OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle in Artema. The Mission followed up on two civilian casualties caused by an explosion in a courtyard in Marinka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded a ceasefire violation near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and Shchastia, as well as again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region.  The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM saw demining near road T-1314 north of Shyrokyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Artema, Zalizne, Nelipivka and Novotoshkivske. In Odessa, the SMM saw anti-Semitic graffiti.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 70), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 35 explosions).

On the evening and night of 22-23 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 23 projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east and two projectiles from north-east to south-west, followed by totals of two explosions (one assessed as an impact and one as an airburst), nine projectiles (four from west to east, one from east to west, two from south-east to north-west, one from south-south-west to north-north-east and one from north-north-west to south-south-east) and three muzzle flashes, all 0.5-3km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-west.

Positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) on 23 July, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions, four shots assessed as infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) rounds and shots and bursts of small-arms fire, including ten minutes of overlapping and uncountable rounds, all 2-3km south-west and west.

On the evening and night of 22-23 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded 18 explosions (three assessed as outgoing and 15 as impacts), 65 projectiles in flight (37 from west-south-west to east-north-east, 25 from west to east, and three from north-east to south-west) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-6km north, north-north-east and north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded five ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours (three explosions).

Positioned near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) while flying a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the SMM heard three shots and a burst of small-arms fire, assessed as directed at the UAV.* At the time of the incident, the UAV was flying at an altitude of approximately 100m over a Ukrainian Armed Forces position about 800m north-east of the SMM’s position. The SMM recalled and safely landed the mini-UAV. Shortly thereafter, two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel arrived in a military vehicle and asked whether the UAV belonged to the SMM. They said that they had shot in the air with the intention to drive the UAV away.

The SMM followed up on reports of two civilian casualties. At a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk), the SMM spoke with a man (43 years old) who had bandages on his face, head, chest and arms. He said that on 22 July, he and another man (44 years old) had been walking through the courtyard to a house at 117 Telmana Street in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south of Donetsk), which he said he had abandoned about one year ago. He said they had heard a click and that then there had been an explosion, which he believed was caused by an unexploded ordnance. According to him, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had come to the scene and provided first aid and transported him to the hospital. A doctor at the hospital in Kurakhove said that the man had been injured by shrapnel, some of which had been removed. The doctor said the other man (44 years old) had suffered injuries to both legs and his right foot and that he had left the hospital the same day. Police in Kurakhove confirmed the time and place of the incident.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned about 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion about 5km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned in both the disengagement area near Zolote and in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM did not observe ceasefire violations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled-areas, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted, on 21 July, a probable self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Kremenivka (78km south of Donetsk) and a probable towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in Zoria (80km south of Donetsk). On 23 July, the SMM saw a military truck towing a howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) about 2km west of Maloriazantseve (77km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled-areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted, on 21 July, a tank (T-64) in the Leninskyi district of Donetsk city and 25 tanks (20 T-64 or T-72 and five T-80) in a military-type compound in the Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled-areas, on 21 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Kremenivka. On 23 July, on the northern edge of Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two military trucks each towing an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm).

On the western edge of Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a military truck with a towed gun (type undetermined) traveling west.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in Chystyi Kliuch (26km north-west of Donetsk) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk). On 23 July, the SMM saw a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Sopyne.

In non-government-controlled-areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted, on 21 July, three IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) in the Leninskyi district of Donetsk city, 15 IFVs (BMP variants) and 11 APCs (four MT-LB, six BTR variants and one BTR-70) in the Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city (see above) and three IFVs (BMP-1), nine APCs (five MT-LB and four BTR-80) and three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (two BRDM-2 and one PRP-3) south of Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk). On 22 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) and three IFVs (BMP-1) near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk). On 23 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) near Bezimenne (30km east of Donetsk). 

The SMM observed the marking of mines. Near Shyrokyi (government-controlled, 38km north-east of Luhansk), a representative of an international demining organization told the SMM that the team of three deminers present (all wearing clothing marked with the international organization’s logo) were marking mines on the western and eastern sides of road T-1314. The SMM saw signs with “Attention, demining work ongoing” written in Ukrainian on red rectangle boards with a white skull-and-crossbones in the same area.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works at the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), a water pumping station in Artema, water pipelines near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and a high-voltage powerline between Zalizne and Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at the pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM observed three people exiting Ukraine.

In Odessa, the SMM saw an anti-Semitic message spray-painted next to a swastika symbol on a wall at 7 Osipova Street in Odessa city. It saw a second anti-Semitic message next to a Star of David with lines drawn through it in the shape of an X on the bottom part of a wall near a parking entrance to an apartment building at Zhukovskoho Street on the Polskyi Descent. At both locations, the SMM observed that the letters of the messages were in black paint and of the same dimensions and style. The same beige colour had been used to paint over the graffiti, leaving the messages only partially legible. At the first location, proprietors of businesses told the SMM that the wall had been clear of graffiti on 20 July. According to a public police statement, an investigation will be opened under Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (violation of human rights based on racial, ethnic, or religious bias).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”.
• At a checkpoint on road E-58 north-west of Bezimenne, seven members of the armed formations (three visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage, citing the “security of the SMM patrol”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• In Bohdanivka, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that anti-tank mines were still in place on the road to Viktorivka and Petrivske, and that they had no plans to clear the mines. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• Near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard one burst and three shots of small-arms fire 800m north-east, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV. The SMM recalled and landed the UAV safely.  
• Positioned near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM experienced a loss of signal while flying a mid-range UAV near Bezimenne. The SMM recalled and landed the UAV safely. 

[1] Please see Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 20 and 21 July compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 21 and 22 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas as well as, again, near Zaichenko and Bezimenne in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region. The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Vrubivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Nelipivka and Novotoshkivske. In Dnipropetrovsk region, the SMM observed 30 young adults participating in a parade aimed at promoting human rights regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 20 and 21 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). Between the evenings of 21 and 22 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 20 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an impact explosion less than 400m south-west of its location and three undetermined explosions less than 600m south-south-west of its location, as well as seven further explosions (five impacts and two undetermined) and 38 projectiles in flight, all 0.4-3km in southerly directions. On the evening and night of 21-22 July, the same camera recorded an impact explosion approximately 80m south of its location (within the perimeter of the DFS) as well as 11 further explosions (seven impacts, two airbursts, and two undetermined), 47 projectiles in flight, ten muzzle flashes, six illumination flares and two bursts, all 3-4km at south-westerly directions.

