European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Political Community (EPC) held its inaugural meeting on 6 October in Prague, bringing together on an equal footing the leaders of the EU’s 27 Member States and 17 other European countries. French President Emmanuel Macron had called for the creation of the EPC after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, to serve as a forum for political dialogue and cooperation on security, stability and prosperity. Its first gathering, attended by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and British Prime Minister Liz Truss among others, focused on the war and the resulting energy crisis in many countries. The EPC will meet twice a year, meeting next in Chişinău, the capital of Moldova.

This note gathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the European Political Community. Some earlier publications on European governance can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The European (geo)Political Community: More than meets the eye?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, October 2022

Five takeaways from the European Political Community summit
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

The European Political Community: A successful test?
Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2022

The European Political Community: Time to invest in the power of democracies
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Filling Europe’s geopolitical vacuum
German Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

European Political Community meets for the first time
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

The beginning of the European Political Community
European Policy Centre, October 2022

What difference can the European Political Community make? 
Foreign Policy Association, October 2022                                                                                     

What can the European political community achieve?
Groupe d’études géopolitiques, October 2022 

Europe in a different world
Institute Montaigne, October 2022

The European Political Community: A step toward differentiated integration in Europe?
London School of Economics blog, October 2022

The UK has been given an opportunity to help shape the future of the European Political Community: It should take it
London School of Economics blog, October 2022

European Political Community: Opportunities and limitations
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, October 2022

European summit in Prague sets agenda and isolates Moscow
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2022

Macron’s ‘European Political Community’ risks two-tiered European Union
Wilson Center, October 2022

The European Political Community: A sword striking water
Voltaire Network, October 2022

Enlarging and deepening: Giving substance to the European Political Community
Bruegel, September 2022

Will the European Political Community actually be useful?
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2022

Macron is serious about the ‘European Political Community’
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

Enlargement and a European political community
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2022

The European Political Community: A new anchoring to the European Union
Jacques Delors Institute, May 2022

La Communauté politique européenne et la question de l’adhésion de l’Ukraine at l’Union européenne
Fondation Jean-Jaurès, May 2022

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The European Political Community‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

The European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) is organising the third European Gender Equality Week at the end of October 2022. Events on the agenda cover gender inequality within different policy sectors. The week includes: a hearing on the regional impact of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan (Committee on Foreign Affairs); a presentation of the ‘Gender Dimension and Impact of the ‘Fitfor55’ package study (FEMM); an exchange of views on the directive on combating violence against women (Committee on Legal Affairs); and a hearing on how to change the EU Treaties to achieve more gender equality in the EU (Committee on Constitutional Affairs). Additionally, the European Institute for Gender Equality is hosting the first Gender Equality Forum on 24 and 25 October, following the presentation of the 2022 Gender Equality Index (FEMM). The aim of Parliament’s European Gender Equality Week is to draw attention to gender inequalities – both to longstanding issues such as the gender pay gap and to more recent crises perpetuated by Russia in Ukraine, requiring a gendered approach within humanitarianism. Considering the gender dimension on different policy levels is necessary to create equal opportunities for both genders, something that benefits the whole of our society. The European Union adopted gender mainstreaming as its official approach to gender equality in 1997. The European Commission defines gender mainstreaming as ‘not restricting efforts to promote equality to the implementation of specific measures to help women, but mobilising all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality’. The EU 2020‑2025 gender-equality strategy defines the priorities to achieve this, for instance by ending gender-based violence, addressing pay and pension gaps, gender balance in decision making positions at work and ending the gender care gap. However, despite great efforts, much change still needs to happen and Parliament is keen to advance legislation for a more just society.

Covid-19 increases women’s unpaid care work

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Underlying the unequal consequences of the COVID‑19 pandemic are other persisting issues, where progress is slow. Parliament is particularly concerned about the gender pay gap, in which women earn less than men for the same work – a measurable indicator of inequality. An intersectional approach shows that women with children, women of colour, women with a migration background, or women with disabilities experience the gender pay gap more widely. Efforts to decrease pay discrimination and improve pay transparency aim at strengthening the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work‘ to improve victims’ access to justice on pay discrimination.

Equal pay for equal work between men and women

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Gender stereotyping is the generalised view of what men or women are like and what they ought to be doing. In some cases, people move away from these generalisations and work in sectors in which their important role goes unnoticed, such as with women in the fishing industry or women in transport. Women in both sectors experience under-representation and working conditions consequently are not suited to women’s needs. Parliament is championing greater participation and simultaneously strengthening women’s position as workers in these industries, as a necessary step to ensuring women’s access to all labour markets and that employers can find enough staff.

Women in EU fisheries

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Finally, gender-based violence is violence directed against a person because of their gender and that affects them disproportionately. Gender-based violence predominantly affects women, leading to reduced mental and physical health, quality of life and a loss of economic output. The EU does not have a specific legal instrument to combat gender-based physical or cyber violence. Parliament first called for a directive on preventing and combating all forms of violence against women in 2009. More recently, the European Commission proposed a directive on combating violence and domestic violence in March 2022. The proposal aims to provide minimum rules on the level of protection against violence taking place online and offline across the EU.

Combating gender-based violence at EU level

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• Exploring gender equality across policy areas
• Combatting gender based cyber-violence
• Combating violence against women and domestic violence

Further listening

• Equal pay for equal work between men and women [Policy podcast]
• Recent trends in female employment [Policy podcast]
• What if care work were recognised as a driver of sustainable growth? [Policy Podcast]

Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

The economies of the EU and China both showed signs of quick and strong recovery in terms of GDP growth, GDP per capita and foreign direct investment in 2021, following a year marked by the COVID-19 pandemic. The value of trade between the two blocs reached record levels for exports and imports, and for goods and services in 2021. This infographic is a further update of one originally published in December 2019.

Read this infographic on ‘China: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Caprile.

Outraged by Russia’s illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, European Union countries, in cooperation with other international partners, have imposed unprecedentedly tough sanctions on Russia, in a succession of packages since 23 February 2022, adding to those adopted in 2014 in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea. The EU has moved swiftly to approve an eighth package of EU sanctions, including the legal basis to cap Russian oil export prices, in retaliation for Russia’s illegal annexation of four regions of Ukraine, the first nation-wide mobilisation since World War Two, and its unequivocal nuclear threat.

Seven months of war: Devastation and escalation

Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine was promptly condemned by the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and the United Nations General Assembly, where 141 nations (with 5 voting against and 35 abstentions) adopted a resolution on 2 March 2022 rejecting the Russian Federation’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, and demanding that Russia immediately withdraw its forces and abide by international law. Over seven months later, the war has resulted in large-scale destruction of infrastructure, including residential areas, medical facilities and educational institutions, and has triggered a vast humanitarian, human rights and displacement crisis. According to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Office, as of 3 October 2022, 6 114 civilians have been killed and 9 132 injured in Ukraine. As of 7 October 2022, the UN Refugee Agency reports that, nearly one-third of Ukrainians have been forced from their homes, compounding one of the largest human displacement crises in the world today. Europe is hosting over 7.6 million refugees from Ukraine, and 6.2 million people remain displaced by the war within Ukraine. The first statement of the UN-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, delivered on 23 September, concluded that war crimes have been committed in Ukraine, including indiscriminate attacks with cluster munitions and multi-launch rocket systems in populated areas, summary executions of civilians, and sexual violence against Ukrainian communities, including children.

Ukraine’s September counter-offensive on its eastern (Kharkov) and southern (Kherson) fronts, left Russian forces in disarray, pressuring President Vladimir Putin to resort, on 21 September, to a further escalation of the conflict on three fronts:

• formalising the annexation of four regions within Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson), following referenda qualified by the UN as ‘not legal according to international law’;
• declaring the mobilisation of the Russian population, initially targeted at 300 000 men, but which could affect up to 1 million people, according to independent reports;
• renewing open threats to resort to the use of nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory, including the defence of the Ukrainian territories illegally annexed on 30 September, in application of the Russian military doctrine.

Eight packages of EU sanctions

The first round of EU sanctions was introduced on 23 February 2022, following Vladimir Putin’s decision to recognise the two ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states. As the military aggression escalated, this was followed by new packages of increasingly harsh measures, adopted on 25 February, 28 February, 15 March, 8 April, 3 June, and 21 to 22 July. The eighth package was adopted on 6 October 2022 in direct response to the illegal annexation by Russia of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. The cumulative effect of the sanctions is unprecedented in scale and nature, including sanctions on individuals and entities, drastic financial and trade restrictions, aimed at particularly sensitive sectors such as aviation, energy and high-technology, and restrictions on Russian media broadcasting.

