European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Every five years, Europeans go to the polls to elect their representatives in the European Parliament. The next chance for citizens to choose who will defend their interests takes place from 6 to 9 June 2024. This will be the 10th time Europeans vote in the world’s largest transnational elections, mandating over 700 Members to represent their views in the only directly elected European institution. With 12 months to go before voting begins, the European Parliament is keen to ensure that Europeans have all the information they need to make their choice. The European Parliamentary Research Service has therefore prepared analysis of various organisational aspects of the 2024 elections.

Although turnout in the European elections increased to 51 % in 2019 (+8.05 percentage points – the highest turnout in two decades), EU institutions and governments are keen to ensure greater representativeness by boosting voter numbers. The election results are also likely to affect young people directly, both in the years to come and later on. Several countries have therefore lowered the voting age (you can vote aged 17 years in Greece, and aged 16 years in Germany, Malta, Austria, and – because voting is obligatory once registered – upon request in Belgium). This should allow young people to have their say on candidates that reflect their values. Furthermore, the European Parliament proposes to allow young people (aged at least 18) to stand as candidates throughout the EU, although that new rule is unlikely to be in place in time for the 2024 elections. At present, the minimum age for candidates is set by each EU country and varies from 18 to 25 years.

The EU guarantees all citizens the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament, under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The European Parliament is an active supporter of the right to equal participation for people with disabilities. Parliament demands that the EU and its Member States ensure equal opportunities for persons with disabilities to vote, campaign, and stand as candidates. Parliament has also highlighted the urgent need to ensure equal access to polling stations and better representation of people with disabilities on electoral rolls.

Depending on the outcome of the elections, the formation of a stable majority is the most likely outcome to provide a good balance between representativeness and getting Parliament’s work done. Setting an electoral threshold (minimum percentage of votes needed for the allocation of seats) is one way to ensure that Parliament can operate without multiple very small parties pulling in too many different directions. Although it is unlikely to be agreed with the Member States in time for the 2024 elections, Parliament adopted a draft law in May 2022, seeking to modify the rules on electoral thresholds in the European elections. Under the proposal, EU countries could set a threshold of no more than 5 % of the valid votes cast, but they would be obliged to establish a threshold of no less than 3.5 % and no more than 5 % for national constituencies comprising more than 60 seats (only the largest Member States). The electoral thresholds expected still to apply in 2024, however, remain at 5 % of valid votes (France, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, Romania, Croatia, Latvia and Hungary), 3 % (Greece), 4 % (Austria, Italy, Sweden), and 1.8 % (Cyprus), while 14 Member States set no threshold.

Once the new Parliament is in place, Members vote to elect the new head of the European Union’s executive body, the President of the European Commission, and hold public hearings to examine the proposed team of Commissioners. To strengthen the political link between the new Parliament’s composition and the choice of a new Commission President, a ‘lead-candidates’ process, known as the Spitzenkandidaten process was used in 2014. European political parties designated their candidate for the post of President of the Commission, meaning that voters would influence the choice of the President of the EU’s executive when choosing to vote for a particular party. While this led to the successful election of European People’s Party lead candidate Jean‑Claude Juncker in 2014 – this was not the case in 2019, with the nomination of Ursula von der Leyen, who had not been a candidate in the election. Was this a temporary switch from a process aimed at making the appointment of EU leaders more comprehensible to the public? Or is the EU abandoning this particular attempt to give European citizens a greater say on who becomes the next President of the Commission? With only 12 months to go, it remains to be seen whether the lead-candidates process will be employed in 2024.

As we have seen above, a European Parliament with a robust mandate from a large voter base is best able to represent citizens’ wishes. Mobilising people to vote has been a major goal for the EU since before the first direct elections in 1979. The organisation of the elections is itself a reflection of this fundamental democratic need, with a crucial role played by political parties. While today’s European political parties are a familiar aspect of the campaign, there was less agreement in the past as to whether European parties were needed for ‘European’ elections. The debate surrounding self-standing European parties and their role in voter mobilisation has run for decades, and continues today. A revision of EU law governing the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, part of the ‘new push for European democracy’, is currently under discussion between the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.

While some consider European elections are ‘second-order’ elections, the increased turnout in 2019 shows this may not be the case forever. With the geopolitical situation underlining the benefits of EU membership, Parliament is working on several proposals to make European elections more consistent and robust across the EU.

Further reading:

• Age to vote in European elections
• Age to stand as a candidate in European elections
• Political participation of people with disabilities in the EU
• Electoral thresholds in European elections
• Spitzenkandidaten or the lead-candidates process: Ways to Europeanise elections to the European Parliament (forthcoming)
• Political parties, voter mobilisation and the 1979 European elections
• Proposing new rules for European elections
• Amending the rules governing the statute and funding of European political parties (recast)
• Heading towards the 2024 European elections [Ten issues to watch in 2023]

Written by Rafał Mańko.

Under current EU law, EU Member States are free to set their minimum national voting age for European elections. This age is set at 16 in Austria, Germany and Malta, 17 in Greece, and 18 in the remaining Member States. In Belgium, EU citizens can, following a recent change, request to vote in European elections from the age of 16.

Current law

The rules applicable to European elections are based on a combination of the common principles established in the European Electoral Act of 1976, as amended by Council Decision 2002/772, and the different national rules implementing those principles. In line with Article 8 of the European Elections Act, Member States can set the minimum voting age in their national legislation.

Proposal

In May 2022, Parliament tabled a proposal for a Council regulation on the election of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) by direct universal suffrage, which would replace the existing European Electoral Act of 1976 (2022/0902(APP)). The aim of the proposal is to harmonise a number of rules applicable to European elections, including the voting age. According to recital 17 of the proposal, a ‘single harmonised age for voting … should be introduced across the Union in order to ensure equality and to avoid discrimination‘. Article 4(1) of the proposal sets the age at 16 but allows for exceptions for ‘existing constitutional orders establishing a minimum voting age of 18 or 17 years of age’. To enter into force, the regulation needs the unanimous approval of the Council and the approval of all Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements.

Figure 1 – Voting age in the Member States Voting by persons under 18 year of age

The 2024 European elections will be governed by the European Electoral Act of 1976. In Belgium, a law adopted in 2022 allows Belgians and other EU nationals resident in Belgium, aged 16-18, to vote in European elections after submitting a request to their municipality of residence. In Germany, a law adopted in early 2023 lowered the voting age for European elections from 18 to 16. In 2018, Malta‘s Constitution sets the standard voting age, including for European elections, at 16. In Greece, the voting age is set at 17. In 2007, Austria fixed its standard voting age at 16. In all other Member States, the voting age is 18.

Member StateVoting ageLegal basisBelgium18, 16 on requestArticle 1 § 2 of the EP Elections Act 1989 as modified by Act of 1 June 2022Bulgaria18Article 350 of the Electoral CodeCzechia18Article 5 of the European Parliament Elections ActDenmark18§ 6 of the Act Concerning the Election of the Danish MEPs in conjunction with § 1(1) of the Parliamentary Elections ActGermany16§ 6 of the European Elections Act as modified by Act of 11.1.2023Estonia18§ 4 (1) of the European Parliament Election ActIreland18Rule 72, Schedule 2 of the European Parliament Elections Act 1997Greece17Article 1 of the European Elections Act 2014 in conjunction with Article 4(1) of the Parliamentary Elections ActSpain18Article 2 of the Organic Law 5/1985 of 19 June 1985France18Article 5 of the European Parliament Elections Act in conjunction with Article L.2 of the Electoral CodeCroatia18Article 45 of the ConstitutionItaly18Article 3 of the Law on Election of Italian MEPs 1979Cyprus18Article 4 of the European Parliament Elections ActLatvia18§ 2 of the Act on Election to European ParliamentLithuania18Article 8(4) of the Electoral CodeLuxembourg18Article 3 of the Electoral Act 2003Hungary18Article XXIII of the Fundamental Law in conjunction with § 2:10 of the Civil Code (age of majority)Malta16Article 11(c) of the European Parliament Elections Act 2004 in conjunction with Article 57(b) of the Constitution of MaltaNetherlands18Article Y3(a) and (b)(2) of the Electoral ActAustria16§ 10 of the European Elections OrdinancePoland18Article 10 § 1 of the Electoral CodePortugal18Article 1 of the Electoral Law for the European Parliament in conjunction with Article 1 of the Law governing Elections to the Assembly of the RepublicRomania18Article 5(5) of the European Parliament Elections LawSlovenia18Article 10 of the Election of MEPs from the Republic of Slovenia ActSlovakia18§ 3 of the Act no. 180/2014 Coll., on the conditions for the exercise of the right to voteFinland18§ 14(II) of the ConstitutionSweden18Avdeling 5, 4 § of the Elections Act (2005:837) in conjunction with Proclamation (1974:152) on the adoption of a new form of government, kap., 4 §.Table 1 –Legal bases setting the voting age for European elections in the EU-27

