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With the world struggling with a global pandemic, increasing attention is being paid to the potential of community-owned and -led initiatives to address poverty, mobilize crisis response, and increase human security and well-being in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

On October 14th, IPI, with co-sponsors Catalyst for Peace, the Institute for State Effectiveness, the Government of Sierra Leone, and the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the UN, held a virtual policy forum to discuss the on-the-ground experiences of two countries that are integrating community-centered initiatives into national government policy, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.

Introducing the subject, Jimena Leiva Roesch, IPI Senior Fellow and Head of the Peace and Sustainable Development Program, explained, “We ask for these inclusive and leave-no-one behind frameworks that center on community, both as the heart of the 2030 Agenda and in the Sustaining Peace resolutions. So at the global policy level, we know that this is our aspiration, but we rarely find examples in the field of how you transform these aspirations into reality. And of course, the local level is a lot more complicated than these aspirations. When you get to work and roll up your sleeves, it’s not as lofty.”

Francess Piagie Alghali, Minister of State for the Office of the Vice President, Government of Sierra Leone, said that one of the main drivers of conflict in her country had been “the lack of inclusive dialogue platforms at the community level, and the lack of participation. People feel that they don’t belong to these communities when they lose their livelihoods, and there is nowhere where they can address some of these issues, and then the next thing that they do is turn to violence.”

She said that her government reasoned that the best way to avert some of these violent incidents was to strengthen local governments and the decentralization process. “We believe that local councils, local governments know and understand their communities better and are well placed to implement initiatives to build social cohesion and to reap the resulting benefits of stronger, more resilient and productive communities.”

The government has now incorporated a people’s planning model called the Wan Fambul Framework for Inclusive Governance and Local Development, an instrument not only for economic development but also to build peace, social cohesion, and inclusion. “It’s a unique model,” Minister Alghali said. “It sparks the imagination of communities. It makes the communities feel that they are part of the development. It engenders leadership and inclusivity. And one unique component of this framework is that it gives prominence to women and former groups that have not been included in the conversation in the communities, like disabled people, like youths. Those people feel that they have a say in the way their communities are being run.”

She said that the community structures that had been developed using the Wan Fambul framework had helped the country cope with current crises. “For example, we used these frameworks to address the Ebola pandemic that we recently went through. We use these frameworks to address natural disasters. We are using this framework to address the COVID pandemic now, in unique and innovative ways, like sending the message of hand washing and spreading the message of socially distanced gatherings. These are the governance structures that we use, and they have worked quite well.”

The Wan Fambul framework is now being legislated into law, giving it permanence in the structure and governance of Sierra Leone. “Once it is legislated, it makes any government that comes to power obliged to follow this framework, and it also means it must be part of the budget allocation for the government.”

Sierra Leone is applying the lesson of Wan Fambul to its fulfillment of the SDGs, Ms. Alghali said. “As a country, we believe that the first step in achieving the SDGs by 2030 is for us to be able to sustain peace and national cohesion, which is the bedrock of any form of development. Without peace, without cohesion, there is not going to be development, and in order to do that, we have to strengthen governance at the community level by putting communities at the center of the planning process. This is what we have done in Sierra Leone as a model by incorporating the Wan Fambul Framework in our governance and structure. And we hope that other countries will emulate this good example.”

Adela Raz, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the UN, recounted how the country had pursued its community-driven development using its people- centric Citizens’ Charter National Priority Program. “Through our Citizens’ Charter, we have empowered Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage, and monitor development projects.” She said that projects have been “democratized” through a process in which locally elected Community Development Councils prioritized projects and applied to receive funding for their implementation. “The program success was evident in its very positive impact in over 35, 000 communities which included greater access to public services and then overall acceptance of the democratic process and the people-centered approaches.”

Ambassador Raz said that the Citizens’ Charter program deepened the relationship between the government and its citizens and expanded the responsibility of the Community Development Councils through an inter-ministerial collaboration for better citizen-centric delivery of services, including universal access to clean drinking water, quality education, health services and infrastructure. “This has translated into 12,800 completed projects and more than 13 million people benefited. This model, of course, originated from collaboration between the international and the national. And as a government, we found ourselves in the middle of this partnership, and we adopted it and held it with two hands.”

She pointed out that the government had also taken a community-led approach to the SDGs. “The government has worked to nationalize the SDGs by identifying the most relevant targets and indicators to develop the Afghanistan Sustainable Development Goals. Of course in Afghanistan, when we are talking about community-led efforts, we cannot discuss this without the element of peace. The government has also emphasized that Afghans from all segments of society should have a say in the peace process. It called a Loya Jirga, our format for our grand assembly, with 3,200 delegates from all 34 provinces that prioritized our objective for peace and the formation of an inclusive negotiating team. Following the lead of the Jirga, the government in August took the very difficult decision to release 400 remaining Taliban prisoners as part of the commitment from the government’s side to start the peace talks.

“The government is also empowering women to engage in track two and track three peace processes through community-led initiatives. The second phase of our Women, Peace, and Security National Action Plan emphasizes the localization of the plan and close consultation with stakeholders around the country. This has led to the development of local action plans which has strengthened community leadership and further amplified local ownership of the National Action Plan I think this is the environment we should strive for with these important initiatives and building more people-centric governments and processes and initiatives that leads to greater ownership of the local communities.”

Her fellow Afghan, Rasoul Rasouli, CDD Operations and Development Expert and former Director General, Citizens’ Charter, Afghanistan, said the overall national project aimed at putting in place sustainable systems to reduce poverty and bind people to the government. It was now in its first phase, he said, and on a path to reach 40,000 villages in the country. “Community-driven development programs encourage the notion of participation and voluntary reason. It is quite feasible to expand the program fast and give more coverage. The bottom-up development gives a way for citizens through the different platforms of community participation, to participate in monitoring, social audit, score cards, and a comprehensive grievance redress mechanism linking the beneficiaries at the primary level to the government officials from the local all the way up to the national level to register their complaints.”

The Fambul Tok project in Sierra Leone shared a similar goal of community involvement with the Afghan Citizens’ Charter movement but proceeded on a different mindset, said John Caulker, Executive Director of Fambul Tok International, ”We don’t’ say ‘bottom up,’ we say ‘inside out’ because with all due respect, we believe that people should not be seen as the bottom. People have their answers to the problems, solutions to look out for, and that is the key. We don’t go to communities to solve their problems, we go to communities to facilitate a conversation.”