On the evening and night of 20-21 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded 29 explosions (one impact and four outgoing, the remainder undetermined), about 100 projectiles in flight, an illumination flare and about fifty bursts of undetermined weapons, all 2-4km north-north-east. On the evening and night of 21-22 July, the same camera recorded two undetermined explosions, 30 projectiles in flight, two muzzle flashes and two illumination flares, all 2-4km north-east and north-north-east.

On the evening and night of 20-21 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about the same number of bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-6km south and south-east. The following night, while in the same location, the SMM heard about 20 undetermined explosions and 14 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km at southerly directions.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 20 and 21 July, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation (an explosion); during the previous reporting period it recorded 14 explosions. Between the evenings of 21 and 22 July, the SMM recorded three ceasefire violations (all explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 20 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) at a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the Petrivske disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 10 July 2018). Infrared imaging revealed the vehicle’s barrel to have been hot, indicating recent use.

On 21 July, the SMM again saw personnel in military-type clothing in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area. (See SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018.)

On the early morning of 21 July, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 8-10km west-south-west. That evening, while at the same location, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km south-west. Early the following morning, while at the same location, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-7km south-west. All explosions were assessed as outside the disengagement area. During the day on 22 July, positioned south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 1-3km north-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned in the disengagement area near Zolote on 21 and 22 July, the SMM did not observe ceasefire violations. Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area on 22 July, the SMM did not observe ceasefire violations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in Vrubivka (government-controlled, 72km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) travelling south on 22 July.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (a BMP-2 and another BMP variant) near Marinka, an IFV (BMP-2) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-2) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-2) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) and an IFV (BMP-2) in Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) on 20 July. On 21 July, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP variant) in Zolote and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4, 23mm) near Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol). On 22 July, the SMM saw an IFV (BRM-1K) in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) and three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BMP-1) in Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) in Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk) and four IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in the Kirpoty neighbourhood of eastern Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) on 20 July. On 21 July, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military-type truck in western Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk). On 22 July, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) loaded on a truck near Korsun (21km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed three mine hazard signs (red rectangles with white skull-and-crossbones and text warning “Danger! Mines!” in Russian) in Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk) on 21 July for the first time. The signs were placed at 50m intervals between a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the town’s cemetery.

The Mission observed unexploded ordnance (UXO) – a mortar shell – stuck in the asphalt approximately 1.2km south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to water pipelines near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and high-voltage power lines in Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

On 22 July, in Kryvy Rih (130km south-west of Dnipro) the SMM observed the “Kryvbas Pride” parade aimed at promoting human rights with a particular focus on ending discrimination against the lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transgender (LGBT) community. It saw some 30 young adults (mixed genders) walking down Sicheslavska Street in Pokrovski District and holding banners with messages that included “Right to freedom” and “Free People, Free rights”. On the spot, the Mission also observed around 600 police officers from the national, patrol and rapid reaction riot police who had cordoned off the area where the parade was taking place, as well as about 60 police vehicles including 15 buses and ten minibuses. The deputy chief of the national police in Dnipropetrovsk region told the SMM the large police presence was to ensure public safety and the rights of the participants, based on previous experiences related to LGBT events. Throughout the event, the Mission observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 21 July, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security reasons”. (See SMM Daily Report 20 July 2018.) The SMM observed cars passing through the checkpoint in both directions.
• On 22 July, at the same checkpoint north of Zaichenko, three armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and southward to Sakhanka citing “security reasons”.
• On 21 July, at a checkpoint on road E-58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage, citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”. (See SMM Daily Report 21 July 2018.)
• On 22 July, at the same checkpoint on road E-58 north-west of Bezimenne, four armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage, citing “security reasons”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 21 and 22 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 21 and 22 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occassions.5
• On 21 and 22 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 20 July, at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), medical staff refused to provide the SMM information regarding civilian casualties citing the need for written permission from a specific senior member of the armed formations.

[1] Please see Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Some 130 representatives from Kazakhstan’s Parliament, central and local government authorities, academia and civil society, as well as experts from both Kazakhstan and Russia, participated in an OSCE-supported international conference on transboundary co-operation in the Zhaiyk (Ural) river basin on 23 July 2018 in Uralsk, Western Kazakhstan.

They discussed challenges in managing the transboundary basin of the Zhaiyk (Ural) river, possible solutions and best practices in managing the local ecosystems.

Experts from Austria and Uzbekistan shared best practices on transboundary joint water bodies with a focus on their mandate, tasks, legal status, organizational structure and sources of funding. They also highlighted ways to strengthen bilateral and multilateral co-operation in water management as well the role of the public in participating in decision-making processes on water management-related issues.

The event concluded with practical exercises where participants identified existing gaps in transboundary co-operation between Kazakhstan and Russia, and proposed solutions to bridge them.

The conference was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Western Kazakhstan’s Regional Administration and the Zhaiyk-Ural Public Fund Ecological Movement. It is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to contribute to the transboundary water dialogue and to raise awareness of state institutions in the area of sustainable water management.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded a ceasefire violation near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas as well as, again, near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Siedove and Bezimenne in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region. The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Korsun. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Nelipivka, Zalizne, Bolotene, Novotoshkivske and Zolote-5. It observed again that the wooden ramps on the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were unstable.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 255 explosions).

On the evening and night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 13 projectiles in flight from east to west, three undetermined explosions, a projectile from east to west, an undetermined explosion, 16 projectiles in vertical flight and 16 projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by totals of 13 undetermined explosions, about 60 projectiles (including 30 from west to east and 26 from north-east to south-west) and a burst (about 50 rounds) in vertical flight, all 0.7-4km south. During the same period of time, the camera also recorded, in sequence, two projectiles from west to east, three explosions assessed as impacts, a projectile from north-north-west to south-south-east assessed as a rocket-propelled grenade, an explosion assessed as an outgoing rocket-propelled grenade and a projectile from west to east assessed as a rocket-propelled grenade, all 200-700m south and south-west.

On the evening and night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 12 projectiles in flight from west to east and a projectile from east-south-east to west-north-west, followed by two undetermined explosions, about 60 projectiles (including 34 from west-north-west and east-south-east and 15 projectiles from east to west) and four illumination flares in flight (two from west-north-west and east-south-east, one from east to west and one in vertical flight), all 2-5km north and north-north-east.

On the evening and night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east and two from south-south-east to north-north-west, followed by an undetermined explosion, about 60 projectiles (including 33 from south-south-east to north-north-west and 23 from north-north-west to south-south-east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-9km east-north-east and east.

