European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Karin Jacobs.

In the framework of the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) and Better Regulation agenda, and as announced in the 2011 White Paper on Transport, the Commission has presented a legislative proposal to amend existing rules on damage stability requirements for roll on roll off (ro-ro) passenger ships, known as ferries. This is to improve the maritime safety of both vessels and their passengers.

The proposed revision of the existing directive originates from maritime accidents, as with the MS Estonia in 1994 and the MS Express Samina in 2000. It would ensure consistency with the applicable international standards, recently updated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) under its 2020 SOLAS Convention. It also aims to strengthen the fleet entry requirements within the EU for large vessels that have not yet been certified here.

The proposal will amend the existing Directive (2003/25/EC) in this area. The main purpose is to align current technical rules with IMO stability requirements, and to simplify these rules.

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/25/EC as regards the inclusion of improved stability requirements and its alignment with stability requirements defined by the International Maritime Organization Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2022) 0053
18.2.2022Rapporteur:Roberts Zile, ECR, Latvia)2022/0036(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Magdalena Adamowicz, EPP, Poland
Vera Tax, S&D, The Netherlands
Caroline Nagtegaal, Renew, The Netherlands
Jutta Paulus, Greens/EFA, Germany
Elena Kountoura, The Left, GreeceOrdinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

With the Conference on the Future of Europe now at an end, a new phase has started: that of following up on the more than 320 recommendations it produced.

This process is however a complicated one. Legally, ways to implement the Conference’s recommendations may require changes to the European Union (EU) Treaties, which is a complex and challenging process. Politically, debating how to implement reforms and deciding to what extent to modify the EU legal system may require intense negotiations.

The current EU Treaties, which are the fruit of successive reforms occurring over the last 35 years, may be modified only according to a complex set of procedures. The ordinary revision procedure may be used to amend any part of the Treaties, including the modifications of the institutional set up and of the Union’s competences. The simplified revision procedure may only be used to modify limited areas of EU policies – namely Title III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – or the Council’s decision-making rules.

The recommendations issued by the Conference on the Future of Europe and the recent international crises and political developments might provide an impulse for a deeper reform of the EU, as the European Parliament has suggested in several resolutions. Whether a deeper reform will be attempted depends however on the political will of the national governments, which hold the power to decide on whether to engage in a revision of the Treaties and, ultimately, on the content of the reforms.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU Treaties are modified‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher.

Three members of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) – Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia) Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain) and Rosa D’Amato (Greens, Italy) – visited the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in Seville on 18‑20 July 2022, to discuss their work on digital, green and innovation policy.

As the Commission’s science and knowledge service, the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC) provides advice and support to EU policy. It has 2 000 scientists working at six sites in five countries. The Seville site hosts 400 staff and focuses upon socio-economic and techno-economic research.

The members were welcomed to Seville by JRC’s Director for Growth and Innovation Mikel Landabaso. He gave an overview of their activities in digital, environmental and innovation policy, as well as analyses supporting responses to the pandemic and the situation in Ukraine. Beyond its role in EU policy, JRC Seville also works closely with national administrations, regional partners, universities, industry and civil society organisations. Members participated in a discussion about how JRC activities are selected and financed, the modalities of their relationship with other Commission Directorates-General, and how they balance scientific excellence and policy needs.

The first day was dedicated to JRCs projects in the context of the digital transition. Carlos Torrecilla explained that digital transformation is not about digitising the things that we do now, but dramatically changing the way things are done. Their analyses provide support across EU digital policies and programmes and are poised to play a major role in future, for example in hosting part of the forthcoming European Centre on Algorithmic Transparency. Giuditta De Prato presented the JRC’s contribution to Europe’s digital decade, which sets targets for skills, infrastructure, public services and business looking to 2030. Yves Punie and Riina Vuorikari then outlined the Digital Competence Framework for Citizens and Emilia Gómez highlighted JRC initiatives in education and healthcare. The session concluded with demonstrations of a robot and a facial recognition tool, which are used in JRC research projects. The discussion sessions focused upon the importance of wide-ranging metrics of inequality and the JRC approach to working with industry and academia.

During the second day, the delegation learnt about JRC projects related to the green transition. Serge Roudier explained the Sevilla Process, which brings together industry, Member States and environmental groups to co-create environmental norms, resulting in consensus around sets of actions that lead to major reductions in emissions of air pollutants. Antonio Amores and Ana Agúndez then shared their insights on fairness aspects of the green deal, including EUROMOD, a tool that analyses the effect of reforms in a range of taxation and social assistance measures in terms of poverty and inequality. The session continued with Antonio Soria, who demonstrated the need to focus upon efficiency, clean energy and electrification in order to meet the Paris targets. Abdel Bitat then presented his work on sustainability competences in education, and René van Bavel concluded the session with an explanation of the role of behavioural insights in EU policy. Wide-ranging discussions with Members covered from the suitability of various metrics and measures to the impacts of sanctions on Russia.

The third and final day focused upon innovation. Guia Bianchi and Ignacio González Vázquez presented the JRC project on Partnerships for Regional Innovation, a strategic approach to innovation-driven territorial transformation. They have developed a ‘playbook‘ of non-prescriptive PRI tools, and are now running a pilot process in collaboration with the Committee of the Regions. Emanuele Pugliese explained JRC assessments of region’s capacities for competitiveness and innovation and, crucially, their potential for growth in specific sectors. Manuel Palazuelos and Filipe Batista gave an overview of JRC activities related to sustainable and resilient tourism, including the EU Tourism Dashboard, which will be launched later this year. Finally, Fernando Mérida Martín and Fabrizio Guzzo presented JRC work on start-up villages including the forthcoming Forum, and the Commission’s long-term vision for more connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas. The discussion with Members examined the key challenges facing regions, in particular the distribution of benefits from innovation and tourism.

During the delegation, Members also took the opportunity to visit the Cartuja Science and Technology Park (PCT), where they were welcomed by representatives of the Junta de Andalucía – General Secretary for External Affairs, Enrique Millo, and General Secretary for Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Enterprise, Pablo Cortés. The Cartuja area of Seville was developed for the 1992 World Expo and now hosts the park as well as several other facilities, including the JRC. PCT Director General Luis Pérez explained that the park is designed to foster a prospering innovation ecosystem through cooperative projects. Rafael Sánchez, ENDESA’s Director General for Andalucía, Extremadura, Ceuta and Melilla also joined the delegation to present the eCitySevilla project, a comprehensive sustainability plan for Cartuja. Finally, the Mayor of Seville, Antonio Muñoz met with Members and expressed the city’s enthusiasm for the New Bauhaus philosophy, as well as Seville’s ambition to become a climate neutral city. He highlighted key challenges for the city in climate change, the digital transition, and social inclusiveness.

The JRC currently rents its office in Seville, and there are some limitations in terms of operational needs, cost-effectiveness, security and environmental performance. A decision has been taken to build a new facility on adjacent land, which has been provided without cost by Seville’s City Council. Vincenzo Cardarelli, Advisor to the JRC’s Director for Growth and Innovation, presented the winner of a recent design contest. The building will be the first EU building under the banner of the New European Bauhaus and is envisaged as an instrumental connection between the JRC and the community. It is also designed as a ‘post-covid’ building that recognises the new work modalities, notably teleworking, and maximises the benefits of exchanges that take place when colleagues are physically present. The discussion focused upon how design choices for the site and the wider area can foster greater integration with Seville’s public spaces and community. Work has commenced on a final design.

STOA is grateful for the JRC and the Cartuja PCT for hosting the visit, to all of the researchers for sharing their interesting and important work, and looks forward to further opportunities for exchange and engagement in future.

Members of the STOA Delegation (Ivars IJABS (Renew, Latvia) Lina GÁLVEZ MUÑOZ (S&D, Spain) and Rosa D’AMATO (Greens, Italy)) meet the Mayor of Seville Antonio Muñoz at the Cartuja Science and Technology Park.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study examines the impact of biases on datasets used to support decision-making systems based on artificial intelligence. It explores the ethical implications of the deployment of digital technologies in the context of proposed European Union legislation, such as the AI act, the data act and the data governance act; as well as the recently approved Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act. It ends by setting out a range of policy options to mitigate the pernicious effects of biases in decision-making systems that rely on machine learning.

Machine learning (ML) is a form of artificial intelligence (AI) in which computers develop their own decision-making processes for situations that cannot be directly and satisfactorily addressed by available algorithms. The process is adjusted through the exploration of existing data on previous similar situations that include the solutions found at the time. The broader and more balanced the dataset is, the better the chances will be of obtaining a valid result; but there is no a priori way of knowing whether the data available will suffice to collect all aspects of the problem at hand. The outputs of systems based on AI can be biased owing to imbalances in the training data, or if the data source is biased itself with respect to ethnicity, gender or other factors.

