Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (1/2015). Alain Antil propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Lemine Ould M. Salem , Le Ben Laden du Sahara. Sur les traces du jihadiste Mokthar Belmokthar (Paris, Éditions de La Martinière, 2014, 208 pages).
Parmi les différents ouvrages parus ces dernières années sur le terrorisme dans la zone saharo-sahélienne, le livre de Lemine Ould M. Salem est particulièrement stimulant. L’auteur, qui couvre cette zone depuis des années pour plusieurs journaux européens, a été l’un des rares journalistes à s’être rendu dans le nord du Mali en 2012, alors que la région échappait à l’autorité de Bamako et que ses principales villes étaient administrées par trois mouvements islamistes : Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI), le Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) et Ansar Dine.
Mokthar Belmokthar, alias Khaled Abou Al-Abbas, alias Laouar (« Le borgne ») est un Algérien né à Ghardaïa en 1972 ; il part très jeune combattre en Afghanistan et s’engage, à son retour, comme des centaines d’autres « Afghans », dans l’islamisme violent. Membre du Groupe islamique armé (GIA) puis du Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC), il en devient l’un des cadres et participe à son internationalisation vers les pays du Sahel. Il est par la suite fondateur des Signataires par le sang, puis des Mourabitoune. L’ouvrage revient sur la ferveur salafiste de celui qui a souvent été décrit comme un terroriste devenu trafiquant – d’où son surnom de « Mister Marlboro ». Il est d’abord un combattant, avec plusieurs faits d’armes à son actif (attaque de la caserne de Lemgheity en Mauritanie en 2005, ou encore attaque d’In Amenas en janvier 2012), qui lui assurent un grand prestige dans la mouvance salafiste-jihadiste. Le livre confirme également que Belmokthar est l’un des principaux artisans de l’affiliation du GSPC à Al-Qaïda, et donc de la naissance d’AQMI, en janvier 2007.
Si la trame de l’ouvrage repose sur le parcours de Belmokthar, l’auteur dresse des portraits d’autres personnages clés du salafisme-jihadisme saharien, comme Younous Al-Mauritani et Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (AQMI), Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (fondateur du MUJAO), Omar Ould Hamaha (AQMI, MUJAO, puis Mourabitoune) et oncle par alliance de Belmokthar. L’ouvrage comporte d’autres morceaux de bravoure. On signalera pêle-mêle : un récit saisissant de l’opération d’In Amenas, l’auteur étant aux premières loges car en liaison téléphonique avec certains des ravisseurs pendant l’action ; une mise en récit très éclairante de la relation entre la Mauritanie et le GSPC, et notamment de la fin de la moutaraka (pacte de non-agression) en 2005, marquée par l’attaque de Lemgheity ; le rôle des combattants mauritaniens dans AQMI, en particulier celui de Khadim Ould Semane, fondateur d’Ansar Allah Al-Mourabitoune Fi Bilad As-Shinguitt, qui rejoint le GSPC et est impliqué dans les premiers actes violents en Mauritanie.
Ould M. Salem présente un ouvrage basé sur des sources de première main, dont de nombreux entretiens, notamment avec certains salafistes-jihadistes qu’il a pu suivre des mois ou des années, comme le gendre mauritanien de Belmokthar. Le fait que le journaliste ait pu enquêter à Tombouctou et Gao pendant l’occupation de ces deux villes par les islamistes donne évidemment un grand relief à son livre.
On regrettera cependant l’absence de références et d’explications sur la méthode de recoupement et d’arbitrage entre les différents entretiens que l’auteur a eu à traiter : on ne sait ainsi jamais si les faits que rapporte tel protagoniste ont été, ou non, confirmés. Et lorsque des récits n’étaient pas convergents, comment l’auteur a-t-il tranché ? Quand il relaie les affirmations d’un islamiste algérien qui lui explique le soutien actif du Maroc au GIA et lui parle d’une rencontre avec Driss Basri et le roi du Maroc dans une villa de Rabat, on reste dubitatif…
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Last week, interior ministers of the 15 countries sitting at the UN Security Council met to discuss foreign fighters. They did so as part of the follow-up of
Resolution 2178 (2014), which defines foreign fighters as people “who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training”.
This is hardly a new phenomenon, but foreign fighters are getting more and more attention in relation to Syria and Iraq. The number of foreign fighters in both countries could exceed 20,000, and according to the Director of Europol, between 3,000 and 5,000 of them would come from EU countries.
In Resolution 2178, as well as previous ones since 2001, the Security Council urges states to adopt legislative and criminal measures to prevent terrorism and bring suspects to justice.