On the evening and night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded seven undetermined explosions and 17 projectiles in flight (16 from west to east and one in vertical flight), all 2-7km south.

During the day on 20 July, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about ten shots of small-arms fire, as well as 15 minutes of uncountable and overlapping shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-3km west.

The same day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-east and south. Positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and 25 bursts of small-arms fire, all 4-7km south-east and south.

Positioned in Fedorivka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 4-5km east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (14), compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions).

During the day on 20 July, positioned in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions 5-8km east-south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 19-20 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion 4-6km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The same day, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), west of the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 19 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) at a compound in a residential area of Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 20 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), a fire control vehicle (MT-LB variant) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Novotoshkivske and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) in a south-west part of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).

On 20 July, on a street at the southern edge of Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed about 15-20 houses occupied by about 20-25 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, some of whom were armed, including with assault rifles (AK-type). The SMM saw them in the yards or in front of the houses.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 19 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) at the abovementioned compound in Korsun. On 20 July, a mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) near Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to high-voltage power lines in Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), water intake station boreholes in Bolotene (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), water pipelines near Novotoshkivske and a water pipeline in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). Repairs to the water pipelines near Novotoshkivske were interrupted for about half an hour due to ceasefire violations which the SMM heard in the area, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at the entry-exit checkpoint near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. Positioned near the wooden ramps on the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw three people (one man and two women in their seventies) in wheelchairs being carried down and up the ramps by three porters. The SMM observed that the southern end of the southern wooden ramp was unstable and that the ramp was bouncing when people walked on it (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 6 July 2018).

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about half an hour, the SMM saw 13 cars (three with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), a minivan (with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plate) exiting Ukraine, and nine cars (three with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

In Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), on 19 July, members of the armed formations returned parts of an SMM mid-range UAV to the SMM. (The Mission had lost contact with the UAV flying near Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk) on 13 July. See SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018.) The SMM saw that the right wing of the UAV was broken and that its fuselage was scratched. It also noted that the UAV’s left wing and a secure digital (SD) card were missing. The members of the armed formations said that they had recovered it from an area near Horlivka.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 600m east of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, nongovernment-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage. (See SMM Daily Report 23 May 2018.)
• At a checkpoint about 1km northwest of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it entry into the village. (See SMM Daily Report 7 July 2018.)
• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage, citing “an ongoing anti-terrorist operation in the area”. (See SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018.)

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [5]

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its miniUAV flying over Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming.[5]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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TBILISI, 20 July 2018 - The 15th South Caucasus Media Conference, a two-day annual meeting organized by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, concluded yesterday.

The conference, held in Tbilisi, gathered civil society, journalists, editors and government representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and international experts to discuss challenges to quality journalism in the region in the digital era. It was opened by the Representative together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, David Zalkaliani, the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, George Tsereteli, and a representative of the OSCE Italian Chairmanship, Antonino Maggiore.

“Quality journalism is more necessary than ever in the age of fake news and manipulation of information,” the Representative stated in his opening remarks. “But quality journalism is only possible when freedom of expression, media pluralism and the safety of journalists are respected. More efforts are still needed to ensure full respect for OSCE principles and commitments on media freedom throughout the region. No journalist should be imprisoned because of her or his reporting, nor should media be put under threat or closed because of dissenting views,” he said.

Desir noted that “the efforts by the media community in the South Caucasus to innovate online and offline and to face up to the spread of false news and propaganda, which affect the quality of information, is a valuable step forward. These efforts must be encouraged and supported by a legal and economic framework with no undue Internet restriction or political interference, and by strong and independent public broadcasters. Quality and pluralism of information is a key element and will shape the future of media in the region.”

The conference focused on many challenges faced by the media in the South Caucasus region. They include the digital transformation and its effects on traditional media and quality journalism, professional standards, fact-checking initiatives and self-regulation, media literacy, and countering hate speech and violent extremism while respecting freedom of the media.

“My Office stands ready to continue its constructive assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with policy recommendations on issues related to freedom of expression and media freedom,” Désir said.

On the occasion of the conference, the Representative met with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia David Zalkaliani and with President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly George Tsereteli to enhance co-operation to support media freedom in Georgia and throughout the region.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

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388607 Polish police officers participate in a group exercise during a the train-the-trainer course. 18 July 2018, Zakopane, Poland. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Building the capacity of Polish police forces to provide training on effective and human rights-compliant policing in Roma communities was the focus of a course organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in co-operation with the Regional Police Headquarters in Krakow, in Zakopane, Poland from 17 to 20 July 2018.

The participants were seven men and seven women from the regional and national police headquarters and the Police Academy in Szczytno. The training strengthened their understanding of the importance and benefits of effective policing practices that respect and protect the rights of all people, particularly those who are excluded, vulnerable or discriminated against, such as members of Roma communities.

The course was delivered within ODIHR’s training programme designed to strengthen the capacity of police officers operating at the local level to work effectively with Roma and Sinti and mixed communities, while complying with international human rights standards. 

“In addition to the training we have offered and delivered to police forces in a number of OSCE participating States in the past two years, we are now offering this train-the-trainer course aimed at building the capacity of national police institutions to conduct the training independently through their own structures, as often as necessary,” said Dan Pavel Doghi, Chief of the ODIHR Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues. “It is essential that the police perform their duty in a manner that is compliant with human rights and that Roma communities receive police services and protection on an equal basis.”

Marta Krasuska, Chief Specialist in Human Rights, Equal Treatment and Ethics at Poland’s National Police Headquarters, said: “This training equips participants with knowledge and skills which can be used to enhance their anti-discriminatory competences. Educating future trainers who can transfer this knowledge and these skills to police at the local level is of critical significance for building trust between the police and minorities such as Roma.”

The training is part of ODIHR’s efforts to assist participating States in implementing the Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area.

COPENHAGEN, 20 July 2018 – Following the end of a two-year state of emergency in Turkey earlier this week, the officers of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chair Margareta Kiener-Nellen (MP, Switzerland), Vice-Chair Michael Georg Link (MP, Germany), and Rapporteur Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (MP, Cyprus) issued the following statement:

“We welcome the end to the state of emergency in Turkey, which should bring to a close the extraordinary measures put in place by the Turkish government following the terrible attempted coup two years ago. We call upon Turkey’s authorities to finally return to full respect for civil liberties, due process, rule of law and fundamental freedoms for all people in Turkey.”

