European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Issam Hallak (1st edition).

On 27 October 2021, the Commission tabled a regulation amending the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Banking Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) with a view to resolving inconsistencies regarding the internal minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (iMREL). The iMREL are indirectly channelled through a number of intermediate parents up to the resolution entity of the group, in a process also known as a ‘daisy chain’.

In its negotiating position adopted in February 2022, Parliament supported the proposal suggesting some changes. The provisional agreement resulting from interinstitutional negotiations adds provisions for a framed review that takes into account the different types of banking group structure. Parliament adopted the agreement on 13 September 2022, and the final act was published in the Official Journal on 25 October 2022.

Versions

• December 2022: Amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation in the area of resolution (‘daisy chain’ proposal) (1st edition)

Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2014/59/EU as regards the prudential treatment of global systemically important institution groups with a multiple point of entry resolution strategy and a methodology for the indirect subscription of instruments eligible for meeting the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Policy (ECON)COM(2021)0665
27.10.2021Rapporteur:Jonás Fernández (S&D, Spain)2021/0343(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria)
Linea Søgaard Lidell (Renew, Denmark) Ernest Urtasun (Greens/EFA, Spain)
Marco Zanni (ID, Italy)
Raffaele Fitto (ECR, Italy)
Martin Schirdewan (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Procedure completed. Regulation (EU) 2022/2036
OJ L 275/1, 25.10.2022, pp. 1–10

Written by Velina Lilyanova.

The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is the main element of the EU’s innovative financing instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU), established with the aim to drive the EU’s post-pandemic economic recovery towards a resilient future. The RRF is a performance-based instrument from which Member States can receive funds once they have met prior commitments (milestones and targets). The funds help the Member States make the reforms and investments they have envisaged under their dedicated national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs).

Digital transformation is one of the six policy areas around which the RRF is built. Given its high priority for the EU, each national plan has to allocate at least 20 % of its resources to digital targets. The funds are meant to complement financing from the EU budget and national budgets and help achieve the EU’s digital objectives by 2030. This briefing focuses on the digital measures that address one of the four cross-cutting strategic EU priorities: the digitalisation of public services (the other three being digital skills, digital infrastructure and digital transformation of businesses).

All NRRPs acknowledge that the digital transformation of government is key to the success of the single market and the most efficient way to provide faster, cheaper and better services. Therefore, they include measures on digital public services – worth roughly €46.5 billion in total (excluding the Netherlands and Hungary) – tailored to each country’s context. The COVID-19 crisis highlighted the importance of digitalising public services, but the goal here extends far beyond this crisis. It involves creating a modern, transparent and efficient public administration that applies less costly and time-consuming administrative processes and provides a supportive environment for businesses in the long run. According to the Commission, the relevant measures in the NRRPs can make a lasting impact on the Member States’ economies and societies through the structural changes they would bring to their administrations, institutions and policies.

The measures in the plans are aligned with the EU’s digital commitments under the eGovernment action plan, the 2017 Tallinn Declaration on eGovernment and the Berlin Declaration on Digital Society and Value-based Digital Government, and with the European flagship ‘Modernise’ (digitalisation of the public administration), which is included in the 2021 annual sustainable growth strategy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital public services in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Karin Smit Jacobs with Jonas Winkel.

Ukraine, an EU candidate country and one of the world’s largest producers of grains and oilseeds, is heavily dependent on maritime transport and its maritime ports for the export of those products. Due to Russia’s war on Ukraine, exports have been blocked and food prices have risen worldwide. Prior to the war, more than 90 % of these products, around 6 million tonnes, were exported via the Black Sea. Through the Black Sea Grain (BSG) Initiative and the EU Solidarity Lanes, these goods are being exported again, thereby improving maritime connectivity and logistics.

Background

The blockade of Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea has had a major impact on food security worldwide. Russia and Ukraine exported about 34 % of the world’s wheat before the war, and 95 % of that was shipped by sea. Maritime transport almost came to a standstill from February until August 2022, causing food prices to rise globally and making it impossible to ensure security of supply in many countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. To relieve the strained food market, Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine and the UN launched the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSG) on 22 July 2022, involving, inter alia,the International Maritime Organization (IMO) regarding maritime safety and security and ship inspections. The IMO can also undertake search and rescue operations in armed conflicts, as well as evacuations of stranded ships and seafarers.

The BSG Initiative allows exports from several Black Sea ports, including Odesa (see map below). The implementation of this Initiative is facilitated by the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul, which guides cargo ships from the Black Sea ports into international waters, avoiding mined areas, through a safe maritime corridor. Since the Initiative was signed, the total tonnage of grain and other foodstuffs exported from Ukrainian ports is over 11 million tonnes, through a total of 941 voyages (470 inbound and 471 outbound), as of 17 November 2022. A quarter of these shipments are going to lower income countries.

The BSG Initiative was initially agreed for 120 days, until 19 November 2022, with an option for extension. However, the Russian government suspended the Initiative, claiming that Ukraine had attacked the port of Sevastopol in late October 2022. With Türkiye’s mediation, President Vladimir Putin agreed to resume the agreement on 2 November 2022, but reserved the right to end it at any time. Russia subsequently agreed, on 17 November, to an extension of the Initiative for another 120 days. The Initiative, combined with the existing EU Solidarity Lanes, has already made it possible to export more than 25 million tonnes of grain.

EU action

The European Union condemned Russia’s suspension of the BSG Initiative and urged Russia to reverse its decision immediately. Meanwhile, the G20 urged the extension of the BSG agreement as well. Following EU action and the latest sanctions packages in relation to maritime transport, EU ports are, at this moment, closed to Russian vessels. There is also a prohibition in place on exports to Russia of goods and technologies, including maritime ones. These sanctions have been welcomed by the European Parliament and are in place until 31 January 2023. They could be extended by the EU, depending on developments in the war.

The EU Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) is continuing flights over the Black Sea to enhance maritime surveillance, for which they have made use of drones and satellites. In addition, Russia remains suspended from the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Port State Control. On 10 November 2022, the European Parliament questioned the Commission on the role of Türkiye regarding Cypriot-flagged vessels or vessels operated by Cyprus, or another EU Member State, that are being prevented by Türkiye from engaging in the transport of grain and other goods under the BSG Initiative. In its plenary session of November 2022, during question time with the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Parliament addressed the issue of the BSG Initiative in relation to third countries, including maritime aspects; it underlined that both the Initiative and the Solidarity Lanes are essential for food security worldwide.

Maritime shipping facts and figures – BSG Initiative
– The first shipment departed on 3 August 2022 with 26 000 tonnes of Ukrainian food to Lebanon.
– Since August 2022, the JCC has enabled the safe movement of 122 voyages to Ukraine (up to mid-September 2022).
– In total, over 11 million tonnes of cargo has been shipped (up to 16 November 2022).Source: CCAMLR website.

In addition to the BSG Initiative, the EU remains committed to the continuation of the Solidarity Lanes, comprising not only land corridors, but also transport by water. To develop the necessary infrastructure, the Commission announced, on 11 November 2022, the provision of €1 billion extra for Solidarity Lanes, to fight the global food crisis. The Commission made available €250 million in grants to boost the Solidarity Lanes in the short term and achieve quick improvements, using, in particular, mobile equipment to reduce waiting times and improve movement through border crossing points and their access routes.

For the medium term, the TEN-T Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) has mobilised €50 million to support infrastructure projects, and the latest CEF call covers the Solidarity Lanes. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is now, besides other support, investing up to €300 million in projects that respond to the Solidarity Lanes, until the end of 2023. The TEN-T revision aims for broader connectivity and the extension of European transport corridors, including with Ukraine and Moldova. The River Danube, which is connected to the Black Sea and the Black Sea Canal, has the potential to be used for the export and import of goods between Ukraine and Europe. However, current non-interoperability affects not only complementarity between transport modes, but also access to (maritime) ports.

Outlook

The Black Sea Deal remains fragile, as it depends on Russia, and when Odesa is under attack this causes loading problems for ships. In this light, further investment in infrastructure and the Solidarity Lanes, including investment in maritime connectivity and logistics, would be necessary. Support from the EU and its Member States, the UN and other parties is continuing in order to enhance and safeguard connectivity for the transport of important goods from and to Ukraine. Belgium, along with other countries, recently made an (additional) pledge, through a joint bilateral statement, for grain shipments from Ukrainian ports to be open to more countries. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated that some 60 ships would be carrying grain from Ukrainian ports to countries in the Global South by mid-2023, and the EU and around 20 countries have agreed to this Grain from Ukraine scheme.

