, has stressed the need to enhance the RRF contribution to mitigating the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The European Parliament and the Council are currently examining a European Commission proposal to finance additional investment and reform in the field of energy. It would introduce new REPowerEU chapters to the NRRPs, using sums still available for RRF loans, some fresh resources and voluntary transfers from other EU instruments. The REPowerEU chapters should enhance the already important contribution that the RRF is making to financing energy investment and reform.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy policy in the national recovery and resilience plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Xi-Jinping won a third term in China’s top job, as secretary general of the Communist Party, at its Congress in October, solidifying his grip on power over a country which has become increasingly autocratic and abrasive in its foreign policy during his 10-year reign to date. Xi’s re-election for a third term broke with China’s recent tradition of leaders being replaced after two terms, in a sign he will yield power in a manner reminiscent of communist China’s founder Mao Zedong. His new reign begins amid fears that China might try to annex Taiwan, and with questions over the extent to which he will support Russia in its war against Ukraine. Domestically, Xi faces challenges including faltering growth, a property crisis, and huge debt levels.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on China, its international relations and domestic policies.

What Xi Jinping’s third term means for the world
Atlantic Council, October 2022

Reading between the lines of Xi’s party congress speech
Atlantic Council, October 2022

An allied strategy for China after the 20th Party Congress
Atlantic Council, October 2022

Tracking the biggest takeaways from China’s Communist Party Congress
Atlantic Council, October 2022

Why China’s leadership must respond to the country’s property crisis
Atlantic Council, October 2022

Xi’s three difficulties: The leadership line-up at the 20th Party Congress
Brookings Institution, October 2022

On the eve of the party congress: What’s ahead for China’s economy?
Brookings Institution, October 2022

Are worsening US-China relations in Taiwan’s interest?
Brookings Institution, October 2022

The critical importance of chips – and having a plan for them
Bruegel, October 2022

China’s real estate sector goes south
Bruegel, October 2022

China and the West: growing apart as geopolitical tensions grow
Bruegel, October 2022

Germany’s continued illusions about China and Russia
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

The inauguration of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

The new U.S National Security Strategy: Battling China for technological leadership
Centre for European Reform, October 2022

The EU should abandon chip nationalism
Centre for European Reform, October 2022

US-China rivalry in the Global South? Insights from a public opinion survey
Central European Institute for Asian Studies, October 2022

Taiwan Strait crisis: Implications for Europe
Central European Institute for Asian Studies, October 2022

Why a more inward-looking China is bad news for the world economy
Chatham House, October 2022

China’s Party Congress: a dose of foreign policy realism is needed
Chatham House, October 2022

Xi Jinping shows the world he is taking a tougher line
Chatham House, October 2022

The UK must avoid conflict with Europe and China
Chatham House, October 2022

We can’t make China dance to our tune
Clingendael, October 2022

How Xi will consolidate power at China’s twentieth party congress
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Washington raises stakes in war on Chinese technology
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

The Chinese Communist Party
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Xi Jinping seeks stability: The 20th National Congress of the CCP
Egmont Institute, October 2022

China between lockdowns and the 20th Party Congress: What can we expect for the EU and globally?
Egmont, October 2022

Watching China in Europe – October 2022
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

The China challenge: Xi Prepares for his third term and beyond
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

Why China is not all-In on supporting Russia
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

20e Congrès du Parti communiste chinois: Décryptage de la nouvelle équipe dirigeante
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2022

China’s economic challenges and the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
Institute for International Security Studies, October 2022

Brussels–Taipei: Changing the game?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2022

The foreign policy implications of China’s twentieth party congress
International Crisis Group, October 2022

China’s economic challenges and the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2022

Xi Jinping the III: Ruling through the pandemic and isolationism
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, October 2022

Key takeaways from Xi’s report to the party congress
Mercator Institute for China Studies, October 2022

The China-Europe freight train and the war in Ukraine: Triumph and tribulations in transcontinental shipping
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

Four years into the trade war, are the US and China decoupling?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2022

China’s private sector advance pauses, but the trend is unclear
Peterson Institute for International Economic, October 2022

The political geography of the South China Sea disputes
Rand Corporation, October 2022

Anticipating Chinese reactions to U.S. posture enhancements
Rand Corporation, October 2022

Building bridges? PGII versus BRI
Brookings Institution, September 2022

Succeeding in the AI competition with China: A strategy for action
Brookings Institution, September 2022

China’s top ranked corporations are not as opaque as they may seem
Bruegel, September 2022

The EU should abandon chip nationalism
Centre for European Reform, September 2022

China Party Congress: Xi’s political blueprint
Chatham House, September 2022

China is divided on Russia: Let’s keep it that way
Clingendael, September 2022

China’s repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

China’s footprint in Latin America
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2022

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Successful economic strategy or failed soft-power tool?
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, September 2022

Responding to the China challenge: Blueprint 2.0
Heritage Foundation, September 2022

“Comprehensive National Security” unleashed: How Xi’s approach shapes China’s policies at home and abroad
Mercator Institute for China Studies, September 2022

First trade war, now Russia’s real war. Why US exports to China continue to suffer
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Xi re-elected to China’s top job‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi.

The ‘farm to fork’ strategy is a roadmap to build a sustainable European Union (EU) food system, in line with the aims of the European Green Deal. Launched in May 2020, the strategy includes initiatives that are progressing at different speeds, within a lively political debate on the strategy’s objectives and priorities. The EU institutions are helping to shape the various elements of the strategy.

European Commission proposal – Where do we stand?

On 20 May 2020, the European Commission adopted a communication on ‘A farm to fork strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally friendly food system’, to address priorities and challenges relating to every step in the food chain. The strategy announced a number of legislative and non‑legislative initiatives, most of them listed in an annexed action plan. One of the leading initiatives was a proposal for a legislative framework for sustainable food systems (FSFS) – expected in 2023 – which was the subject of a public consultation in 2022 and includes the planned initiative on a sustainability labelling framework.

The Commission has already delivered on some ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiatives, for instance:

• the 2020 recommendations to EU countries on their common agricultural policy (CAP) strategic plans;
• the 2021 contingency plan to ensure food supply and food security in times of crisis;
• the EU code of conduct on responsible food business and marketing practices, in force as of July 2021;
• a proposal for a directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, put forward in 2022.

The timetable for some initiatives is set in the EU biodiversity strategy (for instance the 2021 organic production action plan and the future action plan on better nutrient management). Other initiatives require multiple actions over a longer period, such as the improvement of producers’ position in the food chain, which involves the operation of EU rules on unfair trading practices and of CAP rules on agricultural markets.

The following tables outline ongoing and future ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiatives as regards food chain production segments (see Table 1) and areas spanning food services to food consumption (see Table 2).

Table 1 – Ongoing and planned ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiatives on sustainable food production

InitiativeState of playPlant protection products (PPPs)In June 2022, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal on the sustainable use of PPPs. Other rules adopted in the course of 2022 concern the facilitation of the marketing of PPPs with biological active substances and the collection of pesticide statistics.Farm sustainability data network (FSDN)In June 2022, the Commission put forward a legislative proposal to include data on sustainable farming practices in the current farm accountancy data network (FADN).Feed additivesCurrent feed additives rules were the subject of an evaluation in 2021, with a view to the adoption of a proposal for a regulation due in 2021 but not yet adopted.Carbon farmingAfter its 2021 communication on sustainable carbon cycles, the Commission is due to adopt a legislative proposal on EU rules on certifying carbon removals on farms in 2022.New genomic techniques (NGTs)Following a 2021 study on the status of NGTs under EU law, a public consultation took place in 2022 and the adoption of a legislative proposal on NGTs is due in 2023.Animal welfareOnce the fitness check of EU animal welfare legislation has been finalised in 2022, the revision of the legislation, including on animal transport and slaughter, is due in 2023.Source: Compiled by the author.

Table 2 – Ongoing and planned ‘farm to fork’ strategy initiatives beyond food production

InitiativeState of playGeographical indications (GIs)A legislative proposal published in 2022 aims to strengthen the legislative framework for GIs, so as to improve protection of intellectual property rights and increase uptake of GIs.Promotion policyAfter a public consultation, the Commission aims to enhance the role of EU promotion campaigns for agri‑food products in sustainable production and consumption in 2022.Marketing standardsThe legislative proposals expected in 2022 to revise marketing standards for fish and seafood products, agricultural products, and seeds and forests, have yet to be published.Nutrient profilesA legislative initiative on nutrient thresholds (announced for 2022) is still in preparation.Food labellingPreparatory work is ongoing on revised EU laws (announced for 2022) on front‑of‑pack nutrition labelling, origin indication for certain products, and date marking.Food contact materialsNew rules on recycled plastic intended to come into contact with food entered into force in 2022, while a major overhaul of EU food contact material laws is announced for 2023.Food procurement and school schemeIn 2023, the Commission is set to put forward minimum criteria for sustainable public procurement of food, and a review of the legal framework for the EU school scheme.Food wasteIn 2023, the Commission plans to propose legally binding targets to reduce food waste.Source: Compiled by the author.

When it comes to the ‘farm to fork’ strategy’s global dimension, a 2022 Commission report indicates tools to promote production sustainability standards in imports. It also identifies some areas for action: multilateral forums, bilateral cooperation and trade agreements, and unilateral EU measures. The chapter on sustainable food systems featuring in recent bilateral trade agreements and the legislative initiative on deforestation‑free goods are examples of measures to promote the global sustainability transition sought by the strategy.

The debate around the strategy remains lively

Generally greeted as a long‑awaited move towards a more sustainable EU food system, the ‘farm to fork’ strategy is contentious on two points. First, stakeholders and decision‑makers disagree on whether action on food emergencies (such as those caused first by the coronavirus pandemic and then by Russia’s war on Ukraine) should be prioritised over action on the environment and climate emergencies (which the strategy aims to tackle). Second, the Commission has not accommodated stakeholders’ and policy‑makers’ requests for an impact assessment of the strategy, whereas various studies have warned that some elements of the strategy risk having a negative effect on agricultural production. The Commission has stressed that most of the strategy’s initiatives involve an impact assessment, in line with the better regulation approach. Despite some delay on a few initiatives, the Commission intends to implement the strategy as planned.

The EU institutions’ positions

In Parliament, an October 2021 resolution on the ‘farm to fork’ strategy backed its main elements, stressing such issues as building a sustainable common food policy, helping the sustainability transition, and producing healthier food. The Council’s October 2020 conclusions on the strategy broadly welcomed the initiatives announced, conveying political messages on the need to ensure food security and support producers while contributing to EU climate neutrality by 2050. Both the European Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee welcomed the ‘farm to fork’ strategy in 2020. They suggested issues for consideration and identified gaps to address for an effective roadmap. These included the need for consistency between food‑related policies and the contribution of local and rural communities to such policies, the necessity of fair food prices reflecting the environmental and societal cost of production, and reciprocity of standards in trade agreements.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Taking the EU’s ‘farm to fork’ strategy forward‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vivienne Hallleux (1st edition).