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Voting age for European elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Mira Manini Tiwari, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides an insight into the economic performance of Mexico compared to the EU, and looks at the trade dynamics between them. Mexico’s GDP per capita, unemployment rate, female labour force participation, and FDI have remained relatively stable since 2006, with slight increases, whereas remittances have increased more markedly. EU trade with Mexico has increased significantly since 2006, most notably trade in goods. This is dominated by trade in mechanical appliances and electrical equipment, both in terms of imports and exports. ‘Various business services’ constitute the largest proportion of EU service imports and exports from and to Mexico (32.5% and 23.8% respectively in 2021).

Read this infographic on ‘Mexico: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel with José Ernault.

On 1 June 2023, Moldova hosted the second meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) in Bulboaca, just a few kilometres from the Ukrainian border. The focus of this informal forum of 48 leaders from across the European continent was clearly more on peace and security – with all participants reiterating their unity in support of Ukraine – and less on energy and interconnectivity, the other topic on the agenda. Discussions took place in plenary and roundtable format, showing continuity in method with the inaugural EPC meeting held in Prague in 2022.

Enlargement, although not officially a topic for discussion, was placed at the centre of the debates by the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who this time attended the summit in person. The two leaders pleaded for the opening of EU accession negotiations by the end of this year. In addition, Zelenskyy advocated powerfully for a strong signal from NATO at the upcoming summit of the Alliance in Vilnius on 11 July 2023, both regarding Ukraine’s accession and concerning security guarantees on the way to membership. This to some extent transformed the meeting into an informal preparatory meeting for the NATO and European Council meetings later this year, touching on and possibly easing potential sensitivities. No summit declaration was adopted, confirming the EPC’s informal platform format.

A series of side meetings allowed leaders to discuss issues of direct interest to their own countries. Side meetings were also used for mediation purposes in the case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, and to attempt to put the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue back on track, after the recent spike in violence.

1.     Background

The European Political Community’s second summit meeting took place on 1 June 2023 in Moldova, at Mimi Castle in Bulboaca, 20 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. The leaders of 45 European countries, including all 27 EU-Member States, attended the summit, while the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declined the invitation at the last minute. The presidents of three EU institutions – the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament – also attended. The event followed on from the inaugural EPC meeting, held in Prague on 6 October 2022, at which 44 leaders from across the European continent came together for the first time to express their unity and support for Ukraine.

EPC summits are held on a bi-annual basis, being hosted alternately by an EU and a non-EU country. The meeting in Bulboaca was the first EPC summit to be hosted by a non-EU country, Moldova. Spain, the country holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of the year, will host the third EPC meeting in October 2023, when an informal European Council meeting is also expected to take place. The United Kingdom is expected to host the fourth EPC summit in a year’s time, during the first half of 2024.

2.     European Political Community: Origins and initial developments

The EPC originated from a proposal made by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, at the closing event of the Conference on the Future of Europe on 9 May 2022. It is a ‘partnership of equals’, which allows EU and non-EU European countries to share an informal platform for political dialogue and cooperation on peace and security at a time of war on the European continent.

Prior to, during and after the Prague summit, there were discussions about the possibility of transforming the EPC initiative, giving it more structure and possibly providing it with a permanent secretariat and a dedicated budget. This path has not been taken thus far, confirming the leaders’ preference for flexibility, something Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has praised. Academics argue that a dedicated institutional framework could bring more clarity on who is in charge of developing the agenda and ensuring business continuity between summits. For now, however, tasks are being undertaken by the host countries with informal help from the EU. There is a fear that the EU’s involvement in the preparatory stages, if continued, could estrange some participants, who might see the Union’s involvement as an attempt to use the EPC as a vehicle to promote its policies rather than as a platform of equals.

3.     The summit’s host: Moldova

The choice of Moldova as host for the second EPC meeting sends a strong signal of support and commitment from the EU to a country that has expressed its European aspirations vibrantly and was granted candidate country status a year ago, along with Ukraine.

Moldova has been on the front line from the moment Russia’s war on Ukraine broke out. The country has had to cope with high numbers of refugees (691 154 arrivals, with 103 281 remaining in Moldova). It has also been constantly challenged by Russia’s multifaceted hybrid war, being continually confronted with disinformation, weaponisation of energy supplies and destabilisation attempts, against which Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned when addressing the European Council back in February 2023. Moldova’s security is intertwined with that of Ukraine, with the latter acting as a de facto security provider, a reality recognised by Sandu.

Since Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine, the EU has provided Moldova with multifaceted – political, financial, humanitarian and military – support. In May 2023, the EU doubled its macro-financial assistance for Moldova, bringing it to a total of €295 million. The Union has also granted temporary trade liberalisation for seven key Moldovan agricultural products. It has meanwhile provided €48 million in humanitarian aid to help Moldova cope with the challenge posed by the high number of war refugees. Moldova’s electricity grid has been synchronised with the continental European grid, and the country has progressively phased out its dependency on Russian gas (with the exception of Transnistria). A €200 million energy support package was presented in November 2022 to help Moldova meet its gas supply needs, and Moldova is now participating in the common gas purchasing mechanism. As regards military support, a day before the EPC summit, the EU High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell, inaugurated the European Union Partnership Mission Moldova in Chisinau. The mission’s objective is to help strengthen Moldova’s resilience and ability to counter hybrid threats. The EU has so far pledged up to €80 million through the European Peace Facility to support modernisation of Moldova’s armed forces. A new set of sanctions, adopted on Romania’s initiative, target ‘actions aimed at destabilising’ Moldova.

4.     European Political Community meeting in Bulboaca Meeting format

The meeting alternated between plenary and roundtable sessions. A plenary session allowed the host, Maia Sandu, to open the summit. She expressed Moldova’s gratitude to Ukraine for standing up for its security, and to the EU and its Member States for their support and assistance. She also mentioned Moldova’s aspirations for EU integration, and commitment to meet the required conditions. Zelenskyy, who was next to take the floor, called for unity and warned the leaders that ‘every doubt we show here in Europe is a trench that Russia will definitely try to occupy’. Three other leaders – the Prime Minister of Italy, Giorgia Meloni, the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, and the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte – addressed the plenary. They assured Moldova and Ukraine of their countries’ support, called for unity and, in the case of Rutte, stressed the urgent need to train Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16 aircraft.

Two roundtables were scheduled, one on security and one on energy and interconnectivity, to allow European leaders to discuss the two subjects in depth, in smaller groups. This model had already been successfully used at the inaugural EPC meeting but also earlier at the EU-African Union Summit in 2022. In contrast with the previous summit, the leaders came back together for a working lunch, which took the place of a closing plenary session and was followed by side meetings.

Main results of the meeting

The EPC summit was an opportunity to bring the continent together to discuss security, energy and interconnectivity. In practice, the debates were dominated by two topics: security and enlargement. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Rishi Sunak, put migration on the agenda, a topic that could return to the fore in a year’s time, when the EPC summit is to be hosted by the UK.