However, prospects regarding the export of goods and related transport shipping prices, including bunker fuel prices, remain uncertain. Grain prices and shipping costs have been on the rise since 2020 and the war on Ukraine has exacerbated this global trend. The UN claimed that, between February and May 2022, the price for the transport of dry bulk goods increased by nearly 60 %. The current global surge in costs, due to the war, shows that both crude oil prices and shipping prices have increased by 4 % compared to January 2022. The current EU price cap on Russian oil creates insurance problems and transport congestion for oil tankers sailing from the Black Sea via the Bosporus to the Mediterranean.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine – Maritime logistics and connectivity: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the December 2022 plenary session was the ceremony awarding the 2022 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to the brave people of Ukraine. Also, in a ‘This is Europe’ debate, the Prime Minister of Slovenia, Robert Golob, addressed the plenary.

With Council and European Commission representatives, Members debated the preparation of the European Council meeting of 15 December 2022. A number of debates also took place: on the outcome of COP27; addressing persistent challenges in the aviation sector; and turning the Child Guarantee into reality. Debates also took place on the recent Council decision on Schengen accession; the EU response to the US Inflation Reduction Act; and defending the European Union against the abuse of national vetoes. The Commission’s reports on the situation of journalists and the implications of the rule of law; the 30th anniversary of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; recognising the Holodomor as genocide; and the humanitarian situation in Ukraine were also debated. Members also discussed foreign affairs issues, such as prospects for a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine; Turkish airstrikes on northern Syria and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq; and EU-ASEAN relations.

In the wake of allegations of corruption in and around the Parliament, Members held a debate with the Commission on the need for transparency and accountability in the European institutions and adopted a resolution on the issue. The also voted for the early termination of the mandate of the vice-president arrested and charged in recent days.

2022 Sakharov Prize for the brave people of Ukraine

Supporting people’s basic rights and democratic values, both in the EU and the wider world, is one of Parliament’s top priorities. Parliament has awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought for outstanding achievements in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms every year since 1988. Having taken a courageous stand for freedom and democracy in the face of great hardship since the Russian invasion, the 2022 award goes to the brave people of Ukraine. President Roberta Metsola presented the Sakharov Prize in a ceremony during a formal sitting.

REPowerEU

Members considered and adopted a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) report on the European Commission’s proposal to amend EU energy legislation under the REPowerEU plan. The ITRE committee proposes to reduce the time taken to approve new renewable energy installations and upgrade existing ones. The adopted report sets Parliament’s position for forthcoming interinstitutional negotiations.

Upscaling the 2021-2027 MFF

The war in Ukraine and its consequences are having a considerable impact on the EU’s finances. The MFF was not designed to cope with emergencies with huge financial implications, such as COVID‑19 and Russia’s invasion of its neighbour. Members debated and voted on a Committee on Budgets own-initiative report calling for an urgent revision of the MFF to increase the EU budget and make it more flexible. The committee calls for the Commission to propose an upscaled 2021-2027 MFF to provide a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges – with a bigger and more flexible budget, fresh revenue streams, action on preserving the budget from fluctuations in debt repayment for the EU recovery instrument, and greater scrutiny and transparency.

A long term vision for the EU’s rural areas

Over 80 % of total EU territory is rural, supplying much of the EU’s natural resources in terms of biodiversity, agriculture and more. Those living in many rural EU areas face challenges ranging from finding employment to connecting to the internet. To remedy this, the Commission has drawn up a long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas to encourage their resilience in the face of an ageing population, poor connectivity, and lack of opportunity. Members debated and voted an own-initiative report on the proposals from Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI). The report underlines the key role of rural areas in the EU, and the need for action to support the needs of their populations, underpinned by dedicated funding.

Towards equal rights for persons with disabilities

Continued discrimination and a failure to ensure equal rights for persons with disabilities to participate in social and political life are compounded by a lack of suitable accommodation, among other things. Members debated and voted on a Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) own-initiative report on progress towards implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the EU. While the report recognises the efforts made to meet the standards set out in the Convention, the committee decries a number of serious failings, particularly the use of EU funding to construct institutions, despite an EU target to end the practice of placing persons with disabilities in care.

Cultural policy in EU and external relations

Parliament debated and voted a Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) own-initiative report on the implementation of the new European agenda for culture and the EU strategy for international cultural relations. The first strategy sets social and economic objectives for EU cultural policy (for the post-pandemic recovery, employment) and touches on opportunities also identified in the second, for cooperation with non-EU countries on the role of cultural diversity and heritage in sustainable socio-economic development and driving peace. The CULT committee recommends, among other things, paying stricter attention to employment conditions for creative workers and easier access to funding for small entities. Looking to cultural relations outside the EU, the report regrets the lack of focus on sustainable development and warns against perceptions of cultural diplomacy as ‘Eurocentric’.

Question time: Protecting strategic infrastructure against China’s influence

Margrethe Vestager, Executive Vice-President of the Commission, attended the plenary to provide answers to Members’ questions on protecting EU strategic infrastructure from China’s influence during the regular question time session.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, a mandate for negotiations from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justices and Freedom (LIBE) on the proposal for a regulation on the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – December 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Polona Car and Stefano De Luca (1st edition).

New technologies come with new risks, and the impact of cyber-attacks through digital products has increased dramatically in recent years. Increasingly, consumers have fallen victim to security flaws linked to digital products such as baby monitors, robo-vacuum cleaners, Wi-Fi routers and alarm systems. For businesses, the importance of ensuring that digital products in the supply chain are secure has become pivotal, considering three in five vendors have already lost money owing to product security gaps.

The European Commission’s proposal for a regulation, the ‘cyber-resilience act’ therefore aims to impose cybersecurity obligations on all products with digital elements whose intended and foreseeable use includes direct or indirect data connection to a device or network. The proposal introduces cybersecurity by design and by default principles and imposes a duty of care for the life cycle of products.

In Parliament, the file has been provisionally assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE).

Versions

• December 2022: EU cyber-resilience act (1st edition)

Horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements Committee responsible:Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2022)454
15.9.2022Rapporteur:Nicola Danti (Renew, Italy)2022/0272(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Henna Virkunen (EPP, Finland)
Beatrice Covassi (S&D, Italy)
Ignazio Corrao (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, CzechiaOrdinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Anita Orav.

Each year, 18 December is observed as International Migrants’ Day. So designated by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2000, in response to increasing migration around the world, the day aims to draw attention to the human rights of migrants and highlight their contribution to our societies.

Context

Migration and mobility are and will continue to be regular human phenomena, both globally and in the EU. On 1 January 2021, 23.7 million nationals from non-EU countries were residing in the EU, representing 5.3 % of the total population. Most migrants, approximately 2.25 million to 3 million per year, arrive in the EU using legal channels. However, wars and upheaval in neighbouring countries also trigger displacement of people and increased irregular arrivals of migrants in the EU, such as witnessed in 2015-2016, and in 2022 as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Migration management in the EU

The EU and its Member States have shared competence in migration policy. In recent years, the priority accorded to migration has been reflected in the EU budget, with €22.7 billion allocated to migration and security over the 2021-2027 period. Acknowledging that the EU has to move away from ad hoc solutions and put in place a predictable and reliable migration management system, the European Commission put forward a new pact on migration and asylum offering a comprehensive approach aimed at strengthening and integrating key EU policies on migration, asylum and border management. In addition, to enhance legal migration into the EU, the Commission proposed a new skills and talent package, which is intended to attract and retain highly skilled third-country nationals in the EU.