As announced in the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, on 22 June 2022 the European Commission tabled a proposal for a nature restoration regulation. The proposed regulation would set multiple binding restoration targets and obligations across a broad range of ecosystems, from forests and agricultural land to urban areas, rivers and marine habitats, complementing other existing legal instruments. Altogether, these nature restoration measures should cover at least 20 % of the EU’s land and sea areas by 2030, and all ecosystems in need of restoration by 2050. Member States would be required to develop nature restoration plans to reach these targets at national level; the Commission would assess these plans.

While nature restoration enjoys strong public support, the proposal has raised concerns among stakeholders as regards the enforceability and achievability of the targets, the economic and social implications, the protection of property rights and the financial support for restoration.

The text is now with the co-legislators. In Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointed César Luena as rapporteur on 12 July 2022. The ENVI committee is expected to discuss the rapporteur’s draft report in January 2023.

Versions

• October 2022: EU nature restoration regulation: Setting binding targets for healthy ecosystems (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on nature restoration Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022)304
22.6.2022Rapporteur:César Luena (S&D, Spain)2022/0195(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Christine Schneider (EPP, Germany)
María Soraya Rodrígues Ramos (Renew Spain)
Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Mick Wallace (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of a draft report

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on her to award the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Mr Julian Assange, co-founder of WikiLeaks.

Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in October 2022. The European Parliament awards the prize each year through a process involving many actors. The final decision on the winner of the prize is made by the leaders of the political groups.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English, Italian, French and German).

Main points made in the reply in English

The European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize pays tribute to the work of human rights defenders and is the highest recognition the European Union attaches to their human rights efforts. Respect for fundamental freedoms is a core value of the European Union, which it promotes through its external policy.

In September of each year, a political group or at least 40 Members of the European Parliament may nominate candidates for the Sakharov Prize. Each Member may support only a single candidate. From the list of nominees, three finalists are then shortlisted, following a joint vote in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Development and the Subcommittee on Human Rights.

This year, the three finalists are :

• Julian Assange, co-founder of the WikiLeaks association
• the people of Ukraine, represented by their president, elected leaders, and civil society
• the Truth Commission in Colombia

Julian Assange was nominated by Sabrina Pignedoli and 40 Members of the European Parliament.

Please note that the winner is chosen by the leaders of the political groups; the President’s role is to announce the winner. The award ceremony will take place in December.

Main points made in the reply in Italian

Il Premio Sacharov del Parlamento europeo rende omaggio all’attività dei difensori dei diritti umani ed è il massimo riconoscimento che l’Unione europea conferisce agli sforzi compiuti a favore dei diritti dell’uomo. Il rispetto delle libertà fondamentali è un valore basilare dell’Unione europea, che essa promuove attraverso la sua politica esterna.

Nel settembre di ogni anno un gruppo politico o almeno quaranta deputati al Parlamento europeo possono nominare i candidati al premio Sacharov. Ciascun deputato può sostenere una sola candidatura. Dall’elenco dei candidati vengono selezionati quindi tre finalisti mediante un voto congiunto della commissione per gli affari esteri, della commissione per lo sviluppo e della sottocommissione per i diritti dell’uomo.

Quest’anno i tre finalisti sono:

• Julian Assange, co-fondatore di Wikileaks
• il popolo dell’Ucraina, rappresentato dal loro presidente, dai leader eletti e dalla società civile
• la Commissione per la verità della Colombia

Julian Assange è stato nominato da Sabrina Pignedoli e altri 40 eurodeputati.

Le segnaliamo che il vincitore viene scelto dai leader dei gruppi politici; il ruolo della Presidente è annunciare il vincitore. La cerimonia di assegnazione del premio si terrà a dicembre.

Main points made in the reply in French

Le prix Sakharov du Parlement européen rend hommage au travail des défenseurs des droits de l’homme. Il s’agit de la plus haute reconnaissance que l’Union européenne attache à leurs efforts en matière de droits de l’homme. Le respect des libertés fondamentales est une valeur essentielle de l’Union européenne, qu’elle promeut dans le cadre de sa politique extérieure.

Chaque année, en septembre, les groupes politiques ou au moins 40 députés au Parlement européen peuvent nominer des candidats au prix Sakharov. Chaque député ne peut soutenir qu’un seul candidat. Sur la liste des candidats proposés, trois finalistes sont ensuite sélectionnés lors d’un vote conjoint de la commission des affaires étrangères et de la commission du développement, ainsi que de la sous-commission « droits de l’homme ».

Cette année, les trois finalistes sont:

• Julian Assange, co-fondateur de Wikileaks
• Le brave peuple d’Ukraine, représenté par son président, ses dirigeants élus et la société civile
• La Commission de la vérité de Colombie

Julian Assange a été nominé par Sabrina Pignedoli et 40 députés européens.

Veuillez noter que le lauréat est choisi par les présidents des groupes politiques; le rôle de la Présidente est d’annoncer le lauréat. La cérémonie de remise du prix aura lieu en décembre.

Main points made in the reply in German

Der Sacharow-Preis des Europäischen Parlaments wird an Personen und Organisationen verliehen, die sich für Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten einsetzen. Er ist die höchste Anerkennung, die die Europäische Union für Bemühungen um Menschenrechte vergibt. Die Achtung der Grundfreiheiten ist ein Grundwert der Europäischen Union, den sie somit auch durch ihre Außenpolitik fördert.

Jeden September können eine Fraktion oder mindestens 40 Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments Kandidaten für den Sacharow-Preis nominieren. Jedes Mitglied kann nur einen Kandidaten unterstützen. Von der Liste der Kandidaten werden drei Finalisten bei einer gemeinsamen Abstimmung des Ausschusses für auswärtige Angelegenheiten und des Entwicklungsausschusses sowie des Unterausschusses Menschenrechte in die engere Wahl gezogen.

In diesem Jahr sind die drei Finalisten:

• Julian Assange, Mitbegründer der Vereinigung WikiLeaks
• Das ukrainische Volk, vertreten durch seinen Präsidenten, seine gewählten Politiker und die Zivilgesellschaft
• Die Wahrheitskommission in Kolumbien

Julian Assange wurde von der Abgeordneten Sabrina Pignedoli und weiteren 40 Mitgliedern des Europäischen Parlaments nominiert.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass der Gewinner von den Fraktionsvorsitzenden ausgewählt wird; Aufgabe des Präsidenten ist es, den Gewinner bekanntzugeben. Die Preisverleihung findet im Dezember statt.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 8 November 2022, the US will hold mid-term elections. All 435 seats of the House (of Representatives) and 35 of the 100 Senate seats are on the ballot. The mid-terms will not only shape the power distribution of the 118th US Congress (2023-2024) and the chances of legislation being passed in a highly polarised Congress but also provide insights into which direction the US may take in the 2024 presidential race. In mid-term elections, US voters typically set an end to a ‘unified’ government where the president’s party is in control of both chambers, as was the situation during the 117th US Congress (2021-2022), by flipping the majority in at least one chamber. Historical precedent suggests a strong correlation between the incumbent president’s approval rating and the loss of House seats faced by the president’s party. Given President Biden’s current low approval rating, this does not bode well for Democrats. Recent polls suggest that the Democrats are likely to lose their thin majority in the House, but may retain control of the Senate. Of late, a string of vital legislative wins and two Supreme Court rulings have created some new momentum for Democrats.

The US primaries’ results for Republican candidates endorsed by former President Donald Trump suggest that his influence on the Republican Party should not be underestimated. Trump’s narrative about the ‘stolen election of 2020’ continues to resonate strongly with rank-and-file Republicans and the Republican voter base. Few Republican candidates have publicly distanced themselves from that narrative and many of those who have, as well as those who voted for Trump’s impeachment, have lost in the primaries against a Trump-endorsed Republican challenger. A Republican-controlled House is likely to mean legislative gridlock in many policy areas, with President Biden resorting to more executive orders for regulatory action, to his power to veto legislation, and to an increased focus on foreign policy, in particular if Republicans also take control of the Senate. Indeed, the House Republican legislative platform for the 118th Congress is testimony to growing partisanship on a wide range of sensitive domestic issues and to comparatively more bipartisanship on foreign policy issues.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 2022 US mid-term elections: Legislation meets politics‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eamonn Noonan.

The Russian invasion has caused huge destruction of life and property in Ukraine. Reconstruction will be a long and costly process, and the EU and others are already marshalling funds for this effort. Some EU leaders have expressed support for using frozen Russian central bank (RCB) funds towards reconstruction, but it is unclear if this will actually happen. There are recent examples of sovereign assets being confiscated and used to compensate victims of injustice, but the confiscation of Russia’s sovereign funds raises complex legal and political issues that are unlikely to be resolved quickly or easily.

Reconstruction costs and funding sources

The European Union is already engaged in efforts to prepare the reconstruction of Ukraine. The estimated costs are huge. On 18 May 2022, a European Commission communication announced plans to establish a Ukraine reconstruction platform. This would become the ‘strategic governance body’, led jointly by Ukraine’s National Recovery Council, the Commission and international partners. It would channel and coordinate financial support for reconstruction, in the form of the ‘RebuildUkraine’ facility.

At the ‘Ukraine Recovery’ Conference in Lugano, Switzerland on 4-5 July, Ukrainian prime minister Denys Shmygal stated that total reconstruction costs would amount to around US$750 billion, an estimate shared by the Kyiv School of Economics. The prime minister noted that Ukraine had so far received around US$100 billion for this purpose. The European Parliament strongly supports the provision of macro-financial aid for Ukraine.

Since the 24 February invasion, Ukraine’s Western partners and international organisations have been generous and swift in their financial support. The European Union, World Bank and International Monetary Fund were among the first to provide macro-financial assistance and emergency financing packages to the Ukrainian government. The financial support from the US and the UK to date is one of the largest emergency assistance packages in history.

The possibility of mobilising other, less conventional sources of funding remains open. The Commission communication and Shmygal both noted that the RCB’s substantial holdings abroad could be a source of income for Ukraine’s recovery. The US, the EU and other partners moved to freeze these funds within days of the invasion. The funds amount to approximately US$300-500 billion. This figure dwarfs any amount likely to be realised from the seizure of sanctioned oligarchs’ assets.

EU response: ‘Freeze and seize’

The Commission set up the ‘freeze and seize‘ task force in March 2022, in order to identify and freeze the assets of Russian oligarchs, and to ensure a coordinated approach within the EU and with other G7 partners. A proposed directive on asset recovery and confiscation will enhance the ability of national authorities to identify, freeze, confiscate and manage tainted assets. The focus is on the assets of individuals involved in criminal activities; the proposal does not specifically address the confiscation of Russian sovereign funds. The US has created a similar task force, known as Kleptocapture.

The European Parliament has called for compensation from Russia for war damages, arguing that Russian assets frozen as a result of sanctions ‘should be legally confiscated in accordance with international law’.

Political, strategic and legal obstacles

There are major political and strategic obstacles hampering confiscation of Russian sovereign funds. On the political front, the UN Compensation Commission serves as an interesting precedent. This was set up by the UN Security Council to deal with claims from Kuwait against Iraq, and it awarded US$52 billion in compensation to the victims of Saddam Hussein’s invasion. It is difficult to imagine the UN taking this approach in this case however. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia would be able to veto any such proposal to compensate Ukraine.

