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The past year has seen a reduction in insecurity in some areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and notable progress in the governance space and regional relations under the new Congolese government. However, many root causes of violence remain unaddressed, and the potential to address them depends on the continuation of a fragile political transition.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report organized a workshop on November 21, 2019, to discuss MONUSCO’s mandate and political strategy. This workshop offered a platform for member states and UN actors to develop a shared understanding and common strategic assessment of the situation in the DRC. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make informed decisions with respect to the strategic orientation, prioritization, and sequencing of the mission’s mandate ahead of its renewal in December 2019.

Participants encouraged the Security Council to maintain the mission’s mandate to engage on political developments and the protection of civilians. However, they also highlighted opportunities to refine existing tasks, including contextualizing stabilization efforts, bolstering the police presence, and promoting an expanded state presence without undermining protections for civilians’ safety and rights. Finally, they called for the Security Council to take a cautious approach to planning for the transition by mandating a clear division of labor between MONUSCO, the government, and other actors and considering tools to track progress on gains made so far.

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“Africa will not continue to accept, given its weight in the world today, that it has no permanent seat in the Security Council with everything it entails as an advantage to have that seat,” Marcel Amon-Tanoh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire, told an IPI Global Leader Series event on December 17th.

Mr. Amon-Tanoh predicted a resumption of the debate in the General Assembly that had lapsed over the past decade over how to expand the Security Council and make its membership more representative of the United Nations membership as a whole. The 15-member Council is widely perceived as reflecting the world of 1945 when it was created rather than the realities of today where countries like Nigeria and South Africa, along with Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Germany, and Turkey have gained stature relative to the existing five permanent seat holders, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

“I think everybody will agree along with our countries that the UN Security Council as it exists today does not reflect the world we live in,” Mr. Amon-Tanoh said. “It is being discussed in the Security Council but not in the General Assembly, and we must try to make sure that the debate in the General Assembly that has lost energy can once again regain a dynamic quality so that the debate that existed at the time of [former Secretary-General] Kofi Annan can exist today.”

Noting that there was now talk of Africa seeking from three to five such permanent seats, he said, “Africa should have the ambition of having permanent seats on the Council regardless of number, and it is unjust or even hypocritical not to consider the African continent, which is both envied for its natural wealth and resources, which is the target of much interest by all the great powers because Africa is a great continent which has its means through sheer force of resources to determine the future of humanity, and must be present in negotiations. Countries should take an initiative in order to relaunch debate on the Security Council in the interest of the whole world.”

The subject arose in the course of comments by Mr. Amon-Tanoh on the occasion of his country’s concluding its two-year term as an elected member of the Council—a particularly auspicious development since only two years ago the UN was ending its peacekeeping mission (UNOCI) in the country, and now the country  has become a contributor of UN peacekeeping troops.

This swift passage from being a country that had experienced two civil wars between 2002 and 2011 and was on the agenda of the Security Council for 13 years to being an engaged member of the body was discussed by the second speaker at the event, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary General of the UN Department of Peace Operations.

“It’s very meaningful and quite impressive to see the Côte d’Ivoire having gone from being a country whose status was an item on the agenda of the peacekeeping operations to being an active contributor to the UN Security Council’s work,” he said. “It enriched the Security Council and our operations to have the contributions of Côte d’Ivoire and generally of countries that have directly experienced all the complexities and outcomes of peacekeeping. UNOCI, having been one of the early multidimensional peacekeeping missions and having gone through so many situations in the country, was unprecedented, and I think this informed the way Côte d’Ivoire took part in the Security Council.”

Mr. Lacroix said he viewed the ten elected members of the Council as essential “bridge builders” between the disputatious permanent members and other member states on the Council. “The Security Council is divided now, characterized by the division of permanent members,” he said. “As the Secretariat, we expect a lot of the role of bridge builders from the elected members. On top of that, we have the experience of legitimacy like Côte d’Ivoire that adds to the capacity of those members and that can benefit—we’ve seen it in many situations—the Security Council, the UN, and can help overcome difficulties and divisions that characterize our organization today.”

IPI Vice President Adam Lupel noted that during its just completed two years on the Council, Cte d’Ivoire hosted formal debates on post-conflict reconstruction and peace, security, and stability, and on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations, reflecting critical thematic issues on the Council’s agenda. The country also had been a penholder for the situation in Guinea-Bissau and a co-penholder for the UN Office of West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). He recalled that Côte d’Ivoire’s single Council presidency took place a year ago, in December 2018.