Ukrainians under the Temporary Protection Directive

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, over 7.8 million people have already been forced to seek refuge, mostly in neighbouring countries. In response, the European Union swiftly decided to grant EU-wide temporary protection to people arriving from Ukraine, and 4.8 million people have registered under this mechanism or similar national protection schemes. It is an emergency mechanism that can be used in case of mass arrivals of people, waiving the need for the examination of individual applications and allowing Ukrainian nationals to enjoy harmonised rights across the EU for up to two years. These rights include access to a residence permit, education, medical care, housing, the labour market and social welfare assistance. In October 2022, the EU also launched a pilot EU talent pool – an online job search tool to facilitate access to the labour market for new arrivals from Ukraine. The platform brings together jobseekers and EU employers, national public employment services and private employment agencies.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has advocated a humane, solidarity-based and common approach to migration in its various resolutions and reports. In its resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, the Parliament emphasised the need to develop safe and lawful routes for asylum-seekers and refugees into the EU. Furthermore, taking into consideration that total labour supply in the euro area is projected to fall by 13 % (20 million people) between 2019 and 2070, the Parliament has encouraged the development of adequate legal economic migration channels, most recently in its resolution of 25 November 2021. The Parliament is currently working on the Commission’s proposals to update the EU legal migration acquis, with draft reports being debated in the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in December 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘International Migrants’ Day – 18 December 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marc Jütten.

On 15 and 16 November 2022, the Group of Twenty (G20) held the 17th annual summit of its leaders in Bali, Indonesia. This was the first G20 summit since Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine and the first fully fledged physical leaders’ meeting since the COVID-19 pandemic began.

While Russian President Vladimir Putin did not attend the summit and was represented by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy participated by video-conference as a guest.

Condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, expressed in the Leaders’ Declaration, dominated the summit, taking place at a time of geopolitical tension, economic slowdown and rising food and energy prices.

The final communiqué also contains a series of economic measures and political commitments relating to the global health architecture, the sustainable energy transition, and the digital transformation – the three priorities of the Indonesian G20 presidency.

On the margins of the G20 summit, a series of meetings took place, notably that between United States (US) President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the meeting of the leaders of the G7/NATO member countries.

Another take-away of this year’s summit was that the role of the emerging countries from the Global South is growing. They were decisive in overcoming differences between the major geopolitical players. The Bali Summit was the first in a row of Global South G20 presidencies. The next G20 presidencies will be held by members of the BRICS Group: India in 2023, Brazil in 2024, and then South Africa in 2025. The EU has ‘strategic partnerships’ with all three of them.

This briefing draws on a previous one, published ahead of the 2022 G20 summit, by Angelos Delivorias.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the 2022 G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Giulio Sabbati and Alex Wilson.

This infographic aims to provide an overview of some of the most important energy indicators. It is purely for information purposes and subject to change. Figures on page one are based on market data (gas and oil prices) or data supplied by market actors (LNG capacity and gas storage rates). Figures on page 2 are based on the latest publicly available Eurostat data. Mostly, these data are available retrospectively, usually on an annualised basis, and therefore do not always reflect the latest state-of-play following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Read this infographic on ‘Monitoring the energy situation in the EU: December 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafał Mańko (1st edition).

On 1 December 2021, the European Commission tabled a proposal for a horizontal regulation on digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice, intended to apply to both civil and criminal proceedings of a cross-border nature within the EU. It would supplement horizontally, rather than replace, existing rules on the digital delivery of documents, digital hearings and other uses of information technology (IT) for cross-border judicial cooperation. In principle, Member States’ competent judicial or other authorities would be under a duty to use digital channels of communication, whereas for individuals, the use of such channels would be optional.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) and the Committee on Civil Liberty, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) are dealing jointly (Rule 58) with the proposal. On 14 October 2022, the co-rapporteurs presented their draft report. In the Council, the proposal has been examined by the e-Justice working party.

On 30 June 2022, the Council Presidency summarised the working party’s preliminary findings in a document circulated to Member States’ delegations, with view to continuing work at the political level.

Versions

• December 2022: Digitalising cross-border judicial cooperation (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation Committees responsible:Legal Affairs (JURI) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2021) 759
1.12.2021Co-rapporteurs:Emil Radev (EPP, Bulgaria) and Marina Kaljurand (S&D, Estonia)2021/0394(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:For LIBE: Nuno Melo, Maria-Manuel Leitão‑Marques, Fabienne Keller, Yana Toom, Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield, Patryk Jaki, Kosma Złotowski, Clare Daly, Emmanuel MaurelOrdinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Adoption of joint committee report

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine and its entire population has generated a historic outflow of people, largely women and children, fleeing the hostilities. About five million refugees from Ukraine have been recorded across the EU and other countries, triggering a refugee and humanitarian crisis at a scale unseen in Europe since World War II. A recent study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development suggests that EU policies focus on giving refugees quick access to support for integration and further building their skills without hampering a possible return to Ukraine once the situation allows.

The EU is debating an overhaul of its migration rules to make them fairer for Member States that receive high number of migrants due to their geographical location. The number of refugees using the Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes to seek to enter the EU has also been on the rise.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on migration in Europe and on debates on how to reform its rules.

Population displacements in the Ukraine War: The challenge of first humanitarian assistance
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Studies, December 2022

La mobilisation citoyenne et l’hébergement des personnes exilées: Vers un nouveau modèle d’accueil?
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2022

Russia hopes a winter wave of Ukrainian refugees will divide Europe
Atlantic Council, November 2022

Is migration Europe’s Achilles heel?
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Anti-migration cooperation between Vienna, Budapest and Belgrade
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2022

Europe’s migration problems are back
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

Gender, displacement, and climate change
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

Protecting Eden, or the dark new geopolitics of ‘Fortress Europe’
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

Re-thinking approaches to labour migration: Potentials and gaps in four EU member states’ migration infrastructures
European Centre for Development Policy Management, November 2022

Disinformation on refugees from Ukraine: Boosting Europe’s resilience after Russia’s invasion
European Policy Centre, November 2022

Automating decision-making in migration policy: A navigation guide
German Marshall Fund, November 2022

Conditioning or cutting aid is not effective against irregular migration
German Marshall Fund, November 2022

Financing responses to climate migration: The unique role of multilateral development banks
Migration Policy Institute, November 2022

Reassessing recruitment costs in a changing world of labor migration
Migration Policy Institute, November 2022

Migration Update November 2022
Wilfried Martens Centre, November 2022

Central Europe facing a new wave of migration from the Balkans
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Enabling migration as adaptation
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, October 2022

Attracting and retaining talents in the EU: What role can the EU play in ensuring a sustainable and competitive ecosystem for labour migration?
Egmont, October 2022

Keeping a cool head: How to improve the EU migration crisis response
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Refugee protection in the EU: Building resilience to geopolitical conflict
European Policy Centre, October 2022

More connected, less protected? How the EU interoperability framework will affect the European migration space
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

Promoting evidence-informed immigrant integration policymaking
Migration Policy Institute, October 2022

Rebooting the asylum system? The role of digital tools in international protection
Migration Policy Institute, October 2022

Spain’s decentralized immigration system allows local integration policies to lead the way
Migration Policy Institute, October 2022

Amidst refugee flows, irregular migration, and authoritarianism: The politics of citizenship in Turkey
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2022

The economic impact of a more efficient US-Mexico border: How reducing wait times at land ports of entry would promote commerce, resilience, and job creation
Atlantic Council, September 2022

The ‘instrumentalisation’ of migration
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, September 2022

Long-term protection in Europe needed for Ukrainian refugees
Clingendael, September 2022

Italy’s far-right and the migration debate: Implications for Europe
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Ukrainian refugees at the border: The first experience of communication
Razumkov Centre, September 2022

Migration restrictions in the West: Some ethical concerns
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Studies, August 2022

Explaining immigration restrictions using a sequential path dependency model
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Studies, August 2022

Developments along the route: The role of transit countries in shaping mixed-migration flows to Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

How EU asylum policy created a refugee prison in paradise
Chatham House, July 2022

Atypical work and the social protection of migrants in Europe
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, July 2022

The missing link: Connecting eligible asylees and asylum seekers with benefits and services
Migration Policy Institute, July 2022

Neue Entwicklungen in der Governance globaler Migration: Nachlese zum ersten International Migration Review Forum
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Latest on migration‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzanna Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

The last regular European Council meeting of 2022 is scheduled to take place on 15 December, and to deal with the main topics of this year: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, security and defence, energy and the economy. On Russia’s war on Ukraine, EU leaders are likely to reiterate their commitment to political and military support to Ukraine. Energy and the economy are purposely due to be dealt with together, to contain the discussion and to avoid a debate on setting up additional EU funding mechanisms. Moreover, EU leaders are set to hold a strategic discussion on relations with the Southern Neighbourhood, and review the outcome of the recent Western Balkans Summit. Both points are likely to include numerous migration related aspects, as the numbers of illegal border crossings into the European Union have again been rising significantly in the second half of 2022. Additionally, EU leaders will address transatlantic relations in light of rising concerns regarding the new United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA),

The anticipated possible addition of the rule of law conditionality mechanism to the official agenda seems to have been avoided at the last moment, with a deal struck between the Member States on 12 December. The government of Viktor Orbán agreed to unblock the various files it has been blocking in the Council, in particular the adoption of €18 billion in EU aid for Ukraine, in the context of changes agreed to the Commission’s proposal to freeze the EU funds to Hungary.  