European unity

The European leaders once again sent a strong signal of unity, isolating Russia and Belarus, and demonstrating support for Moldova and Ukraine. At the joint press conference closing the summit, Sandu, Sanchez, and the Czech Prime Minister, Peter Fiala, stressed that the European family was in Moldova standing united in support of peace. Attending the summit, the European Parliament President, Roberta Metsola, stressed that the objective was to show support ‘to Moldova, to Ukraine and to the wider European community’, and underlined that Europe is facing a resilience test which it needs to meet united.

Security

The European continent’s security and its protection from war in all its forms, including hybrid attacks, was the overarching theme of the summit. Ukraine’s security was at the centre of the debates. Zelenskyy pleaded for Ukraine’s accession to NATO and for security guarantees on the way to membership. These two questions remain sensitive for members of the Alliance, who will need to consider them at the July summit in Vilnius. Some have taken a clear stance in support of Ukraine’s accession, with over 10 countries, including recently Romania, signing a ‘declaration of support for Ukraine’s accession to NATO’. Macron stressed that ‘Vilnius must send a clear message to Ukraine and Ukrainians. I favour stronger, concrete very clear security guarantees’, without clarifying their form. Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, stressed that her own country’s history and experience tells that ‘the only security guarantee is NATO’.

EU enlargement

Enlargement was the surprise topic prompted by Sandu and Zelenskyy, and echoed by several EU leaders. Sandu used the summit to express her country’s European aspirations and to reiterate Moldova’s self-set objective to join the EU by 2030. European Council President Charles Michel said he would put enlargement on the agenda of EU leaders at the end of the year, after the submission by the Commission of its progress reports. Metsola pointed to the ‘adamant firmness‘ of Moldovan citizens in favour of European integration that she had experienced when visiting Chisinau, and the impressive speed shown by Moldova in its response to the Commission’s conditionality, which had led Parliament to vote a resolution in support of opening accession negotiations with Moldova by the end of 2023. She also addressed a strong message to the Western Balkans, pleading for their ‘faster, more urgent and more deep European integration’.

Side meetings in a variable geometry format Armenia-Azerbaijan

A meeting was convened by Charles Michel on the sidelines of the EPC summit to facilitate the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in a context of resurging tensions in the region, with each side accusing the other of ceasefire violations. The meeting was attended by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz. This meeting followed a similar one held during the Prague EPC summit in October 2022. Michel, who has been actively involved in the peace talks, has met Aliyev and Pashinyan five times in trilateral format since September 2020, and has been engaging in various communication formats (bilateral meetings or phone calls) with both leaders pushing for the conclusion of an agreement on border delimitation and a peace treaty (see Figure 1). Michel announced a new meeting in Brussels on 21 July 2023 and invited participants to reconvene during the EPC summit in Granada in October 2023.

Figure 1 – Timeline of EU-led mediation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan Kosovo–Serbia

Another meeting held on the margins sought to address tensions in north Kosovo following local elections, which were boycotted by the Serb community. The meeting involved Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Kosovan President Vjosa Osmani, Macron, Scholz, and Borrell. Macron stated that Osmani and Vučić had agreed to consider a French-German plan to ease tensions.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Political Community meeting in Bulboaca, Moldova, on 1 June 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sidonia Mazur.

The annual EU budget funds the EU policies and programmes that translate the Union’s political priorities and legal obligations into action. The financial year starts on 1 January and ends on 31 December. The European Commission is scheduled to adopt the annual EU draft budget for 2024 on 7 June 2023. Budget Commissioner Johannes Hahn will present the 2024 draft budget at a meeting of Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) the same day.

The European Parliament is one of the two arms of the budgetary authority of the European Union, the Council being the other. The two institutions, assisted by the European Commission, decide on the budget in the annual EU budgetary procedure, within the limits of the long-term EU budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF).

During preparation of the annual budget negotiations, the two arms of the EU budgetary authority present their guidelines. However, for the first time, the European Parliament has failed to adopt its guidelines for next year’s budget. Due to a lack of agreement among the political groups on the issue of how EU funds should be used to protect the EU’s external borders, Members rejected the draft report in plenary.

Nevertheless, Parliament adopted a resolution on 10 May 2023, on the impact of rising borrowing costs for the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) on the 2024 EU budget. This resolution therefore constitutes Parliament’s input to the 2024 budget preparations and includes three key elements:

1.     It underlines Parliament’s concern that the increasing borrowing costs for the RRF are likely to severely limit the Union budget’s ability to finance the Union’s priorities and policies and to respond to emerging needs;

2.     It calls for urgent revision of the 2021-2027 MFF that defines ceilings for annual EU spending, and which are already widely exhausted;

3.     It calls on the European Commission to put forward proposals for a second basket of new own resources as soon as possible.

Parliament’s rapporteur for the 2024 EU budget is Siegfried Mureșan (EPP, Romania).

Next steps

The Council adopts its position on the draft budget and forwards it to Parliament. Under Article 314(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, this must be submitted by 1 October at the latest (in reality, under a pragmatic timetable, it is sent by the end of July).

Parliament may either approve the Council’s position or propose amendments. The amended draft is referred back to the Council. The President of Parliament, in agreement with the President of the Council, must then immediately convene a meeting of the Conciliation Committee.

The European Commission is due to adopt a revision of the MFF on 20 June 2023. This could have a significant impact on the 2024 EU budget should certain ceilings rise and more resources become available, for example for solidarity with Ukraine.

Further reading

For more on Parliament’s role in the EU annual budgetary procedure see:

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2019)640129

For more on the impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing borrowing costs for the European Union Recovery Instrument see:

Click to access EPRS_ATA(2023)747130_EN.pdf

For more on the MFF see:

Multiannual Financial Framework for the years 2021-2027 and the New Own Resources

For more on the recovery plan for Europe see:

Recovery plan for Europe: State of play

For the latest on the Next Generation EU (NGEU) implementation see EPRS blog:

National Recovery and Resilience Plans: Latest state of play

Written by Marc Jütten. and Leon Peijnenburg.

The 49th G7 Summit, bringing together the leaders of the United States (US), Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU), took place on 19‑21 May 2023 under the Japanese Presidency in Hiroshima, a city with worldwide symbolic importance for war, nuclear devastation and peace. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine dominated the leaders’ summit once again, with Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, attending in person. The other main issue was the need to increase economic resilience and build a unified G7 approach towards China.

This year’s summit took place at a time where the multilateral rules-based global order is being challenged, in particular by Russia and China, and strategic relations around the world are being redefined. Key states from the Global South are becoming increasingly important for the West, in order to isolate Russia and address global challenges. For this reason, in addition to Zelenskyy, the Japanese Presidency invited a series of leaders, including those of the G20 troika – Indonesia, India and Brazil (India assumed the G20 Presidency on 1 December 2022 from Indonesia, and will hand it over to Brazil in December this year).

The G7 leaders made strong commitments to global partners, in particular those in the Global South, in their various communiqués and statements. Some side meetings drew media attention, notably that between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The resulting leaders’ communiqué focused on support for Ukraine, disarmament and non-proliferation, economic security, clean tech economy, food security and the convergence of policy towards China. Many commentators drew an important parallel between the reiterated strong support for Ukraine and an underlying message that the international community would provide equal support were Taiwan to be in peril. In this regard, it is also interesting to note the timing of President Biden’s announcement at the G7 that the US would support a joint international effort to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets.

Read the complete briefing on ‘2023 G7 Summit: Preparing for a new global order?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Among the key moments of the May II plenary session were debates on breaches of the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds, and on the threat to democracy and the rule of law in Poland, in particular through the creation of an investigative committee. Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament, made a statement on the 10-year anniversary of the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh. Another debate addressed the social and economic costs of climate change in light of the floods in Emilia Romagna, Marche and Tuscany and the urgent need for European solidarity. Members also considered an own-initiative report on sexual harassment in the EU. Finally, in a formal sitting, Parliament heard an address by Salome Zourabichvili, President of Georgia.

Corporate sustainability due diligence

Members debated the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) report on harmonising corporate sustainability due diligence across Member States, which demands amendments to the Commission’s proposal. These include broadening the scope of companies subject to the directive, as well as the definition of ‘value chain’, introducing remediation for those affected by unfair corporate practices, and linking the variable remuneration of directors of large companies (1 000+ employees) to the implementation of climate change transition plans. The text adopted sets Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.