In 2018, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Arbitration Institute ordered Russian state-owned company Gazprom to pay US$2.9 billion in compensation to Ukraine’s Naftogaz, and this was duly paid. This is a not a reliable precedent for a judgment involving far greater amounts awarded directly against the Russian State, however, whose disregard for international law is well established. Early in 2022, the US confiscated US$7 billion from Afghan central bank funds, to be used to compensate the victims of terrorism, including relatives of 9/11 victims, and for humanitarian aid. A significant part of the legal justification for this step was that the US was a direct party to the conflict in Afghanistan; this argument cannot be made in relation to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

In law, there is a clear distinction between freezing assets (preventing their use) and confiscating them (removing title from the original owner). Legal analysts note that the principle of sovereign immunity is a formidable obstacle to the confiscation of RCB assets. Any such step could well be overturned by legal challenges, and any failure to comply with due legal process in the matter would be seen as undermining the rules-based order to which the West is committed. A further consideration is that confiscation without a UN Security Council decision could set a precedent that could later be used against the US or its allies. The  Economist also points out that seizure of sovereign assets could deter other countries, notably China, from holding substantial assets in the West in future.

Alternative avenues for compensation

These considerations may explain why the EU has not highlighted the possible use of frozen Russian assets among the potential sources for reconstruction, since the Commission’s communication in May. The moral case for seizing RCB assets is compelling, and the amounts involved are substantial. A significant foresight exercise may be needed in order to identify and resolve issues around legal authority and the legal basis, in addition to the problem of enforcing a judgment against Russia. The practical and political obstacles are such that alternative strategies need to be considered. Radosław Sikorski (EPP, Poland) Member of the European Parliament has called for legislation to allow victims of Russian terror to claim compensation from Russian state assets.

Philip Zelikow and Simon Johnson suggest that instead of confiscation, frozen assets could be used as a lever to achieve concessions from Russia. When the Russian war on Ukraine finally ends, countries that have imposed sanctions could insist on a condition for unfreezing RCB assets and for ending sanctions: that the Russian government agrees to make reparations to Ukraine. This would not require a Security Council resolution. Russia would face the reality that the loss of frozen assets, offset by a restoration of external economic links, would be preferable to the long-term continuation of the asset freeze coupled with continued economic isolation.

A further option is a tariff on Russian oil exports, with the revenue being allocated to Ukraine. Another is the diversion of payments for Russian oil into escrow accounts, to be released only when an agreement is reached on the lifting of sanctions and the provision of funding to Ukraine. With arrangements like this in place, Ukraine’s rebuilding could proceed, and Russia would ultimately have to bear a significant share of the costs.

The reconstruction of Ukraine is likely to be a generational task, extending far into the future. Efforts to secure compensation from Russia will be pursued vigorously – whether or not this involves the confiscation of currently frozen sovereign assets.

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘Confiscating Russian sovereign assets to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction: Mission impossible?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel.

At their 20-21 October 2002 meeting, European Union leaders focused on Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, energy and the economy, as well as on external relations, paying specific attention to China. They reiterated the EU’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and confirmed EU political, financial, military and humanitarian support to Ukraine. On energy, EU leaders agreed that the Council and the European Commission will ‘urgently submit concrete decisions’ on energy-related measures, including a gas price cap, an issue that still divides the Member States. The EU leaders also discussed means to protect critical infrastructure. During their exchange on external relations, EU leaders held a strategic discussion on relations with China, without adopting conclusions; discussed the preparation of the EU-ASEAN Commemorative Summit; took stock of the preparation of the upcoming United Nations-led summits on climate change and biodiversity; and condemned Iran’s human rights breaches. For the seventh time in a row, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed the European Council, stressing ‘terror must lose. Ukraine and all of Europe must win’. The European Parliament President, Roberta Metsola, addressed the leaders, noting that Ukraine is defending Europe and that ‘real peace can only come with justice – with a Tribunal to look into war crimes, perpetrators and restitution’.

1. Background

The European Council meeting began with the customary address by the President of the European Parliament. Roberta Metsola referred to reservations expressed regarding re-opening the EU multiannual financial framework (MFF). She stressed that a revision was needed ‘to respond to crises or to finance new priorities’ and underlined that ‘the MFF needed to be future-proofed with in-built flexibility’ to finance new priorities. President Metsola also drew attention to Moldova, stressing that it needs EU assistance, at a time when it is confronted with the ‘economic, humanitarian, energy or even political’ consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The meeting’s topics – Ukraine, energy and the economy – showed continuity with the informal European Council meeting held in Prague on 7 October 2022, and the next regular meeting on 15‑16 December 2022, as announced in the indicative 2022 Leaders’ Agenda. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called the meeting ‘fruitful’, underlining that the EU leaders ‘have this conviction that when [they] meet together [they] can increase [their] influence and have genuine constructive impact’. He announced a summit with Latin American and Caribbean countries for 2023, under the Spanish rotating presidency of the Council of the EU.

EU leaders offered Mario Draghi, the outgoing Prime Minister of Italy, a round of applause, whilst President Michel praised him for his ‘concise, brief and powerful style’.

2. European Council meeting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders reiterated the Union’s ‘full support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity’. They recalled their statement of 30 September 2022, condemning Russia’s illegal annexation of the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, and confirmed that the EU would never recognise this, just as it has not recognised the annexation of Crimea, Russia having ‘no legitimate basis for any action on the territory of Ukraine’. The EU leaders condemned the recent drone attacks ‘targeting civilians and civilian objects and infrastructure in Kyiv and across Ukraine’ and expressed support for the International Atomic Energy Agency in its efforts to maintain the safety and security of the Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia.

Addressing EU leaders by video-conference, President Zelenskyy stressed that a third of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure had been destroyed as a result of Russia’s attacks using Iranian combat drones, depleting Ukraine’s ability to export energy. He underlined that the IRIS‑T system provided by Germany protects both Ukrainians and Europeans, and urged transatlantic partners to supply more such systems ‘to create a truly reliable air shield’.

The EU leaders noted Ukraine’s ‘readiness for a just peace’ and again noted its right to defend itself, to liberate all illegally occupied territories and to re-establish its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Justice and accountability for war crimes were among the key issues discussed by the EU leaders. Several Member States, including Lithuania and Estonia, supported the creation of a special tribunal for war crimes committed in Ukraine, whist the EU institutions are ‘to explore options so that full accountability can be ensured’.

Reconstruction will be at the centre of the International Expert Conference hosted by the German Presidency of the G7 in Berlin on 25 October 2022. Leaders invited the Commission to present legally valid options for funding Ukraine’s reconstruction, including by using frozen Russian assets.

When it comes to military support, EU leaders noted that the Union will conduct an EU military assistance mission, aimed at training Ukrainian armed forces. Given that Ukraine is a country at war, the mission will be conducted on EU soil, a first for a common security and defence policy mission. Over €10 billion has been allocated from the European Peace Facility (EPF) to cover common costs. The EU leaders also noted that an additional €500 million in EU military assistance was agreed in the Council, increasing the total provided to Ukraine since the start of the war to €3.1 billion. This amount represents nearly 55 % of the entire EPF envelope planned to 2027.  

As regards economic and financial assistance, the EU Heads of State or Government called for the rapid disbursement of the remaining €3 billion in macro-financial assistance. They invited the Commission and the Council to work on ‘a more structural solution for providing assistance to Ukraine’. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen underlined that ‘it is important for Ukraine to have a predictable and stable flow of income’, stressing that Ukraine needed between €3 and €4 billion per month for its basic needs, which the EU, the United States and the international financial instructions could cover. She confirmed that the EU’s contribution could be around €1.5 billion a month in 2023, with the disbursement mechanism still to be developed by the Ministers of Finance. The EU leaders also stressed that existing mechanisms – the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine – facilitated access to the single market and should be implemented in full. With Ukraine recently granted candidate country status, President Michel stressed the need for the EU ‘to act to ensure that this is a credible and strong perspective for Ukraine’

In view of the coming winter, humanitarian aid was also discussed. President von der Leyen underlined that more than 11 million people were internally displaced in Ukraine and that the EU would provide €175 million for their basic needs, as well as several emergency shelters.

The EU leaders discussed the support to Russia of Belarus and Iran. They confirmed the Union’s readiness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Belarus and called on the regime to stop allowing the Russian military to wage war on Ukraine from Belarusian territory. They condemned Iran’s military support for Russia, and welcomed the sanctions on individuals and entities over the delivery of Iranian combat drones to Russia, adopted by the Council on 20 October 2022. Although no further sanctions targeting Russia have been agreed for now, EU leaders recalled that the existing sanctions should be implemented in close cooperation with international partners, and explored means to ‘increase collective pressure on Russia’ to end the war.  

Moreover, EU leaders stressed that a common approach to granting visas to Russian applicants was paramount and welcomed the reviewed guidelines issued by the European Commission.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament:President Metsola stressed that Russia’s strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure require sanctions to be stepped up, military support increased, and efforts redoubled to ensure war crimes do not remain unpunished.

Food availability and affordability

Although not envisaged in Charles Michel’s invitation letter, EU leaders discussed, as anticipated in the EPRS outlook, the issue of global food security, which has been negatively impacted by Russia’s war on Ukraine. EU countries are not at risk of food shortages, however higher food prices (e.g. the price of bread in the EU was 18 % higher on average in August 2022 than a year earlier), are affecting EU consumers, who are simultaneously facing high energy prices and inflation. The European Council notably dismissed the false narrative according to which EU sanctions against Russia were contributing to global food insecurity, by reiterating that ‘EU sanctions against Russia do not prohibit the export of agricultural and food products’.

EU leaders restated their support for EU-Ukraine solidarity lanes and highlighted the important role the initiative plays in enabling Ukrainian crop, agricultural and fertiliser exports. The European Council called for improved solidarity lane efficiency, which would not only contribute to global food security, but also offer an alternative to exporting via ports at a time when Russia is warning it may not extend the Black Sea grain initiative, the extension of which EU leaders had also advocated.

Energy and the economy

In his invitation letter, President Michel anticipated that the energy debate would be ‘the focal point’ of the meeting, stressing that work needed to be intensified on the three lines of action already discussed informally at the Prague European Council meeting: 1) reduced energy demand; 2) greater security of supply; and 3) reduced prices. During the Tripartite Social Summit preceding the European Council meeting, he had warned against ‘national-only approaches’ to the energy crisis, considering them a mistake which would ‘endanger our single market, which benefits us all’.

At the meeting, EU leaders reiterated that ‘Russia bears the sole responsibility for the current energy and economic crises’. They underlined the importance of European unity and coordination in tackling energy and fighting its weaponisation by Russia. EU leaders reached an ‘agreement on energy’, which, in the words of Charles Michel, provides ‘a framework together with a list of measures’, which must now be fine-tuned [and made] ready’ by the European Commission and energy ministers. The roadmap includes a ‘temporary EU framework to cap the price of gas in electricity generation’, ‘improvements to the functioning of energy markets’, ‘energy solidarity measures in case of gas supply disruptions at national, regional or Union level’, as well as measures for energy savings. EU leaders underlined the weight that EU Member States represent collectively on the gas market and the key role of the EU energy platform (open to countries in the Western Balkans as well as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), in pooling demand and facilitating joint procurement of gas and hydrogen.