Biases are commonly considered to be one of the most detrimental effects of AI use. In general, therefore, serious commitments are being made to reducing their incidence as much as possible. However, the existence of biases pre-dates the creation of AI tools. All human societies are biased – AI only reproduces what we are. Therefore, opposing this technology for this reason would simply hide discrimination and not prevent it. Our task must be to use the means at our disposal – which are many – to mitigate its biases. In fact, it is likely that at some point in the future, recommendations made by an AI mechanism will contain less bias than those made by human beings. Unlike humans, AI can be reviewed and its flaws corrected on a consistent basis. Ultimately, AI could eventually serve to build fairer, less biased societies.

Rather than increasing regulation, it is crucial to ensure that existing rules, such as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), cover all new aspects that may appear as the technology evolves. European legislation such as the proposed AI act (together with the data act proposal and the data governance act) may apply not only to algorithms but also to datasets, thereby enforcing the explainability of decisions obtained through systems based on ML. The idea of setting up AI ethics committees to assess and provide certification for the systems or datasets used in ML is also proposed by organisations such as International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CEN). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) follows similar lines in its recommendations on AI. While setting up standards and certification procedures seems a good way to progress, it may also lead to a false impression of safety, as the ML systems and the datasets they use are dynamic and continue to learn from new data. A dynamic follow-up process would therefore also be required to guarantee that rules are respected following the FAIR principles of data management and stewardship (FAIR: findability, accessibility, interoperability and reusability).

The STOA report begins by providing an overview of biases in the context of artificial intelligence, and more specifically of machine-learning applications. The second part is devoted to the analysis of biases from a legal point of view, which shows that shortcomings in this area call for the implementation of additional regulatory tools to address the issue of bias adequately. Finally, the study, and its accompanying STOA options brief, put forward a range of policy options in response to the challenges identified.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. The study was presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting on 7 July 2022.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Martin Höflmayr.

Understanding inflation dynamics requires an understanding of the underlying concept and how it is measured. Inflation is defined as a process of continuously rising prices and falling purchasing power. In other words, a general and broad-based increase in the price of goods and services over an extended period. The main objective of central banks is to keep prices stable, to preserve the integrity and purchasing power of people’s money.

The most common inflation indicator measures the average change in the price of a basket of consumer goods and services over time. The closest approximation of what people intuitively understand by the term inflation is the change in their cost of living. The Harmonised Indicator for Consumer Prices (HICP), against which the European Central Bank (ECB) assesses the achievement of its price stability objective, is based on this concept.

Strong inflation momentum for a broad set of goods and services in the consumer basket led to a record high inflation rate in June 2022, standing at 9.6 % in the EU and 8.6 % in the euro area, driven mainly by energy and food prices, which rose by 42 % and 8.9 % respectively. Inflation is expected to remain significantly above the euro area inflation target of 2 % for some time, due to continued geopolitical uncertainty and persistent supply bottlenecks.

In its monetary policy meeting on 21 July, the ECB raised interest rates for the first time in over a decade by 0.5 percentage points and unveiled a new Transmission Protection Instrument. The latter would help the ECB to counter unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics and to make secondary market purchases of securities under certain conditions, thus preventing financial fragmentation within the currency bloc. At its meeting, the ECB also suspended forward guidance on the size of future rate rises in the interest of more flexibility. In conclusion, the latest ECB decision reflects increased efforts to bring inflation back to the 2 % target through a front-loaded policy rate hike, while putting in place an additional tool to counter unwarranted fragmentation.

This is an update of a Briefing published in April 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Inflation explained: What lies behind and what is ahead?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Inflation generalisation index: combined weight of items in the euro area HICP inflation basket with inflation rates above 2 %, in % Headline and core inflation (including the contribution of energy to their levels) in the euro area, in %

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

A recently published Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study offers a bird’s eye perspective of the key societal and ethical challenges that can be expect as a result of the convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and communication technologies, and proposes some policy options that can be considered to address them.

Ethical discussion about digital technologies in the past few years has frequently focused on AI. It is important, therefore, to note that the challenges extend well beyond those that are typically or usually discussed in the AI ethics literature. The convergence of digital technologies will lead to new technological applications, but will also contribute to the creation of new sociotechnical systems and systems of systems, which may raise their own challenges. The convergence will therefore most likely result in technological possibilities and features that extend beyond those of individual enabling technologies like AI, the internet of things (IoT) and blockchain. To address these challenges, we need to look for policy options and regulation that extend beyond the realm of AI and the concerns it has raised.

Supported by the arrival of 5G and, soon 6G, digital technologies are moving towards an AI-driven internet of robotic and bionano things. New acronyms reflect this blending of technologies: ‘AIoT’ (AI and IoT merging), ‘IoRT’ (IoT and robotics merging) and ‘IoBNT’ (IoT and bionano tech merging). Blockchain, augmented reality and virtual reality add even more technological options to the mix. Smart bodies, smart homes, smart industries, smart cities and smart governments lie ahead, with the promise of many benefits and opportunities. However, unprecedented amounts of personal data will be collected, and digital technologies will affect the most intimate aspects of our life, like the realms of love and friendship, more than ever. The STOA report offers a wide overview of the key societal and ethical challenges we can expect as a result of this convergence, and of the possible policy options to address them.

Many, if not all, new applications and sociotechnical systems will display one or more of the following features: interactive, long-distance, distributed, autonomous, intelligent, adaptive, reconfigurable, hybrid, fully connected, invisible, fast, precise in location, intimate, immersive, persuasive, and commercially exploitable. These features partly stem from the individual technologies ‘in the mix’. For example, features like interactivity, autonomy, intelligence and autonomy are typical characteristics of AI systems. However, some features also emerge due to new combinations of technologies. Moreover, it is often the combination of the features that creates new challenges for society, policy-making and regulation. Based on these features and inspired by the interviews with a number of experts, the STOA study identifies (and explains in more detail) a series of key opportunities and challenges. Using responsible research and innovation (RRI) as the overarching framework for developing policy options, an analysis then centres around four dimensions: inclusiveness, anticipation, reflexivity and responsiveness. Inspired by these dimensions, the report puts forward a variety of policy options in response to the challenges identified. These range from measures aiming to give digital innovation a clearer space in the Horizon Europe funding scheme and to stimulate industrial development in the sector, to fostering the development of critical infrastructures. The proposed measures also address the societal impact of these technologies in relation to specific issues such as digital literacy, privacy and digital rights for citizens.

Read the full report and STOA options brief to find out more. Some preliminary results of this analysis were presented by its authors to the STOA Panel at its meeting of 20 January 2022. A complete version of the study has now been released, incorporating the ideas provided at the time by the STOA Panel Members through their suggestions and comments.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Velina Lilyanova.

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the core element of the EU’s largest and most innovative financing instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU), created to help the EU’s economies and societies recover from the global pandemic. The facility is structured around six pillars representing policy areas of European relevance, identified by the RRF Regulation as vital for strengthening the EU’s resilience. The pillars define investment priorities and the scope of application of financing under the RRF. This briefing is dedicated to one of them – the digital transformation pillar – for which, along with the green transition, the RRF Regulation sets a specific spending target. The briefing aims to give an overview of why the digital transition is one of the key policies in focus under the RRF, what the RRF Regulation requires in that respect, and the approach taken by EU Member States.

To receive funds from the RRF, Member States have drawn up individual national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs), laying down a number of reforms and investments. Funds are released based on performance, upon successful implementation of relevant milestones and targets set out in the plans. Each national plan has to earmark at least 20 % of its resources for achieving digital targets. Digitalisation has been under way for a long time and the EU’s response to this process, even before the pandemic, has been indicative of the high priority it gives to this policy area. The digital transition, one of the ‘twin transitions’, is not only considered key to a faster economic recovery, but also to enhanced security and resilience, and to the EU’s achieving strategic autonomy. NGEU provides an opportunity, among other EU policy tools, to contribute to progress in that area.

While the RRF’s time scope is relatively limited, as investments are due to be completed by 2026, it falls within the recently declared EU Digital Decade 2020-2030. The NRRPs are aligned with the overarching priorities to achieve the EU’s digital objectives by 2030. Digital investment is urgently needed across Europe, and a substantial investment gap in digital infrastructure and services has been estimated between the EU and its global competitors. Thus, funding for digital targets in the RRF is expected to complement funding from EU and national budgets and address this challenge.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The digital dimension of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Wolfram Kaiser.

On 2 April 2009, the European Parliament decided that 23 August each year should mark the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of All Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. With the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had divided Europe into spheres of interest. That agreement, with its secret protocols, preceded the German attack on Poland on 1 September 1939 and the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland, as well as the Soviet occupation and later annexation of the Baltic States, in June 1940.

Background

Questions of historical memory of the Nazi German regime, of fascist collaboration, and of the crimes perpetrated became an increasingly transnational matter in western and southern Europe during the late Cold War period. West Germany experienced its Historikerstreit (or controversy among leading historians) in the 1980s, with debate about the comparability of totalitarian regimes and the singularity of the Holocaust, or Shoah. Trials against surviving perpetrators proliferated in Germany and elsewhere, as in the case of Maurice Papon, for example. Secretary General of the Gironde Prefecture in Bordeaux during the Vichy regime, who was found guilty to have ordered and organised that 1 600 Jews were arrested and transported to the extermination camps during World War II.

