Minden szövetségi múzeum ingyenesen látogatható lesz a 16 év alatti gyerekeknek Oroszországban - idézi az orosz kulturális miniszter Vlagyimir Megyinszkijt a Taszsz hírügynökség.
In ELIAMEP Working Paper 69/2015 Research Associate of Migration Programme Ms Eleni Zervos analyses sex trafficking in Greece. In particular, she focuses on structural barriers and vulnerability victims face in seeking protection.
Since the early 2000s in Western Balkans (WBs) powerful groups have misused democracy in numerous ways. Governing elites have tolerated the capture of public policy sectors by business conglomerates and have also invited in selected businessmen to capture such sectors. Elites have adapted to inherited frail institutions and have created other deficient institutions to serve their changing strategies. To a lesser extent, the same holds for policy capture by relatively privileged occupational groups of insiders, who are less powerful than elites. On their way up to enrichment and reproduction of relatively privileged status, elites and privileged occupational groups have not encountered the obstacles usually found in other European democracies, such as a relatively strong parliament, judiciary, civil society, mass media and a public bureaucracy functioning with a minimum of autonomy from the government. Policy capture would have been impossible without first achieving and consolidating the supremacy of the government over the legislature and the judiciary. This vital for contemporary democracies balance of powers has been destroyed in WBs to an extent larger than in other European democracies. It will not be rectified, as long as civil society and parliamentary opposition remain weak, while media pluralism is restricted in WB democracies.
Working Paper 70/2015: An Inventory of Misuses of Democracy in Western Balkans
Author: Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos
A kőolaj világpiaci árának csökkenésével párhuzamosan gyengült a rubel a dollárhoz képest: hétfőn idei mélypontjára, tavaly decemberi szintjére csúszott az orosz fizetőeszköz árfolyama a moszkvai tőzsde devizakereskedésében.
More than any other conflicts globally that of Palestine-Israel remains an enigmatic riddle waiting to be deciphered. After more than seven decades of constant regional instability and many efforts to reach a consensus, few things have changed today. This period has been one of the most fruitful in the diplomatic history of the conflict. It is perhaps the most productive one after the Oslo Accords (1993). As a result of the upgrade of the representation of Palestine to a non-member observer State in UN in November 2012 and the subsequent change of the mission title from “Palestine (represented by PLO)” to State of Palestine, in 2014 there was an intensive political effort by the international community to take the initiative and create the suitable political framework that could revive negotiations and lead to a permanent and viable solution to the conflict.
Cooperation between Greece and Palestine is much needed both in regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and in areas of mutual interest. Greek-Palestinian relations are of particular importance for geopolitical stability in the Eastern Mediterranean involving a series of issues including that of Cyprus. Increased cooperation between Palestine and Greece is a positive factor for enhancing geopolitical stability in the region. As a result of bilateral contact and cooperation both countries can be benefited mutually, both in resolving critical issues related to geopolitical stability and security and the geopolitical configuration of a secure environment conducive to the economic development of these areas.
Description: The Palestine News Forum is an online news platform and part of the ELIAMEP Middle East Research Project, focusing on political, economic and cultural news and developments regarding Palestine and Palestinian-Greek relations. These topics aim to provide the reader with an update as a means of shedding more light to this riddle which has a strong impact on future regional developments.
The unanimous decision of the plenary committee of the Greek Parliament that urges the Greek government to recognise the Palestinian State in conjunction with the visit of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Athens on 20-22 / 12/2015 are developments of particular importance both for bilateral Greek-Palestinian relations and the Palestinian Question. It reiterates the historical friendship of the two peoples and takes place in a period of geopolitical instability and change of balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Additionally this initiative, which was launched during the presidency of Zoe Konstantopoulou, reflects indirectly the intentions of the Greek foreign policy on the Palestinian issue and the Arab world, boosting the image of the current Greek government in the Greek public opinion. The only imperfection in this initiative of the Greek parliament was the fact that President Abbas spoke at the Senate Hall and not the Plenary Hall.
Just a year ago (12.14.2014, Daily) we wrote about the prospect of an initiative of the Greek Parliament to proceed to the direction of recognising the Palestinian State. The basic argument for such a development is the necessary motivation and diversity of Greek foreign policy in the Middle East with the Palestinian be a reference point in the relationship between Greece and Palestine particularly, and the Arab and Muslim world in general.
As for the decision of the Greek Government to use in the official documents of the Greek state, the term “Palestine” instead of “Palestinian Authority” is in the right direction, but it will become essential when the Greek Government applies systematically the decision of the Greek Parliament. Otherwise it will be a fleeting decision not binding for future Greek governments. Greece is one of the 57 members of a total of 193 members of the UN and one of 21 members in total 28 EU members that have not recognised the Palestinian State government. Knowing that Cyprus, with which Greece shares a common geopolitical, and not only, environment, recognised the Palestinian State in 2013, the question is why Athens is reluctant to do something similar. Obviously the politicians in Greece need to be more courageous and determined.