Mr. Amon-Tanoh said the country had been guided in its Council work by three main priorities:

• Sharing its experience acquired in emerging from crisis and consolidating peace.
• Contributing to the strengthening of international peace and security, including through support for UN peacekeeping activities.
• Amplifying the voice of the African Union on current security and humanitarian issues that inhibit development of the continent.

“In this regard,” he said, “be it the conflict in Libya, the security and humanitarian situations in the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel, as well as issues relating to the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Darfur, Somalia, Burundi, or the Horn of Africa, my country has always stressed the need for reinforced cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in matters of peace and security.“

Beyond that, he said, Côte d’Ivoire had paid “particular attention” to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, and the plight of the Rohingyas in Myanmar “for whose solutions it has always advocated dialogue.”

In the cases of Syria and Yemen, he said, Côte d’Ivoire “focused on the political processes for ending the crisis and the urgent management of humanitarian situations” and “insisted on the need for lasting ceasefires in these hotbeds of tension, in order to open up the political spaces essential for the establishment of a constructive dialogue.” In North Korea, it championed “fruitful dialogue,” and in Iran, it counseled a return to the Security Council-endorsed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. He highlighted the fact that during its presidency, Côte d’Ivoire hosted two high level meetings, one which he chaired, on the need for collaboration between regional and sub-regional organizations and the UN system, and the other, chaired by the country’s president, Alassane Ouattara, on economic reconstruction in the consolidation of peace.

In conclusion, Mr. Amon-Tanoh said he hoped his country would be remembered for “making its voice heard, a voice at the service of dialogue, peace, and fraternity between peoples, the voice of a country that has recently hosted a United Nations peacekeeping mission, and which, through its exemplary crisis resolution and peacebuilding strategies, has returned to peace, stability, and prosperity.”

The discussion was moderated by IPI Vice President Adam Lupel.

Live coverage of the event in French can be found on the IPI Francophone page.

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A tool of coercion or public security

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A popular revolution in Sudan eight months ago ended the 30-year rule of dictator Omar Hassan al-Bashir, abruptly transforming the country’s governance institutions and beginning the reshaping of its social contract. It occurred at a time when the African Union (AU) and the United Nations were deep in preparations for the reconfiguration and eventual withdrawal of the hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMID) from Sudan’s Darfur region.

IPI Policy Analyst Daniel Forti told an IPI audience that UNAMID’s transition is “the most complex mission transition the UN has ever undertaken.” Mr. Forti was speaking at a December 16th policy forum, held in partnership with the Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, to discuss the upcoming stages of the mission’s reconfiguration and to launch an IPI policy paper that he authored called Navigating Crisis and Opportunity: The Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur.

Charlotte Larbuisson, Political Affairs Officer, UN Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, said that “with the events of the past year, the peacekeeping transition is itself taking place in a transition – in Sudan’s democratic transition. We started this transition from peacekeeping in Darfur in a very different environment. We have had to adapt to changing circumstances and shift the trajectory of the peacekeeping. The outcome will probably look quite different than we were envisioning at the beginning of the transition.”

Suggesting that the crisis might actually amount to an opportunity, she said, “The events of 2019 have impacted the substance and direction of the transition and have resulted in a new enabling political environment in Darfur, testing the flexibility of the transition and its ability to adapt. The transition in Darfur is taking place in a different political environment so we have altered our political engagement.”

Framing the peacekeeping transition within recent developments throughout Sudan, Mr. Forti concluded that “UNAMID’s experience has thoroughly tested many of the UN’s emerging principles regarding mission transitions.” Three of these are that: “Transitions are inherently political and are premised on how the UN reconfigures its engagements with a host country; transitions depend, in part, on how well the UN can achieve system-wide integration on the ground and strengthen coherence with a range of national counterparts and international actors; transitions need to be flexible and adaptable, especially in dynamic political environments where the host country re-assumes ownership over a range of security, governance, and development initiatives.”

Gunnar Berkemeier, Peacekeeping Coordinator, Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, said he was “optimistic” about the possibilities. “First and foremost, there is buy-in from the government of Sudan. We have a chance to make this a mission that the Sudanese government and people really want.”

At the same time, he said, while the change had been dramatic, one had to be aware of what had not changed. “It is completely fair to say that there is a ‘new Sudan’, but there are also old issues in Darfur that have been drivers of division in the country that remain to be addressed. We have to take into account the duality of supporting the political process but also addressing the remaining peacekeeping and peacebuilding needs. We have to be ambitious with the mandate because in this moment, we have the opportunity to make real headway on these issues. There must be a great deal of flexibility built into the mandate to deal with its outcome and progress.”