President Michel called the Prague meeting ‘a stepping stone’, since it facilitated the much-needed preparatory work. He stressed that EU unity was visible in the conclusions, as Member States commit to act together on lowering prices, security of supply and on reducing demand, and mentioned that EU leaders hoped for a gradual implementation of the agreement. On the second day of the meeting, President Michel underlined that the energy agreement had had an immediate effect on the markets, observable through a fall in prices.

President von der Leyen confirmed that EU leaders had given the European Commission a clear roadmap on energy, and stressed that the agreed joint purchasing of gas would increase the EU’s market power. She also confirmed that the Commission would review State aid rules by prolonging the Temporary Crisis Framework, allowing Member States to support companies, and that almost €40 billion would be made available to support vulnerable households and businesses.

The European Council, which will continue to work on (‘remain seized of’) the energy file, committed to supporting the coordination of energy policy responses whilst stressing the importance of accelerating investment in renewables, infrastructure, interconnection, and storage. It called on the European Commission ‘to speed up work on the structural reform of the electricity market’ and expressed its support for the development of a full, sovereign and climate neutral energy Union.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament:President Metsola stressed that the EU ‘needs to lower [energy] prices to help return to solid economic growth everywhere’. She warned against high interest rates, stressing that in such a case the ‘Next Generation EU debt repayment will wipe out the budget’s entire crisis response capacity and start eating into the EU programmes’.

Critical infrastructure

The EU leaders expressed their unity and determination to respond to disruption of critical infrastructure, and condemned the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines. They agreed that the resilience of critical infrastructure was key to the EU and the Member States, requiring their joint cooperation. They also underlined the importance of rapid decision-making, recalling that the European Commission had proposed a recommendation on a coordinated Union approach to strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, which awaits the Council’s approval.

External relations

A strategic discussion took place on relations with China. President Michel stressed that the discussion was highly important, regardless of the absence of written conclusions. The EU leaders took stock of the systemic differences – on democracy, the rule of law and human rights – which distinguish the EU from China, and confirmed their agreement on introducing ‘more reciprocity’ in the EU’s relations with China, including on economic issues and climate change.

The EU leaders prepared for the EU-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Commemorative Summit to take place on 14 December 2022, expressing the hope that it would allow for a deepening of the EU’s strategic partnership with ASEAN.

Taking stock of preparations for the UN Climate Change Conference (COP27 – in Sharm el-Sheikh from 6 to 18 November 2022) and for the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15 – in Montreal from 7 to 19 December 2022), EU leaders underlined the urgency of climate action and the importance of protecting biodiversity.

EU leaders welcomed the sanctions imposed on 17 October 2022, on those Iranian entities and individuals responsible for the death of Mahsa Amini and for the violent repression of the peaceful protests which have followed her death, calling on the regime to end its human rights violations.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council meeting of 20 – 21 October 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte.

In December 2013, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 2 November as the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists. The date was chosen in commemoration of the assassination in Mali of Claude Verlon and Ghislaine Dupont, two French journalists, on 2 November 2013. The EU is actively engaged in protecting the independence and safety of journalists, as a crucial component in the proper democratic functioning of its institutions and Member States. Nevertheless, in recent years an increasing number of attacks and threats against journalists have been documented and reported in Europe too. The Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists reports that, in 2021 alone, six journalists were killed in Europe, two of them in EU Member States (Greece and the Netherlands).

Background

Although the EU is actively committed to protecting the safety and independence of journalists as an integral part a proper democratic society, journalists are nevertheless increasingly vulnerable to direct attacks on their physical safety and integrity. In recent years those attacks and threats against journalists have been documented and reported, including by the Commission annual rule of law reports (2020, 2021 and 2022) and the Media Pluralism Monitor. The objective of the attacks is to silence journalists who act as public watchdogs, and ultimately to prevent the creation of a public civic space where citizens can have a democratic debate on issues of public interest. Female media workers appear to be subject to more threats, in particular online harassment, than their male counterparts. Threats, harassment, public shaming and even assassinations of journalists have been reported, for instance, by Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR). In 2021, MFRR tracked 626 alerts affecting 1 063 individuals or media entities in 30 countries, including the murders of three journalists: investigative journalist Peter R. de Vries in the Netherlands, crime reporter Giorgos Karaivaz in Greece, and local radio presenter Hazım Özsu in Turkey. Journalists are targeted and killed in reprisal for their work. Along similar lines, the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists reports that 46 journalists have been killed (13 in 2022 alone) and 1 373 alerts have been received from 42 countries since 2015. In Europe, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made the situation even worse; as reported by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ); 35 journalists and media professionals have been killed in Ukraine since 1992, 15 of them since the start of the conflict in February 2022.

A 2022 study commissioned by the European Parliament confirms the progressive erosion of media freedom around the world and concludes that ‘Impunity remains unacceptably high, with most cases of killings remaining unresolved. Imprisonments are on the rise, while online spaces are becoming increasingly hostile and replete with gender-based hate speech. Between 2012 and 2021, among the 224 recorded cases of complete impunity, 185 (82.6 %) were concentrated in 12 countries: Mexico (26 cases); Somalia (25); Syria (22); India (21); Afghanistan (17); Iraq (17); Philippines (14); Brazil (14); Pakistan (12); Bangladesh (7); South Sudan (5); and the Russian Federation (5). Moreover, the study confirms that a majority of deaths happen because journalists are killed by way of reprisal for their work, while some lose their life in crossfire, i.e. on a battlefield or in a military context. Among those killed because of their work, 28.8 % were working on political journalism, 23.8 % were war reporters, 15.8 % were human rights reporters, while 10.7 % were investigating crime and 9.6 % corruption cases.

The UNESCO observatory of killed journalists reports that 1 561 journalists have been killed since 1993 around the globe, and that in only 164 cases can the status of judicial enquiry for the murder be considered ‘resolved’. This indicator acts as a form of country assessment on impunity for killings. It is worth noting that, according to the same observatory, the proportion of killings in countries that are not experiencing conflicts has been constantly increasing, from 50 % in 2016 to 61 % in 2020. Journalists and media professionals lost their lives in dangerous assignments – for instance, while covering riots – or because they were involved in political journalism, war reporting, or investigations related to human rights, crime and corruption. Against that backdrop, it is therefore important to ensure that investigations and prosecutions of crimes against journalists are conducted with impartiality, transparency and independence, to enable them to fulfil ‘their crucial role on the ground‘. Among other things, investigative journalists play a key role in combating organised crime and corruption and, because of that, they are more likely to be subject to threats and violence including physical and verbal abuse. Therefore, it is important to prevent a culture of impunity.

EU action

In 2021, the Commission recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists stressed that citizens need to have access to multiple sources of information to ensure that they can both build their own opinion and scrutinise governments. According to the Commission, the main objective of the EU’s action was to ‘prevent the emergence of a ‘culture’ of impunity regarding attacks against journalists’, which is why it invited Member States to create a safe and enabling environment. Specific recommendations were addressed to protect and empower female journalists, to raise awareness, to train law enforcement authorities and to tackle online attacks against journalists.

On 27 April 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal for a directive designed to protect people who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘strategic lawsuits against public participation’ – SLAPP) in civil matters with cross-border implications, and also a recommendation. The proposal, which is currently being negotiated by the co-legislators, aims to provide national tribunals and courts with the necessary tools to deal with SLAPP, protect journalists, activists and human rights defenders and, more generally, whoever acts as a societal public watchdog. The proposal also aims to collect data on SLAPP in a more systematic way, raise awareness about SLAPP among professionals, and provide support for victims. However, according to a 2022 study, only 11 %, or 62, of the 570 SLAPP cases recorded were cross-border cases, which means the vast majority of them remain outside the scope of the proposed directive. This is why the Commission has also put forward a recommendation inviting Member States to: adopt ‘effective, appropriate and proportionate’ national legal provisions providing equivalent safeguards to victims of SLAPP in domestic cases; review domestic provisions applicable to defamation (i.e. to abolish prison sentences for defamation cases) to ensure that they do not impact disproportionately on freedom of expression and have a ‘chilling effect’; develop training for legal professionals; and develop campaigns to raise awareness.

European Parliament position

Parliament has called consistently for action to ensure respect for and enhancement of EU fundamental values as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

In 2018, a Parliament resolution highlighted how journalists were still the target of deadly attacks, and recalled the importance of ensuring media freedom and pluralism. Parliament noted the recent political developments in various Member States that had led to increased pressure on and threats against journalists. Member States were urged to set up an independent and impartial regulatory body to report violence and threats against journalists and to ensure the protection and safety of journalists at national level. The same year, another resolution focused on the case of two Slovak journalists, Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová. In 2019, the situation of journalists in Malta and Slovakia was on Parliament’s radar, and another resolution followed the revelations concerning the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia. A 2020 resolution and a 2021 resolution stressed again how journalists, and in particular investigative journalists, are increasingly victims of hatred and violence with the sole aim of preventing public scrutiny and accountability. In June 2021, Parliament expressed, once again, its concerns regarding the erosion of media freedom and referred to ‘smear campaigns against academics, journalists, judges, legal professionals, civil society organisations and activists’ with the purpose of limiting their independence. More recently, in November 2021, Parliament called firmly for legislative action to address the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, non-governmental organisations and civil society.

Read this ‘at a glance note ‘on ‘International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine once more dominated the agenda for the October II 2022 plenary session, with Members participating in a number of debates on the consequences of the war: the social and economic repercussions and the introduction of a windfall tax; the impact on migration flows; recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism; and the Lukashenko regime’s active role in the war against Ukraine. Parliament also debated preparations for the European Council meeting of 20‑21 October 2022 with the Council and the European Commission.

Members also debated the 2023 Commission work programme, on the day of its adoption by the Commission. Further debates were held on EU action on mental health; marking the International Day of Eradication of Poverty; the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia; rising hate crime against LGBTIQ people; continued internal border controls in the Schengen area; and setting up a comprehensive framework for missing children and missing persons at risk. Looking further afield, Members debated EU–Western Balkan relations in the light of the new enlargement package; the political situation in Tunisia, particularly on fighting sexual violence; the outcome of the first meeting of the European Political Community; global food security; and protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems.

Finally, in a formal sitting, Members heard an address by Zuzana Čaputová, President of Slovakia.

‘Fit for 55’: Alternative fuels

Members held a joint debate on ‘fit for 55’ package proposals related to vehicle fuels, focused on encouraging the use of ‘clean’ vehicles and sustainable maritime fuels. The lack of alternative fuel infrastructure (recharging and refilling stations) hampers the wider take-up of electric and other vehicles in EU countries. More outlets at closer ranges (as the vehicles require more frequent recharge) could boost adoption of cleaner vehicles. Members considered a report from Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) proposing, inter alia, to speed up the rollout of higher-power refilling stations, particularly in regions where uptake is slow. As exhaust gases produced by shipping are also a significant source of air pollution, Members debated measures supporting greater use of sustainable maritime fuels. A TRAN committee report proposes higher cuts to emissions and introduces a target for the use of renewable fuels. Recognising that the sector will need support to adapt, the TRAN committee also proposes setting up an Ocean Fund aimed at decarbonising maritime transport. Members adopted both TRAN reports, setting Parliament’s position for interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

UN Climate Change Conference 2022

Members adopted a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the 27th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27). The resolution, tabled by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), looks to move the debate forward from promises to real action on global goals for climate adaptation, in advance of COP27. The resolution confirms the ENVI committee’s call urging all parties to show leadership, to align with the Paris Agreement and to ensure support for developing countries.