Immediately following the attempted coup in July 2016, the OSCE PA deployed a high-level delegation which condemned the attack on democratic institutions, expressed solidarity with the Turkish people, and noted its appreciation for the unity shown by all parties in parliament following the attacks.

In welcoming the end to the state of emergency, Kiener-Nellen, Link and Hadjiyianni also called for the immediate release from pre-trial detention of Selahattin Demirtas and other elected parliamentarians still being held in Turkey. They reiterated that parliamentarians must be allowed to fulfil their duties representing the people who elected them.

During the past two years leaders of the OSCE PA’s human rights committee have repeatedly expressed concerns over the application of measures imposed under the state of emergency, including related to the arrests of parliamentarians, the dismissals of thousands of public servants from their jobs and a lack of clear legal procedures to safeguard individual rights. (See for example here, here, here and here).

An OSCE PA delegation also observed the presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey last month, in which the state of emergency was cited as restricting freedoms of assembly and expression, including in the media.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. Machine gun rounds were fired in the direction of an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle in Khrustalnyi. The SMM observed damage to civilian properties in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas, as well as in areas of Donetsk region outside government control near Zaichenko and Bezimenne. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Khrustalnyi. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Nelipivka, Stanytsia Luhanska, Bolotene, Artema and Novotoshkivske.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 255 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions).

On the evening of 18 July, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions and 55 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-8km west and north-west.

On the evening and night of 18-19 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from east to west and a projectile in vertical flight (both assessed as 30mm cannon rounds), an undetermined explosion, a projectile from east to west and two projectiles from west to east, followed by totals of 22 undetermined explosions and 71 projectiles in flight (63 from east to west, seven from west to east and one in vertical flight), all 1-7km south.

On the evening and night of 18-19 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west and 13 projectiles from north-west to south-east, followed by totals of 119 projectiles (47 from north-west to south-east, 42 from south-east to north-west, 21 from north to south, eight from east to west and one in vertical flight), all 2.5-6km east.

On the evening and night of 18-19 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, three undetermined explosions, 41 projectiles in flight from west to east and an illumination flare in vertical flight, followed by totals of 57 undetermined explosions, 239 projectiles in flight (96 from west to east, 53 from east to west, 49 from south to north and 41 in vertical flight), all 1-7km south.

On the evening and night of 18-19 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions and about 170 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east, south and south-west.

During the day of 19 July, positioned 1.9km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 5-7km at directions ranging from south-west to north-north-west.

Positioned in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions 0.5-7km south-west and west-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions).

The SMM observed damage to civilian properties in residential areas of Dokuchaievsk. At 9 Vatutina Street, it saw a bullet hole in a south-west facing window of an apartment on the first floor of a five-storey building. A resident of the building (woman in her seventies) told the SMM that the apartment was uninhabited and that the window had been damaged on the afternoon of 18 July. (See also SMM Daily Report 13 June 2018).

At 93 Tsentralna Street, the SMM saw that the windowpanes of a south-west facing window of an apartment on the fourth floor of a five-storey building were missing and that the window was covered with pieces of plywood from the inside. A resident of the building (man in his thirties) told the SMM that the apartment was uninhabited and that the window had been damaged on the afternoon of 18 July.

Machine gun rounds were fired in the direction of an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). On the evening of 18 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a PK machine gun (7.62mm) with one person behind it and three people around in the yard of a factory in Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, non-government-controlled, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and recorded the machine gun opening fire towards the UAV. The UAV was not damaged.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 18 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion and nine projectiles in flight (eight from north-west to south-east and one from north-north- east to south-south-west), all 2-6km east-south-east, south-east and south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 19 July, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM again saw a tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) in a field about 2.5m east of a road approximately 100m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position about 300m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). At the same location, on 15 July, the SMM had seen a tailfin of the same type. On 17 July, it had noted that the tailfin was no longer present. (See SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018).

During the day on 19 July, positioned 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and about 20 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-4km south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 18 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 17 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in and near Khrustalnyi.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 18 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1), 14 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and two tanks (one T-80 and one undetermined) near Khrustalnyi. On 19 July, the SMM saw five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) inside a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In areas of Donetsk region outside government control, the SMM saw two towed howitzers (D-30) present and noted that 11 MLRS (BM-21) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in an area of Luhansk region outside government control whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 18 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in Karlivka (government-controlled, 25km north-west of Donetsk). On 19 July, it saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two APCs (a BTR-60 and a BTR variant) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Zolote-4/Rodina.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines in Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, water intake station boreholes in Bolotene (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), water pipelines near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to a pond and a pipeline between Zalizne and Nelipivka.

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 40 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (five with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) enter Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and again denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security reasons”. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018).
• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage, citing “an ongoing anti-terrorist operation in the area”. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a longrange UAV flight near Khrustalnyi, the SMM recorded several rounds from a PK machine gun assessed as fired in the direction of the UAV. The UAV was not damaged.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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The HAGUE, 20 July 2018 – High school students from the Municipality of Jajce in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were selected as the winner of the 2018 Max van der Stoel Award. The award is given in recognition of their outstanding courage and inspirational activism, which led to the prevention of further segregation in schools in Jajce as well as throughout the country.

In the summer of 2016, high school students in Jajce stood up against a cantonal decision to establish a new school solely for Bosniak students. The implementation of this decision would have continued the “two schools under one roof” practice of ethnically segregated schools in the country, further deepening the estrangement between the communities. The Jury made the unanimous decision to reward the students from Jajce, represented by the Student Council of the Secondary Vocational School Jajce, with the 2018 Max van der Stoel Award. The members of the jury acknowledged the tenacity, moral authority and bravery of the students and recognized the need to nurture their quest for inclusive and better quality education.

Commenting on its decision, the international Jury, chaired by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Lamberto Zannier, stated:

“These students from Jajce had the courage to define their own needs and priorities. They are best placed to identify and advocate for ways to create a more harmonious environment for themselves as they prepare for their future. Their achievement followed a year-long battle against further segregation to divide them along ethnic lines. It is an unprecedented victory and deserves to be widely promoted as a positive example of how non-formal groups with limited resources can achieve progress where formal channels failed. While it is the responsibility of the state to ensure inclusive and high-quality education with respect to diversity, combating segregation and discrimination must be an imperative for all of us in order to build sustainable peace. The achievement of the high school students in Jajce serves as an inspirational example.”

The Award – named after the distinguished Dutch statesman and first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, – in the amount of 50,000 euros was established by the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2001. It is awarded biennially to an individual, group or institution in recognition of extraordinary and outstanding achievements aimed at promoting integration and social cohesion in the OSCE participating States.