He explained that the Creole language phrase Fambul Tok means “family talks” and evolved in Sierra Leone in the aftermath of the country’s devastating and divisive civil war. “So the initial concept was to address gaps to work on reconciliation, get the people who suffered during the conflict to sit around to talk about what went wrong. ‘We used to be one big family. Your mother is my mother, and your father is my father, your child is my child. It takes a village to raise a child. What went wrong?’ So that was the initial idea, why we had Fambul Tok, and as the name implies, it’s a national conversation.”

When the Ebola crisis hit five years ago, Sierra Leone profited from this earlier experience with community-centered development. “We realized that it’s important to have a trusted relationship, which we had already forged, and because of that trusted relationship, we were able to lead a conversation at the community level. We were able to get stakeholders to listen to communities.”

Libby Hoffman, President of Catalyst for Peace, spoke of working with Mr. Caulker in Sierra Leone during the Ebola outbreak and a lesson she gleaned from that experience. She recalled that Mr. Caulker was frustrated by the response of the international community which he found replicative of the errors in the outside world’s response to the country’s post-civil war needs years earlier. “He said something that I found so inspiring that I wrote it down, and it’s become a keystone for me. Referring to international donors, he said, ‘They think they can just come in and pour resources at the problem to fix it. They don’t even see the community where the problem is happening.’ And that community is like a bowl, and it’s cracked. And if you pour water into a cracked bowl, it just goes right through, and if you keep pouring, it only makes the cracks bigger.”

Continuing her bowl metaphor, she said the way that Fambul Tok worked was “not about pouring water into the cup of the community, it was about repairing the cup through a community mobilization and engagement process so that it could hold the water itself and then it could generate its own activity and lead in its own reconciliation and development.” Holding up a model of concentric bowls to illustrate her point, she said, “You’ll see that there is no up or down. Depending on where you’re located, it’s a whole system, and the role of each level outside is to create the space that allows the resources in the level inside to be seen, motivated, and magnified. So this is what we mean when we say communities in the center, not separated and hierarchal but all together with distinct roles and responsibilities as part of a larger whole.”

Clare Lockhart, Director, Institute for State Effectiveness, said that the kinds of layered platform designs being discussed varied from place to place and had to be context-specific. “But one of the most important principles that we’ve heard today is that among the decisions, rights or responsibilities, the leadership for planning is vested in the community. And this can sometimes be quite hard for governments or NGOs to let go of when they got used to making the decisions. But it’s really important that shift about understanding that the community will be making the decision and plans for what happens in their community.”

On the crucial issue of financial support, she said that a “single window framework” was key to engaging donors. “From the perspective of donors with these often fragmented programs, having a single set of rules for operation and community development can be so crucial.”

Jimena Leiva-Roesch moderated the discussion.

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High and sustained economic growth rates of the Ghanaian economy in the past two to three decades have been accompanied by a growing urban middle class. With a rapidly growing middle class, overall consumption is not only increasing but changing too. This paper analyses the asset ownership patterns among the Ghanaian middle class, and examines the effect of household wealth, environmental concern and environmental knowledge on carbon dioxide emissions emanating from energy use and transport based on urban household survey data collected in Accra, the capital city, in 2018. We find that middle class households consume a variety of energy intensive consumer goods, and the intensity of consumption increases with household wealth. Regression results reveal statistically significant relationship between household wealth and carbon emissions from energy and transport use. We also find that environmental knowledge has a statistically negative effect on carbon emissions from transport. The policy implications are discussed.

High and sustained economic growth rates of the Ghanaian economy in the past two to three decades have been accompanied by a growing urban middle class. With a rapidly growing middle class, overall consumption is not only increasing but changing too. This paper analyses the asset ownership patterns among the Ghanaian middle class, and examines the effect of household wealth, environmental concern and environmental knowledge on carbon dioxide emissions emanating from energy use and transport based on urban household survey data collected in Accra, the capital city, in 2018. We find that middle class households consume a variety of energy intensive consumer goods, and the intensity of consumption increases with household wealth. Regression results reveal statistically significant relationship between household wealth and carbon emissions from energy and transport use. We also find that environmental knowledge has a statistically negative effect on carbon emissions from transport. The policy implications are discussed.