At the turn of the century, western European leaders increasingly propagated a common approach to remembering the Holocaust. Representatives from 46 countries met in Stockholm in January 2000 for the International Forum on the Holocaust, to discuss questions of Holocaust education, remembrance and research. On that occasion, they declared 27 January, the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz extermination camp, Holocaust Remembrance Day, emphasising that its ‘unprecedented character … will always hold universal meaning’.

Politicians drew different lessons from the past, however, as quickly became clear with the controversy in the EU over the formation of a new Austrian government bringing together the People’s Party and Jörg Haider’s far-right Freedom Party in February 2000. Moreover, historical memory in east-central and south-eastern Europe diverged very much from western Europeans’ strong focus on the Holocaust. For many east-central Europeans, Stalinist crimes and what they had experienced as a result of the Soviet-communist occupation during and after World War II had the same, if not higher importance for their individual and collective memory than the Holocaust. As they regarded the cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 as the starting point of their suffering, an estimated 2.2 million people formed the human chain linking Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius on 23 August 1989, marking the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – an event that contributed to the collapse of communist rule and the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

Leaders from the new and future European Union Member States in east-central and south-eastern Europe increasingly pushed, from the 2000s onwards, for greater recognition and inclusion in remembrance policies of the crimes of the Stalinist and communist regimes. In 2006, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly passed a resolution on the need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes. On 3 June 2008, prominent politicians including former Czech President Vacláv Havel and future German President Joachim Gauck signed the Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism, calling for ‘Europe-wide condemnation of, and education about, the crimes of communism’, and advocating the institutionalisation of a European Remembrance Day.

European Parliament position

Having already signed the Prague Declaration, around 50 MEPs took the initiative in the European Parliament of launching a written declaration, dated 23 September 2008 and signed by 409 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), which formally proposed the adoption of 23 August as the ‘European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism’. The declaration claimed that ‘the influence and significance of the Soviet order and occupation on and for citizens of the post-Soviet States are little known in Europe’, and that better remembrance could contribute to ‘rooting democracy more firmly and reinforcing peace and stability in our continent’.

The written declaration started a process that led the European Parliament to adopt its resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism on 2 April 2009, which formally marked 23 August as the European Day of Remembrance. The resolution in its final wording addressed a variety of concerns in debates among historians and in the Parliament. First, by referring to all ‘totalitarian and authoritarian regimes’ it broadened its scope beyond Stalinism and Nazism, explicitly referring, for example, to Franco’s Spain. Second, it re-emphasised the ‘uniqueness of the Holocaust’, frequently understood as the systematic industrialised mass-murder of a delineated religious group. Third, it admitted the contested character of interpretations of history, and that ‘parliament cannot legislate on the past’.

The main body of the text centres on the ‘victims of totalitarian and undemocratic regimes … and pays tribute to those who fought against tyranny and oppression’. It expresses the need for ‘keeping the memories of the past alive because there can be no reconciliation without truth and remembrance’. And it connects the memory of the totalitarian regimes and their crimes to the notion of ‘European integration as a model of peace and reconciliation’.

In this form, 553 MEPs voted for the resolution, 44 against and 33 abstained. All EPP MEPs except for 10 MEPs from the Greek New Democracy party, who abstained, as well as all liberal ALDE MEPs present voted for the resolution. 30 MEPs from the S&D group voted against, mostly for fear that the totalitarian paradigm could dilute the place of the Holocaust in European remembrance policies and memory. Most MEPs from the European United Left-Nordic Green Left Group voted against or abstained. Thus, Czech MEP Vladimír Remek, a member of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, claimed that the EP majority was ‘simply trying to lump me together with the Nazis’. And Greek communist MEP Athanasios Pafilis complained about ‘the European Union’s wretched anti-Communist strategy … with the counterfeiting of history, slander and lies’ by equating fascism and communism.

The debate preceding the vote on the resolution showed how important the topic was for east-central and south-eastern Member-States. In fact, all but five MEPs, who spoke in the debate, were from the new Member-States. The debate showed not only that memory of the past was and is perhaps still divided between western and east-central and south-eastern Europe, but also along ideological and other lines. A Day of European Remembrance cannot align such divided memory overnight. Marking the day can however contribute to a better mutual understanding of diverging memories and their greater long-term convergence.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘European Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Kiss.

Cancelled and possibly reintroduced coronavirus-related travel restrictions, increasing fuel prices, striking personnel at the airports and the shadow of the war on Ukraine – despite an encouraging increase in terms of travellers, this summer might be challenging for the tourism sector.

Before the Covid‑19 pandemic, the tourism sector has been a major driver for jobs and growth in the European Union, and experienced almost uninterrupted growth for decades. In 2019, the tourism industry employed more than 12.5 million people, accounting for around 10 % of total EU employment.

The impact of the travel restrictions related to the Covid‑19 pandemic (such as cancellation of flights and hotel reservations, mandatory testing, or quarantine measures), changed these figures in an unprecedented way. According to Eurostat statistics, the first lockdown in spring 2020 set tourism almost to zero. A partial recovery followed in summer 2020, driven mainly by domestic demand, with many people deciding to opt for ‘staycations’ in their home countries. At EU-level, the number of accommodation nights for EU tourists had dropped by 61 % from April 2020 to March 2021. Malta (80 %), Spain (78 %) and Greece (74 %) recorded the biggest falls.

The aviation sector suffered the loss of 2 703 million passengers in 2020 due to the pandemic.

Timely and coordinated policy efforts at both EU and national level – for instance, the mutual recognition of vaccinations, or the introduction of the EU Digital Covid Certificate, accepted in all Member States – helped to diminish these impacts and to allow people to travel, even if less than before. Support for employers and employees, such as the SURE Instrument, short-time work schemes, or the REACT-EU package and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative helped to cushion the impact of job losses and economic downturn.

In the first quarter of 2022, a significant increase was observed in tourism, compared to the same period of the previous year: domestic accommodation arrivals more than doubled, and international accommodation arrivals increased six-fold. Air traffic in May 2022 was up 83.1 % compared to May 2021, according to International Air Transport Association (IATA) data, and is now at 68.7 % of pre-pandemic levels. There is still a way to go: at a meeting of the Committee on Transport and Tourism on 12 July 2022, European Commission representative Filip Cornelis noted that figures  are expected to reach 2019 levels by the end of 2024.

A number of issues continue to threaten this generally encouraging increase in the tourism and aviation sectors, however.

Russia’s war on Ukraine affects the tourism industry in different ways. One of its impacts is the loss of Russian and Ukrainian tourists. According to estimates, the two counties accounted for 75 million tourism departures in 2019, which equals 5 % of the global total. In addition, there is also less ‘traveller confidence’ among EU nationals, mainly concerning trips to the countries neighbouring Ukraine. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed by the EU and by Russia on airlines and on the use of airspace are leading to cancelled flights or longer routes in air transport. In addition, higher fuel costs caused by the war (80 % higher jet fuel prices than a year ago), create additional losses for air companies and might lead to higher prices for customers. Increased food, energy and water prices due to the war and related sanctions will unavoidably affect hotels and restaurants and could also lead to higher costs for customers.

The growing willingness to travel after the lifted Covid‑19 restrictions leads to another problem for the catering and transport sector. Due to the closure of transport facilities, hotels and restaurants during lockdowns, a high share of staff were made redundant. For instance, in the aviation sector, 191 000 European aviation workers lost their jobs. The rapidly increasing demand has resulted in labour shortages, as many of these workers cannot be rehired and there is no immediate possibility to hire a new workforce (for example, to carry out ground handling and security tasks, up to 10 weeks training is mandatory). The resulting higher workload for the remaining airport workers, coupled with precarious working conditions, such as ‘zero hour’ or seasonal work contracts, or the lack of wage adaptations compared to rising costs of living, has led to repeated strikes by ground handling workers, joined by pilots and cabin crew. This leads to flight disruption, cancellations and infringements of consumer rights.

Another threat to increasing tourism figures is the possibility of a new rise in Covid‑19 cases. According to World Health Organization data, during the week of 4‑10 July 2022, the number of weekly cases increased for the fifth consecutive week, after a declining trend since the last peak in March 2022. In Europe, over 2.8 million new cases were reported, which is a 4 % increase compared to the previous week. Cyprus has already reintroduced facemasks and other Member States, such as Spain might follow.

The European Commission, together with EU Member State governments and industry stakeholders, is looking for solutions to remedy this situation. Commissioner for Transport Adina Vălean held several meetings with stakeholders to identify the root causes of travel disruption and seek common solutions. The Commission has compiled best practices on better coordination and exchange of information, which stakeholders are expected  to implement. Passengers have to be informed of travel disruption, expected waiting times and their rights when their travel plans are interrupted.