The Award ceremony will take place in The Hague on 9 November 2018.

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388721 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Strengthening the capacity of crisis negotiators from across Kazakhstan was the focus of a five-day training course held from 16 to 20 July 2018 in Koschi, Kazakhstan. The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the Embassy of Israel in Astana and the Ministry of Public Security of the State of Israel, together with the Law Enforcement Agencies Academy under Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office.

The course was led by experts of the Israel Police to prepare state officials to respond to crisis situations such as hostage taking and manage the negotiation process from start to finish. Topics included active listening, operative reaction, structure of negotiation groups, time management, the tactical role of intelligence in negotiations, means of communication, third-party intermediaries and organizing a co-ordinated response. These sessions were complemented by technical discussions and simulated exercises based on real-life cases that the Israel Police had dealt with in the past.

Diana Digol, Deputy Head of the OSCE Programme Office, said: “A safe and efficient response to a crisis situation often requires a group of professional negotiators. Through co-operative training seminars such as this, government agencies will be better prepared to serve and protect the public in such situations. The OSCE stands ready to help other law enforcement agencies to build capacity in emergency response and public safety.”

Michael Brodsky, the Ambassador of the State of Israel to the Republic of Kazakhstan, said:  “Israel has a huge amount of experience in fighting against terror and in negotiations in emergency situations. We are ready to share this experience with other countries. This training course with the participation of Israeli experts is being held in Kazakhstan for the first time, and it indicates a high level of relations between our two countries.”

Shakir Shayahmetov, the Acting Rector of the Law Enforcement Agencies Academy, discussed the importance of state authorities learning from other countries and the need for the course participants to share their lessons learned with colleagues in the areas where they serve.

The event was part of the OSCE’s work on countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism.

VIENNA, 19 July 2018 – While a new recommitment to cease fire that came into effect on 1 July has brought an immediate decrease in violence, a comprehensive ceasefire is yet to be reached, the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ertugrul Apakan, said in his address to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna today.

The Chief Monitor said that during May and June the SMM recorded an increase in the number of ceasefire violations per week. The latest recommitment has led to an improvement of the security situation, including an 85 per cent decrease in kinetic activity along the contact line in the first seven days after the recommitment. “However, additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire are critically needed as the SMM still continues to register ceasefire violations,” he said.

Referring to the general security situation in eastern Ukraine, Apakan noted that the SMM also continued to register the use and presence of weapons that should have been withdrawn according to the Minsk agreements. The SMM has also observed newly placed mines on both sides of the contact line.

“Civilians on both sides of the contact line are the ones who suffer the most from the continuing non-compliance. The sides should find ways to take measures to alleviate human suffering,” Apakan concluded. “The Mission will continue to implement its mandate and contribute to peace, normalization and stabilization of the situation in Ukraine.”

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TBILISI, 19 July 2018 – OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (Georgia) participated this week in the 15th annual South Caucasus Media Conference organized by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in Tbilisi, Georgia.

Titled “Quality Journalism for Trustworthy and Credible Information,” the conference brought together more than 60 participants representing government authorities, media, civil society and academia, as well as international experts in Tbilisi, to exchange views on recent changes in the media landscape that have taken place in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

In his opening remarks on Wednesday, the President noted that propaganda and disinformation – or what is today called “fake news” – has been around for hundreds of years, but that through new technologies and a lack of appreciation by the wider public of the varying quality of journalistic work, there is now an increased risk damaging the credibility of journalism as a whole.

“While we may benefit from huge amounts of information available at our fingertips, information technology is being abused by untold amounts of disinformation,” President Tsereteli said. “We have all seen the perverse effects of ‘fake news’ on domestic and international politics: public debates have become more polarized, public opinion has been influenced, and there are fewer opportunities for an in-depth analysis of our political issues.”

Warning that the instrumentalization of “fake news” as a political tool poses a danger to democracy, Tsereteli noted that everyone benefits from ensuring high professional media standards. He pointed out that journalists and politicians should work together in the interests of good journalism and democracy.

Tsereteli highlighted the OSCE PA’s Berlin Declaration, adopted last week at the close of the 27th Annual Session, which urges action “to combat the growing prevalence of disinformation and propaganda by promoting high-quality journalism, developing norms and standards that apply equally to both traditional and digital platforms and encourage accurate and diverse media content, and ensuring that any efforts to address disinformation and propaganda comply with international legal guarantees of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the media.”

Participants in the Tbilisi conference included Italy’s Ambassador to Georgia Antonio Enrico Bartoli, representing the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, Georgian Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani, and Harlem Désir, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. The conference is taking place 18-19 July and consists of sessions devoted to the digital transformation of the media industry and its effects on the practice and quality of journalism, quality of information in the age of “fake news,” regulation and self-regulation in the digital era, and the latest media freedom developments in the South Caucasus.

Tsereteli and Désir held a bilateral meeting on the margins of the conference in which they discussed strengthening co-operation, engaging parliamentarians in countries with media freedom issues and where the safety of journalists is under threat, and strengthening legal frameworks.

For President Tsereteli’s full speech, please click here.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of a woman injured by shelling in Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near and observed again military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas as well as near Hryhorivka and, again, in areas of Donetsk region outside government control near Zaichenko and Bezimenne and in areas of Luhansk region outside government control at the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Alchevsk and Buhaivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Stanytsia Luhanska, Bolotene and Novotoshkivske. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a court hearing in relation to an attack on members of the Roma community. In Zakarpattia region, the SMM followed up on reports of a fire at a church kindergarten attended entirely by children of the Roma community.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 125 explosions).

On the evening and night of 17-18 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km south-east, south and south-west.

On 18 July, positioned in Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions 2-3km north and west.

On 18 July, positioned in the west-north-western outskirts of Horlivka (non-government controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and about 210 bursts of small-arms fire, all 0.5-2km north-north-east.