High and sustained economic growth rates of the Ghanaian economy in the past two to three decades have been accompanied by a growing urban middle class. With a rapidly growing middle class, overall consumption is not only increasing but changing too. This paper analyses the asset ownership patterns among the Ghanaian middle class, and examines the effect of household wealth, environmental concern and environmental knowledge on carbon dioxide emissions emanating from energy use and transport based on urban household survey data collected in Accra, the capital city, in 2018. We find that middle class households consume a variety of energy intensive consumer goods, and the intensity of consumption increases with household wealth. Regression results reveal statistically significant relationship between household wealth and carbon emissions from energy and transport use. We also find that environmental knowledge has a statistically negative effect on carbon emissions from transport. The policy implications are discussed.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.
The extraction of minerals and metals comes with a large water footprint, both in terms of water needed for extraction itself and in terms of wastewater discharge and the potential pollution of water resources. Thus, coordination between the mining and water sectors is key. A number of instruments to that end have been devised, which aim to mitigate the negative impacts of mining on water resources and on water-resource dependent communities. Among these are environmental impact assessments (EIAs), stakeholder involvement within these processes and within river basin management, and payment schemes that incentivise wastewater treatment at the mine. Whether and how these instruments are implemented depends on the national, provincial and local context, since each instrument involves a number of preconditions. Assessing the effectiveness of these instruments thus requires a sound analysis of the governance system within which they operate.
In this Briefing Paper, we focus on Mongolia as an example case study and look at stakeholder involvement and incentivising wastewater treatment as two key strategies to increase coordination. We assess how these strategies are translated into policies and how they are implemented on the ground in two adjacent river basins. In doing so, we pay particular attention to the human and financial capacities of lower-level administrative entities, as well as to the availability of water-related information, as essential prerequisites for effective natural resource governance.
We find that the Mongolian governance system stipulates the implementation of stakeholder involvement through multiple processes, most importantly through River Basin Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (RB-MSPs) and community consultation within the EIA procedure. In practice, however, the RB-MSP in the study area has yet to diversify its membership from mostly lower-level administrative staff, and community consultations rarely take place. In terms of incentivising wastewater treatment, Mongolia passed amendments to its Water Pollution Fee Law in summer 2019 and is now working on implementation guidelines. Challenges here relate to the collection of data for a baseline on water quality and to guarantees for adequate sampling and analysis. This is tied to the limited human and financial capacity of lower-level administrative entities, which struggle to access or evaluate relevant data.
We recommend that:
•    the diversity of stakeholders in RB-MSPs is increased to better include the private sector and civil society, with sensitivity to differences in socioeconomic standing to ensure equitable access to and deliberation within the platform;
•    the enacting of public consultations as part of EIAs is ensured and governmental procedures (i.e. mining licensing and approval of EIAs) are made more transparent and accountable;
•    public availability of water data is increased;
•    the Water Pollution Fee Law is implemented swiftly to provide incentives for the treatment of mining wastewater before discharge;
•    funding and institutional capacity development for lower-level administrative bodies are increased and funding for RB-MSPs is provided to enable them to fulfill their mandates.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.
The extraction of minerals and metals comes with a large water footprint, both in terms of water needed for extraction itself and in terms of wastewater discharge and the potential pollution of water resources. Thus, coordination between the mining and water sectors is key. A number of instruments to that end have been devised, which aim to mitigate the negative impacts of mining on water resources and on water-resource dependent communities. Among these are environmental impact assessments (EIAs), stakeholder involvement within these processes and within river basin management, and payment schemes that incentivise wastewater treatment at the mine. Whether and how these instruments are implemented depends on the national, provincial and local context, since each instrument involves a number of preconditions. Assessing the effectiveness of these instruments thus requires a sound analysis of the governance system within which they operate.
In this Briefing Paper, we focus on Mongolia as an example case study and look at stakeholder involvement and incentivising wastewater treatment as two key strategies to increase coordination. We assess how these strategies are translated into policies and how they are implemented on the ground in two adjacent river basins. In doing so, we pay particular attention to the human and financial capacities of lower-level administrative entities, as well as to the availability of water-related information, as essential prerequisites for effective natural resource governance.
We find that the Mongolian governance system stipulates the implementation of stakeholder involvement through multiple processes, most importantly through River Basin Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (RB-MSPs) and community consultation within the EIA procedure. In practice, however, the RB-MSP in the study area has yet to diversify its membership from mostly lower-level administrative staff, and community consultations rarely take place. In terms of incentivising wastewater treatment, Mongolia passed amendments to its Water Pollution Fee Law in summer 2019 and is now working on implementation guidelines. Challenges here relate to the collection of data for a baseline on water quality and to guarantees for adequate sampling and analysis. This is tied to the limited human and financial capacity of lower-level administrative entities, which struggle to access or evaluate relevant data.
We recommend that:
•    the diversity of stakeholders in RB-MSPs is increased to better include the private sector and civil society, with sensitivity to differences in socioeconomic standing to ensure equitable access to and deliberation within the platform;
•    the enacting of public consultations as part of EIAs is ensured and governmental procedures (i.e. mining licensing and approval of EIAs) are made more transparent and accountable;
•    public availability of water data is increased;
•    the Water Pollution Fee Law is implemented swiftly to provide incentives for the treatment of mining wastewater before discharge;
•    funding and institutional capacity development for lower-level administrative bodies are increased and funding for RB-MSPs is provided to enable them to fulfill their mandates.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.
The extraction of minerals and metals comes with a large water footprint, both in terms of water needed for extraction itself and in terms of wastewater discharge and the potential pollution of water resources. Thus, coordination between the mining and water sectors is key. A number of instruments to that end have been devised, which aim to mitigate the negative impacts of mining on water resources and on water-resource dependent communities. Among these are environmental impact assessments (EIAs), stakeholder involvement within these processes and within river basin management, and payment schemes that incentivise wastewater treatment at the mine. Whether and how these instruments are implemented depends on the national, provincial and local context, since each instrument involves a number of preconditions. Assessing the effectiveness of these instruments thus requires a sound analysis of the governance system within which they operate.
In this Briefing Paper, we focus on Mongolia as an example case study and look at stakeholder involvement and incentivising wastewater treatment as two key strategies to increase coordination. We assess how these strategies are translated into policies and how they are implemented on the ground in two adjacent river basins. In doing so, we pay particular attention to the human and financial capacities of lower-level administrative entities, as well as to the availability of water-related information, as essential prerequisites for effective natural resource governance.
We find that the Mongolian governance system stipulates the implementation of stakeholder involvement through multiple processes, most importantly through River Basin Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (RB-MSPs) and community consultation within the EIA procedure. In practice, however, the RB-MSP in the study area has yet to diversify its membership from mostly lower-level administrative staff, and community consultations rarely take place. In terms of incentivising wastewater treatment, Mongolia passed amendments to its Water Pollution Fee Law in summer 2019 and is now working on implementation guidelines. Challenges here relate to the collection of data for a baseline on water quality and to guarantees for adequate sampling and analysis. This is tied to the limited human and financial capacity of lower-level administrative entities, which struggle to access or evaluate relevant data.
We recommend that:
•    the diversity of stakeholders in RB-MSPs is increased to better include the private sector and civil society, with sensitivity to differences in socioeconomic standing to ensure equitable access to and deliberation within the platform;
•    the enacting of public consultations as part of EIAs is ensured and governmental procedures (i.e. mining licensing and approval of EIAs) are made more transparent and accountable;
•    public availability of water data is increased;
•    the Water Pollution Fee Law is implemented swiftly to provide incentives for the treatment of mining wastewater before discharge;
•    funding and institutional capacity development for lower-level administrative bodies are increased and funding for RB-MSPs is provided to enable them to fulfill their mandates.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.
Water problems in Iran are intensifying and have mostly been left unaddressed. The Zayandeh Rud River, as one of the main rivers in Iran, suffers from severe physical water scarcity. For decades, water demand has intensified, leading to increased rivalry between regions and economic sectors. Water transfers to the basin have been implemented as the main response without addressing the societal reasons for water scarcity. Currently, considerable tensions and conflicts over water – amplified by climate change and variability – are evident. Despite legal prescriptions for coordination and top-down command of the state, implementation has been deficient. Ineffective coordination practice manifests in fragmented planning, missing information exchange, centralised rule-making, intransparent decision-making and a lack of accountability. The persistence of these challenges implies that water shortage is a symptom of a deeper problem related to the consequences of Iran’s oil state context: Revenues pouring from the rent of oil have changed the role of the state as the principal recipient of the external rent. Power has become concentrated at the national level with an expanding bureaucracy and top-down intervention while undermining the capacity to develop coherent policies.
A lack of state capacity in policy implementation and administrative disorganisation has led to insufficient coordination. In the context of the Zayandeh Rud basin, these deficits become apparent in the limited control and enforcement of rules over water withdrawals, especially from wells (which partly are illegal); redundant coordination mechanisms without well-defined structures and no stakeholder involvement; and missing adaptation of plans and strategies to address the challenges. The technocratic focus on inter-basin water transfers and dam construction projects hides the lack of institutional capacity in the water sector, and it weakens incentives to develop more sophisticated approaches such as basin-wide strategies to manage water demand. We therefore recommend:
•    more transparency in decision-making, along with general public access to information on the water consumption of different users; the promotion of a realistic picture of the river and a raising of the public’s awareness about each individual’s responsibility for a healthy river as well as the social benefits of successful water cooperation;