On 12 July 2022, the European Commission proposed to allow the airline slot regime to respond more flexibly to unexpected developments in the near future. The Commission proposes to return to a higher slot use rate (80 % of the 2019 figures as of 30 October 2022) reflecting the demand, but at the same time, to prolong the possibility to make use of the ‘justified non-use of slots’ (JNUS) tool created during the pandemic. Concerning working conditions in the tourism sector, the adoption of a directive on fair minimum wages, planned for the third quarter of 2022, might lead to improvements. The ongoing revision of the Directive on Air Passenger Rights should lead to better protection of air passenger’s interests when travel is disrupted. In the meantime, the Commission has adopted interpretative guidelines to provide guidance to citizens and airlines on the current state of the law.

Citizens often send messages to the European Parliament expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the House of European History to remove a poster of ‘the Madonna and Christ of Czestochowa with rainbow halos’ from a temporary exhibition. Citizens first began to write to the European Parliament on this subject in June 2022. The Board of Trustees of the House of European History responded, highlighting the story around the poster, as explained and contextualised in the exhibition. It also pointed out that the exhibition presents the views of both critics and proponents of the poster.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the European Parliament on this matter (in English and Polish).

Main points made in the reply in English

We would point out that your message has been brought to the attention of the Board of Trustees of the House of European History. The Board examined it carefully and unanimously supported the following statement at its recent meeting:

‘Your matter of concern is the poster of the Madonna and Christ of Czestochowa with rainbow halos. The image was created in 2019 in protest against anti-LGBT+ statements of the Polish Church. It sparked controversy and led to a criminal investigation and a trial for offending religious feelings and desecrating a ritual object. The activists, who faced trial, were eventually acquitted by the Polish court. Its verdict concluded that this act had not meant to hurt Polish Catholics: “It cannot be claimed that the rainbow flag of LGBT people offends anyone”.

The story around the poster is well explained and contextualised in the exhibition texts and in the exhibition catalogue. Both the criticisms and the court ruling are presented, in line with the commitment of the House of European History to multi-perspectivity.

The poster was chosen to be part of the exhibition – together with the exhibited poster “Je suis Charlie” – in order to reflect about the freedom of expression and to debate about different standpoints, which is the basis of a healthy society. This choice is the result of extensive research by academically independent historians and curators and broad discussions and peer-reviews with the Academic Committee, composed of renowned historians from all over Europe.’

Background to the exhibition

The poster is one of about 150 selected to be part of the ‘When Walls Talk’ exhibition of posters that illustrate European society over the last century. Further information on the House of European History can be found in the Museum’s Mission and Vision statement.

Main points made in the reply in Polish

‘Przekazaliśmy też Pani / Pana wiadomość Radzie Nadzorczej Domu Historii Europejskiej. Rada dokładnie przeanalizowała poruszoną w niej kwestię i na swoim ostatnim posiedzeniu jednogłośnie przyjęła następujące oświadczenie:

„Państwa wątpliwości budzi plakat Matki Boskiej Częstochowskiej z tęczową aureolą. Powstał on w 2019 roku w proteście przeciwko wypowiedziom anty-LGBT+ polskiego Kościoła. Plakat wywołał kontrowersje i doprowadził do wszczęcia dochodzenia i procesu za naruszenie uczuć religijnych i profanację przedmiotu czci religijnej. Polski sąd ostatecznie uniewinnił oskarżone aktywistki. W uzasadnieniu wyroku stwierdzono, że celem działań oskarżonych nie była obraza polskich katolików, ponieważ »symbol flagi osób nieheteronormatywnych nie może być uznawany sam w sobie za znieważający«.

Historię plakatu dobrze wyjaśniono w tekstach oraz w katalogu wystawy. Grafikę umieszczono też w odpowiednim kontekście. Na wystawie przedstawiono zarówno krytykę plakatu, jak i orzeczenie sądu, zgodnie ze zobowiązaniem Domu Historii Europejskiej do prezentowania wielu punktów widzenia.

Plakat został zaprezentowany – wraz z plakatem „Je suis Charlie” – aby zainspirować refleksję nad wolnością wypowiedzi i debatę na temat różnych perspektyw, co stanowi podstawę zdrowego społeczeństwa. Wybrano go w następstwie dogłębnych badań przeprowadzonych przez niezależnych historyków i kuratorów oraz szeroko zakrojonych dyskusji i ocen z Komitetem Akademickim, w którego skład wchodzą renomowani historycy z całej Europy”.

Kontekst wystawy

Plakat jest jednym z około 150 prezentowanych w ramach wystawy Kiedy ściany mają głos, która opowiada o europejskim społeczeństwie w ciągu ostatnich stu lat. Więcej informacji na temat Domu Historii Europejskiej znajdzie Pani / Pan w oświadczeniu o misji i wizji muzeum.’

Written by Elena Lazarou and Ionel Zamfir.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has shattered assumptions and expectations about protracted peace in the wider European space. It has stimulated serious reflection about the instruments and tools available to safeguard peace in times of contestation between great powers and of weakened multilateral institutions, phenomena that have been observed consistently throughout the past decade.

At the same time, the promotion of global peace and security continues to be a fundamental goal and central pillar of European Union (EU) external action, following the model of its own peace project. Both within and beyond the EU, there is a widespread expectation among citizens that the Union will deliver results in this crucial area. Nevertheless, as the security environment poses what could be the most significant challenge to security in the post-Cold War period, the EU is urgently intensifying its work for peace and security in a number of key policy areas.

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According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) 2022, the state of peace in the world deteriorated slightly in 2021, continuing a long-standing trend. In addition, multilateralism, a core element of EU foreign policy and identity, and a cornerstone of its approach to peace and security, is under increasing pressure from alternative value systems and ideologies; a situation that has been exacerbated by the effects of the pandemic.

Even before the launch of Russia’s war, the coronavirus crisis had accelerated these pre-existing trends, which were already signalling the advent of a more competitive and less secure international geopolitical environment. In response to these trends, the European Commission under President Ursula von de Leyen, with the support of the European Parliament, committed to reinforcing the EU as an external actor, able to act more strategically and autonomously, while fully upholding the fundamental values stipulated in the founding Treaties, including the achievement of peace. To this day, the over-arching values and objectives of the EU guide all facets of its external action, including common foreign and security policy (CFSP); democracy support; development cooperation; economic, financial and technical cooperation; humanitarian aid; trade; and neighbourhood policy.

Read our Animated infographic on Peace and Security

While the promotion of peace remains the objective of EU foreign policy, achieving it is also linked to understanding peace and its components. Thus, measuring peace and the threats that challenge it is becoming an increasingly relevant exercise. In that context, the Normandy Index attempts to measure threats to peace based on variables identified in the EU Global Strategy. The EU Member States, supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS), conducted a comprehensive threat analysis in 2020, as part of the development of the EU Strategic Compass, which was adopted by the Council and endorsed by the European Council in March 2022.

The EU’s contribution to countering threats to peace, security and democracy globally has grown significantly through legislation, financing and the creation of new structures and initiatives. A significant share of EU aid goes to fragile states and to issues related to securing peace. The EU’s ‘new consensus on development’ emphasises the role of development cooperation in preventing violent conflicts, mitigating their consequences and aiding recovery from them. On the ground, the EU has been able to strengthen the nexus between security, development and humanitarian aid through the implementation of comprehensive strategies, for example in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel. Through its common security and defence policy (CSDP), the EU runs 18 missions and operations, making it one of the United Nation’s main partners in peacekeeping. To help partners withstand sometimes violent attacks on their democratic structures by domestic illiberal forces and external authoritarian powers, the EU has been strengthening its tools to support democracy all over the world.

In 2021, the EU continued to advance its work on countering new threats to peace, such as disinformation, cyber-attacks and climate change. New elements strengthening EU security and defence capabilities were implemented with the aim of boosting EU strategic autonomy, including its capacity to work for peace and security. These elements of ‘hard power’, together with the EU’s long-standing experience in the practice of soft power, form the backbone of its action for peace and security.

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The EU also continues to be a staunch promoter of multilateralism at global and regional levels to counter global threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and global health crises, including the economic and humanitarian consequences of the coronavirus pandemic across the world. The EU’s immediate neighbourhood is a consistent focus in its work, with the aim of building resilience and upholding peace and democracy, both now seriously challenged at the EU’s eastern border by Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Looking to the future, peace and security are increasing in complexity. Even in Europe, the war in Ukraine has shown that the assumption of sustained peace can no longer be taken for granted. The effects of the war on Ukraine reverberate around the world in the form of diminishing food and energy security, inflationary pressures, economic crises and global polarisation. New types of threats and destabilising factors such as pandemics, climate change, foreign interference in democracy, cyber-attacks and bio-terrorism, as well as various types of hybrid warfare, call for innovative thinking and new types of resources and solutions. While the EU has made significant progress in furthering its aim of strengthening its presence and efficiency in the area of peace and security, more remains to be done. The 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) is focused on streamlining the EU’s programmes and instruments to allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to unforeseen threats, while also implementing innovative financial instruments.

While the EU’s quest for flexibility, efficiency and innovation in recent years has been underpinned by the strategic goal of empowering the EU in its global role as a promoter of peace and security, no event has made the urgency of this challenge as evident as Russia’s war on Ukraine. While adapting to the new realities of the international order and the rapid technological, environmental and societal changes of our times, the war has also precipitated bold and rapid change in the EU’s capacity to act for peace and security, such as unprecedented sanctions and support for substantial arms deliveries. Adapting to the rapidly transforming world has meant that the EU has to become a more autonomous, strategic and holistic actor for peace and security by bringing together elements of normative, soft and hard power with steadfastness and resilience.