Jürgen Schulz, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, introduced the conversation by saying, “We have seen many important developments and decisions in Sudan in the last year, and many Sudanese representatives have called it ‘a new Sudan’, so now we must ask ourselves, ‘What do we do with the peacekeeping mission?’” He noted that the Security Council would soon be taking up the matter of how to reconfigure UNAMID “when we will ask ourselves, ‘What should be the structure? The mandate? The geographical extent?’ There are no easy answers or fixes.”

Looking forward, Mr. Forti enumerated five priorities that should inform the next stages of the peacekeeping transition:

• Strengthening the engagement with the UN Security Council and AU Political and Security Council.
• Ensuring the primacy of any follow-on presence’s political mandate.
• Reinforcing joint planning efforts to strengthen national ownership over the transition process, scale up peacebuilding work and identify fresh complementary opportunities for new actors.
• Integrating human rights and protection into all areas of work.
• Sustaining international attention and financial support to make funding more “predictable and streamlined.”

Natalie Palmer, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the UN, spoke of earlier divisions over the peacekeeping transition within the Security Council.  “We did not have a sustainable peace agreement in place, many concerns had not been addressed, and for the UK, the priority was to have a flexible and responsible withdrawal,” she said. “There were two camps in the Security Council – those who were very happy to see the mission leave, and do it quickly, and those who were wary of leaving without a peace agreement. Financial pressures also contributed to a rapid drawdown.”

She said that while the current configuration of UNAMID is “probably still not the most appropriate tool to address the challenges in Darfur, we have a new opportunity to support a new government and peace process.” The drawdown had been paused until March of 2020, she said, and “there are still major protection concerns, especially for women and children, and a continued need for humanitarian support and aid.”

Husni Mustafa, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Sudan to the UN, praised the AU and UN collaboration that produced the hybrid peacekeeping force in 2007. “This unique partnership is a success story for us,” he said. “The cooperation between the AU and the UN is ongoing, especially between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council. We must focus on national ownership.”

Ms. Larbuisson said she was hopeful for the success of the twin transitions underway.  “The current transitions in Darfur and Sudan are an opportunity to ensure that the support we provide is in line with the new phase that the country finds itself in,” she said. “We need to seize it to get the peacekeeping transition right and help the new authorities build peace.”

Jake Sherman, Director of IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, moderated the discussion.

Climate change, migration flows, security – growing challenges like these are calling for new responses from EU development policy. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 will in itself require additional financial resources of up to USD 2.5 trillion every year in middle- and low-income countries. Although the European Union (EU) and its Member States are already the biggest donors worldwide, the amount of public funds available is not enough to reach the SDGs. In their search for solutions, therefore, state and non-state actors are focusing squarely on linking public- and private-sector funding. Faced with ambitious climate targets and China’s growing involvement in development finance, the current debate on the EU’s future external financing is centred around reforming the institutional architecture. Such reforms are intended to boost green energy and employment in the partner countries and communicate a coherent European model of socioeconomic development to the outside world. While all actors agree that the EU’s external financing architecture should be simpler, more visible and more efficient (European Commission, 2018), views on how this could actually be achieved vary widely. This led the Council of the EU to task a high-level Wise Persons Group with formulating various scenarios for creating an EU Development Bank. EU development financing is plagued by conflicting national and supranational interests and often sees institutional concerns prioritised over matters of content. Against this backdrop, we argue that institutional and content-related interests need to be better aligned if development financing is to be made more efficient and more sustainable. In particular, a reformed architecture for the EU’s external financing has to do more to reconcile European sustainability and development goals with the needs of partners. Measuring impact against uniform standards will both help to achieve overarching objectives and convey a successful European development model. Given the importance of private capital for development finance, a reformed financial architecture should also consider the interests and rationales of the private sector. However, this will only be a winning formula if social, environmental and human rights standards do not take a back seat.