•    an alteration of the relationship between oil rent and the illusion of water abundance through the development of a proactive and collaborative strategy to build public support for shifting from water supply-oriented to water-demand management policies.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.
Water problems in Iran are intensifying and have mostly been left unaddressed. The Zayandeh Rud River, as one of the main rivers in Iran, suffers from severe physical water scarcity. For decades, water demand has intensified, leading to increased rivalry between regions and economic sectors. Water transfers to the basin have been implemented as the main response without addressing the societal reasons for water scarcity. Currently, considerable tensions and conflicts over water – amplified by climate change and variability – are evident. Despite legal prescriptions for coordination and top-down command of the state, implementation has been deficient. Ineffective coordination practice manifests in fragmented planning, missing information exchange, centralised rule-making, intransparent decision-making and a lack of accountability. The persistence of these challenges implies that water shortage is a symptom of a deeper problem related to the consequences of Iran’s oil state context: Revenues pouring from the rent of oil have changed the role of the state as the principal recipient of the external rent. Power has become concentrated at the national level with an expanding bureaucracy and top-down intervention while undermining the capacity to develop coherent policies.
A lack of state capacity in policy implementation and administrative disorganisation has led to insufficient coordination. In the context of the Zayandeh Rud basin, these deficits become apparent in the limited control and enforcement of rules over water withdrawals, especially from wells (which partly are illegal); redundant coordination mechanisms without well-defined structures and no stakeholder involvement; and missing adaptation of plans and strategies to address the challenges. The technocratic focus on inter-basin water transfers and dam construction projects hides the lack of institutional capacity in the water sector, and it weakens incentives to develop more sophisticated approaches such as basin-wide strategies to manage water demand. We therefore recommend:
•    more transparency in decision-making, along with general public access to information on the water consumption of different users; the promotion of a realistic picture of the river and a raising of the public’s awareness about each individual’s responsibility for a healthy river as well as the social benefits of successful water cooperation;
•    an alteration of the relationship between oil rent and the illusion of water abundance through the development of a proactive and collaborative strategy to build public support for shifting from water supply-oriented to water-demand management policies.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.
Water problems in Iran are intensifying and have mostly been left unaddressed. The Zayandeh Rud River, as one of the main rivers in Iran, suffers from severe physical water scarcity. For decades, water demand has intensified, leading to increased rivalry between regions and economic sectors. Water transfers to the basin have been implemented as the main response without addressing the societal reasons for water scarcity. Currently, considerable tensions and conflicts over water – amplified by climate change and variability – are evident. Despite legal prescriptions for coordination and top-down command of the state, implementation has been deficient. Ineffective coordination practice manifests in fragmented planning, missing information exchange, centralised rule-making, intransparent decision-making and a lack of accountability. The persistence of these challenges implies that water shortage is a symptom of a deeper problem related to the consequences of Iran’s oil state context: Revenues pouring from the rent of oil have changed the role of the state as the principal recipient of the external rent. Power has become concentrated at the national level with an expanding bureaucracy and top-down intervention while undermining the capacity to develop coherent policies.
A lack of state capacity in policy implementation and administrative disorganisation has led to insufficient coordination. In the context of the Zayandeh Rud basin, these deficits become apparent in the limited control and enforcement of rules over water withdrawals, especially from wells (which partly are illegal); redundant coordination mechanisms without well-defined structures and no stakeholder involvement; and missing adaptation of plans and strategies to address the challenges. The technocratic focus on inter-basin water transfers and dam construction projects hides the lack of institutional capacity in the water sector, and it weakens incentives to develop more sophisticated approaches such as basin-wide strategies to manage water demand. We therefore recommend:
•    more transparency in decision-making, along with general public access to information on the water consumption of different users; the promotion of a realistic picture of the river and a raising of the public’s awareness about each individual’s responsibility for a healthy river as well as the social benefits of successful water cooperation;
•    an alteration of the relationship between oil rent and the illusion of water abundance through the development of a proactive and collaborative strategy to build public support for shifting from water supply-oriented to water-demand management policies.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.
The European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD) requires member states to achieve a good status for all waters by 2027. Mediterranean countries, including Spain, are facing significant problems of water quantity, which is why one of their main challenges in achieving a good water status is to maintain ecological flows and reduce over-extraction of groundwater. Authorities are confronted with mediating between the competing interests of different water using sectors, such as irrigation, urban water supply and tourism, and non-consumptive uses, such as the environment. Despite recurring requests by scholars and commitments by policy-makers to strengthen cross-sectoral and cross-level coordination to address these trade-offs, coordination deficits remain in the Mediterranean, but also in many other parts of the world. This Briefing Paper examines coordination and implementation challenges between the water and agricultural sectors in relation to water quantity in the context of WFD implementation in the Guadalquivir river basin, southern Spain. These have been identified as: (i) the lack of revision of water rights after the implementation of drip irrigation, (ii) weaknesses in monitoring water use and closing illegal wells, and (iii) limited cross-sectoral exchange during participatory processes. These challenges are interlinked by the underlying difficulty of imposing unpopular decisions against the will of powerful actors in the agricultural sector. To address these challenges, we suggest various coordination instruments based on incentives, voluntary cooperation, persuasion and information exchange. In particular, we recommend the following:
•    Increase financial and human resources for the revision of water rights, monitoring of water use and closure of illegal wells.
•    Facilitate cooperative processes to achieve a multisectoral consensus on how and where water rights will be reduced.
•    Provide incentives for irrigation communities to further strengthen self-control of groundwater use among members.
•    Strengthen cross-sectoral exchange among stakeholders within participatory processes, especially between environmental and agricultural interest groups and improve communication with citizens.
•    Use more comprehensive and inclusive ways of providing information in the context of river basin planning.
However, since the identified challenges are systemic and relate to fundamental distributional questions, there are limits to the potential of coordination instruments. Thus, a clear indication of political will is also needed.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.
The European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD) requires member states to achieve a good status for all waters by 2027. Mediterranean countries, including Spain, are facing significant problems of water quantity, which is why one of their main challenges in achieving a good water status is to maintain ecological flows and reduce over-extraction of groundwater. Authorities are confronted with mediating between the competing interests of different water using sectors, such as irrigation, urban water supply and tourism, and non-consumptive uses, such as the environment. Despite recurring requests by scholars and commitments by policy-makers to strengthen cross-sectoral and cross-level coordination to address these trade-offs, coordination deficits remain in the Mediterranean, but also in many other parts of the world. This Briefing Paper examines coordination and implementation challenges between the water and agricultural sectors in relation to water quantity in the context of WFD implementation in the Guadalquivir river basin, southern Spain. These have been identified as: (i) the lack of revision of water rights after the implementation of drip irrigation, (ii) weaknesses in monitoring water use and closing illegal wells, and (iii) limited cross-sectoral exchange during participatory processes. These challenges are interlinked by the underlying difficulty of imposing unpopular decisions against the will of powerful actors in the agricultural sector. To address these challenges, we suggest various coordination instruments based on incentives, voluntary cooperation, persuasion and information exchange. In particular, we recommend the following:
•    Increase financial and human resources for the revision of water rights, monitoring of water use and closure of illegal wells.
•    Facilitate cooperative processes to achieve a multisectoral consensus on how and where water rights will be reduced.
•    Provide incentives for irrigation communities to further strengthen self-control of groundwater use among members.
•    Strengthen cross-sectoral exchange among stakeholders within participatory processes, especially between environmental and agricultural interest groups and improve communication with citizens.
•    Use more comprehensive and inclusive ways of providing information in the context of river basin planning.
However, since the identified challenges are systemic and relate to fundamental distributional questions, there are limits to the potential of coordination instruments. Thus, a clear indication of political will is also needed.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.
The European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD) requires member states to achieve a good status for all waters by 2027. Mediterranean countries, including Spain, are facing significant problems of water quantity, which is why one of their main challenges in achieving a good water status is to maintain ecological flows and reduce over-extraction of groundwater. Authorities are confronted with mediating between the competing interests of different water using sectors, such as irrigation, urban water supply and tourism, and non-consumptive uses, such as the environment. Despite recurring requests by scholars and commitments by policy-makers to strengthen cross-sectoral and cross-level coordination to address these trade-offs, coordination deficits remain in the Mediterranean, but also in many other parts of the world. This Briefing Paper examines coordination and implementation challenges between the water and agricultural sectors in relation to water quantity in the context of WFD implementation in the Guadalquivir river basin, southern Spain. These have been identified as: (i) the lack of revision of water rights after the implementation of drip irrigation, (ii) weaknesses in monitoring water use and closing illegal wells, and (iii) limited cross-sectoral exchange during participatory processes. These challenges are interlinked by the underlying difficulty of imposing unpopular decisions against the will of powerful actors in the agricultural sector. To address these challenges, we suggest various coordination instruments based on incentives, voluntary cooperation, persuasion and information exchange. In particular, we recommend the following:
•    Increase financial and human resources for the revision of water rights, monitoring of water use and closure of illegal wells.
•    Facilitate cooperative processes to achieve a multisectoral consensus on how and where water rights will be reduced.
•    Provide incentives for irrigation communities to further strengthen self-control of groundwater use among members.
•    Strengthen cross-sectoral exchange among stakeholders within participatory processes, especially between environmental and agricultural interest groups and improve communication with citizens.
•    Use more comprehensive and inclusive ways of providing information in the context of river basin planning.
However, since the identified challenges are systemic and relate to fundamental distributional questions, there are limits to the potential of coordination instruments. Thus, a clear indication of political will is also needed.