Read the complete study on ‘Peace and Security in 2022: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

On 28-30 June 2022, NATO leaders met in Madrid and adopted a new strategic concept, rewriting their assessment of the threat environment in the light of Russia’s war on Ukraine. NATO also overhauled its defence and deterrence posture, and officially invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance.

NATO’s new strategic concept

From 28 to 30 June 2022, the NATO Allies’ heads of state or government met for the 32nd time since 1949, to steer a course through current challenges and determine the Alliance’s future direction. The summit’s most important outcome was the adoption of NATO’s new (eighth) strategic concept – a document that sets out the Alliance’s strategy, and outlines its defence and deterrence posture, its core tasks, and the security challenges it faces. NATO’s last strategic concept dated back to 2010, when the security situation in Europe was fundamentally different. The new strategic concept marks a fundamentally new departure:

• Threat environment: The new concept states that the Euro-Atlantic area is no longer at peace, and faces ‘the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity’. This is starkly different from the 2010 concept’s assessment, which noted that the area was at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO was low. New security challenges such as space, cyber- and hybrid threats, climate change, and emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are all mentioned. NATO commits to enhancing its cyber-defences and investing in its ability to deter, prepare and defend against hybrid threats. The concept notes that cyber- and hybrid threats could justify invocation of Article 5 (the mutual defence clause). Commentators note the ‘laundry list’ will make prioritising difficult and that it lacks detail on how the challenges should be met.
• Russia: NATO notes that Russia presents the ‘most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’. By contrast, in the 2010 concept, NATO sought to pursue ‘a true strategic partnership with Russia’. One expert argues that this is the strongest language on Russia since 1991 and is reminiscent of ‘Cold-War style language’. In arguably a rebuke to Putin, NATO leaders also reaffirmed NATO’s open-door policy and stated that ‘no third party has a say in this process’.
• China: China’s ‘ambitions and coercive policies’ are said to challenge NATO’s ‘interests, security and values’, in this first ever mention of the country in a strategic concept. The concept warns that China’s hybrid, cyber- and disinformation activities are a threat to NATO and raises concerns about the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China. However, the Allies remain open to constructive engagement with China. It was in this context that the Allies’ Indo-Pacific partners, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, attended their first ever NATO summit.
• Core tasks: NATO reaffirms and reinforces its three core tasks: cooperative security, crisis prevention and management (as opposed to simply crisis management in the 2010 concept) and deterrence and defence (collective defence in the previous concept). Importantly, the new concept mainstreams resilience through all three core tasks. According to one analyst, the core tasks remain ‘broadly the same’. However other experts argue that the importance of deterrence has risen compared with other core tasks, even arguing that it now has primacy.
• EU-NATO cooperation: The new concept states that the EU is a ‘unique and essential partner for NATO’. The two organisations share 21 (23 once Finland and Sweden join NATO) Member States in common. EU-NATO cooperation focuses on issues of common interest such as crisis management. It was cemented in a strategic partnership in the early 2000s and expanded through two joint EU-NATO declarations, in 2016 and 2018, that outline areas for strengthened cooperation. A third EU-NATO declaration is expected in the near future. The new concept underlines that cooperation will be enhanced on issues of common interest, such as military mobility, EDTs, the impact of climate change on security, human security, the ‘women, peace and security’ agenda, and hybrid and cyber‑threats. NATO recognises that stronger EU defence will contribute to transatlantic security. This is coherent with the emphasis placed on enhancing EU-NATO cooperation in the EU’s Strategic Compass. A Euro-Atlantic dinner was held on 29 June on the fringes of the summit. Challenges nevertheless remain, owing to tensions between member states (most notably Turkey and Cyprus) and comparatively weak EU military capabilities and defence spending (the latter are improving rapidly).

NATO strengthens its deterrence and defence posture

NATO’s secretary-general announced a ‘fundamental shift’ to deterrence and defence, encompassing:

• Enhanced forward presence: Allies committed to boost the eight multi-national battlegroups, currently deployed on its eastern flank, to brigade-level if necessary. For instance, the United States announced that it would significantly increase US troop deployments to several eastern European Allies and that the permanent headquarters of the US Army’s V Corps would be in Poland.
• Forces boosted to high-readiness: The Alliance’s rapid reaction force, the NATO Response Force, will be increased to 300 000 troops. For the first time since the Cold War these forces will be dedicated to defending a specific Ally. By way of example, the United Kingdom has earmarked an extra 1 000 personnel for rapid deployment for the defence of Estonia.
• Forward deployed equipment: The Allies committed to deploy stockpiles, facilities and military equipment to the Eastern flank to boost the credibility of NATO’s deterrence. For instance, on 30 June, following the NATO summit, France deployed a missile defence system to Romania.

According to experts, these steps are an impressive show of resolve to bolster defences and counter Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. However, one analyst cautions that these commitments will be expensive, and if not backed up adequately, could undermine NATO’s credibility.

Support to Ukraine

NATO Allies have supported Ukraine with military equipment and aid since even before the beginning of the Russian invasion. These deliveries have been coordinated inter alia by the EU and the Ukraine Contact Group, which includes 50 nations. At the summit, the NATO Allies confirmed their commitment ‘for as long as it takes’. NATO members also committed to continue with major bilateral military and financial help, and agreed to a comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine, including non-lethal equipment such as ‘secure communications, fuel, medical supplies and body armour’. NATO further committed to help Ukraine transition to modern equipment, enhance interoperability and bolster its defence and security institutions.

Accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO

Finland and Sweden officially submitted their NATO membership applications on 18 May 2022. It was initially unclear whether their application would be accepted (NATO accession requires unanimity), owing to Turkey’s concerns that the countries were harbouring ‘terrorists’. However, ahead of the summit, Finland, Sweden and Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding in which Turkey obtained commitments on counterterrorism (relating to groups it considers terrorists) and on national arms embargoes. On 29 June 2022, NATO formally invited Finland and Sweden to become full members and on 5 July, NATO ambassadors signed the accession protocols, paving the way for ratification by all members. Finland and Sweden can now participate officially in NATO meetings (they had already been attending unofficially since Russia invaded Ukraine). The ratification process could take up to a year and may yet be blocked by Turkey. Once complete, NATO’s secretary-general will officially invite the candidates to accede to the Washington Treaty. Once their instruments of accession have been deposited, Finland and Sweden will be full members.

European Parliament position

In its June 2022 recommendation on the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Parliament underlined the need to intensify EU-NATO cooperation and the importance of a substantial third EU-NATO joint declaration. MEPs also called for a further boost to NATO’s enhanced forward presence, while acknowledging that NATO is the bedrock of its members’ collective defence. In 2021 the Parliament adopted a resolution on EU-NATO cooperation, in which it emphasised that strong partnership was vital to address today’s security challenges and called for deeper cooperation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the Madrid NATO Summit, June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Abstract

Today’s EU pharmaceutical market is unsustainable, due to the fragmentation of EU players and public dependence on private interests. A recent Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) study proposes a solution involving the creation of a public European medicines infrastructure, a body that would control of the entire drug cycle, from its inception to its delivery.

The forthcoming STOA workshop will discuss how such a structure should be developed. This event is part of a series of STOA activities (including publications and events) addressing the EU health response to the Covid‑19 pandemic, with a view to fostering preparedness to counter future health threats.

Today’s EU public health system is unsustainable

The Covid-19 pandemic exposed gaps in the EU public health system: from non-standardised Member State data reporting and uncoordinated Member State crisis responses, controversial vaccine contracts and slow national vaccine rollouts, to a fragmented network of institutional actors in health.

The EU’s response to Covid-19 improved upon some of these issues. We saw the launch of the EU4Health programme and the pharmaceutical strategy for Europe initiative, the reinforcement of the roles of EU agencies the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and European Medicines Agency (EMA), and the creation of two new EU structures, the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA) and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), the latter of which has a mission to stockpile and distribute vaccines and other medical countermeasures to the 27 EU Member States.

However, some have argued that these solutions are limited and do not address the root of the problem – the unsustainability of the present EU pharmaceutical system. A STOA study analysing 200 literature sources and interviewing 60 experts identifies the main market and policy failures at the heart of the problem, including:

1. a mismatch between public and private research and development (R&D) priorities;

2. a mismatch between public sector ‘open’ science and private copyright regimes;

3. an excessive flow of public subsidies towards the private sector;

4. private monopoly control over access to and the cost of medicines.

A solution is therefore sought that can repurpose the massive public investment in pharmaceutical R&D for an effective and sustainable public EU ecosystem.

With its resolution of 17 September 2020, the European Parliament called on the Commission and Member States to ‘examine the possibility of creating one or more European non-profit pharmaceutical undertakings which operate in the public interest to manufacture medicinal products of health (…), in order to complete and guarantee security of supply and prevent possible shortages of medicines’.