1. European Council agenda

According to the Leaders’ Agenda 2022, the European Council meeting was scheduled to last two days (15‑16 December), with a Euro Summit following on the second day. However, the European Council is, in the end, scheduled to last only one day and, for the second time in 2022, the Euro Summit meeting has been cancelled. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG, or Fiscal Compact Treaty) stipulates that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area must meet informally at least twice a year, and requires the Euro Summit President to present a report to the European Parliament after each meeting. Neither of these requirements has however been fulfilled on a regular basis in recent years, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Number of Euro Summit meetings and subsequent reports to Parliament

As this meeting represents the last entry in the soon-to-expire Leaders’ Agenda 2022, the European Council President, Charles Michel, may possibly present a new document covering European Council meetings and topics for (part of) 2023.

2. European Council meeting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders are set to discuss the situation in Ukraine for the eighth time since the outbreak of the war in February 2022. They will likely again express their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within the internationally recognised borders and condemn the war. The EU’s political, humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine will again be at the centre of the debate. As unity remains key, EU leaders are likely to reiterate their commitment to political as well as military support to Ukraine. It has also become a tradition that the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addresses EU leaders by videoconference when Ukraine is on the agenda.

Since the outbreak of the war, the EU has provided €523 million in humanitarian aid for Ukraine and neighbouring Moldova; an additional €443 million was provided as in-kind assistance through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, enabling a response to the growing needs for access to basic services and utilities, medical needs and food supplies. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 4.8 million refugees from Ukraine are now in the EU, whilst 6.5 million people are believed to be internally displaced inside Ukraine. In addition to humanitarian aid, the EU has pledged €9 billion in macro-financial assistance to Ukraine in 2022. For 2023, however, the European Commission has proposed a more sustainable and predictable financial support solution entailing the disbursement of €18 billion in monthly tranches of €1.5 billion aimed at helping Ukraine ‘maintain essential public services’. On 10 December, agreement was reached in Council on a structural solution to provide this short-term relief, which has been submitted to the European Parliament for a vote this week.

With respect to military support, the EU has pledged €3.1 billion in military assistance through its off-EU budget European Peace Facility (EPF), funded by Member States .The pledged amount exceeds half of the entire EPF envelope (€5.7 billion by 2027). On 12 December 2022, the Foreign Affairs Council agreed politically to increase the EPF envelope by €2 billion (2018 prices), confirming the possibility of ‘a further increase at a later stage’; a decision EU leaders will most probably endorse during the European Council meeting.

Member States individually, and in consultation with allies in NATO and around the world, will also likely continue to offer bilateral military assistance to Ukraine in the form of funding and equipment. The most pressing issue remains to further reinforce Ukraine’s air-defence capacities, which have recently been strengthened with IRIS T, NASAMS and Aspide air defence systems. Another, rapidly growing, challenge is demining. This might prove a medium to long-term challenge, which will have an impact on return and reconstruction as well as on food security in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Food security has been a constant subject of concern on the European Council’s agenda since the outbreak of the war. EU leaders are likely to revert to the topic and again highlight the importance of the UN Black Sea Grain Initiative and of the EU solidarity lanes, which enable exports of agricultural products and fertilisers to countries most in need.

EU leaders have consistently condemned Russia’s continuous attacks against Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, including the multiplication of attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure. Russia is using energy as a weapon against the most vulnerable; EU leaders are therefore likely to reaffirm the Union’s determination to support Ukraine in its resilience-building efforts, including the rebuilding of damaged energy infrastructure. The EU has already pledged €25.5 million ‘to cover the immediate needs of the energy sector’. The safety of the civilian nuclear facilities in Ukraine is a matter of continuous concern to the international community, and EU leaders are likely to reiterate their call on Russia to refrain from endangering their functioning.

EU leaders are scheduled to return to the discussion of accountability for war crimes as well as Ukraine’s reconstruction, two topics they last addressed in October 2022, when they invited the European Commission to present possible options for a way ahead. On 30 November 2022, the European Commission presented different options ‘to make sure that Russia is held accountable for the atrocities and crimes committed during the war in Ukraine’.

As regards war crimes accountability, the proposals include the creation of ‘a special independent international tribunal’ or of a ‘specialised court’, each requiring United Nations support. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed that ‘Russia must pay for its horrific crimes, including for its crime of aggression against a sovereign state’, and that the EU is working to secure the broadest international support for the creation of a ‘specialised court’.

With respect to Ukraine’s reconstruction, the proposals include the creation of a dedicated structure ‘to manage the frozen (Russian) public funds, invest them and use the proceeds in favour of Ukraine’. As part of a peace settlement once the war has ended, such frozen Russian assets could be regarded as war reparations to Ukraine. In this context, she mentioned that material war damage is estimated at €600 billion, whilst the EU and its G7 partners have frozen €300 billion of Russian Central Bank assets, and EU Member States have also frozen €19 billion of assets belonging to Russian oligarchs. In a recent resolution, the European Parliament recognised Russia to be ‘a state sponsor of terrorism’ and called for full accountability for war crimes committed in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Eight new packages of sanctions have been put in place progressively since the start of the war, whilst an additional package targeting Russia’s drone sector is under discussion. EU leaders might explore ways to further increase pressure on Russia, including by reaffirming the importance of implementing sanctions jointly with like-minded partners. They could also welcome the recent agreement on an international oil price cap, set at US$60 per barrel on Russian seaborne crude oil.

Energy and economy

As in October 2022, energy is likely to be central to the debate. EU leaders will probably assess progress made in implementing their previous conclusions, which centred on: 1) energy demand reduction; 2) security of supply; and 3) lower prices. They could also start preparing for next year, focusing on joint purchasing, replenishing winter stocks, infrastructure building and support for renewables, as well as on the phasing-out Russian energy from the EU energy mix.

Security of supply as well as the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on a temporary gas market correction mechanism – ‘to protect EU businesses and households from episodes of excessively high gas prices in the EU’ – are scheduled for discussion at ministerial level prior to the European Council. If no agreement is reached in the Council, the correction mechanism could come to the heart of the debate. Reform of the electricity market is another sensitive item, regularly debated in the past year, for which the Commission will present an impact assessment. A reformed electricity market would only serve a sovereign and climate neutral energy union.

The debate on the economy will likely once again be intertwined with that on energy, focusing on high energy prices. Considering the forecast contraction of the EU economy in the first half of 2023, EU leaders are likely to consider single market competitiveness, building economic resilience, particularly in the industrial domain, and enhanced coordination.

Security and defence

A year ago, the European Council President, Charles Michel, declared that ‘2022 will be the year of European defence’. The outbreak of the war in Ukraine has placed security and defence at the centre of the EU’s agenda, with the subject discussed by the European Council for the fourth time this year.

EU leaders are expected to reaffirm the Union’s commitment to strengthen defence cooperation as well as its capacity to act autonomously. They are likely to take stock of progress made in implementing the Versailles agenda and the Strategic Compass, a document setting out the vision for the Union, which the European Council endorsed in March 2022. EU leaders are likely to focus on EU-NATO cooperation, a point which has featured most frequently in their conclusions when discussing defence. They could also consider progress made in bolstering the joint procurement of capabilities, cyber-defence, the implementation of military mobility, the flagship PESCO project, and the further development of the EU’s crisis management capacity.