Fast auf den Tag genau vor 14 Jahren wurde Muhammad Yunus, der als Begründer der Mikrokredite gilt, als Friedensnobelpreisträger des Jahres 2006 benannt. In seiner Preisrede unterstrich er die Rolle kleiner Kredite in der Armutsbekämpfung. Ein Jahr zuvor hatten die Vereinten Nationen das Internationale Jahr der Mikrokredite ausgerufen. Diese Ereignisse haben dem Finanzinstrument große Beachtung in der Öffentlichkeit beschert. Seitdem ist das Mikrofinanzwesen weitergewachsen, in einigen Ländern durch schwere Krisen gegangen und sowohl medial als auch in der Wissenschaft unter Druck geraten. Das alte Narrativ um Mikrokredite gilt nicht mehr, da das Instrument seine Grenzen in der Armutsbekämpfung zeigt: Es muss in eine größere Entwicklungsstrategie eingebettet werden.

Die Vergabe von Mikrokrediten und anderen Finanzdienstleistungen an Menschen, die keinen Zugang zu konventionellen Banken haben, begann im Jahr 1983 in Bangladesch mit der Gründung der Grameen Bank durch den Wirtschaftsprofessor Muhammad Yunus. Obwohl das Konzept in zahlreichen Ländern kopiert wurde, war um die Jahrtausendwende eine rigorose Wirkungsmessung nur bedingt möglich. Die öffentliche Wahrnehmung wurde vor allem von anekdotischen Erzählungen geprägt: Dass kleine Kredite ärmere Personen befähigten ihre Geschäftsideen zu verwirklichen und damit ihren Weg aus der Armut zu gehen. Der marktbasierte Ansatz mit dem Versprechen einer doppelten Dividende (ökonomisch und sozial), fand großen Anklang unter Gebern und wurde durch Zuwendungen und subventionierte Kredite gefördert. Mikrofinanz wuchs auf über 211 Millionen Kreditnehmer*innen weltweit und entwickelte sich von einem NGO-dominierten zu einem profitorientierten Sektor, bei dem einzelne Mikrofinanzinstitutionen sogar an die Börse gingen. Die Kommerzialisierung des Mikrofinanzsektors sorgte für eine beachtliche Verbreitung und Verfügbarkeit von Mikrokrediten, führte in verschiedenen Ländern aber auch zu schweren Krisen mit Überschuldung, Kreditausfällen und meist drastischen sozialen Folgen. Hohe Wellen schlugen beispielsweise Nachrichtenbeiträge über die Entwicklungen in Indien als 2010/11 Mikrokreditnehmer*innen den Suizid als einzigen Ausweg aus ihrer Schuldenspirale sahen.