Climate change, migration flows, security – growing challenges like these are calling for new responses from EU development policy. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 will in itself require additional financial resources of up to USD 2.5 trillion every year in middle- and low-income countries. Although the European Union (EU) and its Member States are already the biggest donors worldwide, the amount of public funds available is not enough to reach the SDGs. In their search for solutions, therefore, state and non-state actors are focusing squarely on linking public- and private-sector funding. Faced with ambitious climate targets and China’s growing involvement in development finance, the current debate on the EU’s future external financing is centred around reforming the institutional architecture. Such reforms are intended to boost green energy and employment in the partner countries and communicate a coherent European model of socioeconomic development to the outside world. While all actors agree that the EU’s external financing architecture should be simpler, more visible and more efficient (European Commission, 2018), views on how this could actually be achieved vary widely. This led the Council of the EU to task a high-level Wise Persons Group with formulating various scenarios for creating an EU Development Bank. EU development financing is plagued by conflicting national and supranational interests and often sees institutional concerns prioritised over matters of content. Against this backdrop, we argue that institutional and content-related interests need to be better aligned if development financing is to be made more efficient and more sustainable. In particular, a reformed architecture for the EU’s external financing has to do more to reconcile European sustainability and development goals with the needs of partners. Measuring impact against uniform standards will both help to achieve overarching objectives and convey a successful European development model. Given the importance of private capital for development finance, a reformed financial architecture should also consider the interests and rationales of the private sector. However, this will only be a winning formula if social, environmental and human rights standards do not take a back seat.

Bonn, 16.12.2019. Das Globale Flüchtlingsforum, das vom 16. bis zum 18. Dezember 2019 in Genf stattfindet, steht ganz im Zeichen des von der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen im Dezember 2018 beschlossenen Globalen Flüchtlingspaktes (Global Compact on Refugees, GCR) und des darin enthaltenen Umsetzungsrahmens, dem Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). Die Vereinbarungen sehen vor: Erstens den Druck auf Aufnahmegemeinden von Flüchtlingen zu verringern; zweitens die Eigenständigkeit Geflüchteter zu verbessern; drittens ihnen einen besseren Zugang zur Umsiedlung in (wohlhabenderen) Ländern außerhalb des Erstaufnahmelandes zu bieten und viertens Bedingungen in den Herkunftsländern für eine freiwillige Rückkehr in Sicherheit und Würde zu schaffen. Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft hat mit dem GCR auf höchster Ebene einen überfälligen Paradigmenwechsel in der Flüchtlingspolitik festgeschrieben. Viele Krisen und Konflikte kehren zyklisch wieder; zahlreiche Fluchtsituationen dauern über Jahrzehnte an. Diese Realitäten erfordern eine stärkere Verzahnung von kurzfristiger Nothilfe und langfristiger Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Insbesondere in afrikanischen und asiatischen Ländern leben Geflüchtete vor allem in räumlich abgeschiedenen Lagern, ohne Zugang zu nationalen Arbeitsmärkten, sozialen Dienstleistungen und Interaktionsmöglichkeiten mit der aufnehmenden Gesellschaft. Dies führt für sie zu Perspektivlosigkeit und Abhängigkeit von Hilfsleistungen der aufnehmenden Länder oder internationaler Geber. Alternativen zur Unterbringung in Camps zu identifizieren ist daher ein erklärtes Ziel des Flüchtlingshilfswerks der Vereinten Nationen (UNHCR). Es ist mittlerweile unumstritten, dass die lokale Ebene, das heißt sub-nationale Regierungs- und Verwaltungseinheiten sowie zivilgesellschaftliche Gruppen für die Integration von Geflüchteten bedeutsam ist. Allerdings werden lokale Erfahrungen in der globalen Politik noch immer zu wenig wahrgenommen und berücksichtigt. Dies trifft insbesondere auf Kommunen in Ländern des globalen Südens zu. Dabei finden die meisten der globalen Flüchtlingsbewegungen ebendort statt. So suchen etwa laut einer Studie der Weltbank die über 4,6 Millionen Menschen, die zwischen 2016 und 2018 aus Venezuela geflohen sind, hauptsächlich in den umliegenden Ländern Zuflucht. Dort halten sie sich vor allem in städtischen Räumen auf, in Peru beispielsweise im Ballungsraum Lima-El Callao. Daher, so die Autor*innen der Weltbank-Studie, sei es dringlich, die lokale Bevölkerung und Entscheidungsträger*innen von den Vorteilen insbesondere der Arbeitsmarktintegration der (oftmals qualifizierten) Geflüchteten zu überzeugen. Undifferenzierte Überzeugungsarbeit über Vorteile der Integration von Geflüchteten im Sinne der Übertragung ‚globaler Blaupausen‘ genügt allerdings nicht. Denn lokale Voraussetzungen für den Umgang mit Flucht sind sehr unterschiedlich. Dies zeigt auch eine vom Deutschen Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) und Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) durchgeführte Forschung zur lokalen Umsetzung des Flüchtlingspakts in der Turkana Region in Kenia: Neben denjenigen, die inoffiziell in der kenianischen Hauptstadt Nairobi und anderen Städten des Landes leben, hält sich der Großteil der Geflüchteten (circa 350.000 Menschen) in einem der beiden großen Flüchtlingscamps Kukuma und Dadaab im ariden Nordwesten beziehungsweise Osten des Landes auf. Als Pilotland zur Umsetzung des CRRF hat sich die kenianische Regierung jedoch dazu verpflichtet, die bislang strikte und von Sicherheitsbedenken geprägte Lagerpolitik zu lockern und die Eigenständigkeit und gesellschaftliche Integration der Geflüchteten zu stärken. Eine Kernmaßnahme dafür bildet die Pilotsiedlung Kalobeyei für die Integration der Geflüchteten mit der ortsansässigen Bevölkerung in unmittelbarer Nachbarschaft zum Flüchtlingscamp Kakuma. Im migrationspolitisch restriktiven Kenia ist sie bisher eine erfolgreiche Ausnahme. Die Siedlungsplanung geht auf eine ursprüngliche Initiative der Lokalregierung zurück, die das Potenzial der Geflüchteten – sie haben teils einen höheren Bildungshintergrund und landwirtschaftliche Kenntnisse – für die lokale Entwicklung erkannt hatte. Darüber hinaus sah die Regierung die Anwesenheit der internationalen Geber als vorteilhaft für die lokale Wirtschaft, auch über die Siedlungsgrenzen Kalobeyeis hinaus. Mit der Aussicht, dass alle gemeinsam von der Entwicklung profitieren können, hat sie auch die lokale Bevölkerung davon überzeugt, ein Stück Land zur Verfügung zu stellen. Kalobeyei ist ein Lehrstück darin, dass die Umsetzung globaler Flüchtlingspolitik wesentlich von Wahrnehmungen und Interessenslagen lokaler Akteure abhängt. Diese sollten daher stärker in globale Politikdiskurse und -prozesse eingebunden werden. Die Entwicklungspolitik kann dies unterstützen, indem sie etwa den Erfahrungsaustausch zwischen Kommunen aus dem Globalen Süden und Norden (weiter) fördert. Auf lokaler Ebene kann sie wichtige Beiträge leisten durch erstens gebietsbezogene Ansätze (area-based approaches), die von kontextspezifischen Chancen und Herausforderungen ausgehen, zweitens partizipative Siedlungs-, Flächennutzungs- und Infrastrukturplanung zusammen mit der geflüchteten und lokalen Bevölkerung, und drittens Unterstützung kommunaler Verwaltungen beim Integrationsmanagement und lokaler Dienstleistungsversorgung. Eva Dick ist Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin im Programm „Transformation politischer (Un-)Ordnung“ am Deutschen Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Markus Rudolf ist Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter für Vertreibung, Friedens- und Konfliktforschung und ethnische Gewalt am Internationalen Konversionszentrum Bonn - Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