Sanctions on Russia after the eighth package: New and extended measures

• Legal basis for introducing the oil price cap: the text provides the legal basis to impose a price cap on Russian oil exports to third countries, agreed by the G7 on 2 September 2022. More specifically, it bans the facilitation by EU operators of all services relating to the maritime transport of Russian oil and petroleum products to third countries, unless these products are purchased at or below a pre-established price cap. The ban includes the provision of maritime transport, technical assistance, brokering services or financial assistance relating to the maritime transport of crude oil (as of 5 December 2022), or petroleum products (as of February 2023), which originate or are exported from Russia. To enter into force, this measure needs a further decision by the Council, laying down (among other things) the precise mechanism to establish the price cap. Meanwhile, the ban on EU imports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products, included in the sixth package of sanctions, remains untouched, and will enter into force in December 2022, and February 2023 (respectively), as originally agreed.
• Addition of 30 individuals and 9 entities to the sanctions list: this move targets chiefly those involved in Russia’s occupation, illegal annexation and sham referendums in the four occupied territories, those working in the defence sector and well-known personalities spreading disinformation about the war. It brings the total to 1 262 people and 118 entities subject to an asset freeze and travel ban. The Council also decided to broaden the listing criteria on which specific designations can be based, to include the possibility to target those who facilitate the circumvention of EU sanctions.
• New import restrictions: worth an estimated €7 billion, these cover steel products originating in or exported from Russia, machinery, wood pulp and paper, plastics, leather, cigarettes, cosmetics and non-gold jewellery.
• New export restrictions: targeted at further reducing Russia’s access to military, industrial and technological items, these include a ban on coal (and coking coal) exports, and export of specific electronic components and certain chemicals, and prohibit the export of small arms and other goods listed under the Anti-torture Regulation.
• Restrictions on state-owned enterprises: these ban EU nationals from holding posts in the governing bodies of certain state-owned enterprises, and all transactions with the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RMRS).
• Financial, information technology (IT) consultancy and other business services: this places a full ban on providing any crypto-asset wallets, accounts or custody services for Russian persons or residents, regardless of the amount (previously up to €10 000 was allowed). The package also widened the scope of services that can no longer be provided for the Russian government or to legal entities established in Russia: IT consultancy, legal advice, architecture and engineering services.
• Extension of the geographical scope of restrictive measures to cover all the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine in the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

Sanctions coordination and impact

As with the san Sanctions coordination and impact ction packages adopted against Russia in 2014, the EU measures are coordinated with other countries, notably with G7 partners, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Japan. Among the EU enlargement countries, Serbia and Turkey have been to date the most reluctant to follow this alignment. The sanctions coalition has introduced travel bans and asset freezes against key political and business figures, frozen more than half of Russia’s central bank reserves, blocked over 70 % of Russia’s banking assets and restricted the export of technologies to hinder Russia’s long-term technological advancement. The World Bank’s October 2022 outlook forecasts a contraction of the Russian economy by 4.5 percent in 2022, less than initially expected thanks to the surge in energy prices, which has helped increase fiscal revenues. It predicts a deeper recession in 2023, owing to the sanctions and reduced fiscal expansion. In early October, OPEC+, of which Russia is a member, decided on a steep reduction of oil production, of 2 million barrels per day, a move the West has criticised as a way to neutralise the sanctions’ impact, in particular the planned oil price cap.

European Parliament position

On 6 October the European Parliament adopted a resolution on ‘Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine’, strongly condemning the massive violations of human rights and war crimes committed by the Russian armed forces, as well as the illegal and illegitimate sham referenda conducted in the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. The resolution welcomed the eighth package of sanctions against Russia, and called for the sanctions to be expanded to new areas, including cutting seven additional banks from the SWIFT system. It also called on the Commission and co-legislators to work swiftly to complete the legal regime for confiscation of assets frozen by the sanctions.

This paper updates previous ‘at a glance’ notes of 3 March 2022, 5 April 2022 and 13 April 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: New EU sanctions under the eighth package‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jurgita LEKAVICIUTE.

Since its foundation in early 2020, STOA’s Centre for Artificial Intelligence (C4AI) produces studies, organises public events and acts as a platform for dialogue and information exchange on artificial intelligence (AI)-relevant topics within the Parliament and beyond. It aims to contribute to the quality and coherence of discussion and policy-making, as the EU seeks to coordinate its efforts and influence on global AI standard-setting.

Late that same year, STOA and the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) launched a partnership on artificial intelligence with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Parliamentary Network (GPN). The GPN is a hub for legislators and officials from parliaments around the world to share their experience, identify good practices and foster international legislative cooperation. It includes a Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence, and benefits from proximity with the OECD’s AI Policy Observatory and Global Partnership on AI.

In the context of this partnership, a first series of podcasts was produced during 2021. A second series is now available, examining various aspects of AI development and policy with key experts from the field.

The first podcast in the 2022 series explores the role of AI in healthcare and how AI can contribute to the medical and healthcare field, while also taking stock of the most significant risks posed. The podcast includes a contribution from STOA Panel Member Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain) speaking about the work of the European Parliament and on the importance of legislation on AI. Dr Karim Lekadir, head of EUCanImage, then presents a four-year AI research project using AI for making advances in oncology. The project has 20 partners across 11 countries and has received nearly €10 million in funding. You can listen to the podcast here.

In the second podcast, STOA and the OECD focus on public/private regulatory divergence and the EU AI Act. It includes contributions by STOA Panel Member, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection and a member of the OECD Parliamentary Group on AI – Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques (S&D, Portugal) and Ilina Georgieva, a research scientist working on AI, cyber regulation and cyber norms at the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO). They discuss how the proposed AI Act might create divergence in how different public and private sector actors are allowed to use AI, e.g. social scoring, real-time biometric identification or emotion recognition for state or commercial activities. This podcast can be accessed here.

The third podcast is oriented towards AI data governance. Member of the STOA Panel, European Parliament’s Committees on Industry, Research and Energy and on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark), and Professor Linnet Taylor, Professor of Data Ethics, Law and Policy at the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT), where she leads the Global Data Justice project, contribute to the discussion. They highlight the challenges associated with dominant data governance models and explore alternatives in the context of contemporary policy initiatives. You can listen to this podcast here.

Finally, the fourth podcast will focus on AI and the risks for democracy, with European Parliament Vice-President responsible for STOA Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) and Anthony Gooch, Director of Public Affairs & Communications at OECD and Chair of the GPN.

Follow us on Twitter at @EP_ScienceTech to stay informed about our activities.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Suzana Anghel.

On 20 and 21 October 2022, EU Heads of State or Government will meet for a formal European Council dedicated to Ukraine, energy and the economy – three interlinked topics that have been permanently on the European Council agenda since Russia launched its war on Ukraine. EU leaders are expected to condemn Russia’s further escalation of the conflict and recent attacks on civilians and infrastructure across Ukraine; condemn the sham referendums in four Ukrainian regions; consider the deepening food crisis; and explore ways to protect critical infrastructure after the Nord Stream pipelines sabotage. On energy, the European Council meeting is expected to agree on new strategic guidelines, with discussion on means of reducing gas prices, price-caps or alternative approaches – an issue on which Member States have diverging views – likely to be rather heated. EU leaders will also discuss climate change and biodiversity protection ahead of the main annual events on these topics led by the United Nations (UN). Moreover, leaders will hold a debate on China and prepare for the December 2022 summit between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The European Council meeting will open with the traditional exchange of views with the European Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola.

European Council agenda points

In September 2022, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, released the new Indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2022, which offers a much-awaited overview of the meetings and agendas of EU leaders until December 2022. This is the third Leaders’ Agenda presented by Michel since he became President in December 2019. The topics outlined for the October 2022 meeting are: i) Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, ii) energy, iii) the economy, iv|) climate change, and v) external relations.

European Council meeting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders will discuss the situation in Ukraine for the seventh time since Russia began its war. They are expected to condemn the recent massive Russian missile strikes against civilians and energy infrastructure, and deliberate on the dramatic deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Ukraine. They will most probably reaffirm the EU’s political, military, humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine. At the informal European Council meeting of 7 October 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed that ‘Team Europe’ (the EU and the Member States) had pledged €19 billion (military aid excluded). Of this amount, €9 billion is EU macro-financial assistance, €3 billion of which remains to be disbursed. In an attempt to make financial support to Ukraine sustainable, the Commission could propose a ‘more structural solution’ by granting Ukraine €1.5 billion per month in 2023 in the form of grants or loans – an aspect still awaiting clarification. As for military aid, the EU has provided €2.5 billion from the European Peace Facility. The Foreign Affairs Council of 17 October 2022 agreed an additional tranche of €500 million. Agreement was also reached on establishing the new EU Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine, benefiting from an envelope of €106.7 million for common costs.

EU leaders will most likely once again condemn war crimes perpetrated against Ukrainians; reiterate that those responsible will be held accountable; and deplore Russia’s continued breach of international law. They will most probably recall their statement of 30 September 2022, in which they condemned the sham referendums organised by Russia in the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia and stressed that the EU would not recognise their illegal annexation. On 12 October 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted (with 143 votes in favour, 5 votes against, and 35 abstentions) a resolution condemning Russia’s ‘attempted illegal annexation’, and demanding ‘the immediate reversal of the annexation declaration’. In line with past conclusions and in coordination with the G7 leaders, EU leaders will most likely once more call on Russia to withdraw its troops and equipment from Ukraine, while reaffirming EU support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, including its right to self-defence enshrined in the UN Charter and international law.

Since February 2022, the EU has adopted eight packages of sanctions to put pressure on the Russian regime and diminish its ability to wage war on Ukraine. EU leaders might wish to explore ways to step up pressure, although it is unlikely that additional sanctions will be agreed at this meeting.

EU leaders might also focus on Ukraine’s reconstruction, another topic they have discussed regularly. The Commission, in cooperation with the government of Ukraine, the World Bank and other international partners, has estimated reconstruction and recovery costs in Ukraine to amount to €349 billion, a figure that will grow as the war continues. Funding of Ukraine’s reconstruction will be a key issue in the forthcoming international conference hosted by the German G7 Presidency in Berlin on 25 October 2022.

EU leaders could focus again on food security, at a time when the food crisis is deepening, impacting on supply chains, trade in agricultural products, and prices of food and fertilisers. The EU has introduced ‘solidarity lanes‘, facilitating Ukrainian food and fertiliser exports. In July 2022, it welcomed the UN Black Sea Grain initiative, and has since backed its implementation, while favouring the deal’s expansion and extension.