Currently Greece participates in two “triangles” (Greece-Cyprus-Israel and Greece-Cyprus-Egypt) which form essentially a quadrangular (Greece-Cyprus-Israel-Egypt). In this context the Greece-Cyprus-Palestine relations have their own potential regardless of whether there is in practice an independent Palestinian state. The size and importance of Palestine is not confined to the narrow context of a nation-state but is represented by the Palestinian Diaspora around the world. The power of the Diaspora is greater in the economy and culture although politically-strategically there is not yet a state-benchmark for this. The Greek political and business world needs to acknowledge the strength of the Palestinian Diaspora in order to continue the Greek-Palestinian cooperation in the future on more solid foundations. When this is understood, then we can talk about a new regional triangle, that between Greece-Cyprus-Palestine.
Helmand, in southern Afghanistan, is a strategic goal for the Taleban, who have launched more attacks there than in any other province of Afghanistan this year, making a slow pincer movement towards the provincial capital, Lashkargah. The lure of Helmand goes beyond its opium economy, with the Taleban pursuing a long-term strategy to expand their reach into the south, writes AAN’s Borhan Osman in this op-ed published on the British Guardian’s website on 26 December 2015. We republish this here with the kind permission of the Guardian.
The Taleban have launched more attacks in Helmand than in any other province of Afghanistan this year, defending their territory in remote districts and ferociously pushing the war into government enclaves.
Control of Helmand was won over the past decade by thousands of British and American troops, and with their departure in 2014 the government’s hold began to slip. Insurgents were quick to take advantage.
They spent the year making a slow pincer movement, closing in from north and south towards the provincial capital, Lashkargah. Over the past seven months, Taleban forces overran some of the most hard-won rural bases in southern Afghanistan, losses that went almost unnoticed in the media.
The battles have occasionally stirred up a flurry of media interest when the names resonate with bereaved families and veterans, places like Musa Qala and Sangin. But the overall shift has been little noticed or discussed. Kabul can only claim full control of three of Helmand’s 14 districts, including the provincial capital. One district – Nad Ali – is split between government and insurgent control, and the remaining ten are either completely lost to the Taleban, or heavily contested, even if they still boast a nominal government presence.
The losses are due as much to poor leadership of the Afghan army and police as to Taleban strengths. Corruption, desertion, “ghost soldiers” whose salaries are claimed by fraudulent commanders, and other problems have hampered efforts to stem the Taliban advance. But there is no question that the insurgent movement has poured resources into Helmand.
Their focus can be explained partly in economic terms. Afghanistan produces most of the world’s opium, and Helmand is the biggest single centre for production in the country, so whoever calls the shots in the province can get a sizeable share of drug business.
The drug business was always an important source of funding for the insurgents, but it has become more so as opportunities for extortion and skimming from foreign forces started drying up, and wealthy Gulf donors began redirecting their cash to militant groups fighting closer to home.
But the lure of Helmand goes beyond its opium economy. The Taliban have put it at the centre of a long-term strategy to expand their reach in the south. They see it as a stepping stone to other areas and hope to make Helmand the first province they “liberate”, Taliban sources say. They even dream of turning it into a safe haven for leaders based in Pakistan. That would make their insistence that the whole leadership is on Afghan soil a reality.
To move top commanders, the Taliban would need to feel confident about holding core territory while driving Afghan security forces from the province and protecting their leaders from any raids. That would have been almost impossible when 60 Nato spy blimps were scattered across the province, watching fighters from the sky. There is now only one, Reuters recently reported.
It would still be difficult, but Helmand boasts good exit routes across the border to Pakistan or through neighbouring Nimruz province to Iran, and strong supply lines to other parts of Afghanistan. All the provinces surrounding Helmand have a strong Taliban footprint, with most of the adjacent districts already under insurgent control. That makes it easy for them to move in reinforcements, and difficult for government forces to besiege all of Helmand.
The Taliban can also count on the sympathy of the Ishaqzai tribe, who constitute a sizeable part of the province’s population.
The current Taliban leader, Akhtar Mansour, and many in his close circle, are Ishaqzais and the tribe was alienated by the US forces and their Afghan allies in the early years after the fall of the Taliban regime.
The Taliban’s hopes of securing full control of Helmand may be overly optimistic for now, because the loss of Lashkar Gah would be such a devastating blow to morale and confidence that US and UK forces are likely to provide considerable support for some time to come.
The Taliban are also struggling with internal splits about leadership and whether to undertake peace talks, which could undermine their focus on the fighting in Helmand.
But if the government forces cannot rein in their own problems with corruption and attrition, it will still be hard to stop – much less reverse – the Taliban momentum in Helmand, and possibly beyond. And if the insurgents can consolidate even the advances they have made so far, it will be enough to make the province an important base for them and a heavy drain on government troops and resources for Kabul for many years to come.
Find the original article here.