The December 2021 Council conclusions negotiated under the Slovenian Presidency of the EU and signed off by all 27 EU Health Ministers took note of the importance of Parliament’s resolution to ensure the supply of medicinal products affected by market failures.

In July 2022, an open letter to EU institutions signed by researchers, doctors and by Italian ex-ministers of Health Rosy Bindi and Giulia Grillo, called for the creation of a public European infrastructure that can develop vaccines and other therapeutics, for the common good.

Developing a public European medicines infrastructure

According to the authors of the STOA study, a European medicines infrastructure would focus on serving public interest by developing effective, affordable and safe medicines that are free from private intellectual property rights and where public funds are reallocated to public-interest projects. Such a structure would allow the development of new antimicrobials and medicines used to cure rare diseases (‘orphan medicines’), areas traditionally left out of private strategies.

Unlike HERA, which does not have the mandate to directly implement pharmaceutical R&D projects, this new structure would have the authority to control the full drug lifecycle, from research to development, production and distribution. It would centralise EU public health R&D in a manner equivalent to other EU structures. It could take inspiration from the United States’ health federal agencies, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), with their reinforced budgets and scope. It would remain open to collaborations with scientific and public health centres at national and EU levels and with pharmaceutical companies, based on transparent contracts.

A European medicines infrastructure could be developed in one of four models, depending on the level of autonomy – from public/private partnerships to fully public – and R&D capacity – and from a focus on infectious diseases to a wider focus on public health.

The upcoming STOA workshop

On 28 September 2022, the European Parliament will organise a roundtable discussion on the purpose and feasibility of creating a European medicines infrastructure. The event will gather experts from research, industry, civil society governmental and non-governmental organisations to discuss the development models for such a structure.

Ahead of the workshop, participants have shared their views. EU research fragmentation is a main contributor to the issue, advises Karin Sipido of KU Leuven. Rolf Apweiler, from EMBL, highlights the importance of ‘open’ science and accessible data sharing for health crisis response. Rosa Castro, from EPHA, supports EU coordination for areas of low commercial profitability, and includes HERA in such a structure. For Salah Dine Chibout, from Novartis, public and private bodies have complementary roles and should continue to collaborate in clinical trial stages. Global vaccine access and distribution remains unequal, due to private monopoly control, notes Els Torreele,in an appeal for new policies and governance rules.

In conclusion, the industry is a key player in pharmaceutical R&D and innovation. However, overwhelming evidence points to a structural disconnect between public health priorities and private strategies, which lead to market and policy failures that do not benefit the public interest. A European medicines infrastructure could offer a new approach to fixing these issues. The forthcoming workshop will contribute to the ongoing public discussion.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask how the Parliament responds to the issue of forest fires and what actions the European Union can take.

In recent years, several countries around the world have been confronted with particularly intense and widespread forest fires. In 2021, forest fires severely affected California, Turkey and Mexico, in addition to yearly European hotspots, such as the Mediterranean. 

The protection of forests in the European Union (EU) falls primarily under the national competence of the governments of EU countries. There are a number of ways, however, in which the EU contributes to preventing and helping in the case of forest fires, both through EU funding and EU mechanisms.

The European Parliament has repeatedly called on the European Commission and EU countries to do more to protect forests. The Commission has introduced protection mechanisms and a forest strategy for 2030.

European Parliament demands for better protection of forests

Recognising forests’ key role in climate action, the European Parliament has adopted several resolutions concerning the conservation of forests.

• In a resolution of September 2018, Parliament highlighted that sustainable and inclusive forest management and responsible use of forest commodities constitute the most effective and cheapest natural system for carbon capture and storage.
• In a resolution of January 2020, on the European Green Deal, Parliament called on the Commission to ‘present a new, ambitious EU forest strategy to give appropriate recognition to the important, multifunctional and cross-cutting role that European forests, the sector, and sustainable forest management have in the fight against climate change and biodiversity loss’.
• In a resolution of September 2020, on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests, Parliament urged the EU and EU countries to recognise that the protection of native forests provides an outstanding climate mitigation benefit, and to restart the negotiations for an international forest convention.
• In a resolution of June 2021, Parliament welcomed the new EU forest strategy and underlined the importance of strengthening sustainable forest management.

EU plans to protect forests

A 2019 European Commission communication lays out actions to protect and restore forests outside the EU. Primary forests require special attention as they are unique and irreplaceable, have high carbon stocks, unique ecological features, and protect biodiversity. The EU aims to work in partnership with producer countries to reduce pressures on forests and to strengthen international cooperation to halt deforestation and forest degradation.

Regarding forests inside the EU, a 2021 European Commission communication (known as the ‘new EU forest strategy for 2030’) pursues the biodiversity and climate neutrality objectives enshrined in the European Green Deal and the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030. The strategy aims to improve the quantity and quality of EU forests by, for instance:

• providing education and training for people working in forest-based industries and making these industries more attractive to young people;
• promoting sustainable forest management;
• improving the size and biodiversity of forests, including planting three billion new trees by 2030;
• developing a strong research and innovation agenda to improve our knowledge on forests.

EU action to fight forest fires

The European Union actively supports forest fire prevention projects through its Regional Development Fund. Furthermore, the European Union Solidary Fund provides support to help EU countries tackle major natural disasters such as forest fires.

The European Union Civil Protection Mechanism ensures the rapid deployment of resources and personnel to any country in the world that requests assistance during crises such as forest fires. At the core of this mechanism is the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, which monitors forest fire risks and emergencies across Europe. This centre is supported by national and European monitoring services, including the European Forest Fire Information System.

In 2019, to strengthen the mechanism, the EU established a new European reserve of capacities. Known as rescEU, it includes firefighting planes and helicopters. For the 2022 forest fire season, Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden put a total of 12 firefighting planes and 1  helicopter at the disposal of other EU countries in case of an emergency. The European Commission will decide jointly with these EU countries on the deployment of the planes and helicopter.

Further information

• New EU forest strategy for 2030, European Parliamentary Research Service, At a Glance Note, February 2022
• Forest fires: Environmental stakes, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, November 2020
• Legislation on protecting the EU’s forests against fire, European Commission
• Forest Fires, European Commission, Fact Sheet, June 2022

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

Ukraine is one of the worlds’ largest producers of grains and oilseed, and – for the export of these products to Africa, the Middle East and Europe – heavily dependent on its maritime transport and ports, currently blocked because of the war. Ukraine and Russia together typically export nearly 12 % of food calories globally. Before the war, Ukraine exported more than 90 % of its agricultural products, around 6 million tons per month, via the Black Sea. Alternative routes by road and rail only provide for a partial solution, while free navigation in open sea is an international right of sovereign states.

Background

The closure of Ukrainian ports has caused serious disruption in European and other supply chains, and owing to lack of maritime logistics and connectivity, an international food crisis is looming. Russia’s war on Ukraine has affected the maritime transport sector heavily, including its ports. With commercial ships hit in the conflict, operators have to redirect freight transport and divert vessels. Most large shipping companies, citing unpredictable operational impacts, have suspended shipments to and from Ukraine and Russia. Important shipping routes in the Black Sea – in particular, Odesa and the Sea of Azov – are blocked and occupied. At the start of the war, around 2 000 seafarers were stranded aboard 94 vessels in Ukrainian ports. These numbers have fallen slightly. According to the Atlantic Council, Russian naval ships have hit at least 10 commercial ships since Russia’s assault. About 80 commercial ships have been blocked in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov for months. Before the war, Ukrainian Black Sea ports accounted for up to 90 % of the country’s grain and oilseed exports, of which one third is destined to Europe, China and Africa. At the European Parliament’s Transport (TRAN) Committee meeting in May 2022, Ukrainian Minister of Infrastructure Oleksandr Kubrakov said that 70 % of total exports from Ukraine are normally carried by sea. With supply chains heavily disrupted, re-routing of goods to road and rail will not suffice, given the volumes implicated. This situation exacerbates congestion at terminals, putting maritime logistics and connectivity, as well as maritime safety and security, at risk. The International Maritime Organization has called for safe maritime corridors, and the International Transport Forum has made a call for action to unblock trade routes and seaports in the Black Sea for international trade to resume. The United Nations is attempting to open a protected shipping lane in the Black Sea, avoiding an international food crisis. Meanwhile, Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabrielius Landsbergis, proposed establishing a non-military international maritime coalition to break through the blockade of Ukrainian ports.