The recent sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines has put the spotlight on the importance of protecting critical infrastructure, a topic EU leaders will likely discuss. Earlier this year, the co-legislators reached a political agreement on the proposed directive on the resilience of critical entities.

Energy

Following discussions held at the Prague informal European Council meeting of 7 October 2022, EU leaders are expected to consider energy demand reduction measures; gas storage capacities and possible sharing in the event of shortages; joint energy purchasing on international markets; and other means of reducing gas prices. In particular, they will discuss a possible cap on gas prices – a measure requested by a majority of Member States (17), but opposed by Germany and the Netherlands. The two countries prefer to combine the EU’s purchasing power and bolster the existing EU energy platform to ensure that EU countries are ‘no longer in a position that they have to accept any price’. An informal Council meeting of EU energy ministers, held in Prague on 11-12 October 2022, brought ‘some progress‘ on common measures to reduce energy prices. However, while the Commission is expected to favour voluntary price reductions through negotiations with gas-exporting countries in proposals to be unveiled aheadof the 20-21 October meeting, it will be up to the European Council to find a compromise acceptable for all Member States.

Economy

Russia’s war on Ukraine has accelerated the rise in energy prices, already visible in the months preceding the war, when Russia was using energy as a weapon. This led to EU inflation figures quadrupling during the past 15 months, from 2.5 % in July 2021 to 10 % in September 2022. EU leaders are expected to build on the their discussion held at the informal European Council meeting of 7 October 2022, when President Michel recognised that the increase in energy prices induces ‘huge pressure on households, on families, on business, and for economic development within the EU’. Leaders could consider how to strengthen and preserve jointly both the single market and European economies’ resilience.

Climate change and biodiversity

EU leaders will take stock of the preparations for the November 2022 UN Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Sharm el-Sheikh, where the EU is expected to call on its international partners to make more ambitious commitments to cut greenhouse gas emissions further. Leaders are also likely to consider the preparatory work conducted in view of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity in Montreal, where a landmark agreement to safeguard nature is expected.

External relations

EU leaders will discuss relations with Asia in preparation for the December 2022 EU–ASEAN summit. ASEAN is at the centre of the EU’s strategy for cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region, where the EU is committed to supporting sustainable development, democracy and the rule of law. The European Council will hold a strategic debate on relations with China, a topic last discussed in March 2022, when EU leaders focused on China’s stance regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. In light of the Commission proposal to grant Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate country status, and EU leaders’ commitment in this respect, leaders could consider conferring that status on the country at one of their remaining meetings this year.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting on 20 – 21 October 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask how the European Union (EU) contributes to setting adequate minimum wages in EU countries.

In the European Union, member countries set their minimum wage individually, while the EU supports and complements their action. Minimum wages differ greatly throughout the EU, with the lowest level in Bulgaria and the highest in Luxembourg.

Minimum wage protection can be provided through collective agreements, statutory minimum wages set by law, or a combination of both. In the EU, 21 countries have a statutory minimum wage, 5 countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden) determine theirs through collective bargaining and Cyprus has statutory rates for different occupations.

Poverty is an important issue for the EU, especially with many people at risk of in-work poverty. In 2022, the EU has adopted new rules that promote adequate minimum wages and help to improve working and living conditions for employees in EU countries.

European pillar of social rights

Wages are one of the 20 principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, an initiative launched by the Commission in March 2021, which aims to create a more social Europe, to improve labour markets and to strengthen social protection systems. Under this initiative, to help prevent in-work poverty, EU countries should ensure by 2030 an adequate minimum wage to workers.

Towards an EU policy on minimum wages

EU rules on minimum wages can help ensure adequate wages and social security in the context of economic crises, such as those caused by the coronavirus pandemic or Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The European Parliament has long been advocating for general guidelines on minimum wages to prevent poverty in the EU. In 2017, it called on EU countries to introduce adequate minimum income schemes to support citizens and highlighted the issue of in-work poverty due to insufficient wages. In October 2019, Parliament called on the Commission to put forward a legal instrument to ensure fair minimum wages for workers across the EU.

EU law on adequate minimum wages

In October 2020, the Commission responded to these calls by putting forward a proposal for a Minimum Wage Directive. Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement on the new rules in June 2022. Parliament then formally adopted the legislation in September, followed by the Council in October. EU countries now have two years to implement the new rules.

The new law promotes the adequacy of statutory minimum wages and helps to achieve decent working and living conditions for all workers in the EU. The rules require EU countries to:

• set up adequate minimum wages according to a set of clear criteria, including the cost of living. Each EU country will have to set up a minimum wage by national law and/or collective agreements and update it at least every two years.
• promote collective bargaining for wage-setting.
• give workers effective access to minimum wage protection.

However, the new rules do not set up a specific minimum wage level that all EU countries have to reach. Setting up the amount of minimum wages remains a national competence.

Further information

• Minimum wages directive, European Parliament, At A glance, September 2022
• Directive on adequate minimum wages, European Parliament, Briefing, June 2022
• Adequate minimum wages in the EU, European Council
• Fair minimum wages for workers in the European Union, European Parliament, Legislative Train Schedule, September 2022
• Minimum income: more effective support needed to fight poverty and promote employment, European Commission, News, September 2022

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Luisa Antunes, Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA).

On 28 September 2022, STOA organised a roundtable event to discuss the initiative to create a public European health infrastructure, proposed in a recent STOA study. The event was successful, gathering almost 100 participants in Brussels and over 200 online. It gathered a rich diversity of views, from representatives of the European Union (EU) and international bodies, civil society, academia and industry.

The proposal was born out of the reassessment of the EU’s response to COVID‑19 and the need to address preparedness to future epidemics and pandemics, as well as to answer current unmet public health issues, such as antimicrobial resistance and rare diseases. For Patrizia Toia (S&D, IT), STOA Panel member, the EU should step up as a world leader to guarantee public accessibility and equal distribution worldwide – issues the pharmaceutical market cannot handle alone.

The main authors of the study, Massimo Florio, Professor of Public Economics at the Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano and Dr Chiara Pancotti, Partner and senior researcher at CSIL, analysed over 250 reports and consulted 56 experts from 48 organisations in several countries and fields (scientists, clinicians, non-governmental organisations, national public health and industry representatives, EU and other international bodies). The study addresses the issue of misalignment between public health priorities and the pharmaceutical industry’s research and development (R&D) agenda. The proposal for a European public infrastructure was met with an overwhelmingly positive response during consultations.

‘I have a brand for this: Biomed Europe.’

Professor Florio, economist and study author

According to the study authors, such a project would see the EU take the helm in organising a large-scale, pan-European initiative together with Member States and non-Member States, reminiscent of European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) for physics and the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) for biology. The project could build on the example of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in the United States. The mission would be to create, over the course of 20 to 30 years, a portfolio of non-profit research and development (R&D) projects for the public interest, with open global data sharing. This would differ from the EU Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), as it would provide a procurement mechanism for emergency preparedness alone.

‘It is a matter of billions, not millions!’

Professor Florio, economist and study author, on the need for a potential European medicines infrastructure to reach critical mass to deal with health challenges by investing in open science and taking a new approach to intellectual property rights

With a proposed annual budget of €3.5 billion (similar to the NIH intramural sector – see below), or up to €7 billion (similar to ESA), a ‘Biomed Europe’ would be expected to deliver a portfolio of 80 to 150 innovative projects over a 20‑year period. The study proposes four policy options to deliver on this potential, revolving around two dimensions: scope of mission (restricted to infectious diseases or with a more diversified agenda), and scope of internal capacity (in-house vs decentralised).

Source: European pharmaceutical research and development: Could public infrastructure overcome market failures?, EPRS, 2021.

Policy option 3 presented in the study includes taking lessons from the US federal biomedical experience (NIH and BARDA). Presented by Dr Emily Erbelding, M.D., M.P.H., Director of the NIAID Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (DMID) at NIH, the NIH’s mission is to conduct basic research. For this it receives US$43 billion annually, distributed across intramural (90 % of the budget) and extramural structures. In contrast, BARDA’s mission is to improve preparedness and response through public-private partnerships for advanced R&D of drugs and vaccines to address national health security issues, for which it receives US$3 billion annually. US investment in basic research for a period of over 10 years allowed a swift response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, with the development of the Moderna vaccine.

‘The most important venture capitalist in Europe is the European Investment Bank, including funding for BioNtech’

Professor Florio, economist and study author

‘A report from Politico shows the management of COVID‑19 has been entrusted to private actors.’

Nicoletta Dentico, Director of the Global Health Programme

‘There is something wrong about Moderna, Pfizer, BioNtech making tons of billions of profits from having monopolised results of more than 20 years of research supported by public funding.’

Dr Els Torreele, Policy Associate at the UCL Institute for Innovation & Public Purpose (IIPP)

Civil society representatives Dr Rosa Castro (European Public Health Alliance, EPHA) and Dr Els Torreele (University College London, UCL) welcomed the creation of a public European structure. They were particularly in favour of an initiative that addresses public health needs, ensures innovative and affordable products, guarantees fair returns to public investment and public ownership of knowledge, and that takes inspiration from and is open to international cooperation towards a global common agenda.

“30-40 yrs ago we chose a profitable #pharma model. But now, after #Covid19, we can all see that there is something wrong with companies making huge profits of the results of yrs of often publicly funded #research. It’s time to retain the ownership of these results” @ElsTorreele

Originally tweeted by STOA Panel (@EP_ScienceTech) on September 28, 2022.

‘There was an assumption that market incentives would somehow ‘trickle down’ and deliver on public health.’