On the evening and night of 17-18 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from east to west, an explosion assessed as an impact, three projectiles from east to west and three projectiles from west-south-west to east-north-east, followed by 54 explosions (40 assessed as impacts, ten assessed as outgoing rounds and four undetermined), four illumination flares, 10 projectiles in flight (assessed as 30mm cannon rounds), two bursts (one from east to west and one from west to east) and 100 projectiles in flight (46 from east to west, 50 from west to east and four in vertical flight), all 1.5-11km south-south-east and south. The camera also recorded three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds, followed by their subsequent projectiles in flight from east to west and the impacts thereof, 2.5-5km south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (four), compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), and spoke with a woman by telephone who told the SMM that on the evening of 16 July, she had been in her home on Hirska Street in Dokuchaievsk with her son and husband when she had heard the sound of explosions and felt a shockwave. She said that her son had called an ambulance which had taken her to a hospital in Dokuchaievsk. Staff at a hospital in Dokuchaievsk told the SMM that a woman (in her sixties) had been brought by ambulance around 18:00 on 16 July with blast-wave and debris injuries to the left side of her body. The woman was released from hospital the same night. The SMM has been unable to visit the injured woman in her home due to security reasons.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 17 July an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three armed men wearing camouflage clothing moving from a position under a bridge inside the Zolote disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 1 May 2018). The same day, the SMM saw a truck with military licence plates carrying three persons in military-style clothing from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the northern edge of the disengagement area into the disengagement area.

On the evening of 17-18 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and an illumination flare in flight from east to west, all 4-8km south-east and south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. In violation of withdrawal lines, in non-government-controlled areas an SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Alchevsk (40km west of Luhansk), as well as 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), three towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 14 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 17 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), six anti-tank guns (MT-12), nine towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and 18 tanks (eight T-64 and ten T-72) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). The same day, the SMM long-range UAV spotted 29 tanks (type undetermined) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk); 20 tanks and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the same training area near Myrne; a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) near Alchevsk; and 17 towed artillery pieces (type undetermined), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and 16 tanks (type undetermined) near Buhaivka.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 17 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk) and an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB variant) near Svitlodarsk. The same day, the SMM saw an APC (BTR variant) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 18 July, the SMM saw an APC (BTR variant) near Zolote-2/Karbonit and an IFV (BMP variant) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 17 July an SMM mid-range-UAV again spotted 72 anti-tank mines about 1.5km north-east of Novhorodske (see SMM Daily Report 29 June 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, water intake station boreholes in Bolotene (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), and water pipelines near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited three border areas outside government control.* While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for approximately 20 minutes, the SMM saw no cross-border traffic. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for approximately 20 minutes, the SMM observed a car with Ukrainian licence plates and a bus with “LPR” plates entering Ukraine. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed four women and three men entering Ukraine and three women and two men exiting Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a court hearing arising from an attack on a temporary settlement inhabited by members of the Roma community on 21 April (see SMM Daily Report 1 May 2018). The SMM saw about 100 men (aged 20-35) wearing T-shirts with insignia of organizations such as C14 (Sich), National Corps and Natsionalny Druzhyny outside the Holosiivskyi District Court of Kyiv (14A Polkovnyka Potiekhina Street). There were about 20 law enforcement officers, including six police officers, in the courtroom. The court ordered that a defendant, introduced as a leader of C14 (Sich), be held under house arrest for 60 days during a pre-trial investigation.

In Zakarpattia region, the SMM followed up on reports that a church kindergarten attended by children of the Roma community had burnt down. On 17 July, the SMM went to the kindergarten in Velyka Dobron (181km west of Ivano-Frankivsk), and saw that the building had been almost burnt to the ground, its roof and interior having been completely destroyed by fire. Members of the police and of the Roma community told the SMM that the kindergarten was attended entirely by children of the Roma community. A priest of the church which runs the kindergarten told the SMM that the fire had started around 03:30 on 15 July. A press officer of the National Police told the SMM on 15 July that the fire had been accidental. Members of the Roma community in Velyka Dobron told the SMM that they were worried about the safety of their community and have organized “night patrols” to prevent further incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and again denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security reasons”. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 16 July 2018, SMM Daily Report 17 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018). The SMM observed a car driving through the checkpoint towards Zaichenko.
• Two members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) prevented the SMM from travelling west through a checkpoint near Hryhorivka (nongovernment-controlled, 68km south of Donetsk).
• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 16 July 2018, SMM Daily Report 17 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018).
• While present at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, an armed member of the armed formations demanded that the SMM leave the area.
• While present at a border crossing point near Sievernyi, an armed member of the armed formations demanded that the SMM leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]    Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]     Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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388646 Liana Khorovytska

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU) supported the development and launch of a digital government service enabling Ukrainian individuals and businesses to initiate minor construction projects via a simple on-line notification without visiting a government office in person. The service, launched on 19 July in Kyiv, helps to remove a potential avenue for official abuse or corruption. The online service, covers 80 percent of construction projects, was presented today by the Ukrainian State Architecture and Building Inspection, State e-Governance Service and Ministry of Justice.

A piloting of the service began in 2017. Since then, about 5,000 notifications were submitted online, saving an average of 1.5 hours per transaction. The service is now linked to Ministry of Justice register, allowing the automatic completion of technical information. With the barrier of having to enter technical details manually removed, the government expects that a far greater proportion of the 50,000 notifications presented annually will be submitted online, with fewer instances of human error to decrease.

“It’s not a secret that construction has always been considered among the least transparent areas of government administration in Ukraine,” said Oleksiy Kudriavtsev, the Head of State Architecture and Building Inspection. “Digitalization of these services will decrease the risk of offences by officials and builders.”

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine supported the digitalization of 14 types of administrative services in construction, land and waste management with the aim of decreasing the risk of corruption and promoting good governance.

“Digitalization of economic functions supports good governance and stimulates economic growth, which are pillars of the OSCE’s conception of comprehensive security,” said Jeffrey Erlich, Senior Project Officer for the Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine.

VIENNA, 19 July 2018  - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his great concern in a letter to Ukrainian authorities following the recent detention and extradition of a journalist to Turkey.

Reportedly on 12 July, Yusuf Inan, Editor-in-chief of online news outlet News2023.com and former Editor-in-chief of the Yerel Gündem newspaper and its website, was detained by Ukrainian authorities in Mykolayiv and extradited to Turkey.

“Journalists should not be prosecuted for expressing their opinions and it is of concern that a critical journalist was extradited to Turkey. I ask the Ukrainian authorities to clarify whether his freedom of expression and right to appeal were taken into consideration,” Désir said, noting that Inan has been accused in Turkey of being a member of the Gülen movement.

In the letter, the Representative recalled previous cases in which authorities decided not to deport journalists, such as the cases of Fikret Huseynli and of Zhanar Akhmetova, whose appeal is ongoing.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter:@OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

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VIENNA, 19 July 2018 – Slovakia’s OSCE Chairmanship next year will pursue strategies that boost multilateralism, promote conflict prevention and focus on addressing the needs of people, said the country’s Foreign and European Affairs State Secretary Lukáš Parízek in Vienna today, as he addressed the Permanent Council on the incoming Chairmanship’s priority areas.