In the face of evolving security dynamics and geopolitical pressures, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council initiated the withdrawal of the AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2017. This transition is a uniquely complex undertaking—all the more so following Sudan’s political revolution in April 2019, which required the UN and AU to rapidly adapt their support to the country. This complex environment is putting all the principles of peacekeeping transitions to the test.

This paper examines the dynamics of this peacekeeping transition in Darfur, focusing on UNAMID’s drawdown and reconfiguration, as well as the UN’s efforts to build the capacity of other actors to sustain peace following the mission’s exit. It highlights five broad priorities for this transition going forward:

• Strengthening political engagement between the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council;
• Translating the AU-UN joint political strategy into an effective follow-on presence;
• Reinforcing the transition concept;
• Integrating human rights and protection in all areas of work; and
• Sustaining international attention and financial support.

This paper is part of a larger IPI project on UN transitions and is complemented by similar case studies on UN peacekeeping transitions in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, and Liberia, as well as a paper exploring experiences and lessons from these three transitions.

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Vi står over for en fremtid med klimaforandringer af stigende intensitet. Men vi har også mulighed for at etablere en ny form for udviklings- og klimaarbejde, som bedre kan ruste lande og befolkninger til at håndtere de ændringer. Her er fire råd til at omsætte klimaord til resultater

Vi står over for en fremtid med klimaforandringer af stigende intensitet. Men vi har også mulighed for at etablere en ny form for udviklings- og klimaarbejde, som bedre kan ruste lande og befolkninger til at håndtere de ændringer. Her er fire råd til at omsætte klimaord til resultater

New book chapter on civil servants and everyday natural resource governance