Dr Els Torreele, Policy Associate at the UCL Institute for Innovation & Public Purpose

The priority, however, should be on defining its mission and governance rules. Paraphrasing economist Mariana Mazzucato, it is not about fixing market failures, but about defining how R&D pipeline stakeholders work together to serve public health needs.

Originally tweeted by EPHA (@EPHA_EU) on September 28, 2022.

The reactions from some participants were lukewarm. The importance of public-private collaboration was emphasised by industry representative Salah-Dine Chibout (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, EFPIA), as well as academia representative Professor Rolf Apweiler, Director of EMBL-EBI, who suggested a pan-European, decentralised coordinated effort based on existing national and international infrastructures. Dr Jacques Demotes, Director General of the European Clinical Research Infrastructure Network (ECRIN), considers ‘infrastructure’ is not the correct name, and suggested creating an ‘institute’ that follows a ‘top-down’ mechanism and where private interest is separated from public health priorities.

Commission representatives from three Directorate-Generals chose to focus on existing EU-funded projects in the drug development pipeline, such as the COVID‑19 data platform, ACT EU, Horizon Europe, Innovative Health Initiative, EU FAB and IPCEI, all of which funded in collaboration with Member States. A common view was the need to build on existing platforms focusing on sustainability in cost and investment in strategic areas alone (e.g. infectious diseases, antimicrobial-resistant pathogens, orphan diseases and personalised medicine).

The audience reactions in the room and online were emphatic and constructive. Discussion covered patents and open data sharing, levels of investment and governance models.

‘The paradox is that we have an economist here who advocates for public health and public ownership of knowledge, and then European scientists who feel the need to include the private sector at all costs‘

Nicoletta Dentico, Director of the Global Health Programme

Background

The proposal for a public European health infrastructure builds upon a Parliament resolution of 17 September 2020, calling on the Commission and Member States to “examine the possibility of creating one or more European non-profit pharmaceutical undertakings which operate in the public interest to manufacture medicinal products of health.” On December 2021 Council conclusions also took note of the importance of the Parliament’s resolution to ensuring the supply of medicinal products affected by market failures. More recently, in July 2022, the study was the object of an open letter to the EU institutions and governments, signed by researchers, medical professionals and health ministers, calling for the creation of a public European infrastructure that can develop vaccines and other therapeutics, for the common good. The project is now expected to be discussed in Parliament’s Committees Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) and Special Committee on COVID-19 Pandemic: Lessons Learned and Recommendations for the Future (COVI).

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

STOA Workshop – Creation of a public European medicines infrastructure: Purpose and feasibility

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

On 10 October, Russia began massive missile strikes against Ukrainian cities in another twist to a war launched more than 7 months ago. The attacks followed an explosion which damaged the bridge from Russia to the annexed Crimean peninsula and a successful counter-offensive by Ukrainian forces in the east and south of the country. Earlier Russia declared the annexation of Ukraine’s south-eastern provinces, started a mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers and threatened to use its nuclear weapons. In a snub to the United States and the European Union, oil-exporting countries joined Russia in announcing cuts in their oil production, lifting its global price.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses on the topic can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Europeans’ support for Ukraine continues unabated
Bertelsmann Stiftung, October 2022

How to respond to Putin’s land grab and nuclear gambit
Brookings Institution, October 2022

The (sorry) state of EU defense cooperation
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Ukraine exposes Europe’s competing narratives about Russia
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Massive rocket attacks on Ukraine: 228th day of the war
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Ukraine: After two months, the food corridor operation is a success
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Shortages looming: How the annexation of Ukraine’s oblasts affects electricity generation
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Ukraine’s allies must dig deep to save its economy now
Chatham House, October 2022

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, October 2022

Whom are we fighting? Some thoughts related to Russia’s latest mobilization plan
Egmont, October 2022

No partial measures: How Ukraine can meet the challenge of Russia’s mobilisation
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

The coming transatlantic rift over Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

How big is the storm? Assessing the impact of the Russian–Ukrainian war on the eastern neighbourhood
European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2022

Quadruple military aid for Ukraine
European Policy Studies, October 2022

Nine months into the Ukraine conflict: four factors will decide the outcome
Friends of Europe, October 2022

Germany’s choices over Ukraine recall earlier Cold War challenges
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

A modern Marshall plan for Ukraine
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

NATO Strategic Concept in the shadow of the war
GLOBSEC, October 2022

Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction strategy: Breaking free of the Soviet economic legacy
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

Understanding Russia’s threat to employ nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

Reaffirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity at the UN
International Crisis Group, October 2022

Impacts of the Ukraine crisis on Biden’s foreign policy
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2022

Mobilisation, annexions: Où va le régime russe?
Institut Montaigne, October 2022

Russia annexes four Ukrainian regions
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

Russia threatens Ukraine with nuclear weapons
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

Cyberattacks in Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine
Notre Europe, October 2022

A moment of strategic clarity
Rand Corporation, October 2022

The EU’s Russia visa ban debate reveals the bloc’s new power center
Atlantic Council, September 2022

Russia is weaponizing its data laws against foreign organization
Brookings Institution, September 2022

We must reinforce Putin’s military losses with economic ones
Brookings Institution, September 2022

Will Ukraine’s refugees go home?
Bruegel, September 2022

A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis
Bruegel, September 2022

Can Putin be stopped?
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

A democratic roadmap for Ukraine
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Why Ukraine must win
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Russia’s war in Ukraine: A turning point?
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Is NATO doing anything for Ukraine?
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Europe should not forget the challenges to its South
Centre for European Reform, September 2022

How likely is the use of nuclear weapons by Russia?
Chatham House, September 2022

China is divided on Russia: Let’s keep it that way
Clingendael, September 2022

Ukraine’s coming winter of decision
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

The case for creating a special tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

Strict and uniform: Improving EU sanctions enforcement
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, September 2022

Military offensives, hybrid attacks, and no peace in sight
Egmont, September 2022

Syria, the Middle East and the war in Ukraine
Egmont, September 2022

Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

In Europe’s defence: Why the EU needs a security compact with Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

In Europe’s gift: How to avoid a Ukraine ‘forever war’
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

The Leopard plan: How European tanks can help Ukraine take back its territory
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

How the West can help Ukraine capitalise on the Kherson counteroffensive
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022

Russia’s regional elections 2022: The elephant in the room
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, September 2022

How much of a game-changer is Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s territories?
German Marshall Fund, September 2022

Designing Ukraine’s recovery in the spirit of the Marshall Plan
German Marshall Fund, September 2022

Preventing the (un)thinkable: Escalation scenarios and risk reduction measures for Russia and NATO following the war in Ukraine
Hans Seidel Stiftung, September 2022

Make Russia pay for Ukraine’s Western economic integration
Heritage Foundation, September 2022

Le retour de la haute intensité en Ukraine Quels enseignements pour les forces terrestres?
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2022

Putin vs Monnet: European resilience, energy and the Ukraine war
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Mobilisation: Russia crosses the Rubicon
International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute for International Economy, September 2022

A new dawn for EU enlargement?
Peterson Institute for International Economy, September 2022

Consequences of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 Gas Pipeline explosions
Polish Institute of International Relations, September 2022

What came of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit and the Xi-Putin meeting?
Polish Institute of International Relations, September 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

This month’s second plenary session in Strasbourg takes place against a sombre background of the continued economic consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the recent pandemic, and adaptation to climate change. Parliament is due to welcome the Slovak President, Zuzana Čaputová, who will address Members in a formal sitting on Wednesday. The Council and Commission are then expected to make statements on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 20 to 21 October 2022. Tony Murphy, the new President of the Court of Auditors will also attend the session on Wednesday, for the presentation of the Court’s 2021 annual report.

Recent attacks on gas pipelines and cyber-attacks on transport networks in Europe have highlighted the urgent need to protect critical EU infrastructure in the EU. The regular Question Time session on Tuesday afternoon will see Members pose questions to the European Commissioner for Promoting our European Way of Life, Vice-President Margaritis Schinas, on measures to counter such attacks, including hybrid attacks.

Russia’s aggression has underlined our dependence on fossil fuels. With no room left for any doubt that this human activity is driving climate change, Members are due to consider a motion for a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the 27th Conference of Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change on Tuesday afternoon (with vote on Thursday). The motion for a resolution, tabled by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), looks to move the debate forward from promises to real action on global goals for climate adaptation, in advance of COP27, taking place in Sharm el‑Sheikh, Egypt, from 6 to 18 November 2022. The ENVI committee urges all parties to align with the Paris Agreement, in particular by setting immediate goals while working towards future adaptation targets. The committee considers that targets should always include action on compensation for loss and damage, and that the global community should ensure developing nations have an effective role in the decision-making process.

Turning to some of the concrete measures by which the EU plans to tackle the drivers of climate change, Members are expected to take part in a joint debate on ‘fit for 55’ package proposals related to vehicle fuels on Monday evening. The focus of the debate is on encouraging the use of ‘clean’ vehicles and sustainable maritime fuels. The lack of alternative fuel infrastructure – recharging and refilling stations – hampers the wider take-up of electric and other vehicles in EU countries. More outlets, closer together (as the vehicles require more frequent recharge) could boost adoption of cleaner vehicles. Members are therefore due to consider a draft report from Parliament’s Transport and Tourism (TRAN) Committee that proposes greater ambition, notably to speed up the rollout of higher-power refilling stations, particularly in regions where uptake is slow. As exhaust gases produced by shipping are also a significant source of air pollution, Members are also expected to debate measures supporting greater use of sustainable maritime fuels. Here too, a TRAN committee report proposes higher cuts to emissions and introduces a target for the use of renewable fuels. Recognising that the sector will need support to adapt, the TRAN committee also proposes setting up an Ocean Fund aimed at decarbonising maritime transport. The vote on these TRAN reports will set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

The Russian war and the recent pandemic have also led to revised estimates on growth and inflation. Members are expected to vote on an amending budget (the fourth of this year), concerning the EU’s own resources on Wednesday afternoon. A Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report proposes that Parliament agree to the proposed changes, reflecting updated revenue forecasts (and already endorsed by the Council). The committee notes the €3.6 billion increase in own resources and urges greater speed in introducing new own resources to pay for the COVID‑19 recovery. However, as Parliament has not yet taken a position on the REPowerEU proposal, it underlines that changes proposed in amending budget DAB 4/2022 will have no bearing on the legislative outcome on that file. While the committee also commends the changes to Eurojust’s mandate in relation to support for Ukraine, it criticises the redeployment of resources within Eurojust as set out in the proposal.

On Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to consider amendments to the Council’s position on the draft EU budget for 2023. A Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the proposals reverses most of the reductions proposed by the Council, instead proposing to make a considerable increase in spending on Parliament’s priorities: addressing the consequences of the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, defence, research, humanitarian aid, Erasmus+, digitalisation and infrastructure. Once Parliament has completed its reading of the Union budget for 2023, negotiations between the co-legislators will begin.

As the EU institutions run on a budget provided by European citizens, Parliament is naturally responsible for overseeing their use of this funding. In May 2022, Parliament considered the 2020 budget spending for all EU institutions. At the time, it was yet again unable to grant budget discharge to the European Council and the Council, due to a persistent lack of cooperation in this procedure. Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) has re-examined the situation, with its report, tabled for a vote on Tuesday lunchtime, noting a continued lack of progress. The committee therefore proposes that Parliament denies discharge once more. Among other criticisms, CONT again proposes to increase transparency by splitting the European Council and Council budget sections, and reiterates concern regarding European Council interference in legislative matters where it has no role to play. Parliament also postponed a budget discharge decision concerning the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in May, citing the need for more action on fundamental rights. The CONT committee also considers allegations of harassment, misconduct and migrant pushbacks involving the Agency sufficiently serious as to recommend refusing discharge until the Agency has addressed the findings of the EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigation. Conversely, while Parliament had previously withheld the discharge decision for the 2020 budget of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the CONT committee now recommends granting budget discharge. The committee report notes that the institution has addressed issues of staff harassment and misconduct and particularly welcomes measures improving auditing and transparency within the EESC.

See the full agenda here.

• COP27 climate change conference in Egypt
• Deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure
• FuelEU Maritime – Sustainable maritime fuels
• Discharge for the 2020 budget: European Council and Council
• Discharge for the 2020 budget: European Economic and Social Committee
• Discharge for the 2020 budget: European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)
• Amending budget No 4/2022: Own resources and other technical adjustments
• Parliament’s reading of the 2023 EU budget

Written by Luisa Antunes.

One language disappears every two weeks, and up to 90 % of existing languages could be gone by the turn of the century. Globalisation, social and economic pressures and political options can determine whether a language survives. Multilingualism is a cornerstone of the European project, with 24 official and 60 minority languages. In a digital era, ensuring digital language equality can help preserve linguistic diversity.

Have you heard of Livonian? Yurok? Olmec? Almost 7 000 languages are currently spoken in the world, but every two weeks, at least one dies out, with 50‑90 % of all languages predicted to disappear by 2100. But what causes languages to disappear and how can we prevent it?

The Babel myth claims that all humans once spoke the same language. As humanity migrated and civilisations emerged, metaphorical walls were erected and languages diversified. Chomsky has theorised that language emergence must have occurred early in human evolution. A study of phonemes pinpointed the origin of language to 80‑160 000 years ago in southern Africa, thus predating the latest major exodus of Homo sapiens (50‑70 000 years ago) and suggesting a single or main origin.

Today, three main language families exist: Indo-European, Sino-Tibetan and Afro-Asiatic. In Europe, 90 % of citizens (675 million) are native speakers of an Indo-European language of one of three main language groups (Germanic, Romance and Slavic). Minority Indo-European language groups in the EU include Baltic, Celtic and Romani, the latter spoken by 6 million citizens. In addition, 20 million EU citizens speak non Indo-European languages, notably Basque, Estonian, Finnish, Hungarian, Maltese and Sami, the latter of which is considered severely endangered.

It could be argued that linguistic diversity has been threatened by technology since Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press. The standardisation imposed by the written form helped shape the structure of what is at genesis an oral tradition, originally passed on through small communities and then travelling longer distances with trade and theatre. Take Dante‘s consolidation of the Italian language, for instance. It could also be argued that written codification set bounds to the expansion of language, an example of which are today’s digital communities.

Language is a product of history, politics and socioeconomics, and in turn helps structure them. By 1920, half of the world’s languages had been lost as a result of centuries of European colonisation. Throughout Europe, regional and minority languages were prohibited in the 20th century, as centralised governments imposed a dominant language in order to ‘assimilate’, ‘acculturate’ and preserve ‘national identity’. In Spain, Franco declared Castilian the only official language. In France, minority languages such as Basque, Breton and Occitan were suppressed through both ministerial decrees and educational campaigns, creating a sense of ‘vergonha‘ (shame of one’s identity due to institutionalised persecution). Former French President Pompidou asserted ‘there is no place for minority languages in a France destined to make its mark on Europe’. Languages can also be lost due to socioeconomic pressure, as was the case in Italy, with the mass movement of southern workers towards industrialised cities in the north (Turin, Milan and Genoa). In Ireland, British rule in the 19th century led to the erosion of Irish. Romani faces decline as a result of ethnic persecution and the pressure felt by young people to integrate in wider society.

But not all is lost. Over the last quarter of the 20th century, policies began to shift towards language preservation. Yurok, a Native American language at the brink of extinction following the arrival of Western settlers, had a recent revitalisation thanks to the government’s promotion of a language programme. In the EU, several Member States have integrated minority languages in school curricula and enshrined language rights in national constitutions. In Italy, a 1999 law recognises the country’s historical linguistic minorities. Irish was declared an official language in Ireland in 2003 and an official language of the institutions of the EU in 2007.

Potential impacts and developments

Language is deeply embedded in our sense of culture, social connections and personal identity. While globalisation can lead to language homogenisation, it can also contribute to new linguistic diversity. Brazilian poet Oswald de Andrade wrote, on his theory of anthropophagy, that Brazilian culture is more than the sum of its colonisers and that integrating and elaborating these influences allowed the creation of its synergistic, unique identity. In a reverse dynamic, post 1970s Portuguese society has seen the integration of terms originating from Brazilian and African Portuguese, in a sort of ‘reverse triangle trade’. Mozambican writer Mia Couto is famous for creating ‘almost words‘, based on regional dialects infused with animistic realism, which in turn he ascribes as inspiration from the oral tradition of Brazilian author Guimarães Rosa.

Today, English has entered our lives through television, music and the internet. Its influence is felt in business, administration, science and technology. There is no Italian term for ‘privacy’, nor ‘computer’; Germany’s youth have adopted words like ‘legit‘ and ‘cringe‘; and Bulgarians have taken up ‘trendy‘. One might wonder if English influence on EU languages could become as prevalent as to transform them into bona fide English dialects. Conversely, English is also shaped by non-native speakers, in a cultural mixture known as ‘Globish‘. Some might be surprised to find that ‘beamer‘ and ‘handy‘ do not mean what they might expect.

What could become our lingua franca in the future? Language dominance depends on socio-political power. While Esperanto was created artificially with the intention of serving as a lingua franca for international communication, fewer than 200 000 people speak it today. With the emergence of Asian economies, Mandarin or Hindi, which together have more speakers than English, could become next century’s lingua franca. However, this will depend on geopolitical balances, with hyperglobalisation and deglobalisation at its extremes.

Policy-making

Multilingualism is at the centre of the EU project and recognised as one of the EU’s values, anchored in its cultural and linguistic diversity. Linguistic diversity is enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (Article 3) and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Articles 21 and 22). The EU currently has 24 official and working languages. Members of the European Parliament have the right to express themselves in the language(s) of their choice. To that end, the EU invests €1 billion per year in translation and interpretating services, including in sign languages.

The EU recognises the cultural importance of its linguistic diversity. Maltese, the only Semitic European language, is an official EU language. Irish gained full official and working status in January 2022. Catalan, Galician, Basque, (and previously Scottish Gaelic and Welsh) have semi-official status, which means language services are provided by the Member State, when needed and at its own expense. EU-funded research projects collect corpora of mainly oral languages, such as Romani, to promote language preservation. Language learning and mobility are promoted through Erasmus+ and the Creative Europe programmes, aiming for all young people in the EU to have a good knowledge of two foreign languages by 2025. The EU also funds language learning programmes for specific minority languages, such as Romani.

Digital tools can help overcome language barriers and foster language equality. A 2000 STOA study found that online linguistic diversity is threatened not by the dominance of a single language, but rather by the dominance of machine translation in the five most-spoken EU languages (English, French, German, Spanish and Italian), to the detriment of the remaining 19 official and 60 regional and minority languages used in the EU. Based on the results of a 2017 STOA study, Parliament adopted a 2018 resolution on achieving language equality in the digital age. This led to the creation of the EU European Language Equality (ELE) project, which analysed over 80 languages to develop a roadmap towards achieving full digital language equality by 2030. It includes machine translation, speech technologies, text analytics and natural language understanding. In 2019, Parliament launched a call for tender to deliver live speech-to-text captioning (automatic speech recognition and machine translation) of Parliamentary debates in 24 languages. It aims to contribute to accessibility for deaf and hard of hearing persons, who currently have no direct access to Parliamentary debates. Digital tools for sign language to/from text, however, remain an underdeveloped challenge.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if everyone spoke the same language?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if everyone spoke the same language?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Balázs Széchy.