He said that in order to address the current challenges to the international arena and its rule-based order, the OSCE’s participating States have to strengthen the international system founded on multilateral co-operation and good global governance.

“We need to start using tools from our multilateral toolbox properly. Our multilateral institutions were built for people. Not for politicians. Not for diplomats. But people.If we lose sight of that, we lose sight of our overall mission,” said Parízek.  

Dialogue is at the core of multilateralism, he added, and the OSCE is a platform for dialogue. “Dialogue is the most basic, and yet the most powerful instrument we have. Frankly, we need to dust it down, and start using it again.”

The Structured Dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area, he said, is a possible way forward to foster a greater understanding of threat perception and co-operation.

Slovakia will also support the implementation of existing confidence- and security-building measures, promote increased military-to-military contacts and support effective and accountable security sectors, said Parízek. It will work closely with respective Forum for Security Co-operation Chairmanships.

On the protracted conflicts in the OSCE area, he said Slovakia will strive to support the existing negotiating formats.

“A dialogue leading to a political solution is what we need and what we will support. Our Chairmanship will be open to collaboration with all parties, and I am counting on your support,” he urged.

Turning to the crisis in and around Ukraine, he recalled a recent trip to the line of contact in eastern Ukraine, where he witnessed “the consequences of political inaction and their impact on those who have nothing to do with the conflict, nor with the politics behind it.”

Calling for a stop to the daily threats, intimidation and restrictions to the freedom of movement that monitors from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine face, he said the Slovakian Chairmanship will support the work of the Mission, as well as the political process of the Trilateral Contact Group and the Normandy Format in reaching a peaceful solution to the crisis.

In other areas of the OSCE’s work, Parízek noted Slovakia’s intention to promote a comprehensive approach to preventing violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, enhancing cyber security, and in the economic and environmental dimension: greater economic connectivity, protecting energy networks from natural and man-made disasters, good governance, and sustainable water management.

Regarding the human dimension, he said that Slovakia is aware of the current challenges in this area.

“We call on participating States to defend the third dimension and agree on a long-term sustainable solution that will allow us to focus on improving the implementation of our human dimension commitments,” he said.

National minorities, Roma and Sinti issues, and the safety of journalists were areas the State Secretary mentioned as of particular importance to Slovakia in the human dimension.

Concluding, Parízek reminded delegations that an OSCE Chairmanship can assist and facilitate, mediate and moderate, support and defend, but it cannot replace the political will of the participating States.

“We can have different opinions, and we can each offer our own views. But our goal is to find common solutions. Through dialogue. In a new departure that includes all of us.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near and observed again military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas as well as, again, in areas of Donetsk region outside government control near Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Artema, Zaitseve and Novotoshkivske. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering outside the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 125 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

On the evening and night of 16-17 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a total of 27 explosions (19 undetermined and eight assessed as outgoing mortar rounds), 78 projectiles in flight (including 34 from east to west, 11 from north-west to south-east and 12 from west to east) and six muzzle flashes all 0.5-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west, and a projectile from west-south-west to east-north-east 0.3-0.6km south.

On the evening and night of 16-17 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two tracer rounds in flight from north to south and a tracer round from south to north, followed by a total of 19 projectiles in flight (ten from north to south, five from south to north and four from north-west to south-east), an undetermined explosion and a tracer round from north to south, all 1-3km east.

On the evening and night of 16-17 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded totals of 17 projectiles in flight (12 from west to east, two from north-west to south-east, two from south-west to north-east and one in vertical flight), six bursts, two illumination flares (one from north-west to south-east and one in vertical flight) and four muzzle flashes, all 1.5-3km north and north-north-east.

On the evening and night of 16-17 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about 90 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 12 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

During the day on 17 July, positioned in Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 35km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions (six assessed as outgoing mortar rounds and six as their subsequent impacts), all 3-5km south.

On 13 July, the SMM lost contact with one of its mid-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Positioned near Nepilivika (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM launched a mid-range UAV. After flying for 27 minutes without any incident, the SMM abruptly lost contact with the UAV as it was flying at an altitude of about 150m approximately 3.7km north-west of Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk) and about 4km south-east of the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) (see below). As of 18 July, the UAV has not been recovered.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 16 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a military-type truck (GAZ-66), a military-type van (UAZ-469) and two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area. The UAV also spotted a trench system (assessed as recently dug) in a backyard 60m from a residential property in Katerynivka, outside the disengagement area, about 300m from its western edge. On 17 July, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka, the SMM saw two armed persons (a man and a woman) in military-style clothing inside the disengagement area, exiting Katerynivka and walking towards a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the northern edge of the disengagement area.

On the night of 16-17 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst in vertical flight assessed as three rounds of an undetermined weapon 5-8km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 15 July, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw a tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) in a field about 2.5m east of a road approximately 100m north of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position about 300m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). On 17 July, the SMM noted that the tailfin was no longer present.

During the day on 17 July, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Blahodatne (44km south-west of Donetsk) heading north.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft weapons[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 16 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV and three probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk), two probable armoured personnel carriers (APC) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk) and an ACV near Yurivka (35km north of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (a BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Zolote and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol). On 17 July, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) near Stepove (30km north-east of Luhansk).

On 16 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a 25m-long trench about 400m east-north-east of a previously observed Ukrainian Armed Forces position in a northern area of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018) as well as two trenches (25m- and 150m-long) near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 16 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in a compound adjacent to a residential area of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk). On 17 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP-2) near Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 86km south of Donetsk) and an SMM mini-UAV spotted a military-type position near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 28 June 2018).

On 16 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six craters south-west of Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a south-westerly direction and at least 13 craters east of Sakhanka, assessed as caused by artillery (122mm and 152mm) rounds fired from a south-westerly direction (all not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018).

The SMM observed  demining activities. Near Makarove (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Luhansk) on the eastern side of road P-22, the SMM saw four men in Ukrainian State Emergency Service uniforms and six Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel placing sticks and red tape assessed as part of demining activities.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and water pipelines near a non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated the strengthening of the dam of the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka  (78km east of Donetsk) for approximately an hour, the SMM saw 17 cars (six with Ukrainian and ten with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian exiting Ukraine and 21 cars (seven with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and nine with “DPR” plates), two vans (with Ukrainian licence plates), two buses (with about 30 passengers each, with “DPR” plates) and 15 pedestrians entering Ukraine.