With the intention to operationalise the mandate of the Security Council, the Council of Europe is working on a draft protocol to the 2005 European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. This text criminalises the action of joining a group and “participating” in its activities “for the purpose of committing or contributing to the commission” of terrorist offences (Article 2), “receiving training for terrorism” (Article 3), “travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism” (Article 4), “funding travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism” (Article 5), or “organising or otherwise facilitating travelling” for that purpose (Article 6).
As noted by Scheinin, the formulation of these provisions relies on the intent (“purpose”) of the person to participate or contribute towards the commission of a terrorist offence.
The draft protocol, therefore, does not call for the criminalisation of travelling to conflict zones, and individual countries have not modified their criminal legislation to punish travelling per se. The subjective element of intent is required.
However, a variety of measures are already being taken in relation to foreign fighters, ranging from passport confiscation (Germany), attempts to bar foreign fighters from acquiring national citizenship (Austria), stripping known foreign fighters of access to social services (Belgium), or revoking naturalised nationality (UK and Netherlands) (see reports here, here and here).
So far, these measures are targeting Islamic foreign fighters travelling to conflict areas with a religious motivation. However, there is no reason why these measures could not be potentially applied to other conflicts. For example, Spanish authorities recently detained eight nationals that had fought in Ukraine on the pro-Russian side. Apparently their actions may have infringed Spain’s neutrality, and therefore compromise the country’s “peace or independence”.
(Spain has recently modified its criminal legislation to persecute and punish “jihadist-style international terrorists”. Incidentally, this legislative reform coincides with a restriction of the principle of universal jurisdiction in the country. Prosecuting international terrorists is going to be easier, but doing so with genocidaires and war criminals is becoming nearly impossible in Spain.)
Thankfully, the UK, the US and tens of other countries did not think along those lines when George Orwell, Ernest Hemingway and 30,000 other international brigadiers travelled to Spain to fight Franco during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39).
The reader may argue that defending freedom and democracy against fascism is not exactly what pro-Russians and Islamists are doing in Eastern Ukraine and Syria/Iraq, respectively.
My point is different, though. The criminalisation of foreign fighters with the discourse of terrorism poses a fundamental challenge to the jus in bello, that is, to the law that regulates acceptable wartime conduct.
Terrorism is not a condition (“to be a terrorist”), but an action (“to commit a terrorist act”), and it is already prohibited in International Humanitarian Law (IHL): Articles 33 of the 1949 4th Geneva Convention, 51(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1, and 4(2)(d) and 13(2) of the Additional Protocol II, of the same year. The International Committee of the Red Cross has authoritatively established that:
“The term ‘terrorist act’ should be used, in the context of armed conflict, only in relation to the few acts specifically designated as such under the treaties of IHL. It should not be used to describe acts that are lawful or not prohibited by IHL. While there is clearly an overlap in terms of the prohibition of attacks against civilians and civilian objects under both IHL and domestic law, it is believed that, overall, there are more disadvantages than advantages to additionally designating such acts as ‘terrorist’ when committed in situations of armed conflict (whether under the relevant international legal framework or under domestic law). Thus, with the exception of the few specific acts of terrorism that may take place in armed conflict, it is submitted that the term ‘act of terrorism’ should be reserved for acts of violence committed outside of armed conflict.”
Being a human action and not a human condition, terrorism (the act of terrorism) is a matter of jus in bello, not jus ad bellum (acceptable justification to engage in war).
In other words, the determination of whether an act should be considered terrorist does not depend on the legitimacy of the use of force, but rather on whether such an act meets the objective and subjective elements of the crime, as defined in IHL.
Being an action, therefore, terrorist crimes can be potentially committed by ISIS as much as by the Free Syrian Army, by the Ukrainian army as much as pro-Russian groups, by Hitler as much as by the Allies in Dresden.
Again, this does not question the legitimacy of the use of force by Brits against the Nazi Germany (for which Europeans will never be grateful enough). It is not a sign of agnosticism regarding Ukrainian national integrity either. And it does not ignore that ISIS violates the human rights of the Iraqi population under its control in all imaginable ways.
The point I try to make here is that by using the discourse of terrorism in relation to foreign fighters, and by extending criminal jurisdiction over the foreign territories where these conflicts take place, we are breaching the fundamental distinction between the acceptable behaviour in warfare and the acceptable justification to use military force.
Countries must indeed hold accountable those who have allegedly committed war crimes. But the criminalisation of travelling, receiving training or joining forces in countries at war is not the way to do it, as much as we may loathe ISIS, prefer the Free Syrian Army to Al-Nusra, and fear Russia.
The post Against the criminalisation of foreign fighters with the discourse of terrorism appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
Die Liberale Fraktion im Europaparlament verlangen eine Untersuchung der Kontakte des Front National nach Russland. Unklar ist jedoch, wer genau den französischen Rechtsextremisten auf den Zahn fühlen soll.