EU action

In response, the EU has adopted multiple sanctions against Russia. Companies targeted by EU sanctions include Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port and the United Shipbuilding Corporation. The fifth EU sanctions package includes a ban on Russian-flagged vessels entering EU ports. Exemptions apply, for example for medical, food, energy, and humanitarian purposes. The European Council conclusions on the sixth sanctions package envisage a ban – with EU leaders having agreed on a partial ban – on most Russian oil imports (crude oil and petroleum products) arriving in the EU by sea by the end of 2022. This amounts to around two-thirds of imports from Russia, reaching up to 90 % by the end of the year. EU operators will be banned from insuring and financing oil transport services, in particular through maritime routes, to third countries, after a six-month wind-down. This will mainly concern insurance companies from the EU and the United Kingdom. EU ports are facing the need to apply EU sanctions from the fifth and sixth packages against Russian-linked vessels. The situation could affect the forthcoming review of European maritime safety rules, not least regarding port state control, and the TEN-T review for improving connectivity with, inter alia, Ukraine. Russia has been suspended, until further notice from the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on port state control, which includes ports of 22 EU Member States. The European Sea Ports Organisation stressed that Europe’s ports are crucial in keeping supply chains operational and setting up new alternative routes for Ukrainian exports. Ports are pivotal in safeguarding energy supplies and reducing energy-dependence from Russia. The European Parliament has welcomed, in particular, the third pillar of the fifth package of sanctions, calling on the EU to further tighten sanctions against the Russian maritime sector and to refuse entry to EU ports for ships that have docked in Russia on their way to the EU. In this respect, Parliament proposed that the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) could play a role in providing a list of Russian vessels to be banned from EU ports, taking into account those that have re-flagged or re-registered since February 2022. EMSA could provide guidance on the uniform application of sanctions, while maintaining a level playing field for EU ports. EMSA is also conducting flights over the Black Sea to enhance maritime surveillance. Parliament has also asked to refuse calls at EU ports to all ships, irrespective of who owns or operates them, if they also call at Russian ports along their route. It has welcomed the decision of several of the world’s largest shipping companies based in Europe to halt all cargo bookings to and from Russia. Ships wanting to make an EU port call will not be allowed to bunker fuel in Russian ports or from Russian bunkering ships at sea. To avoid further supply chain delays, governments should ensure sufficient staff and resources are available for these measures. A parliamentary question has also expressed concern over the impact of international shipping, logistics, supply chains, and fuel prices, in particular on freight rates in the maritime sector. The EU’s plan for solidarity lanes as alternative logistics corridors, by road, rail and water, to export agricultural goods (e.g. grain, maize) from Ukraine, aims inter alia to unblock 20 million tons of foods in Odesa. The Commission presented its action plan to the TRAN committee in June. Its aim: to redirect 3 million tons of grain a month through new modal routes, such as the Danube, Constanta (Romania), and Polish, Baltic and Adriatic ports. According to the Commission, around 6 million tons have been exported up to now. Most recently, the EU has signed a truck deal with Ukraine and Moldova, to shift cargo from sea to road. This would sustain export flows and allow Ukraine to import necessary goods. At the June 2022 European Council meeting, Ukraine and Moldova, as Black Sea states, were granted EU candidate country status.

Outlook

With the Sea of Azov fully blocked by Russia – and Black Sea ports, including Odesa, not being operational for an indefinite period – Ukraine, the EU and UN are taking action to redirect trade flows and goods away from Ukrainian ports. Increasing the capacity of the Sulina channel connecting the Danube River with the Black Sea could be one option that would permit additional exports. Alternative transit through Danube Maritime Cluster ports could cover a part of global transport needs. Connections need to be made with ports such as Constanta, visited recently by the TRAN committee, and Varna (Bulgaria). Meanwhile, Turkey has forbidden access of all naval ships through its territorial waters, based on the Montreux Convention, and Ukraine has recently asked Turkey to take action over a Russian-flagged cargo ship carrying grain from Berdyansk port in the Sea of Azov. Bunker fuel prices have risen worldwide, over which Parliament has already expressed its concern. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the war in Ukraine is hindering trade and maritime logistics, in particular in the Black Sea region, leading to more global vessel demand and higher costs of shipping globally (see Figure 1). The war and the pandemic have affected global shipping costs. Disruptions in logistics and port operations, the destruction of infrastructure, and trade restrictions have increased marine insurance costs and fuel prices. Shipping distances have increased, along with transit times and therefore costs.

Rising shipping prices (daily vessel earnings, in US$/day)

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Maritime logistics and connectivity‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The thirty NATO member states agreed on 29 June to invite Finland and Sweden to join the Western military alliance, accepting the Nordic countries’ accession bids, which came after Russia launched its war on Ukraine nearly five months ago. The June NATO Summit in Madrid also endorsed a new Strategic Concept and branded the Russian Federation as ‘the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area’. NATO also agreed to boost significantly its defence capabilities and offer more support for Ukraine.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the NATO Summit and on European defence.

Summit speed read: How the G7 and NATO pushed back on Putin
Atlantic Council, July 2022

The triumphs and question marks from this week’s NATO summit
Atlantic Council, July 2022

Scowcroft strategy scorecard: NATO’s Strategic Concept clear on threats, but will require sustained commitment from Alliance
Atlantic Council, July 2022

Americans’ preparedness to pay a price for supporting Ukraine remains robust
Brookings Institution, July 2022

La Boussole stratégique de l’UE répond-elle aux énigmes existentielles de la défense européenne?
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, July 2022

NATO after Madrid: How much deterrence and defence on the eastern flank?
Centre for Eastern Studies, July 2022

Why Sweden and Finland joining NATO makes perfect sense
Heritage Foundation, July 2022

NATO’s new Strategic Concept: Novelties and priorities
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2022

Russia on NATO Enlargement to Sweden and Finland
Polish Institute of International Affairs, June 2022

It’s the national security, stupid
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Explaining Turkish foreign policy moves in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Our experts decipher NATO’s new Strategic Concept
Atlantic Council, June 2022

Blinken: NATO is ‘more united, more focused’ after historic summit
Atlantic Council, June 2022

NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war
Atlantic Council, June 2022

What Turkey won with its NATO leverage
Atlantic Council, June 2022

European security after NATO’s Madrid summit
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Brookings Institution, June 2022

America’s real deterrence problem
Brookings Institution, June 2022

NATO and the EU’s strength lies in their unity
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

NATO and the EU need a strategy for Eastern Europe
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

Is Europe serious about defense?
Carnegie Europe, June 2022

NATO 2030: Towards a new strategy
Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2022

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy
Chatham House, June 2022

NATO knows Asia is vital to protecting global security
Chatham House, June 2022

NATO must prioritize climate change as a security issue
Chatham House, June 2022

NATO countries signal resolve at summit: What does it mean for Russia?
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

How NATO will change if Finland and Sweden become members
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

The G7, NATO, and the future of the West
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

Sweden and Finland steering towards NATO, absent anchorage in Ankara
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, June 2022

NATO: Addressing the alliance’s southern flank, keeping an eye on the geopolitical ball
Friends of Europe, June 2022

Why America won’t turn to isolationism
German Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

Moving towards coherence NATO policy on Artificial Intelligence and innovation
Globsec, June 2022

NATO summit Madrid: Reinforcing deterrence at this crucial time is in the U.S. national interest
Heritage Foundation, June 2022

Will Switzerland move closer to NATO?
Heritage Foundation, June 2022

NATO southern flank matters more than ever, but who will fix it?
Heritage Foundation, June 2022

OTAN: les enjeux du Sommet de Madrid
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, June 2022

L’OTAN: transformation et plasticité
Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire, June 2022

Russia’s war in Ukraine: Large-scale war and NATO
International Centre for Defence and Security, June 2022

The new NATO Strategic Concept and the end of arms control
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2022

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Change, continuity and implications
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, June 2022

Operationalizing cyberspace as a military domain: Lesson for NATO
Rand Corporation, June 2022

Rethinking nuclear deterrence: A European perspective
Brussels School of Governance May 2022

NATO, the EU and the return of collective defence
Brussels School of Governance May 2022

Spain and NATO: 40 years
Fundacion Real Instituto Elcano, May 2022

Fostering NATO expansion and enlargement
German Marshall Fund May 2022

Read this briefing on ‘NATO and European defence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

Semiconductors (or chips) are the engines of the digital transition. Their production relies on complex and vulnerable global supply chains. Against the backdrop of global chip shortages, of a global ‘subsidy race’ in the world’s main producing regions, and of a renewed EU industrial policy, in February 2022 the Commission presented a proposal for an EU chips act aimed at reinforcing the whole EU chips value chain. The chips act is based on a three-pillar structure: pillar 1 aims to bolster large-scale technological capacity building and innovation in the EU chips ecosystem, improving the transition ‘from lab to fab’; pillar 2 focuses on improving the EU’s security of supply, by attracting investment and enhancing production capacities in the EU; pillar 3 aims to set up a monitoring and crisis response mechanism. In the event of supply crises, the Commission would be allowed to implement three types of emergency measures (request information from companies, request companies to accept and prioritise orders of crisis-relevant products, and carry out common purchasing on behalf of Member States). The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file and plans to consider its rapporteur’s draft report in autumn 2022.

Versions

• July 2022: The EU chips act: Securing Europe’s supply of semiconductors (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on the transparency and targeting of political advertising Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022) 46
8.2.2022Rapporteur:Dan Nica (S&D, Romania)2022/0032(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Eva Maydell (EPP, Bulgaria)
Bart Groothuis (Renew, the Netherlands)
Henrike Hahn (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Joëlle Mélin (ID, France)
Jessica Stegrud (ECR, Sweden)
Marc Botenga (The Left, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report Shares in global semiconductor manufacturing capacity by geographical area (2013-2021) Global market shares in the different segments along the chips value chain Europe’s market shares in chips production for different sectors

Written by Issam Hallak (1st edition).