Act in support of ammunition production

Responding to Ukraine’s request for EU assistance, Members voted on the proposal to assist the defence industry to increase ammunition production capacity, and address ammunition shortages and supply-chain bottlenecks (to avoid leaving EU countries without the means for their own defence). The proposal aims at helping the defence industry to ramp up production, including the creation of a fund that would provide financial assistance to EU ammunition producers. Negotiations with the Council on the proposed act in support of ammunition production are to be fast-tracked, aiming to adopt the act by the end of July 2023.

Geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products

Members debated a report from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) on the proposed regulation consolidating elements of the geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products into a single system. The committee’s report simplifies the GI registration procedure, and reduces the role of the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) in comparison to a much criticised element of the proposal. Members’ vote has set Parliament’s mandate for interinstitutional negotiations.

Foreign interference in EU democracy

With evidence of increasing external interference in EU affairs – ranging from social media disinformation campaigns, to corruption of officials, and the weaponisation of energy, food supplies and migrants – Members debated foreign interference in democratic processes and election integrity, and voted on the report of the second Special Committee on Foreign Interference (ING2) on external attempts to influence elections and democratic processes in the EU. The recommendations address resilience-building, cybersecurity, interference during electoral processes, covert funding of political activities by foreign actors, the EU’s coordinated strategy on interference, and the development of a defence of democracy package.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Two decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) committee were announced: on the proposal for a directive on assets recovery and confiscation and on the proposal for a regulation on automated data exchange for police cooperation (Prüm II).

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – May II 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jaan Soone (1st edition).

Road safety has improved significantly in the EU, with the number of road fatalities falling by more than 60 % in the last 20 years. However, improvements in road safety have fallen short of the EU goals of decreasing the number of road deaths by 50 % between 2001 and 2010, and by an additional 50 % between 2011 and 2020.

Directive (EU) 2015/413 facilitating cross-border exchange of information on road safety-related traffic offences – the Cross-border Enforcement (CBE) Directive – is one of the pillars of the policy framework to improve road safety in the EU. It aims to help improve road safety by tackling the relative impunity of non-resident drivers. The revision, announced in the European Commission’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy in 2020, seeks to address key shortcomings in existing rules. According to Commission estimates, 40 % of cross-border offences were committed with impunity, either because the offender was not identified or because the payment was not enforced.

The Commission tabled its proposal to revise the CBE Directive as part of the road safety package on 1 March 2023. In the European Parliament, the file was assigned to the Committee on Transport and Tourism, with Kosma Złotowski (ECR, Poland) as rapporteur.

Versions

• June 2023: Cross-border exchange of information on road safety-related traffic offences (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/413 facilitating cross-border exchange of information on road safety-related traffic offences Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2023) 126
1.3.2023Rapporteur:Kosma Złotowski (ECR, Poland)2023/0052(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Benoît Lutgen (EPP, Belgium)
Bogusław Liberadzki (S&D, Poland)
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (Renew Europe, Spain)
Ciarán Cuffe (Greens/EFA, Ireland)
Elena Kountoura (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly
‘co-decision’)

Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marin Mileusnic.

This briefing focuses on policy measures benefiting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have been enshrined in the national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). Member States drew up their recovery plans in order to take advantage of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument and its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), designed to support recovery from the pandemic while fostering the green and digital transitions.

The RRF is structured around six pillars representing key EU policy areas that will help Member States emerge from the crisis stronger and future-proof. The pillars also define investment priorities and the scope of financing under the RRF. On account of its particular relevance for SMEs, this briefing addresses the RRF’s ‘Smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ pillar, but other pillars can also include SME-related measures.

The SME sector, including micro-enterprises, constitutes over 99 % of all businesses in the EU and was severely affected by the pandemic. Since SMEs represent the bedrock of the economy, it was essential to support them, and Member States have put forward extensive measures in their NRRPs targeting the SME sector both directly and indirectly. SME-related measures range from learning opportunities for SME employees to advance their digital skills to business decarbonisation, the setting up of new financing instruments aimed at developing new technologies in SMEs, and the removal of administrative and regulatory obstacles to boost the productivity of smaller businesses. SME-related measures under the ‘Smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ pillar may also address other RRF objectives, including the specific digital and climate targets.

While the type and scope of the investments and reforms vary between Member States, all the measures feed into at least one of the three axes of the SME strategy developed and presented by the European Commission in 2020. These axes refer to capacity building and support for transition to sustainability and digitalisation, reducing the regulatory burden and improving market access, and boosting access to financing. These dimensions are also reflected in the country-specific recommendations (CSRs), presented in the context of the European Semester. To obtain RRF funding, the NRRP measures must address at least a significant subset of the 2019 and 2020 CSRs.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Ensuring the recovery and resilience of EU small and medium-sized enterprises‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

SME-related country-specific recommendations, 2019-2022 Support to SMEs (% of RRF ‘Smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ pillar in NRRPs) Number of SMEs supported by RRF resources as at 18 April 2023 (common indicator 9)

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Citizens are calling on the President of the European Parliament to amend the legislative proposal for a cyber resilience act currently under discussion in the European Parliament. Many citizens have written to the President on this subject since April 2023. They ask her to make sure that there is an exemption for free and open-source software that is not provided as part of a commercial activity.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French and English):

English Open source software in the European Commission’s proposal

According to the Commission, the proposed law should not concern free and open-source software developed or supplied outside the course of a commercial activity (see recital 10 of the proposal). A summary of the proposal is available on our Legislative Observatory website.

Examination of the proposal in the European Parliament

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is discussing the proposal. On 31 March 2023, the Member in charge of the file published his draft report, which aims to modify the content of the proposal.

The Member is proposing an amendment to exempt developers from the rules if they do not earn money from the project. However, open-source software provided as part of a commercial activity should comply with the law, to ensure cybersecurity in the European Union.

He also proposed adding an article obliging the European Commission to publish guidelines in the form of a manual to assist economic operators. This manual should provide information to determine what constitutes a business activity for open-source software developers.

Stages in the European Parliament

On 25 April 2023, the ITRE Committee held an exchange of views on the legislative proposal on cyber resilience. You can watch the streaming video of the meeting on our website.

Members of the ITRE Committee had until 27 April 2023 to request changes to the draft report.

More information

You can find further information at the following links:

• Procedure file on the Legislative Observatory website,
• Overview of the file’s progress on the Legislative Train website,
• Briefing by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) published on 14 December 2022.

French Les logiciels libres dans la proposition de la Commission européenne

Selon la Commission, la loi proposée ne devrait pas concerner les logiciels libres et ouverts développés ou fournis en dehors du cadre d’une activité commerciale (voir considérant 10 de la proposition). Un résumé de la proposition est disponible sur notre site internet Observatoire législatif.

Examen de la proposition au Parlement européen

Au Parlement européen, la proposition est examinée par la commission de l’industrie, de la recherche et de l’énergie (ITRE). Le 31 mars 2023, le député en charge du dossier a publié son projet de rapport qui vise à modifier le contenu de la proposition.

Le député propose un amendement afin que les développeurs soient exemptés du règlement si le projet ne leur rapporte pas d’argent. Néanmoins, les logiciels open source fournis dans le cadre d’une activité commerciale devraient se conformer au règlement, afin de garantir la cyber-sécurité de l’écosystème de l’Union.

Il propose également d’ajouter un article obligeant la Commission européenne à publier des lignes directrices sous la forme d’un manuel pour aider les opérateurs économiques. Ce manuel devrait notamment fournir des informations pour déterminer ce qui constitue une activité commerciale pour les développeurs de logiciels open source.

Étapes au Parlement européen

Le 25 avril dernier, la commission ITRE a organisé un échange de vues concernant la proposition législative sur la cyber-résilience. Sur notre site internet, vous pouvez visionner la réunion en streaming.

Les députés membres de la commission ITRE pouvaient déposer jusqu’au 27 avril des amendements au projet de rapport.