European Union general budget for 2023

Members considered the Council’s position on the draft EU budget for 2023, and introduced amendments to address the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In adopting a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the proposals, Parliament reverses most of the reductions proposed by the Council, proposing to make a considerable increase in spending on Parliament’s priorities instead. These include: addressing the consequences of the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, defence, research, humanitarian aid, Erasmus+, digitalisation and infrastructure. As the resolution completes Parliament’s reading of the Union budget for 2023, conciliation negotiations between the co-legislators will now begin.

Amending budget 4/2022

The Russian war and the recent pandemic have also led to revised estimates on growth and inflation. Members adopted a pressing amending budget (the fourth of this year), concerning the EU’s own resources, following a BUDG committee recommendation that Parliament agree to the proposed changes. These reflect updated revenue forecasts and were previously endorsed by the Council. The committee notes the €3.6 billion increase in own resources and urges greater speed in introducing new own resources to pay for the COVID‑19 recovery. However, as Parliament has not yet taken a position on the REPowerEU proposal, BUDG underlines that changes proposed in draft amending budget DAB 4/2022 will have no bearing on the legislative outcome on that file. The committee also commends the changes to Eurojust’s mandate in relation to support for Ukraine, but criticises the redeployment of resources as set out in the proposal.

Budget discharge 2020

As the EU institutions run on a budget ultimately provided by European citizens, Parliament is responsible for overseeing their use of this funding. Members considered three files regarding decisions postponed in May 2022 on budgetary discharge for 2020. Due to a persistent lack of cooperation in this scrutiny process, Parliament had again refused to grant budget discharge to the European Council and the Council. Following a re-examination of the situation, Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) notes a continued lack of progress. The CONT committee criticises a lack of transparency that could be improved by splitting the European Council and Council budget sections, and reiterates concern regarding European Council interference in legislative matters where it has no role to play. Parliament therefore decided once again to refuse to grant discharge to the two institutions. Parliament also again refused to grant budget discharge concerning the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), citing the need for more action on fundamental rights. Conversely, while Parliament had also previously withheld a discharge decision for the 2020 budget of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), Parliament followed a CONT committee recommendation to grant budget discharge.

Question time: Protecting critical infrastructure in the EU against attacks and countering hybrid attacks

During Tuesday’s question time, Members debated the urgent need to protect key EU infrastructure against physical and digital threats, including hybrid attacks, with European Commissioner for Promoting our European Way of Life, Vice-President Margaritis Schinas.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without voting, several mandates for negotiation: two from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on the proposal for a regulation establishing a collaboration platform to support functioning of joint investigation teams and on the proposal for a directive on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States; one from the Committee on International Trade (INTA) on a proposal for a regulation on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries; a joint mandate from the Committees on Foreign Affairs, INTA and Constitutional Affairs (AFET/INTA/AFCO) on the proposal for a regulation on rules for the exercise of the Union’s rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Brexit agreements; and one from the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) on a proposed regulation on a 2023‑2027 connectivity programme.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October II 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Political Community (EPC) held its inaugural meeting on 6 October in Prague, bringing together on an equal footing the leaders of the EU’s 27 Member States and 17 other European countries. French President Emmanuel Macron had called for the creation of the EPC after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, to serve as a forum for political dialogue and cooperation on security, stability and prosperity. Its first gathering, attended by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and British Prime Minister Liz Truss among others, focused on the war and the resulting energy crisis in many countries. The EPC will meet twice a year, meeting next in Chişinău, the capital of Moldova.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the European Political Community. Some earlier publications on European governance can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The European (geo)Political Community: More than meets the eye?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, October 2022

Five takeaways from the European Political Community summit
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

The European Political Community: A successful test?
Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2022

The European Political Community: Time to invest in the power of democracies
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Filling Europe’s geopolitical vacuum
German Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

European Political Community meets for the first time
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

The beginning of the European Political Community
European Policy Centre, October 2022

What difference can the European Political Community make? 
Foreign Policy Association, October 2022                                                                                     

What can the European political community achieve?
Groupe d’études géopolitiques, October 2022 

Europe in a different world
Institute Montaigne, October 2022

The European Political Community: A step toward differentiated integration in Europe?
London School of Economics blog, October 2022

The UK has been given an opportunity to help shape the future of the European Political Community: It should take it
London School of Economics blog, October 2022

European Political Community: Opportunities and limitations
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, October 2022

European summit in Prague sets agenda and isolates Moscow
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2022

Macron’s ‘European Political Community’ risks two-tiered European Union
Wilson Center, October 2022

The European Political Community: A sword striking water
Voltaire Network, October 2022

Enlarging and deepening: Giving substance to the European Political Community
Bruegel, September 2022

Will the European Political Community actually be useful?
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2022

Macron is serious about the ‘European Political Community’
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

Enlargement and a European political community
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

The European Political Community: A new anchoring to the European Union
Jacques Delors Institute, May 2022

La Communauté politique européenne et la question de l’adhésion de l’Ukraine at l’Union européenne
Fondation Jean-Jaurès, May 2022

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The European Political Community‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

The European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) is organising the third European Gender Equality Week at the end of October 2022. Events on the agenda cover gender inequality within different policy sectors. The week includes: a hearing on the regional impact of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan (Committee on Foreign Affairs); a presentation of the ‘Gender Dimension and Impact of the ‘Fitfor55’ package study (FEMM); an exchange of views on the directive on combating violence against women (Committee on Legal Affairs); and a hearing on how to change the EU Treaties to achieve more gender equality in the EU (Committee on Constitutional Affairs). Additionally, the European Institute for Gender Equality is hosting the first Gender Equality Forum on 24 and 25 October, following the presentation of the 2022 Gender Equality Index (FEMM). The aim of Parliament’s European Gender Equality Week is to draw attention to gender inequalities – both to longstanding issues such as the gender pay gap and to more recent crises perpetuated by Russia in Ukraine, requiring a gendered approach within humanitarianism. Considering the gender dimension on different policy levels is necessary to create equal opportunities for both genders, something that benefits the whole of our society. The European Union adopted gender mainstreaming as its official approach to gender equality in 1997. The European Commission defines gender mainstreaming as ‘not restricting efforts to promote equality to the implementation of specific measures to help women, but mobilising all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality’. The EU 2020‑2025 gender-equality strategy defines the priorities to achieve this, for instance by ending gender-based violence, addressing pay and pension gaps, gender balance in decision making positions at work and ending the gender care gap. However, despite great efforts, much change still needs to happen and Parliament is keen to advance legislation for a more just society.

Covid-19 increases women’s unpaid care work

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Underlying the unequal consequences of the COVID‑19 pandemic are other persisting issues, where progress is slow. Parliament is particularly concerned about the gender pay gap, in which women earn less than men for the same work – a measurable indicator of inequality. An intersectional approach shows that women with children, women of colour, women with a migration background, or women with disabilities experience the gender pay gap more widely. Efforts to decrease pay discrimination and improve pay transparency aim at strengthening the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work‘ to improve victims’ access to justice on pay discrimination.

Equal pay for equal work between men and women

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Gender stereotyping is the generalised view of what men or women are like and what they ought to be doing. In some cases, people move away from these generalisations and work in sectors in which their important role goes unnoticed, such as with women in the fishing industry or women in transport. Women in both sectors experience under-representation and working conditions consequently are not suited to women’s needs. Parliament is championing greater participation and simultaneously strengthening women’s position as workers in these industries, as a necessary step to ensuring women’s access to all labour markets and that employers can find enough staff.

Women in EU fisheries

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Finally, gender-based violence is violence directed against a person because of their gender and that affects them disproportionately. Gender-based violence predominantly affects women, leading to reduced mental and physical health, quality of life and a loss of economic output. The EU does not have a specific legal instrument to combat gender-based physical or cyber violence. Parliament first called for a directive on preventing and combating all forms of violence against women in 2009. More recently, the European Commission proposed a directive on combating violence and domestic violence in March 2022. The proposal aims to provide minimum rules on the level of protection against violence taking place online and offline across the EU.

Combating gender-based violence at EU level

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content Further reading

• Exploring gender equality across policy areas
• Combatting gender based cyber-violence
• Combating violence against women and domestic violence

Further listening

• Equal pay for equal work between men and women [Policy podcast]
• Recent trends in female employment [Policy podcast]
• What if care work were recognised as a driver of sustainable growth? [Policy Podcast]

Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

The economies of the EU and China both showed signs of quick and strong recovery in terms of GDP growth, GDP per capita and foreign direct investment in 2021, following a year marked by the COVID-19 pandemic. The value of trade between the two blocs reached record levels for exports and imports, and for goods and services in 2021. This infographic is a further update of one originally published in December 2019.

Read this infographic on ‘China: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Caprile.

Outraged by Russia’s illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, European Union countries, in cooperation with other international partners, have imposed unprecedentedly tough sanctions on Russia, in a succession of packages since 23 February 2022, adding to those adopted in 2014 in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea. The EU has moved swiftly to approve an eighth package of EU sanctions, including the legal basis to cap Russian oil export prices, in retaliation for Russia’s illegal annexation of four regions of Ukraine, the first nation-wide mobilisation since World War Two, and its unequivocal nuclear threat.

Seven months of war: Devastation and escalation

Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine was promptly condemned by the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and the United Nations General Assembly, where 141 nations (with 5 voting against and 35 abstentions) adopted a resolution on 2 March 2022 rejecting the Russian Federation’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, and demanding that Russia immediately withdraw its forces and abide by international law. Over seven months later, the war has resulted in large-scale destruction of infrastructure, including residential areas, medical facilities and educational institutions, and has triggered a vast humanitarian, human rights and displacement crisis. According to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Office, as of 3 October 2022, 6 114 civilians have been killed and 9 132 injured in Ukraine. As of 7 October 2022, the UN Refugee Agency reports that, nearly one-third of Ukrainians have been forced from their homes, compounding one of the largest human displacement crises in the world today. Europe is hosting over 7.6 million refugees from Ukraine, and 6.2 million people remain displaced by the war within Ukraine. The first statement of the UN-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, delivered on 23 September, concluded that war crimes have been committed in Ukraine, including indiscriminate attacks with cluster munitions and multi-launch rocket systems in populated areas, summary executions of civilians, and sexual violence against Ukrainian communities, including children.

Ukraine’s September counter-offensive on its eastern (Kharkov) and southern (Kherson) fronts, left Russian forces in disarray, pressuring President Vladimir Putin to resort, on 21 September, to a further escalation of the conflict on three fronts:

• formalising the annexation of four regions within Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson), following referenda qualified by the UN as ‘not legal according to international law’;
• declaring the mobilisation of the Russian population, initially targeted at 300 000 men, but which could affect up to 1 million people, according to independent reports;
• renewing open threats to resort to the use of nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory, including the defence of the Ukrainian territories illegally annexed on 30 September, in application of the Russian military doctrine.