Both the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and the UK allow a party to adopt measures in order to induce the other party to comply with a ruling delivered by an arbitral tribunal. Both agreements also allow the implementation of measures without having first to resort to the relevant dispute settlement mechanism, and the TCA provides for compensatory measures if a party has been found to have applied remedial measures that are inconsistent with the applicable provisions. The proposed legislation empowers the Commission to act by means of implementing acts for implementation and enforcement of the two agreements.

Versions

• July 2022: Rules for exercising the Union’s rights in implementing and enforcing EU UK agreements (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules for the exercise of the Union’s rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom, of the other part. Committees responsible:Foreign Affairs (AFET); International Trade (INTA); Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)COM(2022) 89
11.3.2022Rapporteurs:Danuta Maria Hübner (EPP, Poland); Seán Kelly (EPP, Ireland); Andreas Schieder (S&D, Austria)2022/0068(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:David McAllister (EPP, Germany); Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D, Portugal); Charles Goerens (Renew, Luxembourg); Nathalie Loiseau (Renew, France); Francois Alfonsi (Greens, France); Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield (Greens, France); Anna Fotyga (ECR, Poland); Helmut Scholz (The Left, Germany); Idoia Villanueva-Ruiz (The Left, Spain)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Vitalba Crivello and Tobias Hoffmann.

Since its launch in November 2020, the New European Bauhaus (NEB) project has brought a new cultural and creative dimension to the European Green Deal. To be successful, this ambitious project will have to go beyond its initial intentions, to embrace not only the world of architecture but also the entire creative sector. This is what emerges from the report on ‘The Green Deal ambition: Technology, creativity and the arts for environmental sustainability’, and from the workshop ‘Combining technology with cultural heritage and creativity: The way forward for the New European Bauhaus project’, organised on 13 June 2022, by the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA).

When launched by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen two years ago, the NEB promised to be a creative and interdisciplinary movement shaping a new image of European cities and suburbs, with the aim of making them more sustainable, resilient, and inclusive. A project of social, environmental, and economic innovation, the NEB intends create a better future by bridging the worlds of science, technology, and the arts.

A qualitative assessment of the NEB project: the STOA study

In 2021, the STOA Panel commissioned a study on the NEB from environmental journalist and geographer Emanuele Bompan, editor-in-chief of the circular economy magazine ‘Renewable Matter’, and science journalist Elisabetta Tola, CEO of ‘Formicablu’ and founder of ‘Facta.eu’. The study represents a qualitative assessment of the NEB policies adopted so far by the European Commission, and a workshop to present its findings took place at the European Parliament the day after the NEB 2022 Festival.

The research paper combines potential solutions, inspired by recent scientific research papers and reports, with fresh ideas, contributions and perspectives from a selected group of European players, each with expertise in culture, art, architecture, design, and circular economy. The data collected speaks clearly: the European cultural industry is clamouring for full creative sector involvement – from design to new materials, from fashion to digital arts, and from cultural heritage to new technologies.

According to the study’s authors, the eco-systemic transformation of Europe called for by the New European Bauhaus ultimately requires new words and new ideas. It needs innovative communication models, new analysis patterns, and public involvement. All this should be detached from traditional business models. The authors find that those currently adopted, even in the financing schemes launched by the European Commission, are actually standardised and based more on the usual indicators and metrics than on the actual data provided by the territory and are therefore inadequate to deal with the diversity of places and of cultures.

A better definition of the NEB project

The report advocates a more innovative and radical strengthening of the NEB project, noted Emanuele Bompan, who presented the main findings of the study during the first part of the workshop. This could start by building scenarios and sharing models, looking for implementing solutions that continue the co-design process initiated in 2021 by the European Commission, and making the discussion as broad as possible.

‘An important cultural process is needed to support the ecological transition. A process that arises from below, from the territories, and that has the economic support of the European Union’, he explained. ‘This study tells us that, while it is necessary to define and lay down practical projects, there is also a need for extensive cultural work on a new imagination of the inhabited world, of Europe, and of the ecological transition.‘

Two of the experts who contributed to the paper, Gloria Benedikt, scientist and artist, and Piero Pelizzaro, International Relations Director of the City of Bologna, joined the roundtable, pointed out some action to be taken.

Artists should be employed to foster the cultural shift that is a prerequisite for behavioural change. In the future, support should be given to new experimental programmes where the strategy itself is designed by technologists, researchers, artists and decision makers in a truly integrated process.

Gloria Benedikt summarised this goal as: ‘Translating knowledge into understanding is where artists can come in’, ‘to help citizens to internalise the ecological transition and to reinforce green ethics, inspiring them in their deepest self’.

Support should also be given to large and smaller cultural institutions with a strong NEB mission and a clear track record of activity, making deep connections between the creative and cultural industries and science and green and circular economy enterprises.

Piero Pelizzaro, pointed out that ‘the European Union institutions produce a considerable amount of “guidance” with a limited impact, and a more bottom-up approach could perhaps be more successful and make a real difference’. Examples in the spirit of the NEB already exist, such as the collaboration between Leipzig digital performing arts and the Bologna supercomputer centre.

Involve citizens in making the NEB a success

To provide an ‘external point of view’, two experts who did not take part in the study were also invited to the presentation: Ilona Puskas, Lead of citizen engagement activities, European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) Climate-Knowledge Information Centre (KIC), and Michal Gorzynski, Head of Section Impact (EIT) shared their thoughts about the NEB. They discussed the study’s emphasis on the need for action on more decentralised territories and cultural centres. Many of the study’s respondents agreed on the risk related to an excessively centralised approach, notably that it would not create a sufficiently deep sharing of Green Deal values throughout the EU, especially in light of the global crisis and the new ‘Fit for 55’ plan.

Ilona Puskas, highlighted that if ‘the NEB [would want] to reach its goals, we need to be more open minded and welcome experimental approaches when interacting with artists, as the scientific method might not be the right one’. ‘Art represents a source for a result and should not be merely illustrative. Funding should be more accessible, but there are still many blocking elements, such as pre-defined goals, that affect new initiatives’.

The EIT has been involved in the NEB project since its launch, and as Michal Gorzynski noted, ‘What NEB means today will not mean NEB in two years’ – ‘the project should be designed by citizens and for citizens’. According to Gorzynski, citizen involvement, as clients of what the NEB has to offer, is currently lacking. Additionally, he feels the regional level is critical, as NEB means different things in different EU regions, and requires greater focus. ‘Industry, and innovators, should also be brought in, and work hand in hand with artists and scientists’.

Christian Ehler, (EPP, Germany) STOA Chair, closed the workshop, focusing on the role of citizens as key players and clients of the NEB project, and on the need to address the final beneficiaries of the project. ‘For the NEB to work, it has to be attractive for citizens. Most of the time citizens are addressed as consumers, not as citizens. And as consumers, people are addressed in a very modern and versatile way, with their attention attracted by visuals and art support’.

According to Christian Ehler, ‘The NEB should look at the consumer market, and efforts should be made to integrate marketing strategies because citizens are used to them’. Mr Ehler concluded that, sustainability needs to meet aesthetics, which brings us to what was at the core of the old Bauhaus, where form followed function. ‘And function is that we need to save the world and behave in an environmentally sound way. You cannot drive a society out of a dystopia. You need to create a utopia’.

NEB Video

The new European Bauhaus: a better future together

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

Nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity. Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons in the context of its war on Ukraine has been a stark reminder that this threat is real. At present, nine states are known to have military nuclear programmes. Over recent years, tensions among nuclear-armed states have increased, leading to ‘outright strategic rivalry and competition’ among several of them. Moreover, experts are concerned that the ‘fabric of international institutions, treaties, and norms that has historically contributed to predictable and more stable relationships among nuclear-armed States is deteriorating’. Experts also point to technological developments that heighten uncertainties and unpredictability in the strategic relationships among nuclear-armed states. In January 2021, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the doomsday clock to 100 seconds to midnight and warned that the world is ‘sleepwalking its way through a newly unstable nuclear landscape’.

In 1968, the five states that possessed nuclear weapons at the time signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), intended to lead to the eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons and control their proliferation. However, rather than fulfilling the pledge to disarm that they made when they signed the NPT, nuclear weapon states are investing massive sums in more modern nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Moreover, an additional four states have acquired nuclear weapons since the NPT came into force in 1970, and a fifth, Iran, is getting dangerously close to building its own nuclear bomb. The Tenth NPT Review Conference, scheduled to take place in New York from 1‑26 August 2022, will review progress on the implementation of the treaty. The conference is taking place at a time of fundamental divides between NPT member states over key aspects of the treaty. Moreover, Russia’s invasion of a non-nuclear weapon state and its reckless nuclear rhetoric pose particular challenges for the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. The EU remains fully committed to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and recently called on all parties to work towards a positive and substantive outcome of the conference.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Tenth NPT review conference: Nuclear weapons threat at an all-time high‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.