Plus d’informations

Vous pouvez consulter les liens suivants :

• Fiche de procédure sur le site Observatoire législatif,
• Vue d’ensemble sur l’avancée du dossier sur le site internet du Train législatif,
• Briefing du Service de recherche du Parlement européen (EPRS) publié le 14 décembre 2022 (disponible en anglais).

Written by Rebecca Fredrick and Clare Ferguson.

Members of the European Parliament meet in plenary session in Brussels this week, and will focus on the topical subject of countering the effects of foreign interference in democratic processes, with just over a year to go until the next European Parliament elections. Breaches of the rule of law also feature, along with further assistance to Ukraine, corporate responsibility in value chains and protection of EU speciality products through geographical indications. Salomé Zourabichvili, President of Georgia is expected to address a formal sitting on Wednesday afternoon.

Against a background of increasing external interference in European Union affairs – ranging from social media disinformation campaigns, to corruption of officials and the weaponisation of energy, food supplies and migrants – Parliament is making it a priority to develop recommendations on how to counter harmful foreign influences. Members are set to hold a joint debate on foreign interference in democratic processes and election integrity on Thursday morning. They will then vote on the report of the second Special Committee on Foreign Interference (ING2) on external attempts to influence elections and democratic processes in the EU. The ING2 report follows the first INGE special committee’s report, whose work ING2 continues, with the added mandate to address issues of transparency, integrity and accountability within the European Parliament. The recommendation and updates in the report on foreign interference in EU democracy address resilience-building, cybersecurity, interference during electoral processes, covert funding of political activities by foreign actors, the EU’s coordinated strategy on interference, and the development of a defence of democracy package.

In the face of ongoing Russian aggression, Ukraine is fast exhausting its own supplies of ammunition and missiles as well as those provided by NATO. Responding to Ukraine’s request for EU assistance, the Council agreed on a three-track proposal on ammunition in March 2023. The first two components (delivery from existing Member State stocks, and joint procurement from industry), are already under way, supported through the European Peace Facility. The third component – increasing EU production – is the subject of a legislative proposal now subject to the urgent procedure, following a vote at the May I 2023 plenary session. The proposal aims to assist defence industry to increase production capacity, introduce a temporary regulatory framework to address ammunition shortages, and create a mechanism to address supply-chain bottlenecks – as providing assistance to Ukraine should not leave EU countries without the means for their own defence. While Parliament supports increasing munitions delivery to Ukraine, the new proposal is potentially controversial as, in helping the defence industry to ramp up production, it includes the creation of a fund that would provide financial assistance to EU ammunition producers. After Parliament adopts its position, negotiations with the Council on the proposed act in support of ammunition production are to be fast-tracked, with Parliament aiming to adopt the act by the end of July 2023.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

President Roberta Metsola opens the session on Wednesday afternoon with a statement marking the 10-year anniversary of the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, a disaster that highlighted the terrible conditions in which many workers produce goods for Western companies. Concern has continued to grow about corporate responsibility for the potential risks business activities pose to human rights and the environment, particularly from companies with operations outside the EU. Yet a 2020 Commission study found that only 37 % of businesses were undertaking due diligence that considered environmental and human rights impacts. A Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) report on harmonising corporate sustainability due diligence across Member States demands amendments to the Commission’s proposal. These include broadening the scope of companies subject to the directive, as well as the definition of ‘value chain’, introducing remediation for those affected by unfair corporate practices, and linking the variable remuneration of directors of large companies (1000+ employees) to the implementation of climate change transition plans. Members are due to debate the JURI report on corporate sustainability due diligence on Wednesday, with a view to setting Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Commission and Council.

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

The EU’s geographical indications (GIs) schemes currently protect over 3 500 products whose quality or reputation are linked to the place in which they are produced. Accounting for 7 % of sales in the EU food and drink sector, certification can be lucrative for producers: on average, products with a GI label have double the sales value of those without. However, rules for GIs for food, spirits and wine are currently governed by three separate pieces of legislation, leading to delays in application and approval, and concerns regarding consumer awareness, sustainability requirements, and enforcement. On Wednesday, Parliament is scheduled to consider a report from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) on a proposed regulation consolidating elements of the geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products into a single system. Under the proposal, management of GIs would be transferred to the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), a move that has garnered criticism from stakeholders who say that EUIPO lacks sectoral expertise. The AGRI amendments would restrict EUIPO’s role to monitoring the GI register and potential domain name conflicts. The committee’s report would also simplify the GI registration procedure and allow some of the existing rules for wine GIs to remain in place.

European Parliament Plenary Session May II 2023 – Agenda

• Foreign interference in EU democratic processes: Second report
• Act in support of ammunition production
• Corporate sustainability due diligence
• Geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products

Citizens are calling on the European Union to adopt a law on nature restoration. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since May 2023, asking her to act now to fight biodiversity loss and climate change.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French and English):

English

In its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, the European Parliament strongly welcomed the European Commission’s commitment to propose a law on nature restoration in the EU that includes binding targets.

In June 2022, the Commission presented a legislative proposal to restore nature in Europe, i.e. repairing habitats and reintroducing nature into all ecosystems. The proposal sets obligations for each EU country, with the aim of restoring at least 20 % of the EU’s land and marine areas by 2030. The ultimate goal is to extend these measures to all ecosystems that need to be restored by 2050.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is examining the proposal. On 5 December 2022, the Member in charge of the file published his draft report, which aims at modifying the content of the proposal. The report was presented in committee on 12 January 2023 and Members tabled amendments to the draft report. You can watch the video of the committee meeting on this subject from January 2023 on our website.

As indicated in the planning document published on the ENVI website, the vote in committee is currently scheduled for 15 June 2023. Parliament’s plenary vote could take place as early as July. In the event of any changes, the information on the ENVI website and in the Legislative Observatory will be updated.

French

Dans sa résolution du 9 juin 2021 sur la stratégie de l’Union européenne en matière de biodiversité pour 2030, le Parlement européen a vivement salué l’engagement de la Commission européenne à proposer une loi sur la restauration de la nature dans l’UE qui comprenne des objectifs contraignants.

En juin 2022, la Commission a présenté une proposition législative visant à restaurer la nature en Europe, c’est-à-dire réparer les habitats en mauvais état et réintroduire la nature dans tous les écosystèmes. La proposition fixe des obligations pour chaque pays de l’Union européenne, avec pour objectif de restaurer au moins 20% des zones terrestres et marines de l’UE d’ici 2030. L’objectif ultime est d’étendre, d’ici 2050, ces mesures à tous les écosystèmes devant être restaurés.

Au Parlement européen, la proposition est examinée par la commission de l’environnement, de la santé publique et de la sécurité alimentaire (ENVI). Le 5 décembre dernier, le député en charge du dossier a publié son projet de rapport qui vise à modifier le contenu de la proposition. Le rapport a été présenté en commission le 12 janvier 2023 et les députés ont déposé des amendements au projet de rapport. Sur notre site web, vous pouvez revoir la vidéo de la réunion de commission à ce sujet en janvier 2023.

Comme indiqué dans ce document de planification publié sur le site de la commission ENVI, le vote en commission est actuellement prévu pour le 15 juin 2023. Le vote en plénière du Parlement pourrait avoir lieu dès le mois de juillet. En cas de modifications, les informations figurant sur le site internet de la commission ENVI et dans l’Observatoire législatif seront mises à jour.

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Martin Höflmayr (1st edition).

On 26 April 2023, the European Commission published a package of three proposals to revise the EU’s economic governance framework: a regulation to replace the current preventive arm of the stability and growth pact (SGP), an amending Council regulation on the corrective arm of the SGP, and an amending Council directive to strengthen the role of independent fiscal institutions. The main proposal on the preventive arm is to be adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure with the Parliament and the Council as co-legislators.

The reform proposals are shaped by the trade-off between reducing higher and more dispersed public debt levels after several years of unprecedented fiscal challenges and the need for sustained public investment in the Union’s shared priorities. Stricter fiscal monitoring would ensure debt sustainability, based on a country-specific fiscal adjustment path anchored to a debt sustainability analysis framework. The Commission would negotiate a fiscal-structural plan bilaterally with Member States, with a minimum 4-year horizon; possible extension of the fiscal adjustment path to 7 years would provide an incentive to include investment and reform commitments. Greater political buy-in and better Member State ownership of the medium-term plan is also envisaged.