Eight packages of EU sanctions

The first round of EU sanctions was introduced on 23 February 2022, following Vladimir Putin’s decision to recognise the two ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states. As the military aggression escalated, this was followed by new packages of increasingly harsh measures, adopted on 25 February, 28 February, 15 March, 8 April, 3 June, and 21 to 22 July. The eighth package was adopted on 6 October 2022 in direct response to the illegal annexation by Russia of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. The cumulative effect of the sanctions is unprecedented in scale and nature, including sanctions on individuals and entities, drastic financial and trade restrictions, aimed at particularly sensitive sectors such as aviation, energy and high-technology, and restrictions on Russian media broadcasting.

Sanctions on Russia after the eighth package: New and extended measures

• Legal basis for introducing the oil price cap: the text provides the legal basis to impose a price cap on Russian oil exports to third countries, agreed by the G7 on 2 September 2022. More specifically, it bans the facilitation by EU operators of all services relating to the maritime transport of Russian oil and petroleum products to third countries, unless these products are purchased at or below a pre-established price cap. The ban includes the provision of maritime transport, technical assistance, brokering services or financial assistance relating to the maritime transport of crude oil (as of 5 December 2022), or petroleum products (as of February 2023), which originate or are exported from Russia. To enter into force, this measure needs a further decision by the Council, laying down (among other things) the precise mechanism to establish the price cap. Meanwhile, the ban on EU imports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products, included in the sixth package of sanctions, remains untouched, and will enter into force in December 2022, and February 2023 (respectively), as originally agreed.
• Addition of 30 individuals and 9 entities to the sanctions list: this move targets chiefly those involved in Russia’s occupation, illegal annexation and sham referendums in the four occupied territories, those working in the defence sector and well-known personalities spreading disinformation about the war. It brings the total to 1 262 people and 118 entities subject to an asset freeze and travel ban. The Council also decided to broaden the listing criteria on which specific designations can be based, to include the possibility to target those who facilitate the circumvention of EU sanctions.
• New import restrictions: worth an estimated €7 billion, these cover steel products originating in or exported from Russia, machinery, wood pulp and paper, plastics, leather, cigarettes, cosmetics and non-gold jewellery.
• New export restrictions: targeted at further reducing Russia’s access to military, industrial and technological items, these include a ban on coal (and coking coal) exports, and export of specific electronic components and certain chemicals, and prohibit the export of small arms and other goods listed under the Anti-torture Regulation.
• Restrictions on state-owned enterprises: these ban EU nationals from holding posts in the governing bodies of certain state-owned enterprises, and all transactions with the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RMRS).
• Financial, information technology (IT) consultancy and other business services: this places a full ban on providing any crypto-asset wallets, accounts or custody services for Russian persons or residents, regardless of the amount (previously up to €10 000 was allowed). The package also widened the scope of services that can no longer be provided for the Russian government or to legal entities established in Russia: IT consultancy, legal advice, architecture and engineering services.
• Extension of the geographical scope of restrictive measures to cover all the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine in the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

Sanctions coordination and impact

As with the san Sanctions coordination and impact ction packages adopted against Russia in 2014, the EU measures are coordinated with other countries, notably with G7 partners, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan. Among the EU enlargement countries, Serbia and Turkey have been to date the most reluctant to follow this alignment. The sanctions coalition has introduced travel bans and asset freezes against key political and business figures, frozen more than half of Russia’s central bank reserves, blocked over 70 % of Russia’s banking assets and restricted the export of technologies to hinder Russia’s long-term technological advancement. The World Bank’s October 2022 outlook forecasts a contraction of the Russian economy by 4.5 percent in 2022, less than initially expected thanks to the surge in energy prices, which has helped increase fiscal revenues. It predicts a deeper recession in 2023, owing to the sanctions and reduced fiscal expansion. In early October, OPEC+, of which Russia is a member, decided on a steep reduction of oil production, of 2 million barrels per day, a move the West has criticised as a way to neutralise the sanctions’ impact, in particular the planned oil price cap.

European Parliament position

On 6 October the European Parliament adopted a resolution on ‘Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine’, strongly condemning the massive violations of human rights and war crimes committed by the Russian armed forces, as well as the illegal and illegitimate sham referenda conducted in the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. The resolution welcomed the eighth package of sanctions against Russia, and called for the sanctions to be expanded to new areas, including cutting seven additional banks from the SWIFT system. It also called on the Commission and co-legislators to work swiftly to complete the legal regime for confiscation of assets frozen by the sanctions.

This paper updates previous ‘at a glance’ notes of 3 March 2022, 5 April 2022 and 13 April 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: New EU sanctions under the eighth package‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jurgita LEKAVICIUTE.

Since its foundation in early 2020, STOA’s Centre for Artificial Intelligence (C4AI) produces studies, organises public events and acts as a platform for dialogue and information exchange on artificial intelligence (AI)-relevant topics within the Parliament and beyond. It aims to contribute to the quality and coherence of discussion and policy-making, as the EU seeks to coordinate its efforts and influence on global AI standard-setting.

Late that same year, STOA and the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) launched a partnership on artificial intelligence with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Parliamentary Network (GPN). The GPN is a hub for legislators and officials from parliaments around the world to share their experience, identify good practices and foster international legislative cooperation. It includes a Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence, and benefits from proximity with the OECD’s AI Policy Observatory and Global Partnership on AI.

In the context of this partnership, a first series of podcasts was produced during 2021. A second series is now available, examining various aspects of AI development and policy with key experts from the field.

The first podcast in the 2022 series explores the role of AI in healthcare and how AI can contribute to the medical and healthcare field, while also taking stock of the most significant risks posed. The podcast includes a contribution from STOA Panel Member Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain) speaking about the work of the European Parliament and on the importance of legislation on AI. Dr Karim Lekadir, head of EUCanImage, then presents a four-year AI research project using AI for making advances in oncology. The project has 20 partners across 11 countries and has received nearly €10 million in funding. You can listen to the podcast here.

In the second podcast, STOA and the OECD focus on public/private regulatory divergence and the EU AI Act. It includes contributions by STOA Panel Member, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection and a member of the OECD Parliamentary Group on AI – Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal) and Ilina Georgieva, a research scientist working on AI, cyber regulation and cyber norms at the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO). They discuss how the proposed AI Act might create divergence in how different public and private sector actors are allowed to use AI, e.g. social scoring, real-time biometric identification or emotion recognition for state or commercial activities. This podcast can be accessed here.

The third podcast is oriented towards AI data governance. Member of the STOA Panel, European Parliament’s Committees on Industry, Research and Energy and on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark), and Professor Linnet Taylor, Professor of Data Ethics, Law and Policy at the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT), where she leads the Global Data Justice project, contribute to the discussion. They highlight the challenges associated with dominant data governance models and explore alternatives in the context of contemporary policy initiatives. You can listen to this podcast here.

Finally, the fourth podcast will focus on AI and the risks for democracy, with European Parliament Vice-President responsible for STOA Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) and Anthony Gooch, Director of Public Affairs & Communications at OECD and Chair of the GPN.

Follow us on Twitter at @EP_ScienceTech to stay informed about our activities.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Suzana Anghel.

On 20 and 21 October 2022, EU Heads of State or Government will meet for a formal European Council dedicated to Ukraine, energy and the economy – three interlinked topics that have been permanently on the European Council agenda since Russia launched its war on Ukraine. EU leaders are expected to condemn Russia’s further escalation of the conflict and recent attacks on civilians and infrastructure across Ukraine; condemn the sham referendums in four Ukrainian regions; consider the deepening food crisis; and explore ways to protect critical infrastructure after the Nord Stream pipelines sabotage. On energy, the European Council meeting is expected to agree on new strategic guidelines, with discussion on means of reducing gas prices, price-caps or alternative approaches – an issue on which Member States have diverging views – likely to be rather heated. EU leaders will also discuss climate change and biodiversity protection ahead of the main annual events on these topics led by the United Nations (UN). Moreover, leaders will hold a debate on China and prepare for the December 2022 summit between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The European Council meeting will open with the traditional exchange of views with the European Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola.

European Council agenda points

In September 2022, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, released the new Indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2022, which offers a much-awaited overview of the meetings and agendas of EU leaders until December 2022. This is the third Leaders’ Agenda presented by Michel since he became President in December 2019. The topics outlined for the October 2022 meeting are: i) Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, ii) energy, iii) the economy, iv|) climate change, and v) external relations.

European Council meeting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders will discuss the situation in Ukraine for the seventh time since Russia began its war. They are expected to condemn the recent massive Russian missile strikes against civilians and energy infrastructure, and deliberate on the dramatic deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Ukraine. They will most probably reaffirm the EU’s political, military, humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine. At the informal European Council meeting of 7 October 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed that ‘Team Europe’ (the EU and the Member States) had pledged €19 billion (military aid excluded). Of this amount, €9 billion is EU macro-financial assistance, €3 billion of which remains to be disbursed. In an attempt to make financial support to Ukraine sustainable, the Commission could propose a ‘more structural solution’ by granting Ukraine €1.5 billion per month in 2023 in the form of grants or loans – an aspect still awaiting clarification. As for military aid, the EU has provided €2.5 billion from the European Peace Facility. The Foreign Affairs Council of 17 October 2022 agreed an additional tranche of €500 million. Agreement was also reached on establishing the new EU Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine, benefiting from an envelope of €106.7 million for common costs.

EU leaders will most likely once again condemn war crimes perpetrated against Ukrainians; reiterate that those responsible will be held accountable; and deplore Russia’s continued breach of international law. They will most probably recall their statement of 30 September 2022, in which they condemned the sham referendums organised by Russia in the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia and stressed that the EU would not recognise their illegal annexation. On 12 October 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted (with 143 votes in favour, 5 votes against, and 35 abstentions) a resolution condemning Russia’s ‘attempted illegal annexation’, and demanding ‘the immediate reversal of the annexation declaration’. In line with past conclusions and in coordination with the G7 leaders, EU leaders will most likely once more call on Russia to withdraw its troops and equipment from Ukraine, while reaffirming EU support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, including its right to self-defence enshrined in the UN Charter and international law.

Since February 2022, the EU has adopted eight packages of sanctions to put pressure on the Russian regime and diminish its ability to wage war on Ukraine. EU leaders might wish to explore ways to step up pressure, although it is unlikely that additional sanctions will be agreed at this meeting.

EU leaders might also focus on Ukraine’s reconstruction, another topic they have discussed regularly. The Commission, in cooperation with the government of Ukraine, the World Bank and other international partners, has estimated reconstruction and recovery costs in Ukraine to amount to €349 billion, a figure that will grow as the war continues. Funding of Ukraine’s reconstruction will be a key issue in the forthcoming international conference hosted by the German G7 Presidency in Berlin on 25 October 2022.