Randomisiert kontrollierte Studien (RCTs) ermöglichten in den 2010er-Jahren eine verlässliche Wirkungsmessung, die weder die vielversprechenden Anekdoten noch die scharfe Kritik von Mikrofinanzgegnern unterstützte. RCTs aus verschiedenen Ländern zeigen, dass der durchschnittliche Effekt auf unternehmerische Aktivitäten sehr moderat ist.  Es gibt positive Effekte auf Investitionen in langlebige Güter wie Werkzeuge und einfache Maschinen, und teilweise auch auf Unternehmensgröße und Profite. Allerdings stellen sich keine dauerhaften Veränderungen im Einkommens- oder Konsumniveau auf Haushaltsebene und dadurch auch keine transformativen Effekte auf Bildung, Gesundheit, Teilhabe von Frauen oder subjektives Wohlbefinden ein. Nach heutigem Wissensstand scheiden Mikrokredite also als Instrument zur Armutsbekämpfung aus. Dennoch gibt es eine Daseinsberechtigung aus ökonomischer und entwicklungspolitischer Sicht: Zum einen ermöglichen Mikrokredite mehr Selbstbestimmung und Sicherheit für ärmere Haushalte durch größere Freiheiten in der Berufswahl und das Ausgleichen von Einkommensschwankungen. Zudem schneiden Mikrokredite im Vergleich zu anderen Entwicklungsinstrumenten in Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen relativ gut ab, so dass Subventionen im Mikrofinanzbereich gerechtfertigt werden können, auch wenn die Effekte klein sein mögen.

Aktuelle DIE Forschung zu kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen, betrachtet unter anderem Mikrofinanz im größeren Kontext des nationalen Finanzsystems. Dabei zeigt sich, dass ein starker Mikrofinanzsektor den Zugang zu ausreichend großen Krediten für erfolgreiche kleine Unternehmen verschlechtern kann. Der Grund ist, dass für diese Unternehmen Mikrokredite zu niedrig, aber höhere Kredite bei konventionellen Banken nicht verfügbar sind. Unter anderem weil Banken nicht „downscalen“, das heißt keine geeigneten Finanzinstrumente für diese Unternehmen entwickeln, da starke Mikrofinanzinstitutionen dieses Marktsegment und die damit verbundenen Profitmargen einengen. Eine unbeabsichtigte Folge von Mikrofinanz ist also, dass gerade erfolgreiche kleine Unternehmen, die aufgrund ihres Wachstums wichtige Impulse für die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen und die lokale wirtschaftliche Entwicklung setzen, durch Finanzierungsengpässe ausgebremst werden.

Deshalb gilt es den Mikrofinanzsektor in eine größere Strategie für die Finanzsystementwicklung einzubetten. Beispielsweise können funktionierende Kreditbüros, denen auch Mikrofinanzinstitutionen zur Meldung verpflichtet sind, für kleine Unternehmen den Übergang von Mikrofinanz zu einem Anschlusskredit im konventionellen Finanzsystem erleichtern. Mikrofinanzinstitutionen leisten einen wichtigen Beitrag, da der Zugang zu Finanzdienstleistungen für ärmere Menschen mehr Selbstbestimmung und Sicherheit im Alltag schafft. Allerdings müssen wir uns der Grenzen von Mikrokrediten bewusst sein: Um transformative Effekte und Fortschritte in der Armutsbekämpfung zu erzielen, braucht es soziale Sicherung und umfassendere Programme wie beispielsweise „multi-faceted programs“, die neben Mikrofinanzdienstleistungen auch Training, Coaching, und einmalige Zuwendungen beinhalten.

Fast auf den Tag genau vor 14 Jahren wurde Muhammad Yunus, der als Begründer der Mikrokredite gilt, als Friedensnobelpreisträger des Jahres 2006 benannt. In seiner Preisrede unterstrich er die Rolle kleiner Kredite in der Armutsbekämpfung. Ein Jahr zuvor hatten die Vereinten Nationen das Internationale Jahr der Mikrokredite ausgerufen. Diese Ereignisse haben dem Finanzinstrument große Beachtung in der Öffentlichkeit beschert. Seitdem ist das Mikrofinanzwesen weitergewachsen, in einigen Ländern durch schwere Krisen gegangen und sowohl medial als auch in der Wissenschaft unter Druck geraten. Das alte Narrativ um Mikrokredite gilt nicht mehr, da das Instrument seine Grenzen in der Armutsbekämpfung zeigt: Es muss in eine größere Entwicklungsstrategie eingebettet werden.

Die Vergabe von Mikrokrediten und anderen Finanzdienstleistungen an Menschen, die keinen Zugang zu konventionellen Banken haben, begann im Jahr 1983 in Bangladesch mit der Gründung der Grameen Bank durch den Wirtschaftsprofessor Muhammad Yunus. Obwohl das Konzept in zahlreichen Ländern kopiert wurde, war um die Jahrtausendwende eine rigorose Wirkungsmessung nur bedingt möglich. Die öffentliche Wahrnehmung wurde vor allem von anekdotischen Erzählungen geprägt: Dass kleine Kredite ärmere Personen befähigten ihre Geschäftsideen zu verwirklichen und damit ihren Weg aus der Armut zu gehen. Der marktbasierte Ansatz mit dem Versprechen einer doppelten Dividende (ökonomisch und sozial), fand großen Anklang unter Gebern und wurde durch Zuwendungen und subventionierte Kredite gefördert. Mikrofinanz wuchs auf über 211 Millionen Kreditnehmer*innen weltweit und entwickelte sich von einem NGO-dominierten zu einem profitorientierten Sektor, bei dem einzelne Mikrofinanzinstitutionen sogar an die Börse gingen. Die Kommerzialisierung des Mikrofinanzsektors sorgte für eine beachtliche Verbreitung und Verfügbarkeit von Mikrokrediten, führte in verschiedenen Ländern aber auch zu schweren Krisen mit Überschuldung, Kreditausfällen und meist drastischen sozialen Folgen. Hohe Wellen schlugen beispielsweise Nachrichtenbeiträge über die Entwicklungen in Indien als 2010/11 Mikrokreditnehmer*innen den Suizid als einzigen Ausweg aus ihrer Schuldenspirale sahen.