Both reference values – the 3 % deficit-to-GDP and 60 % debt-to-GDP ratios – would remain unchanged, the proposal introduces three additional safeguards: two numerical requirements over the agreed plan’s horizon and a minimum fiscal adjustment of 0.5 % of GDP per annum if a country is expected to be above the 3 % deficit ratio threshold in an excessive deficit procedure.

Versions

• May 2023: New economic governance rules (1st edition)

Proposal for a on the effective coordination of economic policies and multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97; Proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure; Proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2022) 240;
COM(2022) 241;
COM(2023) 242;
26.4.2023Rapporteur:2023/0138(COD);
2023/0137(CNS);
2023/0136(NLE)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD);
Consultation procedure;
Non-legislative enactment

Next steps expected: Appointment of a rapporteur

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Two anti-Kremlin armed groups, made up of Russian nationals fighting for Kyiv against their compatriots, have claimed they were behind a short incursion into Russian territory, prompting threats from Moscow, as the West pondered further sanctions against Russia and more arms deliveries to Ukraine. Ukraine has denied any role in the raid, while Russia has blamed ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ for the attack, and its Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, has vowed that Moscow will respond to any more cross-border raids swiftly and ‘extremely harshly.’

At the G7 summit of industrialised and democratic nations on 19-21 May, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked for more arms supplies for his country, including F-16 fighter jets. Russia said that the transfer of such planes would raise the question of NATO’s role in the 15-month-old military conflict. The US and other countries promised to start training Ukrainian pilots to use F-16s.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Ukraine’s growing defense tech prowess can help defeat Russia
Atlantic Council, May 2023

Ukraine’s European integration is the key to a sustainable peace
Atlantic Council, May 2023

Wagner chief’s rants highlight Russian infighting ahead of Ukraine offensive
Atlantic Council, May 2023

Deciphering Vladimir Putin’s unspoken Victory Day message
Atlantic Council, May 2023

Russia’s last red line: Will the West help Ukraine liberate Crimea?
Atlantic Council, May 2023

Global South does not buy western stance on Ukraine
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, May 2023

Backstopping Ukraine’s long-term security: Toward an Atlantic-Asian security community
Brookings Institution, May 2023

What really influences United Nations voting on Ukraine?
Bruegel, May 2023

Bank of Russia’s immobilised assets: what happens next?
Bruegel, May 2023

Sanctions against Russia will worsen its already poor economic prospects
Bruegel, May 2023

In every crisis an opportunity? European Union integration in defence and the War on Ukraine
Brussels Centre for Governance, May 2023

Is the EU ready for further enlargement?
Carnegie Europe, May 2023

Ukrainians Wait for Their Return Home
Carnegie Europe, May 2023

Tackling the constraints on EU foreign policy towards Ukraine
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2023

Tsar Nicholas I’s Crimean War and Putin’s in Ukraine: Plus ça change
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2023

Ukraine’s alarming demographics
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2023

Social media analysis disrupts Russian digital narratives
Chatham House, May 2023

How much aid has the U.S. sent Ukraine?
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023

How the Ukraine grain deal went from boon to burden for the Kremlin
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, May 2023

Navigating the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear warheads in Belarus: Key factors and considerations
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, May 2023

Culture clash: Russia, Ukraine, and the fight for the European public
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023

Keeping the lights on: The EU’s energy relationships since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023

The Ukraine war and European identity
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023

11th package of EU sanctions: Focusing on circumvention
European Policy Centre, May 2023

European politics in times of crisis: Developments in Germany, France and Italy, and consequences for the EU
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 2023

Ukraine’s refugees highlight the shameful EU housing crisis
Friends of Europe, May 2023

Defining Russia’s defeat: The war’s exit strategy and a new international security architecture
Friends of Europe, May 2023

Toward a Marshall Plan for Ukraine
German Marshall Fund, May 2023

Pathways to disaster: Russia’s war against Ukraine and the risks of inadvertent nuclear escalation
Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, May 2023

The war in Ukraine and the future of non-proliferation and arms control in the European continent
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2023

Applying for EU membership in time of war: “Accession through war” of Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2023

Europe’s evolving order and the war in Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2023

Is there life in the desert? Russian civil society after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine
International Centre for Defence and Security, May 2023

What should future U.S. policy toward Russia be in peacetime?
Rand Corporation, May 2023

What the drone strikes on the Kremlin reveal about the war in Ukraine
Rand Corporation, May 2023

Why does Ukraine want Western jets?
Rand Corporation, May 2023

The trade-offs of Ukraine’s recovery: Fighting for the future
Rand Corporation, May 2023

Russian civil society actors in exile
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2023

Helping Ukraine is not only crucial for peace in Europe but also for world peace
Vox Ukraine, May 2023

Ukraine’s agriculture and farmland market: the impact of war
Vox Ukraine, May 2023

Towards an acceptable accounting of Ukraine’s post-war environmental damages
Vox Ukraine, May 2023

Americans show signs of impatience with Ukraine war
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Ukraine’s resilience is about winning the war
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

Why Ukraine needs security guarantees
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

Nine months of full-scale war in Ukraine: thoughts, feelings, actions
Cedos, April 2023

The EU increases its agri-food imports from Ukraine: causes and reactions from Central European states
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023

From Popasna to Bakhmut: The Wagner Group in the Russia-Ukraine war
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023

Protecting Europe’s critical infrastructure from Russian hybrid threats
Centre for European Reform, April 2023

Note to the West: Help Georgia and Moldova as well as Ukraine
Centre for European Reform, April 2023

Will Russia control the skies over Ukraine?
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, April 2023

Ukraine’s counter-offensive: Will it retake Crimea?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

Working together toward accountability: How the ICC and a Special Tribunal on Aggression can work together on Ukraine
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

What Northern Ireland teaches us about ending the Ukraine war?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

Judging Putin
Fondation Robert Schuman, April 2023

Rebuilding Ukraine: What the international community now needs to consider
German Institute of Development and Sustainability, April 2023

War in Ukraine, where quantity as well as quality matters
International Institute for International Studies, April 2023

Lessons from the past for Ukrainian recovery: A Marshall Plan for Ukraine
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023

Countering Russia’s nuclear threat in Europe
Rand Corporation, April 2023

Cyber operations in Russia’s war against Ukraine Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.

At this year’s G7 summit in Japan, the leaders of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, and the European Union, expressed their determination to uphold an international order based on the rule of law and the UN Charter, under serious threat due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As part of this strategy, the G7 nations committed to engage with partner countries worldwide to preserve international norms by addressing shared challenges, not least the current food crisis, recognised as posing the ‘highest risk of famine in a generation’.

For over a year, many countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, have been subject to an intense Russian diplomatic and disinformation campaign aimed at shifting the responsibility for the current food crisis, away from Moscow’s destabilising actions – such as the months-long Black Sea blockade – and blaming it on the international sanctions imposed on the Kremlin after its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

To counter Russia’s strategy, and to strengthen present and future global food security, the G7 and invited nations (Australia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Comoros and the Cook Islands) committed to a series of joint actions outlined in the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, calling on other international partners to join these efforts.

The six-page document envisages three lines of action, aimed at addressing the immediate food security challenge, preparing for and preventing future food crises, and setting the building blocks of a resilient food system guaranteeing fair nutrition for all.

Responding to the most immediate challenge of the ongoing food crisis, the G7 nations commit to better donor coordination and a substantial increase in humanitarian and development assistance to food-stressed countries. The action statement highlights the importance of expanding and extending the Black Sea Grain Initiative, continuing the EU Solidarity Lanes, and restoring Ukraine’s agricultural sector. The G7 also commits to achieving greater transparency in international markets, given their influence on food prices and availability.