Several defence files, aimed at bolstering joint procurement, are likely to attract EU leaders’ attention. This is the case with the proposed European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act, which is currently being considered in committee in Parliament, whilst the Council has recently agreed on its general approach on the proposal. It is also the case for the European defence investment programme, which the European Commission is still to present following a request from the European Council.

Southern Neighbourhood

EU leaders will discuss the Southern Neighbourhood, a topic last addressed in December 2021, when they called to accelerate work on the New Agenda for the Mediterranean. They could revert again to the subject in autumn 2023, as the forthcoming Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU has indicated that the Southern Neighbourhood will be one of its presidency pillars.

External relations Transatlantic relations

The European Council may hold a strategic discussion on EU-US relations at a time when transatlantic unity is key. EU leaders could review the outcome of bilateral high-level contacts, such as the visit to the US by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. They could also take stock of the outcome of the recent EU-US Trade and Technology Council, whilst considering the bilateral trade relationship amid rising concerns regarding the US Inflation Reduction Act. 

Western Balkans

EU leaders are expected to address the Western Balkans and could endorse the expected General Affairs Council conclusions on enlargement of 13 December 2022, notably the recommendation to grant Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate country status as proposed by the European Commission.

They could also consider the outcome of the recent EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tirana, which focused on the consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine, on building resilience to foreign interference and on tackling terrorism, organised crime and migration, a phenomenon on the rise on the Western Balkans route in 2022. The Tirana Declaration, in many ways similar to the Brdo (2020), Zagreb (2020) and Sofia (2018) declarations, has reconfirmed the Western Balkans’ European perspective, called for the acceleration of the accession process, stressed the importance of good neighbourly relations and invited partners to align with the EU sanctions imposed on Russia.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting of 15 December 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marin Mileusnic.

The Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument and its centrepiece, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), are the largest-ever EU financing tools, created to mitigate the socio-economic fall-out of the pandemic. The facility is organised around six pillars representing policy areas of EU relevance that require strengthening in order to make the EU economies and societies robust and futureproof. The pillars define investment priorities and the scope of financing under the RRF. This briefing focuses on the ‘Policies for next generation’ pillar and in particular on the policy measures in education, training and skills, early childhood education and care that the Member States have laid out in their individual National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs).

These NRRPs are required to list reforms and investments the Member States commit to making in order to meet the RRF objectives. To receive RRF grants and loans, the Member States should have successfully completed the relevant milestones and targets that accompany the planned measures. That is, the facility is a performance-based instrument, as specified in the RRF Regulation. Even though it only plays a supporting role in education policy, the EU has made RRF funding available for actions in this policy area to address the structural shortcomings in the education sector – likely worsened by the COVID-19 crisis – across all Member States. Tackling these shortcomings efficiently can guarantee recovery and resilience, maintain alignment with the job market and ultimately safeguard the integrity of the single market.

The RRF is defined as a one-off instrument that would be discontinued after 2026, following the implementation of all the measures included in the NRRPs. While the main EU initiatives for education policy are defined in the long term and thus extend beyond the planned lifetime of the RRF, the facility is nevertheless capable of supporting large-scale investment and reforms with a medium- to long-term impact. The European Parliament welcomes the measures in the areas of education and training built into the NRRPs, and encourages the development of a European dimension in the Member States’ education policies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Education policy in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Common indicators for the ‘Policies for next generation’ pillar in 12 Member States NRRP components exclusively dedicated to education, skills and training (in million €, per EU country) Policies for next generation (expenditure as % of individual NRRP costs)

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

The Construction Products Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 305/2011, CPR) has applied fully since 1 July 2013. Its objective is to achieve the proper functioning of the internal market for construction products (such as sheets for waterproofing, thermal insulation foams, chimneys and wood-based panels produced for permanent incorporation in construction works), by means of harmonised rules for their marketing in the EU. The CPR, which provides a common technical language to assess the performance of construction products, enables Member States to define the legal requirements towards construction works. On 30 March 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal to revise the CPR; the proposal is part of a package with several other sectoral proposals aimed at making sustainable products the norm in the EU and boosting circular business models. The stated aims of the proposal are to improve the functioning of the internal market for construction products, address the implementation challenges that still exist at national level (particularly regarding market surveillance), simplify the legal framework and support the green and digital transition in the sector. In Parliament, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is responsible for the file; the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is associated (under Rule 57), with exclusive and shared competence. In particular, ENVI has exclusive competence regarding the new environmental obligations for manufacturers. The vote in IMCO is expected in March 2023.

Versions

• December 2022: Revision of the Construction Products Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and repealing Regulation (EU) 305/2011 Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2020) 144
30.3.2022Rapporteur:Christian Doleschal (EPP, Germany)2020/0094(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria Grapini (S&D, Romania)
Sandro Gozi (Renew, France)
Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France)
Alessandra Basso (ID, Italy)
Carlo Fidanza (ECR, Italy)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee

Written by Agnieszka Widuto, Jakub Przetacznik and Sidonia Mazur.

On 23 November 2022, the European Parliament partnered with Eurocities to launch the ‘Generators of Hope’ campaign in order to provide Ukraine with energy equipment for the winter. Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure temporarily left around 10 million Ukrainians without electricity, while temperatures have already dropped below zero. The campaign will facilitate city-to-city donations of power generators, transformers and other devices, sent with the logistical support of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

‘Generators of Hope’ initiative – How does it work?

The ‘Generators of Hope‘ campaign was launched on 23 November 2022 by Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament, and Dario Nardella, President of Eurocities and Mayor of Florence, a city twinned with the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv. Eurocities is a network of over 200 of the largest cities in 38 countries, with many of the organisation’s members already providing support to Ukraine. The campaign aims to facilitate city-to-city support in order to meet Ukraine’s energy needs in view of the targeted Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure. It calls on cities to donate energy equipment to Ukrainian cities, in order to keep essential services running and provide energy to ‘hospitals, schools, water supply facilities, relief centres, shelters, phone masts and more’, according to the campaign’s website. On 8 December 2022, the European Parliament announced a donation of a generator to Ukraine as part of the campaign.

Ukrainian authorities have provided a list of equipment needed to replace the damaged energy infrastructure. This includes ‘generators (from less than 10 kW to more than 300 kW), heating centres, transformers, autotransformers, current and voltage transformers, reactors, circuit breakers, disconnectors, surge arresters, batteries, as well as relay protection and emergency automatic products’. Generators and high-voltage electrical equipment, such as transformers, play an important role in providing back-up power supply in case of emergency and power outage.

Cities that wish to donate energy equipment can contact their national civil protection authorities, which will help arrange the logistical transport to one of the three hubs operating in Poland, Romania and Slovakia under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The equipment will then be transported to Ukraine, with the whole procedure expected to be completed within a few days. The 24/7 contact point is the Emergency Response Coordination Centre.

Situation in Ukraine

Russia’s war on Ukraine has now been going on for nine months and Ukrainian citizens have paid the highest price to defend the country’s independence. In recent months, the Ukrainian army has liberated significant areas of the country; in response, Russia has increased its attacks against civilian infrastructure. Around half of the country’s power capacity has been damaged and the network is constantly under repair; it is estimated that the attack on 16 November alone caused power shortages in 10 700 000 households, equal to half of the country. Russia continues to shell civilian infrastructure, including electricity grids, cutting people off from water, electricity and heating, health services and communication tools ahead of winter, during which daily temperatures may reach -20OC. Ukraine is opening over 4 000 points of invincibility that provide the civilian population with access to independent heating, energy for mobile devices and basic services in case of major disturbances caused by shelling.

The EU Commissioner for Crisis Management assessed back in mid-November that ‘the destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is reaching a critical point’, making the scaling up of ‘winterisation‘ assistance a main priority of EU humanitarian assistance. Several EU Member States are already preparing for a possible ‘new wave‘ of refugees.