Randomisiert kontrollierte Studien (RCTs) ermöglichten in den 2010er-Jahren eine verlässliche Wirkungsmessung, die weder die vielversprechenden Anekdoten noch die scharfe Kritik von Mikrofinanzgegnern unterstützte. RCTs aus verschiedenen Ländern zeigen, dass der durchschnittliche Effekt auf unternehmerische Aktivitäten sehr moderat ist.  Es gibt positive Effekte auf Investitionen in langlebige Güter wie Werkzeuge und einfache Maschinen, und teilweise auch auf Unternehmensgröße und Profite. Allerdings stellen sich keine dauerhaften Veränderungen im Einkommens- oder Konsumniveau auf Haushaltsebene und dadurch auch keine transformativen Effekte auf Bildung, Gesundheit, Teilhabe von Frauen oder subjektives Wohlbefinden ein. Nach heutigem Wissensstand scheiden Mikrokredite also als Instrument zur Armutsbekämpfung aus. Dennoch gibt es eine Daseinsberechtigung aus ökonomischer und entwicklungspolitischer Sicht: Zum einen ermöglichen Mikrokredite mehr Selbstbestimmung und Sicherheit für ärmere Haushalte durch größere Freiheiten in der Berufswahl und das Ausgleichen von Einkommensschwankungen. Zudem schneiden Mikrokredite im Vergleich zu anderen Entwicklungsinstrumenten in Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen relativ gut ab, so dass Subventionen im Mikrofinanzbereich gerechtfertigt werden können, auch wenn die Effekte klein sein mögen.

Aktuelle DIE Forschung zu kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen, betrachtet unter anderem Mikrofinanz im größeren Kontext des nationalen Finanzsystems. Dabei zeigt sich, dass ein starker Mikrofinanzsektor den Zugang zu ausreichend großen Krediten für erfolgreiche kleine Unternehmen verschlechtern kann. Der Grund ist, dass für diese Unternehmen Mikrokredite zu niedrig, aber höhere Kredite bei konventionellen Banken nicht verfügbar sind. Unter anderem weil Banken nicht „downscalen“, das heißt keine geeigneten Finanzinstrumente für diese Unternehmen entwickeln, da starke Mikrofinanzinstitutionen dieses Marktsegment und die damit verbundenen Profitmargen einengen. Eine unbeabsichtigte Folge von Mikrofinanz ist also, dass gerade erfolgreiche kleine Unternehmen, die aufgrund ihres Wachstums wichtige Impulse für die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen und die lokale wirtschaftliche Entwicklung setzen, durch Finanzierungsengpässe ausgebremst werden.

Deshalb gilt es den Mikrofinanzsektor in eine größere Strategie für die Finanzsystementwicklung einzubetten. Beispielsweise können funktionierende Kreditbüros, denen auch Mikrofinanzinstitutionen zur Meldung verpflichtet sind, für kleine Unternehmen den Übergang von Mikrofinanz zu einem Anschlusskredit im konventionellen Finanzsystem erleichtern. Mikrofinanzinstitutionen leisten einen wichtigen Beitrag, da der Zugang zu Finanzdienstleistungen für ärmere Menschen mehr Selbstbestimmung und Sicherheit im Alltag schafft. Allerdings müssen wir uns der Grenzen von Mikrokrediten bewusst sein: Um transformative Effekte und Fortschritte in der Armutsbekämpfung zu erzielen, braucht es soziale Sicherung und umfassendere Programme wie beispielsweise „multi-faceted programs“, die neben Mikrofinanzdienstleistungen auch Training, Coaching, und einmalige Zuwendungen beinhalten.

Fast auf den Tag genau vor 14 Jahren wurde Muhammad Yunus, der als Begründer der Mikrokredite gilt, als Friedensnobelpreisträger des Jahres 2006 benannt. In seiner Preisrede unterstrich er die Rolle kleiner Kredite in der Armutsbekämpfung. Ein Jahr zuvor hatten die Vereinten Nationen das Internationale Jahr der Mikrokredite ausgerufen. Diese Ereignisse haben dem Finanzinstrument große Beachtung in der Öffentlichkeit beschert. Seitdem ist das Mikrofinanzwesen weitergewachsen, in einigen Ländern durch schwere Krisen gegangen und sowohl medial als auch in der Wissenschaft unter Druck geraten. Das alte Narrativ um Mikrokredite gilt nicht mehr, da das Instrument seine Grenzen in der Armutsbekämpfung zeigt: Es muss in eine größere Entwicklungsstrategie eingebettet werden.

Die Vergabe von Mikrokrediten und anderen Finanzdienstleistungen an Menschen, die keinen Zugang zu konventionellen Banken haben, begann im Jahr 1983 in Bangladesch mit der Gründung der Grameen Bank durch den Wirtschaftsprofessor Muhammad Yunus. Obwohl das Konzept in zahlreichen Ländern kopiert wurde, war um die Jahrtausendwende eine rigorose Wirkungsmessung nur bedingt möglich. Die öffentliche Wahrnehmung wurde vor allem von anekdotischen Erzählungen geprägt: Dass kleine Kredite ärmere Personen befähigten ihre Geschäftsideen zu verwirklichen und damit ihren Weg aus der Armut zu gehen. Der marktbasierte Ansatz mit dem Versprechen einer doppelten Dividende (ökonomisch und sozial), fand großen Anklang unter Gebern und wurde durch Zuwendungen und subventionierte Kredite gefördert. Mikrofinanz wuchs auf über 211 Millionen Kreditnehmer*innen weltweit und entwickelte sich von einem NGO-dominierten zu einem profitorientierten Sektor, bei dem einzelne Mikrofinanzinstitutionen sogar an die Börse gingen. Die Kommerzialisierung des Mikrofinanzsektors sorgte für eine beachtliche Verbreitung und Verfügbarkeit von Mikrokrediten, führte in verschiedenen Ländern aber auch zu schweren Krisen mit Überschuldung, Kreditausfällen und meist drastischen sozialen Folgen. Hohe Wellen schlugen beispielsweise Nachrichtenbeiträge über die Entwicklungen in Indien als 2010/11 Mikrokreditnehmer*innen den Suizid als einzigen Ausweg aus ihrer Schuldenspirale sahen.