Beyond the current disruption, the G7 strategy outlines ways to prepare for and prevent future food security crises. On top of supply shortages caused by weather shocks and armed conflict, the skyrocketing prices for agricultural commodities owes much to unilateral trade restrictions to protect national markets, especially of fertilisers. Therefore, transparency and enforcing World Trade Organization rules is deemed crucial to ensuring food security. Increased data collection and monitoring, as well as support for the adoption of preparedness strategies by food-stressed countries is also considered to prevent future crises.

Ultimately, the G7 leaders recognise that ensuring food security for all depends on the resilience and adaptability of global food systems to changing weather and shrinking biodiversity. The G7 strategy devotes substantial attention to these challenges, outlining many initiatives enshrined in the European Union by the Green Deal, and the biodiversity and farm to fork strategies. Strengthening local production, ensuring affordable access to fertilisers or developing agricultural innovative technologies and making them accessible to less developed countries are some of the initiatives outlined to that end in the Hiroshima Action Statement.

In its attempt to undermine the post-World War II international consensus, Russia has resorted to the threat of nuclear war, and has deliberately aggravated a global food security crisis. In the highly symbolic city of Hiroshima, the G7 group of nations pushed back at Moscow’s challenge to the rules-based order, by showing that it is willing and able to engage the wider international community to ensure food security for all, while preserving the international rules that can make it possible.

Written by Clément Evroux (1st edition).

On 27 February 2023, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation to allow voluntary digital labelling of EU fertilising products. This initiative follows similar EU legislative initiatives establishing the digital labelling of goods in other economic sectors, such as batteries. The rationale for digital labelling is provided by: on the one hand, the deployment of digital solutions such as QR codes, which can lower the cost of labelling while facilitating the updating of content; and on the other, the complexification of physical labelling, whose readability can prove difficult.

Against this backdrop, the proposal introduces a set of voluntary digital labelling schemes for EU fertilising products, whose requirements depend on the packaging arrangements and the users of the products (economic operators or end-users). The proposal also introduces a single set of technological requirements for all established labels, to ensure that labels are accessible free of charge, including for vulnerable groups.

In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection.

Versions

• May 2023: Digital labelling of EU fertilising products (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 as regards the digital labelling of EU fertilising products Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2023) 98
27.02.2023Rapporteur:2023/0049(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’)

Next steps expected: Appointment of the rapporteur

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

The required deployment of clean energy technologies to support the achievement of Europe’s 2030 and 2050 climate targets is considerable. Europe already largely imports these technologies, and many third countries have stepped up their efforts to expand their clean energy manufacturing capacity. On 16 March 2023, the Commission put forward a proposal for a ‘net-zero industry act’ that aims to expand the manufacturing capacity of net-zero technologies in the EU and enhance the resilience of its energy system.

The proposed regulation would set up enabling conditions for the manufacturing of 10 net-zero technologies (through streamlined administrative processes and access to regulatory sandboxes and European net-zero industry academies). Eight ‘strategic’ net-zero technologies would gain additional benefits (even shorter administrative processes, facilitated access to markets, and administrative support to access finance). The proposed regulation would aim to ensure that, by 2030, the manufacturing capacity in the EU for these strategic net-zero technologies reaches an overall benchmark of at least 40 % of the EU’s annual deployment needs. It would also set an EU‑level target for annual CO2 injection capacity by 2030 (50 million tonnes).

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file.

Versions

• May 2023: Net-zero industry act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem (Net Zero Industry Act) Committee responsible:Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2023)161
16.3.2023Rapporteur:Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany)2023/0081(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Tsvetelina Penkova (S&D, Bulgaria)
Christophe Grudler (Renew, France)
Damien Carême (Greens/EFA, France)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia)
Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy)
Marc Botenga (The Left, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’)

Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Between 2018 and 2020, over 18 000 migrant and refugee children were reported as missing in Europe. It is feared that many may have been exploited and abused for sexual or labour purposes. The European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the need to address the disappearance of migrant children in the EU. The conflict in Ukraine and the subsequent mass displacement of people have only made the situation worse, creating fertile ground for criminal networks to take advantage of vulnerable people, especially children.

Background

The number of migrant children has been growing, both globally and in the European Union (EU). According to 2020 estimates, 35.5 million children worldwide (1.5 million more than in 2000), were living outside their country of birth. In 2021, Lost in Europe, a journalism project investigating the disappearance of migrant children, reported that more than 18 000 migrant children had gone missing in Europe between 2018 and 2020. According to Missing Children Europe, migrant children are considered missing ‘when they are registered with state authorities and go missing from the reception/accommodation centres provided for them’. While most missing migrant children are understood to be unaccompanied minors (UAMs), they also include separated children and children that were travelling with family. According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), UAMs missing from first reception facilities are a major concern in many EU Member States. However, incomplete and inconsistent reporting makes it difficult to fully grasp the picture. The importance of data collection and sharing has been confirmed by several studies on missing migrants; a single contact point would arguably make it much easier to search for and find information about such people. In fact, registration is particularly relevant in the case of children, as it lessens the risk of them going missing while also helping families reunite. In addition, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there have been reports of children disappearing after having arrived in EU countries from Ukraine. Overall, the reasons for children’s disappearance include: poor reception conditions; a lack of child-friendly information; inefficient family reunification and guardian-appointment procedures; fear of detention or deportation; the desire to join family or friends in another country; and violence and abuse, including illegal adoption and trafficking.

EU action to protect children in migration

In recent years, the EU has adopted a series of policies relevant to children in migration. In February 2007, the European Commission adopted a decision requiring EU countries to reserve the telephone number 116000 as a hotline for reporting missing children, including UAMs of third-country origin. The hotline has been implemented gradually at national level and is now active in 32 countries.

In a communication from 2017, the European Commission laid out a list of priority actions aimed at contributing to the protection of children in migration. Moreover, in its 2020 communication on a new Pact on Migration and Asylum, the Commission stressed that ‘the reform of EU rules on asylum and return is an opportunity to strengthen safeguards and protection standards under EU law for migrant children’. It furthermore identified children’s rights as a priority to be taken into consideration as part of a broader range of initiatives, such as those set out in the 2020 action plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027 and the 2021 EU strategy on voluntary return and reintegration. In 2020, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on EU Member States to do ‘whatever is necessary and required in the best interests of the child’ to avoid the disappearance of thousands of child refugees and migrants globally.

More recently, the 2021 EU strategy on the rights of the child stressed the vulnerability of migrant children, who are often deeply traumatised by what they have had to endure in their country of origin or on a migratory route. The strategy notes that migrant children are more likely to be victims of abuse and violence, and that the risk of going missing increases ‘when children travel unaccompanied or are obliged to share overcrowded facilities with adult strangers’. Additionally, several directives look at the specific situation of migrant children, with a view to preventing them from going missing and falling victim to criminal networks. For instance, Article 24 of the Reception Conditions Directive and Article 25 of the Asylum Procedures Directive envisage the appointment of guardians for UAMs, while Article 14 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive requires Member States to provide specific assistance and support to child victims. Moreover, AMBER Alert Europe aims to achieve zero missing children in Europe by increasing the technological and human resources that are mobilised in searches for missing children.