Ukraine’s energy needs and interconnection with the EU grid

Around 53 % of households – especially in cities – are heated through district heating systems, with thermal energy being produced by combined heat and power plants (CHPs) and over 19 000 heat-only boilers (HOBs). In 2021, HOBs transported thermal energy by 1.9 million km of pipelines and distributed warmth to households through over 5 500 central heating points. They are also being targeted by Russian shelling, and require electricity to function. In 2021, 55 % of Ukraine’s energy was produced by its four nuclear power plants (NPP), while almost 24 % of its energy was produced by 12 thermal power plants. The biggest NPP in Europe – Zaporizhzhia (ZNPP), occupied since early March 2022 – used to account for around half of the Ukrainian NPPs’ production. The remaining NPPs together produce around the same amount of energy as ZNPP alone; all of them are being repeatedly switched off, due to Russian missile strikes. Ukraine’s urgent electricity grid synchronisation with the EU’s took place on 16 March 2022, thanks to which trade in electricity with Ukraine is possible and started at the end of June. Over the summer, it was Ukraine that exported its energy surplus to the EU.

Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure as a war crime

International humanitarian law (IHL) – many of the rules of which have been broken by Russia – and specifically the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, explicitly prohibits attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, but does not explicitly mention electrical infrastructure. The commentary specifies that the definition of indispensable objects can depend on local climatic conditions. Moreover, the 1977 Additional Protocol II prohibits attacks or threats for which the primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population. Research by Human Rights Watch assesses that, by repeatedly targeting critical energy infrastructure, and knowing its impact on the civilian population, ‘Russia appears to be seeking unlawfully to create terror among civilians’ and make life ‘untenable for as many Ukrainian civilians as possible’. The two protocols have been ratified by Russia and 170 other countries (but not the US), and are therefore binding on Russia.

European Union aid to Ukraine

The EU and Western allies are supporting the country with in-kind, financial, diplomatic and military assistance. While Ukraine has received considerable support from the EU and European financial institutions since 2014, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, relaunched on 24 February 2022, has triggered two-fold and unprecedented mobilisation of EU and Member States’ funds for humanitarian action and military support. Support from ‘Team Europe’ has steadily increased, to €19.7 billion in financial, humanitarian, emergency and budget support, with a further €3.1 billion in military assistance via the European Peace Facility, supplemented by bilateral military assistance. For 2023, the Commission has proposed to provide Ukraine with macrofinancial assistance of €18 billion in highly concessional loans to support essential state functions and public services, maintain macro-financial stability and repair critical infrastructure.

EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM) for Generators of Hope

The logistics of the Generators of Hope initiative are expected to be financed through the EUCPM. The EUCPM facilitates cooperation between the EU, the EU Member States and eight other participating states in the field of civil protection to improve the emergency response to natural and man-made disasters. Based on lessons learnt from managing the coronavirus crisis, the EUCPM was strengthened in organisational and budgetary terms in 2021. The EUCPM has already been activated for Ukraine, becoming the EUCPM’s largest-ever operation. All 27 EU countries, plus Norway, Turkey, North Macedonia and Iceland, have offered medical supplies, shelter items, vehicles and energy equipment, including generators. The items are being delivered to Ukraine directly or through logistical hubs established in Poland, Romania and Slovakia. As of 16 November, almost 74 000 tonnes of aid had been delivered. In addition, the EU coordinates medical evacuations of Ukrainian patients to EU hospitals and supports Ukrainian refugees across Europe.

On 23 November, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which states that the destruction of civilian infrastructure, together with the deliberate attacks and atrocities against the civilian population ‘amount to acts of terror against the Ukrainian population and constitute war crimes’. Based on this, the Parliament recognises Russia as both a state sponsor of terrorism and a state which uses means of terrorism.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Generators of Hope: Delivering energy equipment to Ukraine for the winter ahead‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

Members return to Strasbourg for the final plenary session of 2022, with much of the agenda still reflecting issues we flagged up back in January in our analysis of the ‘ten issues to watch‘ this year – the green and digital transitions, energy supply security, defence and human rights. A ‘This is Europe’ debate is planned with the Prime Minister of Slovenia, Robert Golob, on Tuesday. The outcome of the recent COP27 climate change conference will be debated on Monday afternoon. European Commission representatives will give statements on relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union response to the United States Inflation Reduction Act, the Commission’s reports on the situation of journalists, and various human rights issues.

Supporting people’s basic rights and democratic values, both in the EU and the wider world, is one of Parliament’s top priorities. Parliament has awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought for outstanding achievements in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms since 1988. Laureates Nelson Mandela, Malala Yousafzai, Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad subsequently won the Nobel Peace Prize. Having taken a courageous stand for freedom and democracy in the face of great hardship since the Russian invasion, the 2022 award goes to the brave people of Ukraine. President Roberta Metsola is due to present the Sakharov Prize in a ceremony in a formal plenary sitting on Wednesday.

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The war in Ukraine and its consequences are also having a considerable impact on the EU’s finances, with the multiannual financial framework (MFF) under extreme strain. The MFF was not designed to cope with emergencies with huge financial implications, such as COVID‑19 and Russia’s invasion of its neighbour. Members are therefore expected to debate a Committee on Budgets own-initiative report on Wednesday, calling for an urgent revision of the MFF to increase the EU budget and make it more flexible. The committee calls for the Commission to propose an upscaled 2021-2027 MFF to provide a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges – with a bigger and more flexible budget, fresh revenue streams, action on preserving the budget from fluctuations in debt repayment for the EU recovery instrument and greater scrutiny and transparency.

The consequences of Russia’s attack on Ukraine are also scheduled for debate on Tuesday, when Members are due to consider a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) report on the European Commission’s proposal to amend EU energy legislation under the REPowerEU plan. The ITRE committee implicitly endorses the higher renewable and energy efficiency targets proposed, and goes further, calling for a reduction in the delays in approving renewable energy installations. The vote on the file should set Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations.

The war in Ukraine and the COVID‑19 pandemic have also affected international relations worldwide. One such area is relations with China, which are undoubtedly set to change, posing questions as to the EU’s priorities in trade, particularly in sensitive areas such as telecoms. Members are set to hear the Commission’s answers on the protection of strategic infrastructure from China’s influence during the question time session scheduled for Tuesday.

However, access to strategic infrastructure is not uniform for EU citizens themselves. Over 80 % of total EU territory is rural, supplying much of the EU’s natural resources in terms of biodiversity, agriculture and more. Those living in many rural EU areas face challenges ranging from finding employment to connecting to the internet. To remedy the situation, the European Commission has drawn up a long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas to encourage their resilience in the face of an ageing population, poor connectivity, and lack of opportunity. Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) has responded with an own-initiative report, due for debate in plenary on Monday. The report underlines the key role of rural areas in the EU, and the need for action to support the needs of their populations, underpinned by dedicated funding.

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Continued discrimination and a failure to ensure equal rights for persons with disabilities to participate in social and political life are compounded by a lack of suitable accommodation, among other things. On Monday, Parliament is scheduled to debate a Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) own-initiative report on progress towards implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the EU. While the report recognises the efforts made to meet the standards described in the Convention, the committee decries a number of serious failings, particularly the use of EU funding to construct institutions, despite an EU target to end the practice of placing persons with disabilities in care.

Finally, on Tuesday, Parliament is set to debate a Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) own-initiative report on the implementation of the new European agenda for culture and the EU strategy for international cultural relations. The first strategy sets social and economic objectives for EU cultural policy (for the post-pandemic recovery, employment) and touches on opportunities also identified in the second, for cooperation with non-EU countries on the role of cultural diversity and heritage in sustainable socio-economic development and driving peace. The CULT committee recommends, among other things, paying stricter attention to employment conditions for creative workers, easier access to funding for small entities, better synergies with programmes like Erasmus+, Horizon Europe and the New European Bauhaus initiative, and emphasises freedom of artistic expression as an indicator of respect for the rule of law. Looking to cultural relations outside the EU, the report regrets the lack of focus on sustainable development and warns against perceptions of cultural diplomacy as ‘Eurocentric’.

The full agenda is available here.

• 2022 Sakharov Prize laureate: The brave people of Ukraine
• A long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas
• Cultural policy in EU and external relations
• Upscaling the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework: A resilient EU budget fit for new challenges
• Towards equal rights for persons with disabilities
• REPowerEU: Amending energy legislation
• Question time: Protection of strategic infrastructure from China’s influence
• COP27 climate change conference: Outcomes
• Ten issues to watch in 2022

Written by Virginia Mahieu.