EU leaders could focus again on food security, at a time when the food crisis is deepening, impacting on supply chains, trade in agricultural products, and prices of food and fertilisers. The EU has introduced ‘solidarity lanes‘, facilitating Ukrainian food and fertiliser exports. In July 2022, it welcomed the UN Black Sea Grain initiative, and has since backed its implementation, while favouring the deal’s expansion and extension.

The recent sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines has put the spotlight on the importance of protecting critical infrastructure, a topic EU leaders will likely discuss. Earlier this year, the co-legislators reached a political agreement on the proposed directive on the resilience of critical entities.

Energy

Following discussions held at the Prague informal European Council meeting of 7 October 2022, EU leaders are expected to consider energy demand reduction measures; gas storage capacities and possible sharing in the event of shortages; joint energy purchasing on international markets; and other means of reducing gas prices. In particular, they will discuss a possible cap on gas prices – a measure requested by a majority of Member States (17), but opposed by Germany and the Netherlands. The two countries prefer to combine the EU’s purchasing power and bolster the existing EU energy platform to ensure that EU countries are ‘no longer in a position that they have to accept any price’. An informal Council meeting of EU energy ministers, held in Prague on 11-12 October 2022, brought ‘some progress‘ on common measures to reduce energy prices. However, while the Commission is expected to favour voluntary price reductions through negotiations with gas-exporting countries in proposals to be unveiled aheadof the 20-21 October meeting, it will be up to the European Council to find a compromise acceptable for all Member States.

Economy

Russia’s war on Ukraine has accelerated the rise in energy prices, already visible in the months preceding the war, when Russia was using energy as a weapon. This led to EU inflation figures quadrupling during the past 15 months, from 2.5 % in July 2021 to 10 % in September 2022. EU leaders are expected to build on the their discussion held at the informal European Council meeting of 7 October 2022, when President Michel recognised that the increase in energy prices induces ‘huge pressure on households, on families, on business, and for economic development within the EU’. Leaders could consider how to strengthen and preserve jointly both the single market and European economies’ resilience.

Climate change and biodiversity

EU leaders will take stock of the preparations for the November 2022 UN Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Sharm el-Sheikh, where the EU is expected to call on its international partners to make more ambitious commitments to cut greenhouse gas emissions further. Leaders are also likely to consider the preparatory work conducted in view of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity in Montreal, where a landmark agreement to safeguard nature is expected.

External relations

EU leaders will discuss relations with Asia in preparation for the December 2022 EU–ASEAN summit. ASEAN is at the centre of the EU’s strategy for cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region, where the EU is committed to supporting sustainable development, democracy and the rule of law. The European Council will hold a strategic debate on relations with China, a topic last discussed in March 2022, when EU leaders focused on China’s stance regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. In light of the Commission proposal to grant Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate country status, and EU leaders’ commitment in this respect, leaders could consider conferring that status on the country at one of their remaining meetings this year.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting on 20 – 21 October 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask how the European Union (EU) contributes to setting adequate minimum wages in EU countries.

In the European Union, member countries set their minimum wage individually, while the EU supports and complements their action. Minimum wages differ greatly throughout the EU, with the lowest level in Bulgaria and the highest in Luxembourg.

Minimum wage protection can be provided through collective agreements, statutory minimum wages set by law, or a combination of both. In the EU, 21 countries have a statutory minimum wage, 5 countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden) determine theirs through collective bargaining and Cyprus has statutory rates for different occupations.

Poverty is an important issue for the EU, especially with many people at risk of in-work poverty. In 2022, the EU has adopted new rules that promote adequate minimum wages and help to improve working and living conditions for employees in EU countries.

European pillar of social rights

Wages are one of the 20 principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, an initiative launched by the Commission in March 2021, which aims to create a more social Europe, to improve labour markets and to strengthen social protection systems. Under this initiative, to help prevent in-work poverty, EU countries should ensure by 2030 an adequate minimum wage to workers.

Towards an EU policy on minimum wages

EU rules on minimum wages can help ensure adequate wages and social security in the context of economic crises, such as those caused by the coronavirus pandemic or Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The European Parliament has long been advocating for general guidelines on minimum wages to prevent poverty in the EU. In 2017, it called on EU countries to introduce adequate minimum income schemes to support citizens and highlighted the issue of in-work poverty due to insufficient wages. In October 2019, Parliament called on the Commission to put forward a legal instrument to ensure fair minimum wages for workers across the EU.

EU law on adequate minimum wages

In October 2020, the Commission responded to these calls by putting forward a proposal for a Minimum Wage Directive. Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement on the new rules in June 2022. Parliament then formally adopted the legislation in September, followed by the Council in October. EU countries now have two years to implement the new rules.

The new law promotes the adequacy of statutory minimum wages and helps to achieve decent working and living conditions for all workers in the EU. The rules require EU countries to:

• set up adequate minimum wages according to a set of clear criteria, including the cost of living. Each EU country will have to set up a minimum wage by national law and/or collective agreements and update it at least every two years.
• promote collective bargaining for wage-setting.
• give workers effective access to minimum wage protection.

However, the new rules do not set up a specific minimum wage level that all EU countries have to reach. Setting up the amount of minimum wages remains a national competence.

Further information

• Minimum wages directive, European Parliament, At A glance, September 2022
• Directive on adequate minimum wages, European Parliament, Briefing, June 2022
• Adequate minimum wages in the EU, European Council
• Fair minimum wages for workers in the European Union, European Parliament, Legislative Train Schedule, September 2022
• Minimum income: more effective support needed to fight poverty and promote employment, European Commission, News, September 2022

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Luisa Antunes, Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA).

On 28 September 2022, STOA organised a roundtable event to discuss the initiative to create a public European health infrastructure, proposed in a recent STOA study. The event was successful, gathering almost 100 participants in Brussels and over 200 online. It gathered a rich diversity of views, from representatives of the European Union (EU) and international bodies, civil society, academia and industry.

The proposal was born out of the reassessment of the EU’s response to COVID‑19 and the need to address preparedness to future epidemics and pandemics, as well as to answer current unmet public health issues, such as antimicrobial resistance and rare diseases. For Patrizia Toia (S&D, IT), STOA Panel member, the EU should step up as a world leader to guarantee public accessibility and equal distribution worldwide – issues the pharmaceutical market cannot handle alone.

The main authors of the study, Massimo Florio, Professor of Public Economics at the Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano and Dr Chiara Pancotti, Partner and senior researcher at CSIL, analysed over 250 reports and consulted 56 experts from 48 organisations in several countries and fields (scientists, clinicians, non-governmental organisations, national public health and industry representatives, EU and other international bodies). The study addresses the issue of misalignment between public health priorities and the pharmaceutical industry’s research and development (R&D) agenda. The proposal for a European public infrastructure was met with an overwhelmingly positive response during consultations.

‘I have a brand for this: Biomed Europe.’

Professor Florio, economist and study author

According to the study authors, such a project would see the EU take the helm in organising a large-scale, pan-European initiative together with Member States and non-Member States, reminiscent of European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) for physics and the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) for biology. The project could build on the example of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in the United States. The mission would be to create, over the course of 20 to 30 years, a portfolio of non-profit research and development (R&D) projects for the public interest, with open global data sharing. This would differ from the EU Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), as it would provide a procurement mechanism for emergency preparedness alone.

‘It is a matter of billions, not millions!’

Professor Florio, economist and study author, on the need for a potential European medicines infrastructure to reach critical mass to deal with health challenges by investing in open science and taking a new approach to intellectual property rights

With a proposed annual budget of €3.5 billion (similar to the NIH intramural sector – see below), or up to €7 billion (similar to ESA), a ‘Biomed Europe’ would be expected to deliver a portfolio of 80 to 150 innovative projects over a 20‑year period. The study proposes four policy options to deliver on this potential, revolving around two dimensions: scope of mission (restricted to infectious diseases or with a more diversified agenda), and scope of internal capacity (in-house vs decentralised).

Source: European pharmaceutical research and development: Could public infrastructure overcome market failures?, EPRS, 2021.

Policy option 3 presented in the study includes taking lessons from the US federal biomedical experience (NIH and BARDA). Presented by Dr Emily Erbelding, M.D., M.P.H., Director of the NIAID Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (DMID) at NIH, the NIH’s mission is to conduct basic research. For this it receives US$43 billion annually, distributed across intramural (90 % of the budget) and extramural structures. In contrast, BARDA’s mission is to improve preparedness and response through public-private partnerships for advanced R&D of drugs and vaccines to address national health security issues, for which it receives US$3 billion annually. US investment in basic research for a period of over 10 years allowed a swift response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, with the development of the Moderna vaccine.

‘The most important venture capitalist in Europe is the European Investment Bank, including funding for BioNtech’

Professor Florio, economist and study author

‘A report from Politico shows the management of COVID‑19 has been entrusted to private actors.’

Nicoletta Dentico, Director of the Global Health Programme

‘There is something wrong about Moderna, Pfizer, BioNtech making tons of billions of profits from having monopolised results of more than 20 years of research supported by public funding.’

Dr Els Torreele, Policy Associate at the UCL Institute for Innovation & Public Purpose (IIPP)

Civil society representatives Dr Rosa Castro (European Public Health Alliance, EPHA) and Dr Els Torreele (University College London, UCL) welcomed the creation of a public European structure. They were particularly in favour of an initiative that addresses public health needs, ensures innovative and affordable products, guarantees fair returns to public investment and public ownership of knowledge, and that takes inspiration from and is open to international cooperation towards a global common agenda.

“30-40 yrs ago we chose a profitable #pharma model. But now, after #Covid19, we can all see that there is something wrong with companies making huge profits of the results of yrs of often publicly funded #research. It’s time to retain the ownership of these results” @ElsTorreele

Originally tweeted by STOA Panel (@EP_ScienceTech) on September 28, 2022.

‘There was an assumption that market incentives would somehow ‘trickle down’ and deliver on public health.’

Dr Els Torreele, Policy Associate at the UCL Institute for Innovation & Public Purpose

The priority, however, should be on defining its mission and governance rules. Paraphrasing economist Mariana Mazzucato, it is not about fixing market failures, but about defining how R&D pipeline stakeholders work together to serve public health needs.

Originally tweeted by EPHA (@EPHA_EU) on September 28, 2022.

The reactions from some participants were lukewarm. The importance of public-private collaboration was emphasised by industry representative Salah-Dine Chibout (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, EFPIA), as well as academia representative Professor Rolf Apweiler, Director of EMBL-EBI, who suggested a pan-European, decentralised coordinated effort based on existing national and international infrastructures. Dr Jacques Demotes, Director General of the European Clinical Research Infrastructure Network (ECRIN), considers ‘infrastructure’ is not the correct name, and suggested creating an ‘institute’ that follows a ‘top-down’ mechanism and where private interest is separated from public health priorities.

Commission representatives from three Directorate-Generals chose to focus on existing EU-funded projects in the drug development pipeline, such as the COVID‑19 data platform, ACT EU, Horizon Europe, Innovative Health Initiative, EU FAB and IPCEI, all of which funded in collaboration with Member States. A common view was the need to build on existing platforms focusing on sustainability in cost and investment in strategic areas alone (e.g. infectious diseases, antimicrobial-resistant pathogens, orphan diseases and personalised medicine).