The European Union’s outermost regions (ORs) qualify for special treatment owing to structural difficulties – such as remoteness, difficult topography and economic dependence on a few products – that can severely hamper their development. In addition, the coronavirus pandemic has hit their economies particularly hard. While these regions are quite different from one another, they have levels of unemployment and GDP significantly worse than EU and national averages.

Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for specific measures to support the ORs, including the tailored application of EU law and access to EU programmes. Specific support mechanisms exist under cohesion, agricultural and fisheries policies, and other policy areas, with the Commission outlining measures aimed at assisting ORs in communications published in 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2017. In July 2021, the Commission opened a public consultation to feed into its plan to renew the EU’s strategic approach for the ORs, with Parliament adopting an own-initiative report in September 2021 inviting the Commission to ‘co-construct’ a new strategy for and with the ORs, accompanied by a precise action plan. On 3 May 2022, the Commission adopted a renewed strategy for the ORs, prioritising place-based approaches and tailored support for the ORs across all EU policies, aiming to unlock their potential through appropriate investment and reforms.

In addition to the unprecedented level of funding for the ORs already negotiated in the 2021-2027 funds and programmes, the Commission is creating, with the renewed strategy, dedicated opportunities in many EU policy areas, including the launch of a series of dedicated calls for projects exclusively for the ORs. However, no legislative initiatives or significant new financial resources are included in the 2022 communication. While the EU plays a key role in helping to unlock the ORs’ growth potential, their well-being and development fundamentally rely on choices and actions by the regions themselves and their Member States. Therefore, the Commission’s communication, while presenting a number of initiatives to be developed at EU level, encourages action by these regions and their Member States, for example to take account of their specificities in cross-cutting policies and instruments. This, however, raises questions about the extent to which the new strategy will truly be sufficient to improve the situation in the ORs and boost their development.

This is a revised and updated version of a briefing from May 2021 by Christiaan Van Lierop.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outermost regions of the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Culture and regional development’ on YouTube.

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Written by Alex Wilson.

On 30 September 2022, the Council of the European Union agreed an urgent regulation to address the problem of very high energy prices in the EU. The Council regulation would raise revenues for Member States to compensate energy consumers for rising prices.

Firstly, Member States would receive the excess revenues of electricity generators that rely on cheaper ‘inframarginal’ energy technologies. These companies are obtaining windfall revenues from high electricity prices caused by the exceptional rise in gas prices, rather than from any increases in their own cost of production. Under the marginal pricing model, high gas prices are largely setting electricity prices across the EU.

Secondly, fossil fuel producers in the EU would be subject to a solidarity contribution on their excess profits, at a rate of at least 33 % across the EU. These revenue-raising measures are accompanied by a voluntary target to reduce electricity consumption by ‑10 % and a mandatory target to reduce peak electricity demand by ‑5 %. These efforts would lower the share of gas in the energy mix and diminish its effect in terms of price setting, especially at peak times. Other measures would temporarily allow price regulation for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and below-cost electricity supply.

The briefing goes on to look at Member State actions in addressing high energy prices and what this implies for a rapidly changing EU framework, with the European Commission expected to adopt further new proposals in the coming months. The briefing then considers some expert views on the reform of EU electricity markets and the European Parliament’s position on high energy prices.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Emergency intervention to address high energy prices in the EU‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Natural gas market prices in the EU (Dutch title transfer facility (TTF), since 2012)

Written by Tambiama Mandiega (1st edition).

On 23 February 2022, the European Commission unveiled a proposal for an EU regulation – the data act – laying down harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data. The aim is to remove barriers before consumers and businesses’ access to data in a context in which the volume of data generated by humans and machines is increasing exponentially and becoming a critical factor for innovation by businesses (e.g. algorithm training) and by public authorities (e.g. shaping of smart cities). The proposed act establishes common rules governing the sharing of data generated by the use of connected products or related services (e.g. the internet of things, industrial machines) to ensure fairness in data sharing contracts and to allow public sector bodies to use data held by enterprises where there is an exceptional need (e.g. public emergency). Furthermore, the proposed act introduces new rules to facilitate switching between providers of cloud services and other data processing services, and puts in place safeguards against unlawful international data transfer by cloud service providers. The Council and Parliament are working on defining their respective positions.

Versions

• October 2022: The Data act (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act) Committee responsible:Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022)0068
23.2.2022Rapporteur:Pilar del Castillo Vera (EPP, Spain)2022/0047(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Miapetra Kumpula-Natri (S&D, Finland)
Alin Mituța (Renew, Romania)
Damian Boeselager (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Elena Lizzi (ID, Italy)
Margarita De La Pisa Carrion (ECR, Spain)
Elena Kountoura (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Suzana Anghel.

EU leaders met on 6 and 7 October 2022 in Prague for the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) and an informal meeting of the European Council. At the EPC meeting, hosted by the current Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU, over 40 European heads of state or government expressed unity in the face of the common challenge posed by the brutal return of war on European soil, affirmed their support to Ukraine and committed to strengthening energy cooperation. They clarified that the EPC was intended as a bi-annual informal platform – hence the absence of a declaration – for dialogue among equals at leaders’ level. The EPC aims to boost cooperation on issues of continental concern – and not to be a substitute for EU policies, in particular enlargement. It was agreed that the next EPC meeting would take place in Chişinău, Moldova.

At the informal meeting of the European Council, which aimed to prepare the forthcoming formal meeting on 20-21 October 2022, EU leaders focused on Ukraine and energy. As regards Ukraine, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, stressed that, with the successive packages of sanctions, including the agreed oil price cap, the EU was depriving Putin’s regime of the ability to wage war in Ukraine and that Team Europe (EU and the Member States) had pledged €19 billion to Ukraine (military aid excepted). With respect to energy, EU leaders discussed ways of jointly addressing the energy price and security of supply challenges, and notably considered joint purchasing of gas at EU level. EU leaders also discussed the protection of critical infrastructure, which is a key element of work conducted on resilience as part of EU-NATO cooperation.

The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, addressed the leaders by video-link at both meetings, stressing the importance of supporting Ukraine in defending itself. In her address to the European Council, the European Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, emphasised that war and high energy prices had led to high inflation rates, reaching 10 % in the euro area. Following a proposal by Charles Michel, Ms Thérèse Blanchet was appointed Secretary-General of the Council.

1. Background

The Indicative Leaders’ Agenda 2022 included an informal meeting of the European Council on 7 October 2022, preceded a day earlier by the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community. The two events, held in Prague Castle, shared common topics – peace and security, energy security and economic issues. They also presented similarities in outcome, as no declarations were adopted, while leaders stressed, both in the EPC framework and at the informal European Council, their unity against Russia and unfailing support to Ukraine.

2. The inaugural meeting of the European Political Community

On 6 October 2022, the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU hosted the first meeting of the EPC. The meeting followed on from the proposal formulated on Europe Day 2022 by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, to establish a platform allowing EU and non-EU European countries to come together to discuss issues of common interest in a wide range of policy areas, including security, the economy and energy. The inaugural EPC meeting allowed for clarification of pending issues such as participation, format and aim. It also helped to dissipate scepticism by emphasising that the EPC was not intended as an alternative to enlargement and that those European countries wishing and meeting the criteria would continue on their EU integration path.

Participation

The inaugural EPC meeting was attended by over 40 heads of state or government, as well as President Michel and the Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President (HR/VP) of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, was also in attendance. The Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, was absent from the inaugural EPC meeting for domestic political reasons, but joined her colleagues a day later for the informal meeting of the European Council. The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, addressed his colleagues by video-link, while the Prime Minister, Denys Shmyhal, attended the meeting in person.

As stressed by President Macron, ‘we share the same space, often the same history, and we have a mission to write the future together. This is the EPC.’ Thus, the EPC brought together EU Member States, countries aspiring to become members of the EU (the Western Balkan countries, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Turkey), countries which have left the bloc (the United Kingdom) and countries which do not wish to join (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland). The Prime Minister of Belgium, Alexander de Croo, drew attention to the fact that ‘the whole European continent [was in Prague] except two countries, Belarus and Russia’ and pointed to their level of isolation, an analysis shared by the Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki.

An informal partnership of equals

The EPC is about fostering informal cooperation among equal partners. As stressed by the Czech Prime Minister, Petr Fiala, in his opening remarks, there is, for the moment, no intention to formalise meetings or to transform the EPC into an organisation of its own. In a pre-summit op-ed, the Prime Ministers of Albania, Edi Rama, and the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, stressed that the EPC ‘should be driven not by bureaucracy but by flexibility’ and that it ‘should be guided not by fixed agendas but by priorities that concern us all’. President Michel stressed that European leaders ‘listened to each other’, which was the main objective and achievement of the first EPC meeting.

The idea of an informal intergovernmental gathering, on an equal footing, of heads of state or government on a continental scale was central to the joint press conference held by President Macron, the EPC’s initiator, Petr Fiala, representing the host country, and the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, representing the country which will host the next EPC meeting in the first half of 2023. She stressed that ‘solidarity and trust’ represent the rock on which the EPC is built.

In a way, the first EPC meeting mirrored the European Council in its early days, when meetings were informal, resembling ‘fireside chats’ and allowing Heads of State or Government to exchange freely on the most salient issues with the aim of identifying common solutions to common challenges. The absence of a chair is yet another element of flexibility and informality in the organisation of the EPC. This contrasts with, for example, EU-Western Balkans summits organised in the margins of informal European Council meetings by the countries holding the rotating Council Presidency – Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia – and chaired by the European Council President.