At a reservoir near a phenol factory near Zalizne, close to the contact line, recent SMM UAV footage from 17 July did not reveal new indications of military presence when compared with imagery from June 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 29 June 2018).

The SMM monitored a gathering in Kyiv and saw two separate groups outside the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office at 11 Isaakiana Street. According to media reports, on 4 April, representatives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau accused the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office of corruption during a session of Parliament. The first group consisted of about 200 people (men and women, aged 20-40), some of whom were holding banners critical of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor. The second group consisted of about 120 people (mostly women, aged 40-60) who stood on the other side of the street and held banners critical of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine; some of them were carrying flags of a political party. The SMM saw about 150 police officers on the street and 20 police officers protecting the front door of the Office. No incidents were observed while the SMM was present.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 17 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and again denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security reasons”. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 16 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 17 July 2018).
• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 16 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 17 July 2018.)

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• In Luhansk city (nongovernment-controlled), a member of the armed formations said that he could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• In Luhansk city, hospital staff said that they could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• In Holubivka, a woman who introduced herself as a community representative said that she could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• In Khoroshe (nongovernment-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk), a woman who introduced herself as a community representative said that she could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 18 July 2018 – Slovenia worked towards restoring confidence and advancing meaningful dialogue among OSCE participating States and placed particular focus on the role of women in security processes, said Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the OSCE Ambassador Andrej Benedejčič as he opened the last meeting of the FSC as Chair.

"One of the recurring themes of our Chairmanship was the role of women in security processes. Forty-two per cent of all the speakers at our Security Dialogues were female," said Benedejčič. Recalling that one of the Security Dialogues focused on nuclear security, he said: "If gender can be mainstreamed in nuclear security, it can be mainstreamed anywhere." 

Benedejčič added that Slovenia highlighted the key role men have to play in promoting gender equality. He mentioned that the webpage of the OSCE MenEngage Network – which Benedejčič heads - was launched during Slovenia’s FSC Chairmanship. In addition, officials from the OSCE Secretariat and delegations of participating States performed the play SEVEN, which charts the real-life experiences of seven women from around the world in challenging security situations.

The high calibre of the exchange of views on this issue and others shows that the FSC continues to provide "a unique platform to address politico-military issues in the OSCE area," said Benedejčič. 

"The crisis in and around Ukraine has remained a major topic of debate at the FSC. In light of the current situation in the OSCE area, these discussions offer a valuable opportunity for a frank exchange of views between participating States. Despite all the challenges the FSC has continued to contribute significantly to the overall efforts to lower tensions and promote co-operation," he said. "I am therefore confident that it will also continue to effectively address politico-military issues in the future, with the aim of restoring confidence in the OSCE region."

Benedejčič noted that one of the ways forward in this regard was the continuation of discussions on the modernization of the Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Multilateral mechanisms, like the OSCE, are also crucial to restoring trust and confidence - a key conclusion from the special commemorative session organized by the Slovenian FSC Chair on the centenary of the end of the First World War, he recalled.

Other Security Dialogues focused on the importance of export controls and deactivation in countering the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons, regional military co-operation in the Western Balkans and the role of mine action in all phases of the conflict cycle.

The Chairmanship organized the annual meeting reviewing the implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, and on the margins led discussions on national best practices and a discussion on the challenges presented by private military and security companies for human rights and the rule of law.

Working closely with the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the FSC Chair organized  joint meetings of the FSC and the Permanent Council on the Structured Dialogue process and on security in the Mediterranean region, as well as a working session on conventional arms control and CSBMs during the Annual Security Review Conference. 

Presenting the insignia of the FSC Chair to his successor, Ambassador Ulrika Funered of Sweden, Benedejčič assured her of Slovenia’s full support during the upcoming Swedish FSC Chairmanship later this year.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Azerbaijan, Early Presidential Election, 11 April 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the 11 April 2018 early presidential election in Azerbaijan recommends that electoral legislation be revised through a genuine participatory and consultative process, sufficiently in advance of the next elections. The aim should be to bring legislation in compliance with international standards and obligations, guarantee constitutionally protected rights and freedoms, eliminate gaps and ambiguities and address previous ODIHR and Council of Europe recommendations.

The report, published on 18 July 2018, also recommends that a thorough and independent investigation of election day irregularities be conducted. This should include a review of web camera footage, where available, signed voter lists and valid and invalid ballots.

Highlighting that the formula for appointing election commissions does not provide for an impartial election administration in practice, the report recommends a revision of the composition of election commissions to enhance their impartiality and public confidence in their work.

Noting a number of campaign events where public sector staff appeared to be coerced to attend by party officials or police, the report recommends that election campaigning be conducted in an atmosphere free from intimidation and fear of retribution, and that the authorities and political parties refrain from pressuring public sector employees and others.

The report also recommends that defamation and libel be decriminalized, including for online content, that the judiciary be given the exclusive power to decide on restriction of access to websites, and that a list of such sites be made publicly available.

Other priority recommendations relate to the development of comprehensive instructions regulating voter list verification, lifting educational and residency requirements for candidacy, and eliminating unnecessary restrictions for holding a public gathering.

The report affirms ODIHR’s readiness to support Azerbaijan in its efforts to bring electoral legislation and practice into compliance with OSCE commitments.

For election day observation, the ODIHR Election Observation Mission joined efforts with the delegations of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings has increased at both BCPs.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO) and one first-responder[1]. The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 11,606 to 11,955 per day at both BCPs compared to last week.

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossing occurred into the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 171 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 33.8 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[2].

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased by  50 per cent (24 persons compared to 16 last week); 14 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and ten into Ukraine. 22 of these crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP, while the other two occurred at the Gukovo BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and another three into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when one family was observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and another seven into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed an increase in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (401 compared to 366 observed during the previous week). There were 205 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 196 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted:  Alchevsk-Kyiv;   Rovenky-Kyiv; and Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 745 to 786 (237 at the Gukovo BCP and 549 at the Donetsk BCP); 466 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 320 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                         

Among them, the OTs continued to also observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased by 27 per cent compared to the previous reporting period (from 66 to 48). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP went from 123 to 85: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 57 trucks (67 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 28 trucks (33 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[3] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased around 24 per cent (from 123 to 153 vehicles); 77 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 76 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 36 occasions, compared to 33 last week; the OTs assessed that 16 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 20 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 12 June to 17 July 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] First-responders are OSCE staff or mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time.

[2] Based on data received from the Rostov-on-Don Regional Administration.

[3] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

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