Quantum technologies could be a game-changer in the digital transformation of health care. By enabling much faster and more complex data analysis, they could open the door to the accelerated discovery and development of novel therapeutics, improved diagnostics and treatments, including for rare and complex diseases, genuinely personalised medicine, and better data-driven health policy planning. However, as is also the case in other sectors, quantum technologies come with risks, particularly to cybersecurity and data privacy, as well as economics, trade, and global competition. The EU legislators need to prepare the health technology assessment process for the possible changes that this developing technology could entail.

The advent of quantum computing (one aspect of the broader category of quantum technologies) has been on the horizon for some time. Where a classical computer uses binary code to store data, a quantum computer uses qubits. Conceptually, if a bit is like either end of a piece of string, a qubit could be anywhere on that piece of string. In practice, this could allow for drastically faster computing speeds, potentially cutting certain calculations that would take today’s fastest supercomputer 10 000 years to 200 seconds (though this specific claim is debated).

This extra computing power has a broad range of potential applications in all fields and across all of society, including in health care. However, as with many disruptive technologies it is important to consider possible unintended side effects of its deployment, so that long-term policy decisions can maximise on the opportunities that it brings and mitigate potential risks to human health and healthcare systems.

Potential impacts and developments

Quantum technologies allow the use of much more complex algorithms and simulations, allowing calculations to be performed in a fraction of the time needed by a classical computer, thus potentially rendering them accessible to healthcare practitioners and researchers in their day-to-day work. In parallel, the body of available health and medical data sources (such as electronic health records and clinical trial results) is growing, and is expected to be boosted by the implementation of the European health data space. These two factors in combination – more accessible high-power computing and more data to run it on – have the potential to revolutionise health care in the EU, to move from reactive to predictive treatment, reducing health costs and saving lives.

For instance, quantum-supported molecular modelling could improve researchers’ ability to find, develop, and administer new therapeutics, including for diseases that are currently untreatable. Already today, the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking (EuroHPC JU) is actively searching for treatments for COVID-19. A quantum computer could accelerate this process to the point that we could beat another pandemic before it even began. This boost in algorithmic processing power could also enable clinical trials to be done in silico (i.e. in a computer rather than a living being), whereby a digital twin of an organ or an entire body could be created to simulate and virtually study the effects of a treatment and its interaction with genetic, environmental, and lifestyle factors. This would have the dual benefit of reducing the need for animal and human research, while also streamlining and reducing costs in the clinical trials process. It would also mean that researchers could control variables more easily than with live patients, for example by accounting for whether patients use a treatment correctly and in the prescribed way (i.e. at the right time with the right dosage), and improving the certainty of how well new and existing medicines work.

Furthermore, quantum computing could boost researchers’ ability to sequence and analyse genetic information rapidly, giving better insight into the functions of the human genome and its interactions with the environment. Along the same vein, it could allow for better research and understanding of the complex interactions of microorganisms in the gut and body, which play a major role in many aspects of health and well-being. Quantum technologies, especially quantum imaging and quantum sensing could improve imaging diagnoses from, for example, MRI or PET scanners. Not only would it generally help make more powerful medical algorithmic decisions, quantum sensors could make highly precise biological measurements and take better resolution images than current methods. Quantum computing could also facilitate data-driven optimisation (and possibly reduction) of pricing of health insurance premiums, as well as improving detection of fraudulent insurance claims.

All of this information could go into patient care, to achieve truly personalised medicine, and could even be used to predict and prevent illnesses, ultimately reducing healthcare costs and improving quality of life as well as life expectancy. For example, imagine a patient presents to a neurologist with symptoms of Parkinson’s disease. By combining a digital model of the patient’s brain with their health records, genetic, cellular, and environmental information, a doctor could use a quantum molecular simulation to determine exactly which treatment to administer, at what dosage, what side effects the treatment might incur and how to reduce these. Indeed, a doctor could even estimate with high certainty whether a patient was likely to develop Parkinson’s disease in the first place and tailor preventative treatment for them.

Anticipatory policy-making

Supporting innovation in healthcare technologies is essential in the face of mounting global health challenges, such as an ageing population, a rise in non-communicable diseases, and health inequalities. The advances in health care facilitated by quantum computing outlined above will have a broad impact on society, which EU policy must anticipate to be able to reap its advantages fully. In addition, challenges may arise. For instance, the intellectual property of the technology may be proprietary (e.g. owned by Google or IBM), adding to the already-complex duality of healthcare as a public service provisioned by private corporations. Furthermore, healthcare cybersecurity and data protection – already important considerations in the digitalisation of health – will become all the more relevant due to concerns over the potential for the first quantum computers to break through existing classical computing security systems easily. Conversely, quantum cryptography could also help make data much more secure. This is particularly relevant given the sensitive nature of health data, especially that involving quantum-accelerated genetic sequencing. With the increasing use and availability of genetic data – considered sensitive personal data under the GDPR – genetic privacy could become a greater issue of concern, tied to the protection of fundamental rights.

Beyond direct patient care and research and innovation, there are also dimensions of external relations, health diplomacy, trade, and competition to be considered. The development of quantum computing is the current-day space race, and the EU must be at the forefront of this geostrategic competition to maintain its position in the global pharmaceutical market, and as a healthcare leader. If the EU lags behind, its strategic partners and rivals could gain significant advantages, and it would become more difficult for the EU to catch up. The Quantum Technologies Flagship, an initiative launched in 2018, is boosting research in the EU into all aspects of quantum technologies. Its main pillars include quantum computing, simulation, communication, and sensing, all of which have healthcare applications. In parallel, the EU is planning to build state-of-the-art ‘hybrid’ computers blending quantum and already-existing classical computing technologies by 2023, as part of the EuroHPC JU. By June 2019, all 27 EU Member States had signed the EuroQCI Declaration, agreeing to work together towards building a secure EU-wide quantum communications infrastructure. It will consist of an earth-based component linking strategic sites using existing fibre networks, as well as a space component to cover long distances. In conjunction with these initiatives, the implementation of the European health data space must be strategically prepared for the upcoming advances and changes that the EU’s investments in quantum technologies will bring.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if quantum technologies were to revolutionise healthcare?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if quantum technologies were to revolutionise healthcare?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Sofija Voronova.

International Anti-Corruption Day is marked every year on 9 December to raise awareness of the negative effects of corruption on all areas of life. While difficult to measure, corruption entails not only economic but also social and political costs. International and EU anti-corruption efforts have translated into a multi-layered policy and legal framework. The European Parliament recently called for strengthened EU anti-corruption rules.

Background Why an International Anti-Corruption Day?

On 31 October 2003, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and designated 9 December as International Anti-Corruption Day, to raise awareness of corruption and of the role of the convention in combating and preventing it. On the eve of the convention’s 20th anniversary, the 2022 edition of International Anti-Corruption Day, dubbed UNCAC at 20: Uniting the World Against Corruption, seeks to highlight the link between the absence of corruption and peace, security, and development.

The negative impact of corruption on sustainable development and human rights is widely recognised by the international community. According to the UN, corruption ‘undermines the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and has a negative impact on peace, stability, security, the rule of law, gender equality, the environment and human rights’. The importance of action against corruption is explicitly highlighted in SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), with its set targets for reducing bribery, strengthening institutions and ensuring public access to information. Preventing corruption is instrumental in the achievement of all the other goals.

Cost and prevalence of corruption

While corruption is difficult to measure, it is known to be costly, in economic but also in political and social terms. It hampers growth and the distribution of benefits across populations, by undermining trust in public institutions, weakening the state’s capacity to perform its core functions and hindering public and private investment. In 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the yearly cost of bribery alone at about US$1.5 trillion to US$2 trillion (around 2 % of global gross domestic product – GDP). Regarding the European Union (EU), the 2016 European Parliamentary Research Service cost of non-Europe report found that corruption costs the EU economy between €179 billion and €990 billion per year, representing up to 6 % of EU GDP in terms of lost tax revenue and investment.

Moreover, corruption facilitates the infiltration of organised crime networks in all sectors of society, including politics and law enforcement. According to the latest Europol threat assessment, more than 80 % of criminal networks active in the EU use legal business structures for their criminal activities, and around 60 % engage in corruption. Europol underlines that corruption takes place at all levels of society, ranging from petty bribery to complex multi-million-euro corruption schemes. Not only does it hinder economic development, it also weakens state institutions and erodes the rule of law.