Randomisiert kontrollierte Studien (RCTs) ermöglichten in den 2010er-Jahren eine verlässliche Wirkungsmessung, die weder die vielversprechenden Anekdoten noch die scharfe Kritik von Mikrofinanzgegnern unterstützte. RCTs aus verschiedenen Ländern zeigen, dass der durchschnittliche Effekt auf unternehmerische Aktivitäten sehr moderat ist.  Es gibt positive Effekte auf Investitionen in langlebige Güter wie Werkzeuge und einfache Maschinen, und teilweise auch auf Unternehmensgröße und Profite. Allerdings stellen sich keine dauerhaften Veränderungen im Einkommens- oder Konsumniveau auf Haushaltsebene und dadurch auch keine transformativen Effekte auf Bildung, Gesundheit, Teilhabe von Frauen oder subjektives Wohlbefinden ein. Nach heutigem Wissensstand scheiden Mikrokredite also als Instrument zur Armutsbekämpfung aus. Dennoch gibt es eine Daseinsberechtigung aus ökonomischer und entwicklungspolitischer Sicht: Zum einen ermöglichen Mikrokredite mehr Selbstbestimmung und Sicherheit für ärmere Haushalte durch größere Freiheiten in der Berufswahl und das Ausgleichen von Einkommensschwankungen. Zudem schneiden Mikrokredite im Vergleich zu anderen Entwicklungsinstrumenten in Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen relativ gut ab, so dass Subventionen im Mikrofinanzbereich gerechtfertigt werden können, auch wenn die Effekte klein sein mögen.

Aktuelle DIE Forschung zu kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen, betrachtet unter anderem Mikrofinanz im größeren Kontext des nationalen Finanzsystems. Dabei zeigt sich, dass ein starker Mikrofinanzsektor den Zugang zu ausreichend großen Krediten für erfolgreiche kleine Unternehmen verschlechtern kann. Der Grund ist, dass für diese Unternehmen Mikrokredite zu niedrig, aber höhere Kredite bei konventionellen Banken nicht verfügbar sind. Unter anderem weil Banken nicht „downscalen“, das heißt keine geeigneten Finanzinstrumente für diese Unternehmen entwickeln, da starke Mikrofinanzinstitutionen dieses Marktsegment und die damit verbundenen Profitmargen einengen. Eine unbeabsichtigte Folge von Mikrofinanz ist also, dass gerade erfolgreiche kleine Unternehmen, die aufgrund ihres Wachstums wichtige Impulse für die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen und die lokale wirtschaftliche Entwicklung setzen, durch Finanzierungsengpässe ausgebremst werden.

Deshalb gilt es den Mikrofinanzsektor in eine größere Strategie für die Finanzsystementwicklung einzubetten. Beispielsweise können funktionierende Kreditbüros, denen auch Mikrofinanzinstitutionen zur Meldung verpflichtet sind, für kleine Unternehmen den Übergang von Mikrofinanz zu einem Anschlusskredit im konventionellen Finanzsystem erleichtern. Mikrofinanzinstitutionen leisten einen wichtigen Beitrag, da der Zugang zu Finanzdienstleistungen für ärmere Menschen mehr Selbstbestimmung und Sicherheit im Alltag schafft. Allerdings müssen wir uns der Grenzen von Mikrokrediten bewusst sein: Um transformative Effekte und Fortschritte in der Armutsbekämpfung zu erzielen, braucht es soziale Sicherung und umfassendere Programme wie beispielsweise „multi-faceted programs“, die neben Mikrofinanzdienstleistungen auch Training, Coaching, und einmalige Zuwendungen beinhalten.

The rising importance of cities, states and regions, firms, investors, and other subnational and non-state actors in global and national responses to climate change raises a critical question: to what extent does this climate action deliver results? This article introduces a conceptual framework that researchers and practitioners can use as a template to assess the progress, implementation, and impact of climate action by sub- and non-state actors. This framework is used to review existing studies that track progress, implementation, and achievement of such climate action between 2014 and mid-2019. While researchers have made important advances in assessing the scope and future potential of sub- and non-state climate action, we find knowledge gaps around ex-post achievement of results, indirect impacts, and climate action beyond the realm of greenhouse gas reductions.
Key policy insights
• While we increasingly understand the scale, scope, and potential of climate action by sub- and non-state actors, we lack rigorous evidence regarding the results achieved and their broader impacts.
• More information on progress and impact is essential for the credibility of sub- and non-state climate action. Policymakers need to understand which approaches are working and which are not, promoting the diffusion of best practice and creating conditions for stronger action in the future.
• The proposed conceptual framework can be tailored and applied to a wide range of initiatives that target mitigation, adaptation, and other spheres of climate action. By providing a template to identify key elements of progress tracking and evaluation, the framework can help align both research and practitioner communities around the data and metrics required to understand the overall impact of climate action.

The rising importance of cities, states and regions, firms, investors, and other subnational and non-state actors in global and national responses to climate change raises a critical question: to what extent does this climate action deliver results? This article introduces a conceptual framework that researchers and practitioners can use as a template to assess the progress, implementation, and impact of climate action by sub- and non-state actors. This framework is used to review existing studies that track progress, implementation, and achievement of such climate action between 2014 and mid-2019. While researchers have made important advances in assessing the scope and future potential of sub- and non-state climate action, we find knowledge gaps around ex-post achievement of results, indirect impacts, and climate action beyond the realm of greenhouse gas reductions.
Key policy insights
• While we increasingly understand the scale, scope, and potential of climate action by sub- and non-state actors, we lack rigorous evidence regarding the results achieved and their broader impacts.
• More information on progress and impact is essential for the credibility of sub- and non-state climate action. Policymakers need to understand which approaches are working and which are not, promoting the diffusion of best practice and creating conditions for stronger action in the future.
• The proposed conceptual framework can be tailored and applied to a wide range of initiatives that target mitigation, adaptation, and other spheres of climate action. By providing a template to identify key elements of progress tracking and evaluation, the framework can help align both research and practitioner communities around the data and metrics required to understand the overall impact of climate action.