The audience reactions in the room and online were emphatic and constructive. Discussion covered patents and open data sharing, levels of investment and governance models.

‘The paradox is that we have an economist here who advocates for public health and public ownership of knowledge, and then European scientists who feel the need to include the private sector at all costs‘

Nicoletta Dentico, Director of the Global Health Programme

Background

The proposal for a public European health infrastructure builds upon a Parliament resolution of 17 September 2020, calling on the Commission and Member States to “examine the possibility of creating one or more European non-profit pharmaceutical undertakings which operate in the public interest to manufacture medicinal products of health.” On December 2021 Council conclusions also took note of the importance of the Parliament’s resolution to ensuring the supply of medicinal products affected by market failures. More recently, in July 2022, the study was the object of an open letter to the EU institutions and governments, signed by researchers, medical professionals and health ministers, calling for the creation of a public European infrastructure that can develop vaccines and other therapeutics, for the common good. The project is now expected to be discussed in Parliament’s Committees Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) and Special Committee on COVID-19 Pandemic: Lessons Learned and Recommendations for the Future (COVI).

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

STOA Workshop – Creation of a public European medicines infrastructure: Purpose and feasibility

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

On 10 October, Russia began massive missile strikes against Ukrainian cities in another twist to a war launched more than 7 months ago. The attacks followed an explosion which damaged the bridge from Russia to the annexed Crimean peninsula and a successful counter-offensive by Ukrainian forces in the east and south of the country. Earlier Russia declared the annexation of Ukraine’s south-eastern provinces, started a mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers and threatened to use its nuclear weapons. In a snub to the United States and the European Union, oil-exporting countries joined Russia in announcing cuts in their oil production, lifting its global price.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses on the topic can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Europeans’ support for Ukraine continues unabated
Bertelsmann Stiftung, October 2022

How to respond to Putin’s land grab and nuclear gambit
Brookings Institution, October 2022

The (sorry) state of EU defense cooperation
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Ukraine exposes Europe’s competing narratives about Russia
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Massive rocket attacks on Ukraine: 228th day of the war
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Ukraine: After two months, the food corridor operation is a success
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Shortages looming: How the annexation of Ukraine’s oblasts affects electricity generation
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Ukraine’s allies must dig deep to save its economy now
Chatham House, October 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, October 2022

Whom are we fighting? Some thoughts related to Russia’s latest mobilization plan
Egmont, October 2022

No partial measures: How Ukraine can meet the challenge of Russia’s mobilisation
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

The coming transatlantic rift over Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

How big is the storm? Assessing the impact of the Russian–Ukrainian war on the eastern neighbourhood
European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2022

Quadruple military aid for Ukraine
European Policy Studies, October 2022

Nine months into the Ukraine conflict: four factors will decide the outcome
Friends of Europe, October 2022

Germany’s choices over Ukraine recall earlier Cold War challenges
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

A modern Marshall plan for Ukraine
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

NATO Strategic Concept in the shadow of the war
GLOBSEC, October 2022

Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction strategy: Breaking free of the Soviet economic legacy
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

Understanding Russia’s threat to employ nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

Reaffirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity at the UN
International Crisis Group, October 2022

Impacts of the Ukraine crisis on Biden’s foreign policy
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2022

Mobilisation, annexions: Où va le régime russe?
Institut Montaigne, October 2022

Russia annexes four Ukrainian regions
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

Russia threatens Ukraine with nuclear weapons
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

Cyberattacks in Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine
Notre Europe, October 2022

A moment of strategic clarity
Rand Corporation, October 2022

The EU’s Russia visa ban debate reveals the bloc’s new power center
Atlantic Council, September 2022

Russia is weaponizing its data laws against foreign organization
Brookings Institution, September 2022

We must reinforce Putin’s military losses with economic ones
Brookings Institution, September 2022

Will Ukraine’s refugees go home?
Bruegel, September 2022

A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis
Bruegel, September 2022

Can Putin be stopped?
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

A democratic roadmap for Ukraine
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Why Ukraine must win
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Russia’s war in Ukraine: A turning point?
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Is NATO doing anything for Ukraine?
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Europe should not forget the challenges to its South
Centre for European Reform, September 2022

How likely is the use of nuclear weapons by Russia?
Chatham House, September 2022

China is divided on Russia: Let’s keep it that way
Clingendael, September 2022

Ukraine’s coming winter of decision
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

The case for creating a special tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

Strict and uniform: Improving EU sanctions enforcement
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, September 2022

Military offensives, hybrid attacks, and no peace in sight
Egmont, September 2022

Syria, the Middle East and the war in Ukraine
Egmont, September 2022

Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

In Europe’s defence: Why the EU needs a security compact with Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

In Europe’s gift: How to avoid a Ukraine ‘forever war’
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

The Leopard plan: How European tanks can help Ukraine take back its territory
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

How the West can help Ukraine capitalise on the Kherson counteroffensive
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

Russia’s regional elections 2022: The elephant in the room
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, September 2022

How much of a game-changer is Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s territories?
German Marshall Fund, September 2022

Designing Ukraine’s recovery in the spirit of the Marshall Plan
German Marshall Fund, September 2022

Preventing the (un)thinkable: Escalation scenarios and risk reduction measures for Russia and NATO following the war in Ukraine
Hans Seidel Stiftung, September 2022

Make Russia pay for Ukraine’s Western economic integration
Heritage Foundation, September 2022

Le retour de la haute intensité en Ukraine Quels enseignements pour les forces terrestres?
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2022

Putin vs Monnet: European resilience, energy and the Ukraine war
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Mobilisation: Russia crosses the Rubicon
International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute for International Economy, September 2022

A new dawn for EU enlargement?
Peterson Institute for International Economy, September 2022

Consequences of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 Gas Pipeline explosions
Polish Institute of International Relations, September 2022

What came of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit and the Xi-Putin meeting?
Polish Institute of International Relations, September 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

This month’s second plenary session in Strasbourg takes place against a sombre background of the continued economic consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the recent pandemic, and adaptation to climate change. Parliament is due to welcome the Slovak President, Zuzana Čaputová, who will address Members in a formal sitting on Wednesday. The Council and Commission are then expected to make statements on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 20 to 21 October 2022. Tony Murphy, the new President of the Court of Auditors will also attend the session on Wednesday, for the presentation of the Court’s 2021 annual report.

Recent attacks on gas pipelines and cyber-attacks on transport networks in Europe have highlighted the urgent need to protect critical EU infrastructure in the EU. The regular Question Time session on Tuesday afternoon will see Members pose questions to the European Commissioner for Promoting our European Way of Life, Vice-President Margaritis Schinas, on measures to counter such attacks, including hybrid attacks.

Russia’s aggression has underlined our dependence on fossil fuels. With no room left for any doubt that this human activity is driving climate change, Members are due to consider a motion for a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the 27th Conference of Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change on Tuesday afternoon (with vote on Thursday). The motion for a resolution, tabled by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), looks to move the debate forward from promises to real action on global goals for climate adaptation, in advance of COP27, taking place in Sharm el‑Sheikh, Egypt, from 6 to 18 November 2022. The ENVI committee urges all parties to align with the Paris Agreement, in particular by setting immediate goals while working towards future adaptation targets. The committee considers that targets should always include action on compensation for loss and damage, and that the global community should ensure developing nations have an effective role in the decision-making process.

Turning to some of the concrete measures by which the EU plans to tackle the drivers of climate change, Members are expected to take part in a joint debate on ‘fit for 55’ package proposals related to vehicle fuels on Monday evening. The focus of the debate is on encouraging the use of ‘clean’ vehicles and sustainable maritime fuels. The lack of alternative fuel infrastructure – recharging and refilling stations – hampers the wider take-up of electric and other vehicles in EU countries. More outlets, closer together (as the vehicles require more frequent recharge) could boost adoption of cleaner vehicles. Members are therefore due to consider a draft report from Parliament’s Transport and Tourism (TRAN) Committee that proposes greater ambition, notably to speed up the rollout of higher-power refilling stations, particularly in regions where uptake is slow. As exhaust gases produced by shipping are also a significant source of air pollution, Members are also expected to debate measures supporting greater use of sustainable maritime fuels. Here too, a TRAN committee report proposes higher cuts to emissions and introduces a target for the use of renewable fuels. Recognising that the sector will need support to adapt, the TRAN committee also proposes setting up an Ocean Fund aimed at decarbonising maritime transport. The vote on these TRAN reports will set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

The Russian war and the recent pandemic have also led to revised estimates on growth and inflation. Members are expected to vote on an amending budget (the fourth of this year), concerning the EU’s own resources on Wednesday afternoon. A Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report proposes that Parliament agree to the proposed changes, reflecting updated revenue forecasts (and already endorsed by the Council). The committee notes the €3.6 billion increase in own resources and urges greater speed in introducing new own resources to pay for the COVID‑19 recovery. However, as Parliament has not yet taken a position on the REPowerEU proposal, it underlines that changes proposed in amending budget DAB 4/2022 will have no bearing on the legislative outcome on that file. While the committee also commends the changes to Eurojust’s mandate in relation to support for Ukraine, it criticises the redeployment of resources within Eurojust as set out in the proposal.

On Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to consider amendments to the Council’s position on the draft EU budget for 2023. A Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the proposals reverses most of the reductions proposed by the Council, instead proposing to make a considerable increase in spending on Parliament’s priorities: addressing the consequences of the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, defence, research, humanitarian aid, Erasmus+, digitalisation and infrastructure. Once Parliament has completed its reading of the Union budget for 2023, negotiations between the co-legislators will begin.

As the EU institutions run on a budget provided by European citizens, Parliament is naturally responsible for overseeing their use of this funding. In May 2022, Parliament considered the 2020 budget spending for all EU institutions. At the time, it was yet again unable to grant budget discharge to the European Council and the Council, due to a persistent lack of cooperation in this procedure. Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) has re-examined the situation, with its report, tabled for a vote on Tuesday lunchtime, noting a continued lack of progress. The committee therefore proposes that Parliament denies discharge once more. Among other criticisms, CONT again proposes to increase transparency by splitting the European Council and Council budget sections, and reiterates concern regarding European Council interference in legislative matters where it has no role to play. Parliament also postponed a budget discharge decision concerning the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in May, citing the need for more action on fundamental rights. The CONT committee also considers allegations of harassment, misconduct and migrant pushbacks involving the Agency sufficiently serious as to recommend refusing discharge until the Agency has addressed the findings of the EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigation. Conversely, while Parliament had previously withheld the discharge decision for the 2020 budget of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the CONT committee now recommends granting budget discharge. The committee report notes that the institution has addressed issues of staff harassment and misconduct and particularly welcomes measures improving auditing and transparency within the EESC.

See the full agenda here.

• COP27 climate change conference in Egypt
• Deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure
• FuelEU Maritime – Sustainable maritime fuels
• Discharge for the 2020 budget: European Council and Council
• Discharge for the 2020 budget: European Economic and Social Committee
• Discharge for the 2020 budget: European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)
• Amending budget No 4/2022: Own resources and other technical adjustments
• Parliament’s reading of the 2023 EU budget