European Political Community meeting format

As flagged in the EPRS outlook, the meeting saw a mix of plenary sessions and roundtables. The number of roundtables was reduced to two, one on peace and security (co-facilitated by Slovakia and Moldova) and one on energy, climate and economy (co-facilitated by Greece and Switzerland). The format of roundtables, co-facilitated by an EU and a non-EU country, was successfully introduced at the February 2022 EU-African Union summit. The format notably enabled a focus on various crises taking place on the continent, including tensions in the eastern Mediterranean, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the situation in the Western Balkans.

Bilateral meetings held on the sidelines of the EPC meeting allowed European leaders to discuss pending issues. For instance, the Prime Minister of Sweden, Magdalena Andersson, discussed the status of Sweden’s NATO bid with the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Migration, a topic which was initially planned as part of a stand-alone roundtable, was discussed by leaders at bilateral meetings. This was the case, for example, between President Macron and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Liz Truss, who agreed during their meeting to, inter alia, increase cooperation on migration. The Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, confirmed that he discussed migration with Truss and that work should continue in a trilateral framework with France and the UK but also in a more inclusive European way.

In addition to bilateral meetings, other formats were explored with different levels of success. For example, a quadrilateral meeting was held by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, President Macron and President Michel. A statement was published after the meeting, confirming Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s commitment to the UN Charter and the 1991 Alma Ata Declaration, in which both countries ‘recognise each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty’. The meeting was key ahead of the meeting of the border commissions to be held in Brussels in the course of October 2022. No similar success was found with respect to facilitating the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. The quadrilateral meeting envisaged between the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, and the President of Kosovo, Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu, in the presence of President Macron and the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, did not occur, being replaced by two separate trilateral meetings attended by the Franco-German duo.

Main results of the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community European unity

The European leaders sent a strong signal of unity, condemning Russia’s war on Ukraine and expressing support for Ukraine. The Prime Minister of Iceland, Katrín Jakobsdơttir, stressed that ‘Europe stands in solidarity against the Russian invasion in Ukraine’, while Prime Minister Petr Fiala stressed that ‘we all know in our hearts that Ukraine will win because the truth is on their side’.

Priorities for future cooperation

European leaders jointly agreed on six work ‘paths’, or priority lines for cooperation. President Macron stressed that work on protecting critical infrastructure is key in light of the recent attack on Nord Stream and that a common European strategy is needed. Fighting cyber-attacks originating, for instance, in Russia or Iran also requires a joint European approach. Regional cooperation and security in the Black, Baltic and North Seas is yet another aspect in need of a common European vision. The development of an ‘integrated energy strategy’, in particular coordination with non-EU European partners, some of which – notably Azerbaijan and Norway – are energy producers, is needed to bring energy prices down. For Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, the leaders sent a clear message to the energy market that they were ‘completely aligned’ and ‘have the joint ambition to come up with measures to bring down the gas prices’. Last but not least, youth is one area where a more integrated vision is needed on a continental scale.

The way forward

As announced by President Macron, EPC meetings will be held bi-annually. A calendar was drawn up with Moldova to host the next EPC meeting in spring 2023, followed by Spain in autumn 2023 and the UK in early 2024. This pattern shows a desire to alternate meetings between EU and non-EU countries. The nomination of Spain indicates that EPC meetings are likely to be organised back-to-back with informal European Council meetings in the country holding the six-monthly EU Council presidency, which could result in a revival of its role in foreign policy. Furthermore, a number of open questions remain, particularly regarding the financing of the EPC, as outlined by Josep Borrell.

3. The informal meeting of the European Council

On 7 October 2022, EU Heads of State or Government met in Prague for an informal European Council meeting at which they discussed Ukraine and energy. No conclusions were adopted, although exceptionally a draft statement had been circulated ahead of the summit. Prior to the summit, President Michel held a preparatory meeting with President Macron, Chancellor Scholz, Petr Fiala and Ursula von der Leyen.

Main results of the informal meeting of the European Council Ukraine

As confirmed by Charles Michel, EU leaders reiterated their financial, humanitarian, political and military support to Ukraine and strengthened sanctions to increase pressure on the Russian regime. They also considered the global implications of food shortages and confirmed their willingness to support partners under strain around the world. Similar to past meetings held since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, President Zelensky addressed the European Council, stressing both the need to protect critical infrastructure and Ukraine’s high expectations from the recovery conference being organised by the Commission and the G7 Presidency in Berlin on 25 October 2022.

Main message from the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that only by providing Ukraine with ‘advanced weaponry and military intelligence’ can the war be stopped and real peace achieved. She stressed that aspiring countries must stay the course on EU membership.

Energy

As highlighted by President Michel after the meeting, EU leaders considered ways of addressing the energy challenge on three levels. First, measures to reduce energy consumption and demand. Second, the progressive setting-up of platforms for joint purchasing of energy at EU level, notably gas, to ensure security of supply. And third, they focused on the high energy prices and considered the steps laid out by Ursula von der Leyen in her letter of 5 October 2022, notably price caps, to tackle the situation. The European Commission is to present a more detailed proposal in the coming weeks. President von der Leyen confirmed that Russian gas imports had been cut from 41 % of total EU gas imports in February 2022 to 7.5 % currently and stressed that EU Member States’ gas storage facilities were filled to 90 %, an increase of 15 % compared with one year ago.

Main message from the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola stressed that the Parliament ‘has called for an EU bloc-wide gas price cap’, called for the energy union to ‘finally become a reality’ and emphasised that the Parliament is a reliable partner that is able to act fast whenever needed.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Outcome of the European Political Community and European Council meetings in Prague on 6-7 October 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has threatened to undermine the European Union’s economic recovery from the pandemic. Most EU Member States had returned to growth after two years of COVID, with the help of the massive Next Generation EU fund, but the military conflict brought about a steep rise in the prices of food and, especially energy. The resulting surge in inflation has forced the European Central Bank and other central banks to raise interest rates, boding ill for future growth. Rate hikes by the US Federal Reserve and global financial volatility have pushed the euro below parity with the US dollar. On a positive note, EU unemployment remains relatively low.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the economic situation in Europe. Some earlier publications on inflation and growth can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union Address
Atlantic Council, September 2022

Two large shocks in quick succession: How can Europe avoid another decade of growth disappointment?
Brookings Institution, September 2022

5 key takeaways on inflation from the August CPI report
Brookings Institution, September 2022

The ECB’s monetary tightening: A belated start under uncertainty
Bruegel, September 2022

Tackling inflation: Learning from the European Central Bank’s six lapses
Bruegel, September 2022

An assessment of Europe’s options for addressing the crisis in energy markets
Bruegel, September 2022

National policies to shield consumers from rising energy prices
Bruegel, September 2022

How effective has the pandemic emergency purchase programme been in ensuring debt sustainability?
Bruegel, September 2022

A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis
Bruegel, September 2022

Global economic consequences of the war in Ukraine: Sanctions, supply chains and sustainability
Centre for Economic Policy Research, September 2022

Why gas price caps and consumer subsidies are both extremely costly and ultimately futile
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2022

The economic basis of democracy in Europe
Chatham House, September 2022

Where might high inflation lead to? Economic warfare
Chatham House, September 2022

Global food crisis: Fuelled by conflict
Chatham House, September 2022

Conseil énergie du 9 septembre 2022: Quelles réponses européennes à la crise?
Confrontations Europe, September 2022

How is the EU paying for the economic crisis?
German Marshall Fund, September 2022

Energy unity or breakup? The EU at a crossroads
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Enabling green innovations for the circular economy: What factors matter?
Economic and Social Affairs Institute, September 2022

Euro Area Autumn 2022: Recession ahead
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, September 2022

As the economy tanks, will the Fed pivot or stay the course?
Mises Institute, September 2022

Uncoordinated monetary policies risk a historic global slowdown
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

Biden could reduce inflation, mitigate a recession, and strengthen democracy with a new EU-US trade agreement
Brookings Institution, August 2022

Macroeconomic stabilization for a post-pandemic world
Brookings Institution, August 2022

Germany is now the fulcrum for Vladimir Putin’s pressure
Brookings Institution, August 2022

The ECB’s monetary policy and its new instrument
Luiss School of Political Economy, August 2022

Inflation and unemployment: Where is the US economy heading over the next six months?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

The West must take urgent steps to prevent Ukrainian economic collapse
Atlantic Council, July 2022

Euro-dollar parity: Beyond symbolism
Bruegel, July 2022

Covid-19 in the European Union: Health impacts and effects on economic activity
Bruegel, July 2022

Legal options for a green golden rule in the European Union’s fiscal framework
Bruegel, July 2022

An individual tax on fuel consumption is an effective, flexible and sustainable solution to combat inflation
Bruegel, July 2022

Central banks have been too slow in responding to higher inflation
Bruegel, July 2022

How can the ECB deal with the risk of fragmentation?
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

Real effects of financial market integration: Evidence from an ECB collateral framework change
DIW, July 2022

Achieving the full potential of sustainable finance: The role of national, European and international initiatives
European Policy Centre, July 2022

The war in Ukraine and the European Central Bank
International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 2022

Read this briefing on ‘The EU’s economic woes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

Russia’s war on Ukraine once again featured at the top of agenda during the October I 2022 plenary session, with a debate held with the European Commission and Council on Russia’s escalation of the conflict, and Members calling for a massive increase in defence support for Ukraine, as well as additional support for those regions most affected. Regarding the related energy crisis, Members demanded that the EU response focus on the most vulnerable. A number of political debates were held, inter alia, on ocean governance; rule of law conditionality in Hungary; Romania and Bulgaria’s accession to the Schengen area; and the EU strategy on fertilisers to ensure food security in Europe. Members also debated ending discrimination against Roma people, and called for an end to illegal trade in wildlife by 2025.