In focus: The situation of missing Ukrainian children
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Magnolia has recorded more than 2 100 children as kidnapped, abducted, forcibly disappeared or simply missing inside Ukraine. Similarly, NGOs and public authorities have been warning about the risk of violence and trafficking facing children outside Ukraine too, stressing the importance of proper registration. The Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) has likewise warned of the danger faced by people fleeing Ukraine of falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, the Office of the European Parliament Vice-President, and EP Coordinator on Children’s Rights, Ewa Kopacz, cooperates with a number of stakeholders on the issue of missing Ukrainian children, while continuing to keep awareness of Ukrainian children high on the Parliament‘s agenda. In March 2022, the Commission presented a 10-point plan for stronger EU coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war against Ukraine. The plan envisages strengthening children’s protection by developing ‘standard operating procedures and uniform guidance for the reception and support of children, as well as specific procedures for the transfer of UAMs‘ and measures on recording and exchange of information. The plan also underpins the development of an anti-trafficking plan, while also supporting the ‘Safe Homes’ initiative. Finally, during the first joint mission of the Parliament, Commission and Council to Kyiv focusing on the protection of Ukrainian children under institutional care, Parliament’s Coordinator on Children’s Rights, Ewa Kopacz, met with First Lady Olena Zelenska and the Presidential Commissioner for Children, Daria Herasymczuk, to discuss the concerns for children illegally deported or retained in Russia and the Russian-occupied territories. European Parliament position

The need to tackle the disappearance of migrant children has featured in several Parliament resolutions in recent years. In a November 2014 resolution, Parliament stressed that many UAMs had disappeared or absconded after their arrival in the EU, and insisted that more should be done to ensure that the rights of migrant children were fully respected across the EU. In a December 2016 resolution, Parliament called on the Commission to ensure that UAMs do not disappear and to design a strategy for that purpose and for the purpose of identifying the whereabouts of missing children. In another December 2016 resolution, Parliament recommended reinforcing the existing tools for finding missing children and noted that children’s rights and the best interest of the child needed to be taken into account and assessed in all EU policies and actions, including migration and asylum.

In May 2018, Parliament called on the Member States to place all children and families with children in non-custodial, community-based accommodation while their immigration status is being processed. Parliament also stressed the need to host UAMs in separate facilities from adults to avoid any risk of violence and sexual abuse. In November 2019, Parliament called on the Member States to improve the situation of children in migration and stressed the importance of child protection as a fundamental principle for the EU. In March 2021, Parliament stressed that the EU strategy on the rights of the child needed to include measures to improve the situation of children in migration and protect their interests at every stage of asylum procedures. In April 2022, Parliament adopted a resolution on the protection of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine, which stressed the need to identify vulnerable groups and to move swiftly to appoint guardians for UAMs. Most recently, Parliament also highlighted the risk of children falling victim to human trafficking in relation to the situation of Ukrainian migrant- and displaced children.

This updates an ‘at a glance’ note by Micaela Del Monte and Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou published in September 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Disappearance of migrant children in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

The EU’s ambition to become a climate-neutral economy by 2050, and its ability to sustain the green and digital transition and achieve strategic autonomy, all rely heavily on reliable, secure and resilient access to critical raw materials (CRMs).

On 16 March 2023, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on CRMs. It introduces the concept of strategic raw materials (SRMs), which are key for some strategic technologies and vulnerable to shortages. The general objective of the proposed regulation is to improve the functioning of the single market by establishing a framework to ensure the EU’s access to a secure and sustainable supply of CRMs. To achieve this, the regulation would pursue four specific objectives: strengthening the whole SRM value chain; diversifying the EU’s imports of SRMs (so that by 2030, no third country would provide more than 65 % of the EU’s annual consumption of each SRM); improving the EU’s ability to monitor and mitigate the CRM supply risk; ensuring the free movement of CRMs and products containing CRMs placed on the EU market; and ensuring a high level of environmental protection, by improving their circularity and sustainability.

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file.

Versions

• May 2023: Critical raw materials act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 Committee responsible:Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2023)160
16.3.2023Rapporteur:Nicola Beer (Renew, Germany)2023/0079(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Hildegard Bentele (EPP, Germany)
Mohammed Chahim (S&D, the Netherlands)
Henrike Hahn (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Izabela-Helena Kloc (ECR, Poland)
Marie Dauchy (ID, France)
Cornelia Ernst (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Discussion of draft report in committee

Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.

YouTube privacy policy

If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.

Accept YouTube Content

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The United States, China and the European Union are making more and more funds available for the green economic transition and efforts to fight climate change. Increased government spending on green technologies also serves the goal of establishing or expanding industries that have emerged as strategic at a time of global warming, as well as providing quality jobs. This subsidy race is strongly affected by the technological rivalry between China and the US.

However, the race in governments’ support to develop or strengthen sectors such as batteries, electronic vehicles, solar panels, wind turbines and many others, may not be the best solution for decarbonising the economy, some think-tank analysts say. It risks a downward race among governments, and suboptimal allocation of resources.

This note offers links to recent reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on the green transition. Analyses on EU clean tech and industrial policies can be found a previous edition of What think tanks are thinking.

Green hydrogen: Loaded up and (long-haul) trucking
Atlantic Council, May 2023

Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls
Finnish Institute for International Relations, May 2023

Industrial policy for electric vehicle supply chains and the US-EU fight over the Inflation Reduction Act
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2023

The US and the EU want to create a hydrogen economy: They need the BIS in BRICS
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2023

“Carbon management”: Opportunities and risks for ambitious climate policy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2023

Building a prosperous world with fewer emissions
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Green transition: Create a European energy agency
Bruegel, April 2023

North Sea Summit: Blowing in the wind?
Bruegel, April 2023

Mobilising transition finance will require credible corporate climate plans
Bruegel, April 2023

Why Europe’s critical raw materials strategy has to be international
Bruegel, April 2023

Rising to the challenge: EU actorness in climate policy and its global impact
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

Europe’s pursuit of securing critical raw materials for the green transition
Chatham House, April 2023

The Critical Raw Materials Act: Digging in the dirt for a sustainable future
Climate Foresight, April 2023

Pour fabriquer une électricité non polluante, avoir un horizon de long terme
Fondation Jean Jaurès, April 2023

Greenhouse gas emissions in the EU
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2023

Rise in coal use and decline in hydropower cancelled out EU gains in renewables this year
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023

“Made in America” puts the brakes on electric vehicles Biden hopes to push
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023

Can China’s green energy acceleration put at risk the West’s hydrogen plans?
Rand Corporation, April 2023

The green, digital and social transitions: Towards a new Eco-social pact
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, March 2023

Energy and climate challenges will continue in 2023
Brookings Institution, March 2023

Developing countries are key to climate action
Brookings Institution, March 2023

The ‘Green Golden Rule’ for the green transition
Bruegel, March 2023

The potential of sovereign sustainability-linked bonds in the drive for net-zero
Bruegel, March 2023

The Net-Zero Industry Act puts EU credibility at risk
Bruegel, March 2023

Climate adaptation: The race to cool down Europe’s cities
European Policy Centre, March 2023

Energy prices, not us subsidies, are Europe’s biggest headache
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

What the IPCC report means for global action on 1.5°C
Chatham House, March 2023

Climate action in China
Chatham House, March 2023

Europe’s green industrial policy and the United States’ IRA: Reducing dependence on China
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2023

Certification of carbon dioxide removals evaluation of the Commission proposal
Ecologic Institute, March 2023

Blowing in the balance: Europe’s wind industry
Friends of Europe, March 2023

Que faut-il retenir du European Critical Raw Materials Act
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, March 2023

Building climate resilience in urban informal settlements through data co-production
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023

Four lessons on the interaction between climate change mitigation policies and social behaviour
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2023

A permanent EU Investment Fund for tackling the climate and energy crisis
Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, March 2023

The role of the ocean in climate policy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023

Power play: How the US benefits if China greens the Global South
Brookings Institution, February 2023

Climate versus trade? Reconciling international subsidy rules with industrial decarbonisation
Bruegel, February 2023

Climate action, social justice, and democracy: Europe’s new trilemma
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Plugging green power into the EU-ASEAN partnership
Clingendael, Feruary 2023

For a green European industrial policy
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 2023

A European green deal diplomacy toolbox
E3G, February 2023

Strategy and risk: How to make the Green Deal Industrial Plan a geoeconomic success
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

The power of pragmatism: Nuclear energy, technological innovation, and the green transition
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Decarbonise and democratise: How the European Green Deal could transform high-carbon economies
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

EU poised to copy US subsidies for green technology: New evidence from China shows how it could backfire
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, February 2023

The US-EU race for green subsidies can help fight climate change
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2023

Where is the carbon premium? Global performance of green and brown stocks
Brookings Institution, January 2023

Carbon farming co-benefits: Approaches to enhance and safeguard biodiversity
Ecologic, Institute for European Environmental Studies, January 2023

More than just a petrol station: Norway’s contribution to European Union’s green strategic autonomy
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, January 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Green transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.