The 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI) reveals that not much progress has been made in reducing perceived corruption levels across the world, with the global average rate unchanged for 10 years in a row (43 out of 100 points, with 100 meaning perceived as the least corrupt). No country is exempt from corruption. According to TI, anti-corruption efforts have stalled in Europe too, although western Europe and the EU still register the best scores (with an average of 66 out of 100). Behind this image of the least corrupt region in the world, significant differences persist within the EU: while 6 EU countries are in the top 10, 5 score less than 50 out of 100 points). Another TI survey, the 2021 Global Corruption Barometer, dedicated to the EU, shows that 62 % of respondents consider government corruption to be a big problem in their country while 30 % pay a bribe or use a personal connection to access public services. The recent Eurobarometer surveys on perception of corruption by EU citizens and businesses show a similar picture: 68 % of citizens believe that corruption is still widespread in their country, especially in national public institutions, political parties and among politicians at various levels. A similar share of EU businesses (63 %) point to widespread corruption across all activity sectors surveyed (this view is shared by even higher proportions of businesses active in healthcare (68 %) and financial services (66 %)); and 70 % indicate that favouritism and corruption hamper business competition in their country.

Global response to corruption International framework

The very first international instrument was adopted in 1997 in the context of international trade. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions) introduced a legally binding obligation to criminalise bribery, focusing on the ‘supply-side’ of bribery transactions. There are 44 parties to the convention (all OECD and 6 non-OECD countries). In 2021, the parties agreed on a new Anti-Bribery Recommendation, complementing the original convention, designed to reinforce prevention, detection and investigation of foreign bribery.

In 1999, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted two other tools: the Civil Law Convention on Corruption and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The Criminal Law Convention aims at the coordinated criminalisation of a large number of corrupt practices and better international cooperation in the prosecution of corruption offences. The Civil Law Convention was the first attempt to define common international rules in the field of civil law and corruption, providing effective remedies for persons having suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, including the possibility of obtaining compensation.

The year 2003 saw the adoption of the above-mentioned UN Convention against Corruption, the only universal legally binding instrument addressing corruption in a comprehensive manner. It covers five main areas: preventive measures, criminalisation and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange. The convention requires state parties to establish as criminal offences many different forms of corruption, such as bribery, trading in influence, abuse of functions, and various acts of corruption in the private sector. It contains an entire chapter dedicated to prevention and a specific chapter on asset recovery, as well as provisions on mutual legal assistance. At this point in time, 189 states across the world have joined the convention and committed to its obligations.

EU action

All EU Member States are party to the UNCAC and the CoE conventions, and are bound by corresponding standards. However, the EU has sought to coordinate and support Member States’ efforts within the limits of shared competence, provided by the EU Treaties, in the area of freedom, security and justice. As part of its anti-corruption policy, the EU has adopted several instruments, including legislation on corruption in the private sector, on public procurement rules (Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU, and 2014/25/EU), on anti-money-laundering efforts and on whistleblower protection. Protection of the EU budget, including against corruption, is governed by the 2017 Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests (PIF Directive) and falls within the competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), operating since 1 June 2021. The EU has also sought to address corruption outside its territory through its external action and international trade tools, such as trade agreements and human rights dialogues. The European Commission has recently announced a review of the EU’s anti-corruption legislative framework and an update of the EU sanctions toolbox to include corruption, as advocated by Parliament.

European Parliament position
The European Parliament has addressed corruption, both within the EU and in the context of external policies, in numerous resolutions and reports. Most recently, it has looked into systemic challenges to the rule of law and deficiencies in the fight against corruption across the EU, focusing for instance on measures to prevent corruption and the misuse of national and EU funds. Parliament has called repeatedly either for legislative amendments to extend the scope of the current EU global human rights sanctions regime to cover corruption, or for a new sanctions regime to address serious acts of corruption. In February 2022, Parliament adopted recommendations on corruption and human rights, calling for an EU global anti-corruption strategy, enhanced support for anti-corruption capacity-building, and a strengthened EU anti-corruption framework, including an anti-corruption directive establishing common minimum rules for criminal sanctions against corruption.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘International Anti-Corruption Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

For two decades, the EU has sought to modernise its preferential trade relationship with the sub-Saharan African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and establish free trade areas with regional groupings under so-called economic partnership agreements (EPAs). The process of establishing the EPAs has been longer and more complicated than initially expected, encountering criticism and opposition from civil society and some governments in ACP countries, who have been worried about the potential negative impact. So far, the results are mixed, with nine agreements negotiated – covering more than half of the ACP countries – but not yet all implemented.

EPAs are free trade agreements that allow ACP countries to continue exporting their products to the EU duty free and quota free, while ensuring full compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. EU goods should also benefit gradually from full liberalisation, though with numerous exceptions related to goods ACP countries wish to protect from external competition, particularly agricultural products. In this respect, EPAs are development-oriented, asymmetric agreements providing important advantages and safeguards to ACP countries, to foster their sustainable economic development, regional integration and integration on world markets.

While their potential impact has given rise to both numerous fears and great expectations, assessments of EPAs that have already been implemented show very limited effects, possibly due to their long drawn-out and gradual implementation. The risk of fragmenting regional integration schemes, particularly in Africa, is mitigated by the slow pace of trade integration on the continent.

The European Parliament has closely monitored the EPA process from the beginning. In a resolution of June 2022 on the future of EU trade with Africa, the Parliament insisted on a careful assessment of their impact by the Commission, on strengthening their – currently limited – sustainable development provisions and introducing a sanctions mechanism for non-compliance, and on the need to ensure that they do not disrupt regional integration.

This briefing updates a previous publication from July 2018.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU economic partnership agreements with ACP countries: Which way forward?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU economic partnership agreements with ACP countries: Which way forward?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Mar Negreiro (1st edition).

The volume of online child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) and frequency of grooming activities, increasingly targeting younger children, is rising sharply. On 11 May 2022, the European Commission adopted a proposal for mandatory legislation to combat what is an escalating problem. Reporting of suspected online child sexual abuse increased by 35 % in 2021 compared with 2020, representing a historical peak. Most of the activities detected were hosted in Europe.

The Commission proposal would require interpersonal communication services and others to search proactively for CSAM materials and grooming activities targeting children. However, this poses many concerns regarding privacy, security and law enforcement investigations. The proposal also provides for the establishment of a new EU centre to support implementation and supervision.

In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE).

Versions

• November 2022: Combating child sexual abuse online (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse Committee responsible:Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2020) 209
11.5.2022Rapporteur:Javier Zarzalejos (EPP, Spain)2020/0155(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Paul Tang (S&D, the Netherlands)
Hilde Vautmans (Renew, Belgium)
Patrick Breyer (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Annalisa Tardino (ID, Italy)
Vicenzo Sofo (ECR, Italy)
Cornelia Ernst (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ulrich Jochheim.

Founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often compared with the EU. Both organisations brought together former adversaries and successfully resolved tensions through cooperation, helping to bring peace and prosperity to their regions. However, the EU and ASEAN operate in very different ways. ASEAN is a strictly intergovernmental organisation in which decisions are based on consensus. While this approach has made it difficult for south-east Asian countries to achieve the same level of integration as the EU, it has also enabled ASEAN to accommodate huge disparities among its 10 member states.

ASEAN’s impact has been uneven. The organisation is an effective platform for cooperation between its member states and the wider Indo-Pacific region, but its goal of promoting peaceful cooperation is undermined by growing geopolitical tensions, especially in the South China Sea and with regard to Myanmar. While there has been significant economic integration, the goal of an EU-style single market is still a long way off – something that partially explains why intra-regional trade remains relatively weak.

EU-ASEAN relations span more than four decades and have steadily deepened, building on common values as well as booming trade and investment. In 2020, the two sides upgraded to a strategic partnership. In the current environment of huge geopolitical challenges, both sides seem determined to take their bilateral cooperation to a higher level, as exemplified by the new plan of action (2023-2027), the first bilateral summit at leaders’ level and the ongoing and intensifying cooperation between the European Parliament and the ASEAN member states’ parliaments.

This briefing updates a previous one published in November 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘ASEAN: The EU’s strategic partner in Asia‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.