Common charger

The long-running issue of the compatibility of chargers for electronic devices (such as smart phones, tablets, cameras, headphones, game consoles and portable speakers) is finally being resolved. As a voluntary approach from industry had neither reduced the numbers of chargers needed by consumers, nor their frustration at not being able to find a compatible one, Members debated and adopted, by a large majority, a provisional agreement on the proposal for a common charger for such devices. The adopted text, agreed with the Council in trilogue, should simplify life for consumers and reduce electronic waste.

European Health Union

Members debated and adopted provisional agreements reached with Council negotiators on two proposals that aim to create a European Health Union. Drawn up in the wake of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the Commission’s plans should ensure the EU is better prepared to deal with future health threats. The proposed regulation on serious cross-border health threats envisages that the EU and each Member State sets up coordinated, regularly reviewed and updated complementary preparedness plans to deal with health crises. Boosting networks should also improve contacts and knowledge-sharing among epidemiological and medical surveillance bodies. Furthermore, the extension of the mandate of the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) broadens its role to monitor health systems across the EU, and ensures data are made available to address all major health threats.

Customs single window

Members voted to adopt a legislative proposal on the establishment of an EU customs single window, which should streamline the paperwork traders and shippers are required to complete – such as documents relating to health, the environment, agriculture, and compliance with standards, as well as customs – by enabling them to use a single electronic gateway.

Coronavirus relief measures for the aviation sector

Although the pandemic has not yet quite disappeared, air traffic has recently increased. Members therefore voted to revise the pandemic relief measures, including the rules on take-off and landing slots for airlines, which were allowed exceptions due to COVID‑19. Airlines will now have to use 75 % of their landing slots to be allowed to retain them the following season.

Statistics on agricultural input and output

Members also voted to adopt a proposal on new rules for data on input and output of agricultural activity, including farmers’ use of agro-chemicals, within the framework of the modernisation of the collection of agricultural statistics.

Transposition of management measures for Indian Ocean tuna fisheries

Parliament adopted measures, following an agreement with the Council, to bring the latest rules of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) into EU law. The western Indian Ocean is a key fishing ground for tuna for the EU fishing fleet, with a catch of some 217 000 tonnes in the area in 2020. As a contracting party to the IOTC, the EU is obliged to ensure its conservation and fisheries management measures are applied to EU fishing vessels.

Horn of Africa

Instability in the eight countries located in the Horn of Africa stems from violent conflict and food insecurity. However, as they are located on major trading routes through the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, they are of strategic interest for the EU. Members debated and adopted a set of recommendations to the Commission, Council and High Representative on EU policy on the Horn of Africa, underlining the need to combat the influence of third parties in the region that do not act under similar values to those of the Union.

Protests in Iran over the death of Mahsa Amini

Among other foreign policy issues tackled during the October I plenary session, Members debated the protests in Iran, following the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini. Iran has seen increasingly brutal repression of protests by the authorities, since the death of Amini on 16 September, following her arrest for allegedly violating the Iranian law requiring women to wear a veil. The protests are reportedly being led by women in solidarity with Amini, but commentators underline that the demonstrations also come in a context of deteriorating economic conditions and the soaring cost of living.

Question time: Tackling depopulation through cohesion policy instruments

During a question time session with Elisa Ferreira, European Commissioner for Cohesion and Reforms, Members discussed the issue of tackling depopulation through cohesion policy instruments. Several Member States and regions are facing population decline, caused by factors including low fertility rates, net emigration and an ageing society.

Question time: Heightening tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Members took the opportunity during Question Time with Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, to discuss recent tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where hostilities have recently broken out on Armenian territory despite the November 2020 ceasefire agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October I 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt.

The way children use digital technologies has changed a lot over the past decade. Most children go online using a smartphone, and do so almost twice as much as 10 years ago. They also use the internet at an earlier age than did children 10 years ago. Although the internet provides many opportunities for kids to learn and explore, to be creative or to interact with their friends and family, it also entails many risks such as cyberbullying, age-inappropriate content, disinformation and sexual abuse.

On 11 May 2022, the European Commission published a new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+). The strategy builds on its predecessor with the same name, adopted in 2012. The new strategy contributes to the vision for the EU’s digital transformation by 2030 and reflects the principle, ‘Children and young people should be protected and empowered online’.

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The BIK+ strategy is built around three topics focused on children: safe digital experience, digital empowerment and active participation. It includes concrete actions that the Commission plans to support such as media literacy campaigns and the EU code of conduct on age-appropriate design to ensure privacy, safety and security for children online.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been attributed to the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT). The committee plans to deal with this file together with the proposal for a regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. It does not plan to adopt a report on the updated strategy itself. The Commission plans to carry out an evaluation of the strategy every two years and publish regular reports.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The new European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+)‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Balazs Szechy.

The European Week of Regions and Cities (#EURegionsWeek) is the biggest annual Brussels-based event dedicated to cohesion policy. The 20th edition of EURegionsWeek under the motto ‘New Challenges for Europe’s cohesion’ includes online and onsite sessions and a virtual exhibition. The European Parliamentary Research Service is organising two workshops and will be moderating a high-level event as part of the EU RegionsWeek.

The European Week of Regions and Cities is a[FC1]  four-day event during which cities and regions showcase their capacity to create growth and jobs, implement European Union cohesion policy, and prove the importance of the local and regional level for good European governance. During this year’s edition, held from 10 to 13 October 2022, over 1 000 speakers will take part in 386 hours of interactive conferences. The main aim is to discuss common challenges for Europe’s regions and cities and examine possible solutions, by bringing together politicians, decision-makers, experts and practitioners of cohesion policy, as well as stakeholders from business, banking, civil society organisations, academia, the EU institutions and the media. The event provides a platform for capacity-building, learning, and to share experience and good practice for those implementing EU cohesion policy and managing its financial instruments. It facilitates cooperation and networking between regions and cities. The EU Regions Week also feeds into the debate on EU cohesion policy in a wider context, including recent research and views from third countries and international organisations.

For the seventh year running, EPRS is organising a workshop on research as part of the EU RegionsWeek College. This workshop will discuss how the Parliament’s research work is organised and will examine how closer links can be established between researchers in the academic world and EU policy-makers. The workshop is open to all.

A second EPRS workshop will examine the effectiveness of cohesion policy as a tool for solidarity in the context of the war in Ukraine. With large numbers of people having fled Ukraine, the event will focus on the new measures introduced under the cohesion policy framework, such as CARE, CARE+ and FAST-CARE. A panel of policy experts and political practitioners will guide the session, aiming to identify actionable ideas for improving cohesion policy in this area, and involving audience participation through the use of interactive polls. Members of the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions are due to participate in the debate. Issues such as cohesion policy’s capacity to address unforeseen emergencies, or how recent regulatory changes (in addition to flexibility introduced through the CRII packages and REACT-EU) might accelerate a paradigm shift from cohesion policy being a long-term investment mechanism to incorporating a crisis-response feature on a permanent basis, are likely to feature.

The EPRS will also moderate the high-level workshop on ’20 years of EU policies in island regions: where are we?’, organised by the Sardinia Region’s EU liaison office, in partnership with the regional authorities of Corsica, the Balearic islands, Gozo, Crete and the Ionian islands. High-level political representatives from these regions will take the floor, alongside a representative from the European Commission and four Members of the European Parliament, including the Committee on Regional Development’s Chair, Younous Omarjee (GUE/NGL, France).

As in previous years, the European Parliamentary Research Service has published a topical digest linked to the event, providing a selection of briefings and studies published by the European Parliament on many of the major issues under discussion, including the green transition, territorial cohesion, digital transition and youth empowerment.

We look forward to welcoming you online on 11-12 October 2022.

Written by Liselotte Jensen.

The European Union (EU) is legally bound by the Climate Law to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and deliver negative emissions from that year on. To do so, carbon emissions must be significantly reduced and any remaining greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions balanced, and subsequently exceeded, by sequestration or removals, to limit and ultimately reverse the warming of our planet.

In its December 2021 communication on sustainable carbon cycles, the Commission outlined various approaches to capture and store or sequester carbon dioxide emissions, or capture already released carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere to reduce the concentration and thereby its warming effect. Various solutions, both technology- and nature-based, are being brought forward to this end. A key challenge will be to ensure permanence of carbon dioxide removals, whether in underground geological storage or through actively managed natural processes, such as carbon farming and management practices in the land use, land-use change and forestry sectors.

Many products today, such as plastics and chemicals, are produced using virgin fossil-based carbon resources. The Commission therefore also aims to push for product and process innovation to substitute current fossil-based feedstock with sustainably sourced bio-based materials, or through the circular economy, to ensure that carbon integrated in products is recycled and remains stored. More CO2 transport infrastructure is essential to increase the reuse of captured carbon.

At the end of 2022, the Commission plans to put forward a legislative proposal on a European framework for the certification of carbon removals, which could lead to a market for carbon removals, further incentivising measures to increase carbon sequestration and storage. Ensuring high environmental integrity and adequate monitoring and reporting frameworks is crucial, while also taking into account potential trade-offs or co-benefits of potential solutions.

Read this briefing on ‘Sustainable carbon cycles: Promoting removal, storage and recycling‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Carbon flows EU-27 (2018)